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Ladera entered into a contract with C.N. Hodges. Hodges promised to sell a lot with an area of 278 square meters to Ladera, subject to certain terms and conditions. The agreement called for a down payment of P 800.00 and monthly installments of P 5.00 each with interest of 1% per month, until P 2,085 is paid in full. In case of failure of the purchaser to make any monthly payment within 60 days after it fell due, the contract may be considered as rescinded or annulled. Ladera built a house on the lot. Later on, she defaulted in the payment of the agreed monthly installment. Hodges filed an action for the ejectment of Ladera. The court issued an alias writ of execution and pursuant thereto, the city sheriff levied upon all rights, interests, and participation over the house of Ladera. At the auction sale, Ladera’s house was sold to Avelino A. Magno. Manuel P. Villa, later on, purchased the house from Magno. Ladera filed an action against Hodges and the judgment sale purchasers. Judgment was rendered in favor of Ladera, setting aside the sale for non-compliance with Rule 39, Rules of Court regarding judicial sales of real property. On appeal, Hodges contends that the house, being built on a lot owned by another, should be regarded as movable or personal property. ISSUE: Whether or not Ladera’s house is an immovable property. HELD: YES. The old Civil Code numerates among the things declared by it as immovable property the following: lands, buildings, roads and constructions of all kind adhered to the soil. The law does not make any distinction whether or not the owner of the lot is the one who built. Also, since the principles of accession regard buildings and constructions as mere accessories to the land on which it is built, it is logical that said accessories should partake the nature of the principal thing.
Mindanao Bus Company v. The City Assessor and Treasurer G.R. No. L-17870, September 29, 1962, 6 SCRA 197 Labrador, J. FACTS: Petitioner Mindanao Bus Company is a public utility solely engaged in transporting passengers and cargoes by motor trucks, over its authorized lines in the Island of Mindanao, collecting rates approved by the Public Service Commission. Respondent sought to assess the following real properties of the petitioner; (a) Hobart Electric Welder Machine, (b) Storm Boring Machine; (c) Lathe machine with motor; (d) Black and Decker Grinder; (e) PEMCO Hydraulic Press; (f) Battery charger (Tungar 1
charge machine) and (g) D-Engine Waukesha-M-Fuel. It was alleged that these machineries are sitting on cement or wooden platforms, and that petitioner is the owner of the land where it maintains and operates a garage for its TPU motor trucks, a repair shop, blacksmith and carpentry shops, and with these machineries, which are placed therein. Respondent City Assessor of Cagayan de Oro City assessed at P4, 400 petitioner's above-mentioned equipment. Petitioner appealed the assessment to the respondent Board of Tax Appeals on the ground that the same are not realty. Respondents contend that said equipments, though movable, are immobilized by destination, in accordance with paragraph 5 of Article 415 of the New Civil Code. ISSUE: Whether the equipments in question are immovable or movable properties. HELD: The equipments in question are movable. So that movable equipments to be immobilized in contemplation of the law, it must first be "essential and principal elements" of an industry or works without which such industry or works would be "unable to function or carry on the industrial purpose for which it was established." Thus, the Court distinguished those movable which become immobilized by destination because they are essential and principal elements in the industry from those which may not be so considered immobilized because they are merely incidental, not essential and principal. The tools and equipments in question in this instant case are, by their nature, not essential and principle municipal elements of petitioner's business of transporting passengers and cargoes by motor trucks. They are merely incidentals—acquired as movables and used only for expediency to facilitate and/or improve its service. Even without such tools and equipments, its business may be carried on, as petitioner has carried on, without such equipments, before the war. The transportation business could be carried on without the repair or service shop if its rolling equipment is repaired or serviced in another shop belonging to another.
Makati Leasing and Finance Corporation v. Wearever Textile Mills, Inc. G.R. No. L-58469, May 16, 1983, 122 SCRA 29 De Castro, J. FACTS: To obtain financial accommodations from the Makati Leasing and Finance Corporation, the Wearever Textile discounted and assigned several receivables with them under a “receivable purchase agreement.” To secure the collection of receivables assigned, Wearever Textile executed a chattel mortgage over certain raw materials inventory, as well as machinery described as an aero dryer stentering range. Upon default of Wearever Textile, the Makati Leasing petitioned for extrajudicial foreclosure of the properties mortgaged to it. When the sheriff failed to enter Wearever Textile’s premises to seize the machinery, Makati Leasing applied for a replevin. Wearever Textile contended that it cannot be a subject of replevin or a chattel mortgage because
it is a real property as it is attached to the ground by means of bolts and that the only way to remove it is to destroy the concrete floor. ISSUE: Whether or not the machinery is real or personal property. HELD: The machinery is a personal property. The Supreme Court explained that if a house of strong materials may be considered as personal property for purposes of executing a chattel mortgage, there is absolutely no reason why a machinery, which is movable in its nature and becomes immobilized only by destination or purpose, may not be likewise treated as such.
Santos Evangelista v. Alto Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. G.R. No. L-11139, April 23, 1958, 103 Phil. 401 Concepcion, J. FACTS: On June 4, 1949, Santos Evangelista instituted a civil case for a sum of money. On the same date, he obtained a writ of attachment, which was levied upon a house, built by Rivera on a land situated in Manila and leased to him. In due course, judgment was rendered in favor of Evangelista, who bought the house at public auction held in compliance with the writ of execution issued in said case. When Evangelista sought to take possession of the house, Rivera refused to surrender it, upon the ground that he had leased the property from the Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. and that the latter is now the true owner of said property. It appears that on May 10, 1952, a definite deed of sale of the same house had been issued to Alto Surety, as the highest bidder at an auction sale held. Hence, Evangelista instituted an action against Alto Surety and Ricardo Rivera, for the purpose of establishing his title over said house, and securing possession thereof, apart from recovering damages. After due trial, the CFI Manila rendered judgment for Evangelista, sentencing Rivera and Alto Surety to deliver the house in question to Evangelista and to pay him, jointly and severally, P40.00 a month from October, 1952, until said delivery, plus costs. ISSUE: Whether or not a house constructed by the lessee of the land on which it is built, should be dealt with, for purposes of attachment, as immovable property or as personal property. HELD: The house is not personal property, much less a debt, credit or other personal property not capable of manual delivery, but immovable property. As explicitly held, in Ladera vs. Hodges (48 OG 5374), "a true building (not merely superimposed on the soil) is immovable or real property, whether it is erected by the owner of the land or by a usufructuary or lessee. The opinion that the house of Rivera should have been attached in accordance with subsection (c) of said section 7, as "personal property capable of manual delivery, by taking and safely keeping in his custody", for it declared that "Evangelista could not have validly purchased Ricardo Rivera's house from the sheriff
it leased the entire factory premises to petitioner Ruby L. Assuming that the properties in question are immovable by nature. PBCom granted a second loan to EVERTEX. No. In the case at bar. EVERTEX claimed that no rights having been transmitted to PBCom over the assets of insolvent EVERTEX. lock. After April 23. nothing detracts the parties from treating it as chattels to secure an obligation under the principle of estoppel. The loan was secured by a chattel mortgage over personal properties enumerated in a list attached thereto. On March 7.R. HELD: Yes. 366 SCRA 324 Quisumbing. is to treat machinery and equipment as chattels.000. a perusal of the contract of Real and Chattel Mortgage executed by the parties gives a contrary indication. 120098.00) loan from petitioner Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCom). 1989. 1979. and the chattels located therein. stock. Upon EVERTEX's failure to meet its obligation to PBCom. October 2. On April 23. On December 15. and damages with the Regional Trial Court against PBCom. EVERTEX executed in favor of PBCom. (EVERTEX) obtained a three million peso (P3. 1982. 1984. Inc.000. In November 1986. Tsai. and should reconvey the assets. 1979. FACTS: On November 26. respondent Ever Textile Mills. On May 3. the true intention of PBCOM and the owner. As security for the loan. the first public auction was held where petitioner PBCom emerged as the highest bidder and a Certificate of Sale was issued in its favor on the same date. Tsai v. 4 . including the contested machineries. reconveyance. 1988. On March 16. EVERTEX filed a complaint for annulment of sale. as in the case at bar. a deed of Real and Chattel Mortgage over the lot where its factory stands. J. EVERTEX purchased various machines and equipments. 2001. While it is true that the questioned properties appear to be immobile. EVERTEX. 1975.as the latter was not in possession thereof at the time he sold it at a public auction” is untenable. Court of Appeals G. PBCom sold the factory. therefore Tsai acquired no rights over such assets sold to her. the date of the execution of the second mortgage mentioned above. PBCom consolidated its ownership over the lot and all the properties in it. and barrel to Tsai. It has been held that an immovable may be considered a personal property if there is a stipulation as when it is used as security in the payment of an obligation where a chattel mortgage is executed over it. ISSUE: Whether or not the inclusion of the questioned properties in the foreclosed properties is proper. the latter commenced extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings against EVERTEX.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject machines were personal. the lease agreement clearly provides that the machines in question are to be considered as personal properties. v. RMS Building. 137705. praying for a directive for the sheriff to defer enforcement of the writ of replevin. Under the circumstances. 133 SCRA 800 Escolin. Quezon Avenue. and 784 Units C & D. 2000. The Court of Appeals ruled that the subject machines were personal property as provided by the agreement of the parties. a party to a contract is ordinarily precluded from denying the truth of any material fact found therein.R. HELD: The contracting parties may validly stipulate that a real property be considered as personal. they are proper subject of the writ of seizure. The motion was opposed by PCI on the ground that the properties were personal and therefore still subject to seizure and writ of replevin. which may be a proper subject of a writ of replevin. J. G. Clearly then. In the present case. FACTS: On December 7. motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing. not real. 64261. Quezon City. No. PCI Leasing and Finance. Petitioner filed a motion for special protective order invoking the power of the court to control the conduct of its officers and amend and control its processes. Burgos v. 1982. Quezon City. paraphernalia. the parties' agreement to the contrary notwithstanding. December 26. Inc. The sheriff proceeded to petitioner's factory and seized one machinery. A writ of replevin was issued. Inc. Project 6. they are consequently estopped from claiming otherwise. the petition was denied and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed.Serg’s Products. with an application for a writ of replevin. Road 3. In their reply. After agreeing to such stipulation. AFP G. J. Chief of Staff. two search warrants where issued and the premises at 19. Under the principle of estoppel. No. FACTS: Respondent PCI Leasing and Finance Inc. 1984. equipment. publication and distribution of the 5 . directing the sheriff to seize and deliver the machineries and equipment to PCI Leasing after five days and upon payment of the necessary expenses.R. petitioners were estopped from denying the characterization of the subject machines as personal property. filed with the RTC of Quezon City a complaint for sum of money. property. Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals via an original action for certiorari. petitioners asserted that the properties were immovable as defined in Article 415 of the Civil Code. business addresses of the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers were searched. August 22. Accordingly. Office and printing machines. 338 SCRA 499 Panganiban.
or that the shares of stock be sold in public auction. receptacles. Jr.50. property or plant. were seized. He asked that Orosa and Plaza theatre be held liable solidarily for the unpaid balance. usufructuary. The machineries. Due to Lopez’ demands. books and other written literature alleged to be in the possession and control of Jose Burgos.said newspapers. it was said that machinery which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement. 1958. v. HELD: No. J. Jr. Castillo. While it is true that generally. Lopez filed a case against Orosa and Plaza Theatre. Lopez v. Orosa. In the present case. unless such person acted as the agent of the owner. Under Article 415 (5) of the Civil Code. Lopez expressed his unwillingness to invest. remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant. Orosa issued a deed of assignment over his shares of stock of the Plaza Theatre. "machinery. 771. G. In Davao Sawmill Co. separate and distinct 6 . 255. As there was still an unpaid balance. or any other person having only a temporary right. documents. 103 Phil. the land and building should be sold in public auction with the proceeds to be applied to the balance. and in case defendants failed to pay. No. as well as numerous papers. and Plaza Theatre.R. 98 Felix. instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works" are considered immovable property. of the total cost of materials amounting to P62. while in fact bolted to the ground. HELD: No. real estate connotes the land and the building constructed thereon. but not so when placed by a tenant. FACTS: Lopez was engaged in business under the name Lopez-Castelo Sawmill. ISSUE: Whether or not real properties were seized under the disputed warrants.. the Plaza Theatre.35. Lopex delivered the lumber which was used for the construction of the Plaza Theatre. thus leaving a balance of P 41. Orosa approached Lopez and invited the latter to make an investment in the theatre business he was forming.85. Inc. Lopez was paid only P 20. However. it is obvious that the inclusion of the building. Lopez agreed to supply the lumber for the construction of the theatre. February 28. ISSUE: Whether or not the lien for the value of the materials used in the construction of the building attaches to said structure alone and does not extend to the land on which the building is adhered to. petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which the machineries were placed. publisher-editor of the "We Forum" newspaper. Inc. L-10817-18. Nonetheless. Lopez further agreed that that the payment therefore would be on demand and not cash on delivery basis. 848.
the pump and its accessories being immovable because attached to the ground with character of permanency (Art. In view of the absence of any specific provision to the contrary. Goulds presented evidence ex parte and judgment by default was rendered by Judge Tañada requiring Yap to pay to Goulds the unpaid balance of the pump purchased by him and interest of 12% per annum. J. 415. Therefore. Thereafter. 163 SCRA 464 Narvasa.. FACTS: Goulds Pumps International (Phil. It could be. the Deputy Provincial Sheriff went ahead with the scheduled auction sale and sold the property levied on to Goulds as the highest bidder. Yap v. and was in fact separated from Yap's premises without being broken or suffering deterioration." i.R. Yap's argument is untenable. Rule 39.30 representing the balance of the price and installation cost of a water pump in the latter's premises. the separation or removal of the pump involved nothing more complicated than the loosening of bolts or dismantling of other fasteners.from the land. The Civil Code considers as immovable property. No. scheduled the execution sale thereof. 7 . It appears however that a copy of the order suspending the sale was not transmitted to the sheriff Hence. HELD: No.459. a building is an immovable property irrespective of whether or not said structure and the land on which it is adhered to belong to the same owner. July 18. Yap argues that "the sale was made without the notice required by Sec. in the enumeration of what may constitute real properties could only mean one thing—that a building is by itself an immovable property. the lien in favor of appellant for the unpaid value of the lumber used in the construction of the building attaches only to said structure and to no other property of the obligors. notice by publication in case of execution sale of real property.). suspension of the sale was directed. 18. Inc. 1969. L-32917. Tañada G.e. But in view of the pendency of Yap's motion for reconsideration. in such a way that it cannot be separated therefrom without breaking the material or deterioration of the object. ISSUE: Whether or not the water pump in question is an immovable property. the water pump in question was levied by the sheriff and by notice dated November 4. filed a complaint against Yap and his wife seeking recovery of P1. 1988. anything "attached to an immovable in a fixed manner. of the New Rules of Court. Obviously. Civil Code). among others." The pump does not fit this description. The lien so created attaches merely to the immovable property for the construction or repair of which the obligation was incurred.
but also to cut some of its wooden supports. Inc. Replevin is applicable only to personal property. NPC entered into a lease contract with Polar Energy. October 29. Hence. over diesel engine power barges moored at Balayan Bay in Calaca. in order to remove the said outfit. since the sheriff contended that his duty is purely ministerial. assigned its rights under the agreement to FELS Energy Inc.R. they were already immovable pursuant to paragraphs 3 and 5 of Article 415 of the Civil Code. Roco. Inc.. Moreover. No. Polar Energy. FACTS: Petitioner Machinery and Engineering Supplies filed a complaint for replevin for the recovery of the machinery and equipment sold and delivered to Ipo Limestone Co.Machinery and Engineering Supplies. Court of Appeals G. 168557. FACTS: On January 18. reminding it of its obligation under the agreement to pay all real estate taxes. 1954. The Province of Batangas G. v. Sr. However. FELS received an assessment of real property taxes on the power barges from Provincial Assessor of Batangas City. the company’s President. in such a way that the former could not be separated from the latter without breaking the material or deterioration of the object. in a fixed manner. particularly to the concrete foundation of said premises. The machinery and equipment in question appeared to be attached to the land. FELS Energy. they had to cut some of the supports of the equipment which rendered its use impracticable. and Torres protested against the seizure of the properties on the ground that they are not personal properties. 96 Phil. L-7057. 70 Concepcion. along with a crew of technical men and labourers.184. J.088. The assessed tax amounted to P56. No. v. The manager of Ipo Limestone Co. proceeded to the factory. Inc. ISSUE: Whether or not the machinery and equipment in question could be the subject of replevin. 2007 Callejo. Batangas. On August 7. Upon carrying out the court’s order.R. The contract staes that NPC shall be responsible for the payment of all taxes other levies imposed government to which POLAR may be or become subject to in respect of the Power Barges. Subsequently. it became necessary not only to unbolt the same. NPC sought reconsideration 8 . said machinery and equipment were intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry carried on said immovable. For these reasons.40 per annum. 1993. HELD: No. FELS referred the matter to NPC. they all went to the factory and dismantled the equipment despite the fact that the equipment could not be dismantled without causing damage or injuries to the wooden frames attached to them. Consequently. 1995. J. Inc. February 16. An order was issued to seize and take immediate possession of the properties specified in the order.
9 . not subject to real property tax. with the taxpayer having the burden of proving otherwise. 7160. factual findings of administrative bodies. are personal properties and therefore. Besides.of the Provincial Assessor’s decision to assess real property taxes on the power barges. ISSUE: Whether power barges. are generally binding and conclusive upon the Court. In its answer.A. Tax assessments by tax examiners are presumed correct and made in good faith. the Provincial Assessor averred that the barges were real property for purposes of taxation under Section 199(c) of Republic Act (R.) No. which are floating and movable. alleging that barges are non-taxable items. which have acquired expertise in their field. HELD: NO. The power barges are real property and are thus subject to real property tax.
R. lease or other disposition. Likewise. 187 SCRA 797 Gutierrez. 92013. The said property was formerly the location of the Chancery of the Philippine Embassy until it was transferred to Nampeidai on July 22. 1990. The Administrative orders authorizing the study of the conditions of government properties in Japan were merely directives for investigation but did not in any way signify a clear intention to dispose of the properties. L-24916. No. it merely made them available to foreigners in case of sale. On the other hand.R. 1974. Executive Order 296 was issued by President Aquino allowing non-Filipinos to buy or lease some of the properties of the Philippines located in Japan. EO 296 did not declare that the properties lost their public character. 1976.Laurel v. Under Art. Villegas G. Thus. 422 of the Civil Code. No. including Roppongi. four properties located in Japan were given to the Philippines. Garcia G. The Roppongi property has remained abandoned from the time of the transfer due to lack of funds to develop the said property. the Roppongi property still remains part of the inalienable properties of the State. ISSUE: Whether or not the Roppongi property still forms part of the public dominion hence cannot be disposed nor alienated. there must be a definite and a formal declaration on the part of the government to withdraw it from being public. July 25. Rabuco v. HELD: Yes. The mere transfer of the embassy to Nampeidai is not a relinquishment of the property’s original purpose. Subsequently. Consequently. They further contend that EO 296 converted the subject property to patrimonial property. The respondents failed to convincingly show that the property has already become patrimonial. Petitioners now contend that the Roppongi property cannot be alienated as it is classified as public dominion and not of private ownership because it is a property intended for public service under paragraph 2. Abandonment must be a certain and a positive act based on correct legal premises. J. The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual Embassy service does not automatically convert it to patrimonial property. since there is no law authorizing its conveyance. article 420 of the Civil Code. February 28. 55 SCRA 658 10 . respondents aver that it has already become part of the patrimonial property of the State which can be alienated because it has not been used for public service for over 13 years. One of these properties is the Roppongi property. FACTS: In view of the Reparations Agreement between the Philippines and Japan. Administrative orders were issued by the President authorizing the study of the condition of the properties of the Philippines in Japan.
subsection (2). 212 SCRA 464 Medialdea. 3120 whereby the Congress converted the lots in question together with another lot in San Andres. Lt. Macasiano v.R. Paranaque Metro Manila and the establishment of a flea market thereon. maintain and manage the flea market in the aforementioned streets with the 11 . 97764. August 10. operation. the municipal council of Paranaque issued a resolution authorizing Paranaque Mayor Walfrido N. but simply as a manifestation of its right and power to deal with state property. Respondent contends that the Act is invalid and unconstitutional for it constitutes deprivation of property without due process of law and without just compensation. maintenance and management of flea markets and/or vending areas. Thereafter. ISSUE: Whether or not Republic Act No. entered into an agreement whereby the latter shall operate. 1992. The lots in question are manifestly owned by the city in its public and governmental capacity and are therefore public property over which Congress had absolute control as distinguished from patrimonial property owned by it in its private or proprietary capacity of which it could not be deprived without due process and without just compensation. The subdivision of the land and conveyance of the resulting subdivision lots to the occupants by Congressional authorization does not operate as an exercise of the power of eminent domain without just compensation in violation of Section 1. Ferrer to enter into a contract with any service cooperative for the establishment. J. Garcia Extension and Opena Streets located at Baclaran. No.Teehankee. Cruz.G. Gabriel. G. By virtue of this. Malate that are reserved as communal property into disposable or alienable lands of the State. FACTS: The issue in this case involves the constitutionality of Republic Act No. The Acts in question were intended to implement the social justice policy of the Constitution and the government program of land for the landless and that they were not intended to expropriate the property involved but merely to confirm its character as communal land of the State and to make it available for disposition by the National Government. Diokno G. which will not be interfered with by the courts. 3120 is constitutional. It is established doctrine that the act of classifying State property calls for the exercise of wide discretionary legislative power. FACTS: The Municipality of Paranque passed an ordinance that authorized the closure of J. J. Bayanihan. respondent municipality and respondent Palanyag. Such lands are to be placed under the administration and disposal of the Land Tenure Administration for subdivision into small lots not exceeding 120 square meters per lot for sale on instalment basis to the tenants or bona fide occupants thereof and expressly prohibited ejectment and demolition of petitioners' homes under Section 2 of the Act. a service cooperative. HELD: Yes. Article III of the Constitution.
Furthermore.000. which was five to six feet deep during high tides and three feet deep on low tides. Hence. Quezon. Court of Appeals G. the subject land should revert back to the ownership of the State. No. then ordered the destruction and confiscation of the stalls along the abovementioned streets. As for the mortgage. Republic of the Philippines v. and thus. LGUs have no authority whatsoever to control or regulate the use of public properties unless specific authority is vested upon them by Congress. Hence. PNP Superintendent of the Metropolitan Traffic Command. FACTS: Morato filed for a patent on a parcel of land located in Calauag. to which the petitioner filed his opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. market stalls were put up by Palanyag on the said streets. 281 SCRA 639 Panganiban. The lease was an encumbrance included in the prohibitions of the patent because it impairs the use of the land by Morato herself. The Director of Lands filed a suit with the contention that Morato violated the 5-year prohibitory period and thus the patent should be cancelled and the land should revert back to the State. November 14. the land was established to be a portion of Calauag Bay. ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of the prohibition of the patent.R. The aforementioned streets are local roads used for public service and are therefore considered public properties of respondent municipality. it is a 12 . Consequently. HELD: Yes. ISSUE: Whether or not an ordinance or resolution which authorizes the lease and use of public streets or thoroughfares as sites for flea markets is valid. 1997. HELD: No. respondents filed with the trial court a joint petition for prohibition and mandamus with damages and prayer for preliminary injunction.obligation to remit dues to the treasury of the municipal government of Paranaque. Later on. Article 424 of the Civil Code provides that properties of public dominion devoted for public use and made available to the public in general are outside the commerce of man and cannot be disposed of or leased by the local government unit to private persons. 100709. Properties of the local government which are devoted to public service are deemed public and are under the absolute control of Congress. The trial court upheld the validity of the ordinance in question. that the land of Morato was leased to Advincula for P100 per month and it was also mortgaged to Co for P10. J. which was approved. The water level rose because of the ebb and flow of tides from the bay and the storms that frequently passed through the area. Petitioner Macasiano. provided that the land shall not be encumbered or alienated within a period of five years from the date of the issuance of the patent. it was observed by the Director of Lands from his investigation.
P. the property will be auctioned. Included in the properties were the capital site and capitol building. Thus. The validity of the law ultimately depends on the nature of the lots and buildings in question. properties and assets belonging to the former province of Zamboanga and located within the City of Zamboanga are hereby transferred. the rest remain patrimonial. the land can no longer be subject to a pending patent application and must be returned to the State. HELD: The subject properties are properties for public use. Applying the norm obtaining under the principles constituting the law of Municipal Corporations. whether it was low or high tide. the property is public and Congress has absolute control over it. free of charge.legal limit on the title and if there will be foreclosure because Morato was not able to pay her debts. is an impairment on the use or transfer of property. Republic Act 3039 was approved providing that “all buildings. Moreover. In accordance with this land reclassification. The municipality cannot be deprived of it without due process and payment of just compensation. Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. No. Under this norm. Morato clearly violated the terms of the patent on these points. the property became a foreshore land because it turned into a portion of land which was covered most of the time with water.. L-24440. then it is patrimonial and Congress has no absolute control. hospital and leprosarium sites. 22 SCRA 1334 Bengzon. certain school sites. City of Zamboanga G. J.” Plaintiff-appellee Zamboanga del Norte filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte against defendants-appellants Zamboanga City. The principle itself is simple: If the property is owned by the municipality (meaning municipal corporation) in its public and governmental capacity. It was prayed that Republic Act 3039 be declared unconstitutional for depriving plaintiff province of property without due process and just compensation. in favor of the said City of Zamboanga. and high school playground. Republic Act 711 was approved dividing the province of Zamboanga into two (2): Zamboanga del Norte and Zamboanga del Sur. 1952. But if the property is owned in its private or proprietary capacity. to be 13 .R. J. Encumbrance. all those of the 50 properties in question which are devoted to public service are deemed public. March 28. as defined. the Secretary of Finance and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. It is also a limitation on Morato's right to enjoy and possess the land for herself. or a claim or lien on the property where there is a burden on the title. FACTS: On June 6. 1968. ISSUE: Whether or not the properties mentioned are properties for public use or patrimonial. Foreshore is defined as land between high and low waters which is dry depending on the reflux or ebb of the tides.
considered public. devoted for governmental purposes like local administration. FACTS: In 1973. Under the 1987 Constitution. and PD 1085. invoking the constitutional right of the people to information on matters of public concern. creating Public Estates Authority (PEA). Public Estates Authority G. Chavez. etc. PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with AMARI. Congress could very well dispose of said buildings in the same manner that it did with the lots in question. ISSUE: Whether AMARI has the capacity to acquire the lands held by PEA. it can be assumed that said buildings were erected by the National Government. He assails the sale to AMARI of lands of the public domain as a blatant violation of the constitutional prohibiting in the sale of alienable lands of the public domain to private corporations. filed a petition to compel PEA to disclose all facts on its negotiations with AMARI. as a taxpayer. using national funds. a private corporation to develop the Freedom Islands. Hence. Reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands. Despite the ongoing court petitions. July 9.R. the records do not disclose whether they were constructed at the expense of the former Province of Zamboanga. and such was approved by President Estrada. transferring the reclaimed lands under the MCCRRP to PEA.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands. and the JVA was approved by President Ramos. 2002 Carpio. which are covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA. it is enough that the property be held and. 133250. The Amended JVA seeks to convey to AMARI the ownership of 77. public education. PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA through negotiation without public bidding. Considering however the fact that said buildings must have been erected even before 1936 when Commonwealth Act 39 was enacted and the further fact that provinces then had no power to authorize construction of buildings such as those in the case at bar at their own expense. Frank I. PD 1084 was issued. HELD: No. private corporations such as AMARI cannot acquire alienable land of the public domain. In 1995. PEA and AMARI signed an Amended Joint Venture Agreement (Amended JVA) in 1999. However. No. the Government through the Commissioner of Public Highways and the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) signed a contract to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay. Chavez v. are alienable 14 . A Legal Task Force was created to look into the issue. public health. The said task force upheld the legality of the JVA. Regarding the several buildings existing on the lots above-mentioned. In 1998. J.
It produced the “Smokey Mountain Development Plan and Reclamation of the Area Across R-10” or the Smoke Mountain Development and Reclamation Project. President Ramos issued Proclamation No. 161 approving and directing the implementation of the Comprehensive and Integrated Metropolitan Manila Waste Management Plan. there was however an implicit executive declaration that the reclaimed areas are not necessary anymore for public use or public service when President Aquino through MO 415 conveyed the same to the National Housing Authority (NHA) partly for 15 . they are automatically converted to patrimonial properties of the State which can be sold to Filipino citizens and private corporations. National Housing Authority G. No. President Aquino approved the said Project through MO 415. After President Aquino’s term. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. Respondent National Housing Authority was ordered to “conduct feasibility studies and develop low–cost housing projects at the dumpsite and absorb scavengers in NHA resettlement/low–cost housing projects”. The combined and collective effect of Proclamations Nos. The Project aimed to covert Smokey mountain dumpsite into a habitable housing project. inclusive of the reclamation of the area. J.. FACTS: President Corazon Aquino issued Memorandum Order No. 465 increasing the proposed area for reclamation across R-10 from 40 hectares to 79 hectares. 164527. 2007 Velasco. Thus. Afterwards. 39. Inc. 60% of which are owned by Filipinos. 39 and 465 with Special Patents Nos.lands of the public domain. subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws. particularly in the Smokey Mountain. The petitioner Francisco Chavez contended that the respondent NHA or respondent RBI has no authority to reclaim foreshore and submerged land. (RBI) for the implementation of the project. HELD: Yes. August 15. President Fidel Ramos. The National Housing Authority (NHA) is a government agency not tasked to dispose of public lands under its charter – it is an “end-user agency” authorized by law to administer and dispose of reclaimed lands. Even if it is conceded that there was no explicit declaration that the lands are no longer needed for public use or public service. Jr. Chavez v. the Amended Joint Venture Agreement between AMARI and PEA was null and void. The moment titles over reclaimed lands based on the special patents are transferred to the National Housing Authority (NHA) by the Register of Deeds. authorized the NHA to enter into a Joint Venture Agreement with R-II Builders. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens. 3592 and 3598 is tantamount to and can be considered to be an official declaration that the reclaimed lots are alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent NHA has the authority to reclaim foreshore and submerged land.R. through Proclamation No.
housing project and related commercial/industrial development intended for disposition to and enjoyment of certain beneficiaries and not the public in general and partly as enabling component to finance the project.
Manila International Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 155650, July 20, 2006 Carpio, J. FACTS: MIAA received Final Notices of Real Estate Tax Delinquency from the City of Parañaque for the taxable years 1992 to 2001. MIAA’s real estate tax delinquency was estimated at P624 million. Thus, the City of Parañaque, through its City Treasurer, issued notices of levy and warrants of levy on the Airport Lands and Buildings. The Mayor of the City of Parañaque threatened to sell at public auction the Airport Lands and Buildings should MIAA fail to pay the real estate tax delinquency. City of Parañaque contends that Section 193 of the Local Government Code expressly withdrew the tax exemption privileges of “government-owned and-controlled corporations” upon the effectivity of the Local Government Code. However, MIAA avers that airport lands and buildings are owned by the State, and thus, exempt from tax. ISSUE: Whether or not airport lands and buildings of MIAA are exempt from real estate tax. HELD: Yes. MIAA is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers to perform efficiently its governmental functions. MIAA is like any other government instrumentality, the only difference is that MIAA is vested with corporate powers. Unless the government instrumentality is organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, it remains a government instrumentality exercising not only governmental but also corporate powers. Thus, MIAA exercises the governmental powers of eminent domain, police authority and the levying of fees and charges. The airport lands and buildings of MIAA are property of public dominion and therefore owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines. Hence, the subject properties are not subject to tax.
Javier v. Veridiano II G.R. No. L-48050, October 10, 1994, 237 SCRA 565 Bellosillo, J. FACTS: Javier filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application for lot 1641. She later instituted a complaint for forcible entry against Babol, alleging that she was forcibly dispossessed of a portion of said land. The case for forcibly entry was however dismissed as it was found by the court that the occupied portion was outside Lot 1641. The same was dismissed on appeal. Javier was eventually granted a Miscellaneous Sales Patent and issued an OCT for lot 1641. Babol, however had sold the property he was occupying, including a portion of 200 square meters to Rosete. Javier demanded the surrender of the same area from Rosete who repeatedly refused to comply. After 4 years, Javier instituted a complaint for quieting of title and recovery of possession with damages against Babol and Rosete. Rosete moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of res judicata. The CFI sustained the argument of Rosete and granted his motion to dismiss. Javier contends that res judicata cannot apply in the instant case since there is no identity of parties and causes of action between her complaint for forcible entry, which had long become final and executory, and her subsequent petition for quieting of title. Javier maintains that there is no identity of causes of action since the first case was for forcible entry, which is merely concerned with the possession of the property, whereas the subsequent case was for quieting of title, which looks into the ownership of the disputed land. ISSUE: Whether or not there are really different causes of action between the forcible entry case and the later quieting of title case. HELD: Yes. For res judicata to bar the institution of a subsequent action the following requisites must concur: (1) There must be a final judgment or order; (2) The court rendering the judgment must have jurisdiction over the subject matter; (3) The former judgment is a judgment on the merits; and, (4) There is between the first and second actions identity of (4a) parties, (4b) of subject matter and (4c) of causes of action. Javier's argument that there is no identity of parties between the two actions is without merit. We have repeatedly ruled that for res judicata to apply, what is required is not absolute but only substantial identity of parties. But, there is merit in Javier's argument that there is no identity of causes of action. "The only issue in an action for forcible entry is the physical or material possession of real property, that is, possession de facto and not possession de jure. The philosophy underlying this remedy is that irrespective of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by strong hand, violence or terror." A judgment rendered in a case for recovery of possession is conclusive only on the question of possession and not on the ownership. It does not in any way bind the title or affects the ownership of the land or building. On the other hand, Civil Case No. 2203-0 is in reality an action to recover a parcel of land or an accion reivindicatoria under Art. 434 of the Civil Code, and should be 17
distinguished from Civil Case No. 926, which is an accion interdictal. Accion interdictal, which is the summary action for forcible entry (detentacion) where the defendant's possession of the property is illegal ab initio, or the summary action for unlawful detainer (desahuico) where the defendant's possession was originally lawful but ceased to be so by the expiration of his right to possess, both of which must be brought within one year from the date of actual entry on the land, in case of forcible entry, and from the date of last demand, in case of unlawful detainer, in the proper municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court; accion publiciana which is a plenary action for recovery of the right to possess and which should be brought in the proper regional trial court when the dispossession has lasted for more than one year; and, accion reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion which seeks the recovery of ownership and includes the jus utendi and the jus fruendi brought in the proper regional trial court. Accion reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion is thus an action whereby plaintiff alleges ownership over a parcel of land and seeks recovery of its full possession. It is different from accion interdictal or accion publiciana where plaintiff merely alleges proof of a better right to possess without claim of title. In Civil Case No. 926 Javier merely claimed a better right or prior possession over the disputed area without asserting title thereto. It should be distinguished from Civil Case No. 2203-0 where she expressly alleged ownership.
Bustos v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 120784-85, January 24, 2001, 350 SCRA 155 Pardo, J. FACTS: Paulino Fajardo died intestate on April 2, 1957. He had four (4) children, namely: Manuela, Trinidad, Beatriz and Marcial, all surnamed Fajardo. On September 30, 1964, the heirs executed an extra-judicial partition of the estate of Paulino Fajardo. On the same date, Manuela sold her share to Moses G. Mendoza, husband of Beatriz by deed of absolute sale. At the time of the sale, there was no cadastral survey in Masantol, Pampanga. Later, the cadastre was conducted and the property involved in the partition case was specified as Lots 280, 283, 284, 1000-A and 1000-B. The share of Manuela, which was sold to Moses, includes Lot 284 of the Masantol Cadastre and Lot 284 was subdivided into Lots 284-A and 284-B. Trinidad was in physical possession of the land. She refused to surrender the land to her brother-in-law Moses G. Mendoza, despite several demands. On September 3, 1971, Moses filed with the Court of First Instance, Pampanga a complaint for partition claiming the one fourth (1/4) share of Manuela which was sold to him. During the pendency of the case for partition, Trinidad Fajardo died. On December 15, 1984, the heirs executed an extra-judicial partition of the estate of Trinidad Fajardo. On February 16, 1987, Lucio Fajardo Ignacio, son of Trinidad sold Lot 284-B to spouses Venancio Viray and Cecilia Nunga-Viray. 18
the court declared petitioners as the lawful owners of the land. Macabebe. J. The municipal circuit trial court decided the case in favor of spouses Viray. the issue of possession is intertwined with the issue of ownership. Mendoza. Heirs of Roman Soriano v.On February 8. Placing petitioners in possession of the land in question is the necessary and logical consequence of the decision declaring them as the rightful owners is possession. Besides. Mendoza. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners could be ejected from what is now their own land. In the present case. In the unlawful detainer case. petitioners are entitled to possession of the same. but stayed when spouses Bustos filed with the regional Trial Court. 1989. petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. Adriano Soriano has 7 heirs whom leased the subject parcel of land to David de Vera and Consuelo Villasista for a term of 15 years starting July 1. 1994. In the accion reinvindicatoria. 1992. to recover or vindicate and to the fruits is a crippled owner. to use and enjoy. On September 9. the Regional Trial Court. spouses Venancio Viray and Cecilia Nunga-Viray. 363 SCRA 87 Ynares – Santiago. Hence. the regional trial court rendered a decision dismissing the case. To execute the judgment by ejecting petitioners from the land that they owned would certainly result in grave injustice. Subsequently. Branch 55. the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court as to possession on the ground that the decision has become final and executory.R.In the meantime. Francisco Ignacio. HELD: In this case. Macabebe. a petition for certiorari. On December 18. This means that the petitioners may be evicted. 2001. the Court of Appeals denied the motion. "An owner who cannot exercise the seven (7) "juses" or attributes of ownership-the right to possess. Pampanga. Court of Appeals G. on June 21. Pampanga. 1995. It follows that as owners of the subject property. to dispose or alienate. The lease contract states that Roman Soriano will serve as the caretaker of the said property during the period of lease. the trial court issued writs of execution and demolition. of the subject land. the 19 . Branch 55 rendered a decision in favor of Moses G. prohibition and injunction. FACTS: The land in dispute in this case is originally owned by Adriano Soriano who died sometime in 1947. the buyers of Moses G. No. 128177. Macabebe-Masantol. who were in actual possession as lessees of the husband of Trinidad. August 15. however. the stay of execution is warranted by the fact that petitioners are now legal owners of the land in question and are occupants thereof. buyers of Lucio Ignacio's share of the property. the Court of Appeals affirmed the ownership of petitioners over the subject land. During the effectivity of the lease contract. to abuse or consume. Pampanga an action for unlawful detainer against spouses Bustos. 1967. 1989. filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court. to accessories. on November 6. the issue of possession was rendered moot when the court adjudicated ownership to the spouses Bustos by virtue of a valid deed of sale.
Roman Soriano's motion for reconsideration was denied on March 16. The deicion became final and executor. On March 14. 1976. The other property. Roman filed petition for certiorari and prohibition in the Court of Appeals but the latter denied the petition. the parties entered into a post-decisional agreement wherein the de Vera spouses allowed Roman Soriano to sub-lease the property until the termination of the original lease on June 30. 1983. 60052 which was assigned to Lourdes and Candido. This agreement was approved by the CAR court in an order dated December 22. 8459. On appeal. 8459 was assigned to Francisco. Lot No. 60052 sold the lot to spouses Braulio and Aquiliana Abalos. 1968. Roman. 1983. 1969. Roman Soriano and the Director of Lands acted as oppositors. the Abalos spouses applied for the registration of the disputed parcel of land. Roman filed a motion to suspend hearing on the rental demanded by the Abalos spouses until after the other issues raised in his opposition to the motion for execution are resolved. Lourdes. Lot No. 1985. to allow Roman. On October 25. On April 13. Not satisfied with the decision of the Court of Appeals. except Roman also sold their shares to spouses Briones. later. the decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals.heirs of Adriano Soriano entered into extrajudicial settlement of his estate. heirs of Adriano and the heirs of Dionisia another heir of Adriano. As a result of the settlement. Candido and the heirs of Dionisia filed a complaint to annul the deeds of sale they executed in favor of the Abalos spouses or should the deeds be not annulled. 1982. 1983. the Land Registration Court granted the application for registration. Elcociado and Librada to redeem their shares in the disputed land and to uphold Roman Soriano’s possession of the fishpond portion of the property as a tenant-caretaker. the property was divided into two property. Librada. 1724-P68. Elcociado and Roman all heirs of Adriano. The motion to suspend hearing on the issue of the rentals was denied and the trial court authorized the substitution of the de Vera spouses by the Abalos spouses. pending the denial of this petition. After the dismissal of the case for unlawful detainer. 1972. However. Librada. this case was dismissed on motion of the Abalos spouses. On July 14. the heirs of Roman Soriano brought this case in the Supreme Court. On September 30. the de Vera spouses ousted Roman as caretaker and appointed Isidro Versoza and Vidal Versoza as his substitute. Francisco. 1984. after the expiration of the original lease and sub-lease in favor of Roman Soriano. the Abalos spouses filed on August 22. Elcociado. On August 16. The owners of Lot No. 1984. before it was executed. 20 . and the owners of Lot No. the Abalos spouses filed a case for unlawful detainer against Roman Soriano. Roman filed a case for reinstatement and reliquidation against the de Vera spouses in CAR Case No. Roman Soriano died. a motion for execution of the post-decisional order embodying the agreement of Roman Soriano and the de Vera spouses allowing the former to sublease the property. On June 27. the Agrarian Court rendered a decision authorizing the ejectment of Roman.
The exercise of the right of ownership. 133140. The Court held that a judgment in a land registration case cannot effectively used to oust the possessor of the land. the declaration pertains only to ownership and does not automatically include possession. 1980.ISSUE: Whether or not a winning party (ABALOS) in a land registration case can effectively eject the possessor (SORIANO) thereof. Atty. FACTS: Petitioner Atty. 1999. Agricultural lessees are entitled to security of tenure and they have the right to work on their respective landholdings once the leasehold relationship is established. The redemption period of the foreclosed mortgage expired without the Magpayos redeeming the same. Security of tenure is a legal concession to agricultural lessees which they value as life itself ad deprivation of their landholdings is tantamount to deprivation of their only means of livelihood. 312 SCRA 180 Puno. then. title over the land was consolidated in favor of PBCom. Jose Ma. Pedro Garcia. he was in possession of the property. The RTC granted the petition. J. hence. The Magpayos failed to pay their loan upon its maturity. 21 . HELD: No. yields to the exercise of the rights of an agricultural tenant. sometime in October. when his mother Remedios Tablan Garcia died. Court of Appeals G. and that. August 10. that. Garcia. There is no dispute that Abalos spouses' title over the land under litigation has been confirmed with finality. PBCom subsequently filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession over the land with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati. whose security of tenure rights is still pending determination before the DARAB. Garcia v. Maria Luisa Magpayo’s brother. he became. the mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed and at the public auction sale in which PBCom bought the land. inter alia. T. the Magpayos. whose security of tenure rights are still pending determination before the DARAB. and the RTC Sheriff the instant suit for recovery of realty and damages wherein he contended. Garcia. Pedro V. No. Upon service of the writ of possession. However. especially soin the instant case where there is a third party occupying the said parcel of land. at the time of the execution of the instrument in favor of the Magpayo spouses was not in possession of the subject property. The Supreme Court decided to refrain from ruling whether petitioners may be dispossessed of the subject property while petitioner's status as tenant has not yet been declared by the DARAB. The Magpayos mortgaged the land to the Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCom) to secure a loan. sold a parcel of land situated at Bel Air II Village. allegedly in the concept of an agricultural tenant. with the consent of his wife Remedios Garcia. Makati to his daughter Maria Luisa Magpayo and her husband Luisito Magpayo. hence. that at the time of the alleged sale to the Magpayo spouses.R. who was in possession of the land. by operation of law. a co-owner of the property. Jose Garcia thereupon filed against PBCom. refused to honor it.
An owner’s act of allowing another to occupy his house.” The records show that petitioner Jose Garcia occupied the property not in the concept of an owner for his stay was merely tolerated by his parents. Possession may be had in one of two ways: possession in the concept of an owner and possession of a holder. November 29. Atty. Consequently. No. On the other hand. Possession and ownership are distinct legal concepts. members of the Ides O’Racca Building Tenants Association. 129609. Pending action on the offer of RODIL to purchase the property. The renewal contract was forwarded to then Secretary Jose de Jesus of Department of General Services and Real Estate Property Management (DGSREPM) for approval. On 12 September 1982 BP 233 was enacted. (RODIL) is the lessee of the Ides O'Racca Building (O'RACCA) since 1959 which is a property owned by the Republic of the Philippines. De Jesus disapproved the renewal contract in favour of Rodil and 22 . Rodil Enterprises. one of which is the right to dispose of the thing by way of sale.” On the other hand. v. whether his belief be right or wrong. to possess means to actually and physically occupy a thing with or without right.. Pedro Garcia and his wife Remedios exercised their right to dispose of what they owned when they sold the subject property to the Magpayo spouses. Upon recommendation of DGSREPM Rufino Banas. and the O'RACCA building was classified as commercial property. the Magpayo spouses were already the owners when they mortgaged the property to PBCom. Rodil entered into a sublease contract with respondents Carmen Bondoc. In 1980. Inc. Court of Appeals G. “one who possesses as a mere holder acknowledges in another a superior right which he believes to be ownership. possession is defined as the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right. 2001. Divisoria Footwear and Chua Huay Soon. “A possessor in the concept of an owner may be the owner himself or one who claims to be so. It was not a hindrance to a valid transfer of ownership. Ownership confers certain rights to the owner. J. It authorized the sale of "former alien properties" classified as commercial and industrial. Ownership exists when a thing pertaining to one person is completely subjected to his will in a manner not prohibited by law and consistent with the rights of others. 371 SCRA 79 Bellosillo. RODIL and Ides O’Racca Building Tenants Association. Inc.ISSUE: Whether or not Jose Magpayo was a co-owner of the parcel of the land in dispute. it is of no moment that petitioner was in possession of the property at the time of the sale to the Magpayo spouses. offered to purchase the subject property. Teresita Bondoc-Esto. Literally. HELD: No. Director Factora of the Building Services and Real Property Management Office granted RODIL's request for another renewal of the lease contract on 23 September 1987 for another five (5) years from 1 September 1987. All said. Inc. rent-free does not create a permanent and indefeasible right of possession in the latter’s favor.R. FACTS: Rodil Enterprises Inc.
ISSUE: Whether or not Rodil has the right to occupy the building by virtue of its lease contract with the Republic. On 6 October 1987 RODIL filed an action for specific performance. 18 May 1992 and 25 May 1992 did not give rise to valid contracts. hence. the same is not true of the contracts of 18 May 1992 and 25 May 1992. Secretary De Jesus likewise directed RODIL to pay its realty tax delinquency and ordered the issuance of a temporary occupancy permit to the ASSOCIATION. The REPUBLIC being the owner of the disputed property enjoys the prerogative to enter into a lease contract with RODIL in the exercise of its jus disponendi. Banas and Factora were later substituted by Secretary Fulgencio Factoran of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) in the action for specific performance. As argued by RODIL.recalled all papers signed by him regarding the subject. De Jesus. without other limitations than those established by law. as lessor. asked Factora to duly execute a lease contract and forward it to his office for approval. This is evident from the fact that Secretary De Jesus. HELD: Yes. It is an attribute of ownership. Bondoc. Upon appeal. damages and injunction with prayer for temporary restraining order before the Regional Trial Court of Manila against the REPUBLIC. no contract. 1 designating the Land Management Bureau represented by Director Abelardo Palad. Pending the action for specific performance. these contracts are not proscribed by law.This is true only of the Contract of Lease entered into on 23 September 1987 which the REPUBLIC did not approve. RODIL neither alleged nor proved that such approval was made known to it. Factora and the ASSOCIATION. The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing. in his letter. Rodil then filed an action for unlawful detainer against Divisoria Footwear. and this rule has no exception. However. Bondoc-Esto and Chua Huay Soon. Hence. there is no real meeting of the minds. The Civil Code provides that no contract shall arise unless acceptance of the contract is communicated to the offeror. Every owner has the freedom of disposition over his property. Private respondents claim that the agreements of 23 September 1987. The socalled approval of the lease contract was merely stated in an internal memorandum of Secretary De Jesus addressed to Director Factora. the Court of Appeals declared the contracts null and void and dismissed the actions for unlawful detainer. As a result. the REPUBLIC has the right to eject usurpers of the leased property where the factual elements required for relief in an action for unlawful detainer are present. Banas. RODIL signed a renewal contract with Director Palad which was approved by Secretary Factora. On 31 May 1988 Factora issued Order No. Until that moment. Jr. The renewal contract would extend the lease for ten (10) years from 1 September 1987. A supplement to the renewal contract was subsequently entered into on 25 May 1992 where rentals on the previous lease contract were increased. as custodian of all "former alien properties" owned by the REPUBLIC. no concurrence of offer and acceptance. The consequences of this fact are clear. neither is there a law 23 . the action was dismissed in favour of Rodil. De Jesus.
one cannot enjoin an act already fait accompli. J. On February 10. 138053. 2000. where a contract is susceptible of two (2) interpretations. novation is never presumed. Private respondents argue that the "renewal contract" cannot "renew" a void contract. We do not agree. Alejandro de Lara was succeeded by his wife-respondent Felicitas de Lara as claimant. they could cite no legal basis for this assertion. This is hardly conclusive of the existence of an intention by the parties to novate the contract of 23 September 1987. it was issued only on 25 May 1992 or after the assailed contracts were entered into. one that would make it valid and another that would make it invalid. Isaguirre. Based on this factual milieu. Upon his death. However. The assailed agreement of 18 May 1992. it is the specific provisions of the contract which dictate its nature. the latter interpretation is to be adopted. De Lara G. Where there is nothing in a contract that is contrary to law. Respondent ASSOCIATION claims that the Decision of the Office of the President declaring null and void the lease contracts of 18 May 1992 and 25 May 1992 should be counted in its favor. It would seem that respondents consider the renewal contract to be a novation of the earlier lease contract of 23 September 1987. While a temporary restraining order was indeed issued against RODIL. a document denominated as “Deed of Sale and Special Cession of Rights and Interests” was executed by Felicitas and Isaguirre. Also. It is wellsettled that a court's judgment in a case shall not adversely affect persons who were not parties thereto. May 31. When Felicitas encountered financial difficulties. morals. public policy or public order. Furthermore. The Court of Appeals invalidated the contracts because they were supposedly executed in violation of a temporary restraining order issued by the Regional Trial Court. 332 SCRA 803 Gonzaga – Reyes. On this lot stands a two-story residential-commercial apartment declared for taxation purposes in the name of respondent’s sons. Nor can it be argued that there is an implied novation for the requisite incompatibility between the original contract and the subsequent one is not present. "Renewal of Contract of Lease." merely states that the term of the contract would be for ten (10) years starting 1 September 1987.prohibiting the execution of a contract with provisions that are retroactive. FACTS: Alejandro de Lara was the original applicant-claimant for a Miscellaneous Sales Application over a parcel of land with an area of 2. Apolonio and Rodolfo de Lara. However. good customs. 1960. No. 24 . On the contrary.342 square meters. she approached petitioner Cornelio M. the title of a contract does not determine its nature. the validity of the contract must be sustained. Isaguirre v. The contention does not hold water. the presumption of validity of contract cannot be said to have been overturned. As correctly stated by petitioner.R. The appellate court however failed to note that the order restrains the REPUBLIC from awarding the lease contract only as regards respondent ASSOCIATION but not petitioner RODIL.
whereby the former sold a 250 square meter portion of the subject lot, together with the two-story commercial and residential structure standing thereon. Sometime in May 1969, Apolonio and Rodolfo de Lara filed a complaint against petitioner for recovery of ownership and possession of the two-story building. However, petitioner filed a sales application over the subject property and was issued an OCT. Due to overlapping of title, petitioner filed an action for quieting of title. Judgment was rendered in favor of the respondents. When respondent filed a motion for execution, petitioner opposed, and alleged that he had a right of retention over the property until payment of the value of the improvements he had introduced on the property. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner can be considered a builder in good faith with respect to the improvements he made on the property. HELD: No. The petitioner is a possessor in bad faith. Based on the factual findings from this case, it is evident that petitioner knew from the very beginning that there was really no sale and that he held respondent’s property as mere security for the payment of the loan obligation. Therefore, petitioner may claim reimbursement only for necessary expenses; however, he is not entitled to reimbursement for any useful expenses which he may have incurred.
German Management & Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 76216 and 76217, September 14, 1989, 177 SCRA 495 Fernan, J. FACTS: Spouses Cynthia Cuyegkeng Jose and Manuel Rene Jose, residents of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA are the owners of a parcel of land situated in Sitio Inarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal, with an area of 232,942 sq. M. The land was originally registered on 5 August 1948 in the Office of the Register of Deeds Rizal as OCT 19, pursuant to a Homestead Patent granted by the President of the Philippines on 27 July 1948. On 26 February 1982, the spouses Jose executed a special power of attorney authorizing German Management Services to develop their property into a residential subdivision. Consequently, the German Management obtained Development Permit 00424 from the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission for said development. Finding that part of the property was occupied by Gernale and Villeza and 20 other persons, German Management advised the occupants to vacate the premises but the latter refused. Nevertheless, German Management proceeded with the development of the subject property which included the portions occupied and cultivated by Gernale, et.al. Gernale, et.al. filed an action for forcible entry against German Management before the MTC Antipolo, Rizal, alleging that they are mountainside farmers of Sitio Inarawan who have occupied and tilled their farmholdings some 12 to 15 years prior to the promulgation of PD 27, and that they were deprived of their property without due process of law when German Management forcibly removed and destroyed the barbed wire fence enclosing their farmholdings without notice and bulldozing the rice, corn, fruit bearing trees and other crops that they planted by means of force, violence and intimidation The MTC dismissed Gernale et.al.'s complaint for forcible entry. On appeal, the RTC sustained the dismissal by the MTC. Gernale then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. Said court gave due course to their petition and reversed the decisions of the MTC and the RTC. The Appellate Court held that since Gernale, et.al. were in actual possession of the property at the time they were forcibly ejected by German Management, they have a right to commence an action for forcible entry regardless of the legality or illegality of possession. German Management moved to reconsider but the same was denied by the Appellate Court. Hence, here is the present recourse. ISSUE: Whether the doctrine of self-help may be availed of when respondents refused to vacate the premises. HELD: No. The justification that the drastic action of bulldozing and destroying the crops of the prior possessor on the basis of the doctrine of self help (enunciated in Article 429 NCC) is unavailing because the such doctrine can only be exercised at the time of actual or threatened dispossession, which is absent in the present case. When possession has already been lost, the owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of property. This is clear from Article 536 New Civil Code which provides that "in no case may possession be acquired through force or intimidation as long as there is a possessor who objects thereto. He, who believes that he has an action or right to
deprive another of the holding of a thing, must invoke the aid of the competent court, if the holder should refuse to deliver the thing."
Caisip v. People of the Philippines G.R. No. L-28716, November 18, 1970, 36 SCRA 17 Concepcion, C. J. FACTS: Spouses Marcelino Guevarra and Gloria Cabalag cultivated a parcel of land known as Lot 105-A of Hacienda Palico situated in Nasugbu, Batangas, the same land used to be tenanted by Cabalag’s father when he was still alive. Hacienda Palico is owned by Roxas y Cia, administered by Antonio Chuidian, and supervised by the overseer, Felix Caisip. Prior to the incident involved, Guevarra sought recognition as a lawful tenant of Royas y Cia from the Court of Agrarian Relations but his action was dismissed. Thereafter, Roxas y Cia filed an action against Guevarra for forcible entry with prayer that Guevarra be ejected from the premises of Lot 105-A. The Justice of the Peace of Court of Nasugbu decided in favor of Roxas y Cia and on June 6, 1959, a trouble between Cabalag and Caisip occurred regarding the cutting of sugarcane. A day later, Cabalag entered again the premises of Lot 105-A and refused to be driven out by Caisip. Due to Cabalag’s tenacious attitude, Caisip sought the help of the Chief of Police of Nasugbu. The Deputy Sheriff, however, informed Caisip that his request to eject Cabalag cannot be acted upon without a proper court order. Nevertheless, the Chief of Police assigned Sergeant Ignacio Rojales and Corporal Frederico Villadelrey to Haciendo Palico. On June 17, 1959, Cabalag was seen weeding a portion of Lot 105-A which was a ricefield. Caisip approached her and bade her to leave, but she refused to do so. So, Caisip went to Sgt. Rojales and Cpl. Villadelrey and brought them to Cabalag. Rojales told Cabalag to stop weeding but she insisted on her right to stay in the said lot. While in squatting position, Cabalag was grabbed by Rojales who twisted her right arm and wrested the trowel she was holding. Villadelrey held her left hand and together Rojales forcibly dragged her towards a banana plantation while Caisip stood nearby, with a drawn gun. Cabalag shouted, “Ina ko po! Ina ko po!” and was heard by some neighbors. Zoilo Rivera, head of the tenant organization to which Cabalag was affiliated, went with them on their way to the municipal building. Upon arrival, Cabalag was turned over by Rojales and Villadelrey to the policemen on duty, who interrogated her. But upon representations made by Rivera, she was released and allowed to go home. Cabagan then filed a complaint charging Caisip, Rojales and Villadelrey of the crime of “grave coercion.” The Court of First Instance of Batangas found them guilty as charged. On appeal, The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision. ISSUE: Whether or not the force employed by Caisip and others, in the exercise of his right granted by Article 429, is reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property. 27
FACTS: Tito Pletcha. an owner 28 . Pletcha asked the group to desist from fenicing pending a resurvey he proposed. Cabalag did not. invoking ‘self-help’ in defense of the land he inherited from his father 19 years ago against the workers of Radeco Corporation.. 1977. even by means of bolo because they refused to listen to his appeal which is reasonable. farmer. No. therefore. having been given 20 days from June 6th within which to vacate the lot. in violation of Article 286 of the Revised Penal Code. In the instant case. The situation required immediate action and Art. The appellant need not rush to the court to seek redress before reasonably resisting the invasion of his property. People of the Philippines v. whether it be right or wrong.R. and without legal authority.HELD: No. Jr. Caisip was not even entitled to the right granted by Article 429. 19029-CR. 22 CA Rep. were constructing a fence in a hacienda allegedly leased by the corporation from a certain Lopinco. HELD: Yes. had prevented the complainant from doing something not prohibited by law (weeding and being in Lot 105-A). thus he fought off and prevented the workers. J. June 27.the usurper’s possession has not yet become complete and the complainants were in the act of building a fence. She had merely remained in possession thereof. that Caisip. and compelled her to do something against her will (stopping the weeding and leaving said lot). for. by means of violence. and had expressed the view that he could not oust them without a judicial order. invades or usurps the said lot. despite the fact that the Sheriff had explicitly authorized Guevarra and Cabalag to stay in said property up to June 26th. thereby taking the law into their hands. even though the hacienda owner may have become its co-possessor by reason of the prior order of the Justice of Peace Court of Nasugbu. The provision in Art 429 of the New Civil Code confirms the right of the appellant. but he was totally ignored. 807 Sison. As a result of such resistance he was prosecuted and convicted of grave coercion by the Municipal Trial Court. It is clear. 429 gave him the self executory mechanics of self-defense and self-reliance. Pletcha G. Caisip and others did not repel or prevent an actual or threatened physical invasion or usurpation. Pletcha appealed the decision of the MTC with the Court of Appeals. who without court order. Such an act constitutes force in contemplation of the law. They expelled Cabalag from a property which she and her husband were in possession. This is totally inapplicable to the case. Claiming actual possession and ownership and believing that the land sought to be fenced was an integral part of the land he inherited. Rojales and Villadelrey. This act of trespass justified the appellant to drive them away. ISSUE: Whether the appellant’s action is a legitimate exercise of a private citizen’s ‘selfhelp. on June 17th and within said period.
The principle of self-defense and the protective measures related thereto. but also his liberty and property. covers not only his life. not only to prevent a threatened unlawful invasion or usurpation thereof. The use of such necessary force to protect propriety or possessory rights constitutes a justifying circumstance under the Penal Code.” 29 . threatened or physical of his property. to use reasonable force to repel an invasion or usurpation. It is lawful to repel force by force. He who merely uses force to defend his possession does not possess by force.and lawful possessor. “The principle of self-help authorizes the lawful possessor to use force. it is a sort of self-defense. actual.
Andamo v. Intermediate Appellate Court G.R. No. 74761, November 6, 1990, 191 SCRA 195 Fernan, C.J. FACTS: Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land situated in Biga (Biluso) Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of private respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious corporation. Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths and contrivances, including an artificial lake, were constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners' land, caused a young man to drown, damaged petitioners' crops and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the lives of petitioners and their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed plants and other improvements to destruction. Petitioners instituted a criminal action against the officers and directors of respondent corporation, for destruction by means of inundation under Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code. Subsequently, petitioners filed a civil action against respondent corporation for damages. The trial court dismissed the civil case for lack of jurisdiction, as the criminal case which was instituted ahead of the civil case was still unresolved. The appellate court affirmed the order of the trial court. The motion for reconsideration was also denied. ISSUE: Whether a corporation, which has built through its agents, waterpaths, water conductors and contrivances within its land, thereby causing inundation and damage to an adjacent land, can be held civilly liable for damages. HELD: Yes. Petitioners' complaint sufficiently alleges that petitioners have sustained and will continue to sustain damage due to the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation. It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code provides that "the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each must use his own land in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of others. Although we recognize the right of an owner to build structures on his land, such structures must be so constructed and maintained using all reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and expected forces of nature. If the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the latter can claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered. Article 2176 of the Civil Code imposes a civil liability on a person for damage caused by his act or omission constituting fault or negligence. However, responsibility for fault or negligence under the said article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. The plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. The decision is reversed and set aside.
Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. L-43938, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 228 Cruz, J. FACTS: An application for registration of a parcel of land was filed on February 11, 1965, by Jose de la Rosa on his own behalf and on behalf of his three children. The land, situated in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet Province, was divided into 9 lots. According to the application, Lots 1-5 were sold to Jose de la Rosa and Lots 6-9 to his children by Mamaya Balbalio and Jaime Alberto, respectively, in 1964. In support of the application, both Balbalio and Alberto testified that they had acquired the subject land by virtue of prescription Balbalio claimed to have received Lots 1-5 from her father shortly after the Liberation. Alberto said he received Lots 6-9 in 1961 from his mother, Bella Alberto. She was corroborated by Felix Marcos, who recalled the earlier possession of the land by Alberto's father. Benguet opposed on the ground that the June Bug mineral claim covering Lots 1-5 was sold to it on September 22, 1934, by the successors-in-interest of James Kelly, who located the claim in September 1909 and recorded it on October 14, 1909. From the date of its purchase, Benguet had been in actual, continuous and exclusive possession of the land in concept of owner. Atok alleged that a portion of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9 were covered by the Emma and Fredia mineral claims located by Harrison and Reynolds on December 25, 1930, and recorded on January 2, 1931, in the office of the mining recorder of Baguio. These claims were purchased from these locators on November 2, 1931, by Atok, which has since then been in open, continuous and exclusive possession of the said lots. The Bureau of Forestry Development also interposed its objection, arguing that the land sought to be registered was covered by the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve under Proclamation No. 217 dated February 16, 1929. Moreover, by reason of its nature, it was not subject to alienation under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973. The trial court denied the application, holding that the applicants had failed to prove their claim of possession and ownership of the land sought to be registered. The applicants appealed to the respondent court, which reversed the trial court and affirmed the surface rights of the de la Rosas over the land while at the same time reserving the sub-surface rights of Benguet and Atok by virtue of their mining claims. Both Benguet and Atok appealed to the Supreme Court, invoking their superior right of ownership. The Republic filed its own petition for review and reiterated its argument that neither the private respondents nor the two mining companies had any valid claim to the land because it was not alienable and registerable. ISSUE: Whether or not Benguet and Atok have a better right over the property in question. HELD: Yes. It is true that the subject property was considered forest land and included in the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve, but this did not impair the rights already vested in Benguet and Atok at that time. The perfection of the mining claim converted the property to mineral land and under the laws then in force removed it from the public domain. By such act, the locators acquired exclusive rights over the land, against even 31
the government, without need of any further act such as the purchase of the land or the obtention of a patent over it. As the land had become the private property of the locators, they had the right to transfer the same, as they did, to Benguet and Atok. It is true, as the Court of Appeals observed, that such private property was subject to the "vicissitudes of ownership," or even to forfeiture by non-user or abandonment or, as the private respondents aver, by acquisitive prescription. The Court of Appeals justified this by saying there is "no conflict of interest" between the owners of the surface rights and the owners of the sub-surface rights. Under the aforesaid ruling, the land is classified as mineral underneath and agricultural on the surface, subject to separate claims of title. However, the rights over the land are indivisible and that the land itself cannot be half agricultural and half mineral. The classification must be categorical; the land must be either completely mineral or completely agricultural. In the instant case, as already observed, the land which was originally classified as forest land ceased to be so and became mineral — and completely mineral — once the mining claims were perfected. As long as mining operations were being undertaken thereon, or underneath, it did not cease to be so and become agricultural, even if only partly so, because it was enclosed with a fence and was cultivated by those who were unlawfully occupying the surface. This is an application of the Regalian doctrine. If a person is the owner of agricultural land in which minerals are discovered, his ownership of such land does not give him the right to extract or utilize the said minerals without the permission of the State to which such minerals belong. Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property in question by virtue of their respective mining claims which they validly acquired before the Constitution of 1935 prohibited the alienation of all lands of the public domain except agricultural lands, subject to vested rights existing at the time of its adoption. The land was not and could not have been transferred to the private respondents by virtue of acquisitive prescription, nor could its use be shared simultaneously by them and the mining companies for agricultural and mineral purposes. The decision is set aside and that of the trial court is reinstated.
Mabasa filed a case for the grant of an easement of right of way against petitioners. One of the tenants of the apartment vacated because an adobe fence was constructed thereby making the first passageway narrower in width. February 9.Custodio v. Said property may be described to be surrounded by other immovables owned by petitioner Spouses Custodio. 253 SCRA 483 Regalado. On appeal. 33 . Article 430 of the Civil Code provides that “every owner may enclose or fence his land or tenements by means of walls. Morato also constructed her fence and even extended it in such a way that the entire passageway was enclosed. Burgos. Thereafter. The proper exercise of a lawful right cannot constitute a legal wrong for which an action will lie. It was then that the remaining tenants of the apartment left. 116100. Spouses Santos and Rosalina Morato. Court of Appeals G. live or dead hedges. there are two possible passageways to Mabasa’s property. From the main street P. ditches. ordering petitioners to pay private respondent a sum of money for damages. FACTS: Pacifico Mabasa owns a parcel of land with a two-door apartment. although the act may result in damage to another. HELD: No. the act of petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot is a valid exercise of their right as owners.R. ISSUE: Whether the award of damages to private respondent is proper. The RTC granted the easement of right of way sought by private respondent. the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC and furthermore. No. The courts can give no redress for hardship to an individual resulting from action reasonably calculated to achieve a lawful end by lawful means. Ma. 1996. J. Cristina Santos testified that she constructed said fence for security reasons. or by any other means without detriment to servitudes constituted thereon.
Without his knowledge and consent. petitioner declared only his house. On appeal. J. the CA reversed the decision of the RTC stating that the only basis for reconveyance is actual fraud which in this case was failed to be substantiated by Abejaron. HELD: An action for reconveyance of a property is the sole remedy of a landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name after one year from the date of the decree so long as the property has not passed to an innocent purchaser for value. Petitioner later improved their abode to become a two-storey house. Abejaron did not apply for title of the land on the belief that he could not secure title over it as it was government property. He later planted five coconut trees on the property. 84831. Petitioner Abejaron and his family occupied the 118-square meter land. Fraud is a ground for reconveyance. 2001. the land had not yet been surveyed. including petitioner Abejaron's 118-square meter portion. For an action for reconveyance based on 34 . the title would become indefeasible. Conchita. This house. Knowing that the disputed land was public in character. General Santos City. 359 SCRA 47 Puno.Abejaron v. The protest was dismissed for failure of the petitioner to attend the hearings. The last two declarations state that petitioners' house stands on Lots 1 and 2. Nabasa was issued an Original Certificate of Title pursuant to a Free Patent covering Lot 1. The RTC The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of petitioner in its reconveyance case declaring the possession and occupancy of Abejaron over 118 square meters of lot in good faith and thereby declaring the inclusion of said portion in the OCT issued in the name of Nabasa erroneous. The small store was eventually destroyed and in its stead. They fenced the area and built thereon a family home with nipa roofing and a small store.R. for taxation purposes. Nabasa G. At that time. Employees of the Bureau of Lands surveyed the area. occupies a portion of Lot 1. FACTS: Petitioner Abejaron avers that he is the actual and lawful possessor and claimant of a 118-square meter portion of a 175-square meter residential lot in Silway. The action does not seek to reopen the registration proceeding and set aside the decree of registration but only purports to show that the person who secured the registration of the property in controversy is not the real owner thereof. he filed a protest with the Bureau of Lands against Nabasa's title and application. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has acquired title over the disputed land. Petitioner stated that respondent Nabasa resided on the remaining 57-square meter portion of Lot 1. which stands to this day. As the title included petitioner Abejaron’s portion of the lot. and not the disputed land. Nabasa applied for and caused the titling in his name the entire Lot 1. Nabasa built his house about 4 meters away from petitioner Abejaron's house. Block 5. Without proof of irregularity neither in the issuance of title nor in the proceedings incident thereto nor a claim that fraud intervened in the issuance of the title. Block 5 and a portion of the adjoining Lot 2 of the same Psu. Lot 2 belongs to petitioners' daughter. The petitioner hence resorts to the Supreme Court. June 20. No. petitioner Abejaron another store. Petitioner Abejaron then filed an action for reconveyance with damages against respondent Nabasa before the RTC.
what he has is only a "preferential right" to acquire ownership thereof by virtue of his actual possession since January 1947. 35 . In the case at bench. Reconveyance is a remedy granted only to the owner of the property alleged to be erroneously titled in another's name. continuous. Title to alienable public lands can be established through open. and exclusive possession for at least 30 years. Persons who have not obtained title to public lands could not question the titles legally issued by the State. it is essential for the party seeking reconveyance to prove by clear and convincing evidence his title to the property and the fact of fraud. Not being the owner.fraud to prosper. petitioner does not claim to be the owner of the disputed portion. petitioner cannot maintain the present suit. Admittedly.
ISSUE: Whether or not the bonus in question is civil fruits HELD: No. by a resolution passed on that same date. 1923. it is income arising from said risk. v. as bonus. Bachrach Motor Co.. To secure the payment of its debt. or as soon as it obtained from said bank authority to make such payment. 56 Phil. as bonus in favor of Mariano Lacson Ledesma. 36 . for the benefit of the entity granting said bonus. is not based upon the value. was indebted to the Philippine National Bank. 1931. 1930. according to the annual balance.. the amount of the bonus.. which is something quite distinct from and independent of the property referred to. No. filed a complaint against the Talisay-Silay Milling Co. according to the resolution of the central granting it. G. if one chooses. And in order to compensate those planters for the risk they were running with their property under the mortgage. Talisay – Silay Milling Co. the aforesaid central. among whom. 35223. or. from Mariano Lacson Ledesma's generosity in facing the danger for the protection of the central. Inc.850 or promissory notes or other instruments or credit for that sum payable on June 30. Equatorial Realty Development.e. Hence. i. J.. Inc. for the delivery of the amount P13. v. as soon as the central became free of its obligations to the aforesaid bank. it succeeded in inducing its planters. Inc. and of those contracted by virtue of the contract of supervision. The Philippine National Bank filed a third party claim alleging a preferential right to receive any amount which Mariano Lacson Ledesma might be entitled to from the Talisay-Silay Milling Co. 117 Romualdez. The said bonus bears no immediate. Inc. Inc. because that would be civil fruits of the land mortgaged to said bank by said debtor for the benefit of the central referred to.Bachrach Motor Co. 1923. or in part from time to time. but only a remote accidental relation to the land mentioned. but certainly it is not civil fruits or income from the mortgaged property.. and praying that said central be ordered to delivered directly to the intervening bank said sum on account of the latter's credit against the aforesaid Mariano Lacson Ledesma.. If this bonus be income or civil fruits of anything. undertook to credit the owners of the plantation thus mortgaged every year with a sum equal to two per centum of the debt secured according to yearly balance. the Talisay-Silay Milling Co. and had funds which might be so used. Inc. Mayfair Theater. and by virtue of a deed of assignment.. was Mariano Lacson Ledesma. to mortgage their land to the creditor bank.R. importance or any other circumstance of the mortgaged property. having been granted as compensation for the risk of having subjected one's land to a lien in favor of the bank. the payment of the bonus being made at once. December 22. September 17. but upon the total value of the debt thereby secured. FACTS: On December 22.
No. without offering it first to Mayfair. claiming payment of rentals or reasonable compensation for the defendant’s use of subject premises after its lease contract had expired. Carmelo entered into a Contract of Lease with Mayfair Theater Inc. Carmelo could no longer be located. and the price with its interest. 136221. Later. Both leases contained a provision granting Mayfair a right of first refusal to purchase the subject properties. in view of Mayfair’s timely objection to the sale and continued actual possession of the property. part of the second floor of the 2-storey building and two store spaces on the ground floor and the mezzanine. Inc.R. the fact that Mayfair paid rentals to Equatorial during the litigation should not be interpreted to mean actual delivery or ispo facto recognition of Equatorial’s title. the subject properties were sold by Carmelo to Equatorial Realty Development. J. It is clear the Equatorial never took actual control and possession of the property sold. together with two 2-storey buildings constructed thereon. May 12. Mayfair deposited with the clerk of court a quo its payment to Carmelo. following the order of execution of the trial court. use to own a parcel of land. However. The contract was likewise for a period of 20 years. FACTS: Carmelo and Bauermann. on which Mayfair put up another movie house known as Miramar Theater. Furthermore. Two years later. for a period of 20 years. 370 SCRA 56 Pardo. 2000. Rescission creates the obligation to return the things which were the object of the contract. Mayfair filed a Complaint before the RTC of Manila for the annulment of the Deed of Absolute Sale between Carmelo and Equatorial. The Supreme Court denied the petition for review and rescinded the contract of sale between Carmelo and Equatorial and ordered Carmelo to allow Mayfair to buy the lots. However. Inc. The Court of Appeals completely reversed and set aside the judgment of the lower court.G. together with their fruits. They were made merely to avoid imminent eviction and should not be construed as recognition of Equatorial as new owner. The lease covered a portion a portion of the second floor and mezzanine of a 2-storey building which respondent used as a movie house known as Maxim Theater. HELD: No. Equatorial filed with the trial court an action for the collection of the sum of money against Mayfair. Mayfair entered into a second Contract of Lease with of Carmelo for the lease of another portion of the latter’s property – namely. ISSUE: Whether or not Equatorial should be entitled to back rentals. The lower court issued a Deed of Reconveyance in favour of Carmelo and a Deed of Sale in favor of Mayfair. The RTC rendered its decision in favour of Carmelo and Equatorial. 37 . Thus.
Useful expenses shall be refunded to the possessor in good faith with the same right of retention.R.Ignacio v. No. FACTS: This case concerns the ownership of a parcel of land. upon the other hand. The owner of land on which anything has been built. sown or planted in good faith. ISSUE: Whether the respondent Court erred in its judgment. 76 Phil. Hilario G. the plaintiffs prayed for an order of execution alleging that since they chose neither to pay defendants for the buildings nor to sell to them the residential lot. was granted by Judge Natividad. is entitled to retain the possession of the land until he is paid the value of his building. Subsequently. after having chosen to sell his land. partly rice-land and partly residential. and the one who sowed. HELD: Yes. The Civil Code provides: ART. The owner of the building erected in good faith on a land owned by another. after the payment of the indemnity stated in articles 453 and 454. a rehearing of the case for a determination of the rights of the parties upon failure of extra-judicial settlement. but only the possessor in good faith may retain the thing until such expenses are made good to him. 605 Moran. has the option. Hence. the person who has defeated him in the possession having the option of refunding the amount of the expenses or paying the increase in value which the thing may have acquired in consequence thereof. shall have the right to appropriate as his own the work. or (c). the other party fails to pay for the same. ART. August 30. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor. either to pay for the building or to sell his land to the owner of the building. or sell to them the residential lot for P45. L-175. C. in accordance with article 361 of the Civil Code. sowing or planting. He is entitled to another motion only when. as respondents here did. or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land. 38 . refuse both to pay for the building and to sell the land and compel the owner of the building to remove it from the land where it is erected. Defendants objected to this motion which. after hearing. the proper rent. J. 453. The lower court rendered judgment holding plaintiffs as the legal owners of the whole property but conceding to defendants the ownership of the houses and granaries built by them on the residential portion with the rights of a possessor in good faith. But he cannot. said defendants should be ordered to remove the structure at their own expense and to restore plaintiffs in the possession of said lot. The owner of the land. 361. (b) an order to compel plaintiffs to pay them the sum of P2. this petition by defendants praying for (a) a restraint and annulment of the order of execution issued by Judge Natividad. under article 453.000 for the buildings. under article 361. 1946.
. L-12812. Intermediate Appellate Court G. FACTS: Petitioner Florencio Ignao and his uncles Juan Ignao and Isidro Ignao were coowners of a 534sqm land located in Cavite. ISSUE: Whether or not Article 448 of the Civil Code is applicable in the case at bar. 164 SCRA 287 Barrera. offensive to articles 361 and 453 of the Civil Code. January 18. But since the first option seems to be impractical. 39 . As to the workable solution applied by the lower court. that the order of Judge Natividad compelling defendantspetitioners to remove their buildings from the land belonging to plaintiffs-respondents only because the latter chose neither to pay for such buildings not to sell the land. The trial court which based its decision on Article 448 of the Civil Code. whether it might seem impractical. for it amends substantially the judgment sought to be executed and is. the CFI of Cavite directed the partition of the said land. 193 SCRA 17 Fernan. the same cannot be upheld because Article 448 clearly states that the right of choice belongs to the land owner and not upon the builder and the courts. v. the co-ownership has already been terminated by virtue of the partition. 72876. thus. Filipinas Colleges. However. the appellate court affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. when Juan and Isidro built their houses they encroached upon a portion of land belonging to Florencio. furthermore. J. is null and void. A total of 133. Inc.5 was allotted to the petitioner.The Court holds. 1989. C. in the case at bar. Thus. al. No. Ignao v. HELD: Yes. No. it ordered to sell to Juan and Isidro those portions occupied by them because it is the “workable solution”. J.R. therefore. However. Article 448 now applies since the builder is not anymore considered as an owner of the land where the house was built. A geodetic engineer surveyed the land and it was found out that Juan and Isidro occupied a total of 101sqm of Florencio’s lot. Garcia Timbang.R. ruled that Florencio should have the choice to either appropriate to himself that part of the house standing on his lot or to require Juan and Isidro to pay the price of the land. the landowner may choose to appropriate the improvements. September 29. Upon appeal petitioner contends that Article 448 cannot be applied because they are co-owners of he subject property. Pursuant to an action for partition filed by petitioner. However. et. G. It is true that Article 448 cannot be applied where a co-owner builds upon a land owned in common. 1991.5 sqm was allotted to the petitioner’s uncles while the remaining 266.
00 minus the sum of P5. the builder lost his right of retention provided in Article 546 and that by operation of Article 445. Filipinas Colleges would lose all its rights to the land and the spouses Timbang would then become the owners thereof. 2-a on which the building sold in the auction sale is situated.200. Meanwhile. Then. The spouses Timbang contends that because the builder in good faith has failed to pay the price of the land after the owners thereof exercised their option under Article 448 of the Civil Code. Inc. Inc. Based on Article 448 and 546 of the New Civil Code. the sum of P19. Blas filed a motion for execution of her judgment representing the unpaid portion of the price of the house sold to Filipinas which was granted. b) that Filipinas is owner of 245.00 that the spouses Timbang had bid for the building at the Sheriff's sale. As a consequence of which. the Timbangs are ordered to make known to the court their option under Article 448 of the Civil Code whether they would appropriate the building in question.34 undivided interest in Lot No.00.859.FACTS: After appropriate proceedings.859. Inc. Maria Gervacio Blas was also declared to be a builder in good faith of the school building constructed in the lot in question and was entitled to be paid the amount of P19. Filipinas Colleges. HELD: No. ISSUE: Whether or not the spouses Timbang automatically become the owners of the building upon failure of Filipinas to pay the value of the land. Inc.34 which was granted by the Court.000.000.34. the owner of the land has the right to choose between appropriating the building by reimbursing the builder of the value thereof or compelling the builder in good faith to pay for his land.859. for the payment of the sum of P32.00/32. Levy was made on the house in virtue of the writs of execution. in which even they would have to pay Filipinas Colleges.00. the Sheriff of Manila sold the building in public auction in favor of the spouses Timbang.807. Several motion were the subsequently filed before the lower court wherein the court held that: a) the Sheriff's certificate of sale covering a school building sold at public auction was null and void unless within 15 days from notice of said order spouses Timbang shall pay to Blas the sum of P5. If that is the case. Article 546 gives him the corollary right of retention of the property until he is indemnified by the owner of the land. and c) that the undivided interest of the Filipinas in the lot should be sold to satisfy the unpaid portion of the judgment in favor of Blas and against Filipinas in the amount of P8. failed to deposit the value of the land. On the other hand. Inc.859. the spouses Timbang as owners of the land automatically became the owners ipso facto of the school building. There is nothing in the language of these 40 .750. they are ordered to pay the spouses Timbang in the amount of P15. are declared to have acquired the rights of the spouses Timbang in the questioned lots. within the 90-day period set by the Court.00 for the same. Even this second right cannot be exercised if the value of the land is considerably more than that of the building. In addition to the right of the builder to be paid the value of his improvement. that Filipinas Colleges. failed to pay the sum of P32. in case that Filipinas Colleges..34 so the spouses Timbang made known to the court their decision that they had chosen not to appropriate the building but to compel Filipinas Colleges.90 plus such other amount which said spouses might have paid or had to pay. as the highest bidders.750. Also. among other things. which after liquidation was fixed at P32. a writ of execution was issued. the Court of Appeals held. or would compel the latter to acquire the land and pay the price thereof.
as successful bidders.00 is therefore correct.. 1988. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Judge Tecson can deny petitioner’s (landowner) motion to avail of its option. On July 13. Said court rendered judgment declaring Madlangawa as a builder-possessor in good faith. ordering the company to recognize the right of Madlangawa to remain in Lot 345. to pay in cash the amount of their bid in the sum of P5. However. Manotok Realty v. upon the failure of the builder to pay the value of the land. Judge Tecson denied the motion for approval. the right to appropriate the works or improvements or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the proper price of the land belongs to the owner of the land. J. L-47475 August 19. The only 41 . which would justify the conclusion of appellants that. petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals and upon affirming the trial court’s decision. in the present case. 164 SCRA 287 Gutierrez Jr. a motion for the approval of the company’s exercise of option and for satisfaction of judgment.two articles. Tecson). the latter becomes automatically the owner of the improvement under Article 445. 1977. Hence. Blas is actually a lien on the school building are concerned. the builder's right of retention provided in Article 546 is lost. The order of the lower court directing the Timbang spouses.500. Tecson G. when such is demanded by the land-owner. like. Under Article 448 of the Civil Code.00. Petitioner then filed with the trial court (Judge Jose H. The case of Bataclan vs Bernardo cannot be applied in this case in the sense that although it is true it was declared therein that in the event of the failure of the builder to pay the land after the owner thereof has chosen this alternative.R. this petition is filed. the Court of Appeals has already adjudged that appellee Blas is entitled to the payment of the unpaid balance of the purchase price of the school building. Block 1. of the Clara Tambunting Subdivision until after he shall have been reimbursed by the company the sum of P7. the introduction of certain major repairs of and other substantial improvements…” because the option given by law belongs to the owner of the land. Not satisfied with the trial court’s decision. No. without pronouncement as to costs. the Supreme Court issued a resolution denying Manotok’s petition for lack of merit. HELD: No. nevertheless there was nothing said that as a consequence thereof. the builder loses entirely all rights over his own building. 448 and 546. Neither can the judge deny the issuance of a writ of execution because the private respondent was adjudged a builder in good faith or on the ground of “peculiar circumstances which supervened after the institution of this case. for instance. Also. no basis for the respondent judge to deny the petitioner’s motion to avail of its option to appropriate the improvements made on its property. FACTS: Petitioner Manotok Realty filed a complaint against Nilo Madlangawa for recovery of possession with damages with the Court of First Instance of Manila.750. it elevated the case to the Supreme Court. There is. therefore.
November 28. J. further claiming that such authorization was granted to him ever since 1922. In order that he may take possession and occupy the said land. he filed a case in the CFI for such purpose and the court rendered a favorable decision for Bernardo. From the moment that he told the courts of his inability to pay for the price of the land. He was within the premises because he was authorized by the previous owners to clear the land and make the necessary improvements he deems fit. 1938. However.R. 598 Laurel. An appeal to the decision of the court was filed by both Bernardo and Bataclan. However. Bernardo was declared owner but the defendant was held to be a possessor in good faith for whom the work done and improvements made by him should be reimbursed. Bataclan informed the court that he will not be able to pay for the price of the land. when he was supposedly set in occupying the said land. 344 SCRA 238 Gonzaga – Reyes. Bataclan G. after failure of Bataclan to pay within the period the purchase price.right given to the builder in good faith is the right of reimbursement of necessary expenses for the preservation of the land. v. the builder cannot compel the landowner to sell such land to the former. FACTS: Respondents stated that sometime in August 1970 and months thereafter they 42 . 2000. The decision was modified by lowering the price of the land from P300 to P200 per hectare. he found Bataclan. Bernardo v. FACTS: Bernardo bought a parcel of land from Samonte which was located in Cavite. 136456 October 24. Bernardo was given 30 days to exercise his option. Bernardo chose the option which would require Bataclan to pay him the value of the land at the rate of P200 per hectare.R. The option of the owner was already exercised where he decided that he will just allow the defendant to purchase the land such that Bataclan was to comply with the option if he wants to retain the land. J. Since Bataclan was not a party in the first case. whether to sell the land to Bataclan or to buy the improvements from him. Bataclan no longer has lost the right of retention. No. he already lost his right to retain the land. the land shall be sold in a public auction. L-44606. the land was sold to Teodoro at a public auction. 66 Phil. Heirs of Ramon Durano. Bernardo filed against him a separate case. After 30 days. No. The court then gave Bataclan 30 days to pay the price of the property and after the lapse of the period. Uy G. HELD: No. Sr. ISSUE: Whether or not Bataclan has the right of retention over the parcel of land in question.
including the regular payment of taxes and introduction of plantings and improvements. Sr. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in its decision ordering the petitioners to return the properties to the respondents. The RTC found that the case preponderated in favor of respondents. Respondents urged the Department of Justice to conduct the preliminary investigation. The notices also declared that the lands were needed by Durano & Co. HELD: No. On September 15. A number of these respondents alleged that they inherited these properties from their parents. in turn. and directed respondents to immediately turn over the said lands to the representatives of the company.. T103 and TCT No. They exercised rights of ownership over the lands. As early as the first week of August 1970. and they continually paid the taxes thereto. continuous. who all possessed their respective portions of the property covered by TCT Nos. which. T-103 and T-104 thinking that they were the absolute owners thereof. and even before many of the respondents received notices to vacate.received mimeographed notices dated August 2. formerly owned by the Cebu Portland Cement Company (hereafter. petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals. affirmed the said decision and ordered the return of the property to all the respondents-claimants.. destroying in their wake the plantings and improvements made by the respondents therein. Some others came into the properties by purchase from the former occupants thereof. The properties were conveyed to respondents by purchase or inheritance. sold the disputed property to petitioner Ramon Durano III. who procured the registration of these lands in his name under TCT No. They and their predecessors were responsible for the plantings and improvements on the property. open and adverse possession of the properties. Respondents maintained that they were unaware of anyone claiming adverse possession or ownership of these lands until the bulldozing operations in 1970. “Cepoc”). The evidence shows that respondents successfully complied with all the requirements for acquisitive prescription to set in. who in turn inherited them from their own parents. Dissatisfied. tall bamboo poles with pennants at the tops thereof were planted in some areas of the lands and metal sheets bearing the initials “RMD” were nailed to posts. They were unaware of anyone claiming to 43 . Inc. Simultaneously. for planting to sugar and for roads or residences. proceeded to bulldoze the lands occupied by various respondents. and in each case the respondents were in actual. had been purchased by Durano & Co. Durano & Co. They were the ones who sought for the properties to be tax-declared in their respective names. 1970 and signed by the late Ramon Durano. T-104. 1970. Respondents contended that the display of force and the known power and prestige of petitioners and their family restrained them from directly resisting this wanton depredation upon their property. informing them that the lands which they are tilling and residing in. men who identified themselves as employees of Durano & Co.
A buyer who could not have failed to know or discover that the land sold to him was in the adverse possession of another is a buyer in bad faith. planted or sown without right of indemnity. or he may compel the builder or planter to pay the price of the land. a purchaser of a parcel of land cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man upon his guard. loses what is built. There even appears to be undue haste in the conveyance of the property to Durano III. The owner of the land on which anything has been built. attempted to transfer registration of the property in its name before it conveyed the same to Durano III. in order to replace things in their former condition at the expense of the person who built. In the cases of the two preceding articles. Petitioners made no attempt to investigate the nature of respondents’ possession before they ordered demolition in August 1970. 449. the landowner is entitled to damages from the builder. planter or sower. 451. the purchase of the property by petitioner Ramon Durano III from Durano & Co.and at the time each of them had already completed the ten-year prescriptive period either by their own possession or by obtaining from the possession of their predecessors-in-interest. Since petitioners knew fully well the defect in their titles. plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another. The Civil Code provides: Art. as the bulldozing operations by Durano & Co. Art. 44 . There is not even an indication that Durano & Co. Based on these provisions. Furthermore. 1970. could not be said to have been in good faith. were still underway when the deed of sale to Durano III was executed on September 15. In any case. or (3) to compel the builder to pay the value of the land. or (2) to demand that the builder remove what he had built. the landowner is entitled to damages under Article 451. such as when the property subject of the purchase is in the possession of persons other than the seller. or that the planting or sowing be removed. planted or sowed. Art. and the sower the proper rent. supposedly purchased the same from Cepoc. In the same manner. In the case.be the owner of these lands other than themselves until the notices of demolition in 1970 --. planted or sown in bad faith may demand the demolition of the work. He who builds. 450. respondents were in open possession and occupancy of the properties when Durano & Co. It is not disputed that Durano III acquired the property with full knowledge of respondents’ occupancy thereon. they were correctly held by the Court of Appeals to be builders in bad faith. the owner of the land has three alternative rights: (1) to appropriate what has been built without any obligation to pay indemnity therefor.
the owner-developer of the subdivision project. On 10 June 1985. 24 but Go refused. March 2. and that this lot was surveyed by Engineer Jose Quedding. claimed that his house. So Ballatan instituted against Go a civil case for recovery of possession the RTC of Malabon decided in favor of Ballatan. J. increased by two meters. petitioner Ballatan constructed her house on Lot No. 25 and 26 of respondents Go in 1983 and allegedly found the boundaries to have been in their proper position. He. Her building contractor informed her that the area of her lot was actually less than that described in the title. During the construction. or sell to said respondents the portion of their land on which the improvement stands. however. Sr. Go. Ballatan v. ISSUE: Whether or not Ballatan have a right of remotion. 24. demolish their improvements and pay petitioner Ballatan actual damages. the purchase price must be at 45 . ordering the Go's to vacate the subject portion of Lot No. Engineer Quedding found that the lot area of petitioner Ballatan was less by few meters and that of respondent Li Ching Yao. registered in the name of respondent Li Ching Yao. respondent Winston Go. HELD: All the parties have acted in good faith so Article 448 must apply. which was three lots away. constructed his house. Engineer Quedding declared that he made a verification survey of Lots Nos. could not explain the reduction in Ballatan's area since he was not present at the time respondents Go constructed their boundary walls. 304 SCRA 34 Puno. the authorized surveyor of the Araneta Institute of Agriculture (AIA). 26 is Lot No. No. 414 square meters in area. Court of Appeals G. 25 and 26 are registered in the name of respondent Gonzalo Go. attorney's fees and the costs of the suit. Lot No. petitioner Ballatan made a written demand on respondents Go to remove and dismantle their improvements on Lot No. Forthwith. is registered in the name of petitioners Eden Ballatan and spouses Betty Martinez and Chong Chy Ling. son of Gonzalo Go. however. were built within the parameters of his father's lot. On Lot No. FACTS: Ballatan. including its fence and pathway. 125683.. she noticed that the concrete fence and side pathway of the adjoining house of respondent Winston Go encroached on the entire length of the eastern side of her property. Ballatan informed respondent Go of this discrepancy and his encroachment on her property. Petitioners are ordered to exercise within thirty (30) days from finality of the decision their option to either buy the portion of respondents Go's improvement on their Lot No. In 1985. If petitioners elect to sell the land or buy the improvement. Metro Manila. 25. Lots Nos. So Ballatan called the attention of the IAI and after another survey of the land. Martinez and Ling are the owners of adjacent lots in Malabon. Go appealed. 24. 24.R. 27.The Court sustains the return of the properties to respondents and the payment of indemnity as being in accord with the reliefs under the Civil Code. Adjacent to Lot No. 24. 1999. Sr.
the court of origin is directed to fix the terms of the lease. 46 . in which case the parties shall agree upon the terms.the prevailing market price at the time of payment. If buying the improvement will render respondents Go's house useless. the lease. But if the value of the land is considerably more than the value of the improvement. If petitioners choose to sell the land but respondents Go are unwilling or unable to buy. then respondents Go may elect to lease the land. then petitioners should sell the encroached portion of their land to respondents Go. then the latter must vacate the subject portion and pay reasonable rent from the time petitioners made their choice up to the time they actually vacate the premises. Should they fail to agree on said terms.
However. HELD: 1.) Yes. ISSUES: 1. Abesia G. 1998. respectively. the plaintiffs may oblige the defendants to pay the price of the land occupied by their house. who is appointed by the court. The coowner is not a third person under the circumstances. FACTS: Plaintiffs – spouses Concepcion Fernandez and Estanislao Del Campo and defendant Bernarda Fernandez Abesia are co-owners of parcel of land with an area of 45 square meters and divided in the proportion of 2/3 and 1/3 share each. Applying Article 448 of the Civil Code. defendants may demolish or remove the said portion of their house. Otherwise. the trial court shall fix the terms thereof. 2. when. as in this case. the rights of a builder in good faith. Article 448 of the Civil Code cannot apply where a co-owner builds. then the latter cannot be obliged to buy the land. plant or sow upon land that exclusively belongs to another but of which he is a co-owner.) It depends. and the situation is governed by the rules of co-ownership. should be applied to the plaintiff-spouses Del Campo. The parties asked the court to finally settle and adjudicate who among the parties should take possession of the 5 square meters of land. it was shown in the sketch plan that the house of the defendant occupied the portion with an area of 5 square meters of Lot 1161 – A of plaintiffs. the co-ownership is terminated by the partition and it appears that the house of defendants overlaps or occupies a portion of 5 square meters of the land pertaining to plaintiffs which the defendants obviously built in good faith.) Whether or not the house of the defendant Abesia should be removed and demolished at their expense. However.) Whether or not Article 448 of the Civil Code. A commissioner. April 15. J. 2. if the price asked for is considerably much more than the value of the portion of the house of defendants built thereon. Manresa and Navarro Amandi agree that the said provision of the Civil Code may apply even when there was co-ownership if good faith has been established. No. Of course. In case of disagreement.Spouses Del Ocampo v. The defendant shall then pay the reasonable rent to the plaintiffs upon such terms and conditions that they may agree. he did not build. conducted a survey and recommended that the property be divided into two lots: Lot 1161 – A with an area of 30 square meters for the plaintiffs and Lot 1161 – B with an area of 15 square meters for the defendants. at their own expense. 47 . the plaintiffs have the right to appropriate said portion of the house of defendants upon payment of indemnity to defendants as provided for in Article 546 of the Civil Code. L-49219. However. if they so decide.R. plants or sows on the land owned in common for then. 160 SCRA 379 Gancayco. then the provisions of Article 448 of the new Civil Code should apply.
May 26. the owner of the materials is entitled to remove them. on which he built a a four-door. if it does own the six buildings.710.whether personally or through another makes constructions or works thereon. The owner of the land who in good faith . filed a suit against the Company and the sheriff asserting ownership over the levied buildings which it had acquired from the Insular Farms by virtue of absolute sale executed on March 21.Pacific Farms Inc. the Court consider the buildings as the principal and the lumber and construction materials that went into their construction as the accessory. the land being considered the principal. On the other hand.00.R. The defendant sheriff levied th six buildings. 30 SCRA 684 Castro. No. two-storey apartment building. the appellant — which apparently has no desire to remove the materials. 1956 to March 2. even if it were minded to do so. Quezon City. The Pacific Farms. Pecson v. L-21783. Esguerra G. Applying article 447 by analogy. No. and. provided no substantial injury is caused to the landowner. 244 SCRA 407 Davide. Inc. of the total procurement price of P15. J. must bear the obligation to pay for the values of the said materials. the Company instituted a civil case to recover the unpaid balance and the court sustained their claim. ISSUE: Whether or not the application by analogy of the rules of accession would suffice for a just adjudication.000. FACTS: On October 1. Consequently.R. The trial court rendered judgment annulling the levy and the certificate of sale. But because of failure to 48 . FACTS: Pedro Pecson owned a commercial lot situated in Kamias street. it denied the plaintiff's claim for actual and exemplary damages on the ground that it was not "prepared to find there was gross negligence or bad faith on the part of any defendants". Thus the appellee. and the plantings. Court of Appeals G. Otherwise. cannot remove them without necessarily damaging the buildings — has the corresponding right to recover the value of the unpaid lumber and construction materials. using materials belonging to somebody else. Pangasinan. v. J. 1958. he has the right to reimbursement for the value of his materials. Jr. the accessory. constructions or works. However. November 29. HELD: Article 447 of the Civil Code contemplates a principal and an accessory. 1957 the Company sold and delivered lumber and construction materials to the Insular Farms Inc. 1995. becomes the owner of the said materials with the obligation however of paying for their value. Pacific prays that the judicial sale of the six buildings be declared null and void. 1969. the sum of P4.18 has not been paid. 115814. which the latter used in the construction of the si buildings at its compound in Bolinao.
This is so because the right to retain the improvements while the corresponding indemnity is not paid implies the tenancy or possession in fact of the land on which it is built. The court ruled that though Article 448 do not apply in the case at bar. necessarily. until he is paid the proper indemnity. considering that the primary intent of Article 448 is to avoid a state of forced coownership and that the parties agree that Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code are applicable and indemnity for the improvements may be paid. With the said decision at hand.000 from June 23. the fruits of which during such possession. The lower court judged in favor of Pecson. HELD: No. The lower court ruled in favor of the private respondents. However. As in this case.000 on October 12. ISSUE: Whether the Nuguid Spouses can eject Pecson even if reimbursement hasn’t been given for the construction costs. by analogy. It was purchased by Nepomuceno. as well as of the portion of the lot where the building has been constructed.pay realty taxes amounting to P12. Since the spouses have opted to appropriate the apartment building. one of whom has built some works. The Spouses Nuguid then filed a motion for delivery of possession of the lot and the apartment building. or sown or planted something. sowing or planting may have been made in good faith or in bad faith. The Court ruled that since the spouses still haven’t reimbursed Pecson for the cost of construction of the building. the commercial lot owned was sold at a public auction. good faith and bad faith becomes irrelevant.000. The building. However. declaring that the apartment building was indeed not included in the subject sale. the income therefrom. the spouses have yet to pay Pecson for the construction costs. planted or sown. 1983. contrary to the claim of the Nuguid spouses. Pecson is thus entitled to the possession and enjoyment of the apartment building. Pecson then challenged the sale. the indemnity may be applied. 1993). and along with it. the spouses then made a move to eject Pecson and as well as the tenants residing therein. since the owner himself was the one who constructed the improvement. 49 . Article 448 refers to a land whose ownership is claimed by two or more parties. although they differ as to the basis of the indemnity. By its clear language. The petitioner not having been so paid. was not included in the sale. alleging that the apartment building. 1993 to September 23. he was entitled to retain ownership of the building and. which later sold the same to the Nuguid spouses for P103. but subject to the reimbursement to Pecson of the cost of constructing the apartment building minus the rents due to the spouses (calculated at P21. The Court of Appeals affirmed the same.00. the latter has the right to retain the property.
There is no question in that when Technogas purchased the land from Pariz Industries. Similarly. it is not clear as to who actually built these structures but it can be assumed that the predecessor-ininterest of Technogas. Eduardo Uy purchased the land adjacent to it. FACTS: Technogas purchased a parcel of land from Pariz Industries. the latter acquired ownership of the property. did so. Furthermore. and his ignorance of any defect or flaw in his title. as buyer. 50 . The good faith ceases from the moment the defects in the title are made known to the possessor.) Whether or not petitioner Technogas Philippines has stepped into the shoes of the seller. An article 527 of the New Civil Code presumes good faith. when both parties shall have become aware of it. 108894. ISSUES: 1. Uy bought another lot adjoining the lot of Technogas. J. Pariz Industries. including the right to compel Uy to exercise either of the two options under Article 448 of the New Civil Code. 2. the structures should be presumed to have been built in good faith.) No. Inc. Since no proof exists to show that the builder built the encroaching structures in bad faith. upon delivery of the property to Pariz Industries. February. contrary as to the good faith of Technogas has not been overthrown. the landowner’s exercise of his option can only take place after the builder shall have to know the intrusion – in short. for it is only then that both parties will have been aware that a problem exists with regard to their property rights. Consequently. no one can determine the precise extent or location of his property by merely examining his paper title. 2. 10. Unless one is versed in the science of surveying. The following year. 1997. as seller. possession acquired in good faith does not lose this character except in case and from the moment facts exist which show that the possessor is not aware that he possesses the thing improperly or wrongfully. 268 SCRA 5 Panganiban. Portions of the buildings and wall bought by Technogas together with the land from Pariz Industries are occupying a portion of Uy’s adjoining land. the buildings and other structures were already in existence. to Technogas.) Whether or not petitioner Technogas Philippines is a possessor in bad faith. Thus. Technogas is deemed to have stepped into the shoes of the seller with regard to all the rights of ownership of the property over the immovable sold. by extraneous evidence or by suit for recovery of the property of the true owner. Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his. In the same year. Only then will the occasion for exercising the option arise.Technogas Philippines Manufacturing Corporation v. Court of Appeals G. No. Furthermore. The knowledge of some encroachment was only made known to both parties after their parties of their respective parcels of land. HELD: 1.R.) Yes. Has been shown.
On appeal. These amounts were paid by Kee before he took possession of Lot 8. Bacolod City a complaint for ejectment with damages against Kee. Zenaida Octaviano. Jardinico. Kee appealed directly to the Supreme Court which referred the matter to the Court of Appeals. Edith Robillo purchased from Pleasantville Development Corporation Lot 9. she sold the said parcel of land. 1975 for the preparation of lot plan. 1981. HELD: 1. employee of CTTEI accompanied Donnabelle Kee the wife of Wilson Kee to inspect Lot 8. J. through his lawyer. The Appellate Court overturned the ruling of the RTC and held the Kee was a builder in good faith and the erroneous delivery was attributable to the negligence of CTTEI. Jardinico secured from the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City on December 19. the Regional Trial Court held that Pleasantville and CTTEI were not negligent and that Kee was in bad faith. ISSUES: 1. 1975. demanded that Kee vacate Lot 9 and remove all the improvements introduced by the latter. FACTS: On March 26. Octaviano pointed Lot 9. the exclusive real estate agent of petitioner. 2. but failed. No. Lot 9. Panganiban. repair shop and other improvements.) Whether or not.) Whether or not petitioner is liable for the acts of its agent CTTEI. After the preparation of the lot plan and a copy was presented to Kee. in turn filed a third-party complaint against Pleasantville Development Corporation and CTTEI. The MTCC held that the erroneous delivery was attributable to CTTEI and the Kee has no rights to Lot 9 because of the rescission made by CTTEI of their contract due to Kee’s failure to pay the installment. Thereafter. Kee can exercise possession over the parcel of land even before the completion of installment payments.Pleasantville Development Corporation v. 1974. MTCC also held that Kee must pay reasonable rental for the use of Lot 9 and furthermore he cannot claim reimbursement for the improvements introduced by him. Upon paying completely to Robillo. Wilson Kee on installment Lot 8 from C.T. On January 30. Sometime in 1975.) Petitioner fails to persuade the Court to abandon the findings and 51 . It was only that time that he discovered that Wilson Kee take possession of that lot and that the same have introduced improvements to the same lot. 106367 in his name. 1996. 1978 Transfer Certificate of Title No. Unfortuantely. Hence the instant petition filed by Pleasantville. Kee constructed his residence on the said Lot 9 together a store. Court of Appeals G. February 1. Kee refused which made Jardinico filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities. Under the Contract to Sell on installment. On January 20. Torres Enterprises Inc. Wilson Kee is a builder in good faith.R.00 and another on January 27. Kee. Branch 3. to Eldred Jardinico which at that time is vacant. Kee paid CTTEI relocation fee of Php 50. 79688. Jardinico confronted Kee and tried to reach for an amicable settlement.
on his state of mind at the time he built the improvements on Lot 9. respectively. On the first issue. It is this negligence that is the basis of petitioner's liability. He was not aware that the lot delivered to him was not Lot 8. only that in so acting. the parties agreed to confine the issues to: (1) whether there was an implied renewal of the lease which expired in November 1985.conclusions of the Court of Appeals that Kee was a builder in good faith. Jr. it was negligent. For such negligence. but may not be the basis to negate the presumption that Kee was a builder in good faith. And as good faith is presumed. Kee is in good faith. FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari which has its origins in Civil Case No. During the pre-trial conference. J. the court held that since the petitioners' mother was no longer the owner of the lot in question at the time the lease contract was executed in 1978. 546 and 548 of the Civil Code). in view of its acquisition by Maria Lee as early as 1972. To demonstrate Kee's bad faith. The rule is that the principal is responsible for the acts of the agent done within the scope of his authority. per Articles 1909 and 1910 of the Civil Code. there was no lease to speak of. At the time he built improvements on Lot 8. Such violations have no bearing whatsoever on whether Kee was a builder in good faith.) Yes. Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his and his ignorance of any defect or flaw in his title. These alleged violations may give rise to petitioner's cause of action against Kee under the said contract (contractual breach). 9214 of Branch 3 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) in Dagupan City for unlawful detainer and damages. Kee believed that said lot was what he bought from petitioner.. Germiniano v.. on the ground of "equity". and (3) the value of the house. the petitioner should be held liable for damages. petitioner points to Kee's violation of paragraphs 22 and 26 of the Contract of Sale on Installment. No. On the other hand. Arts. that is. 1996. 448. Thus. are regulated by law (i. 2. the agent who exceeds his authority is personally liable for the damage. as principal of CTTEI. 259 SCRA 344 Davide. The rights of Kee and Jardinico vis-a-vis each other. It was error for the Court of Appeals to make a "slight modification" in the application of such law [by holding petitioner and CTTEI solidarily liable]. as builder in good faith and owner in good faith. But CTTEI was acting within its authority as the sole real estate representative of petitioner when it made the delivery to Kee. Court of Appeals G. much 52 .R. It has no merit. petitioner has the burden of proving bad faith on the part of Kee. and should bear the damage caused to third persons.e. Petitioner failed to prove otherwise. 120303. July 24. (2) whether the lessees were builders in good faith and entitled to reimbursement of the value of the house and improvements.
never sought a writ of possession in order that she gain possession of the property in question. but only on a month-to-month basis pursuant to Article 1687 of the Civil Code. As regard the petitioners' alleged failed promise to sell to the private respondents the lot occupied by the house. the court held that such should be litigated in a proper case before the proper forum. The refusal of the petitioners' mother to accept the rentals starting January 1986 was then a clear indication of her desire to terminate the monthly lease. however. ISSUE: Whether or not Article 448 or Article 1678 of the Civil Code should apply in the instant case. It must be stressed. a renewal thereof. the right of the private respondents as lessees is governed by Article 1678 of the Civil Code which allows reimbursement to the extent of one-half of the value of the useful improvements. or removal of the improvements should the lessor refuse to reimburse. holding that Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code. And even if the lease legally existed.less. as correctly pointed out by the petitioners. "a state of forced co-ownership" would not be created between the petitioners and the private respondents. On the third issue. There is no need to apply by analogy the provisions of Article 448 on indemnity as was done in Pecson vs. The petitioners' mother therefore remained in possession of the lot. did not apply to lessees like the private respondents. the court deemed as conclusive the private respondents' allegation that the value of the house and improvements was P180. is not present in this case.00. HELD: In this case. its implied renewal was not for the period stipulated in the original contract. Court of Appeals. The court resolved the second issue in the negative. Since the 53 . On appeal by the private respondents. It has been said that while the right to let property is an incident of title and possession. a person may be lessor and occupy the position of a landlord to the tenant although he is not the owner of the premises let. the rights of the private respondents were specifically governed by Article 1678. For. because the situation sought to be avoided and which would justify the application of that provision. Besides. there being no controverting evidence presented. the RTC of Dagupan City reversed the trial court's decision. because the latter knew that their occupation of the premises would continue only during the life of the lease. that the right to indemnity under Article 1678 of the Civil Code arises only if the lessor opts to appropriate the improvements. The land was allegedly acquired later by one Maria Lee by virtue of an extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage. Suffice it to say.000. not an ejectment case where the only issue was physical possession of the property. which allow possessors in good faith to recover the value of improvements and retain the premises until reimbursed. however. which allow reimbursement of up to one-half of the value of the useful improvements. both parties admit that the land in question was originally owned by the petitioners' mother. Lee.
54 . Neither can they retain the premises until reimbursement is made. The private respondents' sole right then is to remove the improvements without causing any more impairment upon the property leased than is necessary.petitioners refused to exercise that option the private respondents cannot compel them to reimburse the one-half value of the house and improvements.
cut across the lands of Maria Melad.Agustin v. Among these occupying lands covered by Solana Cadastre were Pablo Binayug and Maria Melad. J. 187 SCRA 218 Grino – Aquino. depositing the alluvium as accretion on the land possessed by Binayug on the western bank. returned to its 1919 bed and in the process. HELD: No. J. the Cagayan River eroded lands of the Tuguegarao Cadastre on its eastern bank among which was Agustin’s Lot 8457.” whenever the current of a river divides itself into branches. Through the years. 1990. 73465. and the spouses Pablo Binayug and Geronima Ubina whose lands were transferred on the eastern. However. creek or torrent segregates from an estate on its bank a known portion of land and transfer it to another estate. Binayug. ISSUE: Whether or not ownership of accretion is lost upon sudden and abrupt change of the river. 1989. In 1925. FACTS: The Cagayan River separates the towns of Solana on the west and Tuguegarao on the east in the province of Cagayan. As the years went by.” Cureg v. and Arturo Balisi. claimed the same lands as their own and drove away the Melads. the heirs of Baldomero Langcay. No. the Cagayan River changed its course.R.” Article 463 provides that. To cultivate those lots they had to cross the river. July 5. Intermediate Appellate Court G. while the Melads. side of the river. September 7. 66075-76. OCT 5472 was issued for land east of the Cagayan River owned by Eulogio Agustin. He also retains it if a portion of land is separated from the estate by the current.R. In 1950. Timoteo Melad. accompanied by the mayor and some policemen of Tuguegarao. Binayug and Urbina from the premises. The shifting of the river and siltation continued until 1968. depositing silt on the west bank. 1968. Agustin. Urbina and their tenants were planting corn on their lots located on the easter side of Cagayan River. after a big flood. provided that he removes the same within two years. 55 . leaving a piece of land or part thereof isolated. all lands west of the river were included in the Solana Cadastre. Articles 459 and 463 of the New Civil Code apply to this situation. Juan Langcay. or Tuguegarao. 177 SCRA 313 Medialdea. No. the owner of the land to which the segregated portion belonged retains the ownership of it. the Cagayan River moved gradually eastward. Article 459 provides that “whenever the current of a river. Intermediate Appellate Court G. the owner of the land retains his ownership. In April 1969. and separated or transferred said accretions to the other side (eastern bank) of the river. In 1919 the lands of the east of the river were covered by the Tuguegarao Cadastre. The ownership of the accretion to the lands was not lost upon sudden and abrupt change of the course of the river (Cagayan River in 1968 or 1969 when it reverted to its old 1919 bed).
J. with the conformity of his wife. The “motherland” showed signs of accretion caused by the movement of the Cagayan River. the heirs verbally sold the “motherland” to Apostol. and his predecessors-in-interest have been in actual. the increase in the area of the petitioner’s land. being an accretion left by the change of course or the northward movement of the Cagayan River does not automatically become registered land just because the lot which receives such accretion is covered by a Torrens title. The “subject land” is an alluvial deposit left by the northward movement of the Cagayan River and pursuant to Article 457 of the New Civil Code: “To the owners of land adjoining the banks of river belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters. which was formerly the river bed of the Suague River per cadastral survey of 1926. has also been in the possession of Ladrido.” However. Consequently. When private respondents were about to cultivate their “motherland” together with its accretion.. private respondents Domingo Apostol et al. Spouses Rosendo and Ana Te were also the registered owners of a parcel of land described in their title as Lot 7340 of the Cadastral Survey of Pototan. No. Court of Appeals G. that the “subject land” is an accretion to their registered land. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners have the better right of accretion. Rosendo Te. and that the Viajars have never been in actual 56 . 1988. Subsequently. The piece of real property which used to be Lot 7340 of the Cadastral Survey of Pototan was located in barangay Guibuanogan. peaceful and continuous possession. Pototan.036 sq. The complaint alleged that private respondents. HELD: Yes. filed a complaint for quieting of title against petitioners Leonida Cureg et al. Petitioners alleged that the “motherland” claimed by the private respondents is nonexistent. under a bona fide claim of ownership of a parcel of land (referred to as their “motherland”). The petitioners are entitled to the accretion. it must also be placed under the operation of the Torrens system. Angelica Viajar had Lot 7340 relocated and found out that the property was in the possession of Ricardo Y.ms. Viajar and Celso F. they were prevented by the petitioners. 168 SCRA 405 Medialdea. FACTS: The spouses Ricardo and Leonor Ladrido were the owners of Lot 7511. and that petitioners have been in possession and cultivation of the “accretion” for many years now. that at the time of the cadastral survey in 1926. Ladrido.000. open. Viajar for P5. As such. Viajar v. are the legal and/or the forced heirs of the late Domingo Gerardo. she demanded its return but Ladrido refused. 1982.R. Iloilo. that the area of 14.FACTS: On November 5. December 12. sold this lot to Angelica F. that Lot 7340 has been in the possession of Ladrido. Lot 7511 and Lot 7340 were separated by the Suague River. 77294. A Torrens title was later issued in the latter’s names. except Apostol. Later. On 6 September 1973.
The Ladridos have sufficiently established that for many years after 1926 a gradual accretion on the eastern side of Lot 7511 took place by action of the current of the Suague River so that in 1979 an alluvial deposit of 29. Not satisfied with the decision. FACTS: The subject of this controversy is a parcel of land formed as a result of sawdust dumped into the dried-up Balacanas Creek and along the banks of the Cagayan river. J. the Viajars appealed to the Court of Appeals. June 26. The consequent increase in the area of Lot 7511 due to alluvion or accretion was possessed by the defendants whose tenants plowed and planted the same with corn and tobacco. The MTC rendered a decision against private respondents which was affirmed by the RTC. Therefore. As a result.912 sq. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the court. On 15 February 1974. De Nazareno v. the lower court correctly found that the evidence introduced by the Viajars to show that the change in the course of the Suague River was sudden or that it occurred through avulsion is not clear and convincing. Nazareno and petitioners filed a case for ejectment with the MTC of Cagayan de Oro City. Angelica and Celso Viajar instituted a civil action for recovery of possession and damages against Ricardo Y. the 57 . petitioners’ predessor-in-interest. The established facts indicate that the eastern boundary of Lot 7511 was the Suague River based on the cadastral plan. HELD: Article 457 of the New Civil Code provides that “to the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters. The land is already plain and there is no indication on the ground of any abandoned river bed.R. For a period of more than 40 years (before 1940 to 1980) the Suague River overflowed its banks yearly and the property of the defendant gradually received deposits of soil from the effects of the current of the river." The presumption is that the change in the course of the river was gradual and caused by accretion and erosion. Under the law. Private respondents Salasalan and Rabaya leased the subject lots on which their houses stood from Antonio Nazareno. Private respondents allegedly stopped paying rentals. No. declaring the Ladridos are entitled to the possession thereof. ISSUE: Whether the respondents are entitled to the land on the ground of accretion. accretion which the banks or rivers may gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters becomes the property of the owners of the lands adjoining the banks. the accretion to Lot 7511 which consists of Lots A and B belong to the Ladridos.physical possession of Lot 7340. 98045. Court of Appeals G. In the present case. The quondam river bed had been filled by accretion through the years. The Viajars filed a petition for review on certiorari. 257 SCRA 589 Romeo. Ladrido. dismissing the complaint of Angelica and Celso Viajar with costs against them.ms. had been added to Lot 7511. After several petitions for annulmentof judgment by private respondents which were all dismissed. Vda. more or less. The trial court rendered its decision in favor of Ladrido. 1996.
Respondent Director of lands Abelardo Palad ordered Nazareno to vacate the portions adjudicated to private respondents and remove whatever improvements they have introduced. Sinforoso Pascual. These are called rules on alluvion. disposition and management of the lands of public dominion. he caused the approval by the Bureau of lands of the survey plan with a view to perfecting his title over the accretion area being claimed by him. The word “current” indicates the participation of the body of water in the flow of waters due to high and low tide. land investigator Avelino labis recommended that the survey plan be cancelled and that private respondents be directed to file appropriate public land application covering their respective portions. 68166. he also ordered that private respondents be placed in possession thereof. Heirs of Navarro v. respondent Palad is authorized to exercise executive control over any form of concession. soil and other filling materials on portions of the Balacanas creek and the Cagayan River. After conducting a survey of the subject land. J: FACTS: On October 3. Petitioner’s submission not having met the first and second requirements of the rules of alluvion. filed an application for foreshore lease covering a tract of foreshore land in Sibocon.decision of the lower court was finally enforced with the private respondents being ejected from portions of the subject lots they occupied. give to the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers or streams any accretion gradually received from the effects of the current of waters. they cannot claim the rights of a riparian owner. The Bureau of lands classified the subject land as an accretion area which was formed by deposits of sawdust. The said petition was protested by private respondents. Intermediate Appellate Court G. 1946. Bataan. 1997. February 12. petitioners' predecessor-ininterest. Subsequently. Emiliano Navarro. which if present in a case. No. having an area of approximately seventeen (17) hectares. filed a fishpond application with the Bureau of Fisheries 58 . however. 268 SCRA 589 Hermosisima. Balanga. admit that the accretion was formed by the dumping of boulders. The subject being public land is under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of lands. A petitioner filed a case for annulment of the previous decisions with the RTC but was dismissed.R. Nazareno filed a motion for reconsideration with the Undersecretary of the Department of Natural Resources and OIC of the Bureau of lands Ignacio who denied the Motion. Petitioners. Before Nazareno died. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners can claim ownership of the subject land by virtue of Art 457 of the Civil Code. The CA affirmed the RTC decision contending that the approved of the survey plan belongs exclusively to the Director of lands and the same shall be conclusive when approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. HELD: No. accretion as a mode of acquiring property under Art 457 of the NCC requires the concurrence of the requisites mentioned in the Article.
earth or other deposits so as to be rightfully be considered as an accretion [caused by the action of the two rivers]. situated in Barrio Puerto Rivas. thus. the Director of Lands. (2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river. The disputed land. Balanga. Bataan. requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) that the accumulation of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible. 1960. On March 25. represented by the Assistant Solicitor General.611 square meters. such application was denied by the Director of Fisheries on the ground that the property formed part of the public domain. the same being a portion of the public domain and.covering twenty five (25) hectares of foreshore land also in Sibocon. part of the public domain. Manila Bay 59 . therefore. The conclusion formed by the trial court on the basis of the aforegoing observation is that the disputed land is part of the foreshore of Manila Bay and therefore. Balanga. and covered by Original Certificate of Title No. ISSUE: Whether or not the land sought to be registered is accretion or foreshore land. 6830. Sometime in the early part of 1960. It is bounded on the eastern side by the Talisay River. on the western side by the Bulacan River. described in Plan Psu-175181 and said to have an area of 146. Sinforoso Pascual claimed the accretion as the riparian owner. the alluvium should have been deposited on either or both of the eastern and western boundaries of petitioners' own tract of land. Initially. Thus. thus. situated in Sibocon. Clearly lacking. Bataan. is the third requisite of accretion. it belongs to the Republic of the Philippines. Article 457 finds no applicability where the accretion must have been caused by action of the bay. or. Sinforoso Pascual flied an application to register and confirm his title to a parcel of land. that the alluvium is deposited on the portion of claimant's land which is adjacent to the river bank. HELD: Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under said Article 457. and on the northern side by the Manila Bay. If the accretion were to be attributed to the action of either or both of the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers. is an accretion not on a river bank but on a sea bank. The Talisay River as well as the Bulacan River flow downstream and meet at the Manila Bay thereby depositing sand and silt on Pascual's property resulting in an accretion thereon. filed an opposition thereto stating that neither Pascual nor his predecessors-ininterest possessed sufficient title to the subject property. Pascual claimed that this land is an accretion to his property. or on what used to be the foreshore of Manila Bay which adjoined petitioners' own tract of land on the northern side. Balanga. Applicant Pascual has not presented proofs to convince the Court that the land he has applied for registration is the result of the settling down on his registered land of soil. whether or not said land was formed by the action of the two rivers of Talisay and Bulacan or by the action of the Manila Bay. not on the northern portion thereof which is adjacent to the Manila Bay. and (3) that the land where the accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of the river. which is. the disputed property is an accretion on a sea bank. Bataan.
as such.being an inlet or an arm of the sea. 60 . part of the public domain. under Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. the disputed property is.
exclusive ownership. res judicata. Province of Tayabas (now Quezon) and has an approximate area of 1. and. J. December 1. Manuel Pansacola (Fr. 1868 they agreed to modify the terms and conditions of the agreement entered into by them on February 11. Manuel Pena). No. petitioners herein. 1982. On April 11. three brothers. 61 .) Whether or not Cagbalite Island is still undivided property owned in common by the heirs and successors-in-interest of the brothers. 1866. On appeal. Jose and Manuel Pansacola. private respondents herein. Bulacan. Intermediate Appellate Court G. Manuel Pena) entered into an agreement which provided. under the provisions of Rule 69 of the Rules of Court. In their answer some of the defendants. The motion for reconsideration filed by the plaintiffs. Manuel Pena) who will contribute for them in the proposed purchase of the Cagbalite Island. estoppel and laches.owners or co-heirs. 156 SCRA 55 Paras. including as parties the heirs and successors-ininterest of the co-owners of the Cagbalite Island in the second contract of co-ownership dated April 11. Manuel Pansacola (Fr. (2) That the lands shall be considered after the purchase as their common property. 1859. 1981 dismissing the complaint.It also denied the motion for reconsideration and the supplement to motion for reconsideration filed by private respondents. 1968. 72694. (4) That whatever benefits may be derived from the Island shall be shared equally by the co-owners in the following proportion: Benedicto Pansacola-1/4 share.600 hectares. FACTS: In a document executed in the Municipality of San Rafael. Jose Pansacola and Manuel Pansacola (known as Fr. co-owners entered into the actual possession and enjoyment of the Island purchased by them from the Spanish Government. 2. among others: (1) That they will purchase from the Spanish Government the lands comprising the Island of Cagbalite which is located within the boundaries of the Municipality of Mauban. on February 11. 1968. Benedicto. Domingo Arce and Baldomera Angulo-2/4 shares which shall be placed under the care of their father. private respondents brought a special action for partition in the Court of First Instance of Quezon. on November 18. 1983. 1987.) Whether or not a prescription may run in favor of a co-owner against his co. the trial court rendered a decision dated November 6. On August 14. was denied by the trial court in an order dated February 25.R.Del Banco v. About one hundred years later. 1859. Benedicto Pansacola. interposed such defenses as prescription. respondent Court reversed and set aside the decision of the lower court . After trial on the merits. in its resolution dated October 15. ISSUES: 1. (3) That the co-ownership includes Domingo Arce and Baldomera Angulo. Jose Pansacola-1/4 share. minors at that time represented by their father.
32 SCRA 307 . there is nothing in all four agreements that suggests that actual or physical partition of the Island had really been made by either the original owners or their heirs or successors-in-interest. because until physical division is effected such portion is merely an Ideal share. Arlegui. Eustaquio Pansacola allocated a 1/4 portion and the children of Manuel Pansacola (Fr. The agreement entered into in 1859 simply provides for the sharing of whatever benefits can be derived from the island. a 1/4 portion (for each group of co-owners) of the Island which is truly abstract.) On the first issue.HELD: 1. The mechanics of actual partition should follow the procedure laid down in Rule 69 of the Rules of Court. over the whole he exercises the right of dominion. in the instant case. Codigo Civil. Court of Appeals. the heirs that were represented agreed on how the Island was to be partitioned. Felices vs. 1907. Maganon vs. cited in Lopez vs. page 486. 1908 as the surveyor to whom the task of surveying Cagbalite Island pursuant to said agreement was entrusted. not concretely determined (3 Manresa. in fact. Dultra vs. 35 SCRA 173 . 1908 which supplements that of January 20. With the distribution agreed upon each of the co-owner is a co-owner of the whole. Gatchalian vs. CFl 70 SCRA 465 . Virgilio Pansacola. but he is at the same time the sole owner of a portion. 601. 75 SCRA 234 ).. While there is co-ownership. It is undisputed that the Cagbalite Island was purchased by the original co-owners as a common property and it has not been proven that the Island had been partitioned among them or among their heirs. In the second agreement entered in 1868 the co-owners agreed not only on the sharing proportion of the benefits derived from the Island but also on the distribution of the Island each of the brothers was allocated a 1/4 portion of the Island with the children of the deceased brother. 3rd Ed. testified that said contracts were never implemented because nobody defrayed the expenses for surveying the same. It is not enough that the co-owners agree to subdivide the property. and in this sense. 62 . 113 SCRA 10 ).) In the agreement of January 20. Arlegui. 1907 reveals that as of the signing of the 1908 agreement no actual partition of the Island had as yet been done. The agreement. The second and fourth paragraphs of the agreement speaks of a survey yet to be conducted by a certain Amadeo and a plan and description yet to be made. They must have a subdivision plan drawn in accordance with which they take actual and exclusive possession of their respective portions in the plan and titles issued to each of them accordingly (Caro vs. Cuaycong. Neither can such actual possession and enjoyment of some portions of the Island by some of the petitioners herein be considered a repudiation of the co-ownership. however. De la Cruz vs. a son of the surveyor named Amadeo who is referred to in the contract dated April 18. Manuel Pena) also allocated a 1/4 portion of the Island. 75 SCRA 234 . Colegado. 74 Phil. Cruz.. Montejo. states that the Island to be purchased shall be considered as their common property. 146 SCRA 282 ). a co-owner's possession of his share is co-possession which is linked to the possession of the other co-owners (Gatchalian vs. The agreement of April 18.
provides that the assignees of the co-owners may take part in the partition of the common property. no prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner against his coowners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership (Valdez vs. An action for partition does not prescribe. now Article 497. 131 SCRA 100 ). 79 SCRA 24 ).2. 51 SCRA 71 . 63 .) On the second issue. Tero vs. Tero. absent a clear repudiation of the co-ownership clearly communicated to the other co-owners. An action for partition does not lie except when the co-ownership is properly repudiated by the co.owner. Pondoc. a provision which implies that the action to demand partition is imprescriptible or cannot be barred by laches (Budlong vs. Olonga. and Article 400 of the Old Code. now Article 494 provides that each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the common property. Article 403 of the Old Civil Code. Coowners cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners.
ISSUE: Whether or not Vicenta can collect rentals from Matilde who occupies and enjoy the property alone as a co-owner. No. Bartolome G. Subsequently. J. for the reason that until a division is made. Vicenta demanded that she be given rental payments by Matilde in occupying the house since she is a co-owner of the property not occupying the same and as such is entitled to its enjoyment and/or fruits. 1912. Moreover. fruits and products thereof. Each co-owner of a property has the right pro-indiviso over the whole property and may use and enjoy the same with no other limitation than that he shall not injure the interests of his co-owners.Pardell v. FACTS: Plaintiff Vicenta Ortiz and defendant Matilde Ortiz are the duly recognized natural daughters of the spouses Miguel and Calixta who died in Vigan. Matilde was excercising her right as a co-owner without being prejudicial to Vicenta who could have also occupied her property had she wanted to. without judicial authorization or extrajudicial agreement took over the administration and enjoyment of the properties as well as collection of the rents. 23 Phil. 64 . the respective part of each holder of a right as a co-owner cannot be determined and every co-owner exercises joint ownership over the pro-indiviso property in addition to his use and enjoyment of the same. Records show no proof that she neither occasioned any detriment to the interest of the community property nor prevented her sister from utilizing the said property in accordance to her right as a co-owner thereof. Matilde occupied the property owned in common in accordance with the purpose for which it is intended. With this. 450 Torres. Prior to the death of their mother. defendants. she executed a will whereby Matilde and Vicenta became the heirs of all her property. Ilocos Sur. The law grants each co-owner the right to use the property for the purpose intended provided that the interest of the co-ownership must not be injured or prejudiced and the other co-owners must not be prevented from using it according to their rights.R. Matilde and her husband occupied the upper storey of the house and the room of the lower floor as an office. HELD: No. L-4656. November 18.
with the consent of Saturnino Benito and Alfredo Benito as shown in their affidavits. Mario died. Court of Appeals G. 1959. Luz Caro and the intestate estate of Mario Benito. Sometime in May 1966. a written offer to redeem the said one-third share. is valid and consequently binding upon the parties. (2) deposition of Saturnino’s widow that she received and showed the notice to husband but the latter was not interested to buy the property. Saturnino Benito. On August 26. J. Mario Benito and Benjamin Benito were the original co-owners of two parcels of land somewhere in Sorsogon. petitioner presented the following secondary evidence to prove the service of notice of the intended sale to possible redemptioners: (1) affidavit of Benjamin Benito attesting to the fact that the possible redemptioners were formally notified in writing of his intention to sell his undivided share.R. 1982. Hence. HELD: The court held that as early as 1960. Benjamin executed a deed of absolute sale of his one-third undivided portion over said parcels of land in favor of herein petitioner. this offer was ignored by the petitioner. Subsequently. During the hearing of the case. as trustee and representative of the heirs of Mario Benito. Luz Caro for the sum of 10. T-609 and T-610 was terminated when Alfredo Benito. FACTS: Alfredo Benito. However. Sometime in 1957. the case was brought to the SC. L-46001.” 65 . March 25. His wife. 113 SCRA 10 Guerrero. represented by administrators Saturnino Benito. co-ownership of the parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. were subsequently appointed as joint administrators of Mario’s estate by the CFI of Sorsogon. she had not been notified of the sale as required by articles 1620 and 1623 of the Civil Code. though oral.000. No. a subdivision title was issued to petitioner Luz Caro over the lot.Caro v. Hence. agreed to subdivide the property. when private respondent Basilia Lahorra learned from a pleading sent to her that petitioner Luz Caro acquired from Benjamin Benito the aforesaid one-third of the undivided share of the subject lands. Basilia Lahorra and his father. However. She sent to petitioner thru counsel. private respondent Basilia Lahorra filed a case for legal redemption and sought to prove that as joint administrator of the estate of Mario Benito. It added that an “agreement of partition. the decision was reversed by the CA. ISSUE: Whether or not co-ownership on the lots in question still exist thereby allowing private respondent Basilia Lahorra to exercise the right of legal redemption. The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner.
before her death. 1988. executed an Escritura De Donacion donating an area of 12. 1272 to Ana de los Reyes and her heirs. built his house thereon and. Fr. the said church was succeeded by the Roman Catholic Bishop of San Fernando. the herein defendant-appellant [private respondent].R. Balanga Cadastre) situated in the Barrio of Puerto Rivas. declared the land for taxation purposes as well as paid the taxes due thereon. Municipality of Balanga. is indicated in the deed of donation. Bailon – Casilao v. as well as her possession of the subject property. Regarding the contention of private respondent that she was not notified of the sale. more or less covered by OCT No. In addition. Pampanga which was. No. to wit. or on 23 August 1936. the then parish priest and administrator of all the properties of the said church in the Municipality of Balanga Bataan. likewise..Prior thereto. A subdivision plan was made and by common agreement Lot 1-C.368 sq. 1272. With respect to its rights over its properties in Bataan (inclusive of Lot No. m (the subject property) of Lot No. Six (6) years later. 1272. Her acceptance of the donation. having an area of 3. she had given the subject property to her nephew who had been living with her.40 meters or 265. Ana de los Reyes died without issue. J. Court of Appeals G. Mariano Sarili. was ceded to petitioner. the court therein saw no difference with respect to a conveyance which took place before the partition agreement. April 15. TCT no. 14379 of de Registry of Deeds for the province of Bataan. the court ruled that since the right of legal redemption does not exist nor apply in this case because admittedly a subdivision title has already been issued in the name of the petitioner on Lot 1-C sold to her. succeeded by Catholic Bishop of Balanga — registered as a corporation on 15 December 1975.A partition for subdivision was then filed for the purpose. His possession of the subject property was never disturbed by anybody until plaintiff- 66 . or in 1939. This was accompanied by the affidavits of Alfredo Benito and Saturnino Benito to the effect that they agree to the segregation of the land owned in common by the three amigos. 78178. which deed. m. notwithstanding the ruling in the Caram case wherein the sale of the property took place after the partition agreement. for unknown reasons. it becomes moot and academic. with an area of 163 hectares. Rev. 160 SCRA 738 Cortes. as a reward for her long and satisfactory service to the church. FACTS: The Roman Catholic Archbishop [sic] of Manila was the owner of a parcel of land (Lot No. through the years. Nevertheless.40 meters by 21. T-4978. It becomes unnecessary to decide whether private respondent complied with the requirements for the exercise of legal redemption under Article 1623 of the New Civil Code. 1272). by virtue of the authority given him by the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila to donate a portion of Lot No. The latter immediately took possession of the property in the concept of owner. was refused registration by the Register of Deeds. Bataan.36 sq.
or more than 49 years after the deed of donation was executed. 165 SCRA 118 Feliciano. there is equally an abundance of cases in the annals of our jurisprudence where we categorically ruled that a registered landowner may lose his right to recover the possession of his registered property by reason of laches. The following are the essential elements of laches: (1) Conduct on the part of the defendant. Intermediate Appellate Court G. petitioner also presented an undated and unnotarized "Kasulatang Pagkilala sa Bilihan Patuluyan ng Bahagui at Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman at Paghahati-hati at Abuyan ng Bahagui" said to have been signed by the respondents in acknowledgment of the existence and validity of the Bilihan in favor of 67 . as will operate as a bar in equity. petitioner (plaintiff below) claimed legal ownership of an undivided three-fourths (3/4) portion of Lot No. (3) Lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit. HELD: Yes. by exercising due diligence. August 30. In her complaint. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is barred to recover the property by the doctrine of laches. to do that which. on 6 December 1977. it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time. FACTS: Petitioner Concepcion Roque. all of the aforegoing elements are attendant in this case. 5236-M) with Branch 2 of the then Court of First Instance of Malolos against respondents Emesto Roque and the heirs of Victor Roque.appellee [petitioner] filed the instant complaint against him on 5 November 1985. or of one under whom he claims. warranting the presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it.R. while petitioner is admittedly still the registered owner of the donated property. and (4) Injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant. Roque v. filed a Complaint for "Partition with Specific Performance" (docketed as Civil Case No. Finally. giving rise to the situation complained of. In support of this claim. (2) Delay in asserting complainant's right after he had knowledge of the defendant's conduct and after he has an opportunity to sue. by virtue of the 27 November 1961 "Bilihan Lubos at Patuluyan" executed in her favor by Emesto Roque and Victor Roque. 1549. we agree with the respondent Court of Appeals that. L-75886. and jurisprudence is settled as to the imprescriptibility and indefeasibility of a Torrens Title. could or should have been done earlier. J. No. It has also been defined as such neglect or omission to assert a right taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances causing prejudice to an adverse party. 32 Under the present circumstances. Laches means the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time. 1988.
1549. Court of Appeals G. He was able to execute an affidavit adjusting to himself the parcel of land and was able to secure the issuance of a Transfer Certificate of Title in his name. by their unreasonably long inaction. she had a right to seek partition of the property." The facts on record clearly show that petitioner Concepcion Roque had been in actual. Later. Galileo was the caretaker of the property. places respondents here in laches: respondents may no longer dispute the existence of the co-ownership between petitioner and themselves nor the validity of petitioner's claim of a threefourths (3/4) interest in Lot No. however. he died. open and continuous possession of a three-fourths (3/4) portion of Lot No. 1549. 1991. Juanita Delima. 68 ." Not once during those sixteen (16) years did respondents contest petitioner's occupation of a three-fourths (3/4) portion of Lot No. as a co-owner of Lot No. to have acquiesced in the coownership. 201 SCRA 641 Medialdea J. insofar as his share is concerned. R. Respondents Ernesto Roque and the legal heirs of Victor Roque. Finally. 1549 ever since execution of the "Bilihan Lubos at Patuluyan" in November of 1961. contented themselves with occupation of only a fourth thereof. The Court notes that it was only in their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim filed with the trial court in December of 1977 — more than sixteen (16) years later — that respondents first questioned the genuineness and authenticity of the "Bilihan Lubos at Patuluyan. 1549. as they claim. This prompted the heirs of his siblings to file a action for reconveyance. as they are deemed. Furthermore. coupled with the passage of a very substantial length of time during which petitioner all the while remained undisturbed and uninterrupted in her occupation and possession. that she could not be compelled to remain in the coownership of the same. Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that "no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership" and that "each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common. This latter circumstance. ISSUE: Whether or not the property is subject to prescription. leaving as his only heirs three brothers and sisters namely: Eulalio Delima. 1549 and rejected the plan to divide the land. No. upon the other hand. Delima v. FACTS: Lino Delima acquired a lot from the friar lands.petitioner. refused to acknowledge petitioner's claim of ownership of any portion of Lot No. HELD: No. L-46296. September 24. it is most unusual that respondents would have allowed or tolerated such prolonged occupation by petitioner of a major portion (3/4) of the land while they. 1549. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner can be compelled to remain in the co-ownership. Galileo Delima and Vicente Delima. petitioner alleged that. are the absolute owners of the whole of Lot No. if indeed it is true that respondents.
obtained a cancellation of the title in the name of their predecessor and the issuance of a new title in his name as the owner. When the co-owner of the property executed a deed of partition and on the strength thereof. the brothers agreed that the deed of sale would be executed and the title registered in the meantime in the name of Senen. By virtue of a written memorandum. Virgilio and Senen agreed that henceforth their interests in the house and lot should be equal. the brothers agreed that Virgilio's share in the co-ownership was two-thirds while that of Senen was one-third.HELD: Yes. the two brothers purchased a house and lot in Parañaque where their father could spend and enjoy his remaining years in a peaceful neighborhood. 76351. with Senen assuming the remaining mortgage obligation of the original owners with the SSS in exchange for his possession and enjoyment of the house together with their father. 2) that such positive acts of repudiation had been made known to the cestui que trust. and were among the seven (7) children of the late Maximiano Aguilar. the imprescriptibility of the action for partition can no longer be invoked or applied when one of the co-owners has adversely possessed the property as exclusive owner for a period sufficient to vest ownership by prescription. the latter filed an action to compel the sale of the house and lot so that the they could divide the proceeds between them. The issuance of a new title constituted a clear act of repudiation of the trust and co-ownership. 1993. and 3) that the evidence thereon should be clear and conclusive. Aguilar v. Initially. In 1969. October 29. petitioner demanded from private respondent that the latter vacate the house and that the property be sold and proceeds thereof divided among them. the question involved is no longer one of partition but of ownership. It is settled that possession by the co-owner or co-heir is that of a trutee. 227 SCRA 472 Bellosillo. No. Court of Appeals G. the following elements must concur: 1) that the trustee has performed unequivocal acts amounting to an ouster of cestui que trust. the statute of limitations started to run for the purposes of the action instituted by the latter seeking a declaration of the existence of the co-ownership and their rights thereafter. From the moment one of the co-owners claims that he is the absolute and exclusive owner of the properties and denies the others any share therein. In order that such possession is considered adverse to the cestui que trust amounting to a repudiation of the co-ownership. In such case. Since Virgilio was then disqualified from obtaining a loan from SSS. Because of the refusal of respondent to give in to petitioner's demands. be divided on the basis of two-thirds (2/3) in his favor and one-third (1/3) to 69 . FACTS: Petitioner Virgilio and respondent Senen are brothers. It was further agreed that Senen would take care of their father and his needs since Virgilio and his family were staying in Cebu.R. In his complaint. J. petitioner prayed that the proceeds of the sale. After Maximiano Aguilar died in 1974.
trial. he was entitled to the use and enjoyment of the property. We uphold the trial court in ruling in favor of petitioner. allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the others. In his answer with counterclaim. Petitioner also prayed for monthly rentals for the use of the house by respondent after their father died. it shall be sold and its proceeds accordingly distributed. the trial court found him and plaintiff to be co-owners of the house and lot. together with his co-participants joint ownership over the pro indiviso property. However. Since petitioner has decided to enforce his right in court to end the co-ownership of the house and lot and respondent has not refuted the allegation that he has been preventing the sale of the property by his continued occupancy of the premises. the reason being that until a division is made. to delay partition. for failure to appear at pre. However. justice and equity demand that respondent and his family vacate the property so that the sale 70 . and (b) the co-owners are not in agreement as to who among them shall be allotted or assigned the entire property upon proper reimbursement of the co-owners. the respective share of each cannot be determined and every co-owner exercises. free of rent. indivisible and the co-owners cannot agree that it be. This is resorted to (1) when the right to partition the property is invoked by any of the co-owners but because of the nature of the property it cannot be subdivided or its subdivision would prejudice the interests of the co-owners. as he may use the property owned in common long as it is in accordance with the purpose for which it is intended and in a manner not injurious to the interest of the other co-owners. and that each co-owner may demand at any time partition of the thing owned in common insofar as his share is concerned. Art. it ruled that plaintiff has been deprived of his participation in the property by defendant's continued enjoyment of the house and lot. that being a co-owner. in addition to his use and enjoyment of the same. The CA set aside the order of the trial court. the proceeds thereof should be divided equally. the trial court held that this property should be sold to a third person and the proceeds divided equally between the parties. except as to the effectivity of the payment of monthly rentals by respondent as co-owner which we here declare to commence only after the trial court ordered respondent to vacate in accordance with its order. 498 of the Code states that whenever the thing is essentially. HELD: Yes. The trial court also upheld the right of plaintiff as co-owner to demand partition. Rendering judgment by default against defendant. despite demands for rentals and continued maneuvers of defendants.respondent. in equal shares on the basis of their written agreement. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner may demand partition of the property. Since plaintiff could not agree to the amount offered by defendant for the former's share. Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. that if the sale would be effected. being a co-owner respondent has the right to use the house and lot without paying any compensation to petitioner. respondent alleged that he had no objection to the sale as long as the best selling price could be obtained. Corollary to this rule. and. 9 Each co-owner of property held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the whole property and may use and enjoy the same with no other limitation than that he shall not injure the interests of his co-owners.
00 per month. FACTS: Juan De Castro died intestate in 1993 leaving a parcel of land located in Morong. As to the issue on prescription. J. for the use and enjoyment of the other half of the property appertaining to petitioner. In fairness to petitioner. Court of Appeals G.200. 2. HELD: 1. No. Court of Appeals 71 . respondent should be held liable for monthly rentals until he and his family vacate. When petitioner filed an action to compel the sale of the property and the trial court granted the petition and ordered the ejectment of respondent. 124262.R. The other heirs filed an action for partition before the Regional Trial Court of Rizal alleging that the sale made by Mariano affected only his undivided share of the lot but not the shares of the other co-owners. Rizal to his heirs. respondent should pay a rental of P1. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other coowners who did not consent to the sale. from the time the trial court ordered him to vacate. with legal interest. The sale of the whole property by a co-owner does not make the sale null and void but it only transfers the rights to the undivided share of the co-owner who made the sale.can be effected immediately. Tomas Claudio Memorial College v. the continued stay of respondent and his family in the house prejudiced the interest of petitioner as the property should have been sold and the proceeds divided equally between them. To this extent and from then on. The Court has consistently ruled that even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his. the co-ownership was deemed terminated and the right to enjoy the possession jointly also ceased.) No. October 12.) Whether or not the action to file for partition has already prescribed. Mariano De Castro one of the heirs sold the said lot to petitioner Tomas Claudio Memorial College by representing that he is the sole owner of the property. the Civil Code provides that no prescription shall lie in favor of a co-owner or co-heirs as long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership. The Regional Trial Court of Rizal dismissed the petitioner’s motion.) Whether or not the sale affected only the undivided share of Mariano 2. Robles v. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the partition for the reason that it has already been barred by prescription. The proper action in a case like this is not nullification nor recovery but a division or partition of the entire property. 1999. ISSUES: 1.) Yes. Thereafter. 316 SCRA 502 Quisimbing.
J. J. March 24. 123509. The plaintiffs alleged that they had been in possession of the land since 1942 and it was only in 1987 that they knew about the foreclosure of the mortgage. Ulpiano who died before Timotea was survived by his son. absent any clear repudiation of the co-ownership.R. With regards to 72 . be construed as a repudiation of the co-ownership. Hilario did not have possession of the subject property. prescription had already set in. Porfirio Galvez. Galvez died intestate and left a parcel of land in La Union. and (3) the evidence thereof is clear and convincing. (2) such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the other co-owner. 328 SCRA 97 Panganiban. HELD: Yes. 2006 Chico – Nazario. 157954. as he in fact did. neither did he exclude the petitioners from the use and the enjoyment thereof.GR. In order that the title may prescribe in favor of a co-owner. he had the right to alienate his share. Hilario effected no clear and evident repudiation of the co-ownership. A n action for quieting of title was filed by respondent Santos. Defendant Rural Bank sold the same to the Spouses Santos. the tax declaration of the parcel of land in the name of Silvino Robles was cancelled and transferred to one Exequiel Ballena. As absolute owner of his undivided interest in the land. as agreed upon by the co-owners. FACTS: Timotea F. No. his act of entering into a mortgage contract with the bank cannot be construed to be a repudiation of the co-ownership. the same was inherited by his widow Maria dela Cruz and his children. Court of Appeals G. He secured a loan from the Cardona Rural Bank. It is a fundamental principle that a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners. She left behind her children Ulpiano and petitioner Paz Galvez. Upon his death. In the present case. private respondent. as they had indisputably shared in its fruits. Galvez vs. The plaintiffs entrusted the payment of the land taxes to their coheir and half-brother. The latter then took possession of the land and declared it in his name for taxation purposes. FACTS: Leon Robles originally owned the land which was inherited by his son Silvino Robles. No. Hilario Tobles. March 14. the following requisites must concur: (1) the coowner has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the other co-owners. For unknown reasons. The assertion that the declaration of ownership was tantamount to repudiation was belied by the continued occupation and possession of the disputed property by the petitioners as owners. Likewise. ISSUE: Whether or not the action has prescribed in favour of Hilario Robles. Neither should his payment of land taxes in his name. 2000. The Court of Appeals ruled that because of the plaintiff’s inaction for more than 20 years. which was foreclosed for failure to pay the mortgage debt wherein the defendant bank emerged as the highest bidder during the auction sale. Inc. father of Andres Robles who is the wife of the defendant Hilario Robles.
we find that Paz Galvez effected no clear and evident repudiation of the co-ownership. and notorious possession of the property for the period required by law. The equitable remedy of laches is. Laches cannot be used to defeat justice or perpetrate fraud and injustice.) No. ISSUES: 1.00.the property of Timotea. On the matter of laches. unavailing in this case. Having knowledge of such sale. without the knowledge and consent of Porfirio. Prescription.) Whether or not Carlos Tam and Tycoon Properties are buyers in good faith and for value and has the right to rely on the face of the title? HELD: 1.) No. However. Tam thereafter filed an application for registration for said parcel of land. Neither should its application be used to prevent the rightful owners of a property from recovering what has been fraudulently registered in the name of another. (3) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive.) Whether or not the claim of Porfirio Galvez which is based on an implied trust has already prescribed because the action was filed 24 years after Paz Galvez repudiated the said trust? 2. Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that "a prescription shall not run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs as long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership. Porfirio filed a complaint for Legal Redemption with Damages and Cancellation of documents against petitioner which was affirmed by the lower court and the Court of Appeals. Porifirio was surprised to discover that Paz executed an affidavit of adjudication stating that she is the true and lawful owner of the said property. absent any clear repudiation of the co-ownership. In this case. (2) such an act of repudiation is clearly made known to the other co-owners. The act of repudiation. Inc. The execution of the affidavit of selfadjudication does not constitute such sufficient act of repudiation as contemplated under the law as to effectively exclude Porfirio Galvez from the property. is subject to certain conditions: (1) a co-owner repudiates the coownership." It is a fundamental principle that a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners. continuous. therefore. as a mode of terminating a relation of coownership. it is hornbook doctrine that laches is a creation of equity and its application is controlled by equitable considerations. Moreover.) Whether or not the claim of Porfirio Galvez which is based on an implied trust is already banned by laches because he failed to assert his alleged right for almost 24 years? 3. exclusive. 2. it is supposed to pass to Paz and Porfirio. must have been preceded by repudiation (of the co-ownership). and (4) he has been in possession through open.000. Paz sold the property to petitioner Carlos Tam for P10. in turn. 73 . Subsequently. This Court has repeatedly expressed its disapproval over the obvious bad faith of a co-heir feigning sole ownership of the property to the exclusion of the other heirs essentially stating that one who acts in bad faith should not be permitted to profit from it to the detriment of others. Tam sold the property to Tycoon Properties.
for a period of repurchase being 3 years. that did not make him the owner of all of it. herein the private respondents. she died without being able to redeem the lot. Efforts to compromise were made but failed.) No. herein petitioner Rustico Adille. who owned a parcel of lot in Albay was married twice. however. This notwithstanding.’s claim that they are buyers in good faith. No. January 29.3. mortgaged the land to Far East Bank and Trust Company for the sum of P11. Moreover. Inc. ISSUES: 1. FACTS: Felisa Alzul. private respondents filed a present case of partition with accounting on the position that he was only a trustee on an implied trust when he redeemed the lot. The lower court was in favor of the petitioner. J. petitioner Rustico repurchased. It was alleged that Felisa sold the property in pacto de retro to certain 3 rd persons.172. As to petitioners Carlos Tam and Tycoon Properties. same fails to persuade. 2. Emeteria Asejo was occupying a portion.) Whether or not prescription has set in. Significantly. 1988 Sarmiento. he sold the property to Tycoon Properties. it was reversed by the Court of Appeals. It must be noted that Carlos Tam received a copy of the summons and the complaint on 22 September 1994. Inc. So it is that the "honesty of intention" which constitutes good faith implies a freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put a person on inquiry. The first was with Bernabe Adille whom she had an only child. While the records show that the petitioner redeemed the property in its entirety. it turned out that one of the private respondents. All these attendant circumstances negate petitioners’ claim of good faith. However. A purchaser in good faith and for value is one who buys the property without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in such property and pays its fair price before he has notice of the adverse claims and interest of another person in the same property. In other words.R. shouldering the expenses therefore.600. it did not put to end the existing state of co-ownership. Carlos Tam is also an owner of Tycoon Properties. his halfbrothers and sisters. Court of Appeals G.) Whether or not a co-owner can acquire an exclusive ownership over the property held in common. The right of repurchase may be exercised by a co-owner with aspect to his share alone. After her death but during the period of redemption. L-45546. "Tam did not exert efforts to determine the previous ownership of the property in question" and relied only on the tax declarations in the name of Paz Galvez.) No. Despite the inscription.40390. HELD: 1. by himself alone the said lot. Tycoon Properties. to the extent of 45%. he executed a deed of extrajudicial partition by himself. A notice of lis pendens dated 8 July 1997 filed with the Registry of Deeds of the Province of La Union was inscribed on TCT No. T. Afterwards. The second was with Procopio Asejo whom she had three children. Inc. on 27 September 1994. Necessary 74 . Thus. Inc. Adille vs.
He cannot therefore be said to have "made known" his efforts to deny the co-ownership. Failure on the part of all the co-owners to redeem it entitles the vendee a retro to retain the property and consolidate title thereto in his name. Emeteria Asejo. Under Article 488 of the Civil Code. FACTS: Petitioner Arnelito Adlawan. Adlawan vs. exclusive. he sought to recover possession of that portion Emeteria is occupying only as a counterclaim. (3) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive. as we said. 2006 Ynares – Santiago. that is. it provides that each co-owner shall have a right to compel the other co-owners to contribute to the expenses of preservation of the thing or right owned in common and to the taxes. respondents Narcisa 75 . subject to his right to collect reimbursement from the remaining co-owners.R. Prescription. he cannot claim exclusive right to the property owned in common. in turn is subject to certain conditions: (1) a co-owner repudiates the coownership. 2. Adlawan G. (2) such an act of repudiation is clearly made known to the other co-owners. on the contrary.) We hold in the negative. is occupying a portion of the land up to the present. No such waiver shall be made if it is prejudicial to the co-ownership. 161916. the petitioner has not taken pains to eject her therefrom.expenses may be incurred by one co-owner. yet. It does not provide for a mode of terminating a co-ownership. liable to him for reimbursement as and for their shares in redemption expenses. The instant case shows that the petitioner had not complied with these requisites. No. We are not convinced that he had repudiated the co-ownership. Any one of the latter may exempt himself from this obligation by renouncing so much of his undivided interest as may be equivalent to his share of the expenses and taxes. As a matter of fact. as a mode of terminating a relation of coownership. if there is one. and (4) he has been in possession through open. Registration of property is not a means of acquiring ownership. J. It operates as a mere notice of existing title. But the provision does not give to the redeeming co-owner the right to the entire property. While a vendee a retro. The act of repudiation. “may not be compelled to consent to a partial redemption. While his half-brothers and sisters are. Moreover. he had deliberately kept the private respondents in the dark by feigning sole heirship over the estate under dispute. the acknowledged illegitimate child of Dominador Adlawan filed an ejejctment suit against the siblings of his father. and only after the private respondents had first sought judicial relief. There is no doubt that redemption of property entails a necessary expense. January 20. and notorious possession of the property for the period required by law.” the redemption by one co-heir or co-owner of the property in its totality does not vest him ownership over it. Neither does the fact that the petitioner had succeeded in securing title over the parcel in his name terminate the existing co-ownership. under Article 1613 of the Code. continuous. must have been preceded by repudiation (of the co-ownership). one of the private respondents. The result is that the property remains to be in a condition of co-ownership.
Later. It includes forcible entry and unlawful detainer (accion interdictal). It is clear therefore that petitioner cannot validly maintain the instant action considering that he does not recognize the co-ownership that necessarily flows from his theory of succession to the property of his father. the RTC lost sight of the fact that the theory of succession invoked by petitioner would end up proving that he is not the sole owner of the subject lot. recovery of possession (accion publiciana) and recovery of ownership (accion de reinvindicacion). the action will not prosper. Graciana and petitioner became co-owners of the subject lot and house. Graciana. It should be stressed. Graciana. According to the renowned civilest. the action should be dismissed. This so because Dominador was survived not only by petitioner but also by his legal wife. HELD: No. without the necessity of joining all the other coowners as co-plaintiffs. Being the sole heir of Dominador. they refused and filed instead an action for quieting of title. Petitioner averred that he is an acknowledged illegitimate son and the sole heir of Dominador. However. A co-owner may bring such action without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is presumed to have been filed to benefit his co-owners. In this case. They also argued that even if petitioner is indeed Dominador’s acknowledged illegitimate son. because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. Spouses Ramon and Oligia needed money to finance the renovation of their house. when he verbally requested respondents to vacate the house and lot.and Emeterio Adlawan. They claimed that the said lot was originally registered in the name of their deceased parents. the respondents. he explained that “a co-owner may bring such an action. they transferred ownership of the lot to Dominador who was the only one in the family who had a college education. Graciana did not disturb respondents’ possession of the property until they died. his right to succeed is doubtful because Dominador was survived by his wife. Petitioner then contended that even granting that he is a co-owner. In answer. Since they were not qualified to obtain a loan. However. Professor Arturo M. 70 and 59 years of age respectively denied that they begged petitioner to allow them to say on the property since they have been staying there since birth. that where the suit is for the benefit of the petitioner alone who claims to be the sole owner and entitled to the possession of the litigated property. Dominador. Tolentino. he granted their plea to occupy the subject property provided they would vacate the same should his need for the property arise. By intestate succession. This article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can validly maintain the instant case of ejectment. it is not disputed that petitioner brought the suit for unlawful detainer in his name alone and for his own benefit to the exclusion of the heirs of Graciana as he even executed an affidavit of self-adjudication over the disputed property. he alleged that out of respect and generosity to respondents. 76 . who died 10 years after the death of Dominador. he can file the instant case pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code. such that he claims possession for himself and not for the co-ownership. Dominador and his wife. If the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone. however. He then also filed a complaint for ejectment. he executed an affidavit adjudicating the house and lot owned by his father. Ramon and Oligia Adlawan.
Moreover.Sumipat v. ISSUE: Whether or not a co-ownership was formed from the said deed. Placida and petitioners jointly administered the properties. their neighbor Benjamin Rivera lifted the body of Lauro whereupon Lydia guided his hand in affixing his signature on the document. In this case. The Court declared that the deeds of sale questioned therein are not merely voidable but null and void ab initio as the supposed seller declared under oath that she signed the deeds without knowing what they were. HELD: No.R. she filed a complaint for declaration of partition disclaiming any partition in the execution of the subject document. Lydia left but later returned on the same day and requested Lauro’s unlettered wife. Where the deed of donation fails to show the acceptance. Lauro Sumipat. 155810. or where the formal notice of the acceptance. On the document. FACTS: The spouses Placida Tabo-tabo and Lauro Sumipat acquired three parcels of land. After Lauro’s death. it was alleged that Lauro executed it when he was already very sick and bedridden that upon petitioner Lydia’s request. the donation is null and void. however. but that she had not given her consent at all. the Court added. J. Lauro executed a document denominated “Deed of Absolute Transfer and/or Quit-Claim over Real Properties” in favor of the petitioners. Placida. the deed as an instrument of donation is patently void. the donees’ acceptance of the donation is not manifested either in the deed itself or in a separate document. that her consent was not merely marred by vices of consent so as to make the contracts voidable. sired five illegitimate children. They are the petitioners herein. is either not given to the donor or else not noted in the deed of donation and in the separate acceptance. Hence. made in a separate instrument. shall be entitled to one-half (1/2) of all the fruits or produce of the parcels of land for their subsistence and support. As wife’s share in the produce of the properties dwindled. 50% of the produce went to his wife. 77 . A perusal of the deed reveals that it is actually a gratuitous disposition of property — a donation — although Lauro Sumipat imposed upon the petitioners the condition that he and his wife. it appears that the signature of his wife. The couple was childless. August 13. Placida which indicates that she gave her marital consent. Placida to sign on the said document. Banga G. No. The significant circumstance meant. 2004 Tinga. his wife.
203 SCRA 118 Bidin. J. As a general rule. Hence. and to have been in continuous and adverse possession of the property since 1911. one of which is a tax declaration of the said lots. tax declaration and survey plan are not conclusive and indisputable basis of one’s ownership of the property in question. On the other hand.Rizal Cement Co. No. HELD: Yes. The spouses Cervo declared the property for taxation purposes in the name of the wife. February 28. Inc. it is provided in the Civil Code that possession is acquired by the material occupation of a thing or the exercise of a right or by the fact that it is subject to the action of our will. that these lots originally belong to one Maria Certeza. Wong v. v. The CA gave credence to the testimony of the witnesses for respondents. 50264. Ana. that upon her death. 1 and 2 of Plan Psu-147662. On appeal. the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the CFI. after finality of said decision.R. and that the lots were given by the latter to Justice de Joya as the latter’s attorney’s fees.. 1991. the spouses Cervo had the two lots surveyed first in 1950 and then in 1955. L-30272. the property was involved in a litigation between her grandchildren and Gonzalo Certeza. this petition was filed. The CA denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Petitioner’s evidence. or by the proper acts or legal formalities established for acquiring such right. that the lots were then sold by de Joya to Filomeno Sta. who in turn sold the same to spouses Victoriano Cervo and Ignacia Guillermo in 1939. petitioner submitted documentary evidence. 1985.015 sq. that sometime in November 1955. Mercado only began to harvest the coconut fruits but he never placed anyone 78 . designated as Lot Nos.. Assessment alone is of little value as proof of title. The Court of First Instance denied the application for registration of respondents and ordered the issuance of a decree of registration in the name of Rizal Cement Co. Villareal G. FACTS: Respondents are applicants for the registration of two agricultural lands located in Rizal. To substantiate this claim. Mere tax declaration does not vest ownership of the property upon defendant. and paid for the realty taxes thereon. Carpio G. Ignacia Guillermo.. that prior to the sale. having bought the same from Maria Certeza. consisting of tax receipts. They presented testimonial and documentary evidence appearing that the property applied for. October 21. oppositor (Rizal Cement Company) claims to be the owner of the subject lots. have a total area of 26. the said spouses sold the lots to herein applicants as shown by a duly notarized deed of sale. 135 SCRA 15 Cuevas. m. J.R. No. FACTS: William Giger sold a parcel of land through a pacto de recto sale to Manuel Mercado. ISSUE: Whether or not respondents had been in actual possession of the land in question.
took him to Kidapawan. however. Immediately after the partition. if there are two possessions. petitioner demanded that Ayco vacate the premises but such demand proved futile. notwithstanding the execution of the instrument. to transfer his hut to petitioner's lot. coconut trees and other fruit-bearing trees. 235 SCRA 307 Quiason. the present possessor shall be preferred. then delivery has not been effected. the thing shall be placed in judicial deposit pending determination of its possession or ownership through proper proceedings. He would visit the property every three months or on weekened when he had time. FACTS: Wilfredo Mabugat and Nicanor Somodio bought a residential lot situated at Rajah Muda. the purchaser cannot have the enjoyment and material tenancy of the thing and make use of it herself.over the land to watch it." And that the execution of a sale thru a public instrument shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing. or by the proper acts and legal formalities for acquiring such right. and if these conditions are equal. the later sale a retro in favor of petitioner failed to pass the possession of the property because there is an impediment — the possession exercised by private respondent. In 1976. Meanwhile.R. petitioner took possession of his portion and planted thereon ipil-ipil trees. if the dates of possession are the same. and fenced the boundaries. however. Petitioner and Mabugat partitioned the property into two portions. HELD: It should be stressed that "possession is acquired by the material occupation of a thing or the exercise of a right. 1994. on 79 . General Santos. Court of Appeals G. Thereafter. After finding there was none. No. constructed a farmhouse. the one longer in possession. and he left the unfinished structure to the case of his uncle. J. Somodio v. His employment. Ignacio Wong inspected the land to see if whether there was anyone claiming the land. with petitioner taking the western part. 1983. Applying the above pronouncements on the instant case. or by the fact that it is subject to the action of our will. Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in two different personalities except in the cases of co-possession. He couldn't register the sale due to some technicalities. petitioner filed an action for unlawful detainer with damages against respondent Ayco. August 15. Neither did he reside in the land nor was there any hut constructed thereon to show possession. He placed workers on the land. unless there is stipulation to the contrary. Sometime in October 1977. and accordingly. ISSUE: Whether or not the possession of the disputed land belongs to Ignacio Wong. Bula. because such tenancy and enjoyment are opposed by another. 82680. petitioner allowed respondent Felomino Ayco. Should a question arise regarding the fact of possession. the one who presents a title. North Cotabato. Hence. it is clear that possession passed from vendor William Giger to private respondent Manuel Mercado by virtue of the first sale a retro. About six years later. If. petitioner began construction of a structure with a dimension of 22-by-18 feet on his lot. on August 23. he bought the land from Giger.
after the 1952 proceedings. Maglucot G. 1639 in accordance with the sketch plan.R. however. No. 39 Phil. the original co-owners occupied specific portions of Lot No. petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest. 2032-II. 1639 was filed because two of the co-owners. 329 SCRA 78 Kapunan. and each paying rentals therefor. HELD: Yes.June 26. 1983. or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right. By virtue of this agreement. said respondents stopped paying rentals claiming ownership over the subject lot alleging they had a right over the land because such was not partitioned and they were co-owners. Said case was later consolidated with Civil Case No. refused to have said lot subdivided and have separate certificates of title. Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in possession (Ramos v. both surnamed Maglucot. namely Hermogenes Olis and heirs of Pascual Olis. It is immaterial that the building was unfinished and that he left for Kidapawan for employment reasons and visited the property only intermittently. Manglucot-Aw thus filed a complaint for recovery of possession and damages against Manglucot. who represented the heirs of Roberto Maglucot. Leopoldo and Severo. Subsequently. Ruperta Salma. 2013-I.ipil trees and fruit trees. Article 531 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides that possession is acquired by the material occupation of a thing or the exercise of a right. Four days later. ipil. the parties in this case by themselves and/or through their predecessors-in-interest occupied specific portions of Lot No. Significantly. rented portions of subject lot in 1964 and 1969. or by the fact that it is subject to the action of our will. J. It was only in 1952 when the petition to subdivide Lot No. In December 1992. he started the construction of a building on the property. Maglucot – Aw v. ISSUE: Whether or not Manglucot-Aw may recover possession by virtue of a valid partition. 2000. respectively. petitioner filed against respondent Purisima a complaint for forcible entry before the same court docketed as Civil Case No. Director of Lands. 1639. Said respondents built houses on their corresponding leased lots. March 28. respondent Ebenecer Purisima entered the land and constructed a house thereon.00 per annum to Mrs. Guillermo Maglucot rented a portion of the subject lot. Sometime in 1963. 175 ). 1639. FACTS: Sometime in 1946 there was a prior oral agreement to tentatively partition Lot No. They paid the rental amount of P100. Petitioner took possession of the property sometime in 1974 when he planted the property to coconut trees. ISSUE: Whether or not Somodio has actual possession of the property. It is sufficient that petitioner was able to subject the property to the action of his will. In 1976. 80 . 132518.
In this case. the father of the petitioners. 2000. appealable because it decides the rights of the parties upon the issue submitted. Moreover. During the cadastral survey. thus. by reason of their conduct. However. Margarito and Sinforoso are brothers. In this case. contrary to Article 536 of the Civil Code. The purpose of court approval is to give effect to the sketch/subdivision plan. This statement is not to be taken to mean that confirmation of the commissioners may be dispensed with but only that the parties herein are estopped from raising this question by their own acts of ratification of the supposedly non-binding sketch/subdivision plan. the probative value of petitioners’ tax receipts and declarations paled in comparison with respondent’s proof of ownership of the disputed parcel. However. the tax declaration in the name of Sinforoso Mendoza of the contested lot was cancelled and subsequently declared in the name of Margarito Mendoza. Rizal was declared for taxation purposes in the name of Sinforoso Mendoza. Sinforoso died in 1930. where. considerable expense has been incurred in the execution of the commission. 81 . The petitioners contended otherwise that she came into possession through force and violence. the proceedings of the commissioners without being confirmed by the court are not binding upon the parties.HELD: Yes. they cannot thereafter question the decree. Respondents in this case have occupied their respective lots in accordance with the sketch/subdivision plan. exclusive and continuous possession by respondent since 1985 gave her a better title under Article 538 of the Civil Code. No. but show by their conduct that they have assented thereto. J. An order for partition is final and not interlocutory and. especially. April 6. FACTS: The petitioners Fernanda Mendoza Cequeña and Eduarda Apiado sought for the ownership and possession of the land occupied by the respondent Honorata Bolante. the purpose of the court approval has been met. They cannot after acquiescing to the order for more than forty (40) years be allowed to question the binding effect thereof. Prior to 1954. The trial court rendered the petitioners as the lawful owner and possessors of the land. It was said to be insufficient to overcome the denial of respondent and her mother. 137944. where parties do not object to the interlocutory decree. On the basis of an affidavit. clearly. The actual. the land in Binangonan. Under the present rule. this rule does not apply in case where the parties themselves actualized the supposedly unconfirmed sketch/subdivision plan. the Court of Appeals reversed the decision because the genuineness and the due execution of the affidavit. Nevertheless. both the order of partition and the unconfirmed sketch plan are. interlocutory.R. Bolante G. Cequeña v. another brother of the petitioners. 1639 in 1952 and continue to do so until the present until this case was filed. respondent Honorata is the present occupant of the land together with Miguel Mendoza. 330 SCRA 216 Panganiban. the parties themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest implemented the sketch plan made pursuant to a court order for partition by actually occupying specific portions of Lot No. physical. the father of respondent. hence.
the declaration of the land for tax purposes does not prove ownership.) No. exclusive and continuous possession of the land. In the absence of actual public and adverse possession. as the respondent also acquired it before 1985. HELD: 1. they constitute mere prima facie proof of ownership or possession of the property for which taxes have been paid. physical. as well as the respondent and her mother were simultaneously in adverse possession of the land.ISSUES: 1. 82 . benefitting from her father’s tax declaration of the subject lot since 1926. 2.) Whether or not tax declarations and receipts are conclusive evidence of ownership or possession.) Whether or not the respondent has the actual. the respondent is the preferred possessor because. 2. On the other hand. Possession by the petitioner before 1985 was not exclusive. Based on Article 538 of the Civil Code.) Yes. she has been in possession thereof for a longer period. The petitioners’ claim of ownership of the whole parcel has no legal basis. At most. Tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership. petitioners’ father acquired joint possession only in 1952. The records show that the petitioners’ father and brother.
1990. through its proper representatives. under an undisputed claim of ownership. Corollary. torrents. though. such as roads. That there are strong reasons to believe that the land in question was originally well above the ebb and flow of the tide and only in later years have the waters risen to such a height along the shores of the Bay of Manila at this point as to cover the land in question completely at high tide. Court of Appeals G. and others of similar character. that possessory title over the land in question was duly registered in favor of petitioner. to wit: (1) By the abandonment of the thing. (2) By an assignment made to another either by onerous or gratuitous title. 80294. a possessor may lose his possession under the circumstances provided under Article 555 of the New Civil Code. 19 Phil. L-6019. 1911. it cannot be ascertained definitely whether it is due to changes in the current and flow of the waters in the bay. (3) By the destruction or total loss of the thing. objected to the application for registration pursuant to the Land Registration Act of a small lot of parcel of land being instituted by herein petitioner. or because it goes out of commerce. Catholic Vicar Apostolic of the Mountain Province v. canals. ports and bridges constructed by the State. banks. then it is just and proper to register said land in their name. paragraph 1 of the New Civil Code which provides that the following things are property of public dominion: (1) Those intended for public use. or to the gradual sinking of the land along the coast. The Court held that since the foregoing enumerations with respect to the loss of possession was not conclusively established by the representatives of the government. and the fact that the owners of the land in question have never intended to abandon the same. But the real right of possession is not lost till after the lapse of ten years. Insular Government G. rivers. It appears. if the new possession has lasted longer than one year.R. March 23. roadstead. subject to the provisions of Article 537. shores. Juan Aragon on the ground that said land forms part of the public domain applying the provisions of subsection 1 of Article 339 of the old Civil Code. March 25. Article 539 of the New Civil Code which provides that every possessor has a right to be protected in his possession. and (4) By the possession of another.R. 83 . he shall be protected in or restored to said possession by the means established by the laws and the Rules of Court. J. No. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled ownership over the land in question. and that the applicant and their predecessors in interest have been in possession of the parcel of land in question. HELD: The Court affirmed the decree entered by the lower court in favor of petitioner applying the provisions of Article 446 of the old Civil Code. 223 Carson. however. and should he be disturbed therein. J. 183 SCRA 639 Gancayco. FACTS: The Government of the Philippine Islands. now Article 420.Aragon v. No.
FACTS: CA-G. The present actions that were instituted in the Regional Trial Court by private respondents are actions for recovery of possession (accion publiciana) and not for recovery of ownership (accion reivindicatoria). 38830-R. if the new possession has lasted longer than one year. it had been in adverse possession of the same for at least 11 years. But the real right of possession is not lost till after the lapse of ten years. However. In the said decision. 84 . In separate motions for reconsideration filed by private respondents Heirs of Octaviano and Heirs of Juan Valdez relating to the same decision. finds that the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the private respondents to be entitled to the possession thereof. the appellate court found that the petitioner was not entitled to confirmation of its imperfect title to Lots 2 and 3. On August 12. Thus. therefore.” In the case at bar. it is clear that the petitioner was in possession of the said property as borrower in commodatum from private respondents since 1906. Pursuant to the said decision in CA-G. Effectively. the Court of Appeals denied both motions. Said lots are part of the public domain. therefore.R.R. 38830-R was a land registration case where petitioner and private respondents were asking for confirmation of their alleged imperfect titles to the lots in question under Section 49 (b) of the Public Land Act. the action for recover of possession of said property filed by private respondents against petitioner must fail. HELD: Yes. No. Hence. when petitioner filed its application for registration of the said property in 1962. subject to the provisions of Article 537. in the said decision the appellate court ruled that neither the petitioner nor the private respondents are entitled to the confirmation of imperfect title over said two lots. the two lots in question remained part of the public lands. in 1951 petitioner repudiated the trust when it declared the property for tax purposes under its name. they also asked that said two lots be registered in their names. Much less can they pretend to be owners thereof. The Court. This is the only logical conclusion when the appellate court found that neither the petitioner nor private respondents are entitled to confirmation of imperfect title over said lots. No. Under Article 555 (4) of the Civil Code. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the possession of the subject lots. 1977. it is provided that a possessor may lose his possession “by the possession of another.
against which he had drawn the check. Ownership in the thing sold shall not pass to the buyer until full payment of the purchase only if there is a stipulation to that effect. 1990. delivery of the thing sold will effectively transfer ownership to the buyer who can in turn transfer it to another. Non-payment only creates a right to demand payment or to rescind the contract. Nevertheless. which arrested Cruz whose real name was Tomas de la Peña. If the possessor of a movable lost or of which the owner has been unlawfully deprived has acquired it in good faith at a public sale.EDCA Publishing & Distributing Corp. But absent the stipulation above noted. 2. and forced their way into the store of the Santos and threatened her with prosecution for buying stolen property.R. payable on delivery. Article 559 of the Civil Code provides that the possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title. A contract of sale is perfected once agreement is reached between the parties on the subject matter and the consideration. April 26.) Whether or not EDCA was unlawfully deprived of the books because the check issued by the impostor in payment therefor was dishonored. ISSUES: 1. Cruz had no account with the Philippine Amanah Bank. EDCA prepared the corresponding invoice and delivered the books as ordered. 85 . (EDCA). 134 SCRA 614 Cruz. J. the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid therefor. No. one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof. for which Cruz issued a check. Santos sued for recovery of the books after demand for their return was rejected by EDCA. FACTS: Jose Cruz ordered by telephone 406 books from EDCA Publishing and Distributing Corp. EDCA having become suspicious over a second order placed by Cruz even before clearing of his first check. Otherwise. Therefore. 80298. EDCA went to the police. EDCA was not unlawfully deprived of the books. The fact that he had not yet paid for them to EDCA was a matter between him and EDCA and did not impair the title to the books acquired by the Santos spouses. the rule is that such ownership shall pass from the vendor to the vendee upon the actual or constructive delivery of the thing sold even if the purchase price has not yet been paid. HELD: 1. EDCA sought the assistance of the police. Cruz sold 120 of the books to Leonor Santos who paid him after verifying the seller's ownership from the invoice he showed her. Cruz acquired ownership over the books which he could then validly transfer to the private respondents. Further. may recover it from the person in possession of the same. Santos. Subsequently.) Whether or not EDCA had the right to cease the books that were sold to Santos. Actual delivery of the books having been made.) No. v. EDCA was not unlawfully deprived of the books and Santos had rights over the books. G. They seized the 120 books.) No. or to criminal prosecution in the case of bouncing checks. 2. made inquiries with the De la Salle College where he had claimed to be a dean and was informed that there was no such person in its employ. Meanwhile.
Between a common law principle and statutory provision. No. Nevertheless. Mr. Angelita Hinahon who in turn got it from. concluded that it was the very ring that plaintiff bought from him in 1947. ISSUE: Whether or not de Garcia’s possession of the ring in good faith confers her title to the said ring. Two or three days later. cannot be applied in a case which is covered by an express provision of the new Civil Code. The only exception the law allows is when there is acquisition in good faith of the possessor at a public sale. in which case the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price. Col. 86 . Cementina of Pasay PD. It is thus immediately apparent that there is no merit to the contention raised in the first assigned error that her possession in good faith. the law imposes the loss upon the party who. January 30. the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid therefor. 1971. Guevarra explained to de Garcia that that ring was the very same ring stolen from her. has acquired it in good faith at a public sale. Respondent Court of Appeals was so convinced from the evidence submitted that the owner of the ring in litigation is such respondent. her husband Lt. equivalent to title. having been unlawfully deprived of the diamond ring in question. HELD: No. at the request of Guevarra. L-20264. Respondent Angelina D. In trial. Rebullida examined the ring with the aid of high power lens and after consulting the stock card thereon. while talking to Consuelo de Garcia. Lt. de Garcia and her attorney proceeded to the store of Mr. by his misplaced confidence. Juan Guevara. de Garcia who was found in possession of the same. one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof may recover it from the person in possession of the same. sufficed to defeat respondent Guevara's claim. Guevarra asked where de Garcia bought the ring to which de Garcia answered that she bought it from her comadre. Court of Appeals G. The common law principle that where one of two innocent persons must suffer by a fraud perpetrated by the another. specifically Article 559. The controlling provision is Article 559 of the Civil Code which provides that possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title. she. even on that assumption the owner can recover the same once she can show illegal deprivation. Angelina Guevarra. FACTS: On October 11.R. Hon. was entitled to recover it from petitioner Consuelo S. J. recognized her ring in the finger of the latter which she lost sometime in February 1952. The ring was returned to defendant who despite a written request therefor failed to deliver the ring to plaintiff. de Garcia said that she bought the ring from Mrs. 1953. De Garcia handed the ring to Guevarra and the ring fitted her finger. Miranda who got it from Mrs. Aling Petring who was boarding in her house. If the possessor of a movable lost of which the owner has been unlawfully deprived. 37 SCRA 129 Fernando. the latter must prevail in this jurisdiction.De Garcia v. As the above cases demonstrate. Guevara. has enabled the fraud to be committed. Rebullida to whom they showed the ring in question.
Dizon v. She entered into a transaction with Clarita Sison. He bought the vehicles purportedly for his father. The check though was dishonored by the bank on the ground that the check’s value has been materially altered. 559 of the civil code applies and the defense that the pawnshop acquired possession of the without notice of any defect in the title of the pledgor is unavailing. HELD: Yes. Art. This was 87 . SC affirmed CA decision. After a lapse of a considerable amount of time. Suntay through her counsel. the receipt was delivered to Suntay. Upon delivery to him of the vehicles. he paid a manager’s check drawn against PCIB. September 29. L-30817. FACTS: Two motor vehicles—Honda Gemini and Holden Premiere Model—were purchased from Citiwide Motors by a person who identified himself as Jojo Consunji. FACTS: Lourdes Suntay is the owner of a 3 carat diamond ring. Owner of a diamond ring may recover the possession of the same from a pawnshop where another person had pledged it without authority to do so. Dizon is engaged in a business where presumably ordinary prudence would manifest itself to ascertain whether or not an individual who is offering a jewelry by way of a pledge is entitled to do so. No.R. wrote to Dizon asking for the delivery of the ring pledged but. On appeal. Ledesma v. ISSUE: Whether or not the owner of the ring may recover its possession from the pawnshop owner. Neither the promptings of equity nor the mandates of moral right and natural justice come to his rescue. Dizon sought the reversal of the lower court’s decision and invoking estoppel. If no such care be taken he should be the last to complain if thereafter the right of the true owner of such jewelry should be recognized. J. 47 SCRA 160 Fernando. 1992. Court of Appeals G. Suntay G.600. Sison delivered the pawnshop ticket to Suntay. She filed an action for recovery with P 500 as attorney’s fees and costs.R. J. After insistent demands. The CFI of Manila issued the writ and Suntay was able to regain possession during the pendency of the action. No. CA affirmed the lower court’s decision. The lower court rendered a decision in favor of Suntay. September 1. She asked for the remedy of replevin upon filing the requisite bond pending final determination of the action. 213 SCRA 195 Davide. 86051.00. wherein said ring was delivered to the latter for sale on commission. the latter refused. 1972. Upon receiving the ring. the ring was not yet returned and so Suntay demanded for its return from Sison but the latter could not comply as she had already pledged it with Dizon’s pawnshop for P 2.
88 . There was a perfected unconditional contract of sale between Citiwide Motors and Suarez. This being the case. ISSUE: Whether or not CITIWIDE MOTORS has been unlawfully deprived. was discovered to be sold to Ledesma. Citiwide Motors was able to recover. HELD: No. It is thus not entitled to the return of the vehicle from Ledesma who bought the property in good faith and for consideration. but merely allows the prejudiced party to sue for specific performance or rescission of the sale. The Holden car was recovered after being abandoned somewhere in Quezon City. The subsequent dishonor of the check merely amounted to failure of consideration which doesn't render a contract of sale void. The Honda on the other hand.reported to the police authorities and it was found out that the person misrepresenting himself was actually Suarez who had a long line of criminal cases against him for his modus operandi. Citiwide motors wasn't unlawfully deprived of the property. Ledesma averred he purchased the vehicle in good faith from one Neyra. as evidenced by his certificate of registration.
and that while he was in possession thereof. died on May 17. Hence. 1934. J.303 square meters.R. a portion thereof was occupied by Azarcon et al. Victoria P. Azarcon et al. as the order of execution did not expressly prohibit Azarcon et al. 1959. it cannot be said that they committed an act which is clear violation of the court’s order. Under the law. Gregorio Z. 1933. husband of the plaintiff Felipa Cordero and father of the other plaintiffs surnamed Ocampo. Bulacan.Azarcon and Abobo v. 123 SCRA 532 Abad Santos. Alejandro Berboso and Dalmacio Montaos. While the court order of October 3. a person. from gathering the pending fruits. FACTS: Mr. which fruits were the result of their possession and cultivation of the land. Cabral G. The said deceased left several properties. occupied a portion. 1983. 1955 ordered them to move out of the premises. and a writ of execution ordering Azarcon et al. upon verification. Eusebio filed a complaint in the CFI of Nueva Ecija. alleging that he had acquired a big parcel of land by lease from the Bureau of Lands. Cabral claimed to be the owner of said portion while her co-defendants co-possessed the same as her tenants. Eusebio G. which were inherited by the plaintiffs including the land in question which parcel of land was originally registered in accordance with the Land Registration Act on December 14. Manuel Azarcon and Esteban Abobo. has the right to a part of the net harvest. to restore possession of the land to Eusebio was issued on October 3. 1958. The plaintiffs demanded of the defendants to surrender to the former possession of the portion of land and/or vacate it but they refused and failed to do so.R. Cordero v. HELD: Yes. was possessed by the defendants herein. and was registered and/or transferred in the name of Mr. 1955. as expressly provided by Article 545 of the Civil Code. nevertheless entered the land to gather palay which was then pending harvest. Cabral. but they found out that the southern portion of the same with an area 4. However. Ocampo of Meycauayan. J. No. Ocampo. it did not prohibit them from gathering the crop then existing thereon. who is in possession and who is being ordered to leave a parcel of land while products thereon are in pending harvests. No. The trial court ruled in favor of Eusebio. in spite of the receipt of the notice of writ of execution. more or less. the plaintiffs herein took possession of the said parcel of land which is a riceland. July 25. April 29. Victoria P. L-36789. Azarcon et al. Before the dispute could be settled. After the death of the said Mr. L-11977. and the defendant Victoria P. Ocampo on July 31. under a homestead application. FACTS: Victor Eusebio had a dispute over a parcel of land with Leonardo Azarcon. ISSUE: Whether or not Azarcon and Abobo are entitled to the pending fruits of the land. 105 SCRA 569 Labrador. Cabral continued 89 . Gregorio Z. Eusebio filed a lease application for a parcel of land. Gregorio Z.
Plaintiffs alleged that because of the defendants' occupancy of the aforementioned plaintiffs' portion of land with the area of 4. However.T. No. Ocampo. more or less. As possessors in bad faith from the service of the summons they "shall reimburse the fruits received and those which the legitimate possessor could have received. The defendants. the said plaintiffs failed to realize a yearly harvest of at least ten (10) cavanes of palay at the rate of P10. 90 . HELD: Yes. The disputed land is included in T. There is no evidence that they were possessors in bad faith. are in possession of the disputed land. by their own admission. from the harvest-time of 1958 up to the present.00 per cavan. 14513 issued to Gregorio Z. their good faith ceased when they were served with summons to answer the complaint.claiming to be the owner of the same while her co-defendants continued recognizing her as the owner thereof instead of the plaintiffs.303 square meters.C. the predecessor of the plaintiffs. ISSUE: Whether or not the defendants must reimburse the fruits receive. The original registration which includes the disputed land was not vitiated by error or fraud. to the exclusion of the latter.
determining the number of fruit-bearing trees and those that are not fruit-bearing as well as the condition of the same. Judge of First Instance Gloria rendered judgment declaring (a) that the defendant Manuel de Guzman and the intervenor Bernardo Solis have the right to collect from the plaintiffs Martin Mendoza and Natalio Enriquez the sum of P2.046 as compensation for the necessary and useful expenditures in the proportion of 20 per cent for Manuel de Guzman and 80 per cent for Bernardo Solis. 687 was adjudicated in favor of Martin Mendoza and Natalio Enriquez in equal parts pro indiviso subject to the right of retention on the part of Manuel de Guzman until he shall have been indemnified for the improvements existing on the land. B. among other things. This petition was granted. Solis. De Guzman presented a motion requesting the issuance of a writ of possession for lot No. and (b) that Manuel de Guzman and Bernardo Solis are obliged to pay to the plaintiffs the sum of P666.93 per annum from June 25. By virtue of this judgment. one-fifth of this amount to be paid by Manuel de Guzman and the other four-fifths by Bernardo Solis. 1927.Mendoza and Enriquez v. two commissioners were appinted with instructions to inspect the land and to count the number of coconut trees planted thereon. that De Guzman had transferred all his rights in the improvements and in the lot to him with the exception of two hundred coconut trees. 687 in his favor which was granted on June 25. After trial. At the trial which followed and at the instance of the parties. the amount that the plaintiffs were required to pay to the defendant and intervenor exceeded the amount that the latter were to pay the former. Max. alleging. FACTS: In the cadastral proceedings of the municipality of Sariaya. As on the date when this judgment was rendered. one of the persons who were ejected from the land. without special pronouncement as to costs. October 5." However one may speculate as to the true meaning of the term "indemnizacion" whether correctly translated as "compensation" or "indemnity. 1924. De Guzman G. 52 Phil.R. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court correctly declared the amount to be paid as "indemnizacion" in the form of necessary and useful expenditures incurred by the defendant. 1928. Article 361 of the Civil Code in the original Spanish text uses the word "indemnizacion. Mendoza has possessed it since 1916. (b) require the defendant to render an accounting of the fruits received by him and order that the value of the fruits be applied to the payment of the necessary and useful expenses. Since then De Guzman has had dominion over the land. Being unable to come to an agreement as to the amount which should be allowed for the improvements made on the land. Tayabas." the 91 . J. 1924. HELD: Yes. No. a piece of land identified as lot No. that is on September 23. Martin Mendoza and Natalio Enriquez began an action requesting the court to (a) fix the value of the necessary and useful expenses incurred by Manuel de Guzman in introducing the improvements. 164 Malcolm. the defendant and intervenor were ordered to deliver the land and its improvement as soon as the plaintiffs have paid the difference. L-28721. and (c) decree the restitution of the possession to the plaintiffs. asked leave to intervene.
including the aforesaid house No. No. and Lizarraga Hermanos brought suit against her for ejectment.) Whether or not Evarista Robles is the owner of the aforesaid improvements and has the right to demand payment of their value. Lizarraga Hermanos G. leaving six children. Lizarraga Hermanos. December 22. etc. by virtue of which the competent court awarded to said partnership the properties left by the deceased. Here the plaintiffs have chosen to take the improvements introduced on the land and are disposed to pay the amount of the necessary and useful expenses incurred by the defendant.500). 1918. has been with her husband occupying the aforesaid house No. J. Lizarraga Hermanos notified Evarista Robles (Exhibit J) that beginning April next the rent of the upper story of the house would be raised to sixty pesos (P60) a month. On March 18. Inasmuch as the retentionist. since before the death of her mother Anastasia de la Rama. and Purificacion. 4 on Iznart Street in the city of Iloilo. 1921. Evarista Robles. having made some improvements on the house. surnamed Robles. and paying to said partnership forty pesos (P40) monthly as rent of the upper story. one of the heirs. later on by the consent of her coheirs. seeks to be reimbursed for the necessary and useful expenditures. the value of which is fixed at four thousand five hundred pesos (P4. 4 on Iznart Street. Magdalena. as those that augment the income of the things upon which they are expanded. 584 Romualdez. production. as those without which the thing would deteriorate or be lost. The children and heirs of Anastasia de la Rama entered into partnership with Lizarraga Hermanos in liquidation and settlement of their accounts. or crops he has gathered from it. Robles and Martin v. Zacarias. to wit. fruits. L-16736. 4 on Iznart Street. Jose. Felix. she might vacate the house. Evarista Robles refused to pay such a new rate of rent and to vacate the house. ISSUES: 1. by permission of her mother. 2. 92 . 42 Phil. which in the present case is the amount of the necessary and useful expenditures incurred by the defendant. Necessary expenses have been variously described by the Spanish commentators as those made for the preservation of the thing. who is not exactly a posessor in good faith with in the meaning of the law. and that. and some properties. 1916.) Whether or not she has any right to retain the building until the said value is paid to her. Evarista. it is only just that he should account to the owners of the estate for any rents. to whom it had been awarded. FACTS: Anastasia de la Rama died on the 17th of October. upkeep. at the beginning. among which is house No. if she did not agree to the new rate of rent. Evarista Robles sued Lizarraga Hermanos afterwards to recover the value of the improvements. Among the necessary expenditures are those incurred for cultivation.amount of the "indemnizacion" is the amount of the expenditures mentioned in articles 453 and 454 of the Civil Code.R. and lastly by agreement with the partnership.
2. with the stipulation allowing the latter to exercise a right of first refusal should the subject property be made open for sale. It is a fact that the value of the improvements in question has not as yet been paid by Lizarraga Hermanos. and the improvements consisting of the addition of a dining room. on January 30.1976 by then President Ferdinand E.) Yes. Upon being informed that petitioner MWSS and respondent CHGCCI had already agreed in principle on the purchase of the subject property. suitable as a coach house and dwelling.R. subject property) to respondent CHGCCI (formerly the International Sports Development Corporation) for twenty five (25) years and renewable for another fifteen (15) years or until the year 2005. the Asian Appraisal Co. 1981. and entitled to reimbursement therefor. petitioner MWSS (then known as NAWASA) leased around one hundred twenty eight (128) hectares of its land (hereafter. L-54526. inasmuch as with them the house better serves the purpose for which it was intended.00 for the subject property. closet. and a stable. Wherefore. President Marcos expressed his approval of the sale as shown in his marginal note on the letter sent by respondents 93 . 1986.. it is beyond doubt that such improvements are useful to the building. it is beyond question that Evarista Robles is the owner of such improvements.. Robles is the owner of the improvements. being used as a residence. Jr.000. Lizarraga Hermanos have not yet any right to oust them from the building.00 per square meter or a total of P53. but were useful. therefore.800. The expenditures incurred in these improvements were not necessary inasmuch as without them the house would have continued to stand just as before. The terms and conditions of respondent CHGCCI's purchase thereof shall nonetheless be subject to presidential approval. Pursuant to Letter of instruction (LOI) No. Inc. J. Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System v. 143 SCRA 623 Martinez. and bathroom in the lower and upper stories of the house. Hence. the possessor in good faith has the right of retention until she has been fully reimbursed with the same. then General Manager of petitioner MWSS. Valuation thereof was to be made by an appraisal company of petitioner MWSS' choice. to be indemnified for any damages caused by the refusal of the plaintiffs found on their legitimate rights.) Yes. nor.HELD: 1. of its preferential right to buy the subject property which was up for sale. No. FACTS: Sometime in 1965. 440 issued on July 29. Since the improvements are useful and Robles’ possession is in good faith. kitchen. due to the non-reimbursement of the aforesaid useful expenditures. Oscar Ilustre. applying Article 453. which. sometime in November of 1980 informed respondent CHGCCI. pegged a fair market value of P40. Court of Appeals G. Marcos directing petitioner MWSS to negotiate the cancellation of the MWSS-CHGCCI lease agreement for the disposition of the subject property. if Evarista Robles and her husband are entitled to retain the building until the value of such improvements is paid them. August 25. through its president herein respondent Pablo Roman.
200. sold to respondent AYALA about sixty-seven (67) hectares of the subject property at P110. the total price for the subject property is P50. It observed that the "office of Mr. Per the Agreement dated May 11. aside from the fact that these fraudulent checks were found to be of the same kind and design as that of NAWASA's own checks. 1982.The Board of Trustees of petitioner MWSS thereafter passed Resolution 36-83. the NBI concluded in its Report dated 2 November 1970 that the fraudulent encashment of the 23 checks in question was an "inside job". The MWSS-SILHOUETTE sales agreement eventually pushed through.000 was to be paid upon the issuance of title in favor of respondent AYALA. 1983 to accurately identify the subject property. and the remaining balance to be payable within one (1) year with 12% per annum interest. The serial numbers of the checks in question conform with the numbers in current use of NAWASA. While knowledge as to such facts may be obtained through the possession of a NAWASA check of current issue. MWSS's own Fact Finding Committee. P25 Million was to be paid by respondent AYALA directly to petitioner MWSS for respondent SILHOUETTE's account and P2 Million directly to respondent SILHOUETTE. Respondent AYALA developed the land it purchased into a prime residential area now known as the Ayala Heights Subdivision. and for the recovery thereof with damages. Thus the NBI believe that the fraudulent act was an inside job or one pulled with inside connivance at NAWASA. A Supplemental Agreement was forged between petitioner MWSS and respondent SILHOUETTE on August 11. 1984.00 per square meter. it should be noted.Jose Roxas and Pablo Roman. Ongtengco. P25 Million of which was to be paid upon President Marcos' approval of the contract and the balance to be paid within one (1) year from the transfer of the title to respondent SILHOUETTE as vendee with interest at 12% per annum. an outsider without information from the inside can not possibly pinpoint which of NAWASA's various accounts has sufficient balance to cover all these fraudulent checks. Jr. in its report submitted to their General Manager underscored this laxity of records control. approving the sale of the subject property in favor of respondent SILHOUETTE. petitioner MWSS on March 26. HELD: Yes. 1983 covering said purchase.600. 1993 filed an action against all herein named respondents before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City seeking for the declaration of nullity of the MWSS-SILHOUETTE sales agreement and all subsequent conveyances involving the subject property. Circumstances led NBI to believe that the fraudulent encashment as an “inside job”. Relying on the foregoing statement of Mr. Of the total price of around P74 Million. None of these checks.925. ISSUE: Whether or not MWSS failed to provide appropriate security measures over its own records. P11. as assignee of respondent CHGCCI. The records likewise show that MWSS failed to provide appropriate security measures over its own records thereby laying confidential records open to unauthorized persons. Ongtengco (Cashier VI of the Treasury Department at the NAWASA) is quite open to any person known to him or his staff members and that the check writer is merely on top of his table. Almost a decade later. dated December 20. Subsequently. under a deed of sale dated July 26. 94 . respondent SILHOUETTE. was dishonored for insufficiency of funds. The balance was also secured by an irrevocable letter of credit.
M. FACTS: The deceased E. If the dividend be in fact a profit. Sophie Seifert and Elisa Elianoff.. 1950. legal heirs of the deceased. although declared in stock. 95 .000 shares of stock dividend by indorsing and delivering to her the corresponding certificate of stock. made during the lifetime of the usufructuary. received from the latter 54.000 shares. Mary McDonald Bachrach. On June 10. Seifert and Elianoff G. while under the Pennsylvania rule.000 shares representing 50 per cent stock dividend on the said 108. 87 Phil. taking into consideration that a stock dividend as well as a cash dividend can be declared only out of profits of the corporation.R. Hemedes v. M. Bachrach. L-2659.000 shares of stock of the Atok-Big Wedge Mining Co. October 12. claiming that said dividend. 483 Ozaeta. for if it were declared out of the capital it would be a serious violation of the law. opposed said petition on the ground that the stock dividend in question was not income but formed part of the capital and therefore belonged not to the usufructuary but to the remainderman. The Pennsylvania rule is more in accord with our statutory laws than the Massachusetts rule. to transfer to her the said 54. The 54. The usufructuary shall be entitled to receive all the natural. M. The 108. whether in the form of cash or stock. in his last will and testament made various legacies in cash and willed the remainder of his estate. industrial. Said shares may be sold independently of the original shares. consequently. is income and. is fruit or income and therefore belonged to her as usufructuary or life tenant. all earnings of a corporation. who left no forced heir except his widow Mary McDonald Bachrach. should go to the usufructuary. but merely represents an addition to the invested capital. belong to the latter. petitioned the lower court to authorize the Peoples Bank and Trust Company. they contend that a stock dividend is not. as usufructuary or life tenant of the estate. No. The estate of E. and the delivery of the certificate of stock covering said dividend is equivalent to the payment of said profits. While appellants admit that a cash dividend is an income.. and civil fruits of the property in usufruct. Bachrach. as owner of 108. 1948.000 shares of stock are part of the property in usufruct. A dividend. They represent profits. Court of Appeals. a stock dividend is considered part of the capital and belongs to the remainderman. it should be held to be income. HELD: Yes. Under the Massachusetts rule. ISSUE: Whether or not a dividend is an income and whether it should go to the usufructuary. just as the offspring of a domestic animal may be sold independently of its mother. Bachrach. when declared as dividends in whatever form. as administrator of the estate of E.000 shares of stock dividend are civil fruits of the original investment. J. Inc. although paid out in the form of stock.Bachrach v.
Kausapin executed an affidavit to affirm the authenticity of the the kasundudan in favor of his stepson.G. 1960 a "Deed of Conveyance of Unregistered Real Property by Reversion" was made conveying to Maxima Hemedes. FACTS: Jose Hemedes. Hemedes. Hemedes. HELD: No. Asia Brewery started to introduce some improvements already when R & B insurance informed them that they are the owners of the property where these improvements are being built. The court dismissed the petition and affirmed the decision of the CA. subject to the following resolutory conditions that upon her death or marriage. Corp. Justa Kausapin. Unable to pay the mortgage. 1999. The Ministry of Agrarian Reform Office conducted a cadastral survey and indicated Enrique Hemedes as the owner. Hemedes was valid. She had it titled and mortgage it to R & B Insurance with an annotation of “Usufruct” in favor of her stepmother. Justa Kausapin executed another agreement or Kasunduan on May 27. J. It held that Maxima failed to comply with the requirements of Art. 316 SCRA 347 Gonzaga – Reyes. Enrique Hemedes whom she is dependent from for her financial support. (Dominium). He obtained tax declarations and pay realty taxes from thereon. On the other hand.R. It was found that the deed of conveyance to Maxima was spurious and it follows that the original title she had for the property was also null and void so as the mortgage to R & B Insurance. 96 . No. together with all its improvements. Enrique Hemedes sold the property to Dominium Realty Const. the donee shall revert the said property to anyone of Jose Hemedes children. Justa Kausapin. a sister company of Asia Brewery. On September 27. in favor of his third wife. 1971 to his stepson. Enrique D. Jose Hemedes executed a document entitled "Donation Inter Vivos with Resolutory Conditions" whereby he conveyed ownership over the subject land. R & B Insurance extra-judicially foreclosed the property. father of Maxima Hemedes and Enrique D. October 8. 107132. However. ISSUE: Whether or not the kasunduan executed by Justa Kausapin in favor of Enrique D. 1332 of the civil code and also failed to repudiate Justa Kausapin’s allegation that she did not execute such a deed and she never allowed to use the land as security for the loan.
while those of the Ongpin property are other person not concern herein. which was quoted in the decision and by which Josefa Fabie was made by the usufructuary during her lifetime of the income of the property in question. special assessments. and insurance premiums thereon — were by said judgment vested in the usufructuary 97 . with the obligation to pay the taxes and insurance premiums and make the necessary repairs. All the acts of administration — to collect the rents for herself. also admittedly. or an action founded on property right and therefore beyond the jurisdiction of the municipal court. after which the usufructuary shall again collect the rents. FACTS: The petitioner Josefa Fabie is the usufructuary of the income of certain houses located at 372-376 Santo Cristo. special assessments. and insurance premiums. Santa Cruz. Binondo. the former has the right to collect all the rents of said property for herself with the obligation on her part to pay all the real estate taxes. HELD: Yes. under the ninth clause of the will of the deceased Rosario Fabie y Grey. 75 Phil. No. December 12. 1659 of the Court of First Instance of Manila between the usufructuary and the owner. we find that the said usufructuary has the right to administer the property in question. It is likewise admitted that by virtue of a final judgment entered in Civil Case No. vested in the usufructuary. and 950-956 Ongpin. There is therefore no dispute as to the title to or the respective interests of the parties in the property in question. involving the administration of the houses mentioned.R. Previous to September 1944 litigation arose between Josefa Fabie as plaintiff and Juan Grey as defendant and the owner of the Ongpin property as intervenors. and make all necessary repairs thereon. but the right to all the rents thereof. Gutierrez David G. and in case default on her part the owner shall have the right to do all those things. The naked title to the property is to admittedly in the respondent Juan Grey. in which event he shall be entitled to collect all subsequent rents of the property concerned until the amount paid by him and the expenses of collection are fully satisfied. ISSUE: Whether or not the action instituted by the petitioner Josefa Fabie is a purely possessory action and as such within the jurisdiction of said court. the petitioner Josefa Fabie. J. L-123. 1945. 536 Ozaeta. Manila.Fabie v. It is admitted by the parties that the petitioner Josefa Fabie is the usufructuary of the income of the property in question and that the respondent Juan Grey is the owner thereof. and to conserve the property by making all necessary repairs and paying all the taxes. during her lifetime. The owner of Santo Cristo property abovementioned is the respondent Juan Grey. Construing said judgment in the light of the ninth clause of the will of the deceased Rosario Fabie y Grey. is.
Teodoro Aranas. my brother Carmelo Aranas shall be the one to decide who among them shall hold the said office. L-56249. at the designated time.” ISSUE: Whether or not perpetual inalienability and administration of the estate of the late Fr. until his death or until he should not want to hold the said office anymore. and the other half of the produce should be received by the Roman Catholic Church and should be spent for my soul. Aranas G. To void the designation of Vicente Aranas as usufructuary and/or administrator is to defeat the desire and the dying wish of the testator to reward him for his faithful and unselfish services rendered during the time when said testator was seriously ill or bed-ridden.Vda. May 29. should be the first special administrator of said properties. the usufruct of which has been given to Vicente Aranas prohibited from disposing of said naked ownership without prejudice of course to Vicente's continuing usufruct. 1946 his Last Will and Testament which was admitted to probate on August 31. The special administrator of these lands. 1987. Be it noted that Vicente Aranas is not prohibited to dispose of the fruits and other benefits arising from the usufruct. should receive one half of all the produce from which shall be deducted the expenses for the administration. Vicente B. Aranas (Tingting). 98 . 870 of the Civil Code relied upon by the petitioners. a faithful and serviceable nephew and designating him also as recipient of 1/2 of the produce of said properties after deducting the expenses for the administration and the other 1/2 of the produce to be given to the Catholic Church for the eternal repose of the testator's soul. FACTS: Fr. In said Last Will and Testament. 1953. Vicente Aranas as a usufructuary has the right to enjoy the property of his uncle with all the benefits which result from the normal enjoyment (or exploitation) of another's property. Likewise his designation as administrator of these properties is limited by his refusal and/or death and therefore it does not run counter to Art. This right of Vicente to enjoy the fruits of the properties is temporary and therefore not perpetual as there is a limitation namely his death or his refusal. Anyone of the sons of my brother Carmelo Aranas can hold the said office of special administrator. Teodoro Aranas stipulated the special administration of the remainder of his estate (after returning to his brothers Aniceto and Carmelo or their heirs all properties acquired by him including 10 parcels of land inherited by him from his parents) by Vicente Aranas. his said sons will have power to select the one among them ourselves. with the obligation to return. Fr. The special administration is perpetual. HELD: No. 150 SCRA 415 Paras. Teodoro Aranas is null and void for being violative of Article 870 of the NCC. Said pertinent provision reads as follows: “It is my will that the lands I had bought from other persons should be converged and placed under a special administrator. a priest of the Roman Catholic Church. De Aranas v. for his office. died on January 19. No. and none other than they. without bond.R. because he is a faithful and serviceable nephew. He had executed on June 6. or in special cases its equivalent. but upon the death of my said brother Carmelo Aranas. J. either the same thing. Their father. Neither are the naked owners (the other heirs) of the properties. 1956.
A portion of this land known as Lot No. as private respondent apparently urges would obviously defeat the purpose of the land reform statute.Locsin v. Petitioners sought the opinion of the Department of Agrarian Reform(DAR) as to who should be entitled to receive the rental payments which continued to be made by the tenants to respondent. between the naked owner and the usufructuary. PD 27 was enacted. decreasing the “Emancipation of Tenants”. HELD: Yes. fell within the scope of the “Operation Land Transfer”. PD 27 was enacted to emancipate the tenants from “bondage of the soil” by giving to the tenant-farmers ownership of the land which they were cultivating. In 1972. 1972 by the tenant-farmers constituted amortization payments on the cost of the land that they were required to pay under PD 27. The DAR District Officer rendered the opinion that the rental payments were properly considered as amortization payments for the land and as such should pertain to the landowners and not the usufructuary. The usufruct which had therefore existed as a jus in re aliena in favour of Helen Schon was effectively extinguished by PD 27. 1972. The Court holds that Lot No. should be entitled to the amounts paid by the tenants beginning October 21. The tract of land owned in common by the petitioners. J. 99 . therefore. the payments made on October 21. No. ISSUE: Whether or not the usufructuary was extinguished by PD 27 and who. Valenzuela G. 173 SCRA 454 Feliciano. The bulk of this lot was cultivated by the lessees who customarily delivered the rentals to respondent. To hold. These payments. L-51333. FACTS: Petitioners were co-owners of a large tract of agricultural land known as “Hacienda Villa Regalado”. 2-C-A-3 having been declared part of the land reform area and subjected to the Operation Land Transfer. 2-C-A-3 was subject to lifetime usufructuary rights of respondent Helen Schon. May 18. legally pertain to the petitioners as part of the compensation for the dominion over the land of which they were deprived of by operation of PD 27. 1989. including the portion thereof subject to petitioner’s usufructuary rights.R. Ownership over the lands subjected to the Operation Land Transfer moved from the registered owner to the tenants.
as a title in order that he easement may continue actively and passively. J. Honorata Adriano Francisco. on the bank of the Pampanga River. the Secretary of Bureau – PWC reversed its decision and dismissed Valisno’s complaint. The court may not pass upon the validity of the decision of the Public Works Secretary collaterally. The trial court held that Valisno had no right to pass through the defendant's land to draw water from the Pampanga River. tobacco and other vegetables and adjoins the land of Felipe Adriano. the land was irrigated by water from the Pampanga River through a canal about 70 meters long. 1988. as vendee of the land which Honorata received from her father’s estate did not acquire any water rights with the land purchased.R.Valisno v. Later. Adriano levelled a portion of the irrigation canal so that Valisno was deprived of the irrigation water and prevented from cultivating his 57 – hectare land. 100 . HELD: The provisions of the Civil Code shall apply. unless an appeal is taken to the proper court within thirty days. Furthermore. there was nothing in Valisno’s evidence to show that the resolution was not valid. Valisno then filed a complaint for damages. Instead of restoring the irrigation canal. Valisno’s motion for reconsideration was denied. FACTS: Plaintiff – appellant Nicolas Valisno alleges that he is the owner of a parcel of land in Nueva Ecija which he bought from his sister. traversing Adriano’s land. Likewise. It dismissed the complaint and counterclaim. It pointed out that under Section 4 of the Irrigation Law. and he appealed to the Court of the Appeals who certified the case to the Supreme Court. 2152) or those of the Civil Code should apply to this case. ISSUE: Whether the provisions of the Irrigation Act (Act No. corn. Valisno rebuilt the irrigation canal at his own expense due to his urgent need to irrigate his watermelon fields. Valisno. Valisno filed a complaint for deprivation of waters rights in the Bureau of Public Works and Communications (Bureau – PWC). At the time of the sale of the land to Valisno. the water rights did not form part of his hereditary estate which his heirs partitioned among themselves. should either of them be alienated. No. peanuts. However. established or maintained by the owner of both shall be considered. Adriano asked for a reinvestigation of the case which was granted. controversies between persons claiming a right to water from a stream are within the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Bureau-PWC and his decision on the matter is final. 161 SCRA 398 Grino – Aquino. The existence of the irrigation canal on Adriano’s land for the passage of water from the Pampanga River to Honorata's land prior to and at the time of the sale of Honorata's land to Valisno was equivalent to a title for the vendee of the land to continue using it as provided in Article 624 of the Civil Code: The existence of an apparent sign of easement between two estates. Hence. when his irrigation canal collapsed. Thus. His non-use of the water rights since then for a period of more than five years extinguished the grant by operation of law. In the meantime. May 23. Bureau – PWC ruled in favour of Valisno. Said land is planted with watermelon. It held that Eladio Adriano’s water rights which had been granted in1923 ceased to be enjoyed by him in 1936 or 1937. Adriano G. L-37409.
5415812 and one (1) set of suction pipe and discharge of pipe with elbow. nipples. According to Valisno. 103 Phil. the water right was the primary consideration for his purchase of Honorata's property. 101 . Rocos. This provision shall also apply in case of the division of a thing owned in common on by two or more persons (Civil Code). and without right to any compensation therefore unless otherwise stipulated in the deed of conveyance. v. with Serial No. The purchaser's easement of necessity in a water ditch running across the grantor's land cannot be defeated even if the water is supplied by a third person. The deed of sale in favor of Valisno included the "conveyance and transfer of the water rights and improvements" appurtenant to Honorata Adriano's property. al. conveyed and transferred to Dr." and the water rights and such other improvements appertaining to the property subject of this sale. Water rights. title. 6" discharge 500-1500 GPM. the contrary should be provided in the title of conveyance of either of them. The fact that an easement by grant may also have qualified as an easement of necessity does detract from its permanency as property right. he is entitled to enjoy it free from obstruction. G. flanges and footvalves. or the sign aforesaid should be removed before the execution of the deed. et. in going to Igualdad Street and the market place of Naga City for more than 20 years and that the Rocos have long recognized and respected the private legal easement of a right of way of said plaintiffs. By the terms of the Deed of Absolute Sale.described. February 28. which survives the determination of the necessity. Roco. together with one Berkely Model 6 YRF Centrifugal Pump G" suction. disturbance or wrongful interference (19 CJ 984). although not specifically mentioned in the conveyance. between two or more owners. which are appurtenant to a parcel of land. sale or by virtue of some other title. Ronquillo. for without it the property would be unproductive. No. FACTS: Plaintiff Leogario Ronquillo have been in the continuous and uninterrupted use of a road which traversed the land of the defendants. As an easement of waters in favor of Valisno has been established. such as the right to use a drainage ditch for irrigation purposes. 1958. et. 84 Montemayor. al. interest and participations over the parcel of land above. the vendor Honorata Adriano Francisco sold. J.unless at the time. pass with the conveyance of the land. such as Adriano’s act of levelling the irrigation canal to deprive him of the use of water from the Pampanga River. theownership of the two estates is divided.R. L-10619. the owners of the higher estates are under obligation to give free passage to the water as an easement of conduit for the irrigation of the lower estates. Nicolas Valisno all "rights. This provision was lifted from Article 122 of the Spanish Law of Waters which provided: Whenever a tract of irrigated land which previously received its waters from a single point is divided through inheritance. ceded.
Sim blocked the sewage pipe connecting the building of Eduardo Tañedo built on Lot 7501-A. 102 . Instead. Upon learning of the said sale. intimidation. 1953. ceased upon the subdivision of the land and its subsequent sale to different owners who do not have the same interest. However. said Lot 7501-B was sold to herein respondent Spouses Romeo and Pacita Sim. and threats. On the other hand. fenced with barbed wire and closed hermitically the road passage way thereby preventing the plaintiff from using it. No. under Article 622 of the New Civil Code. ISSUE: Whether or not an easement of right of way can be acquired by prescription.R. respondent Spouses claimed they are the absolute owners of Lot 7501-B and that Eduardo Tañedo has no right to redeem the land under Art. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner’s right to continue to use the septic tank. J. 1988. by means of force. it is nevertheless discontinuous or intermittent. the defendants along with a number of men maliciously obstructed plaintiff’s right of way by constructing a chapel in the middle of the said road and then later. illegally and violently planted wooden posts. can be acquired only by a virtue of a title. HELD: No. Tañedo was then constrained to file an action for legal redemption and damages invoking Article 1622 of the Civil Code.On May 12. Cardenas sold Lot 7501-A to herein petitioner Tañedo and the other Lot 7501B was also mortgaged to Tañedo as a security for the payment of loan with an agreement that Cardenas would only sell Lot 7501-B to him. Furthermore. erected on Lot 7501-B. Tañedo v. However. Tañedo offered to redeem the property from Sim but the latter refused. On the said two lots. a right of way cannot be acquired by prescription because prescription requires that the possession be continuous and uninterrupted. L-66520 August 30. to the septic tank in Lot 7501-B. FACTS: Private respondent Antonio Cardenas owned Lot 7501-A and Lot 7501-B. a septic tank was constructed for the common use of the occupants of both lots. plaintiff’s complaint was dismissed by the CFI. 165 SCRA 86 Padilla. He also asked Tañedo to remove that portion of his building enroaching on Lot 7501-B. Bernad G. and therefore. The Court held than an easement of right of way may not be acquired thru prescription because though it may be apparent. The plaintiff claims that he has already acquired the easement of right of way over the land thru prescription by his continuous and uninterrupted use of the narrow strip of land as passage way. 1622 of the Civil Code as the land sought to be redeemed is much bigger than the land owned by Tañedo.
Applying Article 631 and 624 of the Civil Code. J. The CFI rendered a decision on March 15." ISSUE: Whether or not the easement may be granted to private respondent over the land of Costabella. the petitioner fenced its property thus closing even the alternative passageway and preventing the private respondents from traversing any part of it. Court of Appeals G.B). but nonetheless opened another route across its property through which the private respondents. and Perfecta Guangco as one that is not dependent upon the claims of the parties but a compulsory one that is legally demandable by the owner of the dominant estate from the owner of the servient estate.. Nor did Antonio Cardenas stop the use of the drain pipe and septic tank by the occupants of Lot 7501-A before he sold said lot to Eduardo Tafiedo. Hence. .HELD: No. Inc. may only be acquired by virtue of a title and not by prescription. Later. are the owners of adjoining properties. On appeal. no statement abolishing or extinguishing the easement of drainage was mentioned in the deed of sale of Lot 7501A to Eduardo Tañedo. the spouses Romeo and Pacita Sim the new owners of the servient estate (Lot 7501. Lapu-Lapu City. in any manner whatsoever. in the interest of justice and in the exercise by this Court of its equity jurisdiction. in going to and from their respective properties and the provincial road. Therefore. 1984 finding that the private respondents had acquired a vested right over the passageway in controversy based on its long existence and its continued use and enjoyment by the private respondents and also by the community at large. FACTS: Petitioner owns the real estate properties situated at Sitio Buyong. 1991. That notwithstanding. Accordingly.R. the petitioner closed the aforementioned passageway when it began the construction of its hotel. Appellate Court held as without basis the trial court's finding that the private respondents had acquired a vested right over the passageway in question by virtue of prescription. as in the past. 193 SCRA 333 Sarmiento. The appellate court pointed out that an easement of right of way is a discontinuous one which. In 1981. the use of the septic tank is continued by operation of law. No. 103 . cannot impair. when it undertook the construction of the second phase of its beach hotel. were allowed to pass. or sometime in August. the use of the servitude. an action for injunction with damages was filed against the petitioner by the private respondents before the then Court of First Instance of Cebu. under Article 622 of the New Civil Code. there is no reason for Us in not treating the easement here sought by appellees Katipunan Lumber Co. on the other hand. Before the petitioner began the construction of its beach hotel. 80511 January 25. The private respondents. 1982. Costabella Corporation v. Maribago. the private respondents. . passed through a passageway which traversed the petitioner's property. the appellate court went on to rule that ". on which it had constructed a resort and hotel.
the respondent Appellate Court did not order the reversal of the trial court's decision and the dismissal of the complaint after holding that no easement had been validly constituted over the petitioner's property. all of which are located in Talisay. the Appellate Court went on to commit a reversible error by considering the passageway in issue as a compulsory easement which the private respondents. 195 SCRA 74 Fernan. FACTS: Petitioner owns the dominant estate bounded on north by the servient estate owned by respondents and an estate owned by Magsino. the owner of the dominant estate may validly claim a compulsory right of way only after he has established the existence of four requisites. Unfortunately. The CA affirmed said decision of the trial court. Insofar therefore as the appellate court adhered to the foregoing precepts. after making the correct pronouncement. (3) the isolation was not due to the proprietor's own acts. The respondents refused. No. as owners of the "dominant" estate. Batangas. and (4) the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate. he bought a jeepney to enable him to transport more plants and soil catering to the now bigger demand. as is involved here. is discontinuous and as such can not be acquired by prescription.R. to wit: (1) the (dominant) estate is surrounded by other immovables and is without adequate outlet to a public highway. Court of Appeals G. Petitioner made a request upon the respondent to sell to him 1 ½ meters of their property so that the pathway may be widened to enable his jeepney to pass through.J. (2) after payment of the proper indemnity. may demand from the petitioner the latter being the owner of the "servient" estate. As his business grew. Petitioner went to court praying that he would be granted the additional land to the right of way already constituted but the trial court rendered a decision adverse to the petitioner because there was no such necessity as it was shown that there was the presence of dried river bed only 80 meters away from the property of the petitioner which he may use as an alternative route. a one meter road path was paved through in which half of its width was taken from the estate of Magsino and the other half from the estate of the respondent. 104 . C. Based on Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code. In the case at bar. To provide access to the highway. using the one meter road path.HELD: No. Encarnacion v. it stood correct. It is already well-established that an easement of right of way. The problem however was that the jeepney cannot pass through the road path since its width would not be accommodated by a one meter width. there is absent any showing that the private respondents had established the existence of the four requisites mandated by law. Instead. 77628. 1991. March 11. The servient estate is bound on the north by the national highway. Petitioner started a nursery plant type of business in which pushcarts were used to haul the plants from his estate to and from his nursery and the highway.
it appears that property was then already inclosed by a stone wall. the same was impassable as it became flooded. it became necessary for him to do so with a jeepney.ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to be granted his prayer to buy the additional land to increase the existing one meter road path. and besides. Case v. it may demand for a right of way. ISSUE: Whether or not the wall is the property of the heirs of the late Tuason and Santibañez. The latter. it is the needs of the dominant property which ultimately determine the width of the right of way. And in order to efficiently make such transportation of his plants. The petitioner thus shall be granted the additional land to the existing right of way. when Case made alterations in the buildings erected on his land. No. it was found to be an inadequate right of way because a concrete bridge traverses it thereby the jeep would have to jump over said bridge which has a height of 5 meters in order to reach the highway. Heirs of Tuason G. since the business of the petitioner grew larger and pushcarts became tedious to transport his nursery plants. one-half of which along its entire length would belong to the adjoining building owned by Mr. HELD: Yes. L-5044. HELD: The wall in controversy belongs to the heirs of the late Tuason and Santibañez for the reason. In this case. 105 . and that about two years ago. 1796. he improperly caused a portion of them to rest on the wall owned by the respondents. Case. This right of way could not provide adequate access to the highway thereby when an estate has no access to a public road. It was also found that during the rainy season. extended his southwest boundary line to a portion of the lot of the said heirs of Tuason and Santibañez. under Article 651 of the Civil Code. 14 Phil. Even with the presence of the dried river bed.R. the building erected thereon disproves the pretension of the petitioner. The wall supports only the property of the respondents and not that of the petitioner. upon thorough investigation. that in the public document by which one of their original ancestors acquired on the 19th of April. the right of way had to be widened to accommodate the width of the jeepney of the petitioner. There is not sufficient proof to sustain such claim. Furthermore. December 1. J. can not be a party wall. the property now possessed by them. 521 Torres. among others. They alleged that the true dividing line between the property of the petitioner and that of the said heirs is a belonging to the respondents. 1909. FACTS: The counsel for the heirs of Pablo Tuason and Leocadia Santibañez alleged that the parties whom he represents are owners in common of the property adjoining that of the petitioner Edwin Case on the southwest.
among others. inasmuch as the latter have proven by means of a good title that has not been impugned by the petitioner. who. it is not contiguous to the latter's property. Isidro Santamaria. which must be closed or made to conform to the requirements of law with regard to dimensions and an iron grate embedded in the wall. The legal presumption as to party walls is limited to the three cases dealt with in the said article of the code. and is that of juris tantum unless the contrary appear from the title of ownership of the adjoining properties. unless there is a title or exterior sign. and forever prohibiting the opening of the windows and openings marked. and that it was not exclusively owned by the respondents. appears to have suggested an amicable and adjustment of the matter. that at the time the defendant was building his house. and later on and in the year 1905 made written protest and demand on the defendant. J. but the adjustment was not made. or where there is no exterior sign to destroy such presumption and support a presumption against the party wall. it must therefore be understood that in the purchase of the property the wall by which the land was inclosed was necessarily included. 21 Phil. and the windows and the openings were being made. It can not be presumed that the aforesaid portion was a party wall. This opinion is corroborated by the testimony of the defendant's witness who took the said photographs. in so far as he said that "a part of 106 . or proof to the contrary. and against the defendant. HELD: To judge from the photographic views. The Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. which must be closed. though the appellant's lot can be seen through the window. the plaintiffs protested. 6076. from the evidence. it opens on the boundary line between the said lot and that the appellee and is situated perpendicularly above a part of the wall that belongs to the appellants. ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred by not ordering in his judgment the final and perpetual closing of the large window opened in the balcony of the back part of the appellee's house and that. that is to say. 132 Mapa. Severina and Flora Choco. that the entire wall in controversy belongs to one of the property owners.Under article 572 of the Civil Code the easement of party walls is presumed. and this action was brought. and the defendant received the written protest and referred it to his counsel.R. in dividing walls adjoining buildings up to the common point of elevation. No. Santamaria G. forever prohibiting the opening of the window stated. 1911. Choco v. has made several openings and windows in the walls of the house on both sides overlooking then property of the plaintiff. that when one of their ancestors and principals acquired the property the lot was already inclosed by the wall on which the building was erected. FACTS: The defendant in the building of his house. December 29. with the costs of the action.
The petitioner commenced suit for injunction against the private respondent to have the gates removed and to allow full access to the easement. the private respondent constructed steel gates that precluded unhampered used. 2 meters between the wall in which they are built and said estate. since between it and the plaintiffs' property there does not intervene the distance required by law — that of two meters in the first case. the intent of the parties was to retain the “alley” as an easement. a merger exists when ownership of the dominant and servient estates is consolidated in the same person. Manila. The Court held that no genuine merger took place as a consequence of the sale in favor of the private respondent corporation. as regards this window. 1991. the parties thereto reserved as easement of way. The servitude in question is a personal servitude. the window in question must be closed. FACTS: Petitioner Solid Manila Corporation is the owner of the land in Ermita.the window in question is in front of the plaintiffs' property. its opening is a manifest violation of the provisions of article 582 of the Civil Code which reads as follows: “Windows with direct views. One thing ought to be noted here. Neither can side nor oblique views be opened over said property. Inc. ISSUE: Whether or not an easement had been extinguished by merger. G. HELD: No. April 8. and that since the private respondent had acquired title to the property. cannot be made if there is not a distance of. registered in the name of the private respondent Bio Hong Trading Co. and that in any event. or balconies or any similar openings projecting over the estate of the neighbor. and consequently the judgment appealed from should be modified in this sense. notwithstanding the sale. at least.” Because of the lack of the distance required by law. requires full ownership of both estates. however. that is to say. The court a quo issued ex parte an order directing the private respondent to open the gates. the Court of Appeals ordered the restoration of the annotation. therefore. one constituted not in favor of a particular tenement but rather.R. The same lies in the vicinity of another parcel. Solid Manila Corporation v. They ruled that an easement is a mere limitation on ownership and that it does not impair the private respondent’s title. The private respondent’s title came from a prior owner. 107 . The petitioner then averred that the very deed of sale executed between the private respondent and the previous owner of the property “excluded” the alley in question. No. Due to this. “merger” brought about an extinguishment of the easement. Merger then. According to the Civil Code.. there is an annotation which was entered wherein a construction of private alley has been undertaken. as can be seen. As a consequence. However. 90596. Inc. unless there is a distance of 60 centimeters. Bio Hong Trading Co. and in their deed of sale. and 60 centimeters in the second. the petitioner averred that they and their neighbors have been using the private alley and maintained and contributed to its upkeep until sometime in 1983. 195 SCRA 748 Sarmiento. However.. J.
in this case.R. J. June 2. and on the west by ricelands belonging to Marcial Ipapo. as we said. Floro barricaded Road Lot 5 with a pile of rocks. Respondent Orlando Llenado. 75723. No. and the easement pertains to persons without a dominant estate. Floro v. However. thereby preventing its use by the Llenados. Bounded on the South by the 5 to 6 meter-wide Palanas Creek. a duly licensed and registered housing subdivision in the name of Soledad Ortega. However no contract of easement of right of way was ever perfected by both parties. On the other hand. Meanwhile. wooden posts and adobe stones. a proposed access road traversing the idle riceland of Marcial Ipapo has been specifically provided in the subdivision plan of the Emmanuel Homes Subdivision which was duly approved by the defunct Human Settlement Regulatory Commission. adjacent to Floro Park Subdivision. is the registered owner of Llenado Homes Subdivision. and were granted permission by the Floros to use Road Lots 4 and 5 of the Floro Park Subdivision as passageway to and from MacArthur Highway. FACTS: Petitioner Simeon Floro is the owner of Floro Park Subdivision who has its own egress and ingress to and from the Mac Arthur Highway by means of its Road Lot 4 and the PNR level crossing. Merger. Unless the owner conveys the property in favor of the public. no genuine merger can take place that would terminate a personal easement. Llenado G. the judgment of the RTC was reversed ordering Floro to open roads 4 and 5 and remove all the objects that prevent passage on road 5 and to pay the plaintiff damages with costs and payment of indemnity for the easement of right of way. These preconditions are: (1) that the dominant estate is 108 . and the termination of that relation leaves the easement of no use. presupposes the existence of a prior servient-dominant owner relationship. Thereafter. 1995.for the benefit of the general public as stated in Article 614 of the Civil Code. Llenado instituted a complaint before the RTC of Malolos. On appeal by Llenado on the CA. there is therefore no “owner of a dominant tenement” to speak of. For the Llenados to be entitled to a compulsory servitude of right of way under the Civil Code. the Llenados sought. the Llenado Homes does not have any existing road or passage to the Mac Arthur Highway. Prior to its purchase by Llenado. the preconditions provided under Articles 649 and 650 thereof must be established. Later. the land was known as the Emmanuel Homes Subdivision. if that is possible. ISSUE: Whether or not Llenado is entitled to a compulsory easement of right of way. HELD: No. the public at large. Bulacan against Floro for easement of right of way. the trial court rendered another judgment dismissing the case and lifting the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction previously issued and ordered the plaintiff to pay defendant damages and costs. which separates it from the Floro Park Subdivision. In personal servitude. 244 SCRA 713 Romeo. The RTC granted the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and ordered Floro to open the road and pay damages.
If the servitude requested by Llenado is allowed. par. a dirt road will suffice. Antonio and sister Rufina inherited a piece of property situated in Pandi. 1996. Private respondent Llenado admitted that the Ipapo riceland was no longer being cultivated. Thus. would be defeated. No. (2) after payment of proper indemnity (Art. (3) that the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate (Art. Bulacan.surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway (Art. Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required by law as the basis for setting up a compulsory easement.R. 649. On the past subdivision plans by Emmanuel Homes which is bought by Llenado. (4) that the right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate. the third requisite has not been met. 112331 May 29. 257 SCRA 163 Bellosillo. and. Failing to establish the existence of the prerequisites under Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code. the existence of the second requisite has likewise not been established. private respondent Llenado's bid for a compulsory easement of right of way over Road Lots 4 and 5 of the Floro Park Subdivision must fail. the very purpose for which Presidential Decree No. 649. Indications are that it has already been abandoned as a ricefield. if it can be satisfied without imposing the servitude. There was no reason for private respondent's failure to develop the right of way except the inconvenience and expenses it would cost him. not a fictitious or artificial necessity for it. 957 was enacted. that is. there is an indication of an access road through IPAPO’s property although it was not properly paved. In order to justify the imposition of the servitude of right of way. Furthermore. J. there must be a real. to protect subdivision buyers from unscrupulous subdivision owners/developers who renege on their duties to develop their subdivisions in accordance with the duly approved subdivision plans. the same should not be imposed. Court of Appeals G. 649.). Llenado has failed to comply with the first requirement. 650). They 109 . Seeing this. par. Sulpicio. 1). other subdivision developers/owners would be encouraged to hastily prepare a subdivision plan with fictitious provisions for access roads merely for registration purposes. last par. FACTS: Petitioner Anastacia Quimen together with her brothers Sotero. if such practice were tolerated. Quimen v. Even in the face of a necessity. 1). and insofar as consistent with this rule. The complaint for easement of right of way filed by Llenado in the lower court did not contain a prayer for the fixing of the amount that he must pay Floro in the event that the easement of right of way is constituted. Hence. where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest (Art. The burden of proving the existence of the prerequisites to validly claim a compulsory right of way lies on the owner of the dominant estate.
The criterion of least prejudice to the servient estate must prevail over the criterion of shortest distance although this is a matter of judicial appreciation. starting from the back of Sotero's sari-sari store and extending inward by one (1) meter to her property and turning left for about five (5) meters to avoid the store. Yolanda filed an action with the proper court praying for a right of way through Anastacia's property. father of private respondent Yolanda Oliveros. the trial court dismissed her complaint. Sotero. According to Yolanda. it is not always so as when there are permanent structures obstructing the shortest distance. But Anastacia prevailed upon her to buy the lot with the assurance that she would give her a right of way on her adjoining property. Thereafter. Later. Yolanda purchased Lot No. The latter Lot is behind the property of Sotero. Although the pathway leads to the municipal road it is not adequate for ingress and egress. with the shares of Anastacia. and Anastacia's perimeter fence. HELD: Yes. while on the other hand. However. as they did. The conditions sine quo non for a valid grant of an easement of right of way are: (a) the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables without an adequate outlet to a public highway. 1448-B-6-A from her uncle Antonio through her aunt Anastacia who was then acting as his administratrix. Sulpicio and Rufina abutting the municipal road. and. (b) the dominant estate is willing to pay the proper indemnity. (d) the right of way being claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate. But when Yolanda finally offered to pay for the use of the pathway Anastacia refused to accept the payment. While shortest distance may ordinarily imply least prejudice. The municipal road cannot be reached with facility because the store itself obstructs the path so that one has to pass through the back entrance and the facade of the store to reach the road. Yolanda constructed a house on the lot she bought using as her passageway to the public highway a portion of Anastacia's property. The report was that the proposed right of way was at the extreme right of Anastacia's property facing the public highway. (c) the isolation was not due to the acts of the dominant estate. ISSUE: Whether or not passing through the property of Yolanda's parents is more accessible to the public road than to make a detour to her property and cut down the avocado tree standing thereon. Lot No. Finally. Located directly behind the lots of Anastacia and Sotero is the share of their brother Antonio designated as Lot No. when petitioner offered her the property for sale she was hesitant to buy as it had no access to a public road. The store is made of strong materials and occupies the entire frontage of the lot measuring four (4) meters wide and nine meters (9) long. 1448-B-C which the latter divided into two (2) equal parts. 1448-B-6B. 1448-B-6-A and 1448-B-6-B. now Lots Nos. In fact she was thereafter barred by Anastacia from passing through her property. the longest distance may be free of obstructions and the easiest or most convenient to pass 110 . located directly behind the property of her parents who provided her a pathway between their house from the lot of Yolanda behind the sari sari store of Sotero.agreed to subdivide the property equally among themselves. Yolanda purchased the other lot of Antonio Quimen. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision declaring that she was entitled to a right of way on petitioner’s property and that the way proposed by Yoland would cause the least damage and detriment to the servient estate.
ceilings. where the easement may be established on any of several tenements surrounding the dominant estate. However. owners of the land adjoining the plaintiff on the same street where a sixty storey concrete building was constructed. 1974. De Jesus. It does not depend on the degree of care and precaution made by the proprietor in making the excavation or building on his land. thereby causing it to sink in some parts. al. La Vista Association. Manila. 44191 – R. and by the careless manner of handling the cement used the roofing’s of the building of the plaintiff were damaged with the accumulated debris piled thereon.through. Plaintiffs’ house which adjoins the seven storey concrete building constructed by the defendants had sunk by about eight inches. 19 CA Rep. its walls. G. as the excavation made necessarily disturbed the subjacent soil of the plaintiff’s land.R. and another right of way which although longer will only require an avocado tree to be cut down. even if it will not be the shortest. No. v. et. v. August 28. In other words. ISSUE: Whether or not proper precautions had been taken by the defendants in constructing the building in question so as to prevent causing damage to the building of the plaintiff. et. Plaintiffs allege that the defendants failed to observe the necessary care and precautions to protect the construction of the plaintiffs by depriving it of sufficient lateral or subjacent support. and floorings to crack in some places. As between a right of way that would demolish a store of strong materials to provide egress to a public highway. as elsewhere stated. al. the second alternative should be preferred. A reading of Article 684 shows that the duty of an adjacent owner not to deprive any adjacent land or building of sufficient lateral or subjacent support is an absolute one. Inc. the way which will cause the least damage should be used. Defendants having failed to provide the plaintiff’s land and house with sufficient lateral and subjacent support are liable for damages. HELD: No. They brought an action for damages against Homart Corporation and Howmill Manufacturing Corporation. Court of Appeals 111 . The sinking of the left side of the house of the plaintiffs was due to the weakening of subjacent support and to the weight of the seven storey concrete building constructed by the defendant. Homart Corporation. Article 684 of the New Civil Code provides “No property shall make such excavations upon his land as to deprive any adjacent land or building sufficient lateral or subjacent support”. the one where the way is shortest and will cause the least damage should be chosen. 831 FACTS: Jesus and Luz Miranda de Jesus are owners of the building located in Tondo. if these two (2) circumstances do not concur in a single tenement.
G. the parties unequivocally made provisions for its observance by all whom in the future might succeed them in dominion. FACTS: The Tuasons owned a vast tract of land in Quezon City and Marikina. respectively. clearly established a contractual easement of right-of-way over Mangyan Road.. A voluntary easement is quite evidently manifested in the stipulation in the Deed of Sale with mortgage executed by them. On appeal by LA VISTA. 1997. J. while ATENEO deferred improvement on its share and erected instead an adobe wall on the entire length of the boundary. Thus the boundary between LA VISTA and the portion sold to ATENEO was the 15-meter wide roadway known as the Mangyan Road. the subject parcel of land to ATENEO which assumed the mortgage and the obligation in the seven and one-half roadway. HELD: Yes. the Tuasons and the Philippine Building Corporation. Inc. LA VISTA however instructed its security guards to prohibit agents and assignees of Solid Homes. i. Inc.. now claims to have an easement of right-of-way along Mangyan Road through which they could have access to Katipunan Avenue. Solid Homes. Solid Homes Inc. Inc. September 5.. ISSUE: Whether or not there is an easement of right-of-way over Mangyan Road. On their part.R.. the land which the latter developed into a subdivision now known as LOYOLA Grand Villas. and ordered LA VISTA to pay damages. ATENEO subsequently sold to Solid Homes Inc. the decision of the lower court was affirmed. Inc. The lower court recognized the easement of right-ofway along Mangyan Road in favor of Solid Homes. one-half of which shall be taken from the property sold to the Philippine Building Corporation and the other half from the portion adjoining belonging to the Tuasons. 95252. No. the Tuasons developed a part of the estate adjoining the portion sold to Philippine Building Corporation into a residential village known as LA VISTA Subdivision.5-meter share of the 15-meter wide boundary. filed a case before the Regional Trial Court and prayed that LA VISTA been joined from preventing and obstructing the use and passage of LOYOLA residents through Mangyan Road. The Tuasons developed its 7. 278 SCRA 498 Bellosillo. and when they sold to Philippine Building Corporation a portion of their landholdings..e. It is thus very apparent that the parties and their respective 112 . The predecessors-in-interest of both LA VISTA and Solid Homes. it was expressly provided in the Deed of Sale with Mortgage that the boundary line between the property sold and the adjoining property of the Tuasons shall be a road fifteen (15) meters wide. and even constructed concrete posts that prevented the residents of LOYOLA from passing through. Philippine Building Corporation then sold and assigned with the consent of the Tuasons. from traversing Mangyan Road. When the easement was established by their contract.
372 SCRA 364 Pardo. they have the right of first refusal to purchase the land in accordance with Section 3(g) of Presidential Decree No. 1517. December 14. LA VISTA contends that there are other routes to LOYOLA from Mangyan Road. Hence. then filed complaint for the exercise of the right of first refusal under PD No. 2001. J. this should not be taken into consideration since the opening of an adequate outlet to a highway can extinguish only legal or compulsory easements. is thus legally demandable (Articles 619 and 625. the request to have the land proclaimed as an ULRZ would not be necessary if the property was an ULRZ. New Civil Code) with the corresponding duty on the servient estate not to obstruct the same. one must be: (1) a legitimate tenant of the land for ten (10) years or more. Jr. Alcantara. No. such complaint was dismissed and such dismissal was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Alcantara v. 1517 pertains to areas proclaimed as ULRZ. PD No. 1517 since it was not proclaimed as an Urban Land Reform Zone (ULRZ). (2) must have 113 . which survives the termination of the necessity. among others. They also claimed that the amicable settlement executed between Reta and Ricardo Roble. However. Reta.. Clearly. 136996.predecessors-in-interest intended to establish an easement of right-of-way over Mangyan Road for their mutual benefit. ISSUE: Whether the Alcantara and the other petitioners have the right of first refusal. They claim that since they are legitimate tenants or lessees of such land. FACTS: Alcantara and the other petitioners claim that they were tenants or lessees of the land owned by Reta. not voluntary easements like in the case at bar. HELD: No. petitioners cannot claim any right under the said law since the land involved is not an ULRZ. On the other hand. In fact. The land involved has not been proclaimed an Urban Land Reform Zone (ULRZ). G. With this. one of the petitioners. petitioners filed a petition with the National Housing Authority requesting that said land be declared as an ULRZ. however. this petition was filed. the free ingress and egress along Mangyan Road created by the voluntary agreement between Ateneo and Solid Homes. was void ab initio for being violative of PD No. The fact that an easement by grant may have also qualified as an easement of necessity does not detract from its permanency as a property right. To be able to qualify and avail of the rights and privileges granted by the said decree. Consequently. 1517 in the Regional Trial Court. both as dominant and servient estates.R. The land has been converted into a commercial center and Reta is threatening to eject them. the Urban Land Reform Act. Inc. Reta claimed that the land is question is not within the scope of PD No. 1517.
Reta admitted that he had verbal agreements with them. 1517. Prosperity Credit Resources. No. in violation of the terms of the MOU. Inc. The trial court granted the petition for the issuance of the 114 . and. Court of Appeals G. 1517 applies where the owner of the property intends to sell it to a third party. 1517. on the other hand. Those who do not fall within the said category cannot be considered "legitimate tenants" and. There was also no intention on the part of Reta to sell the property. which were on a monthly basis since rentals were paid monthly. This would be in the nature of a personal easement under Article 614 of the Civil Code. January 15. Alcantara. the sale or intended sale of the land has not happened.R. This notwithstanding. ceased to exist as there was termination of the lease. Inc. Thus. The MOA was conditioned upon the agreement that the petitioner shall be given a right of way on the existing private road which forms part of the area to be redeemed by private respondents. therefore. failed to present evidence of a lease agreement other than his testimony in court. 114170. (MFI) and petitioner Prosperity Credit Resources. the situation which would allow the exercise of that right. that is. none of the petitioners is qualified to exercise the right of first refusal under PD No. 1517. refused to allow PCRI to make excavations on one side of the access road for the installation of water. Roble is not a legitimate tenant as defined by PD No. Reta allowed Roble to use sixty-two (62) coconut trees for P186 from where he gathered tuba. (3) has resided continuously for the last ten (10) years. even if the petitioners had the right of first refusal. J. inter alia.built his home on the land by contract. This arrangement would show that it is a usufruct and not a lease. (PCRI) executed a Memorandum of Undertaking (MOU) wherein PCRI acceded to MFI’s request to redeem three of the seven lots foreclosed and won by the former in the ensuing public auction. 301 SCRA 52 Mendoza. that the latter. Hence. not entitled to the right of first refusal to purchase the property should the owner of the land decide to sell the same at a reasonable price within a reasonable time. the verbal lease agreements. Later. the conclusion would still be the same since the agreement was one of usufruct and not of lease. v. they are still not the legitimate tenants who can exercise the right of first refusal under PD No. Reta denies that he has lease agreements with Alcantara and Roble. Inc. FACTS: Private respondent Metropolitan Fabrics. PCRI filed an injunctive suit against MFI alleging. Roble was also allowed to construct his house on the land because it would facilitate his gathering of tuba. In conclusion. PD No. 1999. With regard to the other petitioners. Whether the amicable settlement is valid or not. From the moment Reta demanded that the petitioners vacate the premises.
Unknown to petitioner. or its successors=in-interest. being an existing private road. Julio Sebastian and Shirley Lorilla. in a Contract of Easement of Right of Way.” this legal meaning is not different. PCRI contends that it is entitled to the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction as may be gleaned from the following provision in the MOU: The above cited lot.R. “clearly and unmistakably” convey a meaning that includes a right to install water pipes on the access road. The word “passage” does not. On January 5. November 27. J. Velasco G.writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. the CA set aside the assailed order of the trial court. The question concerns the meaning of the phrase “for whatever kind of passage”. The ordinary meaning of the word. It means. Petitioner was also unaware that private respondents. He maintains that the writ of demolition could not apply to his property since he was not a party to the civil case. He bought it from Pacific Banking Corporation. FACTS: Petitioner Bryan Villanueva is the registered owner of the parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. this petition for review on certiorari. ordering the Gabriels to provide the right of way and to demolish the small house encroaching on the easement. They give petitioner the right to use the private road as means of entry into and exit from its property on the northwestern side o f the compound. 130845. predecessors-in-interest of private respondents. Sebastian and Lorilla wanted to enforce the contract of easement. the Gabriels had constructed the aforementioned small house that encroached upon the two-meter easement. Held: Yes. transition. There is no question as to the meaning of the terms “ingress” and “egress”. The trial court read this phrase to mean that petitioner had the right to make excavations on the side of the access road in order to install a network of pipes. 115 . 2000. even before he bought the land. according to Black’s Law Dictionary. 1991. a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was issued. INC. It occupied one meter of the two-meter wide easement of right of way the Gabriel spouses granted to the Espinolas. will remain open to ingress and egress for whatever kind of passage in favor of PROSPERITY FINANCIAL RESOURCES. the act of passing. Meanwhile. Judge Tirso Velasco issued an Alias Writ of Demolition. 346 SCRA 99 Quisumbing. As successors-in-interest. When petitioner bought the parcel of land there was a small house on its southeastern portion. the mortgagee of said property. On appeal. petitioner filed a Third Party Claim with Prayer to Quash Alias Writ of Demolition. however. transit. had filed on May 8. 127862 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. 1995. is that act or action of passing: movement or transference from one place or point to another. No. hence. 1991 for easement. ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction ordering private respondent to allow petitioner to undertake excavations along the access road for the purpose of installing water pipes. as defined in Webster’s Dictionary. Villanueva v. On August 13.
J. We find that NIA is under no obligation. Meanwhile. HELD: No. units. A legal easement is mandated by law. petitioner National Irrigation Administration entered into a contract with Villamar Development Construction. 114348. 122 and 124 of Commonwealth Act No. petitioner NIA was to construct canals in Cagayan.R. NIA then entered a portion of petitioner’s land and made diggings and fillings thereon. National Irrigation Administration v. 340 SCRA 661 Pardo. 141 which provide that except in favor of the Government or any of its branches. the land hereby acquired shall be inalienable and shall not be subject to encumbrance for a period of 5 years from the date of this patent and shall not be liable for the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of that period. We sustain the appeal. Court of Appeals G. September 20.ISSUE: Whether or not the easement on the property binds petitioner. Subsequently. Unlike other types of encumbrance of real property. Vicente Manglapus. and continues to exist unless its removal is provided for in a title of conveyance or the sign of the easement is removed before the execution of the conveyance conformably with Article 649 in accordance with Article 617 of the Civil Code. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner NIA should pay Manglapus just compensation for the taking of a portion of his property for use as easement of a right of way. FACTS: A free patent over 3 hectares of land in Cagayan was issued and registered in the name of private respondent Dick Manglapus’ predecessor-in-interest. No. Villanueva was bound by the contract of easement. HELD: Yes. a servitude like a right of way can exist even if they are not expressly stated or annotated as an encumbrance in a Torrens title because servitudes are inseparable from the estates to which they actively or passively belong. Moreover. The land was granted to the latter subject to the provisions of sections 113. private respondent Manglapus acquired the lot from Vicente Manglapus by absolute sale and was later registered 11 years later from the issuance of patent. there was a reservation and condition that the land is subject to “to all conditions and public easements and servitudes recognized and 116 . Under the Original Certificate of Title. or institutions. not only as a voluntary easement but as a legal easement. Private respondent then filed a complaint for damages alleging that petitioner’s diggings and fillings destroyed the agricultural use of his land and that no reasonable compensation was paid for its taking. 121. We agree with NIA that the Transfer Certificate of Title and the Original Certificate of Title covering the subject parcel of land contained a reservation granting the government a right of way over the land covered therein. Under the contract. 2000.
J. we find and declare that a legal easement of a rightof-way exists in favor of the government. 110. April 6. provides that lands granted by patent. if any. and similar works as the Government or any public or quasi-public service or enterprises. the fortuitous event became humanized.” This reservation. HELD: No. Article 619 of the Civil Code provides that “Easements are established either by law or by the will of the owners. unlike the other provisos imposed on the grant.” In the present case. and awarded to respondent Manglapus by free patent. 113 and 114. Court of Appeals G. Inc.R. telegraphs and telephone lines. including mining or forest concessionaires may reasonably require for carrying on their business. was not limited by any time period and thus is a subsisting condition. irrigation. ditches. No. railrods. Remman Enterprises. The land was originally public land. and private respondent Crispin Lat are adjoining landowners in Lipa City. The ruling would be otherwise if the land were originally private property. respondent noticed that petitioner’s waste disposal lagoon was already overflowing and inundating ¼ of Lat’s plantation. 141. Private respondent then filed a complaint for damages alleging that the acidity of the soil in his plantation increased because of the overflow of the water heavy with pig manure from petitioner’s piggery farm. Petitioner also argued that the damages. In National Power Corporation v. aqueducts. 111. The latter’s land is 1 ½ meters higher in elevation than that of respondent Lat. Commonwealth Act No. The former are called legal and the latter voluntary easements. 233 SCRA 649 (1993). Inc. FACTS: Petitioner Remman Enterprises. 141. We defer instead to the findings opions expressed by the lower courts: Even assuming that the heavy rains constituted an act of God. 112. He made several representations with petitioner but they fell on deaf ears. the trees growing on the flooded portion where it was inundated with water containing pig manure. v. just compensation must be paid for the taking of a part thereof for public use as an easement of a right of way. by reason of their negligence. 330 SCRA 145 Bellosillo. The land of Lat is agricultural and planted mostly with fruit trees while Remman’s land is devoted to its piggery business. Court of Appeals. rendering appellants liable for the ensuing damges. ISSUE: Whether or not the damages were due to a fortuitous event. the Supreme Court held: “Accordingly.prescribed by law. Meanwhile. We cannot agree with petitioner. 125018. petitioners 117 . as amended. with damages for the improvements only. were due to a fortuitous event. Petitioner denied the allegations and claimed that the construction of additional lagoons was already adopted to contain the waste water coming from its piggery to prevent any damage to the adjoining estate. Section 112. 2000. in which case. Commonwealth Act No. started to wither and die. Consequently. especially thouse mentioned in Sections 109. “shall further be subject to a right of way not exceeding twenty meters in width for public highways.
FACTS: Respondent Municipality of Pasig needed an access road from E. Municipality (now City) of Pasig. where the waters which flow from a higher estate are those which are artificially collected in man-made lagoons.791 square meter property of Lorenzo Ching Cuanco. 1067). v. neither can the owner of the higher estate make works which will increase this natural flow.R. unless he provides an alternative method of drainage. 118 .. as required by the Fire Code. However. The municipality then decided to acquire 51 square meters out of the 1. were guilty of negligence. Likewise. the whole occurrence was thereby humanized. 466 SCRA 235 Callejo. The effect tehn of the force majeure in question may be deemed to have. as well as the stone or eath which they carry with them. were located. The owner of the lower estate cannot construct works which will impede this natural flow. and removed from the rules applicable to acts of God. which is abutting E. Tomas Bukid. even if only partly.” As regards the alleged natural easement imposed upon the property of appelle. No.” As worded. Metro Manila G. The owner of the lower estate cannot construct works which will impede this easement. the residents in the area needed the road for water and electrical outlets. Sr. 152230.R. the two aforecited provisions impose a natural easement upon the lower estate to receive the waters which naturally and without the intervention of man descend from higher estates. Inc. so that fire trucks could pass through in case of conflagration. mostly made of light materials. which provides that “lower estates are obliged to receive the water which naturally and without the intervention of man flow from the higher estates. any damage occasioned thereby entitles the owner of the lower or servient estate to compensation. Santos Street. as it were. Santos Street. a human factor – negligence or imprudence – had intervened. the petitioners. a municipal road near the Pasig Public Market to Barangay Sto. as well as the stones or earth which they carry with them. August 9.D. Thus. it is provided that “lower estates are obliged to receive the waters which naturally and without the intervention of man descend from the higher estates. resort to pertinent provisions of applicable law is imperative. Victor Ching Cuanco and Ernesto Ching Cuanco Kho.” A similar provion is found under Article 50 of the Water Code of the Philippines (P.cannot be heard to invoke the act of God or force majeure to escape liability for the loss or damages sustained by private respondents since they. This event then was not occasioned exclusively by an act of God or force majeure. neither can the owner of the higher estate make works which will increase the burden. resulted from the participation of man. The road has to be at least three meters in width.R. 2005. No. Pasig where 60 to 70 houses. Jesus is Lord Christian School Foundation. Under Article 637 of the Civil Code. J.
The Cuancos then contended that they had sold the said property to petitioner Jesus is the Lord Christian School Foundation.R. The petitioner JILCSFI asserted that the respondent must comply with the requirements for the establishment of an easement of right-of-way. however. the grantee of the power of eminent domain may determine the location and route of the land to be taken unless such determination is capricious and wantonly injurious. The ordinance stated that the property owners were notified of the municipality’s intent to purchase the property for public use as an access road but they rejected the offer. This is more than sufficient to establish that there is a genuine necessity for the construction of a road in the area. Expropriation is justified so long as it is for the public good and there is genuine necessity of public character. Governmentmay not capriciously choose what private property should be taken. When apprised about the complaint. Santos Street. especially fire trucks. absolute necessity is not required. the respondent failed to adduce a preponderance of evidence.Meanwhile. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner JILCSFI’s contentions are tenable. petitioner JILCSFI filed a motion for leave to intervene as defendant-inintervention which was granted. The respondent is not mandated to comply with the essential requisites for an easement of right-of-way under the New Civil Code. more specifically. and that there must be no adequate outlet to a public highway. 119 . who were residents of Sto. The municipality then filed a complaint against the Cuancos for the expropriation of the property under Section 19 of the Republic Act No. the respondent failed to show the necessity for constructing the road particularly in the petitioner’s property and not elsewhere. (JILCSFI) as evidenced by a deed of sale. The witnesses. The petitioner also claimed that the portion of the lot sought to be expropriated is located at the middle protion of the petitioner’s entire parcel of land. The respondent has demonstrated the necessity for constructing a road from E. could enter the area except through the newly constructed Damayan Street. no vehicle. The subject property is expropriated for the purpose of constructing a road. and making it impossible for the petitioner to put up its school building and worship center. the road must be constructed at the point lease prejudicial to the servient state. thereby splitting the lot into two halves. Santos Street to Sto. testified that although there were other ways through which one can enter the vicinity. The respondent’s complaint also alleged that the said portion of the petitioner’s lot has been surveyed as the best possible ingress and egress. only reasonable and practical necessity will suffice. Nonetheless. However. 7160 or otherwise known as the Local Government Code. Inc. Case law has it that in the absence of legislative restriction. HELD: No. Tomas Bukid to E.R. Tomas Bukid. the Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig approved an Ordinance authorizing the municipal mayor to initiate expropriation proceedings to acquire the said property and appropriate the fund therefore. We note that the wheras clause of the ordinance states that the 51-square meter lot is the shortest and most suitable access road to connect Sto. Tomas Bukid. After all.
” wherein they declared to have adjudicated upon themselves the parcel of land in equal share. 1995. ISSUE: Whether or not the subject declaration of heirship and waiver of rights is a recognized mode of acquiring ownership by private respondent over the lot in question. Upon obtaining the Declaration of Heirship with Waiver of Rights in his favor. J. to his widow Laurenciana. and that they waive. Hence. The lot has an area of 13. their only son Felixberto inherited the lot. December 7. ownership and real rights are acquired only pursuant to a legal mode or 120 . Teodoro Acap had been the tenant of a portion of the said land. When ownership was transferred in 1975 by Felixberto to Cosme Pido. No. The controversy began when Pido died interstate and on 27 November 1981. alleging that as his leasehold tenant. It will be noted that at the time of Cosme Pido’s death. Negros Occidental was evidenced by OCT R-12179. delos Reyes filed a complaint for recovery of possession and damages against Acap. In 1975.Acap v. After both spouses died. however. HELD: An asserted right or claim to ownership or a real right over a thing arising from a juridical act. quitclaim all right. Delos Reyes alleged that he and Acap entered into an oral lease agreement wherein Acap agreed to pay 10 cavans of palay per annum as lease rental. In 1982. after the lapse of four (4) years. interests and participation over the parcel of land in favor of Edy de los Reyes. delos Reyes sought for Acap to personally inform him that he had become the new owner of the land and that the lease rentals thereon should be paid to him. Acap refused and failed to pay the agreed annual rental of 10 cavans of palay despite repeated demands. is not per se sufficient to give rise to ownership over the res.500 sq. That right or title must be completed by fulfilling certain conditions imposed by law. covering an area of 9. Acap refused to pay any further lease rentals on the land. 118114. Court of Appeals G. Thereafter. who sent his wife. 251 SCRA 30 Padilla. to a conference scheduled on 13 October 1983. The document was signed by all of Pido’s heirs. Acap continued to be the registered tenant thereof and religiously paid his leasehold rentals to Pido and thereafter. On 20 August 1991. FACTS: The title to Lot 1130 of the Cadastral Survey of Hinigaran. On 28 April 1988. Acap allegedly complied with said obligation. Since 1960. The wife stated that the she and her husband did not recognize delos Reyes’s claim of ownership over the land. de los Reyes filed the same with the Registry of Deeds as part of a notice of an adverse claim against the original certificate of title. In 1983. his surviving heirs executed a notarized document denominated as “Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights of Lot 1130 Hinigaran Cadastre. m.R.720 sq. Edy de los Reyes did not sign said document. title to the property continued to be registered in the name of the Vasquez spouses. m. The MAR invited Acap. however justified. prompting delos Reyes to seek the assistance of the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR) in Hinigaran. The title was issued and is registered in the name of spouses Santiago Vasquez and Lorenza Oruma. Felixberto executed a duly notarized document entitled “Declaration of Heirship and Deed of Absolute Sale” in favor of Cosme Pido. Negros Occidental. upon Pido’s death.
a mode of extinction of ownership where there is an abdication or intentional relinquishment of a known right with knowledge of its existence and intention to relinquish it.. required it to construct a chapel. in favor of other persons who are co-heirs in the succession. law or intellectual creation) and the derivative mode (i. the original mode (i.. Private respondent. FACTS: Prudencio de Luna donated a portion of a lot of the Cadastral Survey of Lucena to the Luzonian University Foundation. 1990. donation. No. January 18. L-57455.process. a nursery and a kindergarten school in the donated property within five (5) years from execution. The first presumes the existence of a contract or deed of sale between the parties. a declaration of heirship and waiver of rights operates as a public instrument when filed with the Registry of Deeds whereby the intestate heirs adjudicate and divide the estate left by the decedent among themselves as they see fit. such as sale.e. Abrigo G. the modes of acquiring ownership are generally classified into two (2) classes. Hence. the trial court was obviously confused as to the nature and effect of the Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights. or any other derivative mode of acquiring ownership. Upon the other hand. through occupation. J. A "Deed of Segregation" was 121 . Under Article 712 of the Civil Code. The donation was embodied in a Deed of Donation Intervivos and made subject to certain terms and conditions and provided for the automatic reversion to the donor of the donated property in case of violation or non-compliance. technically speaking. there is a marked difference between a sale of hereditary rights and a waiver of hereditary rights. 181 SCRA 150 Medialdea. De Luna v. In the case at bench.R. The automatic reversion to the donor of the donated area in case of violation of the conditions was also provided. The foundation failed to comply with the conditions of the donation. through succession mortis causa or tradition as a result of certain contracts. accepted the donation. The foundation. While title is the juridical justification. acquisitive prescription. equating the same with a contract (deed) of sale. barter. It is in effect an extrajudicial settlement between the heirs under Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. assignment or mutuum). They are not the same.e. The second is. namely. in a document entitled "Revival of Donation Intervivos" subject to terms and conditions which among others. one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing. or a donation. and the other party to pay a price certain in money or its equivalent. mode is the actual process of acquisition or transfer of ownership over a thing in question. De Luna "revived" the said donation in favor of the foundation. cannot conclusively claim ownership over the subject lot on the sole basis of the waiver document which neither recites the elements of either a sale. through its president. In a Contract of Sale. being then a stranger to the succession of Cosme Pido.
The court dismissed the complaint. shall be made within five (5) years from its execution. As provided in the donation executed on April 9. actions to revoke a donation on the ground of non-compliance with any of the conditions of the donation shall prescribe in four years (4) counted from such non-compliance. Therefore. It is true that under Article 764. estoppel or prescription. the rules on contracts and the general rules on prescription and not the rules on donations are applicable in the case at bar. trial court was therefore not correct in holding that the complaint is barred by prescription under Article 764 because Article 764 does not apply to onerous donations. HELD: The donation subject of this case is one with an onerous cause. judicial intervention is necessary not for purposes of obtaining a judicial declaration rescinding a contract already deemed rescinded by virtue of an agreement providing for rescission even without judicial intervention. However.later executed by De Luna and the foundation whereby the area donated was adjudicated to the foundation. 1. In the instant case. The heirs of de Luna later filed a complaint with the trial court alleging that the terms and conditions of the donation were not complied with by the foundation. Since the complaint was brought on September 23. it was already barred by prescription. It ruled that under Article 764 of the New Civil Code. a nursery and a kindergarten school in the donated property within five years from execution of the deed of donation. The complaint which was filed on September 23. 1971. actions for the revocation of a donation must be brought within for (4) years from the non-compliance of the conditions of the donation. Furthermore. it prayed for the cancellation of the donation and the reversion of the donated land to the heirs. the defense of prescription of action. 122 . among others. In the instant case. The foundation invoked. 1980 was then well within the ten (10) year prescriptive period to enforce a written contract pursuant to Article 1144 par. where one of the parties contests or denies the rescission. Judicial action will be necessary as without it. the four-year period for filing the complaint for revocation commenced on April 9. It was made subject to the burden requiring the donee to construct a chapel. while the judicial action for the rescission of a contract is generally not necessary where the contract provides that it may be automatically revoked and cancelled for violation of any of its terms and conditions. counted from April 9. 1976 and expired on April 9. 1976. Thus. 1980 or more than five (5) months beyond the prescriptive period. 1980. but in order to determine whether or not the rescission was proper. unless attack thereon should become barred by acquiescence. the said article does not apply to onerous donations in view of the specific provision of Article 733 providing that onerous donations are governed by the rules on contracts. however. compliance with the terms and conditions of the contract of donation. the extrajudicial resolution will remain contestable and subject to judicial invalidation. ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint is one for judicial decree of revocation of the donation in question as contemplated in Article 764 of the New Civil Code and which prescribes in four (4) years and not an action to enforce a written contract which prescribes in ten (10) years.
Tondo. However.R. The CFI of Manila declared the TCT in the name of Parungao null and void and ordered the Register of Deeds to cancel the title. Oscar. Jose. In the case. Jr. Benjamin filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of the TCT of Parungao and/or reconveyance of the deed of title. 1990 Gutierrez. Pascual during his lifetime on November 2.B.L. On appeal. 1966 executed a Donation mortis causa in her favor covering the said property. On September 23. and Emmanuel Reyes. July 23. FACTS: On May 15. Ursula executed a deed of absolute sale over the Tondo property in favor of Benjamin. No. it can be clearly inferred that he was actually executing a donation Inter Vivos to Ursula.R. L-45262. Ursula Pascual alleged that Dr. 102 Phil.. Mosqueda G. ISSUE: Whether or not the donation to Ursula was Inter Vivos or Mortis Causa. Parungao. 577 Reyes. No. The title given by the donor in the deed of donation is not a determinative factor which makes the donation inter vivos or mortis causa. It is the body of the document of donation and the statements contained therein and not the title that should be considered in ascertaining the intent of the donor. Rosario Duncil. The provision as regards the reservation of properties for the donor's subsistence in relation to the other provisions of the deed of donation confirms the intention of the donor to give the naked ownership of the properties to Ursula immediately after the execution of the deed of donation. 123 . 1976. which meant that the property was already transferred to Ursula at that time. Court of Appeals G. Emilio Pascual executed a Deed of Donation of real property located at 1109-1111 R. HELD: It was a Donation Inter Vivos.Reyes v. the donor used the term donation Mortis Causa but from the stipulations of the deed. J. L-11240. J. 1957. a minor. Dr. J. the Court of Appeals ruled that the 1966 donation to Ursula was inter vivos. accepting the gift and donation for and in her behalf. Liguez v.. upon reaching the age of majority was able to register the Deed of Donation with the Register of Deeds in Manila and was issued a TCT. with her mother. December 18. Pascual since it was a donation Inter Vivos. Hence. Manila in favor of Ofelia Parungao. Papa St. The transfer of ownership over the properties donated to Ursula was immediate and independent of the death of Dr. he could not have donated the property again in 1969 in favor of Parungao since the lot was already transferred to Ursula at that time. 1969.
being thus precluded from pleading the defense of immorality or illegal causa of the donation. that the widow and children of Lopez were in possession of the land and made improvements thereon. Appellees. that the land was assessed in the tax rolls first in the name of Lopez and later in that of his widow. sometime during June of 1943. the total or partial ineffectiveness of the same must be decided by different legal principles. and that the deed of donation was never recorded. because said property was conjugal in 124 . Salvador P. The defense interposed was that the donation was null and void for having an illicit causa or consideration. and null and void (1) because the husband. ISSUE: Whether or not the donation is valid. The appellant seeks recovery of the disputed land on the strength of a donation regular on its face. will not be aided by the law but will both be left where it finds them. executed in her favor by the late owner. Lopez to recover a parcel of land in barrio Davao. as successors of the late donor. has been interpreted by this Court as barring the party from pleading the illegality of the bargain either as a cause of action or as a defense. if equally guilty. pursuant to a deed of donation of said land. The rule that parties to an illegal contract.. Lopez. Upon these facts. if living. had no right to donate conjugal property to the plaintiff appellant. since Lopez. Lopez. can have no better rights than Lopez himself. it is scarcely disputable that Lopez would not have conveyed the property in question had he known that appellant would refuse to cohabit with him. The cohabitation was an implied condition to the donation. Lopez. and that the property had been adjudicated to the appellees as heirs of Lopez by the court of First Instance. It was ascertained by the Court of Appeals that the donated land originally belonged to the conjugal partnership of Salvador P. In this regard. the appellees must plead and prove that the same is illegal. the Court of Appeals correctly held that Lopez could not donate the entirety of the property in litigation. and (2) because the donation was tainted with illegal cause or consideration. To defeat its effect.FACTS: The case began upon complaint filed by petitioner-appellant against the widow and heirs of the late Salvador P. since 1949. which was the plaintiff's entering into marital relations with Salvador P. of which donor and donee were participants. and being unlawful. to the prejudice of his wife Maria Ngo. as his privies and successors in interest. the Court of Appeals held that the deed of donation was inoperative. necessarily tainted the donation itself. HELD: In the present case. Lopez and his wife. Plaintiff averred to be its legal owner. But such plea on the part of the Lopez heirs is not receivable. himself. Maria Ngo. Memo auditor propriam turpitudinem allegans. a married man. that the latter had met and berated Conchita for living maritally with her husband. on 18 May 1943. would be barred from setting up that plea. and his heirs.
Afterwards Restituta sued both Juan and Tan Queto for reconveyance of the title over the registered but disputed lot. The court ruled that the land is conjugal. 749. The oral donation of the lot cannot be a valid donation intervivos because it was not executed in a public instrument (Art. A contract of lease over the lot was entered into between petitioner. FACTS: Herein private respondent Restituta Tacalinar Guangco de Pombuena received the questioned lot from her mother Basilides Tacalinar either as a purported donation or by way of purchase with P50 as the alleged consideration thereof. for annulment of the barter. The lease of contract having expired. Tan Queto constructed on the disputed land a concrete building without any objection from Restituta. No. and for recovery of the land with damages. Juan then filed for himself and his supposed co-owner Resitituta an application for a Torrens Title over the land which was later on granted pronouncing him (‘married to Resitiuta’) as the owner of the land. The unlawful detainer case was won by the spouses in the Municipal Court but on appeal in the CFI the entire case was dismissed because of a barter agreement whereby Tan Queto became the owner of the disputed lot and the spouses became the owners of a parcel of land with the house thereon previously owned before the barter by Tan Queto. The allegation that the transfer was a conveyance to RESTITUTA of her hereditary share in the estate of her mother (or parents) cannot be sustained for the contractual transmission of future inheritance is generally prohibited. 712.character and the right of the husband to donate community property is strictly limited by law Pershing Tan Queto v. ISSUE: Whether or not the conveyance of the share of Restituta in the future hereditary estate of her parents was valid hence a paraphernal property. nor as a valid donation mortis causa for the formalities of a will were not complied with.R. Court of Appeals G. J. Pershing Tan Queto and Restituta with the consent of her husband for a period of 10 years. Civil Code). 148 SCRA 54 Paras. March 27. The respondent court’s decision which later on was affirmed by the Supreme court led to the reformation of the Contract of Sale of the disputed lot from Basilides to Restituta from a sale to a conveyance of the share of Restituta in the future hereditary estate of her parents. Civil Code) with 125 . The donation or sale was consummated while Restituta was already married to her husband Juan Pombuena. HELD: No. After the barter agreement. 1987. this petition for a motion for reconsideration. The fact is ownership was acquired by both JUAN and RESTITUTA by tradition (delivery) as a consequence of the contract of sale (See Art. L-35648. Restituta filed for unlawful detainer against Tan Queto. Hence. not paraphernal.
126 .000. 1946. The extra-judicial settlement also reflects their own affection for Salud which constituted the valid consideration for their own act of liberality. who was then staying with her brother Claudio and his family. who will assume the encumbrance/obligation to the Philippine National Bank in the amount of P 1. On May 25. Hence. there was no legal impediment to their doing so. 1956. The instrument was never registered nor the title transferred to Salud’s name although she immediately took possession of the land. During the period they were occupying the land. the said property be donated to private respondent Salud Suterio de Matias.” In it they disposed that in according to Perfecta’s wishes and in consideration of love and affection. No. 176 SCRA 340 Cruz. Sometime in 1951. The fact that they did no do this speaks well of their integrity and their loyalty to their deceased sister. August 11. The lot is therefore conjugal.R. the private respondents Salud and Pedro Matias filed a complaint for the reconveyance of the property on the ground that the deed of sale in favour of Claudio was fictitious and the registration in his name was null and void. 72908. having been acquired by the spouses thru onerous title (the money used being presumably conjugal there being no proof that RESTITUTA had paraphernal funds of her own). Perfecta’s niece. the done accepted the donation in a public instrument. Juana executed a deed of absolute sale conveying the land to Claudio. FACTS: Perfecta Balane de Cordero died intestate in 1945 and leaving a tract of 28 hectares of land with buildings and improvements in the Quezon Province. they were free to give the land to whomever they pleased and for whatever reason they saw fit. perfecta’s siblings Juana and Felipe executed a public instrument entitled “ Extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the decease Perfecta Balane de Cordero. Claudio died in 1961 and his mother in 1963. Claudio had the land registered in his name. 1965. 1989. ISSUE: Whether or not the extra-judicial settlement was a donation. J. Felipe and Juana had declared themselves the heirs of Perfecta and the owners of the property in question. Salud claimed that no compensation was paid by Claudio and that the transaction was deliberately concealed from her by her brother and the defendants. In the same document. Pajarillo vs. Two years later. On June 30.00 (then a considerable amount) as the cause or consideration of the transaction. There is no question that Felipe and Juana could have simply disregarded their sister’s sentiments and decided not to donate the property to Salud. Intermediate Appellate Court G. Salud transferred the possession of the land to her mother Juana. Claudio paid realty taxes thereon. On May 20. HELD: Yes.P50. if they choose to respect Perfecta’s wishes and carry out her intentions by donating the land to Salud. As such.
Cruz v. after which she extrajudicailly tried to revoke the donation. Rizal.420 in 1977. the late Maximo Cruz. all surnamed De Leon).5 sq. The property was accordingly transferred to the names of private respondents. the burden of proof is on the plaintiff-donor. an agricultural land of more than two hectares situated in Barrio Dolores. No. HELD: Yes. Court of Appeals 127 . alleging that: (1) the property in question was co-owned by Eduvigis Cruz and her brother. L-58671. there is unrebutted evidence that the donor has another piece of land worth P273. the effect of which is to reduce the value of the donation which can then more easily be taken from the portion of the estate within the free disposal of petitioner. In the case of the subsequent adoption of a minor by one who had previously donated some or all of his properties to another.R. a minor. Taytay. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and dismissed the complaint. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Indeed. 3 of the NCC. grandfather of the donees. FACTS: In 1973. 1985. Taytay. Rizal together with the two-door apartment erected thereon to her grandnieces (private respondents Teresita. in the case at bar. The trial court rendered a decision revoking the donation. donated a 235. m. taking into account the whole estate of the donor at the time of the donation of the child (Articles 760. In 1974. a childless widow. invoking Article 760. Eduvigis Cruz. who must allege and establish the requirements prescribed by law. Cruz judicially adopted Cresencia Ocreto. if the donation impairs the legitime of the adopted. residential lot in San Isidro. it contains no indication at all of the total assets of the donor. Court of Appeals G. November 22. On appal. Unfortunately. On the contrary. Petitioner filed a complaint against the donees for revocation of donation. J. Of course. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the complaint to annul the subject donation. but the donee resisted. the donor may sue for the annulment or reduction of the donation within 4 years from the date of adoption. Lydia and Cecilia. hence the donation did not impair the presumptive legitime of the adoptive child. par. Nor is there proof of impairment of legitime. The legal situation of petitioner-donor is made worse by the factual finding of the Court of Appeals that the grandfather of the donees was the owner pro indiviso of one-half of the donated land. and (2) Eduvigis owns another property. on the basis of which annulment or reduction of the donation can be adjudged. hence the latter own 1/2 of the property by inheritance. 761 and 763 of the NCC). the complaint for annulment does not allege that the subject donation impairs the legitime of the adopted child. 140 SCRA 245 Plana.
However. Thus. Hence. J.R. Abrigo has already settled such prescriptive period. on June 30. 1996. No. and that the complaint states no cause of action. 253 SCRA 391 128 . petitioner executed a deed of absolute sale of the property subject of the donation in favor of the petitioner-spouses Florencio and Soledad Ignao in consideration of the sum of P114. 1991. 198 SCRA 300 Regalado. In their answer. However. the donor cannot order a prohibitive period of disposition exceeding 20 years. 727 of the New Civil Code but the donation shall remain valid and subsisting. the petitioners filed a motion to dismiss based on the grounds that the action has been barred by prescription because the complaint was filed four years after the sale. HELD: No. 1930. Court of Appeals G. 77425. The Court in the previous case of De Luna v.000. respondents cannot anymore revoke the donation. The complaint in the case at bar cannot be barred by prescription because the applicable prescriptive period is not the 4-year period provided in Article 764 of the New Civil Code. Eduarte v. although the action cannot be dismissed on the ground of prescription. June 19. private respondents filed a complaint for the nullification of the deed of donation.G. ISSUE: Whether or not the deed of donation in favor of the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila may be revoked.00. the spouses Eusebio de Castro and Martina Rieta executed a deed of donation in favor of herein petitioner Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila covering a parcel of land located at Cavite. and the sale of the property by the petitioner to the Ignao spouses shall be valid and with legal effects. Such prohibitive period imposed by the respondents was unreasonable because applying in analogy Articles 494 and 870 of the New Civil Code. The cause of action of the private respondents is based on the fact that the petitioner sold the lot during the 50th year of the prohibitive period of 100 years. otherwise a violation of such condition would render ipso facto null and void the donation and the property would revert to the estate of the donors. the same should be dismissed for lack of cause of action. The deed of donation provides that the donee shall not dispose or sell the property within a period of 100 years from the execution of the deed of donation.R. FACTS: On August 23. rather it is the 10-year period ordinary prescription shall apply because the deed of donation provides for the automatic reversion of the property to the original owner in case of violation of any condition. February 9. As such. 105944. 1980 while within the prohibitive period to dispose. No. the said condition regarding the prohibitive period being contrary to law shall be considered as null and void pursuant to Art.
The rule is well-settled that mere possession cannot defeat the title of a holder of a registered torrens title to real property. FACTS: On February 20. However. and the spouses Eduarte claiming that his signature to the deed of donation was a forgery. FACTS: Pedro Calapine was the registered owner of a parcel of land with an area of 12. saving the 700 square meters on which Doria’s house was erected. J. 2001. Doria.R. T23205 under the latter's name. Petition granted. The "Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos" consists of two pages. such fact cannot prejudice the rights of herein petitioners absent any showing that they had any knowledge or participation in such irregularity. for the resulting damages to the true owner and original plaintiff. Pedro Calapine filed a complaint against Doria. 371 SCRA 311 Ynares – Santiago. Doria then donated a portion of 157 square meters to the Calauan Christian Reformed Church.199 square meters. and paid a full price for the same at the time of the purchase or before they had notice of the claim or interest of some other person in the property. the whole parcel of land was ceded to Doria by Calapine. He also sold. No. HELD: No. December 3. 132681. He executed a deed entitled “Donation InterVivos” ceding onehalf portion thereof to his niece Helen S. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are buyers in bad faith of the donated property. Helen Doria should instead be adjudged liable to private respondents. Contrary therefore to the conclusion of respondent Court. Inc. and not to petitioners as declared by the trial court and respondent Court of Appeals. Thus. the same was already covered by TCT No.Francisco. the Calauan Christian Reformed Church. transferred and conveyed unto the spouses Eduarte the parcel of land. and is signed on the bottom portion by Catalina Quilala as donor. to declare null and void the deeds of donation and sale that she had executed in favor of the Calauan Christian Reformed Church. He prays for the revocation of the donation made in favour of Doria. Quilala v. J. The first page contains the deed of donation itself. And having established beyond doubt that Helen Doria fraudulently secured her title over the disputed property which she subsequently sold to petitioners. When herein petitioners purchased the subject property from Helen Doria. and the spouses Eduarte. Inc. Catalina Quilala executed a "Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos" in favor of Violeta Quilala over a parcel of land. they cannot be obliged to look beyond the certificate of title which appeared to be valid on its fade and sans any annotation or notice of private respondents' adverse claim. Violeta 129 . petitioners are purchasers in good faith and for value as they bought the disputed property without notice that some other person has a right or interest in such property. 1981. Alcantara G. Pedro Calapine. Eventually. And although Helen Doria's title was fraudulently secured.
the Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming with modification the decision of the trial court by dismissing the complaint for lack of cause of action without prejudice to the filing of probate proceedings of Catalina's alleged last will and testament. a contracting party affixes his signature on each page of the instrument to certify that he is agreeing to everything that is written thereon at the time of signing. Surely. was acknowledged before a notary public only by the donor. Simply put. claiming to be Catalina's only surviving relatives within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity.Quilala as donee. Consequently. Violeta Quilala likewise died on May 22. and the requirement in the above-quoted provision is deemed substantially complied with. which states merely that Catalina Quilala personally appeared before the notary public and acknowledged that the donation was her free and voluntary act and deed. The fact that one of the parties signs on the wrong side of the page does not invalidate the document. respondents instituted against petitioner and Guillermo T. On appeal. 1983. thus rendering the donation null and void. 143015 was issued in the name of Violeta Quilala. the specification of the location of the signature is merely directory. there was no acceptance by Violeta of the donation in a public instrument. As stated above. 1984. in due course. There appear on the left-hand margin of the second page the signatures of Catalina Quilala and one of the witnesses. although signed by both Catalina and Violeta. 17214 was cancelled and TCT No. 1984. Catalina. Meanwhile. The trial court found that the deed of donation. HELD: No. on which the Acknowledgment appears. dividing and adjudicating unto themselves the above-described property. Petitioner Ricky Quilala alleges that he is the surviving son of Violeta Quilala. 130 . Ines Reyes and Juan Reyes. On September 13. The second page contains the Acknowledgment. Leonora Alcantara. The requirement is designed to avoid the falsification of the contract after the same has already been duly executed by the parties. Catalina Quilala died. was signed by the donor and one witness on the left-hand margin. On November 7. and by the donee and the other witness on the right hand margin. respondents Gliceria Alcantara. and on the right-hand margin the signatures of Violeta Quilala and the other witness The deed of donation was registered with the Register of Deeds and. and two instrumental witnesses. an action for the declaration of nullity of the donation inter vivos. the second page of the deed of donation. San Pedro. executed a deed of extrajudicial settlement of estate. The intendment of the law merely is to ensure that each and every page of the instrument is authenticated by the parties. the requirement that the contracting parties and their witnesses should sign on the left-hand margin of the instrument is not absolute. ISSUE: Whether or not the deed of donation is void for lack of acceptance on the part of the donee Violeta Quilala. Hence. the Registrar of Deeds of Manila. TCT No. The purpose of authenticating the page is served.
was made in a public instrument. 1332 of the civil code and also failed to repudiate Justa Kausapin’s allegation that she did not execute such a deed and she never allowed to use the land as security for the loan.R.In the same vein. No. Hemedes. 1971 to his stepson. it is the conveyance that should be acknowledged as a free and voluntary act. R & B Insurance extra-judicially foreclosed the property. the DONEE shall revert the said property to anyone of Jose Hemedes children. He obtained tax declarations and pay realty taxes from thereon. which is explicitly set forth on the first page of the notarized deed of donation. Corp. The instrument should be treated in its entirety. FACTS: Jose Hemedes. HELD: The court dismissed the petition and affirmed the decision of the CA. It held that Maxima failed to comply with the requirements of Art. Jose Hemedes executed a document entitled "Donation Inter Vivos With Resolutory Conditions" whereby he conveyed ownership over the subject land. in favor of his third wife. 1999. It was found that the deed of conveyance to Maxima was spurious and it follows that the original title she had for the 131 . 107132. together with all its improvements. Justa Kausapin executed another agreement or Kasunduan on May 27. However. Hemedes valid. Enrique D. subject to the following resolutory conditions that upon her death or marriage.Justa Kausapin. To be sure. The fact that it was acknowledged before a notary public converts the deed of donation in its entirety a public instrument. the lack of an acknowledgment by the donee before the notary public does not also render the donation null and void. In any event. Her acceptance. Justa Kausapin. October 8. She had it titled and mortgage it to R & B Insurance with an annotation of USUFRUCT favor of her stepmother. Asia Brewery started to introduce some improvements already when R & B insurance informed them that they are the owners of the property where these improvements are being built. a sister company of Asia Brewery. which contains the Acknowledgment only. The Ministry of Agrarian Reform Office conducted a cadastral survey and indicated Enrique Hemedes as the owner. It cannot be considered a private document in part and a public document in another part. ISSUE: Whether or not the kasunduan executed by Justa Kausapin in favor of Enrique D. On September 27. the donee signed on the second page. Unable to pay the mortgage. The fact that the donee was not mentioned by the notary public in the acknowledgment is of no moment. Hemedes. Hemedes v.(Dominium). 316 SCRA 347 Gonzaga – Reyes. J. Enrique Hemedes sold the property to Dominium Realty Const. father of Maxima Hemedes and Enrique D. Court of Appeals G. 1960 a "Deed of Conveyance of Unregistered Real Property by Reversion" conveying to Maxima Hemedes.
Enrique Hemedes whom she is dependent from for her financial support. petitioner filed an accion pauliana against LIM and her children to rescind the questioned Deed of Donation and to declare as null and void the new transfer certificates of title issued for the lots covered by the questioned Deed.R. Lim G. Without any prior existing debt. FACTS: On 2 July 1991. Even if the judgment be subsequent to the alienation. Linde. On the other hand. the following requisites must be present: (1) the plaintiff asking for rescission has a credit prior to the alienation. While it is necessary that the credit of the plaintiff in the accion pauliana must exist prior to the fraudulent alienation. 1381 of the Civil Code enumerates the contracts which are rescissible. that LIM conspired and confederated with her children in antedating the questioned Deed of Donation. For this action to prosper. The general rule is that rescission requires the existence of creditors at the time of the alleged fraudulent alienation. (4) the act being impugned is fraudulent. and this must be proved as one of the bases of the judicial pronouncement setting aside the contract. 318 SCRA 725 Davide. the alleged debt of LIM 132 . Ingrid and Neil was registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Cebu City. ISSUE: Whether or not the Deed of Donation executed by respondent may be rescinded for being in fraud of her alleged creditor. Kausapin executed an affidavit to affirm the authenticity of the kasundudan in favor of his stepson. Jr. and that LIM. with retroactive effect to the date when the credit was constituted. including her. Petitioner claimed therein that sometime in July 1991. Siguan v. 134685. In the instant case. has been an accomplice in the fraud. November 19. the date of the judgment enforcing it is immaterial. fraudulently transferred all her real property to her children in bad faith and in fraud of creditors. Art.property was also null and void so as the mortgage to R & B Insurance. LIM. if it is by onerous title." The action to rescind contracts in fraud of creditors is known as accion pauliana. there can neither be injury nor fraud. it is merely declaratory. and among them are "those contracts undertaken in fraud of creditors when the latter cannot in any other manner collect the claims due them. On 23 June 1993. (5) the third person who received the property conveyed. (2) the debtor has made a subsequent contract conveying a patrimonial benefit to a third person. a Deed of Donation conveying parcels of land and purportedly executed by LIM on 10 August 1989 in favor of her children. HELD: We resolve these issues in the negative. but was reversed by the CA. No. 1999. at the time of the fraudulent conveyance.. C. The RTC ruled in favor of Siguan and rescinded the Contract.J. (3) the creditor has no other legal remedy to satisfy his claim. through a Deed of Donation. to petitioner's and other creditors' prejudice. left no sufficient properties to pay her obligations. although demandable later.
"essential that the party asking for rescission prove that he has exhausted all other legal means to obtain satisfaction of his claim. Hence. But in 1985. Directo demanded from Noceda to vacate her land.530 square meters. September 2. and Arbizo got 41. It is. therefore.R. It was established that petitioner Noceda occupied not only the portion donated to him by private respondent Aurora Arbizo-Directo but he also fenced the whole area of Lot C which belongs to private respondent Directo. Court of Appeals G. Plaintiff Directo donated 625 square meters of her share to defendant Noceda. but the latter refused. Sometime in 1981. Under Article 1381 of the Civil Code. who is her nephew being the son of her deceased sister However another extrajudicial settlement-partition was executed. Directo filed a complaint for the recovery of possession and ownership and rescission/annulment of donation. Noceda constructed his house on the land donated to him by Directo. 133 .810 square meters. while the deed of donation was purportedly executed on 10 August 1989. it is enough that the offense be proved in the action for revocation. 1999. Noceda got 13. No. still her action for rescission would not fare well because the third requisite was not met. thus petitioner's act of occupying the portion pertaining to private respondent Directo without the latter's knowledge and consent is an act of usurpation which is an offense against the property of the donor and considered as an act of ingratitude of a donee against the donor. occupied the three huts (3) and fenced the entire land of plaintiff Directo without her consent. and constructed thereon three huts. J. HELD: Yes. Three fifths of the said land went to Maria Arbizo while plaintiff Directo and defendant Noceda got only one-fifth each. and Maria Arbizo extrajudicially settled the partition of the land with Directo getting 11." Noceda vs. 20 Petitioner neither alleged nor proved that she did so. FACTS: Celestino Arbizo died in 1956 leaving behind a parcel of land having an area of 66. excluding the donated portion. her action for the rescission of the questioned deed is not maintainable even if the fraud charged actually did exist. 313 SCRA 504 Gonzaga – Reyes. against defendant Noceda ISSUE: Whether or not the acts of Noceda constitute ingratitude to warrant revocation of the donation. 119730.in favor of petitioner was incurred in August 1990.426 square meters. Even assuming arguendo that petitioner became a creditor of LIM prior to the celebration of the contract of donation. His heirs plaintiff Aurora Directo. Directo fenced the portion allotted to her in the extrajudicial settlement. defendant Rodolfo Noceda. On this score.294 square meters. contracts entered into in fraud of creditors may be rescinded only when the creditors cannot in any manner collect the claims due them. The law does not require conviction of the donee. Noceda removed the fence earlier constructed by Directo.
Court of Appeals G. the Meneses(heirs of Anatalia de Guzman) filed a complaint for annulment. Plaintiffs prayed for the nullity of the documents covering the properties in question since they do not bear the genuine signatures of the Aquino spouses. No competent proof was adduced by petitioner to prove his allegation. defendants refused. It is incumbent upon petitioner to show proof of the concurrence of these two conditions in order that the one (1) year period for bringing the action be considered to have already prescribed. 2000. Leoncia De Guzman was survived by her sisters Anatalia de Guzman and Tranquilina de Guzman. 1919. 126996. The complaint alleged that before Leoncia’s death. Heirs of Cesario Velasquez v.R. to order the partition of the properties between plaintiffs and defendants in equal shares and to order the defendants to render an accounting of the produce of the land from the time defendants forcibly took possession until partition shall have been effected. partition and damages against the heirs of Cesario Velasquez(son of Tranquilina de Guzman) for the latters' refusal to partition the properties of the Spouses Aquino. Defendants filed their answer with counterclaim alleging that during the lifetime of spouses Aquino. No. Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman. Sometime in 1989. by virtue of a Escritura de Donation Propter Nuptias dated February 15. 325 SCRA 552 Gonzaga – Reyes. they had already disposed of their properties in favor of petitioners' predecessors-in-interest. defendants forcibly took possession of all the properties and despite plaintiffs' repeated demands for partition. FACTS: Spouses Leoncia de Guzman and Cornelio Aquino died intestate sometime in 1945 and 1947. Plaintiffs further claim that after the death of Leoncia. leaving 6 parcels of land situated in Pangasinan. she told that the documents of donation and partition which she and her husband earlier executed were not signed by them as it was not their intention to give away all the properties to Cesario Velasquez because Anatalia de Guzman who is one of her sisters had several children to support. 134 . and that Cesario Velasquez and his mother allegedly promised to divide the properties equally and to give the plaintiffs one-half thereof. (b) provided that it was possible for him to bring the action. February 15. and petitioners Anastacia and Jose Velasquez in the following manner: (1) The third and sixth parcels were conveyed to defendants' late parents Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman. respectively and were childless.The action to revoke by reason of ingratitude prescribes within one (1) year to be counted from the time (a) the donor had knowledge of the fact. J.
Defendants appealed the decision to respondent CA which affirmed the same. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners have acquired absolute and exclusive ownership of the properties in question. and the acceptance was incorporated in the body of the same deed of donation and made part of it. Legally speaking there was delivery and acceptance of the deed. (c) Escritura de Compreventa with a P500 consideration: (d) Deed of Conveyance with a consideration of P600 and confirming in the same Deed the Escritura de donation propter nuptias and Escritura de compraventa abovementioned. It was reversible error for the court to overlook the probative value of these notarized documents. On the other hand. Once a donation is accepted. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners but the same was denied. the Deed of Donation. 1939. 764 and 765 of the Civil Code. the donee becomes the absolute owner of the property donated. A donation as a mode of acquiring ownership results in an effective transfer of title over the property from the donor to the donee and the donation is perfected from the moment the donor knows of the acceptance by the donee. The donation inter vivos may be revoked only for the reasons provided in Articles 760. the Deed of Sale to third parties over the 4th and 5th parcels as null and void insofar as 1/2 of the 6 parcels are concerned legitimately belong to the plaintiffs. and was signed by the donor and the acceptor. the Deed of Sale. 135 . and ordering the defendants to pay damages. (3) The first parcel was likewise conveyed to defendants Jose Velasquez and Anastacia Velasquez by virtue of a deed of conveyance (Donation Intervivos) dated April 10. 1939. HELD: Yes. giving credibility to Santiago Meneses’ testimony. The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. declaring the Donation Intervivos. the same were owned and possessed by third parties. Private respondent Santiago Meneses failed to prove the nullity of the Deeds of Conveyance executed by the Aquino spouses in favor of petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman since he failed to adduce any evidence to support his claim other than his bare allegations of its nullity. The donation of the first parcel made by the Aquino spouses to petitioners Jose and Anastacia Velasquez who were then 19 and 10 years old respectively was accepted through their father Cesario Velasquez. petitioners were able to show by documentary evidence that the Aquino spouses during their lifetime disposed of the four parcels of land subject of the complaint. and the donation existed perfectly and irrevocably. to wit: (a) Escritura de donation propter nuptias.(2) The second parcel was conveyed to defendants' late parents Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman by virtue of a deed of conveyance dated July 14. (4) As to the fourth and fifth parcels. (b) Deed of donation inter vivos.
during the lifetime of Cesario Velasquez. i. No. The alleged reason for the repudiation of the deed. the action of partition cannot be maintained.e. Court of Appeals G. 1939 in favor of Cesario and Camila Velasquez over the remaining portion of the second parcel is also valid. FACTS: Deceased spouses Ignacio and Marina Gonzales were registered owners of two parcels of agricultural land. The Escritura compraventa over another portion of the second parcel and the Deed of conveyance dated July 14. hence. Petitioners were able to establish that these four parcels of land were validly conveyed to them by the Aquino spouses. The best proof of the ownership of the land is the certificate of title and it requires more than a bare allegation to defeat the face value of TCT which enjoys a legal presumption of regularity of issuance. Marina Gonzales died intestate and appointed as administratix was petitioner 136 . they no longer formed part of the conjugal properties of the spouses at the time of their deaths. the Aquino spouses ratified and confirmed the rights and interests of Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman including the previous deeds of conveyance over the second parcel in the complaint and such deed of sale became the basis for the issuance of TCT in the names of Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman. he entered into contracts of mortgage and lease over the property as annotated at the back of the certificate of title which clearly established that he exercised full ownership and control over the property. No co-ownership exists between private respondents and petitioners. Notably. 110335. 2001. 358 SCRA 598 Melo. Petitioners are the successors-in-interest or the children and grandchildren of the deceased spouses. that the Aquino spouses did not intend to give away all their properties since Anatalia had several children to support is not one of the grounds for revocation of donation either inter vivos or propter nuptias. although the donation might be inofficious. J. On the other hand. As regards the fourth and fifth parcels. June 18. In fact in the deed of sale. In view of the foregoing.. The properties sought to be partitioned by private respondents have already been delivered to petitioners and therefore no longer part of the hereditary estate which could be partitioned. private respondents are the farmers and tenants of said spouses who have been cultivating the parcels of land even before World War II either personally or through their predecessors-ininterest. Gonzales v.R. The deed of donation propter nuptias can be revoked by the non-performance of the marriage and the other causes mentioned in Article 86 of the Family Code.The donation propter nuptias in favor of Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman over the third and sixth parcels including a portion of the second parcel became the properties of the spouses Velasquez since 1919. petitioners alleged that these were also conveyed to third persons and they do not claim any right thereto.
agreed that despite the designation of the contract as Deed of Absolute Sale. Leoncio sold the lot for Php 1. However. it must be made in a public document. Ignacio Gonzales executed a Deed of Donation in favor of his grandchildren but was not registered. it was denied but was approved due to the deed of donation. Article 709 of the same Code explicitly states that “the titles of ownership.” From the foregoing provisions. Two years after. which are not duly inscribed or annotated in the Registry of Property shall not prejudice third persons. ISSUE: Whether or not the property subject of the deed of donation which was not registered when P.000 sq. The administratix of the spouses’ estate. petitioner in this case. the transaction is in fact a Donation. m. the landholdings of the said spouses were placed under Operation Land Transfer.D. specifying therein the property donated and the value of the charges which the done must satisfy. in order to bind third persons. For this reason. 316 SCRA 393 Gonzaga – Reyes. HELD: No. Article 749 of the Civil Code provides inter alia that “in order that the donation of an immovable may be valid. or other rights over immovable property. In the case at bar. 27 took effect. It is not necessary for it to be considered valid and effective. No. Registration is not necessary for it to be contained in a public document. On July 7. and located in Albay. it shall not be binding upon private respondents who did not participate in said deed nor had no actual knowledge thereof. all that is required is for said donation to be contained in a public document. FACTS: Leoncio Imperial was the owner of a parcel of land with an area of 32. should be excluded from the Operation Land Transfer. Initially. and (2) petitioner agreed to sell a designated 1. 27 took effect. Lilia Gonzales filed an application for retention requesting that their property be excluded from the Operation Land Transfer. October 8. Prior to the partition of said estate.” Corollarily. portion of the donated land. 137 .Lilia Gonzales. Leoncio filed a complaint for the Annulment of Donation. adopted son of Leoncio. 112483.m. Petitioner and Victor Imperial. Court of Appeals G. J. the donation executed by Ignacio Gonzales in favor of his grand children. 1999. it may be inferred that as between the parties to a donation of immovable property. Imperial v.837 sq. 1951. although in writing and duly notarized. It was however resolved through a compromise agreement under the following terms and conditions: (1) Leoncio recognized and agreed the legality and validity of the rights of petitioner. has not been registered in accordance with law. the donation must be registered in the Registry of Property.R.00 to his acknowledged natural son. No. Private respondents were then issued the corresponding Certificates of Land Transfer. When Presidential Decree No.
Thus. the action has long prescribed. He was therefore not precluded or estopped from subsequently seeking the reduction. Only those who at the time of the donor’s death have a right to the legitime and their heirs and successors in interest may ask for the reduction of the inofficious donation xxx. The cause of action to enforce a legitime accrues upon the death of the donordecedent. it impairs the legitime of Victor Imperial. his rights shall be transmitted to his heirs. Victor’s sole heir. actions upon an obligation created by law must be brought within ten years from the right of action accrues. died four years later. Cesar and Teresa Villalon. ISSUES: 1. the judgment approving the compromise agreement has already been rendered.) No. Victor merely participated in the execution of the compromise judgment. 138 .) Whether or not the 30-year prescriptive period is applicable in the reduction of the inofficious donation. When Victor substituted Leoncio. since only then that the net estate may be ascertained and on which basis. Victor was substituted in the complaint for annulment. Victor died. Villalon died leaving his heirs. and Article 1053. upon his death. Under Article 1144 of the New Civil Code. Allegedly. On March 8. If the heir should die without having accepted or repudiated the inheritance. the 10-year prescriptive period applies to the obligation to reduce inofficious donations required under Article 771 of the New Civil Code to the extent that they impair the legitime of compulsory heirs. He moved for the execution of judgment and it was granted. he gave no indication of any interest to contest the donation of his deceased father.Leoncio died leaving only two heirs: petitioner and Victor Imperial. he was not deemed to have renounced his legitime. respondents filed a complaint for the annulment of the donation. 2. Not only has prescription set in. Ricardo Villalon. 1962.) Whether or not the respondents have the right to question the inofficious donation and seek its reduction. After 15 years. Nor are Victor’s heirs. Clearly so. Victor died and was survived only by his natural father. they are also guilty of estoppel and laches. In 1986. to wit: Article 772.) Yes. precluded from doing so. the legitimes may be determined. HELD: 1. He was not a party to the compromise agreement. Fifteen years after the death of Leoncio. While Victor was alive. It took 24 years since the death of Leoncio to initiate this case. Thus. respondents in this case. Ricardo Villalon. This is in accordance with Articles 772 and 1053 of the new Civil Code. Ricardo Villalon is a lessee of the portion of the subject property. 2. At the time of the substitution.
the District Supervisor and the vice-mayor’s wife entered into a Deed of Exchange whereby the donated lot was exchanged with a bigger lot owned by the latter. HELD: 1. There was no violation even after the donated lot was exchanged for another one. The exclusivity of the purpose was not altered or affected. In fact. 139 . No.R.600 square meter parcel of land in favor of the Bureau of Public Schools of the Municipality of Malangas. the school buildings were constructed on this new school site and the school building previously erected on the donated land was dismantled and transferred to the new location. J. A school building was thereafter constructed on the donated land. the exchange of the lot for a much bigger one was in furtherance and enhancement of the purpose of the donation. 140487. The purpose of the donation remains the same. In the Deed of Donation. The acquisition of the bigger lot paved the way for the release of funds for the construction of Bagong Lipunan school building which could not be accommodated by the limited area of the donated lot.) Whether or not the condition on the donation was violated. Consequently.Republic of the Philippines v. which is for the establishment of a school. another school building that was also supposed to be allocated for the donated parcel of land could not be released since the government required that it be built upon a 1 hectare parcel of land. 2. through an Affidavit of Acceptance and/or Confirmation of Donation. 2. Respondents had knowledge of the existence of the school building put up on the donated lot. Zamboanga del Sur. In the case at bar. the respondents imposed the condition that the said property should be “used exclusively and forever for school purposes only.) No. The actual knowledge by respondents of the construction and existence of the school building fulfilled the legal requirement that the acceptance of the donation by the donee be communicated to the donor. The purpose of the formal requirement for acceptance of a donation is to ensure that such is duly communicated to the donor.) Whether or not there was a valid donation despite non-notation of the acceptance in the Deed of Donation.” This donation was accepted by the District Supervisor of the Bureau. as required in Article 749. By reason of this. ISSUES: 1. Silim G. However.) Yes. One day. 356 SCRA 1 Kapunan. a school building was immediately constructed after the donation was executed. FACTS: Respondent Spouses Silim and Mangubat donated a 5. April 2. respondents were surprised when he saw the vice-mayor constructing a house on the donated land. 2001.
and transferred the tax declarations to her name. She also alleged that the donation inter vivos was coupled with conditions and. No. and the donor's right referred to that of merely giving consent. HELD: The Court Rules that it was a donation inter vivos. Spouses Danlag sold two parcels of lots to Spouses Agripino and Isabel Gestopa and executed a deed of revocation recovering the six parcels of land subject to the deed of donation inter vivos. for quieting of title over the parcels of land and alleged that the land was donated to her by Diego Danlag and that she accepted the donation openly and publicly exercised rights of ownership over the donated properties. she had complied with all of them. Diego Danlag. 140 . 342 SCRA 105 Quisumbing. since its perfection. Mercedes caused the transfer of the parcels of land's tax declaration to her name and paid the taxes on them. In their opposition. mortgage.Gestopa v. if deemed necessary. and that Diego Danlag had no legal basis to revoke the donation and then in selling the two parcels of land to the Gestopa spouses. the intention was for the donation to take effect upon the death of the donor and that the donation was void for it left the donor. Even assuming it was validly executed. They executed three deeds of donation mortis causa. Danlag spouses. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision that the reservation by the donor of lifetime usufruct indicated that he transferred to Mercedes the ownership over the donated properties. cancel or revoke the donation during their lifetime. 111904. October 5.R. J. that the donor changed his intention by donating inter vivos properties already donated mortis causa. All deeds contained the reservation of the rights of the donors to amend. shall continue to enjoy the fruits of the land during their lifetime and that the donee enjoy the fruits of the land during their lifetime and that the donee cannot sell or dispose of the land during the lifetime of the donors without their prior consent and approval. without any property at all. that the transfer to Mercedes' name of the tax declarations pertaining to the donated properties implied that the donation was inter vivos. two of which were in favor of Mercedes Danlag-Pilapil. Consequently. according to Mercedes. Court of Appeals G. and that Mercedes did not purchase two of the six parcels of land donated to her. that she had not been guilty of any act of ingratitude. and to sell. Mercedes Pilapil filed with the Regional Trial Court against the Spouses Danlag and Gestopa. FACTS: Spouses Danlag were the owners of six parcels of unregistered lands. The spouses then executed another deed of donation inter vivos in favor of Mercedes which contained the condition that the donors. ISSUE: Whether the donation is a donation inter vivos or a donation mortis causa. or encumber the properties donated during the donors' lifetime. that the right to sell belonged to the donee. 2000. the spouses Gestopa and the Danlag averred that the deed of donation was null and void because it was obtained by Mercedes through machinations and undue influence.
Banga G. 141 . Placida and petitioners jointly administered the properties. Placida to sign on the said document. ISSUE: Whether or not the questioned deed by its terms or under the surrounding circumstances has validly transferred title to the disputed properties to the petitioners.In ascertaining the intention of the donor. the donor reserved sufficient properties for his maintenance in accordance with his standing in society. Moreover. Lauro Sumipat. ownership of the properties was transferred. This is a mark of a donation inter vivos. Lydia left but later returned on the same day and requested Lauro’s unlettered wife. his wife. Third. are not required to be accepted by the donees during the donors' lifetime. They are the petitioners herein. August 13. 155810. indicating that the donor intended to part with the six parcels of land. Lauro executed a document denominated “Deed of Absolute Transfer and/or Quit-Claim over Real Properties” in favor of the petitioners. their neighbor Benjamin Rivera lifted the body of Lauro whereupon Lydia guided his hand in affixing his signature on the document. Where the deed of donation fails to show the acceptance. Second. Donations mortis causa. Acceptance is a requirement for donations inter vivos. An acceptance clause is a mark that the donation is inter vivos. The granting clause shows that Diego donated the properties out of love and affection for the donee. 2004 Tinga. The limitation on the right to sell during the donors' lifetime implied that ownership had passed to the donees and donation was already effective during the donors' lifetime. No. Lastly. The donor's right to give consent was merely intended to protect his usufructuary interests. After Lauro’s death. On the document. being in the form of a will. As wife’s share in the produce of the properties dwindled.R. The couple was childless. Placida. sired five illegitimate children. HELD: No. The right to dispose of the properties belonged to the donee. however. A perusal of the deed reveals that it is actually a gratuitous disposition of property — a donation — although Lauro Sumipat imposed upon the petitioners the condition that he and his wife. Hence. the donee accepted the donation. it appears that the signature of his wife. it was alleged that Lauro executed it when he was already very sick and bedridden that upon petitioner Lydia’s request. she filed a complaint for declaration of partition disclaiming any partition in the execution of the subject document. the moment that it was accepted by Mercedes Danlag-Pilapil. Placida which indicates that she gave her marital consent. FACTS: The spouses Placida Tabo-tabo and Lauro Sumipat acquired three parcels of land. or where the formal notice of the acceptance. all of the deed's provisions must be read together. J. Sumipat v. 50% of the produce went to his wife. the reservation of lifetime usufruct indicates that the donor intended to transfer the naked ownership over the properties. shall be entitled to one-half (1/2) of all the fruits or produce of the parcels of land for their subsistence and support.
the donation is null and void. The significant circumstance meant. that her consent was not merely marred by vices of consent so as to make the contracts voidable. but that she had not given her consent at all. Hence. is either not given to the donor or else not noted in the deed of donation and in the separate acceptance.made in a separate instrument. the donees’ acceptance of the donation is not manifested either in the deed itself or in a separate document. 142 . the Court added. In this case. the deed as an instrument of donation is patently void. The Court declared that the deeds of sale questioned therein are not merely voidable but null and void ab initio as the supposed seller declared under oath that she signed the deeds without knowing what they were.
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