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LAW ON PUBLIC CORPORATIONS CASE COMPEDIUM
San Beda School of Law A.Y. 2020-2021

Anne Derramas
OUTLINE #8
2. POLICE POWER
Laws:
Section 16, 1991 LGC
SECTION 16. General Welfare. — Every local government unit shall exercise the powers
expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary,
appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are
essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial
jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the
preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the
people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-
reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic
prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace
and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
CASES:
FERNANDO V. ST. SCHOLASTICA’S COLLEGE, G.R. NO. 161107, MARCH 12, 2013
Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make statutes and
ordinances to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general
welfare of the people. The State, through the legislature, has delegated the exercise of police
power to LGUs, as agencies of the State. This delegation of police power is embodied in
Section 16 of the 1991 LGC, known as the General Welfare Clause
According to Fernando v. St. Scholastica’s College (G.R. No. 161107, March 12, 2013), to
successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of an
ordinance and to free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, two tests have been
used: (1) the rational relationship test, and (2) the strict scrutiny test.
 The rational basis test has been applied mainly in analysis of equal protection
challenges. Using the rational basis examination, laws or ordinances are upheld if
they rationally further a legitimate governmental interest. Under intermediate
review, governmental interest is extensively examined and the availability of less
restrictive measures is considered.
a) Under the rational relationship test, an ordinance must pass the
following requisites:
(1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of
a particular class, require its exercise, and
(2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals.
In short, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful
method. Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police
power measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into
private rights and a violation of the due process clause.
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Thus, this test is not complied with when an ordinance requires that a
private owner demolish a wall or build a fence with a setback for the
purpose of allowing the general public to use the property of the
private owner for free depriving the owner of exclusive use.
Compelling the respondents to construct their fence in accordance
with the assailed ordinance is, thus, a clear encroachment on their
right to property, which necessarily includes their right to decide how
best to protect their property. An LGU may not, under the guise of
police power, permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of
their property solely to preserve or enhance the aesthetic appearance
of the community.
b) A substantially overinclusive or underinclusive classification tends to
undercut the governmental claim that the classification serves
legitimate political ends. Where overinclusiveness is the problem, the
vice is that the law has a greater discriminatory or burdensome effect
than necessary. In this light, an ordinance is void for carrying an
invidious classification, and for thereby violating the Equal Protection
Clause (City Government of Davao vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. 189305,
August 16, 2016).
FACTS:
Respondent SSC is the owner of four (4) parcels of land measuring a total of 56,306.80 square
meters, located in Marikina Heights and covered by Transfer Certificate Title (TCT) No. 91537.
Located within the property are SSA-Marikina, the residence of the sisters of the Benedictine Order,
the formation house of the novices, and the retirement house for the elderly sisters.
The property is enclosed by a tall concrete perimeter fence built 30 years ago. Next to the fence
along the West Drive are buildings, facilities, and other... improvements.
The petitioners are the officials of the City Government of Marikina. On September 30, 1994, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Marikina City enacted Ordinance No. 192, entitled "Regulating the
Construction of Fences and Walls in the Municipality of Marikina."
In 1995 and 1998, Ordinance Nos. 217 and 200 were enacted to amend Sections 7 and 5,
respectively. Ordinance No. 192, as amended, is reproduced hereunder, as follows:
Section 3. The standard height of fences or walls allowed under this ordinance are as follows:
(1) Fences on the front yard shall be no more than 1 meter in height. Fences in excess of one 1
meter shall be of an open fence type, at least eighty percent (80%) see-thru
Section 5. In no case shall walls and fences be built within the 5 meter parking area allowance
located between the front monument line and the building line of commercial and industrial
establishments and educational and religious institutions.
On April 2, 2000, the City Government of Marikina sent a letter to the respondents ordering them to
demolish and replace the fence of their Marikina property to make it 80% see-thru, and, at the same
time, to move it back about six 6 meters to provide parking space for vehicles to park. On April 26,
2000, the respondents requested for an extension of time to comply with the directive. 10 In
response, the petitioners, through then City Mayor Bayani F. Fernando, insisted on the enforcement
of the subject ordinance.
The respondents argued that the petitioners were acting in excess of jurisdiction in enforcing
Ordinance No. 192, asserting that such contravenes Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
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The petitioners, on the other hand, countered that the ordinance was a valid exercise of police
power, by virtue of which, they could restrain property rights for the protection of public safety,
health, morals, or the promotion of public convenience and general prosperity.
RTC RULING
The RTC agreed with the respondents that the order of the petitioners to demolish the fence at the
SSC property in Marikina and to move it back six (6) meters would amount to an appropriation of
property which could only be done through the exercise of eminent domain. It held that the
petitioners could not take the respondents' property under the guise of police power to evade the
payment of just compensation.
CA RULING
Affirmed RTC. The CA reasoned out that the objectives stated in Ordinance No. 192 did not justify
the exercise of police power, as it did not only seek to regulate, but also involved the taking of the
respondents' property without due process of law. The respondents were bound to lose an
unquantifiable sense of security, the beneficial use of their structures, and a total of 3,762.36 square
meters of property. It, thus, ruled that the assailed ordinance could not be upheld as valid as it
clearly invaded the personal and property rights of the respondents and "[f]or being unreasonable,
and undue restraint of trade." It noted that although the petitioners complied with procedural due
process in enacting Ordinance No. 192, they failed to comply with substantive due process. Hence,
the failure of the respondents to attend the public hearings in order to raise objections did not
amount to a waiver of their right to question the validity of the ordinance.
ISSUES:
The ultimate question before the Court is whether Sections 3.1 and 5 of Ordinance No. 192 are valid
exercises of police power by the City Government of Marikina.
HELD:
Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make statutes and ordinances to
promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the
people." The State, through the legislature, has delegated the exercise of police power to local
government units, as agencies of the State. This delegation of police power is embodied in Section
16 of the LGC known as the General Welfare Clause, 23 which has two branches.
"The First, known as the general legislative power, authorizes the municipal council to enact
ordinances and make regulations not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and
discharge the powers and duties conferred upon the municipal council by law.
The second, known as the police power proper, authorizes the municipality to enact ordinances as
may be necessary and proper for the health and safety, prosperity, morals, peace, good order,
comfort, and convenience of the municipality and its inhabitants, and for the protection of their
property."
Whitelight Corp vs. City of Manila discussed the test of a valid ordinance:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.
Ordinance No. 192 was passed by the City Council of Marikina in the apparent exercise of its police
power. To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of an
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ordinance and to free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, two tests have been used by
the Court — the rational relationship test and the strict scrutiny test:
Even without going to a discussion of the strict scrutiny test, Ordinance No. 192, must be struck
down for not being reasonably necessary to accomplish the City's purpose. More importantly, it is
oppressive of private rights.
Under the rational relationship test, an ordinance must pass the following requisites as discussed in
Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Atienza, Jr.:
As with the State, local governments may be considered as having properly exercised their
police power only if the following requisites are met:
(1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require its exercise and
(2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose
and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In short, there must be a concurrence of a
lawful subject and lawful method.
Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police power measure shall be struck down as an
arbitrary intrusion into private rights and a violation of the due process clause
The Court joins the CA in finding that the real intent of the setback requirement in Section 5 was to
make the parking space free for use by the public, considering that it would no longer be for the
exclusive use of the respondents as it would also be available for use by the general public. Section
9 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution, a provision on eminent domain, provides that private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
Section 5 to be unreasonable and oppressive as it will substantially divest the respondents of the
beneficial use of their property solely for aesthetic purposes. Accordingly, Section 5 of Ordinance
No. 192 is invalid.
For Section 3.1 to pass the rational relationship test, the petitioners must show the reasonable
relation between the purpose of the police power measure and the means employed for its
accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and
those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
The principal purpose of Section 3.1 is "to discourage, suppress or prevent the concealment of
prohibited or unlawful acts." The ultimate goal of this objective is clearly the prevention of crime to
ensure public safety and security. The means employed by the petitioners, however, is not
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of this purpose and is unduly oppressive to private
rights.
The petitioners have not adequately shown, and it does not appear obvious to this Court, that an
80% see-thru fence would provide better protection and a higher level of security, or serve as a
more satisfactory criminal deterrent, than a tall solid concrete wall. It may even be argued that such
exposed premises could entice and tempt would-be criminals to the property, and that a see-thru
fence would be easier to bypass and breach. It also appears that the respondents' concrete wall has
served as more than sufficient protection over the last 40 years.
As to the beautification purpose of the assailed ordinance, as previously discussed, the State may
not, under the guise of police power, infringe on private rights solely for the sake of the aesthetic
appearance of the community. Similarly, the Court cannot perceive how a see-thru fence will foster
"neighborliness" between members of a community.
Compelling the respondents to construct their fence in accordance with the assailed ordinance is,
thus, a clear encroachment on their right to property, which necessarily includes their right to
decide how best to protect their property.
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It also appears that requiring the exposure of their property via a see-thru fence is violative of their
right to privacy, considering that the residence of the Benedictine nuns is also located within the
property.
Considering the invalidity of Sections 3.1 and 5, it is clear that the petitioners were acting in excess
of their jurisdiction in enforcing Ordinance No. 1 92 against the respondents. The CA was correct in
affirming the decision of the RTC in issuing the writ of prohibition. The petitioners must
permanently desist from enforcing Sections 3.1 and 5 of the assailed ordinance on the respondents'
property in Marikina City.
LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL VS. JAC LINER, G.R. NO. 148339, FEBRUARY 23, 2005
For a valid exercise of police power, two requisites must concur: (1) Lawful Subject
(i.e., substantive due process; equal protection; public interest requires interference); and (2)
Lawful Method (i.e., procedural due process; reasonable means to achieve the purpose.
 An LGU is considered to have properly exercised its police powers only when the
following requisites are met:
(1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require the interference of the State; and
(2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the
object sought to be accomplished and are not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. The first requirement refers to the equal protection clause, and the
second to the due process clause of the Constitution
 An ordinance aimed at relieving traffic congestion meets the first standard.
However, declaring bus terminals as nuisance per se or public nuisances and
ordering their closure or relocation contravenes the second standard. Terminals
are not public nuisances. Their operation is a legitimate business which, by itself,
cannot be said to be injurious to the rights of property, health, or comfort of the
community.
FACTS:
Two ordinances were enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Lucena with the objective of
alleviating the traffic congestion said to have been caused by the existence of various bus and
jeepney terminals within the city.
City Ordinance 1631 grants franchise to the Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. to construct,
finance, establish, operate and maintain common bus- jeepney terminal facility in the City of
Lucena.
City Ordinance 1778, on the other hand, strips out all the temporary terminals in the City of Lucena
the right to operate which as a result favors only the Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc.
The Regional Trial Court of Lucena declared City Ordinance 1631 as a valid exercise of police power
while declaring City Ordinance 1778 as null and void for being invalid. Petitioner Lucena Grand
Central Terminal, Inc. filed its Motion for Reconsideration which was denied. Lucena then elevated
it via petition for review before the Court. The Court referred the petition to the CA with which it
has concurrent jurisdiction. The CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the challenged orders of the
trial court. Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the CA, Lucena now comes to the
Court via petition for review to assail the Decision and Resolution of the CA.
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ISSUE:
WON the ordinance satisfies the requisite of valid exercise of police power, i.e. lawful subject and
lawful means.
HELD:
The local government may be considered as having properly exercised its police power only if the
following requisites are met:
(1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the
interference of the State, and
(2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be
accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Otherwise stated, there must be a
concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful method
The questioned ordinances having been enacted with the objective of relieving traffic congestion in
the City of Lucena, they involve public interest warranting the interference of the State. The first
requisite for the proper exercise of police power is thus present.
This leaves for determination the issue of whether the means employed by the Lucena Sangguniang
Panlungsod to attain its professed objective were reasonably necessary and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals. The ordinances assailed herein are characterized by overbreadth. They go beyond
what is reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem. Additionally, since the compulsory use of
the terminal operated by petitioner would subject the users thereof to fees, rentals and charges,
such measure is unduly oppressive, as correctly found by the appellate court. What should have
been done was to determine exactly where the problem lies and then to stop it right there.
The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium between authority and liberty so that
rights are exercised within the framework of the law and the laws are enacted with due deference
to rights. It is its reasonableness, not its effectiveness, which bears upon its constitutionality. If the
constitutionality of a law were measured by its effectiveness, then even tyrannical laws may be
justified whenever they happen to be effective.
AQUINO V. MUNICIPALITY OF MALAY, AKLAN, G.R. NO. 211356, SEPTEMBER 29, 2014
Generally, LGUs have no power to declare a particular thing as a nuisance unless such a
thing is a nuisance per se. Despite the hotel’s classification as a nuisance per accidens,
however, the LGU may nevertheless properly order the hotel’s demolition. This is because, in
the exercise of police power and the general welfare clause, property rights of individuals may
be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfil the objectives of the government.
In the exercise of police power, an LGU can order the closing and demolition of
establishments. This power granted by the LGC, is not the same power devolved in favor of the
LGU under Sec. 17 (b)(2)(ii), as above-quoted, which is subject to review by the DENR.
Forest lands, although under the management of the DENR, are not exempt from the
territorial application of municipal laws, for local government units legitimately exercise their
powers of government over their defined territorial jurisdiction.
FACTS:
Petitioner is the president and chief executive officer of Boracay West Cove. On January 7, 2010, the
company applied for a zoning compliance with the municipal government of Malay, Aklan.2 While
the company was already operating a resort in the area, and the application sought the issuance of a
building permit covering the construction of a three-storey hotel over a parcel of land measuring
998 sqm. located in Sitio Diniwid, Barangay Balagab, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan, which is covered
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by a Forest Land Use Agreement for Tourism Purposes (FLAgT) issued by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) in favor of Boracay West Cove.
Through a Decision on Zoning dated January 20, 2010, the Municipal Zoning Administrator denied
petitioner’s application on the ground that the proposed construction site was within the “no build
zone” demarcated in Municipal Ordinance 2000-131 (Ordinance).
Petitioner appealed the denial action to the Office of the Mayor but despite follow up, no action was
ever taken by the respondent mayor. A Cease and Desist Order was issued by the municipal
government, enjoining the expansion of the resort, and on June 7, 2011, the Office of the Mayor of
Malay, Aklan issued the assailed EO 10, ordering the closure and demolition of Boracay West Cove’s
hotel.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for injunctive relief with the CA Alleging that
the order was issued and executed with grave abuse of discretion.
PETITIONER CONTENTION: The hotel cannot summarily be abated because it is not a nuisance per
se, given the hundred million peso-worth of capital infused in the venture. And the Municipality of
Malay, Aklan should have first secured a court order before proceeding with the demolition.
RESPONDENTS CONTENTION: The demolition needed no court order because the municipal mayor
has the express power under the Local Government Code (LGC) to order the removal of illegally
constructed buildings.
Article 694 of the Civil Code defines "nuisance" as

any act, omission, establishment, business, condition or property, or anything else that (1)
injures or endangers the health or safety of others; (2) annoys or offends the senses; (3)
shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; (4) obstructs or interferes with the free
passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or (5) hinders or impairs the
use of property
ISSUE:
Whether or not judicial proceedings be conducted first before the LGU can order the closure and
demolition of the property in question.
HELD:
Generally, LGUs have no power to declare a particular thing as a nuisance unless such a thing is a
nuisance per se.
Despite the hotel’s classification as a nuisance per accidens, however, we still find in this case
that the LGU may nevertheless properly order the hotel’s demolition. This is because, in the
exercise of police power and the general welfare clause, property rights of individuals may be
subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the government. Otherwise
stated, the government may enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty, property,
lawful businesses and occupations to promote the general welfare.
Under the law, insofar as illegal constructions are concerned, the mayor can, after satisfying the
requirement of due notice and hearing, order their closure and demolition.
One such piece of legislation is the LGC, which authorizes city and municipal governments, acting
through their local chief executives, to issue demolition orders. Under existing laws, the office of the
mayor is given powers not only relative to its function as the executive official of the town; it has
also been endowed with authority to hear issues involving property rights of individuals and to
come out with an effective order or resolution thereon.20 Pertinent herein is Sec. 444 (b) (3) (vi) of
the LGC, which empowered the mayor to order the closure and removal of illegally constructed
establishments for failing to secure the necessary permits.
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As jurisprudence elucidates, nuisances are of two kinds: nuisance per se and nuisance per accidens.
The first is recognized as a nuisance under any and all circumstances, because it constitutes a direct
menace to public health or safety, and, for that reason, may be abated summarily under the
undefined law of necessity.
The second is that which depends upon certain conditions and circumstances, and its existence
being a question of fact, it cannot be abated with out due hearing thereon in a tribunal authorized to
decide whether such a thing does in law constitute a nuisance.14
In the case at bar, the hotel, in itself, cannot be considered as a nuisance per se since this type of
nuisance is generally defined as an act, occupation, or structure, which is a nuisance at all times and
under any circumstances, regardless of location or surrounding.15 Here, it is merely the hotel’s
particular incident––its location––and not its inherent qualities that rendered it a nuisance.
Otherwise stated, had it not been constructed in the no build zone, Boracay West Cove could have
secured the necessary permits without issue. As such, petitioner is correct that the hotel is not a
nuisance per se, but to our mind, it is still a nuisance per accidens.
In establishing a no build zone through local legislation, the LGU effectively made a determination
that constructions therein, without first securing exemptions from the local council, qualify as
nuisances for they pose a threat to public safety. No buildzones are intended for the protection of
the public because the stability of the ground’s foundation is adversely affected by the nearby body
of water. The ever present threat of high rising storm surges also justifies the ban on permanent
constructions near the shoreline. Indeed, the area’s exposure to potential geo-hazards cannot be
ignored and ample protection to the residents of Malay, Aklan should be afforded.
CITY GOVERNMENT OF DAVAO VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. 189305, AUGUST 16, 2016
A substantially overinclusive or underinclusive classification tends to undercut the
governmental claim that the classification serves legitimate political ends. Where
overinclusiveness is the problem, the vice is that the law has a greater discriminatory or
burdensome effect than necessary. In this light, an ordinance is void for carrying an invidious
classification, and for thereby violating the Equal Protection Clause.
The precautionary principle (by which the State was allowed to take positive actions to
prevent harm to the environment and to human health despite the lack of scientific certainty) shall only
be relevant if there is concurrence of three elements, namely: uncertainty, threat of
environmental damage and serious or irreversible harm. In situations where the threat is
relatively certain, or ·that the causal link between an action and environmental damage can be
established, or the probability of occurrence can be calculated, only preventive, not
precautionary measures, may be taken. Neither will the precautionary principle apply if there is
no indication of a threat of environmental harm, or if the threatened harm is trivial or easily
reversible.
An LGU cannot demand compliance with an ordinance within an unreasonable period.
Requiring compliance with the consequences of the ban within the (insufficient) 3-month
period under pain of penalty like fine, imprisonment and even cancellation of business permits
would definitely be oppressive as to constitute abuse of police power
Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority retains jurisdiction over the regulation and control of
pesticides and other agricultural chemicals. FPA was responsible for ensuring the compatibility
between the usage and the application of pesticides in agricultural activities and the demands
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for human health and environmental safety. This responsibility includes not only the
identification of safe and unsafe pesticides, but also the prescription of the safe modes of
application in keeping with the standard of good agricultural practices. On the other hand, the
enumerated devolved functions to the local government units do not include the regulation and
control of pesticides and other agricultural chemicals
An ordinance that regulates and controls the same is therefore ultra vires. As an LG, a city could
act only as an agent of Congress, and its every act should always conform to and reflect the will
of its principal.
FACTS:
After several committee hearings and consultations with various stakeholders, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Davao City enacted Ordinance No. 0309, Series of 2007, to impose a ban against
aerial spraying as an agricultural practice by all agricultural entities within Davao City.
SECTION 5. BAN OF AERIAL SPRAYING. — A ban on aerial spraying shall be strictly
enforced in the territorial jurisdiction of Davao City three (3) months after the effectivity of
this Ordinance.
The Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters Association, Inc. (PBGEA) and two of its members,
namely: Davao Fruits Corporation and Lapanday Agricultural and Development Corporation
(PBGEA, et al.), filed their petition in the RTC to challenge the constitutionality of the ordinance
They alleged that the ordinance exemplified the unreasonable exercise of police power; violated the
equal protection clause; amounted to the confiscation of property without due process of law; and
lacked publication pursuant] to Section 511 of Republic Act No. 7160
RTC RULING
The RTC rendered judgment declaring Ordinance No. 0309-07 valid and constitutional
The RTC opined that the City of Davao had validly exercised police power under the General
Welfare Clause of the Local Government Code; that the ordinance, being based on a valid
classification, was consistent with the Equal Protection Clause; that aerial spraying was distinct
from other methods of pesticides application because it exposed the residents to a higher degree of
health risk caused by aerial drift; and that the ordinance enjoyed the presumption of
constitutionality, and could be invalidated only upon a clear showing that it had violated the
Constitution.
CA RULING
On January 9, 2009, the CA promulgated its assailed decision reversing the judgment of the RTC. It
declared Section 5 of Ordinance No. 0309-07 as void and unconstitutional for being unreasonable
and oppressive;
The CA did not see any established relation between the purpose of protecting the public and the
environment against the harmful effects of aerial spraying, on one hand, and the imposition of the
ban against aerial spraying of all forms of substances, on the other.
ISSUE:
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WON Ordinance No. 0309-07 is unconstitutional on due process and equal protection grounds for
being unreasonable and oppressive, and an invalid exercise of police power: (a) in imposing a ban
on aerial spraying as an agricultural practice in Davao City under Section 5; (b) in decreeing a 3-
month transition-period to shift to other modes of pesticide application under Section 5; and (c) in
requiring the maintenance of the 30-meter buffer zone under Section 6 thereof in all agricultural
lands in Davao City.
HELD:
The Sangguniang Bayan of Davao City enacted Ordinance No. 0309-07 under its corporate powers.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology under Section 16 is an issue of transcendental
importance with intergenerational implications. It is under this milieu that the questioned
ordinance should be appreciated.
Advancing the interests of the residents who are vulnerable to the alleged health risks due to their
exposure to pesticide drift justifies the motivation behind the enactment of the ordinance. The City
of Davao has the authority to enact pieces of legislation that will promote the general welfare,
specifically the health of its constituents. Such authority should not be construed, however, as a
valid license for the City of Davao to enact any ordinance it deems fit to discharge its mandate. A
thin but well-defined line separates authority to enact legislations from the method of
accomplishing the same.
Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Due Process Clause
A valid ordinance must not only be enacted within the corporate powers of the local government
and passed according to the procedure prescribed by law. In order to declare it as a valid piece of
local legislation, it must also comply with the following substantive requirements, namely:
(1) it must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) it must be fair, not
oppressive; (3) it must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) it must not prohibit but may
regulate trade; (5) it must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) it must not
be unreasonable.
In the State's exercise of police power, the property rights of individuals may be subjected to
restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the Government. A local government unit
is considered to have properly exercised its police powers only if it satisfies the following
requisites, to wit:
(1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require the interference of the State; and
(2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to
be accomplished and not unduly oppressive.
The first requirement refers to the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution; the second, to the
Due Process Clause of the Constitution.
Substantive due process requires that a valid ordinance must have a sufficient justification for the
Government's action. This means that in exercising police power the local government unit must
not arbitrarily, whimsically or despotically enact the ordinance regardless of its salutary purpose.
So long as the ordinance realistically serves a legitimate public purpose, and it employs means that
are reasonably necessary to achieve that purpose without unduly oppressing the individuals
regulated, the ordinance must survive a due process challenge.
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The required civil works for the conversion to truck-mounted boom spraying alone will consume
considerable time and financial resources given the topography and geographical features of the
plantations. As such, the conversion could not be completed within the short timeframe of three
months. Requiring the respondents and other affected individuals to comply with the consequences
of the ban within the three-month period under pain of penalty like fine, imprisonment and even
cancellation of business permits would definitely be oppressive as to constitute abuse of police
power.
The respondents posit that the requirement of maintaining a buffer zone under Section 6 of the
ordinance violates due process for being confiscatory; and that the imposition unduly deprives all
agricultural landowners within Davao City of the beneficial use of their property that amounts to
taking without just compensation.
The position of the respondents is untenable.
In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., we have thoroughly explained that taking only becomes confiscatory
if it substantially divests the owner of the beneficial use of its property
Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Equal Protection Clause
The constitutional right to equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public
bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The guaranty
equal protection secures every person within the State's jurisdiction against intentional and
arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper
execution through the State's duly constituted authorities. The concept of equal justice under the
law demands that the State governs impartially, and not to draw distinctions between individuals
solely on differences that are irrelevant to the legitimate governmental objective.
Equal treatment neither requires universal application of laws to all persons or things without
distinction, nor intends to prohibit legislation by limiting the object to which it is directed or by the
territory in which it is to operate. The guaranty of equal protection envisions equality among equals
determined according to a valid classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial
distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from
another. In other word, a valid classification must be:
(1) based on substantial distinctions; (2) germane to the purposes of the law; (3) not
limited to existing conditions only; and (4) equally applicable to all members of the class.
In our view, the petitioners correctly argue that the rational basis approach appropriately applies
herein. Under the rational basis test, we shall:
(1) discern the reasonable relationship between the means and the purpose of the
ordinance; and (2) examine whether the means or the prohibition against aerial spraying is
based on a substantial or reasonable distinction.
A reasonable classification includes all persons or things similarly situated with respect to the
purpose of the law.
Davao City justifies the prohibition against aerial spraying by insisting that the occurrence of drift
causes inconvenience and harm to the residents and degrades the environment. Given this
justification, does the ordinance satisfy the requirement that the classification must rest on
substantial distinction? We answer in the negative.
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The occurrence of pesticide drift is not limited to aerial spraying but results from the conduct of any
mode of pesticide application. Even manual spraying or truck-mounted boom spraying produces
drift that may bring about the same inconvenience, discomfort and alleged health risks to the
community and to the environment. A ban against aerial spraying does not weed out the harm that
the ordinance seeks to achieve. In the process, the ordinance suffers from being "underinclusive"
because the classification does not include all individuals tainted with the same mischief that the
law seeks to eliminate. A classification that is drastically underinclusive with respect to the purpose
or end appears as an irrational means to the legislative end because it poorly serves the intended
purpose of the law.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the consolidated petitions for review on certiorari for their lack of
merit; AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on January 9, 2009 in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 01389-MIN.
declaring Ordinance No. 0309-07 UNCONSTITUTIONAL;
DIDIPIO EARTH-SAVERS’ MULTI-PURPOSE ASSOCIATION VS. GOZUN, G.R. NO. 157882,

MARCH 30, 2006
No compensation is needed to be paid by the LGU as there is no compensable taking in
the condemnation of private property under police power. Property condemned under police
power is usually noxious or intended for a noxious purpose.
 In the exercise of police power, property rights of private individuals are
subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort,
health, and prosperity of the state. Where a property interest is merely
restricted because the continued use thereof would be injurious to public
welfare, or where property is destroyed because its continued existence would
be injurious to public interest, there is no compensable taking.
 In the exercise of its police power regulation, the state restricts the use of
private property, but none of the property interests in the bundle of rights which
constitute ownership is appropriated for use by or for the benefit of the public.
To justify the payment of just compensation, there must be compensable taking. The
expropriated property must be used after taking.
 When a property interest is appropriated and applied to some public purpose,
there is compensable taking. The deprivation of use can in fact be total and it will
not constitute compensable taking if nobody else acquires use of the property or
any interest therein. If, however, in the regulation of the use of the property,
somebody else acquires the use or interest thereof, such restriction constitutes
compensable taking.
FACTS:
In 1987, Cory rolled out EO 279 w/c empowered DENR to stipulate with foreign companies when it
comes to either technical or financial large-scale exploration or mining. In 1995, Ramos signed into
law RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act. In 1994, Ramos already signed a Financial and
Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) with Arimco Mining Co, an Australian company. The FTAA
authorized AMC (later CAMC) to explore 37,000 ha of land in Quirino and N. Vizcaya including Brgy
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Didipio. After the passage of the law, DENR rolled out its implementing RRs. Didipio petitioned to
have the law and the RR to be annulled as it is unconstitutional and it constitutes unlawful taking of
property. In seeking to nullify Rep. Act No. 7942 and its implementing rules DAO 96-40 as
unconstitutional, petitioners set their sight on Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 and Section 107 of
DAO 96-40 which they claim allow the unlawful and unjust “taking” of private property for private
purpose in contradiction with Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandating that private
property shall not be taken except for public use and the corresponding payment of just
compensation. They assert that public respondent DENR, through the Mining Act and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations, cannot, on its own, permit entry into a private property and
allow taking of land without payment of just compensation.
Traversing petitioners’ assertion, public respondents argue that Section 76 is not a taking provision
but a valid exercise of the police power and by virtue of which, the state may prescribe regulations
to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety and general welfare of the
people. This government regulation involves the adjustment of rights for the public good and that
this adjustment curtails some potential for the use or economic exploitation of private property.
Public respondents concluded that “to require compensation in all such circumstances would
compel the government to regulate by purchase.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 7942 and the DENR RRs are valid.
HELD:
Petitioners claimed that Section 76 of Republic Act 7942 and DAO 96-40 were unconstitutional for
allowing the unlawful and unjust taking of private property for a private purpose. The Court,
however, rejected that claim. Underscoring the history of mining laws, it explained that their
evolution gave a positive indication that mining operators who were qualified to own lands were
granted the authority to exercise eminent domain for the entry, acquisition, and use of private lands
in areas open to mining operations. Considering that Section 1 of PD 512 granted qualified mining
operators that authority, which was deemed incorporated in Section 76 of Republic Act 7942, the
inescapable conclusion was that the latter was a “taking” provision. By this conclusion, the Court
did not mean, though, that Section 76 was unconstitutional for allowing the taking of private
property without a determination of public use and the payment of just compensation. Concededly,
for a taking to be valid, it must be for public use. The mining industry was deemed to play a pivotal
role in the economic development of the country and to be a vital tool in the government’s
emphasis on accelerated recovery. It was therefore an industry that yielded public benefit. The
Court rejected petitioners’ claim that the State’s discretion to decide when to take private property
had been contractually reduced by the CAMC FTAA. Moreover, it held that the assailed agreement
had laid down the ways and means by which a foreign contractor, disqualified from owning land,
could identify for the government which specific surface areas within the FTAA contract area were
to be acquired for the mine infrastructure. Through a voluntary transaction, the government would
acquire ownership of those areas on behalf of the contractor, which would then be able to proceed
with the full implementation of the agreement.
The SC ruled against Didipio. The SC noted the requisites of eminent domain. They are:
(1) the expropriator must enter a private property;
(2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period.
(3) the entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority;
(4) the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously
affected;
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(5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and
deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property.
In the case at bar, Didipio failed to show that the law is invalid. Indeed, there is taking
involved but it is not w/o just compensation. Sec 76 of RA 7942 provides for just compensation as
well as section 107 of the DENR RR. To wit,
Section 76. xxx Provided, that any damage to the property of the surface owner, occupant,
or concessionaire as a consequence of such operations shall be properly compensated as
may be provided for in the implementing rules and regulations.
Section 107. Compensation of the Surface Owner and Occupant- Any damage done to the
property of the surface owners, occupant, or concessionaire thereof as a consequence of the
mining operations or as a result of the construction or installation of the infrastructure
mentioned in 104 above shall be properly and justly compensated.
Further, mining is a public policy and the government can invoke eminent domain to exercise entry,
acquisition and use of private lands.
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3. Eminent Domain
Laws:
SECTION 19. Eminent Domain. — A local government unit may, through its chief executive and
acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or
purpose or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just
compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws:
Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and
definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted:
Provided, further, That the local government unit may immediately take possession of the
property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the
proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on
the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated:
Provided, finally, That, the amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be
determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the
property.
CASES:
BELUSO VS. MUNICIPALITY OF PANAY, G.R. NO. 153974, AUGUST 07, 2006
The power of eminent domain delegated to LGs is in reality not eminent but “inferior.”
Congress is still the principal of LGs, and the latter cannot go against the principal's will or
modify the same.
The enabling instrument for the exercise of eminent domain is an ordinance, not a
resolution (Section 19, 1991 LGC).
 A resolution which merely expresses the sentiment of the municipal council
will not suffice.
FACTS:
Before this Court is a petition for review questioning the Decision 1 of the CA dated March 20, 2002,
as well the Resolution 2 denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration thereof.
Petitioners are owners of parcels of land with a total area of about 20,424 sqm. On November 8,
1995, the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Panay issued Resolution No. 95-29 authorizing
the municipal government through the mayor to initiate expropriation proceedings. A petition for
expropriation was thereafter filed by the Municipality of Panay (respondent) before the RTC.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the taking is not for public use but only for the
benefit of certain individuals; that it is politically motivated because petitioners voted against the
incumbent mayor and vice-mayor; and that some of the supposed beneficiaries of the land sought
to be expropriated have not actually signed a petition asking for the property but their signatures
were forged or they were misled into signing the same.
RTC
Denied petitioners' Motion to Dismiss and declared that the expropriation in this case is for "public
use" and the respondent has the lawful right to take the property upon payment of just
compensation.
Petitioners filed an Answer on reasserting the issues they raised in their Motion to Dismiss. RTC
issued an Order appointing three persons as Commissioners to ascertain the amount of just
compensation for the property. Petitioners filed a "Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Hearing of the
Court Appointed Commissioners to Determine Just Compensation and for Clarification of the
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Court's Order dated October 1, 1997" which was denied by the trial court on November 3, 1997.
Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was also denied on December 9, 1997. Petitioners then
filed on March 2, 1998 a Petition for Certiorari before the CA claiming that they were denied due
process when the trial court declared that the taking was for public purpose without receiving
evidence on petitioners' claim that the Mayor of Panay was motivated by politics in expropriating
their property and in denying their Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Hearing of the Court Appointed
Commissioners
On January 17, 2001, petitioners filed a Motion to Admit Attached Memorandum and the
Memorandum itself where they argued that based on the Petition for Expropriation filed by
respondent, such expropriation was based only on a resolution and not on an ordinance contrary to
Sec. 19 of RA. 7160.
On March 20, 2002, the CA rendered its Decision dismissing the Petition for Certiorari.
We find the petition to be impressed with merit.
ISSUES:
A. Respondent is without, lacks and does not have the lawful power to acquire any or all of the
subject properties through eminent domain, it being exercised by means of a mere resolution, and
not through an ordinance as required by law and applicable jurisprudence;
B. Respondent is likewise without, lacks and does not have the lawful power to acquire any or all of
the subject properties through eminent domain, its previous offer to buy them being not valid;
HELD:
Eminent domain, which is the power of a sovereign state to appropriate private property to
particular uses to promote public welfare, is essentially lodged in the legislature. While such power
may be validly delegated to local government units (LGUs), other public entities and public utilities
the exercise of such power by the delegated entities is not absolute. In fact, the scope of delegated
legislative power is narrower than that of the delegating authority and such entities may exercise
the power to expropriate private property only when authorized by Congress and subject to its
control and restraints imposed through the law conferring the power or in other legislations.
Indeed, LGUs by themselves have no inherent power of eminent domain. Thus, strictly speaking, the
power of eminent domain delegated to an LGU is in reality not eminent but "inferior" since it must
conform to the limits imposed by the delegation and thus partakes only of a share in eminent
domain. The national legislature is still the principal of the LGUs and the latter cannot go
against the principal's will or modify the same. The exercise of the power of eminent domain
necessarily involves a derogation of a fundamental right. It greatly affects a landowner's right to
private property which is a constitutionally protected right necessary for the preservation and
enhancement of personal dignity and is intimately connected with the rights to life and liberty.
Thus, whether such power is exercised directly by the State or by its authorized agents, the exercise
of such power must undergo painstaking scrutiny. Indeed, despite the existence of legislative grant
in favor of local governments, it is still the duty of the courts to determine whether the power of
eminent domain is being exercised in accordance with the delegating law
It is clear therefore that several requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the power of
eminent domain, to wit:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in
behalf of the local government unit, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue
expropriation proceedings over a particular private property.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of
the poor and the landless.
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3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the
Constitution, and other pertinent laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be
expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.
The Court in no uncertain terms have pronounced that a local government unit cannot authorize an
expropriation of private property through a mere resolution of its lawmaking body. LGC expressly
requires an ordinance for the purpose and a resolution that merely expresses the sentiment of the
municipal council will not suffice. A resolution will not suffice for an LGU to be able to expropriate
private property; and the reason for this is settled: . . .
A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution
is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific
matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is
temporary in nature. Additionally, the two are enacted differently — a third reading is
necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority
of all the Sanggunian members.
If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent domain through a mere resolution,
it would have simply adopted the language of the previous LGC. But Congress did not. In a
clear divergence from the previous LGC, Sec. 19 of R.A. [No.] 7160 categorically requires
that the local chief executive act pursuant to an ordinance. . . .
As respondent's expropriation in this case was based merely on a resolution, such expropriation is
clearly defective. While the Court is aware of the constitutional policy promoting local autonomy,
the court cannot grant judicial sanction to an LGU's exercise of its delegated power of eminent
domain in contravention of the very law giving it such power. The Court notes that petitioners
failed to raise this point at the earliest opportunity. Still, we are not precluded from considering the
same. This Court will not hesitate to consider matters even those raised for the first time on appeal
in clearly meritorious situations, such as in this case.
Thus, the Court finds it unnecessary to resolve the other issues raised by petitioners. It is well to
mention however that despite our ruling in this case respondent is not barred from instituting
similar proceedings in the future, provided that it complies with all legal requirements.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
47052 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
MUNICIPALITY OF CORDOVA VS. PATHFINDER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, G.R. NO.

205544, JUNE 29, 2016
The power of eminent domain is essentially legislative in nature but may be validly
delegated to LGs. The basis for its exercise is granted under Section 19 of the 1991 LGC.
For a writ of possession to issue, only two requirements are required:
(1) the sufficiency in form and substance of the complaint; and
(2) the required provisional deposit. No hearing is required for the issuance of a writ of
possession. The sufficiency in form and substance of the complaint for expropriation can be
determined by the mere examination of the allegations of the complaint.
FACTS:
Respondent Pathfinder Development Corporation (Pathfinder) is the owner of real properties in
Alegria, Cordova, Cebu: (1) Lot No. 692 and (2) part of Lot No. 697 with an area of 50,000 sq.m.,
while respondent Topanga Development Corporation (Topanga) owns Lot No. 691 and part of Lot
No. 697.
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On February 8, 2011, petitioner Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Cordova enacted

Ordinance No. 003-2011 expropriating 836 sq.m. of Lot No. 692, 9,728 sq.m. of Lot No. 697, 3,898
sq.m. of Lot No. 691, and 1,467 sq.m. of Lot No. 693 owned by one Eric Ng Mendoza, for the
construction of a road access from the national highway to the municipal roll-on/roll-off (RORO)
port. It likewise authorized petitioner Mayor of Cordova to initiate and execute the necessary
expropriation proceedings. Mayor of Cordova filed an expropriation complaint against the owners
of the properties. Later, the Mayor filed a motion to place the municipality in possession of the
properties sought to be expropriated. Pathfinder and Topanga filed an action for Declaration of
Nullity of the Expropriation Ordinance before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaue City,
Branch 56, claiming that no offer to buy addressed to them was shown or attached to the
expropriation complaint, thereby rendering the Ordinance constitutionally inform for being in
violation of their right to due process and equal protection. On July 13, 2011, they likewise filed an
Urgent Motion to Suspend Proceedings based on prejudicial question in the case for the declaration
of nullity of the Ordinance.
RTC
The Lapu-Lapu RTC, Branch 27 issued an Order 2 denying the corporations' motion for suspension
of the proceedings and granting the issuance of a Writ of Possession in favor of the municipality.
Pathfinder and Topanga moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied.
CA
Reversed the orders by RTC. The case is remanded to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Lapu-
Lapu City for the reception of evidence de novo on the determination of the authority of the
respondent municipality to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise
in the context of the facts involved in the suit.
Petitioners Municipality, Sangguniang Bayan, and Mayor of Cordova then filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, but the same proved to be futile. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA committed a reversible error in giving due course to the petition under Rule
65.
HELD:
Eminent domain is the right or power of a sovereign state to appropriate private property to
particular uses to promote public welfare. It is an indispensable attribute of sovereignty; a power
grounded in the primary duty of government to serve the common need and advance the general
welfare. The power of eminent domain is inseparable in sovereignty being essential to the existence
of the State and inherent in government. Its exercise is proscribed by only two Constitutional
requirements: first, that there must be just compensation, and second, that no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. The power of eminent domain is
essentially legislative in nature but may be validly delegated to local government units. The basis
for its exercise by the Municipality of Cordova, being a LGU, is granted under Sec. 19 of Republic Act
7160.
Judicial review of the exercise of the power of eminent domain is limited to the following areas of
concern:
(a) the adequacy of the compensation,
(b) the necessity of the taking, and
(c) the public use character of the purpose of the taking.
Under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, expropriation proceedings are comprised of two stages:
(1) the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and
the propriety of its exercise in the context of the surrounding facts, and
(2) the determination of the just compensation for the property sought to be taken.
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The first stage ends, if not in a dismissal of the action, with an order of condemnation declaring that
the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for public use or
purpose. Pathfinder and Topanga contend that the trial court issued an Order of Condemnation of
the properties without previously conducting a proper hearing for the reception of evidence of the
parties.
However, no hearing is actually required for the issuance of a writ of possession, which demands
only two requirements: (a) the sufficiency in form and substance of the complaint, and (b) the
required provisional deposit. The sufficiency in form and substance of the complaint for
expropriation can be determined by the mere examination of the allegations of the complaint. Here,
there is indeed a necessity for the taking of the subject properties as these would provide access
towards the RORO port being constructed in the municipality. The construction of the new road will
highly benefit the public as it will enable shippers and passengers to gain access to the port from
the main public road or highway.
The requisites for authorizing immediate entry are the filing of a complaint for expropriation
sufficient in form and substance, and the deposit of the amount equivalent to (15%) of the fair
market value of the property to be expropriated based on its current tax declaration. Upon
compliance with these requirements, the petitioner in an expropriation case is entitled to a writ of
possession as a matter of right and the issuance of the writ becomes ministerial. Indubitably, since
the complaint was found to have been sufficient in form and substance and the required deposit
had been duly complied with, the issuance of the writ had aptly become ministerial on the part of
the RTC. It cannot be said, therefore, that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it
found the taking of the properties of Topanga and Pathfinder proper.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated March 28, 2012 in CA-G.R. SP No. 06193 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Orders of the Regional Trial Court of LapuLapu, Branches 53 and 27, in Civil Case No. R-LLP-11-
05959-CV, dated May 26, 2011, August 12, 2011, and August 22, 2011, are hereby REINSTATED
HON. ALVIN P. VERGARA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS CITY MAYOR OF CABANATUAN CITY VS.
LOURDES MELENCIO S. GRECIA, G.R. 185638, AUGUST 10, 2016
An LGU cannot order a donation of delineated roads and streets without just
compensation. Delineated roads and streets, whether part of a subdivision or segregated for
public use, remain private and will remain as such until conveyed to the government by
donation or through expropriation proceedings. An owner may not be forced to donate his or
her property even if it has been delineated as road lots because that would partake of an illegal
taking. He or she may even choose to retain said properties. If he or she chooses to retain
them, however, he or she also retains the burden of maintaining them and paying for real
estate taxes. When the road or street was delineated upon government request and taken for
public use the government has no choice but to compensate the owner for his or her sacrifice,
lest it violates the constitutional provision against taking without just compensation.
In the exercise of the power of eminent domain, it is basic that the taking of private
property must be for a public purpose (Section 19, 1991 LGC).
 Public use is defined as whatever is beneficially employed for the community
(Barangay Sindalan, San Fernando vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150640, March
22, 2007). There must be a particular public purpose. (City of Manila vs. Prieto,
G.R. No. 221366, July 8, 2019)
Apart from the requirement that compensation for expropriated land must be fair and
reasonable, compensation, to be "just", must also be made without delay. Without prompt
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payment, compensation cannot be considered "just" if the property is immediately taken as the
property owner suffers the immediate deprivation of both his land and its fruits or income. The
rationale for imposing the interest is to compensate the petitioners for the income they would
have made had they been properly compensated for their properties at the time of the taking.
There is a need for prompt payment and the necessity of the payment of interest to
compensate for any delay in the payment of compensation for property already taken. Settled
is the rule that the award of interest is imposed in the nature of damages for delay in payment
which in effect makes the obligation on the part of the government one of forbearance. This is
to ensure prompt payment of the value of the land and limit the opportunity loss of the owner
that can drag from days to decades.
When the road or street was delineated upon government request and taken for public
use the government has no choice but to compensate the owner for his or her sacrifice, lest it
violates the constitutional provision against taking without just compensation.
Two mandatory requirements should underlie the Government's exercise of the power
of eminent domain namely: (1) that it is for a particular public purpose; and (2) that just
compensation be paid to the property owner. These requirements partake the nature of
implied conditions that should be complied with to enable the condemnor to keep the property
expropriated.
The determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial function
and any valuation for just compensation laid down in the statutes may serve only as a guiding
principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation but it may not substitute the
court's own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such
amount.
FACTS:
The subject of this petition is a parcel of land situated in Barangay Barrera, Cabanatuan City, and
registered under the name of the respondents. The record showed that sometime in 1989, the
subject land was taken by the Sanggunian for road-right-of-way and road widening projects.
Despite the taking of the subject land and the completion of the road widening projects, the
Sanggunian failed to tender the just compensation to the respondents. Upon the request of Lourdes,
the Sanggunian created an appraisal committee, to determine the proper amount of just
compensation to be paid by the Sanggunian for the subject land. The Appraisal Committee then
issued Resolution No. recommending the payment of P2,295.00 per sq.m. as just compensation.
Thereafter, the Sanggunian issued Resolution authorizing Mayor Vergara to negotiate, acquire,
purchase and accept properties needed by the Sanggunian for its project. Mayor Vergara executed a
MOA with Lourdes as Attorney-in-fact of the respondents, whereby the Sanggunian bound itself to
pay the respondents the amount of P17,028,900.00 in 12 years at the rate of P1,419,075.00 every
year starting the first quarter of 2002 as payment of the subject land. More than four years had
lapsed after the signing of the MOA but no payment was ever made by the petitioners to the
respondents despite the fact that the subject land was already taken by the petitioners and
was being used by the constituents of the City of Cabanatuan. Despite personal and written
demands, the petitioners still failed to pay the respondents the just and fair compensation of the
subject land. In a letter, Mayor Vergara said that the Sanggunian denied the ratification of the MOA
per its Resolution No. 129-2002 15 on the ground of fiscal restraint or deficit of the Sanggunian. In
view of this resolution, Mayor Vergara claimed that the said MOA could neither be enforced, nor
bind the Sanggunian. Respondents filed a petition for mandamus before the RTC of Cabanatuan
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City, which was raffled to Branch 86. On September 18, 2006, RTC-Branch 86 rendered its Order in
favor of the respondents.
RTC-Branch 86 issued an Order 22 granting the respondents' motion and thereby ordering the
petitioners to pay the sum of P10,000,000.00 as partial execution of the decision. The petitioners
then filed a motion for inhibition and a motion for reconsideration. RTC issued an Order granting
the motion for inhibition which subsequently led to the assignment by raffle of the case to RTC-
Branch 30. RTC-Branch 30 issued an Order 25 denying the petitioners' motions. A writ of execution
was issued. Accordingly, a Notice of Garnishment was issued to the manager of United Coconut
Planters Bank of Cabanatuan City. Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari with urgent Motion for
the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the CA. In
a Resolution, the CA granted the petitioners' prayer for an injunctive relief and enjoined the RTC-
Branch 30 Presiding Judge and Sheriff from enforcing the said writ of execution and orders. On
appeal, the CA, in its Decision, affirmed the trial court's order but modified the same by reducing
the amount to be paid by the petitioners from P10,000,000.00 to P2,554,335.00 representing 15%
of the value of the property as provided by law. Undeterred, the petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration, but it was denied. Hence, this petition. For their part, the petitioners argue that the
subject land is a subdivision road which is beyond the commerce of man as provided for in Section
50 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529. Thus, the said contract entered into by Mayor Vergara
with the respondents is null and void, and there is no obligation on the part of the petitioners to pay
the respondents.
ISSUE:
WON the petitioners are liable for just compensation. Hence, the pertinent point of inquiry is
whether the subject land of the respondents is beyond the commerce of man as provided for in
Section 50 of P.D. No. 1529.
HELD:
CITY OF MANILA VS. PRIETO, G.R. NO. 221366, JULY 8, 2019

The City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8070 that authorized the City Mayor to
acquire certain parcels of land belonging to respondents to be used for the City of Manila's
(petitioner) LandFor-The-Landless Program.
Initially, petitioner attempted to acquire the subject lots by negotiated sale, offering the
amount of P2,000.00 per square meter, which respondents refused to accept on the ground
that their respective properties are worth more than that. Thus, petitioner Bled a Complaint
dated September 3, 2004, before the RTC, asserting its authority to expropriate the subject lots
for its project.
MODAY VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 107916, FEBRUARY 20, 1997
The authority of the supervising-higher LGU in exercising its review authority over
ordinances of supervised-lower LGU is limited to questions of law/legal questions, i.e., whether
or not the ordinances are within the powers of supervised-lower LGU to enact; whether or
not ultra vires; and whether or not procedures were followed. The power to review does not
extend to choice of property to be expropriated; otherwise, this would amount to control, not
just supervision.
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Anne Derramas
MASIKIP V. CITY OF PASIG, G.R. NO. 136349, JANUARY 23, 2006

The right to take private property for public purposes necessarily originates from the
necessity and the taking must be limited to such necessity. There is no genuine necessity when
taking of private property is done for the benefit of a small community which seeks to have its
own sports and recreational facility, notwithstanding the fact that there is a recreational facility
only a short distance away.
Judicial review of the exercise of eminent domain is limited to the following areas of
concern: (1) the adequacy of the compensation; (2) the necessity of the taking; and (3) the
public use character of the purpose of the taking.
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Anne Derramas
4. RECLASSIFICATION OF LAND
Laws:
SECTION 20. Reclassification of Lands. —
(a) A city or municipality may, through an ordinance passed by the sanggunian after conducting
public hearings for the purpose, authorize the reclassification of agricultural lands and provide
for the manner of their utilization or disposition in the following cases:
(1) when the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural
purposes as determined by the Department of Agriculture or
(2) where the land shall have substantially greater economic value for residential,
commercial, or industrial purposes, as determined by the sanggunian concerned:
Provided, That such reclassification shall be limited to the following percentage of the
total agricultural land area at the time of the passage of the ordinance:
(1) For highly urbanized and independent component cities, fifteen percent
(15%);
(2) For component cities and first to the third class municipalities, ten percent
(10%); and acd
(3) For fourth to sixth class municipalities, five percent (5%):
Provided, further, That agricultural lands distributed to agrarian reform beneficiaries
pursuant to R.A. No. 6657 otherwise known as "The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law", shall not be affected by the said reclassification and the conversion of such lands
into other purposes shall be governed by Section 65 of said Act.
(b) The President may, when public interest so requires and upon recommendation of the
National Economic and Development Authority, authorize a city or municipality to reclassify
lands in excess of the limits set in the next preceding paragraph.
(c) The local government units shall, in conformity with existing laws, continue to prepare their
respective comprehensive land use plans enacted through zoning ordinances which shall be the
primary and dominant bases for the future use of land resources: Provided, That the
requirements for food production, human settlements, and industrial expansion shall be taken
into consideration in the preparation of such plans.
(d) Where approval by a national agency is required for reclassification, such approval shall not
be unreasonably withheld. Failure to act on a proper and complete application for
reclassification within three (3) months from receipt of the same shall be deemed as approval
thereof.
(e) Nothing in this Section shall be construed as repealing, amending, or modifying in any
manner the provisions of R.A. No. 6657.
CASES:
ROS VS. DAR, G.R. NO. 132477, AUGUST 31, 2005
Conversion is different from reclassification. Conversion is the act of changing the current use
of a piece of agricultural land into some other use as approved by the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR). Accordingly, a mere reclassification of agricultural land does not automatically
allow a landowner to change its use and thus cause the ejectment of the tenants. He/she has to
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Anne Derramas
undergo the process of conversion before he/she is permitted to use the agricultural land for
other purposes
SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF BATAAN VS. CONGRESSMAN GARCIA, G.R. NO. 174964,

OCTOBER 5, 2016
5. Closure and opening of roads

Laws: Section 21, LGC
SECTION 21. Closure and Opening of Roads. —
(a) A local government unit may, pursuant to an ordinance, permanently or temporarily close or
open any local road, alley, park, or square falling within its jurisdiction: Provided, however, That
in case of permanent closure, such ordinance must be approved by at least two-thirds (2/3) of
all the members of the sanggunian, and when necessary, an adequate substitute for the public
facility that is subject to closure is provided.
(b) No such way or place or any part thereof shall be permanently closed without making
provisions for the maintenance of public safety therein. A property thus permanently
withdrawn from public use may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real
property belonging to the local government unit concerned may be lawfully used or conveyed:
Provided, however, That no freedom park shall be closed permanently without provision for its
transfer or relocation to a new site.
(c) Any national or local road, alley, park, or square may be temporarily closed during an actual
emergency, or fiesta celebrations, public rallies, agricultural or industrial fairs, or an
undertaking of public works and highways, telecommunications, and waterworks projects, the
duration of which shall be specified by the local chief executive concerned in a written order:
Provided, however, That no national or local road, alley, park, or square shall be temporarily
closed for athletic, cultural, or civic activities not officially sponsored, recognized, or approved
by the local government unit concerned.
(d) Any city, municipality, or barangay may, by a duly enacted ordinance, temporarily close and
regulate the use of any local street, road, thoroughfare, or any other public place where
shopping malls, Sunday, flea or night markets, or shopping areas may be established and where
goods, merchandise, foodstuffs, commodities, or articles of commerce may be sold and
dispensed to the general public.
CASES:
SANGALANG V. IAC, G.R. NO. 71169, AUGUST 25, 1989
MMDA V. BEL AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION INC., G.R. NO. 135962, MARCH 27, 2000
6. Local Legislation – Valid Ordinance v. Resolution

Laws:
SECTION 48. Local Legislative Power. — Local legislative power shall be exercised by the
sangguniang panlalawigan for the province; the sangguniang panlungsod for the city; the
sangguniang bayan for the municipality; and the sangguniang barangay for the barangay.
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Anne Derramas

SECTION 22. Corporate Powers. —
(a) Every local government unit, as a corporation, shall have the following powers:
(1) To have continuous succession in its corporate name;
(2) To sue and be sued;
(3) To have and use a corporate seal;
(4) To acquire and convey real or personal property;
(5) To enter into contracts; and
(6) To exercise such other powers as are granted to corporations, subject to the
limitations provided in this Code and other laws.
(b) Local government units may continue using, modify, or change their existing corporate
seals: Provided, That newly established local government units or those without corporate seals
may create their own corporate seals which shall be registered with the Department of the
Interior and Local Government: Provided, further , That any change of corporate seal shall also
be registered as provided hereon.
(c) Unless otherwise provided in this Code, no contract may be entered into by the local chief
executive in behalf of the local government unit without prior authorization by the sanggunian
concerned. A legible copy of such contract shall be posted at a conspicuous place in the
provincial capitol or the city, municipal or barangay hall.
(d) Local government units shall enjoy full autonomy in the exercise of their proprietary
functions and in the management of their economic enterprises, subject to the limitations
provided in this Code and other applicable laws.
Article 107 LGC IRR
CASES:
MANILA VS. LAGUIO, G.R. NO. 118127, APRIL 12, 2005
Local political subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative
power from the national legislature except only that the power to create their own sources of
revenue and to levy taxes is conferred by the Constitution itself. They are mere agents vested
with what is called the power of subordinate legislation. As delegates of Congress, LGUs cannot
contravene but must obey at all times the will of their principal. An enactment local in origin
cannot prevail against a decree, which has the force and effect of a statute.
Ordering a particular type of business to wind up, transfer, relocate or convert to an
allowable type of business in effect permanently restricts the use of property and thus goes
beyond regulation. Just compensation is therefore required.
SAMAHAN NG MGA PROGRESIBONG KABATAAN (SPARK) VS. QUEZON CITY, G.R. NO. 225442,
AUGUST 8, 2017
LAGCAO VS. LABRA, G.R. NO. 155746, OCTOBER 13, 2004;

The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the
latter.
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Anne Derramas
Local legislative acts are referred to as denominated ordinances. For an ordinance to be valid,
it must not only be within the corporate powers of the LGU to enact and must be passed
according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following
substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must
not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but
may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be
unreasonable.
The ordinance must show why the subject property was singled out for expropriation or what
necessity impelled the particular choice or selection.
FERRER VS. BAUTISTA, G.R. NO. 210551, JUNE 30, 2015

As jurisprudence indicates, the tests are divided into the formal (i.e., whether the ordinance
was enacted within the corporate powers of the LGU and whether it was passed in accordance
with the procedure prescribed by law), and the substantive (i.e., involving inherent merit, like
the conformity of the ordinance with the limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as
well as with the requirements of fairness and reason, and its consistency with public policy).
An ordinance must muster the test of constitutionality and the test of consistency with the
prevailing laws. If not, it is void.
A person is real party-in-interest to assail the constitutionality and legality of the ordinances
because he is a registered co-owner of a residential property in the city and that he paid
property tax which already included the SHT and the garbage fee. He has substantial right to
seek a refund of the payments he made and to stop future imposition. While he is a lone
petitioner, his cause of action to declare the validity of the subject ordinances is substantial and
of paramount interest to similarly situated property owners in the city.
LGUs have no inherent power to tax except to the extent that such power might be delegated
to them either by the basic law or by the statute. Under the now prevailing Constitution, where
there is neither a grant nor a prohibition by statute, the tax power must be deemed to exist
although Congress may provide statutory limitations and guidelines. The basic rationale for
the current rule is to safeguard the viability and self-sufficiency of local government units by
directly granting them general and broad tax powers. Nevertheless, the fundamental law did
not intend the delegation to be absolute and unconditional; the constitutional objective
obviously is to ensure that, while the local government units are being strengthened and made
more autonomous, the legislature must still see to it that (a) the taxpayer will not be over-
burdened or saddled with multiple and unreasonable impositions; (b) each local government
unit will have its fair share of available resources; (c) the resources of the national government
will not be unduly disturbed; and (d) local taxation will be fair, uniform, and just.
26 | P a g e
Anne Derramas
An LGU is empowered as well to apply its resources and assets for productive, developmental,
or welfare purposes, in the exercise or furtherance of their governmental or proprietary
powers and functions.
To pass judicial scrutiny, a regulatory fee must not produce revenue in excess of the cost of
the regulation because such fee will be construed as an illegal tax when the revenue generated
by the regulation exceeds the cost of the regulation.
The mayor has the ministerial duty to ensure that all taxes and other revenues of the city are
collected, and that city funds are applied to the payment of expenses and settlement of
obligations of the city, in accordance with law or ordinance. On the other hand, under the LGC,
all local taxes, fees, and charges shall be collected by the provincial, city, municipal, or barangay
treasurer, or their duly-authorized deputies, while the assessor shall take charge, among
others, of ensuring that all laws and policies governing the appraisal and assessment of real
properties for taxation purposes are properly executed. Thus, a writ of prohibition may be
issued against them to desist from further proceeding in the action or matter specified in the
petition.
The socialized housing tax charged by the city is a tax which is within its power to impose.
Aside from the specific authority vested by Section 43 of the UDHA, cities are allowed to
exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions and responsibilities as are
necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provision of the basic services
and facilities which include, among others, programs and projects for low-cost housing and
other mass dwellings. The collections made accrue to its socialized housing programs and
projects. The tax is not a pure exercise of taxing power or merely to raise revenue; it is levied
with a regulatory purpose. The levy is primarily in the exercise of the police power for the
general welfare of the entire city. It is greatly imbued with public interest
The socialized housing tax imposed by the city is not confiscatory or oppressive since the tax
being imposed therein is below what the UDHA actually allows
The garbage fee is a charge fixed for the regulation of an activity. It is not a tax and cannot
violate the rule on double taxation.
The authority of a municipality or city to impose fees is limited to the collection and transport
of non-recyclable and special wastes and for the disposal of these into the sanitary landfill.
Barangays, on the other hand, have the authority to impose fees for the collection and
segregation of biodegradable, compostable and reusable wastes from households,
commerce, other sources of domestic wastes, and for the use of barangay MRFs
For the purpose of garbage collection, there is, in fact, no substantial distinction between an
occupant of a lot, on one hand, and an occupant of a unit in a condominium, socialized housing
project or apartment, on the other hand. Most likely, garbage output produced by these types
27 | P a g e
Anne Derramas
of occupants is uniform and does not vary to a large degree; thus, a similar schedule of fee is
both just and equitable. Different rates based on the above classification is therefore void.
In the exercise of police power, an LGU can supervise and control the collection of garbage
within its corporate limits. Ordinances regulating waste removal carry a strong presumption of
validity. Necessarily, LGUs are statutorily sanctioned to impose and collect such reasonable fees
and charges for services rendered
CITY OF BATANGAS VS. PHILIPPINE SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, G.R. NO. 195003, JUNE
7, 2017
MUNICIPALITY OF TIWI VS. BETITO, G.R. NO. 171873, JULY 9, 2010

A mayor validly entered into a Contract of Legal Services where the sanggunian unanimously
passed a resolution authorizing his/her to hire a lawyer of his/her choice to represent the
municipality’s interest.
OCAMPO VS. PEOPLE, G.R. NOS. 156547-51 / 156382-85, FEBRUARY 4, 2008

A loan agreement entered into by the provincial governor without prior authorization from the
sangguniang panlalawigan is unenforceable. The sanggunian’s failure to impugn the
contract’s validity despite knowledge of its infirmity is an implied ratification that validates the
contract.
Sanggunian
ZAMORA VS. CABALLERO, G.R. NO. 147767, JANUARY 14, 2004
Legislation requires the participation of all its members so that they may not only represent
the interests of their respective constituents but also help in the making of decisions by voting
upon every question put upon the body (Zamora vs. Caballero, G.R. No. 147767, January 14,
2004).
The acts of only a part of the sanggunian done outside the parameters of the legal provisions
are legally infirm. All such acts cannot be given binding force and effect for they are considered
unofficial acts done during an unauthorized session (Zamora vs. Caballero, G.R. No. 147767,
January 14, 2004).
A majority of all members of the sanggunian who have been elected and qualified shall
constitute a quorum to transact official business. The determination of the existence of a
quorum is based on the total number of members of the sanggunian without regard to the
filing of a leave of absence.
NEGROS ORIENTAL II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE INC. VS. SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD OF

DUMAGUETE, G.R. NO. 72492, NOVEMBER 05, 1987
Absent a law, local legislative councils have no contempt and subpoena powers.
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Anne Derramas
Power to Veto
Laws:
SECTION 55. Veto Power of the Local Chief Executive. — (a) The local chief executive may veto
any ordinance of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang
bayan on the ground that it is ultra vires or prejudicial to the public welfare, stating his reasons
therefor in writing.
Cases:
DELOS REYES VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. NO. 121215, NOVEMBER 13, 1997
The grant of the veto power confers authority beyond the simple act of signing an ordinance or
resolution as a requisite to its enforceability. Such power accords the local chief executive the
discretion to sustain a resolution or ordinance in the first instance or to veto it and return it
with his/her objections to the sanggunian.
CANET VS. DECENA, G.R. NO. 155344, OCTOBER 20, 2004
A municipal mayor cannot issue a mayor’s permit to operate a cockpit without an enabling
ordinance. A general ordinance empowering a mayor to issue permits cannot be used to
justify the issuance of a license. A mayor cannot also be compelled to issue such a license
since this would constitute an undue encroachment on the mayor's administrative
prerogatives.
Power to Review
Review of Ordinances
Laws:
SECTION 187. Procedure for Approval and Effectivity of Tax Ordinances and Revenue
Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings. — The procedure for approval of local tax ordinances
and revenue measures shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Code : Provided, That
public hearings shall be conducted for the purpose prior to the enactment thereof:
Provided, further , That any question on the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or
revenue measures may be raised on appeal within thirty (30) days from the effectivity thereof
to the Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within sixty (60) days from the date of
receipt of the appeal:
Provided, however, That such appeal shall not have the effect of suspending the effectivity of
the ordinance and the accrual and payment of the tax, fee, or charge levied therein: Provided,
finally, That within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision or the lapse of the sixty-day
period without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved party may file
appropriate proceedings with a court of competent jurisdiction.

SECTION 326. Review of Appropriation Ordinances of Provinces, Highly-Urbanized Cities,
Independent Component Cities, and Municipalities within the Metropolitan Manila Area. —
The Department of Budget and Management shall review ordinances authorizing the annual or
supplemental appropriations of provinces, highly-urbanized cities, independent component
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Anne Derramas
cities, and municipalities within the Metropolitan Manila Area in accordance with the
immediately succeeding section.
CASES:
CASINO VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 91192, DECEMBER 2, 1991
REYES ET. AL. VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 118233, DECEMBER 10, 1999
ALTA VISTA GOLF AND COUNTRY CLUB VS. CITY OF CEBU, G.R. NO. 180235, JANUARY 20, 2016
Judicial Review
Cases:
LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY NATIONAL VS. MANILA, G.R. NO. 154599, JANUARY 21, 2004
ORTEGA VS. QUEZON CITY, G.R. NO. 161400, SEPTEMBER 02, 2005
MARMETO V. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 213953, 16 SEPTEMBER 2017
SETTLEMENT OF BOUNDARY DISPUTES
BARANGAY MAYAMOT, ANTIPOLO CITY VS. ANTIPOLO CITY, G.R. NO.187349, AUGUST 17,
2016
7. Other Governmental and Corporate Powers

Express Powers – Section 22, 1991 LGC
Implied Powers
JAVIER VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. L-49065, JUNE, 1, 1994
Section 13, Article X, 1987 Constitution
30 | P a g e

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LAGCAO VS. LABRA, G.R. NO. 155746, OCTOBER 13, 2004;

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