ESTRADA V. ESCRITOR, A.M. No.

P-02-1651, August 4, 2003

FACTS Soledad Escritor is a court interpreter since in the RTC of Las Pinas City. Alejandro Estrada,
the complainant, requested for an investigation of the rumors that Escritor has been living with
Luciano Quilapio Jr., a man not her husband, and had eventually begotten a son. Escritor’s husband,
who had lived with another woman, died a year before she entered into the judiciary. On the other
hand, Quilapio is still legally married to another woman. Estrada is not related to either Escritor or
Quilapio and is not a resident of Las Pinas but of Bacoor, Cavite. According to the complainant,
respondent should not be allowed to remain employed in the judiciary for it will appear as if the
court allows such act. Escritor is a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah’s Witnesses
and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society and her relationship with Quilapio is in conformity
with the beliefs of her religion. After ten years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a
“Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness” which was approved by the congregation. Such declaration
is effective when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union.
Gregorio, Salazar, a member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses since 1985 and has been a presiding
minister since 1991, testified and explained the import of and procedures for executing the
declaration which was completely executed by Escritor and Quilapio.

ISSUE: Whether or not Escritor be found guilty of the administrative charge of “gross and immoral
conduct” and be penalized by the State.

RULING: The case is remanded to the OCA of SC. The Solicitor General is ordered to intervene in
the case where it will be given the opportunity (a) to examine the sincerity and centrality of
respondent's claimed religious belief and practice; (b) to present evidence on the state's "compelling
interest" to override respondent's religious belief and practice; and (c) to show that the means the
state adopts in pursuing its interest is the least restrictive to respondent's religious freedom.

The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality. The Court states that our
Constitution adheres to the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for accommodation of
religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow
for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state
interests. A distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in
mind. In order to properly settle the case at bar, it is essential that the government be given an
opportunity to demonstrate the compelling state interest it seeks to uphold in opposing the
respondent’s position that her conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it is within
the scope of free exercise protection. The Court could not prohibit and punish her conduct where
the Free Exercise Clause protects it, since this would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her
right to religious freedom. Furthermore, the court cannot simply take a passing look at
respondent’s claim of religious freedom but must also apply the “compelling state interest” test.

There is nothing in the OCA’s memorandum to the Court that demonstrates how this interest is so
compelling that it should override respondent’s plea of religious freedom. Indeed, it is
inappropriate for the complainant, a private person, to present evidence on the compelling interest
of the state. The burden of evidence should be discharged by the proper agency of the government
which is the Office of the Solicitor General.

SILVERIO V. REPUBLIC, G.R. No. 174680, October 22, 2007

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FACTS: Petitioner was born and registered as male. He admitted that he is a male transsexual, that
is, “anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a “female” and that he had always identified
himself as a girl since childhood. He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment,
breast augmentation and sex reassignment surgery. From then on, petitioner lived as female and
was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed
from Rommel Jacinto to Mely, and his sex from male to female. The trial court rendered a decision
in favor of the petitioner. Republic of the Philippines thru the OSG filed a petition for certiorari in
the Court of Appeals. CA rendered a decision in favor of the Republic.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to change his name and sex in his birth certificate.

RULING: The petition was denied. Article 376 of the Civil Code provides that no person can change
his or her name or surname without judicial authority which as amended by RA 9048 – Clerical
Error Law. But this does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or
any compelling reason justifying such change. In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced
by the use of his true and official name. In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice
that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name. Article 412 of the Civil Code
provides that no entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order. The
birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those corresponding
to his first name and sex, were all correct. Hence, no correction is necessary. Article 413 of the Civil
Code provides that all other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed
by special laws.

However, there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects.
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time
of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the
physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law
legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or
her birth, if not attended by error is immutable.

While the petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the
intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry
for such reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the
entries in his birth certificate. The remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be
addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts.

VIRAY V. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 205180, November 11, 2013

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FACTS: Information for qualified theft was filed against petitioner Ryan Viray before the RTC. At
the pre-trial, the defense proposed the stipulation, and the prosecution admitted, that the accused
was employed as a dog caretaker of private complainant ZenaidaVedua (Vedua) and was never
allowed to enter the house and he worked daily from 5:00 to 9:00 in the morning.

Private complainant Vedua maintains 75 dogs at her compound. To assist her in feeding the dogs
and cleaning their cages, private complainant employed the accused who would report for work
from 6:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. On October 19, 2006, at around 6:30 in the morning, accused arrived
for work. Half an hour later or at 7 o'clock, private complainant left for Batangas. Before leaving, she
locked the doors of her house, and left the accused to attend to her dogs. Later, at around 7:00 in the
evening, private complainant arrived home, entering through the back door of her house. As private
complainant was about to remove her earrings, she noticed that her jewelry, gadgets and other
personal belongings were missing. The total value of the missing items supposedly amounted to
P297, 800.00. Private complainant immediately checked her premises and discovered that the main
doors of her house were destroyed. A plastic bag was also found on top of her stereo, which was
located near the bedroom. The plastic bag contained a t-shirt and a pair of shorts later found to
belong to accused.

Nimfa Sarad, the laundrywoman of Vedua’s neighbour, testified seeing Viray at Veduas house at 6:00
am by 11:00 am. She went out on an errand and saw Viray with an unidentified male companion
leaving Veduas house with a big sack. Leon Young, who prepares official/business letters for Vedua,
testified that he went to Veduas house between 10-11 am of October 19, 2006 to retrieve a diskette
and saw petitioner with a male companion descending the stairs of Vedua’s house. He alleged that
since he knew Viray as an employee of Vedua, he simply asked where Vidua was. When he was
told that Vedua was in Batangas, he left and went back 3 days after, only to be told about the
robbery. Beverly Calagos, Vedua stay-out laundrywoman, testified that on October 19, 2016, she
reported for work at 5:00 am. Her employer left for Batangas at 7:00 am leaving her and the
petitioner Viray to go about their chores. She went home around 8:30 am leaving petitioner alone in
Vidua’s house. Meanwhile, petitioner never reported for work after the day.

For his defense, Viray averred that he did not report for work on the alleged date of the incident as
he was then down with the flu. Petitioner’s sister and aunt corroborated his version.
RTC ruled that the offense charged should have been robbery and not qualified theft as there was an
actual breaking of the screen door and the main door to gain entry to the house (force upon things),
and that he was not a domestic servant but more of a labourer paid on a daily basis for feeding the
dogs of the complainant.

CA ruling that the instant appeal is partly granted. The RTC decision is affirmed with modification
that the accused be convicted for the crime of qualified theft. The CA found that the information
filed against Viray shows that the prosecution failed to allege one of the essential elements of the
crime robbery, which is the use of force upon things. Thus, to convict him of robbery, a crime not
necessarily include in a case of qualified theft, would violate the constitutional mandate that an
accused must be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
The CA still held that a conviction of the accused for qualified theft is warranted considering that
Viray enjoyed Vedua’s confidence (abuse of confidence), being the caretaker of the latter’s pets.

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ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner should be held guilty of simple theft.

RULING: Yes. The petitioner should be held guilty of simple theft. Article 308 in relation to Article
310 of the RPC describes the felony of qualified theft: Article 308. Who are liable for theft. Theft is
committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without violence against, or intimidation of
persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another without the latter’s consent.
Article 310. Qualified Theft. The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two
degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding article, if committed by a domestic
servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or
large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of the planation, fish taken from a
fishpond or fishery or property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, eruption, or
any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance.

In this case, the crime charged is theft qualified by grave abuse of confidence. In this mode of
qualified theft, the SC has stated that the following elements must be satisfied before the accused
may be convicted of the crime charged:
1. Taking of personal property;
2. That the said property belongs to another;
3. That the said taking be done with intent to gain;
4. That it be done without the owner’s consent;
5. That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against person, nor force upon
things; and
6. That it be done with grave abuse of confidence.

As pointed out by both RTC and the CA, the prosecution had proved the existence of the first 4
elements enumerated above beyond reasonable doubt. The fifth and sixth elements, however, the
RTC and the CA diverge in their respective decisions. The SC is inclined to agree with the CA that
the taking committed by petitioner cannot be qualified by the breaking of the door, as it was not
alleged in the information. However, we disagree from its finding that the same breaking of the
door constitutes the qualifying element of grave abuse of confidence to sentence petitioner Viray to
suffer the penalty for qualified theft. Instead, we are one with the RTC that private complainant did
not repose on Viray confidence that the latter could have abused to commit qualified theft.

The very fact that the petitioner forced open the main door and screen because he was denied access
to private complainant’s house negates the presence of such confidence in him by private
complainant. In other words, where the accused had never been vested physical access to or
material possession of, the stole goods, it may not be said that he or she exploited such access or
material possession thereby committing such grave abuse of confidence in taking the property.

Without the circumstances of a grave abuse of confidence and considering that the use of force upon
things in breaking the door was not alleged in the information, petitioner can only be held
accountable fof the crime of SIMPLE THEFT under Art. 308 to Art. 309 of the RPC.

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