Guerrero vs Bihis
G.R. No. 174144 April 17, 2007
Facts:
Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura, mother of petitioner
Bella A. Guerrero and respondent Resurreccion A. Bihis,
died. Guerrero filed for probate in the RTC QC.
Respondent Bihis opposed her elder sister’s petition on
the following grounds: the will was not executed and
attested as required by law; its attestation clause and
acknowledgment did not comply with the requirements
of the law; the signature of the testatrix was procured by
fraud and petitioner and her children procured the will
through undue and improper pressure and influence.
The trial court denied the probate of the will ruling that
Article 806 of the Civil Code was not complied with
because the will was “acknowledged” by the testatrix
and the witnesses at the testatrix’s residence at No. 40
Kanlaon Street, Quezon City before Atty. Macario O.
Directo who was a commissioned notary public for and
in Caloocan City.
ISSUE: Did the will “acknowledged” by the testatrix and
the instrumental witnesses before a notary public acting
outside the place of his commission satisfy the
requirement under Article 806 of the Civil Code?
HELD: No. One of the formalities required by law in
connection with the execution of a notarial will is that it
must be acknowledged before a notary public by the
testator and the witnesses. This formal requirement is
one of the indispensable requisites for the validity of a
will. In other words, a notarial will that is not
acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and
the instrumental witnesses is void and cannot be
accepted for probate.
The Notarial law provides: SECTION 240.Territorial
jurisdiction. — The jurisdiction of a notary public in a
province shall be co-extensive with the province. The
jurisdiction of a notary public in the City of Manila shall
be co-extensive with said city. No notary shall possess
authority to do any notarial act beyond the limits of his
jurisdiction.
Sine Atty. Directo was not a commissioned notary public
for and in Quezon City, he lacked the authority to take
the acknowledgment of the testratix and the
instrumental witnesses. In the same vain, the testratix
and the instrumental witnesses could not have validly
acknowledged the will before him. Thus, Felisa Tamio
de Buenaventura’s last will and testament was, in effect,
not acknowledged as required by law.
JOHNNY S. RABADILLA, petitioner Vs. Court of
Appeals G.R. No. 113725 June 29, 2000
FACTS: In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and
Testament of the deceased Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein
petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was instituted as a
devisee of a big tract of land. The Codicil, was duly
probated and contained in substance, among others;
that as a condition of the devise, Dr. Rabadilla shall
have the obligation until he dies to deliver (one hundred)
100 piculs of sugar (75 export sugar and 25 domestic
sugar) to Maria Marlinna Belleza, sister of the
deceased; should Dr. Rabadilla die, his heir who shall
inherit the subject land shall also oblige to the annual
delivery; that should the wish of the deceased be not
respected, Maria Marlinna Belleza shall immediately
seize the subject lot and deliver the same to the nearest
descendant of the deceased who shall also have the
same obligation to deliver the 100 sacks of sugar to
Belleza.
Dr. Rabadilla died in 1983.
On August 21, 1989, Belleza brought a complaint
against the heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, alleging
violation of the conditions of the Codicil, more
specifically their failure to comply with their obligation to
deliver 100 piculs of sugar to plaintiff Maria Marlena
Coscolluela y Belleza from sugar crop years 1985 up to
the filing despite repeated demands for compliance. She
prayed that judgment be rendered ordering defendant-
heirs to reconvey / return the lot to the surviving heirs of
the late Aleja Belleza.
Belleza and Alan Azurin, son-in-law of the herein
petitioner who was lessee of the property and acting as
attorney-in-fact of defendant-heirs, arrived at an
amicable settlement and entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement with respect to the annual delivery of the
one hundred piculs of sugar. However, there was no
compliance with the aforesaid agreement except for a
partial delivery of 50.80 piculs of sugar corresponding to
sugar crop year 1988 -1989.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject property should
revert back to the estate of the testatrix Aleja Belleza as
provided for in the codicil of her last will and testament.
HELD: Yes. Similarly unsustainable is petitioner's
submission that by virtue of the amicable settlement, the
said obligation imposed by the Codicil has been
assumed by the lessee, and whatever obligation
petitioner had become the obligation of the lessee; that
petitioner is deemed to have made a substantial and
constructive compliance of his obligation through the
consummated settlement between the lessee and the
private respondent, and having
consummated a settlement with the petitioner, the
recourse of the private respondent is the fulfillment of
the obligation under the amicable settlement and not the
seizure of subject property.
Suffice it to state that a Will is a personal, solemn,
revocable and free act by which a person disposes of
his property, to take effect after his death. Since the Will
expresses the manner in which a person intends how
his properties be disposed, the wishes and desires of
the testator must be strictly followed. Thus, a Will cannot
be the subject of a compromise agreement which would
thereby defeat the very purpose of making a Will.
RE: allowance and disallowance of wills
HEIRS OF ROSENDO LASAM, Represented by
Rogelio Lasam and Atty. Edward P. Llonillo, petitioners,
vs. VICENTA UMENGAN, respondent.
G.R. No. 168156 December 6, 2006
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
FACTS: The subject lots denominated as Lot 5427 and
Lot 992 situated in Tugegarao City belonged to the
spouses Pedro Cuntapay and Leona Bunagan. The
spouses sold the said lots to their children Isabel and
Irene Cuntapay. It was agreed that the disputed eastern
portion shall belong to Isabel Cuntapay as evidenced by
a notarized partition agreement. Isabel was first married
to Domingo Turingan, they had four children named
Abdon, Sado, Rufo and Maria. When the first husband
died, Isabel married Rosendo Lasam. She had two
children by him named Trinidad and Rosendo.
In 2001 Rosendo Lasam filed a case against the
respondent who is the daughter of Abdon Turingan, a
son of Isabel Cuntapay, for unlawful detainer. The
petitioner anchored their claim on the disputed property
on the purported will of Isabel Cuntapay whereby she
bequeathed the said property to Rosendo Lasam. The
last will and testament relied upon was not
probated.The MTCC and RTC ruled in favor of the
petitioner on the ground that they are the owners of the
property based on the alleged will of Isabel Cuntapay.
ISSUE: Whether or not the will of Isabel Cuntapay could
be relied upon to establish the petitioner‘s right to
possess the subject lot.
HELD: No. The purported last will and testament of
Isabel Cuntapay could not properly be relied upon to
establish petitioners‘ right to possess the subject lot
because, without having been probated, the said last
will and testament could not be the source of any right.
Article 838 of the Civil Code is instructive:Art. 838. No
will shall pass either real or personal property unless it
is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of
Court.....
In Cañiza v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that: "[a]
will is essentially ambulatory; at any time prior to the
testator‘s death, it may be changed or revoked; and until
admitted to probate, it has no effect whatever and no
right can be claimed thereunder, the law being quite
explicit: N
̳ o will shall pass either real or personal
property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance
with the Rules of Court.‘"
Dr. Tolentino, an eminent authority on civil law, also
explained that "[b]efore any will can have force or
validity it must be probated. To probate a will means to
prove before some officer or tribunal, vested by law with
authority for that purpose, that the instrument offered to
be proved is the last will and testament of the deceased
person whose testamentary act it is alleged to be, and
that it has been executed, attested and published as
required by law, and that the testator was of sound and
disposing mind. It is a proceeding to establish the
validity of the will." Moreover, the presentation of the will
for probate is mandatory and is a matter of public policy.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
DENIED. The assailed Decision dated February 16,
2005 and the Resolution dated May 17, 2005 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 80032 are
AFFIRMED.
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.
EDMUND SANTIBAÑEZ and FLORENCE
SANTIBAÑEZ ARIOLA, respondents.
G.R. No. 149926 February 23, 2005
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
FACTS: On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit
Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim M. Santibañez entered
into a loan agreement3 in the amount of P128,000.00.
The amount was intended for the payment of the
purchase price of one (1) unit Ford 6600 Agricultural All-
Purpose Diesel Tractor. In view thereof, Efraim and his
son, Edmund, executed a promissory note in favor of
the FCCC .
On December 13, 1980, the FCCC and Efraim entered
into another loan agreement, this time in the amount of
P123,156.00. It was intended to pay the balance of the
purchase price of another unit of Ford 6600 Agricultural
All-Purpose Diesel Tractor, with accessories, and one
(1) unit Howard Rotamotor Model AR 60K. Again, Efraim
and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note for
the said amount in favor of the FCCC.
Sometime in February 1981, Efraim died, leaving a
holographic will. Subsequently in March 1981, testate
proceedings commenced. On April 9, 1981, Edmund, as
one of the heirs, was appointed as the special
administrator of the estate of the decedent. During the
pendency of the testate proceedings, the surviving
heirs, Edmund and his sister Florence Santibañez
Ariola, executed a Joint Agreement wherein they agreed
to divide between themselves and take possession of
the three (3) tractors; that is, two (2) tractors for Edmund
and one (1) tractor for Florence. Each of them was to
assume the indebtedness of their late father to FCCC,
corresponding to the tractor respectively taken by them.
Meanwhile, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of
Liabilities was executed by and between FCCC and
Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, wherein the FCCC
as the assignor, among others, assigned all its assets
and liabilities to Union Savings and Mortgage Bank.
When Edmund defaulted in his payments, Union Bank,
started demandingd payment from Florence.
ISSUE: Whether or not the obligations of their deceased
father likewise passed to them along with the properties.
RULING: No. Perusing the records of the case, nothing
therein could hold private respondent Florence S. Ariola
accountable for any liability incurred by her late father.
The documentary evidence presented, particularly the
promissory notes and the continuing guaranty
agreement, were executed and signed only by the late
Efraim Santibañez and his son Edmund. As the
petitioner failed to file its money claim with the probate
court, at most, it may only go after Edmund as co-maker
of the decedent under the said promissory notes and
continuing guaranty, of course, subject to any defenses
Edmund may have as against the petitioner.
TITLE: Morales vs. Olondriz
CITATION: G.R. No. 198994, February 3, 2016
PRINCIPLES:
 Preterition is the complete and total omission of
a compulsory heir from the testator’s
inheritance without the heir’s express
disinheritance.
 Under the Civil Code, the preterition of a
compulsory heir in the direct line shall annul the
institution of heirs, but the devises and legacies
shall remain valid insofar as the legitimes are
not impaired. Consequently, if a will does not
institute any devisees or legatees, the
preterition of a compulsory heir in the direct line
will result in total intestacy.
FACTS:
Alfonso Juan P. Olondriz, Sr. died on June 9, 2003. He
was survived by his widow, Ana Maria Ortigas de
Olondriz, and his children: Alfonso Juan O. Olondriz, Jr.,
Alejandro Marino O. Olondriz, Isabel Rosa O. Olondriz,
Angelo Jose O. Olondriz, and Francisco Javier Maria
Bautista Olondriz.
Believing that the decedent died intestate, the
respondent heirs filed a petition with the Las Piñas RTC
for the partition of the decedent's estate and the
appointment of a special administrator on July 4, 2003.
On July 11, 2003, the RTC appointed Alfonso Juan O.
Olondriz, Jr. as special administrator.
However, on July 28, 2003, Iris Morales filed a separate
petition with the RTC alleging that the decedent left a
will dated July 23, 1991. Morales prayed for the probate
of the will and for her appointment as special
administratrix.
Notably, the will omitted Francisco Javier Maria Bautista
Olondriz, an illegitimate son of the decedent. The
respondent heirs moved to dismiss the probate
proceedings because Francisco was preterited from the
will.
The RTC observed: (1) that Morales expressly admitted
that Francisco Javier Maria Bautista Olondriz is an heir
of the decedent; (2) that Francisco was clearly omitted
from the will; and (3) that based on the evidentiary
hearings, Francisco was clearly preterited. Thus, the
RTC reinstated Alfonso Jr. as administrator of the estate
and ordered the case to proceed in intestacy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was no preterition because
Francisco received a house and lot inter vivos as an
advance on his legitime.
RULING:
Yes.
Preterition consists in the omission of a compulsory heir
from the will, either because he is not named or,
although he is named as a father, son, etc., he is neither
instituted as an heir nor assigned any part of the estate
without expressly being disinherited — tacitly depriving
the heir of his legitime. Preterition requires that the
omission is total, meaning the heir did not also receive
any legacies, devises, or advances on his legitime. In
other words, preterition is the complete and total
omission of a compulsory heir from the testator’s
inheritance without the heir’s express disinheritance.
The decedent's will evidently omitted Francisco Olondriz
as an heir, legatee, or devisee. As the decedent's
illegitimate son, Francisco is a compulsory heir in the
direct line. Unless Morales could show otherwise,
Francisco's omission from the will leads to the
conclusion of his preterition. Under the Civil Code, the
preterition of a compulsory heir in the direct line shall
annul the institution of heirs, but the devises and
legacies shall remain valid insofar as the legitimes are
not impaired. Consequently, if a will does not institute
any devisees or legatees, the preterition of a
compulsory heir in the direct line will result in total
intestacy.
During the proceedings in the RTC, Morales had the
opportunity to present evidence that Francisco received
donations inter vivos and advances on his legitime from
the decedent. However, Morales did not appear during
the hearing dates, effectively waiving her right to
present evidence on the issue. We cannot fault the RTC
for reaching the reasonable conclusion that there was
preterition.
Re: Foreign Wills
IN RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO
APPROVE THE WILL OF RUPERTA PALAGANAS
WITH PRAYER FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF
SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR, MANUEL MIGUEL
PALAGANAS AND BENJAMIN GREGORIO
PALAGANAS, Petitioners, v. ERNESTO PALAGANAS,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 169144, January 26, 2011
ABAD, J.:
FACTS: On November 8, 2001 Ruperta C. Palaganas
(Ruperta), a Filipino who became a naturalized United
States (U.S.) citizen, died single and childless.In the last
will and testament she executed in California, she
designated her brother, Sergio C. Palaganas (Sergio),
as the executor of her will for she had left properties in
the Philippines and in the U.S.
On May 19, 2003 respondent Ernesto C. Palaganas
(Ernesto), anotherbrother of Ruperta, filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, a
petition for the probate of Ruperta‘s will and for his
appointment as special administrator of her estate.
On October 15, 2003, however, petitioners Manuel
Miguel Palaganas (Manuel) and Benjamin Gregorio
Palaganas (Benjamin), nephews of Ruperta, opposed
the petition on the ground that Ruperta‘swill should not
be probated in the Philippines but in the U.S. where she
executed it.Manuel and Benjamin added that, assuming
Ruperta‘swill could be probated in the Philippines, it is
invalid nonetheless for having been executed under
duress and without the testator‘s full understanding of
the consequences of such act.Ernesto, they claimed, is
also not qualified to act as administrator of the estate.
Meantime, since Ruperta‘s foreign-based siblings,
Gloria Villaluz and Sergio, were on separate occasions
in the Philippines for a short visit, respondent Ernesto
filed a motion with the RTC for leave to take their
deposition, which it granted.On April, 13, 2004 the RTC
directed the parties to submit their memorandum on the
issue of whether or not Ruperta‘s U.S. will may be
probated in and allowed by a court in the Philippines.
On June 17, 2004 the RTC issued an order: (a)
admitting to probate Ruperta‘s last will; (b) appointing
respondent Ernesto as special administrator at the
request of Sergio, the U.S.-based executor designated
in the will; and (c) issuing the Letters of Special
Administration to Ernesto.
Aggrieved by the RTC‘s order, petitioner nephews
Manuel and Benjamin appealed to the Court of Appeals
(CA), arguing that an unprobated will executed by an
American citizen in the U.S. cannot be probated for the
first time in the Philippines.
ISSUE: Whether or not a will executed by a foreigner
abroad may be probated in the Philippines although it
has not been previously probated and allowed in the
country where it was executed.
RULING: Petitioners Manuel and Benjamin maintain
that wills executed by foreigners abroad must first be
probated and allowed in the country of its execution
before it can be probated here.This, they claim, ensures
prior compliance with the legal formalities of the country
of its execution.They insist that local courts can only
allow probate of such wills if the proponent proves that:
(a) the testator has been admitted for probate in such
foreign country, (b) the will has been admitted to probate
there under its laws, (c) the probate court has
jurisdiction over the proceedings, (d) the law on probate
procedure in that foreign country and proof of
compliance with the same, and (e) the legal
requirements for the valid execution of a will.
But our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills
executed by foreigners abroad although the same have
not as yet been probated and allowed in the countries of
their execution.A foreign will can be given legal effects
in our jurisdiction.Article 816 of the Civil Code states
that the will of an alienwho is abroad produces effect in
the Philippines if made in accordance with the
formalities prescribed by the law of the place where he
resides, or according to the formalities observed in his
country.
Our rules require merely that the petition for the
allowance of a will must show, so far as known to the
petitioner: (a)the jurisdictional facts; (b) the names,
ages, and residences of the heirs, legatees, and
devisees of the testator or decedent; (c) the probable
value and character of the property of the estate; (d) the
name of the person for whom letters are prayed; and
(e)if the will has not been delivered to the court, the
name of the person having custody of it. Jurisdictional
facts refer to the fact of death of the decedent, his
residence at the time of his death in the province where
the probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a
foreign country, the estate he left in such province. The
rules do not require proof that the foreign will has
already been allowed and probated in the country of its
execution.
In insisting that Ruperta‘s will should have been first
probated and allowed by the court of California,
petitioners Manuel and Benjamin obviously have in
mind the procedure for the reprobate of will before
admitting it here.But, reprobate or re-authentication of a
will already probated and allowed in a foreign country is
different from that probate where the will is presented
for the first time before a competent court.Reprobate is
specifically governed by Rule 77 of the Rules of
Court.Contrary to petitioners‘ stance, since this latter
rule applies only to reprobate of a will, it cannot be
made to apply to the present case.In reprobate, the
local court acknowledges as binding the findings of the
foreign probate court provided its jurisdiction over the
matter can be established.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and
AFFIRMS the Court of Appeals decision in CA-G.R. CV
83564 dated July 29, 2005.cralawlibrary
J.L.T. AGRO, INC., REPRESENTED BY ITS
MANAGER, JULIAN L. TEVES, PETITIONER VS.
ANTONIO BALANSAG AND HILARIA CADAYDAY,
RESPONDENT
G.R. No. 141882 11 March 2005
TINGA, J.:
FACTS:During his lifetime, Don Julian L. Teves (Don
Julian) contracted marriage twice. First, with Antonia
Baena and second, with Milagros Donio Teves. In the
first marriage, he had two children, Josefa and Emilio. In
the second marriage, he had four children, Maria, Jose,
Milagros and Pedro, all surname Teves. There was a
property Lot No. 63 which was originally registered
under the names of Julian and Antonia (TCT 5203)
forming part of their conjugal partnership. After Antonia
died, Lot No. 63 was among the properties involved in
an action for partition. The parties entered into a
Compromise Agreement which embodied the partition of
all the properties of Don Julian. The Agreement showed
that a tract of land known as Hacienda Medalla
Milagrosa was to be owned in common by Don Julian
and his two (2) children of the first marriage which would
remain undivided during his lifetime. The two children
were given other properties. Lot No. 63 was retained by
Don Julian.
Paragraph 13 of the Compromise Agreement provided
that the properties now selected and adjudicated to
Julian L. Teves (not including his share in the Hacienda
Medalla Milgrosa) shall exclusively be adjudicated to the
wife in second marriage of Julian L. Teves and his four
minor children, namely, Milagros Donio Teves, his two
acknowledged natural children Milagros Reyes Teves
and Pedro Reyes Teves and his two legitimate children
Maria Evelyn Donio Teves and Jose Catalino Donio
Teves.
Subsequently, Don Julian, Emilio and Josefa executed a
Deed of Assignment of Assets with Assumption of
Liabilities in favor of J.L.T. Agro, Inc. Less than a year
later, Don Julian, Josefa and Emilio also executed an
instrument which constituted a supplement to the earlier
deed of assignment transferred ownership over Lot No.
63, among other properties, in favor of JLT Agro. On 14
April 1974, Don Julian died intestate.
On the strength of the Supplemental Deed in its favor,
JLT Agro, Inc. sought the registration of the subject lot in
its name. A court issued an order canceling OCT No.
5203 in the name of spouses Don Julian and Antonia on
12 November 1979, and on the same date TCT No. T-
375 was issued in the name of JLT Agro. Since then,
JLT Agro has been paying taxes assessed on the
subject lot.
Meanwhile, Milagros Donio and her children had
immediately taken possession over the subject lot after
the execution of the Compromise Agreement. In 1974,
they entered into a yearly lease agreement with
spouses Antonio Balansag and Hilaria Cadayday. Lot
No. 63 was sold to Antonio Balansag and Hilaria
Cadayday. After the death of Don Julian, Milagros Donio
and her
children executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition of
Real Estate where Lot No. 63 was allotted to Milagros
and her two children, Maria and Jose. Unaware that Lot
No. 63 has been registered under the name of JLT Agro,
Inc., Antonio and Hilaria tried to register the deed of
sale, but failed. They filed a complaint to declare the title
of JLT Agro, Inc. void which was dismissed.
ISSUE: Whether or not future legitime be determined,
adjudicated and reserved prior to the death of the owner
of a property without resulting to preterition
RULING: The partition inter vivos of the properties of
Don Julian is undoubtedly valid pursuant to Article 1347.
However, considering that it would become legally
operative only upon the death of Don Julian, the right of
his heirs from the second marriage to the properties
adjudicated to him under the compromise agreement
was but a mere expectancy. It was a bare hope of
succession to the property of their father. Being the
prospect of a future acquisition, the interest by its nature
was inchoate. It had no attribute of property, and the
interest to which it related was at the time nonexistent
and might never exist. At the time of the execution of the
deed of assignment covering Lot No. 63 in favor of
petitioner, Don Julian remained the owner of the
property since ownership over the subject lot would only
pass to his heirs from the second marriage at the time of
his death. Thus, as the owner of the subject lot, Don
Julian retained the absolute right to dispose of it during
his lifetime. His right cannot be challenged by Milagros
Donio and her children on the ground that it had already
been adjudicated to them by virtue of the compromise
agreement.
Article 854 provides that the preterition or omission of
one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct
line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will
or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the
institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be
valid insofar as they are not inofficious. Manresa defines
preterition as the omission of the heir in the will, either
by not naming him at all or, while mentioning him as
father, son, etc., by not instituting him as heir without
disinheriting him expressly, nor assigning to him some
part of the properties. It is the total omission of a
compulsory heir in the direct line from inheritance. Don
Julian did not execute a will since what he resorted to
was a partition inter vivos of his properties, as
evidenced by the court approved Compromise
Agreement. Thus, it is premature if not irrelevant to
speak of preterition prior to the death of Don Julian in
the absence of a will depriving a legal heir of his
legitime. Besides, there are other properties which the
heirs from the second marriage could inherit from Don
Julian upon his death; the total omission from
inheritance of Don Julian‘s heirs from the second
marriage, a requirement for preterition to exist, is hardly
imaginable as it is unfounded.
Agtarap v. Agtarap
G.R. Nos. 177099 and 177192| June 8, 2011
Topic: Right of representation, effect of failure to
object representation
Facts:
Decedent Joaquin contracted (2) marriages. First with
with Lucia, bearing three children, Jesus+, Milagros+,
Jose+ (survived by three children, namely, Gloria,
Joseph, and Teresa) and then lastly when Lucia died,
thereafter, with Caridad, with three children, Eduardo,
Sebastian, Mercedes.
Son Eduardo filed petition for settlement of Joaquin’s
intestate estate and the RTC issued resolution
appointing Eduardo as administrator.
Gloria Agtarap de Santos, one of the children of
compulsory heir Jose in the estate of Joaquin, died on
May 4, 1995, was later substituted in the proceedings
above by her husband Walter de Santos. On September
16, 1995, Abelardo Dagoro filed a motion for leave of
court to intervene, alleging that he is the surviving
spouse of the compulsory heir Mercedes Agtarap and
the father of Cecilia Agtarap Dagoro, and in his answer
in intervention.
Sebastian, one of the compulsory heirs, filed a motion to
exclude Abelardo Dagoro and Walter de Santos as
heirs, but was denied by lower court. He points out that
his motion was denied by the RTC without a hearing.
Issue:
1. WON Walter de Santos and Abelardo Dagoro had the
right to participate in the estate in representation of the
Joaquins compulsory heirs, Gloria and Mercedes,
respectively. – YES
Held: 1. Sebastians insistence that Abelardo Dagoro
and Walter de Santos are not heirs to the estate of
Joaquin cannot be sustained.
Indeed, this Court is not a trier of facts, and there
appears no compelling reason to hold that both courts
erred in ruling that… Walter de Santos, and Abelardo
Dagoro rightfully participated in the estate of Joaquin. It
was incumbent upon Sebastian to present competent
evidence to refute his and Eduardos admissions that
Joseph and Teresa were heirs of Jose, and thus rightful
heirs of Joaquin, and to timely object to the participation
of Walter de Santos and Abelardo Dagoro.
Unfortunately, Sebastian failed to do so.
Nevertheless, Walter de Santos and Abelardo Dagoro
had the right to participate in the estate in
representation of the Joaquins compulsory heirs, Gloria
and Mercedes, respectively.
URETA v. URETA
G.R. No. 165748, 14 September 2011
Mendoza, J.:
FACTS In his lifetime, Alfonso Ureta begot 14 children,
namely, Policronio, Liberato, Narciso, Prudencia,
Vicente, Francisco, Inocensio, Roque, Adela,
Wenefreda, Merlinda, Benedicto, Jorge, and Andres.
The children of Policronio (Heirs of Policronio), are
opposed to the rest of Alfonso’s children and their
descendants.
Alfonso was financially well-off during his lifetime. He
owned several fishpens, a fishpond, a sari-sari store, a
passenger jeep, and was engaged in the buying and
selling of copra. Policronio, the eldest, was the only
child of Alfonso who failed to finish schooling and
instead worked on his father’s lands.
Sometime in October 1969, Alfonso and four of his
children, namely, Policronio, Liberato, Prudencia, and
Francisco, met at the house of Liberato. Francisco, who
was then a municipal judge, suggested that in order to
reduce the inheritance taxes, their father should make it
appear that he had sold some of his lands to his
children. Accordingly, Alfonso executed four (4) Deeds
of Sale covering several parcels of land in favor of
Policronio, Liberato, Prudencia, and his common-law
wife, Valeriana Dela Cruz. The Deed of Sale executed
on October 25, 1969, in favor of Policronio, covered six
parcels of land, which are the properties in dispute in
this case. Since the sales were only made for taxation
purposes and no monetary consideration was given,
Alfonso continued to own, possess and enjoy the lands
and their produce.
When Alfonso died on October 11, 1972, Liberato acted
as the administrator of his father’s estate. He was later
succeeded by his sister Prudencia, and then by her
daughter, Carmencita Perlas. Except for a portion of
parcel 5, the rest of the parcels transferred to Policronio
were tenanted by the Fernandez Family. These tenants
never turned over the produce of the lands to Policronio
or any of his heirs, but to Alfonso and, later, to the
administrators of his estate.
Policronio died on November 22, 1974. Except for the
said portion of parcel 5, neither Policronio nor his heirs
ever took possession of the subject lands.
On April 19, 1989, Alfonso’s heirs executed a Deed of
Extra-Judicial Partition, which included all the lands that
were covered by the four (4) deeds of sale that were
previously executed by Alfonso for taxation purposes.
Conrado, Policronio’s eldest son, representing the Heirs
of Policronio, signed the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition
in behalf of his co-heirs.
After their father’s death, the Heirs of Policronio found
tax declarations in his name covering the six parcels of
land. On June 15, 1995, they obtained a copy of the
Deed of Sale executed on October 25, 1969 by Alfonso
in favor of Policronio. Not long after, on July 30, 1995,
the Heirs of Policronio allegedly learned about the Deed
of Extra-Judicial Partition involving Alfonso’s estate
when it was published in the July 19, 1995 issue of the
Aklan Reporter.
ISSUE Whether or not the Deed of Extra-Judicial
Partition was valid.
RULING Yes. It has been held in several cases that
partition among heirs is not legally deemed a
conveyance of real property resulting in change of
ownership. It is not a transfer of property from one to the
other, but rather, it is a confirmation or ratification of title
or right of property that an heir is renouncing in favor of
another heir who accepts and receives the inheritance.
It is merely a designation and segregation of that part
which belongs to each heir. The Deed of Extra-Judicial
Partition cannot, therefore, be considered as an act of
strict dominion. Hence, a special power of attorney is
not necessary.
In fact, as between the parties, even an oral partition by
the heirs is valid if no creditors are affected. The
requirement of a written memorandum under the statute
of frauds does not apply to partitions effected by the
heirs where no creditors are involved considering that
such transaction is not a conveyance of property
resulting in change of ownership but merely a
designation and segregation of that part which belongs
to each heir.
A contract entered into in the name of another by one
who has no authority or legal representation, or who has
acted beyond his powers, shall be unenforceable,
unless it is ratified, expressly or impliedly, by the person
on whose behalf it has been executed, before it is
revoked by the other contracting party.
Therefore, Conrado’s failure to obtain authority from his
co-heirs to sign the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition in
their behalf did not result in his incapacity to give
consent so as to render the contract voidable, but
rather, it rendered the contract valid but unenforceable
against Conrado’s co-heirs for having been entered into
without their authority.
UY VS LEE
Facts: Respondent Nixon Lee filed a petition for
mandamus with damages against his mother Uy Kiao
Eng, herein petitioner, before the RTC of Manila to
compel petitioner to produce the holographic will of his
father so that probate proceedings for the allowance
thereof could be instituted. Respondent had already
requested his mother to settle and liquidate the
patriarch’s estate and to deliver to the legal heirs their
respective inheritance, but petitioner refused to do so
without any justifiable reason. Petitioner denied that she
was in custody of the original holographic will and that
she knew of its whereabouts. The RTC heard the case.
After the presentation and formal offer of respondent’s
evidence, petitioner demurred, contending that her son
failed to prove that she had in her custody the original
holographic will. The RTC, at first, denied the demurrer
to evidence. However, it granted the same on
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Respondent’s
motion for reconsideration of this latter order was
denied. Hence, the petition was dismissed. Aggrieved,
respondent sought review from the appellate court. The
CA initially denied the appeal for lack of merit.
Respondent moved for reconsideration. The appellate
court granted the motion, set aside its earlier ruling,
issued the writ, and ordered the production of the will
and the payment of attorney’s fees. It ruled this time that
respondent was able to show by testimonial evidence
that his mother had in her possession the holographic
will. Dissatisfied with this turn of events, petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration. The appellate court denied
this motion. Left with no other recourse, petitioner
brought the matter before this Court, contending in the
main that the petition for mandamus is not the proper
remedy and that the testimonial evidence used by the
appellate court as basis for its ruling is inadmissible.
Issue: Whether or not mandamus is the proper remedy
of the respondent.
Held: The Court cannot sustain the CA’s issuance of the
writ.
Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of
competent jurisdiction, in the name of the state or the
sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or
board, or to some corporation or person requiring the
performance of a particular duty therein specified, which
duty results from the official station of the party to whom
the writ is directed or from operation of law. This
definition recognizes the public character of the remedy,
and clearly excludes the idea that it may be resorted to
for the purpose of enforcing the performance of duties in
which the public has no interest. The writ is a proper
recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a public right
and to compel the performance of a public duty, most
especially when the public right involved is mandated by
the Constitution. As the quoted provision instructs,
mandamus will lie if the tribunal, corporation, board,
officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of
an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust or station.
The writ of mandamus, however, will not issue to
compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to
do or which it is his duty not to do, or to give to the
applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law. Nor
will mandamus issue to enforce a right which is in
substantial dispute or as to which a substantial doubt
exists, although objection raising a mere technical
question will be disregarded if the right is clear and the
case is meritorious. As a rule, mandamus will not lie in
the absence of any of the following grounds: [a] that the
court, officer, board, or person against whom the action
is taken unlawfully neglected the performance of an act
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting
from office, trust, or station; or [b] that such court,
officer, board, or person has unlawfully excluded
petitioner/relator from the use and enjoyment of a right
or office to which he is entitled. On the part of the
relator, it is essential to the issuance of a writ of
mandamus that he should have a clear legal right to the
thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of
respondent to perform the act required.
Recognized further in this jurisdiction is the principle that
mandamus cannot be used to enforce contractual
obligations. Generally, mandamus will not lie to enforce
purely private contract rights, and will not lie against an
individual unless some obligation in the nature of a
public or quasi-public duty is imposed. The writ is not
appropriate to enforce a private right against an
individual.] The writ of mandamus lies to enforce the
execution of an act, when, otherwise, justice would be
obstructed; and, regularly, issues only in cases relating
to the public and to the government; hence, it is called a
prerogative writ. To preserve its prerogative character,
mandamus is not used for the redress of private wrongs,
but only in matters relating to the public.
Moreover, an important principle followed in the
issuance of the writ is that there should be no plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law other than the remedy of mandamus being invoked.
In other words, mandamus can be issued only in cases
where the usual modes of procedure and forms of
remedy are powerless to afford relief. Although
classified as a legal remedy, mandamus is equitable in
its nature and its issuance is generally controlled by
equitable principles. Indeed, the grant of the writ of
mandamus lies in the sound discretion of the court.
In the instant case, the Court, without unnecessarily
ascertaining whether the obligation involved here—the
production of the original holographic will—is in the
nature of a public or a private duty, rules that the
remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by
respondent Lee because there lies another plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. Let it be noted that respondent has a photocopy of
the will and that he seeks the production of the original
for purposes of probate. The Rules of Court, however,
does not prevent him from instituting probate
proceedings for the allowance of the will whether the
same is in his possession or not.
There being a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law for the production of the
subject will, the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed
of. Suffice it to state that respondent Lee lacks a cause
of action in his petition. Thus, the Court grants the
demurrer.
HILARION, JR. and ENRICO ORENDAIN, represented
by FE D. ORENDAIN,
Petitioners,- versus -
TRUSTEESHIP OF THE ESTATE OF DOÑA
MARGARITA RODRIGUEZ,
Respondent.
NACHURA, J.:
FACTS: On July 19, 1960, the decedent, Doña
Margarita Rodriguez, died without issues in Manila,
leaving a last will and testament. The will was admitted
to probate by virtue of the order of the CFI Manila and
said court approved the project of partition presented by
the executor of Doña Margarita Rodriguez‘s will. As
provided in her will Doña Margarita Rodriguez‘s
testamentary dispositions contemplated the creation of
a trust to manage the income from her properties for
distribution to beneficiaries specified in the will.After
almost 40 years later, herein petitioners Hilarion, Jr. and
Enrico Orendain, heirs of Hilarion Orendain, Sr. who
was mentioned in Clause 24 of the decedent‘s will,
moved to dissolve the trust on the decedent‘s estate,
which they argued had been in existence for more than
twenty years, in violation of the the law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trusteeship over the
properties left by DOÑA MARGARITA RODRIGUEZ can
be dissolved . RULING: YES. The will of the decedent
provides for the creation of a perpetual trust for the
administration of her properties and the income accruing
therefrom, for specified beneficiaries. The trust, only
insofar as the first twenty-year period is concerned
should be upheld however after 20 years the trust must
be dissolved. Petitioners were correct in moving for the
dissolution of the trust after the twenty-year period,but
they are not necessarily declared as intestate heirs of
the decedent. The last will and testament of the
decedent did not institute heirs to inherit the properties
under the void clause.Hence the case is remanded to
the lower court for the determination of the heirship of
the intestate heirs of the decedent where petitioners,
and all others claiming to be heirs of the decedent,
should establish their status.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
GRANTED. The Order of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 4 in SP. PROC. No. 51872 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The trust approved by the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 4 in SP. PROC.
No. 51872 is DISSOLVED. We ORDER the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 4 in SP. PROC. No. 51872
to determine the following:
1. the properties listed in Clause 10 of Doña Margarita
Rodriguez‘s will, constituting the perpetual trust, which
are still within reach and have not been disposed of as
yet; and
2. the intestate heirs of Doña Margarita Rodriguez, with
the nearest relative of the decedent entitled to inherit the
remaining properties.
AMELIA P. ARELLANO, represented by her duly
appointed guardians, AGNES P. ARELLANO and NONA
P. ARELLANO,Petitioner, - versus - FRANCISCO
PASCUAL and MIGUEL PASCUAL,
G.R. No. 189776 December 15, 2010
CARPIO MORALES, J.: FACTS: Angel N. Pascual Jr.
died intestate on January 2, 1999 leaving as heirs his
siblings, namely: petitioner Amelia P. Arellano who is
represented by her daughters Agnes P. Arellano (Agnes)
and Nona P. Arellano, and respondents Francisco
Pascual and Miguel N. Pascual.
During his lifetime, he donated a parcel of land to his
sister Amelia. Upon his death, his siblings filed a petition
for ―Judicial Settlement of Intestate Estate and
Issuance of Letters of Administration,‖. The also
questioned the validity of the donation of the parcel of
land made by the decedent in favor of their sister. They
prayed that the same be considered as an advance
legitime of petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject property of the
donation is a valid donation inter vivos
RULING: Yes, The decedent not having left any
compulsory heir who is entitled to any legitime, he was
at liberty to donate all his properties, even if nothing was
left for his siblings-collateral relatives to inherit. His
donation to petitioner, assuming that it was valid, is
deemed as donation made to a ―stranger,‖ chargeable
against the free portion of the estate. There being no
compulsory heir, however, the donated property is not
subject to collation.
DY YIENG SEANGIO, BARBARA D. SEANGIO AND
VIRGINIA D. SEANGIO, PETITIONERS, VS. HON.
AMOR A. REYES, IN HER CAPACITY AS PRESIDING
JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, NATIONAL
CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION, BRANCH 21, MANILA,
ALFREDO D. SEANGIO, ALBERTO D. SEANGIO,
ELISA D. SEANGIO-SANTOS, VICTOR D. SEANGIO,
ALFONSO D. SEANGIO, SHIRLEY D. SEANGIO-LIM,
BETTY D. SEANGIO-OBAS AND JAMES D. SEANGIO,
RESPONDENTS.
G.R. Nos. 140371-72 27 November 2006
AZCUNA, J.:
FACTS: On September 21, 1988, private respondents
filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate
of the late Segundo Seangio. Petitioners Dy Yieng,
Barbara and Virginia, all surnamed Seangio, opposed
the petition. They contended that: 1) Dy Yieng is still
very healthy and in full command of her faculties; 2) the
deceased Segundo executed a general power of
attorney in favor of Virginia giving her the power to
manage and exercise control and supervision over his
business in the Philippines; 3) Virginia is the most
competent and qualified to serve as the administrator of
the estate of Segundo because she is a certified public
accountant; and, 4) Segundo left a holographic will,
dated September 20, 1995, disinheriting one of the
private respondents, Alfredo Seangio, for cause. In view
of the purported holographic will, petitioners averred that
in the event the decedent is found to have left a will, the
intestate proceedings are to be automatically
suspended and replaced by the proceedings for the
probate of the will.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was preterition.
RULING: A perusal of the document termed as "will" by
oppositors/petitioners Dy Yieng Seangio, et al., clearly
shows that there is preterition, as the only heirs
mentioned thereat are Alfredo and Virginia. [T]he other
heirs being omitted, Article 854 of the New Civil Code
thus applies. However, insofar as the widow Dy Yieng
Seangio is concerned, Article 854 does not apply, she
not being a compulsory heir in the direct line.
OFELIA HERNANDO BAGUNU, Petitioner. vs.
PASTORA PIEDAD, Respondent. G.R. No. 140975
December 8, 2000
FACTS: In this case, there is no doubt nor difference
that arise as to the truth or falsehood on alleged facts.
The question as to whether intevenor-appellants as a
collateral relative within the fifth civil degree, has legal
interest in the intestate proceeding which would justify
her intervention; the question as to whether the
publication of notice of hearing made in this case is
defective which would amount to lack of jurisdiction over
the persons of the parties and the question as to
whether the proceedings has already been terminated
when the intestate court issued the order of transfer of
the estate of Augusto H. Piedad to petitioner-appellee,
in spite the absence of an order of closure of the
intestate court, all call for the application and
interpretation of the proper law is applicable on a certain
undisputed state of facts.
Augusto H. Piedad without any direct descendants or
ascendants. Respondent is the maternal aunt of the
decedent, a third-degree relative of the decedent, while
petitioner is the daughter of a first cousin of the
deceased, or a fifth-degree relative of the decedent.
ISSUE: Can petitioner, a collateral relative of the fifth
civil degree, inherit alongside respondent, a collateral
relative of the third civil degree? Elsewise stated does
the rule of proximity in intestate succession find
application among collateral relatives?
HELD: The various provisions of the Civil Code on
succession embody an almost complete set of law to
govern, either by will or by operation of law, the
transmission of property, rights and obligations of a
person upon his death. Each article is construed in
congruity with, rather than in isolation of, the system set
out by the Code.
The rule on proximity is a concept that favors the
relatives nearest in degree to the decedent and
excludes the more distant ones except when and to the
extent that the right of representation can apply. Thus,
Article 962 of the Civil Code provides:
"ART. 962. In every inheritance, the relative nearest in
degree excludes the more distant ones, saving the right
of representation when it properly takes place.
"Relatives in the same degree shall inherit in equal
shares, subject to the provisions of article 1006 with
respect to relatives of the full and half blood, and of
article 987, paragraph 2, concerning division between
the paternal and maternal lines."
By right of representation, a more distant blood relative
of a decedent is, by operation of law, "raised to the
same place and degree" of relationship as that of a
closer blood relative of the same decedent. The
representative thereby steps into the shoes of the
person he represents and succeeds, not from the latter,
but from the person to whose estate the person
represented would have succeeded.
The right of representation does not apply to "others
collateral relatives within the fifth civil degree" (to which
group both petitioner and respondent belong) who are
sixth in the order of preference following, firstly, the
legitimate children and descendants, secondly, the
legitimate parents and ascendants, thirdly, the
illegitimate children and descendants, fourthly, the
surviving spouse, and fifthly, the brothers and
sisters/nephews and nieces, fourth decedent. Among
collateral relatives, except only in the case of nephews
and nieces of the decedent concurring with their uncles
or aunts, the rule of proximity, expressed in Article 962,
aforequoted, of the Code, is an absolute rule. In
determining the degree of relationship of the collateral
relatives to the decedent, Article 966 of the Civil Code
gives direction.
Respondent, being a relative within the third civil
degree, of the late Augusto H. Piedad excludes
petitioner, a relative of the fifth degree, from succeeding
an intestato to the estate of the decedent.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. No
costs. SO ORDERED.
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATES OF
THE DECEASED JOSEFA DELGADO AND
GUILLERMO RUSTIA CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE
DE LA ROSA and other HEIRS OF LUIS DELGADO,
and HEIRS OF GORGONIO DELGADO, Petitioners,
vs. HEIRS OF MARCIANA RUSTIA VDA. DE DAMIAN,
FACTS: The deceased Josefa Delgado was the
daughter of Felisa Delgado by one Lucio Campo.
Josefa has five siblings. Felisa Delgado was never
married to Lucio Campo, hence, Josefa and her full-
blood siblings were all natural children of Felisa
Delgado. However, before him was Ramon Osorio with
whom Felisa had a son, Luis Delgado.
Josefa Delgado died without a will. She was survived by
Guillermo Rustia and some collateral relatives, the
petitioners herein. Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado
never had any children. With no children of their own,
they took into their home the youngsters Guillermina
Rustia Rustia and Nanie Rustia. These children, are
merely ampun-ampunan. However, Guillermo Rustia did
manage to father an illegitimate child, Guillerma Rustia.
Respondents, nonetheless posit that Guillerma Rustia
has no interest in the intestate estate of Guillermo
Rustia as she was never duly acknowledged as an
illegitimate child. More than a year after the death of
Josefa, Guillermo Rustia filed a petition for the
adoption of their ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia.
Guillermo Rustia died without a will. He was survived by
his sisters and by the children of his predeceased
brother Roman Rustia Sr.,
On May 8, 1975, Luisa Delgado, the daughter of Luis
Delgado, filed the original petition for letters of
administration of the intestate estates of the "spouses
Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia" This petition was
opposed on the grounds that Luisa Delgado vda.
de Danao and the other claimants were barred under
the law from inheriting from their illegitimate half-blood
relative Josefa Delgado.
Oppositors filed an appeal and the appellate court
decided that 1.) Dr. Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado Rustia to have been legally married; 2.) the
intestate estate of Dr. Guillermo Rustia, Jacoba
Delgado-Encinas and the children of Gorgonio Delgado
(Campo) entitled to partition among themselves the
intestate estate of Josefa D. Rustia in accordance with
the proportion referred to in this decision; 3.) the
oppositors-appellants as the legal heirs of the late Dr.
Guillermo Rustia and thereby entitled to partition his
estate in accordance with the proportion referred to
herein; and 4.) the intervenor-appellee Guillerma S.
Rustia as ineligible to inherit from the late Dr. Guillermo
Rustia; thus revoking her appointment as administratrix
of his estate. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not there a right of representation
exists. HELD: The court rules that Felisa Delgado and
Ramon Osorio were never married. Hence, all the
children born to Felisa Delgado out of her relations with
Ramon Osorio and Lucio Campo, namely, Luis and his
half-blood siblings Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba,
Gorgonio and the decedent Josefa, all surnamed
Delgado, were her natural children.
The law prohibits reciprocal succession between
illegitimate children and legitimate children of the same
parent, even though there is unquestionably a tie of
blood between them. It seems that to allow an
illegitimate child to succeed ab intestato (from) another
illegitimate child begotten with a parent different from
that of the former, would be allowing the illegitimate
child greater rights than a legitimate child.
Notwithstanding this, however, court submits that
succession should be allowed, even when the
illegitimate brothers and sisters are only of the half-
blood. The reason impelling the prohibition on reciprocal
successions between legitimate and illegitimate families
does not apply to the case under consideration. That
prohibition has for its basis the difference in category
between illegitimate and legitimate relatives. There is no
such difference when all the children are illegitimate
children of the same parent, even if begotten with
different persons. They all stand on the same footing
before the law, just like legitimate children of half-blood
relation.
The court notes, however, that the petitioners before us
are already the nephews, nieces, grandnephews and
grandnieces of Josefa Delgado. Under Article 972 of the
new Civil Code, the right of representation in the
collateral line takes place only in favor of the children of
brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces).
Consequently, it cannot be exercised by grandnephews
and grandnieces. Therefore, the only collateral relatives
of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to partake of her
intestate estate are her brothers and sisters, or their
children who were still alive at the time of her death on
September 8, 1972. They have a vested right to
participate in the inheritance. Together with Guillermo
Rustia,56 they are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado
in accordance with Article 1001 of the new Civil Code.