REPRESENTATIVES EDCEL EUFEMIA CAMPOS NORKAYA S. MOHAMAD v.

C. LAGMAN v. HON. CULLAMAT v. PRESIDENT EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA RODRIGO DUTERTE SALVADOR
G.R. No. 231658 G.R. No. 231771 G.R. No. 231774

FACTS –Effective May 23, 2017, and for a period not exceeding 60 days, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte
issued Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao. Within the timeline set by Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution, the President submitted to Congress on May 25, 2017, a written Report on the factual basis
of Proclamation No. 216. The Report pointed out that for decades, Mindanao has been plagued with
rebellion and lawless violence which only escalated and worsened with the passing of time. The President
went on to explain that on May 23, 2017, a government operation to capture Isnilon Hapilon, a senior
leader of the ASG, and Maute Group operational leaders, Abdullah and Omarkhayam Maute, was
conducted.

These groups, which have been unleashing havoc in Mindanao, however, confronted the government
operation by intensifying their efforts at sowing violence aimed not only against the government
authorities and its facilities but likewise against civilians and their properties enabling them to take
control of major social, economic, and political foundations of Marawi City which led to its paralysis. The
unfolding of these events, as well as the classified reports he received, led the President to conclude that –
These activities constitute not simply a display of force, but a clear attempt to establish the groups'
seat of power in Marawi City for their planned establishment of a DAESH wilayat or province
covering the entire Mindanao. There exists no doubt that lawless armed groups are attempting to
deprive the President of his power, authority, and prerogatives within Marawi City as a
precedent to spreading their control over the entire Mindanao, in an attempt to undermine his
control over executive departments, bureaus, and offices in said area; defeat his mandate to
ensure that all laws are faithfully executed; and remove his supervisory powers over local
govemments.
After the submission of the Report and the briefings, the Senate issued P.S. Resolution No.
388 expressing full support to the martial law proclamation and finding Proclamation No. 216 "to be
satisfactory, constitutional and in accordance with the law". In the same Resolution, the Senate declared
that it found "no compelling reason to revoke the same". The Senate's counterpart in the lower house
shared the same sentiments.

ISSUES
1. Whether or not petitioners have locus standi;
2. Whether or not the petitions docketed as G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771, and 231774 are the "appropriate
proceeding" covered by Paragraph 3, Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution sufficient to invoke the
mode of review required of this Court when a declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus is promulgated;
3. Whether or not the President in declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is required to obtain the favorable recommendation thereon of the Secretary of National Defense;
4. Whether or not the power of this Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis [of] the proclamation
of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is independent of the actual
actions that have been taken by Congress jointly or separately;
5. Whether or not there were sufficient factual [basis] for the proclamation of martial law or the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus;
a. What are the parameters for review?
b. Who has the burden of proof?
c. What is the threshold of evidence?
6. Whether the exercise of the power of judicial review by this Court involves the calibration of graduated
powers granted the President as Commander-in-Chief, namely calling out powers, suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and declaration of martial law;
7. Whether or not nullifying Proclamation No. 216 of 23 May 2017 will:
a. have the effect of recalling Proclamation No. 55 s. 2016; or
b. also nullify the acts of the President in calling out the armed forces to quell lawless violence in
Marawi and other parts of the Mindanao region.

RULING
1. Locus standi of petitioners.— As a general rule, the challenger must have "a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement."
Petitioners in the Cullamat and Mohamad Petitions claim to be suing in their capacities as citizens of the
Republic. In the Lagman Petition, however, petitioners therein merely referred to themselves as duly
elected Representatives which could have elicited a vigorous discussion considering the HOR
expressed full support to the President and finding no reason to revoke Proclamation, which is in
direct contrast to the views and arguments being espoused by the petitioners in the Lagman Petition.
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Considering, however, the trend towards relaxation of the rules on legal standing, as well
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as the transcendental issues involved in the present Petitions, the Court can take judicial cognizance of the
fact that petitioners in the Lagman Petition are all citizens of the Philippines since Philippine citizenship is a
requirement for them to be elected as representatives. Besides, respondents did not question petitioners'
legal standing.

2. Whether or not the petitions are the "appropriate proceeding" covered by paragraph 3, Section
18, Article VII of the Constitution sufficient to invoke the mode of review required by the Court.
The phrase "in an appropriate proceeding" appearing on the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII
refers to any action initiated by a citizen for the purpose of questioning the sufficiency of the factual basis
of the exercise of the Chief Executive's emergency powers, as in these cases. A plain reading of the afore-
quoted Section 18, Article VII reveals that it specifically grants authority to the Court to determine the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus. It could be denominated as a complaint, a petition, or a matter to be resolved by the
Court.

It could not have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution that the phrase "in an appropriate
proceeding" would refer to a Petition for Certiorari pursuant to Section 1 or Section 5 of Article VIII. It must
be emphasized that under Section 18, Article VII, the Court is tasked to review the sufficiency of
the factual basis of the President's exercise of emergency powers. Put differently, if this Court applies the
standard of review used in a petition for certiorari, the same would emasculate its constitutional task under
Section 18, Article VII. The usual period for filing pleadings in Petition for Certiorari is likewise not
applicable under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII considering the limited period within which
this Court has to promulgate its decision.

During the oral argument, the petitioners theorized that the jurisdiction of this Court under the third
paragraph of Section 18, Article VII is sui generis. It is a special and specific jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court different from those enumerated in Sections 1 and 5 of Article VIII. The Court agrees. The unique
features of the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII clearly indicate that it should be treated as sui
generis separate and different from those enumerated in Article VIII. Under the third paragraph of Section
18, Article VII, a petition filed pursuant therewith will follow a different rule on standing as any citizen may
file it. Said provision of the Constitution also limits the issue to the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
exercise by the Chief Executive of his emergency powers.

3. The recommendation of the Defense Secretary is not a condition for the declaration of martial
law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
A plain reading of Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution shows that the President's power to declare
martial law is not subject to any condition except for the requirements of actual invasion or rebellion and
that public safety requires it. Besides, it would be contrary to common sense if the decision of the
President is made dependent on the recommendation of his mere alter ego. Rightly so, it is only on
the President and no other that the exercise of the powers of the Commander-in-Chief under Section 18,
Article VII of the Constitution is bestowed.

4. The power of the Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under Section 18, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution is independent of the actions taken by Congress.
The framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the judicial power to review to be exercised independently
from the congressional power to revoke. The President's extraordinary powers of suspending the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus and imposing martial law are subject to the veto powers of the Court and
Congress. The Court may strike down the presidential proclamation in an appropriate proceeding
filed by any citizen on the ground of lack of sufficient factual basis. On the other hand, Congress may
revoke the proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President.

In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension, the Court considers only
the information and data available to the President prior to or at the time of the declaration; it is not allowed
to "undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings." On the other hand, Congress may take
into consideration not only data available prior to, but likewise events supervening the declaration. Unlike
the Court I which does not look into the absolute correctness of the factual basis as will be discussed
below, Congress could probe deeper and further; it can delve into the accuracy of the facts presented
before it. In addition, the Court's review power is passive; it is only initiated by the filing of a petition "in an
appropriate proceeding" by a citizen. On the other hand, Congress' review mechanism is automatic in the
sense that it may be activated by Congress itself at any time after the proclamation or suspension was
made. Thus, the power to review by the Court and the power to revoke by Congress are not only totally
different but likewise independent from each other although concededly, they have the same trajectory,
which is, the nullification of the presidential proclamation. Needless to say, the power of the Court to
review can be exercised independently from the power of revocation of Congress.

We, therefore, hold that the Court can simultaneously exercise its power of review with, and independently
from, the power to revoke by Congress. Corollary, any perceived inaction or default on the part of
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Congress does not deprive or deny the Court of its power to review.
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5. Whether or not there were sufficient factual [basis] for the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus;
There is sufficient factual basis for the declaration of martial law and the suspension of
the writ of habeas corpus.
a. What are the parameters for review?
Neither could Proclamation No. 216 be described as vague, and thus void, on the ground that it has no
guidelines specifying its actual operational parameters within the entire Mindanao region. Besides,
operational guidelines will serve only as mere tools for the implementation of the proclamation. In Part III,
we declared that judicial review covers only the sufficiency of information or data available to or known to
the President prior to, or at the time of, the declaration or suspension. And, as will be discussed
exhaustively in Part VII, the review will be confined to the proclamation itself and the Report submitted to
Congress.
Clearly, therefore, there is no need for the Court to determine the constitutionality of the implementing
and/or operational guidelines, general orders, arrest orders and other orders issued after the proclamation
for being irrelevant to its review. Thus, any act committed under the said orders in violation of the
Constitution and the laws, such as criminal acts or human rights violations, should be resolved in a
separate proceeding. Finally, there is a risk that if the Court wades into these areas, it would be deemed
as trespassing into the sphere that is reserved exclusively for Congress in the exercise of its power to
revoke.
b. Who has the burden of proof?
As the President is expected to decide quickly on whether there is a need to proclaim martial law even only
on the basis of intelligence reports, it is irrelevant, for purposes of the Court's review, if subsequent events
prove that the situation had not been accurately reported to him.
The framers of the 1987 Constitution considered intelligence reports of military officers as credible
evidence that the President can appraise and to which he can anchor his judgment,167 as appears to be the
case here.
c. What is the threshold of evidence?
The Court's review is confined to the sufficiency, not accuracy, of the information at hand during the
declaration or suspension; subsequent events do not have any bearing insofar as the Court's review is
concerned. Falsities of and/or inaccuracies in some of the facts stated in the proclamation and the
written report are not enough reasons for the Court to invalidate the declaration and/or suspension
as long as there are other facts in the proclamation and the written Report that support the
conclusion that there is an actual invasion or rebellion and that public safety requires the
declaration and/or suspension.
To require precision in the President's appreciation of facts would unduly burden him and
therefore impede the process of his decision-making. Such a scenario, of course, would not only place
the President in peril but would also defeat the very purpose of the grant of emergency powers upon him.
Possibly, by the time the President is satisfied with the correctness of the facts in his possession, it would
be too late in the day as the invasion or rebellion could have already escalated to a level that is hard, if not
impossible, to curtail.

6. Whether the exercise of the power of judicial review by this Court involves the calibration of
graduated powers granted the President as Commander-in-Chief, namely calling out powers,
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and declaration of martial law;
The judicial power to review the sufficiency of factual basis of the declaration of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not extend to the calibration of the
President's decision of which among his graduated powers he will avail of in a given situation.
The President as the Commander-in-Chief wields the extraordinary powers which may be resorted to only
under specified conditions: a) calling out the armed forces; b) suspending the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus; and c) declaring martial law.
The power to call is fully discretionary to the President;" the only limitations being that he acts within
permissible constitutional boundaries or in a manner not constituting grave abuse of discretion. The actual
use to which the President puts the armed forces is not subject to judicial review.
Considering that the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
is now anchored on actual invasion or rebellion and when public safety requires it, and is no longer under
threat or in imminent danger thereof, there is a necessity and urgency for the President to act quickly to
protect the country. The Court, as Congress does, must thus accord the President the same leeway by
not wading into the realm that is reserved exclusively by the Constitution to the Executive
Department.

7. Whether or not nullifying Proclamation No. 216 of 23 May 2017 will have the effect of recalling
Proclamation No. 55 s. 2016 or also nullify the acts of the President in calling out the armed forces
to quell lawless violence in Marawi and other parts of the Mindanao region.
The calling out power is in adifferent category from the power to declare martial law and the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; nullification of Proclamation No. 216 will not affect
Proclamation No. 55. In other words, the President may exercise the power to call out the Armed Forces
independently of the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and to declare martial
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law, although, of course, it may also be a prelude to a possible future exercise of the latter powers, as in
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this case.
LEONEN’s Dissent
Justice Marvic Leonen pointed several points in his dissent, three of which are: the group committing
atrocities in Marawi are terrorists and not rebels; there is no sufficient factual basis, contrary to the
submission by the respondents, to declare martial law; and the declaration of martial law is vague and
unduly expansive. These make it unconstitutional.

Justice Leonen pointed out that the President cannot be granted “undefined powers over the entire
Mindanao region” because his reading of the Constitution is that the Court should be “stricter, more
precise, more vigilant of the fundamental rights of our people.” He said, “there is no rebellion that justifies
martial law, rather, there is terrorism that requires more thoughtful action.”

He insisted that the group committing atrocities in Marawi are terrorists. “They are not rebels. They
are committing acts of terrorism. They are not engaged in political acts of rebellion. They do not have the
numbers nor do they have the sophistication to be able to hold ground. Their ideology of a nihilist
apocalyptic future inspired by the extremist views of Salafi Jihadism will sway no community especially
among Muslims.”

According to Justice Leonen, the difference between terrorists and rebels boils down to their
intention. Terrorists use fear and violence to advance their agenda or ideology, which may or may not
be political in nature, while rebels use violence as a form of strategy to obtain their goal of
destabilizing or overthrowing the government to gain control over a part of or the entire national
territory. If rebels succeed in overthrowing the government, then they install themselves as the ruling party
and their status is legitimized.

In its broader sense, rebellion falls under terrorism because of its resort to violence, which in sum creates
widespread fear and panic, to attain its goals of overthrowing the government. However, not all acts of
terrorism can qualify as rebellion. Certainly, the acts of terrorism committed by the Maute Group and their
allies, after the attempted service of warrants of arrests against their leaders and the disruption of their
plans while trying to escape, is not rebellion in the context of Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code. It is
certainly not the kind of rebellion that warrants martial law.

The terrorists responsible for the armed hostilities in Marawi cannot be considered rebels. It is true that
they may have discussed the possibility of a caliphate. Yet, from all the evidence presented, they are
incapable of actually holding territory long enough to govern. Their current intentions do not appear to be
to establish a government in Marawi. In all the presentations of the respondents, it was clear that
government was able to disrupt the terrorists and the hostilities that resulted were part of the defensive
posture of those involved in the terror plot. The armed hostilities in Marawi are not the spark that would
supposedly lead to conflagration and the burning down of the entirety of Mindanao due to rebellion.

The Maute Group are terrorists, pure and simple. They are not rebels within the constitutional meaning of
the term, neither is there armed conflict as understood under International Humanitarian Law. “Elevating
the acts of a lawless criminal group which uses terrorism as tactic to the constitutional concept of rebellion
acknowledges them as a political group. Rebellion is a political crime. We have acknowledged that if rebels
are able to capture government, their rebellion, no matter how brutal, will be justified. Also, by
acknowledging them as rebels, we elevate their inhuman barbarism as an “armed conflict of a non-
international character” protected by International Humanitarian Law. We will be known worldwide as the
only country that acknowledges them, not as criminals, but as rebels entitled to protection under
international law.”

Justice Leonen also pointed out the insufficiency of factual basis to declare martial law. He said that the
facts presented are not sufficient to reasonably conclude that the armed hostilities and lawless violence
happening in Marawi City is “for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its
laws, the territory of the Philippine Islands or any part thereof, of any body of land, naval or other armed
forces, or of depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or
prerogatives.”

Based on the facts inferred by the respondents from their intelligence sources, the perpetrators of the
atrocities are not numerous or have sufficient resources or even community support to hold any territory.
Neither do the facts show convincingly that “public safety” requires martial law. Respondents did not show
how the available legal tools magnified by the call out of the armed forces would not be sufficient. Public
safety is always the aim of the constitutional concept of police power. Respondents failed to show what
martial law would add.

Further, Justice Leonen contends that Proclamation No. 216 is constitutionally vague. According to Justice
Leonen, the government’s presentation of facts and their arguments of their sufficiency are wanting. First,
there are factual allegations that find no relevance to the declaration of martial law and the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Second, there are facts that have been contradicted by
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OpenSource Intelligence sources. Lastly, there are facts that have absolutely no basis as they are
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unsupported by credible evidence.

General Order No. 1 issued by the President expands martial law by instructing the Armed Forces of the
Philippines to “undertake all measures to prevent and suppress all acts of rebellion and lawless violence in
the whole of Mindanao, including any and all acts in relation thereto, in connection therewith, or in
furtherance thereof.” Justice Leonen held that all acts of lawless violence throughout Mindanao, even if
unrelated to the ongoing hostilities in Marawi, have been included in the General Order.

There are factual allegations contained in Proclamation No. 216 dated May 23, 201 7 and in the Report of
President Duterte to Congress dated May 25, 2017 that are patently irrelevant to the imposition of martial
law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao. The Zamboanga siege and
the Mamasapano clash, cited by the President in his Report to Congress dated May 25, 2017, are
incidents that neither concern nor relate to the alleged ISIS-inspired groups. Moreover, there is no direct or
indirect correlation between these incidents to the alleged rebellion in Marawi City.

There are also disputed factual allegations. These disputes could have been settled by the respondents by
showing their processes to validate the information used by the President. This Court cannot disregard and
gloss over reports from newspapers. Newspapers, on the other hand, according to Justice Leonen, are
considered Open-Source Information (OSINT) from which intelligence information may be gathered.

Moreover, Justice Leonen argues that the respondents failed to show their sources to support the
inference that the ASG Basilan, AKP, Maute Group, and BIFF are indeed linked to the ISIS and that these
groups formed alliances. Respondents’ only basis is Isnilon Hapilon’s “symbolic hijra.” Respondent also
relies heavily on the ISIS newsletter, Al Naba, which allegedly announced the appointment of Isnilon
Hapilon as an emir. These allegations neither explain nor conclusively establish the nature of the links of
the four (4) groups to the ISIS. The ISIS newsletter, Al Naba, cannot be considered as a credible source of
information. It is a propaganda material, which provides skewed information designed to influence opinion.

Aside from the failure to present their sources to support the factual bases cited in Proclamation No. 216
dated May 23, 2017 and the Report of President Duterte dated May 25, 2017, there is also absolutely no
factual basis for the dismantling and arrest of illegal drug syndicates and peace spoilers. The inclusion of
illegal drug syndicates and peace spoilers unjustifiably broadens the scope of martial law. There has been
no evidence presented in this case that would explain their inclusion in the Operational Directive for the
Implementation of Martial Law.

Justice Leonen also contends that this Court must consider, who are Isnilon Hapilon and the Maute
brothers? What is their relationship to ISIS? Are the ideologies of Hapilon, the Maute brothers, and ISIS
compatible? What is their relationship to the people of Marawi? What is the history of armed conflict within
Mindanao?

Ignoring the cultural context will render this Court vulnerable to accepting any narrative, no matter how far-
fetched. A set of facts which should be easily recognized as unrelated to rebellion may be linked together
to craft a tale of rebellion which is convincing only to those unfamiliar with the factual background in which
the story is set. Blindly accepting a possibly far-fetched narrative of what transpired in Marawi leading up to
and including the events of May 23, 2017 and ignoring the cultural context will have its own consequences.
The public will accept this far-fetched narrative as reasonable or the truth, when it could be nothing but
“fake news.” In tum, the government may be inadvertently doing a service for Maute Group and ISIS
projecting them as bigger than what they really are.

Justice Leonen agrees that the facts presented show that there was, indeed, armed confrontation in
Marawi City. As Justice Leonen said, “I acknowledge the hostilities in Marawi and the valiant efforts of our
troops to quell the violence. I acknowledge the huge pain and sacrifice suffered by many of our citizens as
they bear the brunt of violent confrontations.” However, this must be interpreted taking the context into
consideration. Without this due consideration, this Court risks misreading the facts, reinforcing a false and
dangerous narrative in the minds of the people, and acting as a platform for forces that thrive on image
and terror magnified through news reports and social media.

In his departing words, Justice Leonen said that relying on the iron fist of an authoritarian backed up by the
police and the military to solve terrorism is fallacy. He argues that the ghost of Marcos’ Martial Law
lives within the words of our Constitution and that ghost must be exorcised with passion by this
Court whenever its resemblance reappears. Meanwhile, Justice Leonen encourage everyone to fight
the long war against terrorism. “The terrorist wins when we replace social justice with disempowering
authoritarianism,” he said. “We should temper our fears with reason. Otherwise, we succumb to the effects
of the weapons of terror. We should dissent – even resist – when offered the farce that martial law is
necessary because it is ‘only an exclamation point,” Justice Leonen added.

Accordingly, Associate Justice Marvic Leonen voted to grant the Petitions. Proclamation No. 216 of May
23 2017, General Order No. 1 of 2017, and all the issuances related to these Presidential Issuances
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are unconstitutional.
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CARPIO’s Dissent

Was there sufficient factual basis for the issuance of Proclamation No. 216 based on the stringent
requirements set forth in Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution?

The Procedural Issues:

The “appropriate proceeding” under paragraph 3, Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is a sui
generis petition not falling under any of the actions or proceedings under the Rules of Court.

The reasons are: first, any citizen can be a petitioner--This was designed to arrest, without further
delay, the grave effects of an illegal declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ
wherever it may be imposed, and to provide immediate relief to the entire nation. Second, the Court is
vested by the 1987 Constitution with the power to determine the “sufficiency of the factual basis”
of the declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ. Indeed, the Court is
expressly authorized and tasked to be a trier of facts in the review petition. Lastly, the Court must decide
the case within 30 days from the date of filing of the petition.

The proceeding under paragraph 3, Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution cannot possibly refer to
a petition for certiorari. What is assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court are
acts of government officials or tribunals exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. In contrast, what is
assailed in a proceeding under paragraph 3, Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is an executive
act of the President not involving judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Simply put, the petition under
paragraph 3, Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not involve jurisdictional but factual
issues.

The burden of proof to show the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration of martial law is on the
government for being a sui generis petition intended as a checking mechanism against the abusive
imposition of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ. It is the Government that must justify the
resort to extraordinary powers that are subject to the extraordinary review mechanisms under the
Constitution because it is in possession of facts and intelligence reports justifying the declaration of martial
law or suspension of the privilege of the writ. Ordinary citizens are not expected to be in possession of
such facts and reports.

To place the burden of proof on petitioners pursuant to the doctrine of “he who alleges must prove” is to
make this Constitutional checking mechanism a futile and empty exercise. The Court cannot interpret or
apply a provision of the Constitution as to make the provision inutile or meaningless.
The quantum of evidence required is probable cause. The 1987, Constitution does not compel the
President to examine or produce such amount of proof as to unduly burden and effectively incapacitate
him from exercising such powers.

The President need not gather proof beyond reasonable doubt, the highest quantum of evidence, which is
the standard required for convicting an accused charged with a criminal offense under Section 2, Rule 133
of the Rules of Court. Not even preponderance of evidence under Section 1, Rule 133 of the Rules of
Court, which is the degree of proof necessary in civil cases, is demanded for a lawful declaration of martial
law or suspension of the privilege of the writ.

However, the sufficiency of the factual basis of martial law must be determined at the time of its
proclamation. Events immediately preceding or contemporaneous must establish probable cause for the
existence of the factual basis. Subsequent events that immediately take place, however, can be
considered to confirm the existence of the factual basis.

The Substantive Issues:

Justice Carpio opined that the twin requirements for the declaration of martial law or suspension of the
privilege of the writ under Article VII, section 18 Under the 1987 Constitution are: (1) the existence of
actual rebellion or invasion; and (2) public safety requires the declaration. Absence of either element will
not authorize the President, who is sworn to defend the Constitution, from exercising his Commander-in-
Chief power to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ.

Based on Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of rebellion has the following elements: (1)
there is a (a) public uprising and (b) taking arms against the Government; and (2) the purpose of the
uprising is either (a) to remove from the allegiance to the Government or its laws: (1) the territory of the
Philippines or any part thereof; or (2) any body of land, naval, or other armed forces; or (b) to deprive the
Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers and prerogatives.
To clarify, mass or crowd action is not a requisite for rebellion.

Moreover, in the 1987 Constitution, the President can no longer use imminent danger of rebellion or
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invasion as a ground to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ. Thus, absent of an actual
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rebellion or actual invasion, the President cannot proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ.
This is the clear, indisputable letter and intent of the 1987 Constitution.

However, the existence of actual rebellion or invasion alone would not justify the declaration of martial law
or suspension of the privilege of the writ. Another requisite must be satisfied, that is, public safety requires
the declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ to suppress rebellion or invasion.
Probable cause exists that there is actual rebellion and that public safety requires the declaration of martial
law and suspension of the privilege of the writ in Marawi City, but not elsewhere.

The armed and public uprising in Marawi City by 400 to 500 Maute-Hapilon armed fighters, with the
announced intention to impose Shariah Law in Marawi City and make it an Islamic State, is concrete and
indisputable evidence of actual rebellion.

The widespread killing of both government forces and innocent civilians, coupled with the destruction of
government and private facilities, thereby depriving the whole population in Marawi City of basic
necessities and services, endangered the public safety in the whole of Marawi City. Hence, with the
concurrence of an actual rebellion and requirement of public safety, the President lawfully exercised his
Commander-in-Chief powers to declare martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ in Marawi City.
However, the same does not apply to the rest of Mindanao.

The President’s Report expressly states that the Maute-Hapilon armed fighters were waging rebellion first
in Marawi City as a prelude or “precedent” to waging rebellion in the rest of Mindanao. This is a clear
admission that the rebellion was only in Marawi City and had yet to spread to the rest of Mindanao.
Likewise, in an interview, the Maute-Hapilon group’s spokesperson, Abu Hafs, himself announced publicly
over a radio station in Marawi City that the rebels intended to implement Shariah Law in “Marawi City.”
Other areas of Mindanao, outside of Marawi City, were not mentioned.

The argument that martial law is justified in the whole of Mindanao since the rebels in Marawi City could
easily flee or escape to other areas of Mindanao is also wrong. The rebels who escape Marawi City may
be issued a warrant of arrest anywhere within the Philippines without the need to declare martial law or
suspend the privilege of the writ outside of Marawi City. To allow martial law in the whole of Mindanao on
the sole basis of securing the arrest of rebels who escape Marawi City would not only violate the 1987
Constitution, but also render useless the provisions of the Revised Penal Code and the Rules of Court.
Moreover, just hours after the Decision in the present petitions was announced on 4 July 2017, President
Duterte told media that he declared a Mindanaowide martial law to prevent a “spillover’:
“Alam mo, iyong Central Mindanao if you look at the map is in Central Mindanao kaya nga central, sa
gitna. You have the two Lanaos,” he said.

“When you declare martial law, you have to use your coconut, the grey matter between your ears. It’s easy
to escape because there is no division in terms of land. You can go anywhere, there can be a spillover,” he
added

This only confirms that there is no actual rebellion outside of Marawi City. However, the President feared a
“spillover” to other areas of Mindanao because “it is easy to escape” from Marawi City “because there is no
division in terms of land.”

Accordingly, Associate Justuice Antonio Carpio voted to partially grant the petitions in G.R. Nos. 231658,
231771, and 231774, and declare Proclamation No. 216 unconstitutional as to geographic areas of
Mindanao outside of Marawi City, for failure to comply with Section 18, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution. Proclamation No. 216 is valid, effective and constitutional only within Marawi City.
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FIRST EXTENSION

The 17th Congress, on July 23, 2017, granted President Rodrigo Duterte's request to extend Martial Law
in Mindanao. The Senate and the House of Representatives in a joint session on Saturday, July 22, voted
261-18 in favour of the President's request of a 5-month extension or until December 31, 2017. No one
abstained among those present.

"Pursuant to the Constitution and the rules of the joint session, the motion to extend the proclamation of
martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is hereby approved by the
Congress," House Speaker Pantaleon Alvarez announced, as members of Congress clapped.

A total of 261 lawmakers voted in favor of extending martial law in Mindanao, 18 voted against it, and zero
abstained. Sixteen Senators voted yes, while four voted in the negative. In the House of Representatives,
245 voted "yes" votes and 14 voted "no".

The overwhelming vote supporting the extension of martial law was not surprising, with Duterte counting a
majority of lawmakers and senators as his allies. The President had declared martial law in Mindanao on
May 23 through Proclamation Number 216 after government troops clashed with home-grown terrorists
from the Maute Group and Abu Sayyaf Group in Marawi City.

The 1987 Constitution only allows the President to declare martial law for a maximum of 60 days or until
July 22 in this case. Any extension would require from both houses of Congress.

Two months since Duterte issued Proclamation Number 216, however, the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and the Philippine National Police have not yet neutralized the rebels.

Duterte then wrote a letter to Congress asking for an extension until the end of the year, citing the
“evolving” urban warfare that is making it difficult for the military and the police to end the fighting in
Marawi.

Congress had previously refused to convene jointly to discuss the merits of Duterte’s declaration of martial
law.

Instead, both the Senate and the House received briefings from national security officials and issued
separate resolutions expressing support for the martial law in Mindanao.

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SECOND EXTENSION

On December 13, 2017, a special joint session of the House of Representatives and the Senate was held
in order to respond to President Rodrigo Duterte's request to extend the declaration of martial law in
Mindanao until December 31, 2018. In his letter addressed to the Congress, President Duterte cited the
remaining threats of ISIS-inspired terrorist groups. Congress voted 240–27 (14–4 from the Senate, 226–23
from the House) in favor of the second extension.

Four petitions were filed before the Philippine Supreme Court questioning the year-long extension of
martial law in Mindanao. Among the petitioners were one of the framers of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
Christian Monsod, a former Commission on Elections chairperson,[15] and opposition lawmakers.
Petitioners contended that the extension lacked factual basis, citing government reports that Marawi City
had been liberated.

On December 5, 2017, the Supreme Court voted 10-3-1 upholding the implementation of martial law in
Mindanao, with Supreme Court Justice Noel Tijam saying that the extension was necessary because of
persisting rebellion.[19] Dissenting opinion by Supreme Court Associate Justice Marvic Leonen stated that
the re-extension of martial law "enables the rise of an emboldened authoritarian."

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THIRD EXTENSION

The Senate and the House of Representatives granted President Rodrigo Duterte's request to extend
martial law in Mindanao until the end of 2019. A total of 235 lawmakers voted in favor of extending martial
law again, 28 voted negative, and only one abstained. The joint session was held on the second to the last
day of Congress sessions this year.

On December 6, 2018, the President asked Congress to allow martial law to remain in place in Mindanao
to quell terrorist groups that "continue to defy the government by perpetrating hostile activities." While
martial law led to "significant progress" in the peace and order situation in Mindanao, the latest security
assessment pointed to the need to keep it in force.

In his request for a third martial law extension, Duterte cited several fatal bombings in the south, including
the ones in Lamitan City in Basilan, Isulan in Sultan Kudarat, and in General Santos City in the past few
months.

During the joint session, Executive Secretary Salvador Medialdea defended the martial law extension as
government was "at the cusp of ending rebellion in Mindanao." Allowing terrorist groups and rebels to
"regroup" will only hamper the delivery of services in Mindanao.

Justice Secretary Menardo Guevarra said there was "no reason to doubt" the military on the need for
martial law.

The opposition, on the other hand, said another extension of martial law showed the failure of the military
and the police to achieve their objectives and that undue prolongation of martial law in Mindanao would
amount to perpetuity, considering the length of time the declaration and extension had been made. They
emphasized that it is an admission by the military and police authorities that they have failed to achieve the
purported objectives of martial law.

Senate Minority Leader Franklin Drilon opposed the extension, citing "very disturbing thoughts" that top
security officials told lawmakers in a meeting on Tuesday. "This cannot be the new normal for Mindanao,"
added Senator Francis Escudero, saying economic progress in the region could be achieved without
martial law.

Senator Panfilo Lacson, meanwhile, maintained that there is a continuing rebellion in Mindanao, which
merits the President’s position to again ask for a martial law extension in the region.

“Continuing ang rebellion, and rebellion is a continuing crime. Ang talagang nakapagpa-convince siyempre
ano situation ngayon compared to situation before the Marawi siege nabulaga sila roon. And when I read
the jurisprudence, the SC ruling, wala akong nakitang legal impediment para magpatuloy ang martial law,”
he said.

Makabayan bloc lawmakers said they feared a rise in alleged human rights violations in the region under
martial law.

Anakpawis Rep. Ariel Casilao said there were at least 155 cases of violations filed before the Commission
on Human Rights, including the massacre of 8 Lumad people in Lake Sebu, South Cotabato.

"The claims and the basis for another extension of martial law is a prelude to a martial law ad infinitum
(without limit). Thus, ad infinitum of human rights violations to the people who are against [it]," he said.

Opposition sectoral lawmakers Rep. Carlos Zarate of Bayan Muna and Rep. Emmi De Jesus of Gabriela
also slammed the "recycled" reasons cited by Duterte.

House Speaker Gloria Arroyo, meanwhile, cut off congressmen who went past the 1 minute time limit to
explain their votes for or against the extension of martial law.

First to taste Arroyo’s strict enforcement of the time limit was Magdalo Rep. Gary Alejano.

Others Arroyo also cut off were Zarate, Dinagat Islands Rep. Kaka Bag-ao, QC Rep. Kit Belmonte,
Camsur Rep. Gabriel Bordado, Gabriela Rep. Arlene Brosas, ACT Teachers Rep. France Castro, Lanao
del Sur Rep. Khalid Dimaporo, Kabataan Rep. Sarah Elago, Caloocan Rep. Edgar Erice, ACT Teachers
Rep. Antonio Tinio, Akbayan Rep. Tom Villarin, and Iligan Rep. Frederick Siao.
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