1

Estrada vs. Escritor

A.M. P-02-1651 August 4, 2003

Facts: 
In a sworn letter-complaint, Alejandro Estrada, complainant,
wrote to Judge Caoibes Jr. requesting for an investigation of
rumors that respondent Soledad Escritor, court interpreter of
Las Piñas, is living with a man not her husband. Judge Caoibes
referred the letter to Escritor, who stated that “there is no truth
as to the veracity of the allegation” and challenged Estrada, “to
appear in the open and prove his allegation in the proper court”.
Judge Caoibes set a preliminary conference and Escritor move
for inhibition to avoid bias and suspicion in hearing her case. In
the conference, Estrada confirmed that he filed a letter-
complaint for “disgraceful and immoral conduct” under the
Revised Administrative Code against Escritor for that his
frequent visit in the Hall of Justice in Las Piñas learned Escritor
is cohabiting with another man not his husband. 

Escritor testified that when she entered judiciary in 1999, she

was already a widow since 1998. She admitted that she’s been
living with Luciano Quilapo Jr. without the benefit of marriage
for 20 years and that they have a son. Escritor asserted that as a
member of the religious sect known as Jehovah’s Witnesses, and
having executed a “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness” (which
allows members of the congregation who have been abandoned
by their spouses to enter into marital relations) jointly with
Quilapo after ten years of living together, her conjugal
arrangement is in conformity with her religious beliefs and has
the approval of the congregation, therefore not constituting
disgraceful and immoral conduct. 

Issue: 
Whether or not Escritor is administratively liable for disgraceful
and immoral conduct. 

Ruling: 
Escritor cannot be penalized. The Constitution adheres to the
benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for
accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free
Exercise Clause, provided that it does not offend compelling
state interests. The OSG must then demonstrate that the state
has used the least intrusive means possible so that the free
 2

exercise clause is not infringed any more than necessary to

achieve the legitimate goal of the state. In this case, with no iota
of evidence offered, the records are bereft of even a feeble
attempt to show that the state adopted the least intrusive
means. With the Solicitor General utterly failing to prove this
element of the test, and under these distinct circumstances,
Escritor cannot be penalized. 

The Constitution itself mandates the Court to make exemptions

in cases involving criminal laws of general application, and
under these distinct circumstances, such conjugal arrangement
cannot be penalized for there is a case for exemption from the
law based on the fundamental right to freedom of religion. In the
area of religious exercise as a preferred freedom, man stands
accountable to an authority higher than the state.
 3

Goitia vs. Campos-Rueda

GR No. 11263 Nov. 2, 1916

Facts: 
Eloisa Goitia, plaintiff-appellant, and Jose Campos-Rueda,
defendant, were legally married in the city of Manila. They
established their residence 115 Calle San Marcelino, where they
lived together for about a month. However, the plaintiff returned to
the home of her parents. The allegations of the complaint were that
the defendant, one month after they had contracted marriage,
demanded plaintiff to perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his
genital organs in which the latter reject the said demands. With
these refusals, the defendant got irritated and provoked to maltreat
the plaintiff by word and deed. Unable to induce the defendant to
desist from his repugnant desires and cease of maltreating her,
plaintiff was obliged to leave the conjugal abode and take refuge in
the home of her parents. 

The trial court ruled in favor of respondent and stated that Goitia
could not compel her husband to support her except in the conjugal
home unless it is by virtue of a judicial decree granting her
separation or divorce from respondent.  Goitia filed motion for
review.  

Issue: 
Whether or not Goitia can claim for support outside of the conjugal
home. 

Ruling: 
YES. Marriage is something more than a mere contract. It is a new
relation, the rights, duties and obligations of which rest not upon
the agreement of the parties but upon the general law which defines
and prescribes those rights, duties and obligations. Marriage is an
institution, in the maintenance of which in its purity the public is
deeply interested.

When the legal existence of the parties is merged into one by

marriage, the new relation is regulated and controlled by the state
or government upon principles of public policy for the benefit of
society as well as the parties. When the object of a marriage is
defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the
parties and productive of no possible good to the community, relief
in some way should be obtainable.
 4

The law provides that defendant, who is obliged to support the wife,
may fulfill this obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by
maintaining her in his own home at his option. However, the option
given by law is not absolute. The law will not permit the defendant
to evade or terminate his obligation to support his wife if the wife
was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd designs
and physical assaults of the defendant, Eloisa may claim support
from the defendant for separate maintenance even outside of the
conjugal home.
 5

ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC

G.R. No. 174689             October 22, 2007

Facts:
Petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the
change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate. He
alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male
but feels, thinks and acts as a female" and that he had always
identified himself with girls since childhood. Feeling trapped in a
man’s body, he consulted several doctors in the United States.
He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment
and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a
"woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent
sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand.

From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact

engaged to be married. He then sought to have his name in his
birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and
his sex from "male" to "female."

The RTC rendered a decision in favour of petitioner explaining

that the said decision would be more in consonance with the
principles of justice and equity. With his sexual [re-assignment],
petitioner, who has always felt, thought and acted like a woman,
now possesses the physique of a female. Petitioner’s misfortune
to be trapped in a man’s body is not his own doing and should
not be in any way taken against him. Likewise, the [c]ourt
believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will be caused to
anybody or the community in granting the petition. On the
contrary, granting the petition would bring the much-awaited
happiness on the part of the petitioner and her [fiancé] and the
realization of their dreams.

Issue:
WON petitioner can be allowed to change his name and sex.

Held:
NO. A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family
relations. It is a part of a person’s legal capacity and civil status.
But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex
reassignment and its effects. This is fatal to petitioner’s cause.
 6

While petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and

appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law
authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for
that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the
correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate.

The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-

ranging legal and public policy consequences. Even the trial
court itself found that the petition was but petitioner’s first step
towards his eventual marriage to his male fiancé. However,
marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is a special
contract of permanent union between a man and a woman.
One of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the
contracting parties who must be a male and a female. To
grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially
reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family
relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who
has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-
operative transsexual).
 7

PEOPLE vs. VICTORIANO DELA CRUZ y LORENZO

G.R. No. 187683               February 11, 2010

Facts:
Victoriano was charged with the crime of Parricide for the death
of his wife Anna Liza with whom he was united in lawful
wedlock. He hit his wife on her trunk and on the different parts
of her body, thereby inflicting upon her serious physical injuries
which directly caused her death.

Issue:
WON Victoriano can be charged with Parricide.

Held:
YES. Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the
deceased is killed by the accused; and (3) the deceased is the
father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a
legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate
spouse of the accused. The key element in Parricide ― other
than the fact of killing ― is the relationship of the offender
to the victim. In the case of Parricide of a spouse, the best
proof of the relationship between the accused and the deceased
would be the marriage certificate.

In this case, the testimony of the accused that he was married to

the victim, in itself, is ample proof of such relationship as the
testimony can be taken as an admission against penal interest.
Clearly, then, it was established that Victoriano and Anna were
husband and wife.
 8

MAY D. AÑONUEVO, ALEXANDER BLEE DESANTIS and JOHN

DESANTIS NERI, vs. INTESTATE ESTATE OF RODOLFO G.
JALANDONI, represented by BERNARDINO G. JALANDONI as
Special Administrator
G.R. No. 178221               December 1, 2010

Facts:
Rodolfo G. Jalandoni died intestate and without issue. A petition
for the issuance of letters of administration was filed by his
brother, herein respondent Bernardino Jalandoni. Petitioners
and their siblings filed a Manifestation and introduced
themselves as the children of Sylvia Blee Desantis, who in turn,
was revealed to be the daughter of Isabel Blee (Isabel) with one
John Desantis.

The petitioners and their siblings contend that their

grandmother—Isabel—was, at the time of Rodolfo’s death, the
legal spouse of the latter. For which reason, Isabel is entitled to
a share in the estate of Rodolfo.

Respondent Bernardino opposed the petitioner’s intervention on

the ground that that the petitioners and their siblings have failed
to established the status of Isabel as an heir of Rodolfo. The
respondent called attention to the entries in the birth certificate
of Sylvia, who was born on 14 February 1946. As it turned out,
the record of birth of Sylvia states that she was a "legitimate"
child of Isabel and John Desantis. The document also certifies
the status of both Isabel and John Desantis as "married." The
respondent posits that the foregoing entries, having been
made in an official registry, constitute prima facie proof of a
prior marriage between Isabel and John Desantis. According
to the respondent, Isabel’s previous marriage, in the absence of
any proof that it was dissolved, made her subsequent marriage
with Rodolfo bigamous and void ab initio.

On 2 July 2004, the intestate court issued an order allowing the

petitioners and their siblings to take part in the settlement
proceedings. The intestate court was convinced that the evidence
at hand adequately establish Isabel’s status as the legal spouse
of Rodolfo and, by that token, permitted the petitioners and their
siblings to intervene in the proceedings on her behalf.
 9

The intestate court also held that the birth certificate of Sylvia
was insufficient to prove that there was a previous marriage
between Isabel and John Desantis. It ventured on the possibility
that the entries in the birth record of Sylvia regarding her
legitimacy and the status of her parents, may have been made
only in order to save Isabel and her family from the social
condemnation of having a child out of wedlock.

On appeal before the CA, the appellate court nullified the orders
of the intestate court. In coming to its conclusion, the Court of
Appeals found that it was an error on the part of the intestate
court to have disregarded the probative value of Sylvia’s birth
certificate. The appellate court, siding with the respondent, held
that Sylvia’s birth certificate serves as prima facie evidence
of the facts therein stated—which includes the civil status
of her parents. Hence, the previous marriage of Isabel with
John Desantis should have been taken as established.

The Court of Appeals added that since the petitioners and their
siblings failed to offer any other evidence proving that the
marriage of Isabel with John Desantis had been dissolved by the
time she was married to Rodolfo, it then follows that the latter
marriage—the Isabel-Rodolfo union—is a nullity for being
bigamous. From that premise, Isabel cannot be considered as
the legal spouse of Rodolfo. The petitioners and their siblings,
therefore, failed to show that Isabel has any interest in the estate
of Rodolfo.

Issue:
WON the birth certificate of a child can serve as evidence of the
existence of marriage between his/her parents.

Held:
YES. The SC held that the existence of a previous marriage
between Isabel and John Desantis was adequately established.
This holds true notwithstanding the fact that no marriage
certificate between Isabel and John Desantis exists on record.

While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence

of a marital union, it is not regarded as the sole and exclusive
evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of
marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the
marriage certificate. Hence, even a person’s birth certificate
 10

may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage

between his parents.

In the present case, the birth certificate of Sylvia precisely serves

as the competent evidence of marriage between Isabel and John
Desantis. As mentioned earlier, it contains the following notable
entries: (a) that Isabel and John Desantis were "married" and (b)
that Sylvia is their "legitimate" child. In clear and categorical
language, Sylvia’s birth certificate speaks of a subsisting
marriage between Isabel and John Desantis.

Pursuant to existing laws, the foregoing entries are accorded

prima facie weight. They are presumed to be true. Hence, unless
rebutted by clear and convincing evidence, they can, and will,
stand as proof of the facts attested.
 11

RODOLFO A. ESPINOSA vs. ATTY. JULIETA A. OMAÑA

A.C. No. 9081 October 12, 2011

Facts:
Complainants Espinosa and Glindo charged Omaña with
violation of her oath as a lawyer, malpractice, and gross
misconduct in office. They alleged that Espinosa and his wife
Elena Marantal (Marantal) sought Omaña’s legal advice on
whether they could legally live separately and dissolve their
marriage solemnized on 23 July 1983. Omaña then prepared a
document entitled “Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay.” Marantal and
Espinosa, fully convinced of the validity of the contract
dissolving their marriage, started implementing its terms and
conditions. However, Marantal eventually took custody of all
their children and took possession of most of the property they
acquired during their union.

Omaña denied that she prepared the contract. She admitted that
Espinosa went to see her and requested for the notarization of
the contract but she told him that it was illegal.

Issue:
WON the “Kasunduan ng Paghihiwalay” notarized by a lawyer
results to the dissolution of marriage.

Held:
NO. The SC ruled that the extrajudicial dissolution of the
conjugal partnership without judicial approval is void. The Court
has also ruled that a notary public should not facilitate the
disintegration of a marriage and the family by encouraging the
separation of the spouses and extrajudicially dissolving the
conjugal partnership, which is exactly what Omaña did in this
case.
 
 12

ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC

G.R. No. 174689             October 22, 2007

Facts:
Petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the
change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate. He
alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male
but feels, thinks and acts as a female" and that he had always
identified himself with girls since childhood. Feeling trapped in a
man’s body, he consulted several doctors in the United States.
He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment
and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a
"woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent
sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand.

From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact

engaged to be married. He then sought to have his name in his
birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and
his sex from "male" to "female."

The RTC rendered a decision in favour of petitioner explaining

that the said decision would be more in consonance with the
principles of justice and equity. With his sexual [re-assignment],
petitioner, who has always felt, thought and acted like a woman,
now possesses the physique of a female. Petitioner’s misfortune
to be trapped in a man’s body is not his own doing and should
not be in any way taken against him. Likewise, the [c]ourt
believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will be caused to
anybody or the community in granting the petition. On the
contrary, granting the petition would bring the much-awaited
happiness on the part of the petitioner and her [fiancé] and the
realization of their dreams.

Issue:
WON petitioner may be allowed to change his name and sex.

Held:
NO. Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a
historical record of the facts as they existed at the time of birth.
Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by
the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the
genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally
recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s
 13

sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error,
is immutable.

When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given

their common and ordinary meaning in the absence of a
contrary legislative intent. The words "sex," "male" and "female"
as used in the Civil Register Law and laws concerning the civil
registry (and even all other laws) should therefore be understood
in their common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative
intent to the contrary. In this connection, sex is defined as "the
sum of peculiarities of structure and function that
distinguish a male from a female" or "the distinction
between male and female." Female is "the sex that produces
ova or bears young" and male is "the sex that has organs to
produce spermatozoa for fertilizing ova." Thus, the words "male"
and "female" in everyday understanding do not include persons
who have undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, "words
that are employed in a statute which had at the time a well-
known meaning are presumed to have been used in that sense
unless the context compels to the contrary." Since the statutory
language of the Civil Register Law was enacted in the early
1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that the
term "sex" as used then is something alterable through surgery
or something that allows a post-operative male-to-female
transsexual to be included in the category "female."

For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in

altering his body and appearance through the intervention of
modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex
in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis
for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his
birth certificate.
 14

ROSALIA MARTINEZ vs. ANGEL TAN

G.R. No. L-4904            February 5, 1909

Facts:
On 25 September 1907, plaintiff Rosalia Martinez and defendant
Angel Tan signed a petition, in which they state that they have
mutually agreed to enter into a contract of marriage before the
justice of the peace, and ask that the justice solemnize the
marriage. Following this is a document dated on the same day,
signed by the justice of the peace, by the plaintiff, by the
defendant, and by Zacarias Esmero and Pacita Ballori.

It is claimed by the plaintiff, however, that she never appeared

before the justice of the peace and never was married to the
defendant. She admits that she signed the document in
question, but says that she signed it in her own home, without
reading it, and at the request of the defendant, who told her that
it was a paper authorizing him to ask the consent of her parents
to the marriage.

Lower court ruled in favor of the defendant Angel Tan that Tan
and Martinez were married on Sept. 25, 1907. Evidence
supporting this were: document signed by plaintiff, testimony of
defendant that he and plaintiff appeared before the justice of
peace along with their witnesses (by Ballori and Esmero),
testimony of Esmero that he, the defendant, plaintiff and Ballori
appeared before the justice of peace and signed the document,
the testimony of Ballori who also testified to the same effect, and
the testimony of the bailiff of court that defendant, appellant,
justice of peace and two witnesses were all present during the
ceremony.

Issue:
WON what took place before the justice of the peace did not
constitute a legal marriage.

Held:
NO. No particular form from the ceremony of marriage is
required, but the parties must declare in the presence of the
person solemnizing the marriage, that they take each other as
husband and wife.
 15

The petition signed by the plaintiff and defendant contained a

positive statement that they had mutually agreed to be married
and they asked the justice of the peace to solemnize the
marriage. The document signed by the plaintiff, the defendant,
and the justice of the peace, stated that they ratified under oath,
before the justice, the contents of the petition and that witnesses
of the marriage were produced. A marriage took place as
shown by the certificate of the justice of the peace, signed
by both contracting parties, which certificates gives rise to the
presumption that the officer authorized the marriage in due
form, the parties before the justice of the peace declaring
that they took each other as husband and wife, unless the
contrary is proved, such presumption being corroborated in
this case by the admission of the woman to the effect that
she had contracted the marriage certified to in the
document signed by her, which admission can only mean the
parties mutually agreed to unite in marriage when they appeared
and signed the said document which so states before the justice
of the peace who authorized the same.

It was proven that both the plaintiff and the defendant were able
to read and write the Spanish language, and that they knew the
contents of the document which they signed; and under the
circumstances in this particular case were satisfied, and so hold,
that what took place before the justice of the peace on this
occasion amounted to a legal marriage.
 16

LUCIO MORIGO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 145226             February 06, 2004

Facts:
Petitioner Lucio Morigo and private respondent Lucia Barrete
have been known each other since 1974. They lost contact with
each other from 1977-78. In 1984, their communication
resumed and became sweethearts. In 1990, Lucia came back to
the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join her in
Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus they were married on
August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan,
Pilar, Bohol. On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her
work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind.

On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General
Division) a petition for divorce against appellant which was
granted by the court on January 17, 1992 and to take effect on
February 17, 1992.

On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria

Jececha Lumbago at the Virgen sa Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran
City, Bohol. Petitioner then filed a complaint for judicial
declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lucia on the ground
that no marriage ceremony actually took place. However,
petitioner was charged with Bigamy before the RTC.

The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on the

ground that the civil case for judicial nullification of his marriage
with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. His
motion was granted, but subsequently denied upon motion for
reconsideration by the prosecution.

In its decision, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy. The trial court
discounted petitioner’s claim that his first marriage to Lucia was
null and void ab initio. Following Domingo v. Court of Appeals,
the trial court ruled that want of a valid marriage ceremony is
not a defense in a charge of bigamy. The parties to a marriage
should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even
if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of
the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry
again.
 17

On appeal before the CA, the appellate court affirmed the

judgment of conviction of petitioner. The CA held, the fact that
the first marriage was void from the beginning is not a valid
defense in a bigamy case. The Court of Appeals also pointed out
that the divorce decree obtained by Lucia from the Canadian
court could not be accorded validity in the Philippines, pursuant
to Article 15 of the Civil Code and given the fact that it is
contrary to public policy in this jurisdiction. Under Article 17 of
the Civil Code, a declaration of public policy cannot be rendered
ineffectual by a judgment promulgated in a foreign jurisdiction.

Issue:
WON there is a valid marriage ceremony.

Held:
NONE. The trial court found that there was no actual marriage
ceremony performed between Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing
officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the
marriage contract by the two, without the presence of a
solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held that the marriage is
void ab initio, in accordance with Articles 3 and 4 of the Family
Code. As the dissenting opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700,
correctly puts it, "This simply means that there was no
marriage to begin with; and that such declaration of nullity
retroacts to the date of the first marriage. In other words,
for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of the
declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to the date
of the celebration of the first marriage, the accused was,
under the eyes of the law, never married."

The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused

must have been legally married. But in this case, legally
speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete.
Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle
of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio,
the two were never married "from the beginning." The
contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this
argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner
was not married to Lucia at the time he contracted the marriage
with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first
marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is
but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained
 18

where there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner,

must, perforce be acquitted of the instant charge.

The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished

from Mercado v. Tan. In the latter case, the judicial declaration
of nullity of the first marriage was likewise obtained after the
second marriage was already celebrated. We held therein that:

A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is

necessary before a subsequent one can be legally contracted.
One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first
obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This
principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by
statutes as "void."

It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was

actually solemnized not just once, but twice: first before a judge
where a marriage certificate was duly issued and then again six
months later before a priest in religious rites. Ostensibly, at
least, the first marriage appeared to have transpired, although
later declared void ab initio.

In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was

performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer. Petitioner
and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their
own. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears
no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial
declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be
deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which
petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures
a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent
marriage.
 19

LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL vs HON. ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY

G.R. No. L-53703 August 19, 1986

Facts:
Respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel was married to petitioner Lilia
Wiegel in 1978. Petitioner also married to a certain Eduardo A.
Maxion in 1972. Hence, respondent Karl asked for the
declaration of Nullity of his marriage with petitioner Lilia Oliva
Wiegel on the ground of Lilia's previous existing marriage.

Lilia, while admitting the existence of said prior subsisting

marriage claimed that said marriage was null and void, she and
the first husband Eduardo A. Maxion having been allegedly
forced to enter said marital union.

Issue:
WON the marriage between Karl and Lilia was void.

Held:
YES, it is void. There is no need for petitioner to prove that her
first marriage was vitiated by force committed against both
parties because assuming this to be so, the marriage will not be
void but merely viodable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and therefore valid
until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is
clear that when she married respondent she was still validly
married to her first husband, consequently, her marriage to
respondent is VOID (Art. 80, Civil Code).

There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the

existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time they
married each other, for then such a marriage though void still
needs according to this Court a judicial declaration of such fact
and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded
as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage
with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel); accordingly, the marriage of
petitioner and respondent would be regarded VOID under the
law.
 20

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GREGORIO NOLASCO

G.R. No. 94053 March 17, 1993

Facts:
Respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed a petition for the declaration
of presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica Parker and prayed
that his wife be declared presumptively dead or, in the
alternative, that the marriage be declared null and void.

Gregorio Nolasco is a seaman. He first met Janet Monica Parker,

a British, in a bar in England. From that chance meeting
onwards, Janet Monica Parker lived with respondent Nolasco on
his ship for six (6) months until they returned to respondent's
hometown of San Jose, Antique on 19 November 1980 after his
seaman's contract expired. On 15 January 1982, respondent
married Janet Monica Parker.

After the marriage celebration, he obtained another employment

contract as a seaman and left his wife with his parents in San
Jose, Antique. Sometime in January 1983, while working
overseas, respondent received a letter from his mother informing
him that Janet Monica had given birth to his son. The same
letter informed him that Janet Monica had left Antique.
Respondent claimed he then immediately asked permission to
leave his ship to return home. He arrived in Antique in
November 1983.

Respondent Nolasco tried to look for his wife whenever his ship
docked in England. He also sent letters to the address of the bar
where he and Janet Monica first met. He also claimed that he
inquired from among friends but they too had no news of Janet
Monica.

Issue:
Whether or not Nolasco had a well-founded belief that his wife,
Janet, is already dead?

Held:
NONE. The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to
conduct a search for his missing wife with such diligence as to
give rise to a "well-founded belief" that she is dead.
 21

United States v. Biasbas, is instructive as to degree of diligence

required in searching for a missing spouse. In that case,
defendant Macario Biasbas was charged with the crime of
bigamy. He set-up the defense of a good faith belief that his first
wife had already died. The Court held that defendant had not
exercised due diligence to ascertain the whereabouts of his first
wife, noting that:

While the defendant testified that he had made inquiries

concerning the whereabouts of his wife, he fails to state of
whom he made such inquiries. He did not even write to the
parents of his first wife, who lived in the Province of
Pampanga, for the purpose of securing information
concerning her whereabouts. He admits that he had a
suspicion only that his first wife was dead. He admits that
the only basis of his suspicion was the fact that she had
been absent. . . .

In the case at bar, the Court considers that the investigation

allegedly conducted by respondent in his attempt to ascertain
Janet Monica Parker's whereabouts is too sketchy to form the
basis of a reasonable or well-founded belief that she was already
dead. When he arrived in San Jose, Antique after learning of
Janet Monica's departure, instead of seeking the help of local
authorities or of the British Embassy, he secured another
seaman's contract and went to London, a vast city of many
millions of inhabitants, to look for her there. Also, respondent
failed to explain why he did not even try to get the help of the
police or other authorities in London and Liverpool in his effort
to find his wife. The circumstances of Janet Monica's departure
and respondent's subsequent behavior make it very difficult to
regard the claimed belief that Janet Monica was dead a well-
founded one.
 22

GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO vs. REDERICK A. RECIO

G.R. No. 138322           October 2, 2001

Facts:
Respondent Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha
Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal in 1987. They
lived together as husband and wife in Australia. In 1989, they
obtained a divorce decree in Australia. In 1992, respondent
became an Australian citizen. He then married petitioner Grace
Garcia-Recio in 1994 in Cabanatuan City. In their application for
a marriage license, respondent was declared as "single" and
"Filipino."

Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived

separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage.
While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were
divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory
Declarations secured in Australia

Petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage

in the court a quo, on the ground of bigamy – respondent
allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married
her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of
respondent's marriage to Editha Samson only in November,
1997.

In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he

had revealed to petitioner his prior marriage and its subsequent
dissolution. He contended that his first marriage to an
Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree
obtained in Australian in 1989; thus, he was legally capacitated
to marry petitioner in 1994.

The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground

that the divorce issued in Australia was valid and recognized in
the Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended, but not on the
basis of any defect in an essential element of the marriage; that
is, respondent's alleged lack of legal capacity to remarry. Rather,
it based its Decision on the divorce decree obtained by
respondent. The Australian divorce had ended the marriage;
thus, there was no more martial union to nullify or annual.
 23

Issue:
WON respondent has legal capacity to marry Grace Garcia.

Held:
Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our
courts cannot grant it. A marriage between two Filipinos cannot
be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of
Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code. In mixed marriages
involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code
allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the
divorce is "validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry." A divorce obtained abroad
by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective
national laws.

A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading

and proof are concerned, can be made. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr.
decrees that "aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may
be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law." Therefore, before a foreign
divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party
pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Presentation solely of
the divorce decree is insufficient.

In this case, the divorce decree between respondent and Editha

Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian
family court. However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance
with the rules on evidence regarding alleged foreign laws must
be demonstrated.

Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of

May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner
objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had
not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan
City.36 The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to
petitioner's qualification. Hence, it was admitted in evidence and
accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner's failure to
object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a
written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.
 24

Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the

Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no longer bound
by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian
citizenship in 1992. Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an
alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights
belonging to a citizen. Naturalized citizens, freed from the
protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of their
adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent
severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris
that had tied him to Philippine personal laws.

In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of

a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces
are of different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce
or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et
thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the second
suspends it and leaves the bond in full force. There is no
showing in the case at bar which type of divorce was procured
by respondent.

Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree –

a conditional or provisional judgment of divorce. It is in effect the
same as a separation from bed and board, although an absolute
divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during
which no reconciliation is effected.

Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under
some foreign statutes and practices, still restrict remarriage.
Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by
statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorce which was granted on
the ground of adultery may be prohibited from remarrying again.
The court may allow a remarriage only after proof of good
behavior.

The legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the

national law of the party concerned. The certificate mentioned
in Article 21 of the Family Code would have been sufficient to
establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented
it in court. A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is
prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of the
alien applicant for a marriage license. As it is, however, there is
absolutely no evidence that proves respondent's legal capacity to
marry petitioner.
 25

IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS vs. ISAGANI D. BOBIS

G.R. No. 138509             July 31, 2000

Facts:
On October 21, 1985, respondent contracted a first marriage
with one Maria Dulce B. Javier. Without said marriage having
been annulled, nullified or terminated, the same respondent
contracted a second marriage with petitioner Imelda Marbella-
Bobis on January 25, 1996 and allegedly a third marriage with a
certain Julia Sally Hernandez. Based on petitioner's complaint-
affidavit, an information for bigamy was filed against
respondent.

Sometime thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for the

judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage on
the ground that it was celebrated without a marriage license.
Respondent then filed a motion to suspend the proceedings in
the criminal case for bigamy invoking the pending civil case for
nullity of the first marriage as a prejudicial question to the
criminal case. The trial judge granted the motion to suspend the
criminal case in an Order dated December 29, 1998. Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner argues

that respondent should have first obtained a judicial declaration
of nullity of his first marriage before entering into the second
marriage, inasmuch as the alleged prejudicial question justifying
suspension of the bigamy case is no longer a legal truism
pursuant to Article 40 of the Family Code.

Issue:
WON the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of
nullity of a previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial question
to a criminal case for bigamy.

Held:
NO. A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the
resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved
therein. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate
from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it
determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. It must appear
not only that the civil case involves facts upon which the
criminal action is based, but also that the resolution of the
 26

issues raised in the civil action would necessarily be

determinative of the criminal case. Consequently, the defense
must involve an issue similar or intimately related to the same
issue raised in the criminal action and its resolution
determinative of whether or not the latter action may proceed.
Its two essential elements are:

(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately

related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not
the criminal action may proceed.

A prejudicial question does not conclusively resolve the

guilt or innocence of the accused but simply tests the
sufficiency of the allegations in the information in order to
sustain the further prosecution of the criminal case. A party
who raises a prejudicial question is deemed to have
hypothetically admitted that all the essential elements of a crime
have been adequately alleged in the information, considering
that the prosecution has not yet presented a single evidence on
the indictment or may not yet have rested its case. A challenge
of the allegations in the information on the ground of prejudicial
question is in effect a question on the merits of the criminal
charge through a non-criminal suit.

Article 40 of the Family Code, which was effective at the time of

celebration of the second marriage, requires a prior judicial
declaration of nullity of a previous marriage before a party
may remarry. The clear implication of this is that it is not for
the parties, particularly the accused, to determine the validity or
invalidity of the marriage. Whether or not the first marriage was
void for lack of a license is a matter of defense because there is
still no judicial declaration of its nullity at the time the second
marriage was contracted. It should be remembered that bigamy
can successfully be prosecuted provided all its elements concur
– two of which are a previous marriage and a subsequent
marriage which would have been valid had it not been for the
existence at the material time of the first marriage.

In the case at bar, respondent's clear intent is to obtain a

judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage and thereafter
to invoke that very same judgment to prevent his prosecution for
bigamy. He cannot have his cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all
 27

that an adventurous bigamist has to do is to disregard Article 40

of the Family Code, contract a subsequent marriage and escape
a bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is
void and that the subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of
a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first. A party may
even enter into a marriage aware of the absence of a requisite -
usually the marriage license - and thereafter contract a
subsequent marriage without obtaining a declaration of nullity
of the first on the assumption that the first marriage is void.
Such scenario would render nugatory the provisions on bigamy.
As succinctly held in Landicho v. Relova:

(P)arties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for

themselves its nullity, only competent courts having such
authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of
the first marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts
a second marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted
for bigamy.

The issue in this case is limited to the existence of a prejudicial

question, and we are not called upon to resolve the validity of
the first marriage. Be that as it may, suffice it to state that the
Civil Code, under which the first marriage was celebrated,
provides that "every intendment of law or fact leans toward
the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage
bonds." [] Hence, parties should not be permitted to judge for
themselves the nullity of their marriage, for the same must be
submitted to the determination of competent courts. Only when
the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void,
and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is
that the marriage exists. No matter how obvious, manifest or
patent the absence of an element is, the intervention of the
courts must always be resorted to. That is why Article 40 of the
Family Code requires a "final judgment," which only the courts
can render. Thus, as ruled in Landicho v. Relova, he who
contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration
of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the criminal case
may not be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a
civil case for declaration of nullity. In a recent case for
concubinage, we held that the pendency of a civil case for
declaration of nullity of marriage is not a prejudicial question.
 28

This ruling applies here by analogy since both crimes

presuppose the subsistence of a marriage.

Ignorance of the existence of Article 40 of the Family Code

cannot even be successfully invoked as an excuse. The
contracting of a marriage knowing that the requirements of the
law have not been complied with or that the marriage is in
disregard of a legal impediment is an act penalized by the
Revised Penal Code. The legality of a marriage is a matter of
law and every person is presumed to know the law.

The burden of proof to show the dissolution of the first marriage

before the second marriage was contracted rests upon the
defense, but that is a matter that can be raised in the trial of the
bigamy case. The lower court, therefore, erred in suspending
the criminal case for bigamy. Moreover, when respondent was
indicted for bigamy, the fact that he entered into two marriage
ceremonies appeared indubitable. It was only after he was sued
by petitioner for bigamy that he thought of seeking a judicial
declaration of nullity of his first marriage. The obvious intent,
therefore, is that respondent merely resorted to the civil action
as a potential prejudicial question for the purpose of frustrating
or delaying his criminal prosecution. As has been discussed
above, this cannot be done.

In the light of Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent, without

first having obtained the judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage, can not be said to have validly entered into the second
marriage. Per current jurisprudence, a marriage though void still
needs a judicial declaration of such fact before any party can
marry again; otherwise the second marriage will also be void.
The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity,
the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In the case at
bar, respondent was for all legal intents and purposes regarded
as a married man at the time he contracted his second marriage
with petitioner. Against this legal backdrop, any decision in the
civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent
entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first
marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the
determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a
prejudicial question. As stated above, respondent cannot be
permitted to use his own malfeasance to defeat the criminal
action against him.
 29

ARTHUR TE vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and LILIANA CHOA

G.R. No. 126746               November 29, 2000

Facts:
Petitioner Arthur Te and private respondent Liliana Choa were
married in civil rites on September 14, 1988. They did not live
together after the marriage although they would meet each other
regularly. After giving birth to a girl on April 21, 1989, petitioner
stopped visiting her. On May 20, 1990, while his marriage with
private respondent was subsisting, petitioner contracted a
second marriage with a certain Julieta Santella (Santella).

When private respondent learned about petitioner’s marriage to

Santella, she charged him with bigamy. Petitioner then filed an
action for the annulment of his marriage to Choa on the ground
that he was forced to marry her. He alleged that private
respondent concealed her pregnancy by another man at the time
of their marriage and that she was psychologically incapacitated
to perform her essential marital obligations.

On November 8, 1990, private respondent also filed with the

Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) an administrative
case against petitioner and Santella for the revocation of their
respective engineering licenses on the ground that they
committed acts of immorality by living together and
subsequently marrying each other despite their knowledge that
at the time of their marriage, petitioner was already married to
private respondent. With respect to petitioner, private
respondent added that he committed an act of falsification by
stating in his marriage contract with Santella that he was still
single.

Petitioner filed with the Board of Civil Engineering of the PRC

(PRC Board), where the administrative case for the revocation of
his engineering license was pending, a motion to suspend the
proceedings therein in view of the pendency of the civil case for
annulment of his marriage to private respondent and criminal
case for bigamy. The Board denied his motion.

Issue:
WON the CA committed a serious error in refusing to suspend
the legal [criminal and administrative] proceedings despite the
pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage.
 30

Held:
NO. A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a
fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately
connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the
accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must
appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to
those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but
also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the
civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would
necessarily be determined. The rationale behind the principle of
suspending a criminal case in view of a prejudicial question is to
avoid two conflicting decisions.

The Court of Appeals did not err when it ruled that the
pendency of the civil case for annulment of marriage filed by
petitioner against private respondent did not pose a
prejudicial question which would necessitate that the
criminal case for bigamy be suspended until said civil case is
terminated.

The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s

marriage to private respondent had no bearing upon the
determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal
case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of
bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the
time the second marriage is contracted. Petitioner’s argument
that the nullity of his marriage to private respondent had to be
resolved first in the civil case before the criminal proceedings
could continue, because a declaration that their marriage was
void ab initio would necessarily absolve him from criminal
liability, is untenable. The ruling in People vs. Mendoza and
People vs. Aragon cited by petitioner that no judicial decree is
necessary to establish the invalidity of a marriage which is void
ab initio has been overturned. The prevailing rule is found in
Article 40 of the Family Code, which was already in effect at the
time of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent in September
1988. Said article states that the absolute nullity of a
previous marriage may not be invoked for purposes of
remarriage unless there is a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void. Thus, under the law, a marriage, even
one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until
declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding.
 31

It is clear from the foregoing that the pendency of the civil case
for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent did
not give rise to a prejudicial question which warranted the
suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy
since at the time of the alleged commission of the crime, their
marriage was, under the law, still valid and subsisting.

Neither did the filing of said civil case for annulment necessitate
the suspension of the administrative proceedings before the PRC
Board. As discussed above, the concept of prejudicial question
involves a civil and a criminal case. We have previously ruled
that there is no prejudicial question where one case is
administrative and the other is civil.

Furthermore, Section 32 of the Rules and Regulations Governing

the Regulation and Practice of Professionals of the PRC Board
expressly provides that the administrative proceedings before it
shall not be suspended notwithstanding the existence of a
criminal and/or civil case against the respondent involving the
same facts as the administrative case. The Board shall proceed
independently with the investigation of the case and shall render
therein its decision without awaiting for the final decision of the
courts or quasi-judicial body.

It must also be noted that the allegations in the administrative

complaint before the PRC Board are not confined to the issue of
the alleged bigamous marriage contracted by petitioner and
Santella. Petitioner is also charged with immoral conduct for
continued failure to perform his obligations as husband to
private respondent and as father to their child, and for
cohabiting with Santella without the benefit of marriage. The
existence of these other charges justified the continuation of the
proceedings before the PRC Board.
 32

Vincent Paul G. Mercado vs Consuelo Tan

G.R. No. 137110, August 1, 2000

Facts:
Petitioner Dr. Vincent Mercado and respondent Ma. Consuelo
Tan got married on June 27, 1991, but at the time of the
marriage, petitioner was already married to Ma. Thelma Oliva in
a marriage ceremony solemnized on April 10, 1976. As such, a
complaint for bigamy was filed by respondent Tan. During the
pendency of the case for bigamy against him, petitioner filed an
action for declaration of nullity of his marriage with Oliva. After
trial, the trial court declared the marriage of Mercado and Oliva
as null and void.

Meanwhile, petitioner was charged with bigamy for having

contracted a second marriage with respondent Tan on June 27,
1991 when at that time he was previously united in lawful
marriage Oliva on April 10, 1976 at Cebu City, without said first
marriage having been legally dissolved. Petitioner posited the
defense that his previous marriage had been judicially declared
null and void and that the private complainant had knowledge of
the first marriage of accused.

Appealing before the CA, the court agreed with the lower court
and held that Under Article 40 of the Family Code, ‘the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes
of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void.’ But here, the final
judgment declaring null and void petitioner’s previous marriage
came not before the celebration of the second marriage, but
after, when the case for bigamy against accused was already
tried in court.  And what constitutes the crime of bigamy is
the act of any person who shall contract a second
subsequent marriage ‘before’ the former marriage has been
legally dissolved.

On his appeal before the SC, petitioner contended, however, that

he obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code, thereby rendering it void ab
initio.  Unlike voidable marriages which are considered valid
until set aside by a competent court, he argues that a void
marriage is deemed never to have taken place at all. Thus, he
concludes that there is no first marriage to speak of.  Petitioner
 33

also quotes the commentaries of former Justice Luis Reyes that

“it is now settled that if the first marriage is void from the
beginning, it is a defense in a bigamy charge.  But if the first
marriage is voidable, it is not a defense.”

Respondent, on the other hand, admits that the first marriage

was declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code,
but she points out that that declaration came only after the
Information had been filed.  Hence, by then, the crime had
already been consummated.  She argues that a judicial
declaration of nullity of a void previous marriage must be
obtained before a person can marry for a subsequent time.

Issue: 
WON the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Oliva will
exculpate him to the crime of bigamy.

Held:
NO. Under the law, illegal marriages are any marriage
subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the
first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:

(a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;

(b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive
years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse
present having news of the absentee being alive, or the
absentee being generally considered as dead and believed to
be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such
subsequent marriage, the marriage as contracted being valid
in either  case until declared null and void by a competent
court."

The Court held in those two cases that the said provision
“plainly makes a subsequent marriage contracted by any person
during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void from its
performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its
invalidity, as distinguished from mere annulable marriages.”

The provision appeared in substantially the same form under

Article 83 of the 1950 Civil Code and Article 41 of the Family
Code.  However, Article 40 of the Family Code, a new provision,
 34

expressly requires a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous

marriage.

In this light, the statutory mooring of the ruling in Mendoza and

Aragon – that there is no need for a judicial declaration of nullity
of a void marriage --  has been cast aside by Article 40 of the
Family Code.  Such declaration is now necessary before one can
contract a second marriage.  Absent that declaration, we hold
that one may be charged with and convicted of bigamy.

The present ruling is consistent with our pronouncement in

Terre v. Terre, which involved an administrative Complaint
against a lawyer for marrying twice.  In rejecting the lawyer’s
argument that he was free to enter into a second marriage
because the first one was void ab initio, the Court ruled: “for
purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to
contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the
first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential.” The
Court further noted that the said rule was “cast into statutory
form by Article 40 of the Family Code.” Significantly, it observed
that the second marriage, contracted without a judicial
declaration that the first marriage was void, was “bigamous and
criminal in character.”

“It is now settled that the fact that the first marriage is void
from the beginning is not a defense in a bigamy charge.  As
with a voidable marriage, there must be a judicial declaration
of the nullity of a marriage before contracting the second 
marriage.   Article 40 of the Family Code states that x x x. 
The Code Commission believes that the parties to a marriage
should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void,
even if such is the fact, but must first secure a judicial
declaration of nullity of their marriage before they should be
allowed to marry again. x x x.”

In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage

although there was yet no judicial declaration of nullity of his
first marriage.  In fact, he instituted the Petition to have the first
marriage declared void only after complainant had filed a letter-
complaint charging him with bigamy.  By contracting a second
marriage while the first was still subsisting, he committed the
acts punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
 35

That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the

nullity of the first marriage was immaterial.  To repeat, the crime
had already been consummated by then. Moreover, his view
effectively encourages delay in the prosecution of bigamy cases;
an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous
marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a
prejudicial question in the criminal case.  We cannot allow that.

Under the circumstances of the present case, he is guilty of the

charge against him.
 36

SSS vs. Jarque vda. De Bailon

GR No. 165545, March 24, 2006

Facts:
On April 25, 1955, Clemente G. Bailon (Bailon) and Alice P. Diaz
(Alice) contracted marriage in Barcelona, Sorsogon. More than
15 years later or on October 9, 1970, Bailon filed before the then
Court of First Instance (CFI) of Sorsogon a petition to declare
Alice presumptively dead. The CFI granted the petition and
declared Alice for all legal intents and purposes, except for those
of succession, presumptively dead.

Close to 13 years after his wife Alice was declared presumptively

dead or on August 8, 1983, Bailon contracted marriage with
Teresita Jarque (respondent) in Casiguran, Sorsogon. On
January 30, 1998, Bailon, who was a member of the Social
Security System (SSS) since 1960 and a retiree pensioner thereof
effective July 1994, died. After which, respondent Jarque was
able to claimed funeral and death benefits from the SSS.

However, Cecilia Bailon-Yap (Cecilia), who claimed to be a

daughter of Bailon and one Elisa Jayona (Elisa) contested before
the SSS the release to respondent of the death and funeral
benefits. She claimed that Bailon contracted three marriages in
his lifetime, the first with Alice, the second with her mother
Elisa, and the third with respondent, all of whom are still alive;
she, together with her siblings, paid for Bailon’s medical and
funeral expenses; and all the documents submitted by
respondent to the SSS in support of her claims are spurious. In
support of her claim, Cecilia and her sister Norma Bailon Chavez
(Norma) submitted an Affidavit dated February 13, 1999 averring
that they are two of nine children of Bailon and Elisa who
cohabited as husband and wife as early as 1958; and they were
reserving their right to file the necessary court action to contest
the marriage between Bailon and respondent as they personally
know that Alice is "still very much alive."

In the meantime, a certain Hermes P. Diaz, claiming to be the

brother and guardian of "Aliz P. Diaz," filed before the SSS a
claim for death benefits accruing from Bailon’s death, he further
attesting in a sworn statement that it was Norma who defrayed
Bailon’s funeral expenses. Elisa and seven of her children
 37

subsequently filed claims for death benefits as Bailon’s

beneficiaries before the SSS.

Atty. Marites C. de la Torre of the Legal Unit of the SSS Bicol

Cluster, Naga City recommended the cancellation of payment of
death pension benefits to respondent and the issuance of an
order for the refund of the amount paid to her from February
1998 to May 1999 representing such benefits; the denial of the
claim of Alice on the ground that she was not dependent upon
Bailon for support during his lifetime; and the payment of the
balance of the five-year guaranteed pension to Bailon’s
beneficiaries according to the order of preference provided under
the law, after the amount erroneously paid to respondent has
been collected. In this case, it is the deceased member (Bailon)
who was the deserting spouse and who remarried, thus his
marriage to Teresita Jarque, for the second time was void as it
was bigamous. To require affidavit of reappearance to terminate
the second marriage is not necessary as there is no
disappearance of Aliz [sic] Diaz, the first wife, and a voidable
marriage [sic], to speak of.

As a result, the SSS-Sorsogon Branch advised respondent

Jarque to return the P12,000 funeral benefits paid to her; the
cancellation of her monthly pension for death benefits in view of
the opinion rendered by its legal department that her marriage
with Bailon was void as it was contracted while the latter’s
marriage with Alice was still subsisting; and the to return the
amount of P24,000 representing the total amount of monthly
pension she had received from the SSS from February 1998 to
May 1999.

Respondent then protested the cancellation of her monthly

pension for death benefits. In her petitioner before the Social
Security Commission (SSC), she asserted that her marriage with
Bailon was not declared before any court of justice as bigamous
or unlawful, hence, it remained valid and subsisting for all legal
intents and purposes as in fact Bailon designated her as his
beneficiary. In the meantime, respondent informed the SSS that
she was returning, under protest, the amount of P12,000
representing the funeral benefits she received, she alleging that
Norma and her siblings "forcibly and coercively prevented her
from spending any amount during Bailon’s wake.
 38

Before SSC could render a decision, one Alicia P. Diaz filed an

Affidavit dated August 14, 2002 with the SSS Naga Branch
attesting that she is the widow of Bailon; she had only recently
come to know of the petition filed by Bailon to declare her
presumptively dead; it is not true that she disappeared as Bailon
could have easily located her, she having stayed at her parents’
residence in Barcelona, Sorsogon after she found out that Bailon
was having an extramarital affair; and Bailon used to visit her
even after their separation. Hence, the SSC found that the
marriage of respondent to Bailon was void and, therefore, she
was "just a common-law-wife."

On her appeal before the CA, the court reversed the decision of
the SSC and ordered the SSS to pay respondent Jarque all the
pension benefits due to her. Nowhere does the law contemplates
[sic] the possibility that respondent SSS may validly declare the
second marriage null and void on the basis alone of its own
investigation and declare that the decision of the RTC declaring
one to be presumptively dead is without basis. Assuming
arguendo that respondent SSS actually possesses the authority
to declare the decision of the RTC to be without basis, the
procedure it followed was offensive to the principle of fair play
and thus its findings are of doubtful quality considering that
petitioner Teresita was not given ample opportunity to present
evidence for and her behalf. Respondent SSS is correct in stating
that the filing of an Affidavit of Reappearance with the Civil
Registry is no longer practical under the premises. Indeed, there
is no more first marriage to restore as the marital bond between
Alice Diaz and Clemente Bailon was already terminated upon the
latter’s death. Neither is there a second marriage to terminate
because the second marriage was likewise dissolved by the death
of Clemente Bailon. However, it is not correct to conclude that
simply because the filing of the Affidavit of Reappearance with
the Civil Registry where parties to the subsequent marriage
reside is already inutile, the respondent SSS has now the
authority to review the decision of the RTC and consequently
declare the second marriage null and void.

Issue:
WON the SSS and the SSC can validly re-evaluate the findings of
the RTC and subsequently declared a marriage null and void.
 39

Held:
NO. That the SSC is empowered to settle any dispute with
respect to SSS coverage, benefits and contributions, there is no
doubt. In so exercising such power, however, it cannot review,
much less reverse, decisions rendered by courts of law as it did
in the case at bar when it declared that the December 10, 1970
CFI Order was obtained through fraud and subsequently
disregarded the same, making its own findings with respect to
the validity of Bailon and Alice’s marriage on the one hand and
the invalidity of Bailon and respondent’s marriage on the other.
In interfering with and passing upon the CFI Order, the SSC
virtually acted as an appellate court. The law does not give the
SSC unfettered discretion to trifle with orders of regular courts
in the exercise of its authority to determine the beneficiaries of
the SSS.

The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior

to the effectivity on August 3, 1988 of the Family Code, the
applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which
was the law in effect at the time of their celebration.

Under the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage contracted

during the lifetime of the first spouse is illegal and void ab
initio unless the prior marriage is first annulled or dissolved
or contracted under any of the three exceptional
circumstances. It bears noting that the marriage under any of
these exceptional cases is deemed valid "until declared null and
void by a competent court." It follows that the onus probandi in
these cases rests on the party assailing the second marriage.

In the case at bar, as found by the CFI, Alice had been absent
for 15 consecutive years when Bailon sought the declaration of
her presumptive death, which judicial declaration was not even
a requirement then for purposes of remarriage.

Eminent jurist Arturo M. Tolentino (now deceased) commented:

Where a person has entered into two successive marriages, a
presumption arises in favor of the validity of the second
marriage, and the burden is on the party attacking the validity of
the second marriage to prove that the first marriage had not
been dissolved; it is not enough to prove the first marriage, for it
must also be shown that it had not ended when the second
marriage was contracted. The presumption in favor of the
 40

innocence of the defendant from crime or wrong and of the

legality of his second marriage, will prevail over the presumption
of the continuance of life of the first spouse or of the
continuance of the marital relation with such first spouse.
(Underscoring supplied)

Under the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage being voidable, it

is terminated by final judgment of annulment in a case
instituted by the absent spouse who reappears or by either of
the spouses in the subsequent marriage.

Under the Family Code, no judicial proceeding to annul a

subsequent marriage is necessary. Thus Article 42 thereof
provides:

Art. 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding

Article shall be automatically terminated by the recording of
the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless
there is a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring
it void ab initio.

A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of

reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of the
residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the
instance of any interested person, with due notice to the
spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to
the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in case such
fact is disputed. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The termination of the subsequent marriage by affidavit provided

by the above-quoted provision of the Family Code does not
preclude the filing of an action in court to prove the
reappearance of the absentee and obtain a declaration of
dissolution or termination of the subsequent marriage.

If the absentee reappears, but no step is taken to terminate the

subsequent marriage, either by affidavit or by court action, such
absentee’s mere reappearance, even if made known to the
spouses in the subsequent marriage, will not terminate such
marriage. Since the second marriage has been contracted
because of a presumption that the former spouse is dead, such
presumption continues inspite of the spouse’s physical
reappearance, and by fiction of law, he or she must still be
 41

regarded as legally an absentee until the subsequent marriage is

terminated as provided by law.

If the subsequent marriage is not terminated by registration of

an affidavit of reappearance or by judicial declaration but by
death of either spouse as in the case at bar, Tolentino submits:

x x x [G]enerally if a subsequent marriage is dissolved by the

death of either spouse, the effects of dissolution of valid
marriages shall arise. The good or bad faith of either spouse
can no longer be raised, because, as in annullable or
voidable marriages, the marriage cannot be questioned
except in a direct action for annulment.

Similarly, in Lapuz v. Eufemio, even if the bigamous marriage

had not been void ab initio but only voidable under Article 83,
paragraph 2, of the Civil Code, because the second marriage had
been contracted with the first wife having been an absentee for
seven consecutive years, or when she had been generally
believed dead, still the action for annulment became
extinguished as soon as one of the three persons involved had
died, as provided in Article 87, paragraph 2, of the Code,
requiring that the action for annulment should be brought
during the lifetime of any one of the parties involved. And
furthermore, the liquidation of any conjugal partnership that
might have resulted from such voidable marriage must be
carried out "in the testate or intestate proceedings of the
deceased spouse," as expressly provided in Section 2 of the
Revised Rule 73, and not in the annulment proceeding.

It bears reiterating that a voidable marriage cannot be assailed

collaterally except in a direct proceeding. Consequently, such
marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties
and not after the death of either, in which case the parties and
their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly
valid. Upon the death of either, the marriage cannot be
impeached, and is made good ab initio.

In the case at bar, as no step was taken to nullify, in accordance

with law, Bailon’s and respondent’s marriage prior to the
former’s death in 1998, respondent is rightfully the dependent
spouse-beneficiary of Bailon.
 42

LUCIO MORIGO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 145226             February 06, 2004

Facts:
Petitioner Lucio Morigo and private respondent Lucia Barrete
have been known each other since 1974. They lost contact with
each other from 1977-78. In 1984, their communication
resumed and became sweethearts. In 1990, Lucia came back to
the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join her in
Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus they were married on
August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan,
Pilar, Bohol. On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her
work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind.

On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General
Division) a petition for divorce against appellant which was
granted by the court on January 17, 1992 and to take effect on
February 17, 1992.

On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria

Jececha Lumbago at the Virgen sa Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran
City, Bohol. Petitioner then filed a complaint for judicial
declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lucia on the ground
that no marriage ceremony actually took place. However,
petitioner was charged with Bigamy before the RTC.

In its decision, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy. The trial court
discounted petitioner’s claim that his first marriage to Lucia was
null and void ab initio. The parties to a marriage should not be
allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the
fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of
their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again.

On appeal before the CA, the appellate court affirmed the

judgment of conviction of petitioner. The CA held, the fact that
the first marriage was void from the beginning is not a valid
defense in a bigamy case. The Court of Appeals also pointed out
that the divorce decree obtained by Lucia from the Canadian
court could not be accorded validity in the Philippines, pursuant
to Article 15 of the Civil Code and given the fact that it is
contrary to public policy in this jurisdiction. Under Article 17 of
 43

the Civil Code, a declaration of public policy cannot be rendered

ineffectual by a judgment promulgated in a foreign jurisdiction.

Issue:
WON Morigo must have filed declaration for the nullity of his
marriage with Barrete before his second marriage in order to be
free from the bigamy case.

Held:
NO. Morigo’s marriage with Barrete is void ab initio considering
that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between
them by a solemnizing officer instead they just merely signed a
marriage contract. 

The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished

from Mercado v. Tan. In the latter case, the judicial declaration
of nullity of the first marriage was likewise obtained after the
second marriage was already celebrated. We held therein that:

A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is

necessary before a subsequent one can be legally contracted.
One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first
obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This
principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by
statutes as "void."

It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was

actually solemnized not just once, but twice: first before a judge
where a marriage certificate was duly issued and then again six
months later before a priest in religious rites. Ostensibly, at
least, the first marriage appeared to have transpired, although
later declared void ab initio.

In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was

performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer. Petitioner
and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their
own. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract
bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no
judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more,
cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for
which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first
secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a
subsequent marriage.
 44

VERONICO TENEBRO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 150758             February 18, 2004

Facts:
Petitioner Veronico Tenebro contracted marriage with private
complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The two lived
together continuously and without interruption until the latter
part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been
previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10,
1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage
contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking this previous
marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which
he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit
with Villareyes.

On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another

marriage, this one with a certain Nilda Villegas. When Ancajas
learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes
whether the latter was indeed married to petitioner. In a
handwritten letter, Villareyes confirmed that petitioner, Veronico
Tenebro, was indeed her husband. Ancajas thereafter filed a
complaint for bigamy against petitioner.

During the trial, petitioner admitted having cohabited with

Villareyes from 1984-1988, with whom he sired two children.
However, he denied that he and Villareyes were validly married
to each other, claiming that no marriage ceremony took place to
solemnize their union. He alleged that he signed a marriage
contract merely to enable her to get the allotment from his office
in connection with his work as a seaman. He further testified
that he requested his brother to verify from the Civil Register in
Manila whether there was any marriage at all between him and
Villareyes, but there was no record of said marriage.

Issue:
WON petitioner is validly married to Villareyes.

Held:
YES. To assail the veracity of the marriage contract, petitioner
presented (1) a certification issued by the National Statistics
Office dated October 7, 1995; and (2) a certification issued by
the City Civil Registry of Manila, dated February 3, 1997. Both
these documents attest that the respective issuing offices have
 45

no record of a marriage celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro

and Hilda B. Villareyes on November 10, 1986.

The documents presented by the defense cannot adequately

assail the marriage contract, which in itself would already have
been sufficient to establish the existence of a marriage between
Tenebro and Villareyes.

The certified copy of the marriage contract, issued by a public

officer in custody thereof, was admissible as the best evidence of
its contents. The marriage contract plainly indicates that a
marriage was celebrated between petitioner and Villareyes on
November 10, 1986, and it should be accorded the full faith and
credence given to public documents.

Moreover, an examination of the wordings of the certification

issued by the National Statistics Office on October 7, 1995 and
that issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila on February 3,
1997 would plainly show that neither document attests as a
positive fact that there was no marriage celebrated between
Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on November 10,
1986. Rather, the documents merely attest that the respective
issuing offices have no record of such a marriage. Documentary
evidence as to the absence of a record is quite different from
documentary evidence as to the absence of a marriage ceremony,
or documentary evidence as to the invalidity of the marriage
between Tenebro and Villareyes.

The marriage contract presented by the prosecution serves as

positive evidence as to the existence of the marriage between
Tenebro and Villareyes, which should be given greater credence
than documents testifying merely as to absence of any record of
the marriage, especially considering that there is absolutely no
requirement in the law that a marriage contract needs to be
submitted to the civil registrar as a condition precedent for the
validity of a marriage. The mere fact that no record of a marriage
exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites
for its validity are present. There is no evidence presented by the
defense that would indicate that the marriage between Tenebro
and Villareyes lacked any requisite for validity, apart from the
self-serving testimony of the accused himself. Balanced against
this testimony are Villareyes’ letter, Ancajas’ testimony that
petitioner informed her of the existence of the valid first
 46

marriage, and petitioner’s own conduct, which would all tend to

indicate that the first marriage had all the requisites for validity.
Finally, although the accused claims that he took steps to verify
the non-existence of the first marriage to Villareyes by
requesting his brother to validate such purported non-existence,
it is significant to note that the certifications issued by the
National Statistics Office and the City Civil Registry of Manila
are dated October 7, 1995 and February 3, 1997, respectively.
Both documents, therefore, are dated after the accused’s
marriage to his second wife, private respondent in this case.

As such, this Court rules that there was sufficient evidence

presented by the prosecution to prove the first and second
requisites for the crime of bigamy.

***********************************
The SC hold that the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity does not
retroact to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as
the Philippines’ penal laws are concerned. As such, an individual
who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally liable for bigamy,
notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that the second
marriage is void ab initio on the ground of psychological
incapacity.

As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the

subsistence of petitioner’s valid marriage to Villareyes,
petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio
completely regardless of petitioner’s psychological capacity or
incapacity. Since a marriage contracted during the
subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the
nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for
the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently,
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes "any person
who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the
former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent
spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings". A plain reading of
the law, therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes
the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.
 47

Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage

on the ground of psychological incapacity is not an indicator
that petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential
requisites for validity. The requisites for the validity of a
marriage are classified by the Family Code into essential (legal
capacity of the contracting parties and their consent freely given
in the presence of the solemnizing officer) and formal (authority
of the solemnizing officer, marriage license, and marriage
ceremony wherein the parties personally declare their agreement
to marry before the solemnizing officer in the presence of at least
two witnesses). Under Article 5 of the Family Code, any male or
female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of
the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38 may contract
marriage.

In this case, all the essential and formal requisites for the
validity of marriage were satisfied by petitioner and Ancajas.
Both were over eighteen years of age, and they voluntarily
contracted the second marriage with the required license before
Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu
City, in the presence of at least two witnesses.

Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage

on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the
date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the
vinculum between the spouses is concerned, it is significant
to note that said marriage is not without legal effects.
Among these effects is that children conceived or born before the
judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be considered
legitimate. There is therefore a recognition written into the law
itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still
produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is
incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would
render the State’s penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory,
and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital
contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the
consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling
throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity and
commitment.
 48

REPUBLIC vs. YOLANDA CADACIO GRANADA

G.R. No. 187512               June 13, 2012

Facts:
In May 1991, respondent Yolanda Cadacio Granada met Cyrus
Granada at Sumida Electric Philippines, an electronics company
in Paranaque where both were then working. The two eventually
got married at the Manila City Hall on 3 March 1993. Their
marriage resulted in the birth of their son, Cyborg Dean Cadacio
Granada.

Sometime in May 1994, when Sumida Electric Philippines closed

down, Cyrus went to Taiwan to seek employment. Yolanda
claimed that from that time, she had not received any
communication from her husband, notwithstanding efforts to
locate him. Her brother testified that he had asked the relatives
of Cyrus regarding the latter’s whereabouts, to no avail.

After nine (9) years of waiting, Yolanda filed a Petition to have

Cyrus declared presumptively dead. On 7 February 2005, the
RTC rendered a Decision declaring Cyrus as presumptively dead.

Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office

of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Motion for Reconsideration
of this Decision. However, the RTC denied the motion.

Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal to elevate the case to the CA

and then Yolanda filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that
the CA had no jurisdiction over the appeal. She argued that her
Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death, based on Article
41 of the Family Code, was a summary judicial proceeding, in
which the judgment is immediately final and executory and,
thus, not appealable.

The appellate court granted Yolanda’s Motion to Dismiss on the

ground of lack of jurisdiction. Citing Republic v. Bermudez-
Lorino, the CA ruled that a petition for declaration of
presumptive death under Rule 41 of the Family Code is a
summary proceeding. Thus, judgment thereon is
immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties.
 49

Issue:
WON the declaration of presumptive death is proper.

Held:
YES. In Nolasco, petitioner Republic sought the reversal of the
CA’s affirmation of the RTC’s grant of respondent’s Petition for
Declaration of Presumptive Death of his absent spouse, a British
subject who left their home in the Philippines soon after giving
birth to their son while respondent was on board a vessel
working as a seafarer. Petitioner Republic sought the reversal of
the ruling on the ground that respondent was not able to
establish his "well-founded belief that the absentee is already
dead," as required by Article 41 of the Family Code. In ruling
thereon, this Court recognized that this provision imposes more
stringent requirements than does Article 83 of the Civil Code.
The Civil Code provision merely requires either that there be no
news that the absentee is still alive; or that the absentee is
generally considered to be dead and is believed to be so by the
spouse present, or is presumed dead under Articles 390 and 391
of the Civil Code. In comparison, the Family Code provision
prescribes a "well-founded belief" that the absentee is already
dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death can
be granted. As noted by the Court in that case, the four
requisites for the declaration of presumptive death under the
Family Code are as follows:

1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four

consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the
disappearance occurred where there is danger of death
under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil
Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the
absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for
the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.

In evaluating whether the present spouse has been able to prove

the existence of a "well-founded belief" that the absent spouse is
already dead, the Court in Nolasco cited United States v.
Biasbas, which it found to be instructive as to the diligence
required in searching for a missing spouse.
 50

In Biasbas, the Court held that defendant Biasbas failed to

exercise due diligence in ascertaining the whereabouts of his
first wife, considering his admission that that he only had a
suspicion that she was dead, and that the only basis of that
suspicion was the fact of her absence.

Similarly, in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Alegro, petitioner

Republic sought the reversal of the CA ruling affirming the RTC’s
grant of the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of the
absent spouse on the ground that the respondent therein had
not been able to prove a "well-founded belief" that his spouse
was already dead. The Court reversed the CA, granted the
Petition, and provided the following criteria for determining the
existence of a "well-founded belief" under Article 41 of the Family
Code:

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage

under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must
institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for
the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee,
without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent
spouse.

The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse
has been absent and that he has a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse may
contract a subsequent marriage. The law does not define what is
meant by a well-grounded belief. Cuello Callon writes that "es
menester que su creencia sea firme se funde en motivos
racionales."

Belief is a state of the mind or condition prompting the doing of

an overt act. It may be proved by direct evidence or
circumstantial evidence which may tend, even in a slight degree,
to elucidate the inquiry or assist to a determination probably
founded in truth. Any fact or circumstance relating to the
character, habits, conditions, attachments, prosperity and
objects of life which usually control the conduct of men, and are
the motives of their actions, was, so far as it tends to explain or
characterize their disappearance or throw light on their
intentions, competence [sic] evidence on the ultimate question of
his death.
 51

The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and
honest to goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the
whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent
spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the
spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the
absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a
great many circumstances occurring before and after the
disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of
the inquiries made by present spouse. (Footnotes omitted,
underscoring supplied.)

Applying the foregoing standards to the present case, petitioner

points out that respondent Yolanda did not initiate a diligent
search to locate her absent husband. While her brother
Diosdado Cadacio testified to having inquired about the
whereabouts of Cyrus from the latter’s relatives, these relatives
were not presented to corroborate Diosdado’s testimony. In
short, respondent was allegedly not diligent in her search for her
husband. Petitioner argues that if she were, she would have
sought information from the Taiwanese Consular Office or
assistance from other government agencies in Taiwan or the
Philippines. She could have also utilized mass media for this
end, but she did not. Worse, she failed to explain these
omissions.
 52

MERLINDA MONTAÑES vs. LOURDES TAJOLOSA CIPRIANO

G.R. No. 181089               October 22, 2012

Facts:
Respondent Lourdes Cipriano married Socrates Flores in Lezo,
Aklan. During the subsistence of the said marriage, respondent
married Silverio V. Cipriano (Silverio) in San Pedro, Laguna. In
2001, respondent filed a Petition for the Annulment of her
marriage with Socrates on the ground of the latter’s
psychological incapacity.

Petitioner Merlinda Cipriano Montañez, Silverio’s daughter from

the first marriage, filed a Complaint for Bigamy against
respondent. Attached to the complaint was an Affidavit thumb-
marked and signed by Silverio, which alleged, among others,
that respondent failed to reveal to Silverio that she was still
married to Socrates.

Before her arraignment, respondent, through counsel, filed a

Motion to Quash Information alleging that her marriage with
Socrates had already been declared void ab initio in 2003, thus,
there was no more marriage to speak of prior to her marriage to
Silverio on January 24, 1983 and that the basic element of the
crime of bigamy, i.e., two valid marriages, is therefore wanting.
She also claimed that since the second marriage was held in
1983, the crime of bigamy had already prescribed. The
prosecution filed its Comment arguing that the crime of bigamy
had already been consummated when respondent filed her
petition for declaration of nullity; that the law punishes the act
of contracting a second marriage which appears to be valid,
while the first marriage is still subsisting and has not yet been
annulled or declared void by the court.

In its decision, the RTC denied the motion. It found respondent's

argument that with the declaration of nullity of her first
marriage, there was no more first marriage to speak of and thus
the element of two valid marriages in bigamy was absent.

However, the RTC reconsidered its previous and set aside. In so

holding, the trial court ruled that at the time the accused had
contracted a second marriage on January 24, 1983, i.e., before
the effectivity of the Family Code, the existing law did not require
a judicial declaration of absolute nullity as a condition precedent
 53

to contracting a subsequent marriage; that jurisprudence before

the Family Code was ambivalent on the issue of the need of prior
judicial declaration of absolute nullity of the first marriage. The
RTC found that both marriages of respondent took place before
the effectivity of the Family Code, thus, considering the
unsettled state of jurisprudence on the need for a prior
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before commencing a
second marriage and the principle that laws should be
interpreted liberally in favor of the accused, it declared that the
absence of a judicial declaration of nullity should not prejudice
the accused whose second marriage was declared once and for
all valid with the annulment of her first marriage by the RTC of
Muntinlupa City in 2003.

Issue:
WON the declaration of nullity of respondent's first marriage
justifies the dismissal of the Information for bigamy filed against
her.

Held:
NO. At the time respondent contracted the second marriage, the
first marriage was still subsisting as it had not yet been legally
dissolved. As ruled in the previous jurisprudence, the
subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage would not change the fact that she contracted the
second marriage during the subsistence of the first
marriage. Thus, respondent was properly charged of the crime
of bigamy, since the essential elements of the offense charged
were sufficiently alleged.

Respondent claims that Tenebro v. CA is not applicable, since

the declaration of nullity of the previous marriage came after the
filing of the Information, unlike in this case where the
declaration was rendered before the information was filed. We do
not agree. What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy
is when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage
during the subsistence of a valid marriage.

Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for

themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the
judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the
marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as
there is no such declaration the presumption is that the
 54

marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage

before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.

Anent respondent's contention in her Comment that since her

two marriages were contracted prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code, Article 40 of the Family Code cannot be given
retroactive effect because this will impair her right to remarry
without need of securing a judicial declaration of nullity of a
completely void marriage. We are not persuaded.

In Jarillo v. People, where the accused, in her motion for

reconsideration, argued that since her marriages were entered
into before the effectivity of the Family Code, then the applicable
law is Section 29 of the Marriage Law (Act 3613), instead of
Article 40 of the Family Code, which requires a final judgment
declaring the previous marriage void before a person may
contract a subsequent marriage.

The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the

litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive application to
pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is
not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is
adversely affected. The reason is that as a general rule, no
vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.
 55

SYED AZHAR ABBAS vs. GLORIA GOO ABBAS

G.R. No. 183896               January 30, 2013

Facts:
Petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas, a Pakistani citizen, married
respondent Gloria Goo, a Filipino on August 9, 1992 at the
Taipei Mosque in Taiwan. He went to the Philippines in
December 1992. While he was at his mother-in-law’s residence
in Malate, Manila, she arrived with two men. According to him,
he was told that he was going to undergo some ceremony, one
of the requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but was not
told of the nature of said ceremony. During the ceremony he and
Gloria signed a document. He claimed that he did not know that
the ceremony was a marriage until Gloria told him later.

He further testified that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to

apply for a marriage license, and that he had never resided in
that area. In July of 2003, he went to the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to check on their marriage license,
and was asked to show a copy of their marriage contract wherein
the marriage license number could be found. The Municipal Civil
Registrar issued a certification on July 11, 2003 to the effect
that the marriage license number appearing in the marriage
contract he submitted, Marriage License No. 9969967, was the
number of another marriage license issued to a certain Arlindo
Getalado and Myra Mabilangan.

Thus, Syed filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his

marriage to Gloria Goo-Abbas (Gloria) alleging the absence of a
marriage license.

In its decision, the RTC held that no valid marriage license was
issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite in
favor of Gloria and Syed, as Marriage License No. 9969967 had
been issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan, and the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite had certified that
no marriage license had been issued for Gloria and Syed. It also
took into account the fact that neither party was a resident of
Carmona, Cavite, the place where Marriage License No. 9969967
was issued, in violation of Article 9 of the Family Code. As the
marriage was not one of those exempt from the license
requirement, and that the lack of a valid marriage license is an
 56

absence of a formal requisite, the marriage of Gloria and Syed on

January 9, 1993 was void ab initio.

On appeal before the CA, the appellate court gave credence to

Gloria’s arguments, and granted her appeal. It held that the
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar failed to
categorically state that a diligent search for the marriage license
of Gloria and Syed was conducted, and thus held that said
certification could not be accorded probative value. The CA ruled
that there was sufficient testimonial and documentary evidence
that Gloria and Syed had been validly married and that there
was compliance with all the requisites laid down by law.

It gave weight to the fact that Syed had admitted to having

signed the marriage contract. The CA also considered that the
parties had comported themselves as husband and wife, and
that Syed only instituted his petition after Gloria had filed a case
against him for bigamy.

Issue:
WON the marriage between Syed and Gloria was valid.

Held:
NO. The SC held that Gloria failed to present their marriage
license or a copy thereof to the court and to explain why the
marriage license was secured in Carmona, Cavite, a location
where, admittedly, neither party resided. She took no pains to
apply for the license, so she is not the best witness to testify to
the validity and existence of said license. Neither could the other
witnesses she presented prove the existence of the marriage
license, as none of them applied for the license in Carmona,
Cavite. Her mother, Felicitas Goo, could not even testify as to the
contents of the license, having admitted to not reading all of its
contents. Atty. Sanchez, one of the sponsors, whom Gloria and
Felicitas Goo approached for assistance in securing the license,
admitted not knowing where the license came from. The task of
applying for the license was delegated to a certain Qualin, who
could have testified as to how the license was secured and thus
impeached the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar as
well as the testimony of her representative. As Gloria failed to
present this Qualin, the certification of the Municipal Civil
Registrar still enjoys probative value.
 57

It is also noted that the solemnizing officer testified that the

marriage contract and a copy of the marriage license were
submitted to the Local Civil Registrar of Manila. Thus, a copy of
the marriage license could have simply been secured from that
office and submitted to the court. However, Gloria inexplicably
failed to do so, further weakening her claim that there was a
valid marriage license issued for her and Syed.

In the case of Cariño v. Cariño, following the case of Republic, it

was held that the certification of the Local Civil Registrar
that their office had no record of a marriage license was
adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license. The case
of Cariño further held that the presumed validity of the marriage
of the parties had been overcome, and that it became the burden
of the party alleging a valid marriage to prove that the marriage
was valid, and that the required marriage license had been
secured. Gloria has failed to discharge that burden, and the
only conclusion that can be reached is that no valid
marriage license was issued. It cannot be said that there was a
simple irregularity in the marriage license that would not affect
the validity of the marriage, as no license was presented by the
respondent. No marriage license was proven to have been issued
to Gloria and Syed, based on the certification of the Municipal
Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite and Gloria’s failure to produce
a copy of the alleged marriage license.

To bolster its ruling, the CA cited other evidence to support its

conclusion that Gloria and Syed were validly married. To quote
the CA:

Moreover, the record is replete with evidence, testimonial and

documentary, that appellant and appellee have been validly
married and there was compliance with all the requisites laid
down by law. Both parties are legally capacitated to marry. A
certificate of legal capacity was even issued by the Embassy
of Pakistan in favor of appellee. The parties herein gave their
consent freely. Appellee admitted that the signature above
his name in the marriage contract was his. Several pictures
were presented showing appellant and appellee, before the
solemnizing officer, the witnesses and other members of
appellant’s family, taken during the marriage ceremony, as
well as in the restaurant where the lunch was held after the
 58

marriage ceremony. Most telling of all is Exhibit "5-C" which

shows appellee signing the Marriage Contract.

xxxx
The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife
and has [sic] one offspring, Aliea Fatima Goo Abbas, who was
born on 15 June 1993. It took appellee more than ten (10)
years before he filed on 01 August 2003 his Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Article 4 of the
Family Code. We take serious note that said Petition appears
to have been instituted by him only after an Information for
Bigamy (Exhibit "1") dated 10 January 2003 was filed against
him for contracting a second or subsequent marriage with
one Ma. Corazon (Maryam) T. Buenaventura. We are not
ready to reward (appellee) by declaring the nullity of his
marriage and give him his freedom and in the process allow
him to profit from his own deceit and perfidy.

All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding

ceremony was conducted and a marriage contract was signed
does not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage license.
Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says, "The absence
of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the
marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2)."
Article 35(3) of the Family Code also provides that a marriage
solemnized without a license is void from the beginning, except
those exempt from the license requirement under Articles 27 to
34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same Code. Again, this marriage
cannot be characterized as among the exemptions, and thus,
having been solemnized without a marriage license, is void ab
initio.
 59

JOEL JIMENEZ vs. REMEDIOS CAÑIZARES

G.R. No. L-12790             August 31, 1960

Facts:
Plaintiff Joel Jimenez filed a petition the annulment of his
marriage to the defendant Remedios Cañizares upon the ground
that the orifice of her genitals or vagina was too small to allow
the penetration of a male organ or penis for copulation. The
condition of her genitals as described above existed at the time
of marriage and continues to exist; and that for that reason he
left the conjugal home two nights and one day after they had
been married.

The Court ordered the defendant to submit to a physical

examination by a competent lady physician to determine her
physical capacity for copulation and to submit, within 10 days
from receipt of the order, a medical certificate on the result
thereof. On 14 March 1957 the defendant was granted additional
5 days from notice to comply with the order of 17 December
1956 with warning that her failure to undergo medical
examination and submit the required doctor's certificate would
be deemed lack of interest on her part in the case and that
judgment upon the evidence presented by her husband would be
rendered.

After hearing, at which the defendant was not present, on 11

April 1957 the Court entered a decree annulling the marriage
between the plaintiff and the defendant. On 26 April 1957 the
city attorney filed a motion for reconsideration of the decree thus
entered, upon the ground, among others, that the defendant's
impotency has not been satisfactorily established as required by
law; that she had not been physically examined because she had
refused to be examined; that instead of annulling the marriage
the Court should have punished her for contempt of court and
compelled her to undergo a physical examination and submit a
medical certificate; and that the decree sought to be
reconsidered would open the door to married couples, who want
to end their marriage to collude or connive with each other by
just alleging impotency of one of them. He prayed that the
complaint be dismissed or that the wife be subjected to a
physical examination. Pending resolution of his motion, the city
attorney timely appealed from the decree. On 13 May 1957 the
motion for reconsideration was denied.
 60

Issue:
WON the marriage may be annulled on the strength only of the
lone testimony of the husband.

Held:
NO. Marriage in this country is an institution in which the
community is deeply interested. The state has surrounded it
with safeguards to maintain its purity, continuity and
permanence. The security and stability of the state are largely
dependent upon it. It is the interest of each and every member of
the community to prevent the bringing about of a condition that
would shake its foundation and ultimately lead to its
destruction. The incidents of the status are governed by law, not
by will of the parties. The law specifically enumerates the legal
grounds that must be proved to exist by indubitable evidence, to
annul a marriage.

In the case at bar, the annulment of the marriage in question

was decreed upon the sole testimony of the husband who was
expected to give testimony tending or aiming at securing the
annulment of his marriage he sought and seeks. Whether the
wife is really impotent cannot be deemed to have been
satisfactorily established, because from the commencement of
the proceedings until the entry of the decree she had abstained
from taking part therein. Although her refusal to be examined or
failure to appear in court show indifference on her part, yet from
such attitude the presumption arising out of the suppression of
evidence could not arise or be inferred because women of this
country are by nature coy, bashful and shy and would not
submit to a physical examination unless compelled to by
competent authority.

This the Court may do without doing violence to and infringing

in this case is not self-incrimination. She is not charged with
any offense. She is not being compelled to be a witness against
herself. "Impotency being an abnormal condition should not
be presumed. The presumption is in favor of potency." The
lone testimony of the husband that his wife is physically
incapable of sexual intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder
the ties that have bound them together as husband and wife.
 61

VERONICA CABACUNGAN ALCAZAR vs. REY C. ALCAZAR

G.R. No. 174451               October 13, 2009

Facts:
Petitioner Veronica Alcazar was married to respondent Rey
Alcazar on 11 October 2000. After their wedding, petitioner and
respondent lived for 5 days in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, the
hometown of respondent’s parents. Thereafter, the newlyweds
went back to Manila, but respondent did not live with petitioner
at the latter’s abode in Tondo, Manila.

On 23 October 2000, respondent left for Riyadh, Kingdom of

Saudi Arabia, where he worked as an upholsterer in a furniture
shop. While working in Riyadh, respondent did not communicate
with petitioner by phone or by letter. Petitioner tried to call
respondent for five times but respondent never answered. About
a year and a half after respondent left for Riyadh, a co-teacher
informed petitioner that respondent was about to come home to
the Philippines. Petitioner was surprised why she was not
advised by respondent of his arrival.

When respondent arrived in the Philippines, he did not go home

to petitioner in Tondo, Manila. Instead, respondent proceeded to
his parents’ house in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. Petitioner
asserted that from the time respondent arrived in the
Philippines, he never contacted her. Thus, petitioner concluded
that respondent was physically incapable of consummating his
marriage with her, providing sufficient cause for annulment of
their marriage pursuant to paragraph 5, Article 45 of the Family
Code of the Philippines (Family Code). There was also no more
possibility of reconciliation between petitioner and respondent.

According to the psychological evaluation made by a clinical

psychologist Nedy Tayag revealed that respondent diagnosed to
have personality disorder that he is harboring, making him
psychologically incapacitated to properly assume and comply
[with] essential roles (sic) of obligations as a married man.

The pattern of behaviors displayed by the respondent satisfies

the diagnostic criteria of a disorder clinically classified as
Narcissistic Personality Disorder, a condition deemed to be
grave, severe, long lasting in proportion and incurable by any
treatment. The psychological incapacity of the respondent is
 62

characterized by juridical antecedence as it already existed long

before he entered into marriage. Since it already started early in
life, it is deeply engrained within his system and becomes a[n]
integral part of his personality structure, thereby rendering such
to be permanent and incurable.

Issue:
WON respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the
essential marital obligatons.

Held:
NO. Incapacity to consummate denotes the permanent inability
on the part of the spouses to perform the complete act of sexual
intercourse. Non-consummation of a marriage may be on the
part of the husband or of the wife and may be caused by a
physical or structural defect in the anatomy of one of the parties
or it may be due to chronic illness and inhibitions or fears
arising in whole or in part from psychophysical conditions. It
may be caused by psychogenic causes, where such mental block
or disturbance has the result of making the spouse physically
incapable of performing the marriage act.

No evidence was presented in the case at bar to establish that

respondent was in any way physically incapable to consummate
his marriage with petitioner. Petitioner even admitted during her
cross-examination that she and respondent had sexual
intercourse after their wedding and before respondent left for
abroad. There obviously being no physical incapacity on
respondent’s part, then, there is no ground for annulling
petitioner’s marriage to respondent. Petitioner’s Complaint was,
therefore, rightfully dismissed.

One curious thing, though, caught this Court’s attention. As can

be gleaned from the evidence presented by petitioner and the
observations of the RTC and the Court of Appeals, it appears
that petitioner was actually seeking the declaration of nullity of
her marriage to respondent based on the latter’s psychological
incapacity to comply with his marital obligations of marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code.

In Santos v. Court of Appeals, the Court declared that

"psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code is
not meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It
 63

should refer, rather, to no less than a mental (not physical)

incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed
and discharged by the parties to the marriage. Psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability.

The Court laid down the guidelines in resolving petitions for

declaration of nullity of marriage, based on Article 36 of the
Family Code, in Republic v. Court of Appeals, to wit:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the

marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws
cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family.
Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the
Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It
decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it
from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family
and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage

and the family and emphasizes their permanence,
inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must

be a) medically or clinically identified, b) alleged in the
complaint, c) sufficiently proven by experts and d)
clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological –
not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms
may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that
the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to
such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of
such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
 64

explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified

psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the

"time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence
must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their "I do’s." The manifestation of the illness
need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself
must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically

or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability
may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the
same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to
the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to
those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may
be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise
his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the

disability of the party to assume the essential obligations
of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities,
mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal
or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those

embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221
and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also
be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in
the text of the decision.
 65

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate

Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts. x x x.

Being accordingly guided by the aforequoted pronouncements in

Republic v. Court of Appeals, we scrutinized the totality of
evidence presented by petitioner and found that the same was
not enough to sustain a finding that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated.

Petitioner’s evidence, particularly her and her mother’s

testimonies, merely established that respondent left petitioner
soon after their wedding to work in Saudi Arabia; that when
respondent returned to the Philippines a year and a half later,
he directly went to live with his parents in San Jose, Occidental
Mindoro, and not with petitioner in Tondo, Manila; and that
respondent also did not contact petitioner at all since leaving for
abroad. These testimonies though do not give us much insight
into respondent’s psychological state.

Tayag’s psychological report leaves much to be desired and

hardly helps petitioner’s cause. It must be noted that Tayag was
not able to personally examine respondent. Respondent did not
appear for examination despite Tayag’s invitation.25Tayag, in
evaluating respondent’s psychological state, had to rely on
information provided by petitioner. Hence, we expect Tayag to
have been more prudent and thorough in her evaluation of
respondent’s psychological condition, since her source of
information, namely, petitioner, was hardly impartial.

Tayag concluded in her report that respondent was suffering

from Narcissistic Personality Disorder, traceable to the latter’s
experiences during his childhood. Yet, the report is totally bereft
of the basis for the said conclusion. Tayag did not particularly
describe the "pattern of behavior" that showed that respondent
indeed had a Narcissistic Personality Disorder. Tayag likewise
failed to explain how such a personality disorder made
respondent psychologically incapacitated to perform his
obligations as a husband. We emphasize that the burden falls
upon petitioner, not just to prove that respondent suffers from a
psychological disorder, but also that such psychological disorder
renders him "truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
 66

that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the

parties to the marriage." Psychological incapacity must be more
than just a "difficulty," a "refusal," or a "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations.

In this instance, we have been allowed, through the evidence

adduced, to peek into petitioner’s marital life and, as a result, we
perceive a simple case of a married couple being apart too long,
becoming strangers to each other, with the husband falling out
of love and distancing or detaching himself as much as possible
from his wife.

To be tired and give up on one’s situation and on one’s spouse

are not necessarily signs of psychological illness; neither can
falling out of love be so labeled. When these happen, the remedy
for some is to cut the marital knot to allow the parties to go their
separate ways. This simple remedy, however, is not available to
us under our laws. Ours is a limited remedy that addresses only
a very specific situation – a relationship where no marriage could
have validly been concluded because the parties; or where one of
them, by reason of a grave and incurable psychological illness
existing when the marriage was celebrated, did not appreciate
the obligations of marital life and, thus, could not have validly
entered into a marriage.

An unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage.

As we stated in Marcos v. Marcos:

Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be

confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at
the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers
to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even
before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so
grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of
the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one
is about to assume. x x x.

Resultantly, we have held in the past that mere "irreconcilable

differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitute
psychological incapacity.

As a last-ditch effort to have her marriage to respondent

declared null, petitioner pleads abandonment by and sexual
 67

infidelity of respondent. In a Manifestation and Motion dated 21

August 2007 filed before us, petitioner claims that she was
informed by one Jacinto Fordonez, who is residing in the same
barangay as respondent in Occidental Mindoro, that respondent
is living-in with another woman named "Sally."

Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not constitute

psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the
Family Code. Again, petitioner must be able to establish that
respondent’s unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered
personality, which makes him completely unable to discharge
the essential obligations of the marital state.

It remains settled that the State has a high stake in the

preservation of marriage rooted in its recognition of the sanctity
of married life and its mission to protect and strengthen the
family as a basic autonomous social institution. Hence, any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity. Presumption is always in favor of the validity of
marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. In the case at bar,
petitioner failed to persuade us that respondent’s failure to
communicate with petitioner since leaving for Saudi Arabia to
work, and to live with petitioner after returning to the country,
are grave psychological maladies that are keeping him from
knowing and/or complying with the essential obligations of
marriage.
 68

LEOUEL SANTOS, vs. CA & JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS

G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995

Facts:
Petitioner Leouel Santos, a First Lieutenant in the Philippine
Army, met Julia in IloIlo. They got married on 20 September
1986 before Municipal Trial Court followed, shortly thereafter, by
a church wedding. Leouel and Julia lived with the latter's
parents at the J. Bedia Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City. Julia gave
birth to a baby boy in 1987 and was named Leouel Santos, Jr.
Occasionally, the couple will quarrel over a number of things
aside from the interference of Julia’s parents into their family
affairs. 

On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of

America to work as a nurse despite Leouel's pleas to so dissuade
her. Seven months after her departure, or on 01 January 1989,
Julia called up Leouel for the first time by long distance
telephone. She promised to return home upon the expiration of
her contract in July 1989. She never did. When Leouel got a
chance to visit the United States, where he underwent a training
program under the auspices of the AFP, he desperately tried to
locate, or to somehow get in touch with, Julia but all his efforts
were of no avail.

Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed a

complaint for "Voiding of marriage Under Article 36 of the Family
Code.” He argued that failure of Julia to return home or to
communicate with him for more than 5 years are circumstances
that show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into
married life.

Issue:
WON the marriage between petitioner and respondent can be
considered void under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Held:
NO. The phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of
the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible
cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical
authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like
circumstances. Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken
and construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction
 69

with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated,

"psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68
of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help
and support.

There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law

has been to confine the meaning of "psychological
incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
This pschologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other
hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the
other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family
Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial
declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."

Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are

established, every circumstance that may have some bearing on
the degree, extent, and other conditions of that incapacity must,
in every case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no
precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed.
The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and
persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be
helpful or even desirable. Marriage is not an adventure but a
lifetime commitment.
 70

CHI MING TSOI vs. COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI

G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997

Facts:
Petitioner Chi Ming Tsoi and respondent Gina Lao-Tsoi was
married on May 22, 1988. After the celebration of their marriage
and wedding reception at the South Villa, Makati, they went and
proceeded to the house of defendant's mother. There was no
sexual intercourse between them during the first night until the
fourth night.

In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where

they can enjoy together during their first week as husband and
wife, they went to Baguio City but Gina’s relatives went with
them upon the invitation of petitioner. There was no sexual
intercourse between them, since the defendant avoided her by
taking a long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on a
rocking chair located at the living room. They slept together in
the same room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988 until
March 15, 1989. But during this period, there was no attempt of
sexual intercourse between them. She claimed that she did not
even see her husband's private parts nor did he see hers.

Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical

examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag, a urologist at the
Chinese General Hospital, on January 20, 1989. The results of
their physical examinations were that she is healthy, normal and
still a virgin, while that of her husband's examination was kept
confidential even the medications prescribed for him.

Respondent said that petitioner is impotent, a closet homosexual

as he did not show his penis. She said, that she had observed
the defendant using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the
cleansing cream of his mother. And that, according to her, the
defendant married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain
his residency status here in the country and to publicly
maintain the appearance of a normal man. Respondent is not
willing to reconcile with her husband.

On the other hand, petitioner does not want his marriage with
his wife annulled for several reasons because he loves her very
much and that he has no defect on his part and he is physically
and psychologically capable. Since their relationship is still very
 71

young, they can still reconcile their differences. He further

claims, that if there is any defect, it can be cured by the
intervention of medical technology or science. Chi Ming Tsoi
submitted himself to another physical examination and the
result was that there is no evidence of impotency and he is
capable of erection. 

Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record

to show that any of the parties is suffering from phychological
incapacity. Petitioner also claims that he wanted to have sex
with private respondent; that the reason for private respondent's
refusal may not be psychological but physical disorder.

Issue:
WON Chi Ming Tsoi’s refusal to have sexual intercourse with his
wife constitutes psychological incapacity.

Held:
YES. The abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate
his marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality
disorder which to the mind of the Supreme Court clearly
demonstrates an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage within the meaning of Article 36
of the Family Code.

If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to

perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the
refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals
attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to
stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is
equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged
refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her
spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity.
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the
Family Code is "To procreate children based on the universal
principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation
is the basic end of marriage." Constant non- fulfillment of this
obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the
marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted
refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital
obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.

REPUBLIC vs. CA & RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA

 72

G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

Facts:
Respondent Roridel Olaviano and petitioner Reynaldo Molina
were married on April 14, 1985 and has a son. After a year of
marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and
irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred to
spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he
squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for aid
and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to
their finances,

In October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a

result of which their relationship was estranged. Roridel
resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her parents
in Baguio City. A few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their
child, and had since then abandoned them.

Respondent Roridel filed a petition for declaration of nullity of

her marriage to Reynaldo Molina on the ground that he was
psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital
obligations and was highly immature. She also claimed that it
would be to the couple's best interest to have their marriage
declared null and void in order to free them from what appeared
to be an incompatible marriage from the start.

On the other hand, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could

no longer live together as husband and wife, but contended that
their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to her
strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of friends
even after their marriage, her refusal to perform some of her
marital duties such as cooking meals and failure to run the
household and handle their finances.

Issue:
WON the marriage was void on the ground of psychological
incapacity.

Held:
NO. The marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and
remains valid.  There is no clear showing to us that the
psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us
to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in
 73

the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of

"irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in
no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough
to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and
duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be
shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological
(nor physical) illness.

There is no showing that Reynaldo’s alleged personality traits

were constitutive of psychological incapacity existing at the time
of marriage celebration. While some effort was made to prove
that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of
"thoughtfulness and gentleness" on Reynaldo's part of being
"conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part of Roridel,
such failure of expectation is nor indicative of antecedent
psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows love's
temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the beloved.

The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she

and her husband could nor get along with each other. There had
been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its
juridical antecedence nor its incurability. In addition, the expert
testimony by Dr Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder
but only incompatibility which is not considered as psychological
incapacity.

The following are the guidelines as to the grounds of

psychological incapacity laid set forth in this case:
a. burden of proof to show nullity belongs to the plaintiff
b. root causes of the incapacity must be medically and
clinically inclined
c. such incapacity should be in existence at the time of
the marriage
d. such incapacity must be grave so as to disable the
person in complying with the essentials of marital
obligations of marriage
e. such incapacity must be embraced in Art. 68-71 as
well as Art 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code
f. decision of the National Matrimonial Appellate Court
or the Catholic Church must be respected
g. court shall order the prosecuting attorney and the
fiscal assigned to it to act on behalf of the state.
LEONILO ANTONIO vs. MARIE IVONNE F. REYES
 74

G.R. No. 155800             March 10, 2006

Facts:
Petitioner Leonilo Antonio, 26 years old and respondent Marie
Ivonne Reyes, 36 years old met in August 1989. Barely a year
after their first meeting, they got married at the Manila City Hall,
and then subsequent church wedding in Pasig in 1990. Out of
their union, a child was born on 19 April 1991, who sadly died
five (5) months later.

On 8 March 1993, petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage

to respondent declared null and void. He anchored his petition
for nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage. He asserted that respondent’s
incapacity existed at the time their marriage was celebrated and
still subsists up to the present.

As manifestations of respondent’s alleged psychological

incapacity, petitioner claimed that respondent persistently lied
about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income,
educational attainment and other events or things.

In support of his petition, petitioner presented a psychiatrist,

and a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the tests they
conducted, that petitioner was essentially a normal,
introspective, shy and conservative type of person. On the other
hand, they observed that respondent’s persistent and constant
lying to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It undermined
the basic relationship that should be based on love, trust and
respect. They further asserted that respondent’s extreme
jealousy was also pathological. It reached the point of paranoia
since there was no actual basis for her to suspect that petitioner
was having an affair with another woman. They concluded based
on the foregoing that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations.

In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that she performed

her marital obligations by attending to all the needs of her
husband. She asserted that there was no truth to the allegation
that she fabricated stories, told lies and invented personalities
 75

In fine, respondent argued that apart from her non-disclosure of

a child prior to their marriage, the other lies attributed to her by
petitioner were mostly hearsay and unconvincing. Her stance
was that the totality of the evidence presented is not sufficient
for a finding of psychological incapacity on her part.

Issue:
WON petitioner’s evidence were sufficient to establish
respondent’s psychological incapacity.

Held:
YES. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving
the psychological incapacity of his spouse. Apart from his own
testimony, he presented witnesses who corroborated his
allegations on his wife’s behavior, and certifications from
Blackgold Records and the Philippine Village Hotel Pavillon
which disputed respondent’s claims pertinent to her alleged
singing career. He also presented two (2) expert witnesses from
the field of psychology who testified that the aberrant behavior of
respondent was tantamount to psychological incapacity. In any
event, both courts below considered petitioner’s evidence as
credible enough. Even the appellate court acknowledged that
respondent was not totally honest with petitioner.

The root cause of respondent’s psychological incapacity has been

medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint,
sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the trial
court’s decision. The initiatory complaint alleged that
respondent, from the start, had exhibited unusual and abnormal
behavior "of peren[n]ially telling lies, fabricating ridiculous
stories, and inventing personalities and situations," of writing
letters to petitioner using fictitious names, and of lying about
her actual occupation, income, educational attainment, and
family background, among others.

It has been shown clearly from her actuations that

respondent has that propensity for telling lies about almost
anything, be it her occupation, her state of health, her
singing abilities, her income, etc. She has this fantastic ability
to invent and fabricate stories and personalities. She practically
lived in a world of make believe making her therefore not in a
position to give meaning and significance to her marriage to
petitioner. In persistently and constantly lying to petitioner,
 76

respondent undermined the basic tenets of relationship between

spouses that is based on love, trust and respect. As concluded
by the psychiatrist presented by petitioner, such repeated lying
is abnormal and pathological and amounts to psychological
incapacity.

Respondent’s psychological incapacity was established to

have clearly existed at the time of and even before the
celebration of marriage. She fabricated friends and made up
letters from fictitious characters well before she married
petitioner. Likewise, she kept petitioner in the dark about her
natural child’s real parentage as she only confessed when the
latter had found out the truth after their marriage.

The gravity of respondent’s psychological incapacity is

sufficient to prove her disability to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. It is immediately discernible that the
parties had shared only a little over a year of cohabitation before
the exasperated petitioner left his wife. Whatever such
circumstance speaks of the degree of tolerance of petitioner, it
likewise supports the belief that respondent’s psychological
incapacity, as borne by the record, was so grave in extent that
any prolonged marital life was dubitable.

Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential

marital obligations as embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the
Family Code. Article 68, in particular, enjoins the spouses to
live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and
render mutual help and support. As noted by the trial court, it
is difficult to see how an inveterate pathological liar would be
able to commit to the basic tenets of relationship between
spouses based on love, trust and respect.

The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into

consideration the fact that the marriage of the parties was
annulled by the Catholic Church. The appellate court
apparently deemed this detail totally inconsequential as no
reference was made to it anywhere in the assailed decision
despite petitioner’s efforts to bring the matter to its attention.
Such deliberate ignorance is in contravention of Molina, which
held that interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines,
 77

while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect

by our courts.

We stated earlier that Molina is not set in stone, and that the
interpretation of Article 36 relies heavily on a case-to-case
perception. It would be insensate to reason to mandate in this
case an expert medical or clinical diagnosis of incurability, since
the parties would have had no impelling cause to present
evidence to that effect at the time this case was tried by the RTC
more than ten (10) years ago. From the totality of the evidence,
we are sufficiently convinced that the incurability of
respondent’s psychological incapacity has been established by
the petitioner. Any lingering doubts are further dispelled by the
fact that the Catholic Church tribunals, which indubitably
consider incurability as an integral requisite of psychological
incapacity, were sufficiently convinced that respondent was so
incapacitated to contract marriage to the degree that annulment
was warranted.
 78

EDWARD KENNETH TE vs. ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE

G.R. No. 161793               February 13, 2009

Facts:
Petitioner Edward Kenneth Ngo Te first met respondent Rowena
Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te in a gathering organized by the Filipino-
Chinese association in their college. Edward was then initially
attracted to Rowena’s close friend; but, as the latter already had
a boyfriend, the young man decided to court Rowena in January
1996.

In March 1996, or around three months after their first meeting,

Rowena asked Edward that they elope. At first, he refused,
bickering that he was young and jobless. Her persistence,
however, made him relent. Thus, they left Manila and sailed to
Cebu that month; he, providing their travel money and she,
purchasing the boat ticket.

In April 1996, they decided to go back to Manila. Rowena

proceeded to her uncle’s house and Edward to his parents’
home. As his family was abroad, and Rowena kept on
telephoning him, threatening him that she would commit
suicide, Edward agreed to stay with Rowena at her uncle’s place.
On April 23, 1996, respondent’s uncle brought the parties to
Valenzuela[,] and on that very same day[,] petitioner was made
to sign the Marriage Contract before the Judge. Petitioner
actually never applied for any Marriage License.

After a month, Edward escaped from the house of Rowena’s

uncle, and stayed with his parents. His family then hid him from
Rowena and her family whenever they telephoned to ask for him.
In June 1996, Edward was able to talk to Rowena. Unmoved by
his persistence that they should live with his parents, she said
that it was better for them to live separate lives. They then
parted ways. After almost four years, or on January 18, 2000,
Edward filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage to
Rowena on the basis of the latter’s psychological incapacity.

Issue:
WON the marriage is void on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
 79

Held:
YES. The parties’ whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six
(6) months. They met in January 1996, eloped in March,
exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. The
psychologist who provided expert testimony found both parties
psychologically incapacitated. Petitioner’s behavioral pattern
falls under the classification of dependent personality disorder,
and respondent’s, that of the narcissistic and antisocial
personality disorder.

By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the

primary task and burden of decision-making, must not
discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence
the expert opinion on the psychological and mental
temperaments of the parties.

There is no requirement that the person to be declared

psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a
physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. Verily, the
evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts
that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological
disorder itself. This is not to mention that the presentation of
expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment
of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive
diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of
psychological incapacity.

In the case at bench, the psychological assessment, which we

consider as adequate, produced the findings that both parties
are afflicted with personality disorders—to repeat, dependent
personality disorder for petitioner, and narcissistic and
antisocial personality disorder for respondent.

The seriousness of the diagnosis and the gravity of the disorders

considered, the Court, in this case, finds as decisive the
psychological evaluation made by the expert witness; and, thus,
rules that the marriage of the parties is null and void on ground
of both parties’ psychological incapacity. We further consider
that the trial court, which had a first-hand view of the witnesses’
deportment, arrived at the same conclusion.
 80

Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent personality

disorder, cannot assume the essential marital obligations of
living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering
help and support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions
without advice from others, allows others to make most of his
important decisions (such as where to live), tends to agree with
people even when he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing
things on his own, volunteers to do things that are demeaning in
order to get approval from other people, feels uncomfortable or
helpless when alone and is often preoccupied with fears of being
abandoned. As clearly shown in this case, petitioner followed
everything dictated to him by the persons around him. He is
insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of his identity as a
person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and
clear direction in life.

Although on a different plane, the same may also be said of the

respondent. Her being afflicted with antisocial personality
disorder makes her unable to assume the essential marital
obligations. This finding takes into account her disregard for the
rights of others, her abuse, mistreatment and control of others
without remorse, her tendency to blame others, and her
intolerance of the conventional behavioral limitations imposed
by society. Moreover, as shown in this case, respondent is
impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in manipulating
petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of committing
suicide.

Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable

psychological incapacity, the precipitous marriage which they
contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void.
 81

MARIETA C. AZCUETA vs. REPUBLIC & CA

G.R. No. 180668               May 26, 2009

Facts:
Petitioner Marietta C. Azcueta and Rodolfo Azcueta met in 1993.
Less than two months after their first meeting, they got married
on July 24, 1993 at St. Anthony of Padua Church, Antipolo City.
At the time of their marriage, petitioner was 23 years old while
respondent was 28. They separated in 1997 after four years of
marriage. They have no children. On March 2, 2002, petitioner
filed a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Petitioner claimed that her husband Rodolfo was psychologically

incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage. According to petitioner, Rodolfo was emotionally
immature, irresponsible and continually failed to adapt himself
to married life and perform the essential responsibilities and
duties of a husband.

Petitioner complained that Rodolfo never bothered to look for a

job and instead always asked his mother for financial
assistance. When they were married it was Rodolfo’s mother who
found them a room near the Azcueta home and it was also his
mother who paid the monthly rental.

Petitioner also testified that she constantly encouraged her

husband to find employment. She even bought him a newspaper
every Sunday but Rodolfo told her that he was too old and most
jobs have an age limit and that he had no clothes to wear to job
interviews. To inspire him, petitioner bought him new clothes
and a pair of shoes and even gave him money. Sometime later,
her husband told petitioner that he already found a job and
petitioner was overjoyed. However, some weeks after, petitioner
was informed that her husband had been seen at the house of
his parents when he was supposed to be at work. Petitioner
discovered that her husband didn’t actually get a job and the
money he gave her (which was supposedly his salary) came from
his mother. When she confronted him about the matter, Rodolfo
allegedly cried like a child and told her that he pretended to have
a job so that petitioner would stop nagging him about applying
for a job. He also told her that his parents can support their
needs. Petitioner claimed that Rodolfo was so dependent on his
 82

mother and that all his decisions and attitudes in life should be
in conformity with those of his mother.

Apart from the foregoing, petitioner complained that every time

Rodolfo would get drunk he became physically violent towards
her. Their sexual relationship was also unsatisfactory. They only
had sex once a month and petitioner never enjoyed it.
Additionally, when petitioner requested that they move to
another place and rent a small room rather than live near his
parents, Rodolfo did not agree. Because of this, she was forced
to leave their residence and see if he will follow her. But he did
not.

During the trial of the case, petitioner presented Rodolfo’s first

cousin, Florida de Ramos, as a witness. She corroborated
petitioner’s testimony that Rodolfo was indeed not gainfully
employed when he married petitioner and he merely relied on
the allowance given by his mother. This witness also confirmed
that it was respondent’s mother who was paying the rentals for
the room where the couple lived.

Petitioner likewise presented Dr. Cecilia Villegas, a psychiatrist.

Dr. Villegas testified that after examining petitioner for her
psychological evaluation, she found petitioner to be mature,
independent, very responsible, focused and has direction and
ambition in life. She also observed that petitioner works hard for
what she wanted and therefore, she was not psychologically
incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of
marriage.

On the other hand, she found that Rodolfo showed that he was
psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital duties and
responsibilities. Dr. Villegas concluded that he was suffering
from Dependent Personality Disorder associated with severe
inadequacy related to masculine strivings. She explained that
persons suffering from Dependent Personality Disorder were
those whose response to ordinary way of life was ineffectual and
inept, characterized by loss of self-confidence, constant self-
doubt, inability to make his own decisions and dependency on
other people. She added that the root cause of this psychological
problem was a cross-identification with the mother who was the
dominant figure in the family considering that respondent’s
father was a seaman and always out of the house. She stated
 83

that this problem began during the early stages in his life but
manifested only after the celebration of his marriage. According
to Dr. Villegas, this kind of problem was also severe because he
will not be able to make and to carry on the responsibilities
expected of a married person. It was incurable because it started
in early development and therefore deeply ingrained into his
personality.

Issue:
WON the totality of evidence presented by petitioner sufficiently
proved that her husband is psychologically incapacitated to
comply with his marital obligations

Held:
YES. With the preponderant evidence presented by the
petitioner, the court finds that respondent totally failed in his
commitments and obligations as a husband. Respondent’s
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility is grave and he has no
showing of improvement. He failed likewise to have sexual
intercourse with the wife because it is a result of the
unconscious guilt felling of having sexual relationship since he
could not distinguish between the mother and the wife and
therefore sex relationship will not be satisfactory as expected.

The respondent is suffering from dependent personality disorder

and therefore cannot make his own decision and cannot carry
on his responsibilities as a husband. The marital obligations
to live together, observe mutual love, respect, support was
not fulfilled by the respondent.

Of course, this is not to say that anyone diagnosed with

dependent personality disorder is automatically deemed
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the obligations of
marriage. We realize that psychology is by no means an exact
science and the medical cases of patients, even though suffering
from the same disorder, may be different in their symptoms or
manifestations and in the degree of severity. It is the duty of
the court in its evaluation of the facts, as guided by expert
opinion, to carefully scrutinize the type of disorder and the
gravity of the same before declaring the nullity of a marriage
under Article 36.
 84

Rodolfo is evidently unable to comply with the essential

marital obligations embodied in Articles 68 to 71 of the
Family Code. As noted by the trial court, as a result of Rodolfo’s
dependent personality disorder, he cannot make his own
decisions and cannot fulfill his responsibilities as a husband.
Rodolfo plainly failed to fulfill the marital obligations to live
together, observe mutual love, respect, support under Article 68.
Indeed, one who is unable to support himself, much less a wife;
one who cannot independently make decisions regarding even
the most basic and ordinary matters that spouses face everyday;
one who cannot contribute to the material, physical and
emotional well-being of his spouse is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the marital obligations within the
meaning of Article 36. The incurability of Rodolfo’s condition
which has been deeply ingrained in his system since his early
years was supported by evidence and duly explained by the
expert witness.

Considering the totality of evidence of the petitioner clearly show

that respondent failed to comply with his marital obligations.
Thus the marriage between petitioner and respondent should be
declared null and void on the account of respondent’s severe and
incurable psychological incapacity.
 85

Halili vs Halili & Republic

GR No. 165424, June 9, 2009

Facts:
Petitioner Lester Benjamin S. Halili filed a petition to declare his
marriage to respondent Chona M. Santos-Halili null and void on
the basis of his psychological incapacity to perform the essential
obligations of marriage. He alleged that he wed respondent in
civil rites thinking that it was a "joke." After the ceremonies, they
never lived together as husband and wife, but maintained the
relationship. However, they started fighting constantly a year
later, at which point petitioner decided to stop seeing respondent
and started dating other women. Immediately thereafter, he
received prank calls telling him to stop dating other women as
he was already a married man. It was only upon making an
inquiry that he found out that the marriage was not "fake."

Eventually, the RTC found petitioner to be suffering from a

mixed personality disorder, particularly dependent and self-
defeating personality disorder, as diagnosed by his expert
witness, Dr. Natividad Dayan. The court a quo held that
petitioner’s personality disorder was serious and incurable and
directly affected his capacity to comply with his essential marital
obligations to respondent. It thus declared the marriage null and
void.

On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the trial
court on the ground that the totality of the evidence presented
failed to establish petitioner’s psychological incapacity. Petitioner
moved for reconsideration. It was denied. The case was elevated
to the SC via a petition for review under Rule 45. The SC
affirmed the CA’s decision and resolution upholding the validity
of the marriage.

Petitioner then filed this motion for reconsideration reiterating

his argument that his marriage to respondent ought to be
declared null and void on the basis of his psychological
incapacity. He stressed that the evidence he presented,
especially the testimony of his expert witness, was more than
enough to sustain the findings and conclusions of the trial court
that he was and still is psychologically incapable of complying
with the essential obligations of marriage.
 86

Issue:
WON psychological incapacity of the petitioner is a sufficient
ground for the nullity of marriage.

Held:
YES. The SC reiterated that courts should interpret the provision
on psychological incapacity (as a ground for the declaration of
nullity of a marriage) on a case-to-case basis — guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines and by decisions of church tribunals.
Accordingly, we emphasized that, by the very nature of Article
36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of
decision-making, must consider as essential the expert opinion
on the psychological and mental disposition of the parties. In
this case, the testimony of petitioner’s expert witness revealed
that petitioner was suffering from dependent personality
disorder.

In Te vs Yu-Te, this Court defined dependent personality

disorder as

[a] personality disorder characterized by a pattern of

dependent and submissive behavior. Such individuals
usually lack self-esteem and frequently belittle their
capabilities; they fear criticism and are easily hurt by
others’ comments. At times they actually bring about
dominance by others through a quest for
overprotection.

Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early

adulthood. Individuals who have this disorder may be unable to
make everyday decisions without advice or reassurance from
others, may allow others to make most of their important
decisions (such as where to live), tend to agree with people even
when they believe they are wrong, have difficulty starting
projects or doing things on their own, volunteer to do things that
are demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feel
uncomfortable or helpless when alone and are often preoccupied
with fears of being abandoned.

In her psychological report, Dr. Dayan stated that petitioner’s

dependent personality disorder was evident in the fact that
petitioner was very much attached to his parents and depended
 87

on them for decisions. Petitioner’s mother even had to be the one

to tell him to seek legal help when he felt confused on what
action to take upon learning that his marriage to respondent
was for real. Dr. Dayan further observed that, as expected of
persons suffering from a dependent personality disorder,
petitioner typically acted in a self-denigrating manner and
displayed a self-defeating attitude. This submissive attitude
encouraged other people to take advantage of him. This could be
seen in the way petitioner allowed himself to be dominated, first,
by his father who treated his family like robots and, later, by
respondent who was as domineering as his father. When
petitioner could no longer take respondent’s domineering ways,
he preferred to hide from her rather than confront her and tell
her outright that he wanted to end their marriage. Ultimately,
Dr. Dayan concluded that petitioner’s personality disorder was
grave and incurable and already existent at the time of the
celebration of his marriage to respondent.

It has been sufficiently established that petitioner had a

psychological condition that was grave and incurable and had a
deeply rooted cause. This Court, in the same Te case, recognized
that individuals with diagnosable personality disorders usually
have long-term concerns, and thus therapy may be long-term.
Particularly, personality disorders are "long-standing, inflexible
ways of behaving that are not so much severe mental disorders
as dysfunctional styles of living. These disorders affect all areas
of functioning and, beginning in childhood or adolescence,
create problems for those who display them and for others."

From the foregoing, it has been shown that petitioner is indeed

suffering from psychological incapacity that effectively renders
him unable to perform the essential obligations of marriage.
Accordingly, the marriage between petitioner and respondent is
declared null and void.
 88

DIGNA A. NAJERA vs. EDUARDO J. NAJERA

G.R. No. 164817               July 3, 2009

Facts:
Petitioner Digna Najera and respondent Eduardo Najera were
married in 1988. They are childless and respondent is presently
living in the United States. On January 27, 1997, petitioner filed
a petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with Alternative
Prayer for Legal Separation, with Application for Designation as
Administrator Pendente Lite of the Conjugal Partnership of
Gains.

Petitioner alleged that at the time of their marriage, respondent

was jobless and did not exert effort to look for a job. With the
help of petitioner’s elder brother, who was a seaman, respondent
was able to land a job as a seaman in 1988. While employed as a
seaman, respondent did not give petitioner sufficient financial
support and everytime he came from his ship voyage, he would
start to quarrel with her. She also said that respondent was
smoking marijuana and he is always drunk. Because of
respondent’s jealousy, he has inflicted physical violence upon
her and attempted to kill her with a bolo. She was able to parry
his attack with her left arm, yet she sustained physical injuries
on different parts of her body. She was treated by Dr. Padlan,
and the incident was reported at the Bugallon Police Station.

One of petitioner’s witnesses is psychologist Cristina R. Gates,

who testified that she interviewed petitioner, but not respondent
who was abroad. In her report, she said that respondent is
afflicted with psychological hang-ups which are rooted in the
kind of family background he has. She also said that respondent
is afflicted with a Borderline Personality Disorder as marked
by his pattern of instability in his interpersonal relationships,
his marred self-image and self-destructive tendencies, his
uncontrollable impulses. Further, she testified that the chances
of curability of respondent’s psychological disorder were nil. Its
curability depended on whether the established organic damage
was minimal -- referring to the malfunction of the composites of
the brain brought about by habitual drinking and marijuana,
which possibly afflicted respondent with borderline personality
disorder and uncontrollable impulses.
 89

Issue:
WON the totality of petitioner’s evidence was able to prove that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage warranting the annulment of
their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Held:
NO. The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements
earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals:
"psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." The foregoing
guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to
be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause
may be "medically or clinically identified." What is important is
the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the
party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the
person concerned need not be resorted to.

In this case, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the
totality of the evidence submitted by petitioner failed to
satisfactorily prove that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage. The root cause of respondent’s alleged psychological
incapacity was not sufficiently proven by experts or shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable.

As found by the Court of Appeals, Psychologist Cristina Gates’

conclusion that respondent was psychologically incapacitated
was based on facts relayed to her by petitioner and was not
based on her personal knowledge and evaluation of respondent;
thus, her finding is unscientific and unreliable. Moreover, the
trial court correctly found that petitioner failed to prove with
certainty that the alleged personality disorder of respondent was
incurable as may be gleaned from Psychologist Cristina Gates’
testimony.

The evidence presented by petitioner in regard to the physical

violence or grossly abusive conduct of respondent toward
petitioner and respondent’s abandonment of petitioner without
justifiable cause for more than one year are grounds for legal
 90

separation only and not for annulment of marriage under Article

36 of the Family Code.

Hence, even if, as contended by petitioner, the factual basis of

the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal is
similar to the facts established by petitioner before the trial
court, the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal confirming the decree of nullity of marriage by the
court a quo is not based on the psychological incapacity of
respondent. Petitioner, therefore, erred in stating that the
conclusion of Psychologist Cristina Gates regarding the
psychological incapacity of respondent is supported by the
decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal.
 91

MA. SOCORRO CAMACHO-REYES vs. RAMON REYES

G.R. No. 185286               August 18, 2010

Facts:
Petitioner Maria Socorro Camacho-Reyes met respondent Ramon
Reyes at the University of the Philippines (UP), Diliman, in 1972
when they were both nineteen (19) years old. The casual
acquaintanceship quickly developed into a boyfriend-girlfriend
relationship. During this time, respondent held a job in the
family business, the Aristocrat Restaurant.

Only petitioner finished university studies, obtaining a degree in

AB Sociology from the UP. By 1974, respondent had dropped out
of school on his third year, and just continued to work for the
Aristocrat Restaurant. Petitioner, who was already five (5)
months pregnant and employed at the Population Center
Foundation, married respondent in 1976.

Thereafter, the newlyweds lived with the respondent’s family in

Mandaluyong City. All living expenses were shouldered by
respondent’s parents, and the couple’s respective salaries were
spent solely for their personal needs. Initially, respondent gave
petitioner a monthly allowance of P1,500.00 from his salary.

When their first child was born on March 22, 1977, financial
difficulties started. Respondent stopped giving the monthly
allowance and no longer handed his salary to petitioner. He also
resigned from the family business and venture to a new
business. However, this new business took respondent away
from his young family for days on end without any
communication. Petitioner simply endured the set up, hoping
that the situation will change.

To prod respondent into assuming more responsibility, petitioner

suggested that they live separately from her in-laws. However,
the new living arrangement engendered further financial
difficulty. After two (2) years of struggling, the spouses
transferred residence and, this time, moved in with petitioner’s
mother. But the new set up did not end their marital difficulties.
In fact, the parties became more estranged. Petitioner continued
to carry the burden of supporting a family not just financially,
but in most aspects as well.
 92

In 1985, petitioner, who had previously suffered a miscarriage,

gave birth to their third son. At that time, respondent was in
Mindoro and he did not even inquire on the health of either the
petitioner or the newborn. Respondent continued to suffered
business losses, hence, the couple were hounded by the trail of
debt. Not surprisingly, the relationship of the parties
deteriorated.

Sometime in 1996, petitioner confirmed that respondent was

having an extra-marital affair. Petitioner soon realized that
respondent was not only unable to provide financially for their
family, but he was, more importantly, remiss in his obligation to
remain faithful to her and their family.

Despite of this, petitioner made attempts to salvage her marriage

to respondent. She approached respondent’s siblings and asked
them to intervene, confessing that she was near the end of her
rope. Yet, even respondent’s siblings waved the white flag on
respondent. Adolfo Reyes, respondent’s elder brother, and his
spouse, Peregrina, members of a marriage encounter group,
invited and sponsored the parties to join the group. The elder
couple scheduled counseling sessions with petitioner and
respondent, but these did not improve the parties’ relationship
as respondent remained uncooperative. As with all other
attempts to help him, respondent resisted and did not continue
with the clinical psychologist’s recommendation to undergo
psychotherapy.

At about this time, petitioner, with the knowledge of

respondent’s siblings, told respondent to move out of their
house. Respondent acquiesced to give space to petitioner. With
the de facto separation, the relationship still did not improve.
Neither did respondent’s relationship with his children.

Finally, in 2001, petitioner filed a petition for the declaration of

nullity of her marriage with the respondent, alleging the latter’s
psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential marital
obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Traversing the petition, respondent denied petitioner’s

allegations that he was psychologically incapacitated.
Respondent maintained that he was not remiss in performing
 93

his obligations to his family—both as a spouse to petitioner and

father to their children.

After trial (where the testimonies of two clinical psychologists,

Dr. Dayan and Dr. Estrella Magno, and a psychiatrist, Dr.
Cecilia Villegas, were presented in evidence), the RTC granted
the petition and declared the marriage between the parties null
and void on the ground of their psychological incapacity.

Taking exception to the trial court’s rulings, respondent

appealed to the Court of Appeals, adamant on the validity of his
marriage to petitioner. The appellate court, agreeing with the
respondent, reversed the RTC and declared the parties’ marriage
as valid and subsisting.

Issue:
WON respondent is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his
marital obligations.

Held:
YES. The Court find ample basis to conclude that respondent
was psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential
marital obligations at the time of his marriage to the petitioner.
The Court finds that the marriage between the parties from
its inception has a congenital infirmity termed
"psychological incapacity" which pertains to the inability of
the parties to effectively function emotionally, intellectually
and socially towards each other in relation to their essential
duties to mutually observe love, fidelity and respect as well
as to mutually render help and support, (Art. 68 Family Code).
In short, there was already a fixed niche in the psychological
constellation of respondent which created the death of his
marriage. There is no reason to entertain any slightest doubt on
the truthfulness of the personality disorder of the respondent.

The three expert witnesses have spoken. They were unanimous

in their findings that respondent is suffering from personality
disorder which psychologically incapacitated him to fulfill
his basic duties to the marriage. This psychological incapacity
of the respondent, in the uniform words of said three (3) expert
witnesses, is serious, incurable and exists before his marriage
and renders him a helpless victim of his structural
constellation. It is beyond the respondent’s impulse control. In
 94

short, he is weaponless or powerless to restrain himself from his

consistent behaviors simply because he did not consider the
same as wrongful. This is clearly manifested from his assertion
that nothing was wrong in his marriage with the petitioner and
considered their relationship as a normal one.

Respondent’s narcissistic personality features were manifested

by his self-centeredness; his grandiose sense of self-importance;
his sense of entitlement; interpersonally exploitative; and lack of
empathy. The aggressive sadistic personality features were
manifested whom he has physically, emotionally and verbally
abusive [of] his wife when high on drugs; and his dependent
personality features were manifested by his need for others to
assume responsibility for most major areas of his life, and in his
difficulty in doing things on his own.

Respondent, diagnosed with an antisocial personality disorder

with marked narcissistic features and aggressive sadistic and
dependent features, is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill the
essential obligations of marriage: to love, respect and render
support for his spouse and children. A personality disorder is
not curable as it is permanent and stable over time.

From a psychological viewpoint, therefore, there is evidence

that the marriage of petitioner and respondent is null and
void from the very beginning.

Notwithstanding these telling assessments, the CA rejected,

wholesale, the testimonies of Doctors Magno and Villegas for
being hearsay since they never personally examined and
interviewed the respondent. We do not agree with the CA.

The lack of personal examination and interview of the

respondent, or any other person diagnosed with personality
disorder, does not per se invalidate the testimonies of the
doctors. Neither do their findings automatically constitute
hearsay that would result in their exclusion as evidence.

For one, marriage, by its very definition, necessarily involves

only two persons. The totality of the behavior of one spouse
during the cohabitation and marriage is generally and genuinely
witnessed mainly by the other. In this case, the experts testified
on their individual assessment of the present state of the parties’
 95

marriage from the perception of one of the parties, herein

petitioner. Certainly, petitioner, during their marriage, had
occasion to interact with, and experience, respondent’s pattern
of behavior which she could then validly relay to the clinical
psychologists and the psychiatrist.

For another, the clinical psychologists’ and psychiatrist’s

assessment were not based solely on the narration or personal
interview of the petitioner. Other informants such as
respondent’s own son, siblings and in-laws, and sister-in-law
(sister of petitioner), testified on their own observations of
respondent’s behavior and interactions with them, spanning the
period of time they knew him. These were also used as the basis
of the doctors’ assessments.

A recommendation for therapy does not automatically imply

curability. In general, recommendations for therapy are given by
clinical psychologists, or even psychiatrists, to manage behavior.
In short, Dr. Dayan’s recommendation that respondent should
undergo therapy does not necessarily negate the finding that
respondent’s psychological incapacity is incurable. Moreover, Dr.
Dayan, during her testimony, categorically declared that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the
essential marital obligations.

It is true that a clinical psychologist’s or psychiatrist’s diagnoses

that a person has personality disorder is not automatically
believed by the courts in cases of declaration of nullity of
marriages. Indeed, a clinical psychologist’s or psychiatrist’s
finding of a personality disorder does not exclude a finding that
a marriage is valid and subsisting, and not beset by one of the
parties’ or both parties’ psychological incapacity.
 96

REPUBLIC vs. CA & EDUARDO C. DE QUINTOS, .JR.

G.R. No. 159594               November 12, 2012

Facts:
Private respondent Eduardo and Catalina were married on
March 16, 1977 in civil rites solemnized by the Municipal Mayor
of Lingayen, Pangasinan. The couple was not blessed with a
child due to Catalina’s hysterectomy following her second
miscarriage.

On April 6, 1998, Eduardo filed a petition for the declaration of

nullity of their marriage, citing Catalina’s psychological
incapacity to comply with her essential marital obligations.
Catalina did not interpose any objection to the petition, but
prayed to be given her share in the conjugal house and lot
located in Bacabac, Bugallon, Pangasinan.

Eduardo testified that Catalina always left their house without

his consent; that she engaged in petty arguments with him; that
she constantly refused to give in to his sexual needs; that she
spent most of her time gossiping with neighbors instead of doing
the household chores and caring for their adopted daughter;
that she squandered by gambling all his remittances as an
overseas worker in Qatar since 1993; and that she abandoned
the conjugal home in 1997 to live with Bobbie Castro, her
paramour.

Eduardo presented the results of the neuro-psychiatric

evaluation conducted by Dr. Annabelle L. Reyes, a psychiatrist.
Based on the tests she administered on Catalina, Dr. Reyes
opined that Catalina exhibited traits of Borderline
Personality Disorder that was no longer treatable. Dr. Reyes
found that Catalina’s disorder was mainly characterized by her
immaturity that rendered her psychologically incapacitated to
meet her marital obligations.

Catalina admitted her psychological incapacity, but denied

leaving the conjugal home without Eduardo’s consent and
flirting with different men. She insisted that she had only one
live-in partner; and that she would not give up her share in the
conjugal residence because she intended to live there or to
receive her share should the residence be sold.
 97

The RTC ruled that Catalina’s infidelity, her spending more time
with friends rather than with her family, and her incessant
gambling constituted psychological incapacity that affected her
duty to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. It held
that considering that the matter of determining whether a party
was psychologically incapacitated was best left to experts like
Dr. Reyes, the results of the neuro-psychiatric evaluation by Dr.
Reyes was the best evidence of Catalina’s psychological
incapacity.

Issue:
WON there was sufficient evidence warranting the declaration of
the nullity of Catalina’s marriage to Eduardo based on her
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Held:
NONE. Given the insufficiency of the evidence proving the
psychological incapacity of Catalina, the Court cannot but
resolve in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage
and against its dissolution and nullity. The existence or absence
of the psychological incapacity based strictly on the facts of each
case and not on a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations. Indeed, the incapacity should be established by
the totality of evidence presented during trial, making it
incumbent upon the petitioner to sufficiently prove the existence
of the psychological incapacity.

Both lower courts did not exact a compliance with the

requirement of sufficiently explaining the gravity, root cause and
incurability of Catalina’s purported psychological incapacity.
Rather, they were liberal in their appreciation of the scanty
evidence that Eduardo submitted to establish the incapacity.

To start with, Catalina’s supposed behavior (i.e., her frequent

gossiping with neighbors, leaving the house without Eduardo’s
consent, refusal to do the household chores and to take care of
their adopted daughter, and gambling), were not even
established. Eduardo presented no other witnesses to
corroborate his allegations on such behavior. At best, his
testimony was self-serving and would have no serious value as
evidence upon such a serious matter that was submitted to a
court of law.
 98

Secondly, both lower courts noticeably relied heavily on the

results of the neuro-psychological evaluation by Dr. Reyes
despite the paucity of factual foundation to support the claim of
Catalina’s psychological incapacity.

The report was ostensibly vague about the root cause, gravity
and incurability of Catalina’s supposed psychological incapacity.
Nor was the testimony given in court by Dr. Reyes a source of
vital information that the report missed out on. Aside from
rendering a brief and general description of the symptoms of
borderline personality disorder, both the report and court
testimony of Dr. Reyes tendered no explanation on the root
cause that could have brought about such behavior on the part
of Catalina. They did not specify which of Catalina’s various acts
or omissions typified the conduct of a person with borderline
personality, and did not also discuss the gravity of her behavior
that translated to her inability to perform her basic marital
duties. Dr. Reyes only established that Catalina was childish
and immature, and that her childishness and immaturity could
no longer be treated due to her having already reached an age
"beyond maturity.

The expert evidence presented in cases of declaration of nullity

of marriage based on psychological incapacity presupposes a
thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the
psychologist or expert to make a conclusive diagnosis of a grave,
severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity.

Under the circumstances, the report and court testimony by Dr.

Reyes did not present the gravity and incurability of Catalina’s
psychological incapacity. There was, to start with, no evidence
showing the root cause of her alleged borderline personality
disorder and that such disorder had existed prior to her
marriage. We have repeatedly pronounced that the root cause of
the psychological incapacity must be identified as a
psychological illness, with its incapacitating nature fully
explained and established by the totality of the evidence
presented during trial.

What we can gather from the scant evidence that Eduardo

adduced was Catalina’s immaturity and apparent refusal to
perform her marital obligations. However, her immaturity alone
did not constitute psychological incapacity. To rule that such
 99

immaturity amounted to psychological incapacity, it must be

shown that the immature acts were manifestations of a
disordered personality that made the spouse completely unable
to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, which
inability was merely due to her youth or immaturity.

It is not enough that the respondent, alleged to be

psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with
his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform these
obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor –
an adverse integral element in the respondent’s personality
structure that effectively incapacitated him from complying with
his essential marital obligations – must be shown. Mere
difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital
obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is different from
incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or
illness; irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion,
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do not by
themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under
Article 36, as the same may only be due to a person’s refusal or
unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.

The only fact established here, which Catalina even admitted in

her Answer, was her abandonment of the conjugal home to live
with another man. Yet, abandonment was not one of the
grounds for the nullity of marriage under the Family Code. It did
not also constitute psychological incapacity, it being instead a
ground for legal separation under Article 55(10) of the Family
Code. On the other hand, her sexual infidelity was not a valid
ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code, considering that there should be a showing that such
marital infidelity was a manifestation of a disordered personality
that made her completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of marriage. Needless to state, Eduardo did not
adduce such evidence, rendering even his claim of her infidelity
bereft of factual and legal basis.
 100

ARABELLE MENDOZA, vs. REPUBLIC & DOMINIC MENDOZA

G.R. No. 157649               November 12, 2012

Facts:
Petitioner Arabelle J Mendoza and respondent Dominic C
Mendoza met in 1989 upon his return to the country from his
employment in Papua New Guinea. They had been next-door
neighbors in the appartelle they were renting while they were
still in college – she, at Assumption College while he, at San
Beda College taking a business management course. After a
month of courtship, they became intimate and their intimacy
ultimately led to her pregnancy with their daughter whom they
named Allysa Bianca. They got married on her eighth month of
pregnancy in civil rites solemnized in Pasay City on June 24,
1991, after which they moved to her place, although remaining
dependent on their parents for support.

When petitioner delivered Alyssa Bianca, Dominic had to borrow

funds from petitioner’s best friend to settle the hospital bills. He
remained jobless and dependent upon his father for support
until he finished his college course in October 1993. She took on
various jobs to meet the family’s needs. Being the one with the
fixed income, she shouldered all of the family’s expenses. On his
part, Dominic’s irregular income as a car salesman for Toyota
could not be depended upon. He even had am illicit relationship
with Zaida, his co-employee at Toyota Motors.

In November 1995, Dominic gave her a Daihatsu Charade car as

a birthday present. Later on, he asked her to issue two blank
checks that he claimed would be for the car’s insurance
coverage. She soon found out, however, that the checks were not
paid for the car’s insurance coverage but for his personal needs.
Worse, she also found out that he did not pay for the car itself,
forcing her to rely on her father-in-law to pay part of the cost of
the car, leaving her to bear the balance of P120,000.00.

To make matters worse, Dominic was fired from his employment

after he ran away with P164,000.00 belonging to his employer.
He was criminally charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 and estafa, for which he was arrested and incarcerated. After
petitioner and her mother bailed him out of jail, petitioner
discovered that he had also swindled many clients some of
 101

whom were even threatening petitioner, her mother and her

sister themselves.

On October 15, 1997, Dominic abandoned the conjugal abode

because petitioner asked him for "time and space to think things
over." A month later, she refused his attempt at reconciliation,
causing him to threaten to commit suicide. At that, she and her
family immediately left the house to live in another place
concealed from him.

On August 5, 1998, petitioner filed in the RTC her petition for

the declaration of the nullity of her marriage with Dominic based
on his psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code.

In the RTC, petitioner presented herself as a witness, together

with a psychiatrist, Dr. Rocheflume Samson, and Professor
Marites Jimenez. Based on Dr. Samson’s clinical evaluation,
petitioner appears to be mature, strong and responsible
individual. Godly, childlike trust however, makes her vulnerable
and easy to forgive and forget. Petitioner also believes that
marriage was a partnership "for better and for worse", she gave
all of herself unconditionally to respondent. Unfortunately,
respondent cannot reciprocate. On the one hand, respondent
was found to have a personality that can be characterized as
inadequate, immature and irresponsible. His criminal acts in the
present time are mere extensions of his misconduct established
in childhood. His childhood experiences of separations and
emotional deprivation largely contributed to this antisocial
(sociopathic) attitude and lifestyle.

She concluded that respondent had evidently failed to comply

with what is required of him as a husband and father. Besides
from his adulterous relationship and irresponsibility, his
malevolent conduct and lack of true remorse indicate that he is
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill the role of a married man.

Issue:
WON personal medical or psychological examination was not a
requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity.
 102

Held:
YES, it is not a requirement. Even if the expert opinions of
psychologists are not conditions sine qua non in the granting of
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, the actual
medical examination of Dominic was to be dispensed with
only if the totality of evidence presented was enough to
support a finding of his psychological incapacity. This did
not mean that the presentation of any form of medical or
psychological evidence to show the psychological incapacity
would have automatically ensured the granting of the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage. What was essential, we should
emphasize herein, was the "presence of evidence that can
adequately establish the party’s psychological condition," as
the Court said in Marcos.

But where, like here, the parties had the full opportunity to
present the professional and expert opinions of psychiatrists
tracing the root cause, gravity and incurability of the alleged
psychological incapacity, then the opinions should be presented
and be weighed by the trial courts in order to determine and
decide whether or not to declare the nullity of the marriages.

It bears repeating that the trial courts, as in all the other

cases they try, must always base their judgments not solely
on the expert opinions presented by the parties but on the
totality of evidence adduced in the course of their
proceedings.

The Court find the totality of the evidence adduced by petitioner

insufficient to prove that Dominic was psychologically unfit to
discharge the duties expected of him as a husband, and that he
suffered from such psychological incapacity as of the date of the
marriage. Accordingly, the CA did not err in dismissing the
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.
 103

REPUBLIC vs. CESAR ENCELAN

G.R. No. 170022               January 9, 2013

Facts:
Respondent Cesar Encelan married Lolita in 1979 and the union
bore two children. To support his family, Cesar went to work in
Saudi Arabia in 1984. In 1986, Cesar, while still in Saudi
Arabia, learned that Lolita had been having an illicit affair with
Alvin Perez. Sometime in 1991, Lolita allegedly left the conjugal
home with her children and lived with Alvin. Since then, Cesar
and Lolita had been separated. In 1995, Cesar filed a petition
against Lolita for the declaration of the nullity of his marriage
based on Lolita’s psychological incapacity.

Lolita denied that she had an affair with Alvin; she contended
that Alvin used to be an associate in her promotions business.
She insisted that she is not psychologically incapacitated and
that she left their home because of irreconcilable differences
with her mother-in-law.

At the trial, Cesar affirmed his allegations of Lolita’s infidelity

and subsequent abandonment of the family home. He testified
that he continued to provide financial support for Lolita and
their children even after he learned of her illicit affair with Alvin.

Cesar presented the psychological evaluation report on Lolita

prepared by Dr. Fareda Fatima Flores of the National Center for
Mental Health. Dr. Flores found that Lolita was "not suffering
from any form of major psychiatric illness," but had been
"unable to provide the expectations expected of her for a
good and lasting marital relationship"; her "transferring from
one job to the other depicts some interpersonal problems with
co-workers as well as her impatience in attaining her ambitions";
and "her refusal to go with her husband abroad signifies her
reluctance to work out a good marital and family relationship."

The RTC declared Cesar’s marriage to Lolita void, finding

sufficient basis to declare Lolita psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations. On appeal, the CA
set aside the RTC’s verdict, finding that Lolita’s abandonment of
the conjugal dwelling and infidelity were not serious cases of
personality disorder/psychological illness. Lolita merely refused
to comply with her marital obligations which she was capable of
 104

doing. The CA significantly observed that infidelity is only a

ground for legal separation, not for the declaration of the nullity
of a marriage.

Issue:
WON there exists sufficient basis to nullify Cesar’s marriage to
Lolita on the ground of psychological incapacity.

Held:
NONE. The SC held that no sufficient basis exists to annul
Cesar’s marriage to Lolita on the ground of psychological
incapacity.

In interpreting the provision of Article 36 of the Family Code, the

Court have repeatedly stressed that psychological incapacity
contemplates "downright incapacity or inability to take
cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations";
not merely the refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on
the part of the errant spouse. The plaintiff bears the burden of
proving the juridical antecedence (i.e., the existence at the time
of the celebration of marriage), gravity and incurability of the
condition of the errant spouse.

In this case, Cesar’s testimony failed to prove Lolita’s alleged

psychological incapacity. Cesar testified on the dates when he
learned of Lolita’s alleged affair and her subsequent
abandonment of their home, as well as his continued financial
support to her and their children even after he learned of the
affair, but he merely mentioned in passing Lolita’s alleged affair
with Alvin and her abandonment of the conjugal dwelling.

In any event, sexual infidelity and abandonment of the

conjugal dwelling, even if true, do not necessarily constitute
psychological incapacity; these are simply grounds for legal
separation. To constitute psychological incapacity, it must be
shown that the unfaithfulness and abandonment are
manifestations of a disordered personality that completely
prevented the erring spouse from discharging the essential
marital obligations. No evidence on record exists to support
Cesar’s allegation that Lolita’s infidelity and abandonment were
manifestations of any psychological illness.
 105

Cesar mistakenly relied on Dr. Flores’ psychological evaluation

report on Lolita to prove her alleged psychological incapacity.
The psychological evaluation, in fact, established that Lolita
did not suffer from any major psychiatric illness. Dr. Flores’
observation on Lolita’s interpersonal problems with co-workers,
to our mind, does not suffice as a consideration for the
conclusion that she was – at the time of her marriage –
psychologically incapacitated to enter into a marital union with
Cesar. Aside from the time element involved, a wife’s
psychological fitness as a spouse cannot simply be equated with
her professional/work relationship; workplace obligations and
responsibilities are poles apart from their marital counterparts.
While both spring from human relationship, their relatedness
and relevance to one another should be fully established for
them to be compared or to serve as measures of comparison
with one another. To be sure, the evaluation report Dr. Flores
prepared and submitted cannot serve this purpose. Dr. Flores’
further belief that Lolita’s refusal to go with Cesar abroad
signified a reluctance to work out a good marital relationship is
a mere generalization unsupported by facts and is, in fact, a
rash conclusion that this Court cannot support.
 106

People of the Philippines vs. Aniceto Bulagao

G.R. No. 184757               October 5, 2011

Facts:
This is an appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals which
affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos,
Bulacan convicting the accused with two (2) counts of rape. The
victim in this case was adopted by the parents of accused-appellant.
She settled in the house of her adopted brother together with the
accused. On the night of June 17, 2000, accused entered the room
were the victim and his/her younger sister were sleeping. He poked
a knife at the victim’s neck, removed his clothes then his own and
raped her for about an hour. When the younger sister woke up, the
accused did not stop and continued raping the victim. The incident
happened again on June 29, 2000, while she was in her sister’s
house.

The victim told her mother and her brother about the rape
incidents. Upon learning of the same, her mother did not believe her
and whipped her. During trial, the defense presented a clinical
psychologist who conducted a mental examination on accused-
appellant on September 12, 2002, and found that accused-appellant
was suffering from mental retardation as he had an IQ of below 50.

Issue:
WON accused-appeallant is insane when he committed the crime.

Held:
NO. There was no proof that the mental condition of accused-
appellant allegedly exhibited when he was examined by Yolanda
Palma was already present at the time of the rape incidents.
Anyone who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity
bears the burden of proving it with clear and convincing
evidence. Besides, this Court observes that neither the acts of the
accused-appellant proven before the court, nor his answers in his
testimony, show a complete deprivation of intelligence or free will.
Insanity presupposes that the accused was completely deprived
of reason or discernment and freedom of will at the time of the
commission of the crime. Only when there is a complete
deprivation of intelligence at the time of the commission of the crime
should the exempting circumstance of insanity be considered.
 107

AURORA A. ANAYA vs. FERNANDO O. PALAROAN

G.R. No. L-27930 November 26, 1970

Facts:
Plaintiff Aurora and defendant Fernando were married in 1953.
Fernando filed an action for annulment of the marriage on the
ground that his consent was obtained through force and
intimidation. A judgment was rendered dismissing the complaint
of Fernando and upholding the validity of the marriage.

Fernando had divulged to Aurora that several months prior to

their marriage he had pre-marital relationship with a close
relative of his and "the non-divulgement to her of the
aforementioned pre-marital secret on the part of defendant that
definitely wrecked their marriage, which apparently doomed to
fail even before it had hardly commenced. Aurora further
claimed that her marriage with defendant constituted 'FRAUD',
in obtaining her consent. She prayed for the annulment of the
marriage and for moral damages.

Defendant Fernando, in his answer, denied the allegation in the

complaint and denied having had pre-marital relationship with a
close relative; he averred that under no circumstance would he
live with Aurora, as he had escaped from her and from her
relatives the day following their marriage. He also denied having
committed any fraud against her.

Issue:
WON the non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his pre-
marital relationship with another woman is a ground for
annulment of marriage.

Held:
NO. Non-disclosure of a husband's pre-marital relationship
with another woman is not one of the enumerated
circumstances that would constitute a ground for
annulment; and it is further excluded by the last paragraph of
the article, providing that "no other misrepresentation or
deceit as to ... chastity" shall give ground for an action to
annul a marriage. While a woman may detest such non-
disclosure of premarital lewdness or feel having been thereby
cheated into giving her consent to the marriage, nevertheless the
law does not assuage her grief after her consent was solemnly
 108

given, for upon marriage she entered into an institution in which

society, and not herself alone, is interested. The lawmaker's
intent being plain, the Court's duty is to give effect to the same,
whether it agrees with the rule or not.

But plaintiff-appellant Anaya emphasizes that not only has she

alleged "non-divulgement" (the word chosen by her) of the pre-
marital relationship of her husband with another woman as her
cause of action, but that she has, likewise, alleged in her reply
that defendant Fernando paid court to her without any intention
of complying with his marital duties and obligations and covertly
made up his mind not to live with her. Plaintiff-appellant
contends that the lower court erred in ignoring these allegations
in her reply.

On the merits of this second fraud charge, it is enough to point

out that any secret intention on the husband's part not to
perform his marital duties must have been discovered by the
wife soon after the marriage: hence her action for annulment
based on that fraud should have been brought within four years
after the marriage. Since appellant's wedding was celebrated in
December of 1953, and this ground was only pleaded in 1966, it
must be declared already barred.
 109

ORLANDO VILLANUEVA vs. CA & LILIA C. VILLANUEVA

G.R. No. 132955             October 27, 2006

Facts:
Petitioner Orlando Villanueva and private respondent Lilia
Canalita-Villanueva got married on April 13, 1988 in Puerto
Princesa, Palawan. On November 17, 1992, Orlando filed with
the trial court a petition for annulment of his marriage alleging
that threats of violence and duress forced him into marrying
Lilia, who was already pregnant; that he did not get her
pregnant prior to the marriage; that he never cohabited with her
after the marriage; and that he later learned that private
respondent's child died during delivery on August 29, 1988.

In her answer, Lilia argued that petitioner freely and voluntarily

married her; that petitioner stayed with her in Palawan for
almost a month after their marriage; that petitioner wrote letters
to her after he returned to Manila, during which private
respondent visited him personally; and that petitioner knew
about the progress of her pregnancy, which ended in their son
being born prematurely.

Issue:
WON the subject marriage may be annulled on the ground of
vitiated consent (fraud).

Held:
NO. The SC held that petitioner freely and voluntarily married
private respondent and that no threats or intimidation, duress
or violence compelled him to do so.

The SC are at once disturbed by the circumstance that despite

the alleged coerced consent which supposedly characterized his
marriage with Lilia on April 13, 1988, it was only on November
17, 1992 or after a span of not less than four (4) years and
eight (8) months when Orlando took serious step to have the
same marriage annulled.

Appellant invoked fraud to annul his marriage, as he was made

to believe by appellee that the latter was pregnant with his child
when they were married. Appellant’s excuse that he could not
have impregnated the appellee because he did not have an
erection during their tryst is flimsy at best, and an outright lie at
 110

worst. The complaint is bereft of any reference to his inability to

copulate with the appellee. His counsel also conceded before the
lower court that his client had a sexual relationship with the
appellee x x x. He also narrated x x x that sometime in January
1988, he and the appellee went to a hotel where "the sexual act
was consummated, with the defendant on top" x x x.

Instead of providing proofs that he was tricked into marrying his

wife, appellant resorted to undermining the credibility of the
latter by citing her testimony that her child was born, and died,
on August 29, 1989, a year off from August 29, 1988, the date of
fetal death as appearing in the registry of deaths of the Office of
the Civil Registrar of Puerto Princesa City x x x. To Our mind,
appellant cannot make capital of the lapse because it is
inconsequential, as there is no controversy regarding the date of
death of appellee’s fetus.

Appellant’s propensity to rely on his perceived weakness of the

appellee’s evidence continues in his argument that if indeed
there is truth to her claim that she was impregnated sometime
in December 1987, then she could not have a premature delivery
on August 29, 1988, as she had testified during the trial,
because the 35-week period of pregnancy is complete by that
time. Whether the appellee’s impression that she had delivered
prematurely is correct or not will not affect the fact that she had
delivered a fetus on August 29, 1988. In the light of
appellant’s admission that he had a sexual intercourse with
his wife in January 1988, and his failure to attribute the
latter’s pregnancy to any other man, appellant cannot
complain that he was deceived by the appellee into marrying
her.
 111

MANUEL G. ALMELOR vs. RTC & LEONIDA T. ALMELOR

G.R. No. 179620             August 26, 2008

Facts:
Despite receiving many forewarnings and doubts from people
around them regarding the defendant sexual preference,
respondent Leonida Almerol still married defendant Manuel
Almerol in 1989. Their union bore three (3) children. Manuel and
Leonida are both medical practitioners, an anesthesiologist and
a pediatrician, respectively.

After eleven (11) years of marriage, Leonida filed a petition with

the RTC in Las Piñas City to annul their marriage on the ground
that Manuel was psychologically incapacitated to perform his
marital obligations. Respondent claimed that defendant
concealed to her his homosexuality. Her suspicions were first
aroused when she noticed Manuel's peculiar closeness to his
male companions. For instance, she caught him in an indiscreet
telephone conversation manifesting his affection for a male
caller. She also found several pornographic homosexual
materials in his possession. Her worse fears were confirmed
when she saw Manuel kissed another man on the lips. At this
point, Leonida took her children and left their conjugal abode.
Since then, Manuel stopped giving support to their children.

The trial court nullified the marriage, not on the ground of

Article 36, but Article 45 of the Family Code. The CA affirmed
the trial court’s decision.

Issue:
WON the subject marriage can be annulled on the ground of the
husband’s concealment of his homosexuality.

Held:
NO. Evidently, no sufficient proof was presented to
substantiate the allegations that Manuel is a homosexual
and that he concealed this to Leonida at the time of their
marriage. The lower court considered the public perception of
Manuel's sexual preference without the corroboration of
witnesses. Also, it took cognizance of Manuel's peculiarities and
interpreted it against his sexuality.
 112

Even assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that Manuel is a

homosexual, the lower court cannot appreciate it as a ground to
annul his marriage with Leonida. The law is clear - a marriage
may be annulled when the consent of either party was
obtained by fraud, such as concealment of homosexuality.
Nowhere in the said decision was it proven by preponderance of
evidence that Manuel was a homosexual at the onset of his
marriage and that he deliberately hid such fact to his wife. It is
the concealment of homosexuality, and not homosexuality
per se, that vitiates the consent of the innocent party. Such
concealment presupposes bad faith and intent to defraud the
other party in giving consent to the marriage.

Consent is an essential requisite of a valid marriage. To be valid,

it must be freely given by both parties. An allegation of vitiated
consent must be proven by preponderance of evidence. The
Family Code has enumerated an exclusive list of circumstances
constituting fraud. Homosexuality per se is not among those
cited, but its concealment.

To reiterate, homosexuality per se is only a ground for legal

separation. It is its concealment that serves as a valid ground to
annul a marriage. Concealment in this case is not simply a
blanket denial, but one that is constitutive of fraud. It is this
fundamental element that respondent failed to prove.
 113

ORLANDO VILLANUEVA vs. CA & LILIA C. VILLANUEVA

G.R. No. 132955             October 27, 2006

Facts:
Petitioner Orlando Villanueva and private respondent Lilia
Canalita-Villanueva got married on April 13, 1988 in Puerto
Princesa, Palawan. On November 17, 1992, Orlando filed with
the trial court a petition for annulment of his marriage alleging
that threats of violence and duress forced him into marrying
Lilia, who was already pregnant; that he did not get her
pregnant prior to the marriage; that he never cohabited with her
after the marriage; and that he later learned that private
respondent's child died during delivery on August 29, 1988.

In her answer, Lilia argued that petitioner freely and voluntarily

married her; that petitioner stayed with her in Palawan for
almost a month after their marriage; that petitioner wrote letters
to her after he returned to Manila, during which private
respondent visited him personally; and that petitioner knew
about the progress of her pregnancy, which ended in their son
being born prematurely.

Issue:
WON the subject marriage may be annulled on the ground of
vitiated consent.

Held:
NO. The SC held that petitioner freely and voluntarily married
private respondent and that no threats or intimidation, duress
or violence compelled him to do so.

The SC are at once disturbed by the circumstance that despite

the alleged coerced consent which supposedly characterized his
marriage with Lilia on April 13, 1988, it was only on November
17, 1992 or after a span of not less than four (4) years and
eight (8) months when Orlando took serious step to have the
same marriage annulled. Unexplained, the prolonged inaction
evidently finds basis in Lilia’s allegation that this annulment suit
was filed by Orlando solely in the hope that a favorable judgment
thereon would bolster his defense, if not altogether bring about
his acquittal in the criminal case for bigamy which was then
already pending against him.
 114

Appellant anchored his prayer for the annulment of his marriage

on the ground that he did not freely consent to be married to the
appellee. He cited several incidents that created on his mind a
reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave
danger to his life and safety.

The Court is not convinced that appellant’s apprehension of

danger to his person is so overwhelming as to deprive him of the
will to enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It is not
disputed that at the time he was allegedly being harassed,
appellant worked as a security guard in a bank. Given his
employment at that time, it is reasonable to assume that
appellant knew the rudiments of self-defense, or, at the very
least, the proper way to keep himself out of harm’s way. For
sure, it is even doubtful if threats were indeed made to bear
upon appellant, what with the fact that he never sought the
assistance of the security personnel of his school nor the police
regarding the activities of those who were threatening him. And
neither did he inform the judge about his predicament prior to
solemnizing their marriage.

Appellant’s propensity to rely on his perceived weakness of the

appellee’s evidence continues in his argument that if indeed
there is truth to her claim that she was impregnated sometime
in December 1987, then she could not have a premature delivery
on August 29, 1988, as she had testified during the trial,
because the 35-week period of pregnancy is complete by that
time. Whether the appellee’s impression that she had delivered
prematurely is correct or not will not affect the fact that she had
delivered a fetus on August 29, 1988. In the light of
appellant’s admission that he had a sexual intercourse with
his wife in January 1988, and his failure to attribute the
latter’s pregnancy to any other man, appellant cannot
complain that he was deceived by the appellee into marrying
her.
 115

MERCEDITA ARAÑES vs. JUDGE SALVADOR M. OCCIANO

A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390. April 11, 2002

Facts:
Petitioner Mercedita Mata Arañes charged respondent judge with
Gross Ignorance of the Law. Respondent is the Presiding Judge
of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur.
Petitioner alleged that respondent judge solemnized her marriage
to her late groom Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite
marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside
his territorial jurisdiction.

She attested that respondent judge initially refused to solemnize

her marriage due to the want of a duly issued marriage license
and that it was because of her prodding and reassurances that
he eventually solemnized the same. Petitioner and Orobia lived
together as husband and wife on the strength of this marriage
until her husband passed away. However, since the marriage
was a nullity, petitioner’s right to inherit the “vast properties”
left by Orobia was not recognized. She was likewise deprived of
receiving the pensions of Orobia, a retired Commodore of the
Philippine Navy.

Reviewing the records of the case, it appears that petitioner and

Orobia filed their Application for Marriage License on 5 January
2000. The marriage license shall be issued on 17 January 2000.
However, neither petitioner nor Orobia claimed it. No record of
petitioner and Orobia’s marriage appeared in the Office of the
Civil Registrar General. Likewise, the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur issued another Certification
dated 7 May 2001 that it cannot issue a true copy of the
Marriage Contract of the parties since it has no record of their
marriage.

Issue:
WON respondent judge is guilty of solemnizing a marriage
without a duly issued marriage license and conducting it outside
his territorial jurisdiction.

Held:
YES. The territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to
the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of
solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua,
 116

Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to

administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross
ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out
of human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability
for violating the law on marriage.

Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a

marriage without the requisite marriage license. In People vs.
Lara, we held that a marriage which preceded the issuance of
the marriage license is void, and that the subsequent issuance of
such license cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity
to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the
marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the
authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did not
possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of
petitioner. In this respect, respondent judge acted in gross
ignorance of the law.
 117

RODOLFO G. NAVARRO vs. JUDGE HERNANDO DOMAGTOY

A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088. July 19, 1996

Facts:
Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro
filed a complaint on two specific acts committed by respondent
Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy on the
grounds of gross misconduct, inefficiency in office and ignorance
of the law.

It was alleged that on September 27, 1994, respondent judge

solemnized the wedding between Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn
F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely
separated from his first wife. Also, the respondent judge
performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador
Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court's
jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Respondent judge holds office
and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta.
Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. The wedding was solemnized
at the respondent judge's residence in the municipality of Dapa,
which does not fall within his jurisdictional area of the
municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, located some 40 to 45
kilometers away from the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del
Norte.

Respondent judge seeks exculpation from his act of having

solemnized the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a married
man separated from his wife, and Arlyn F. Borga by stating that
he merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial
Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan
and his first wife have not seen each other for almost seven
years. With respect to the second charge, he maintains that in
solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he
did not violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family Code and
that Article 8 thereof applies to the case in question.

Issue:
Whether or not the marriages solemnized were void.

Held:
YES. Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding
for the declaration of his first wife's presumptive death. Absent
this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida Peñaranda.
 118

Whether wittingly, or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the

part of respondent judge to have accepted the joint affidavit
submitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the
law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void,
marriage.

Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the

justifications for his having solemnized the marriage between
Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside of his court's
jurisdiction. As the aforequoted provision states, a marriage can
be held outside of the judge's chambers or courtroom only in the
following instances: (1) at the point of death, (2) in remote
places in accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon request of
both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect.
There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at
the point of death or in a remote place. Moreover, the written
request presented addressed to the respondent judge was made
by only one party, Gemma del Rosario.

More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this

provision is the authority of the solemnizing judge. Under
Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the
"authority of the solemnizing officer." Under Article 7, marriage
may be solemnized by, among others, "any incumbent
member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction."
Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue
of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the
authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding
provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the
marriage.

Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the

municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, he was not clothed
with authority to solemnize a marriage in the municipality
of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. By citing Article 8 and the
exceptions therein as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced
authority, respondent judge again demonstrated a lack of
understanding of the basic principles of civil law.
 119

Sy vs CA
GR No. 127263, April 2, 2000

Facts:
Petitioner Filipina Y. Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy
contracted marriage on November 15, 1973 at the Church of Our
Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City. Both were then 22 years old.
Their union was blessed with two children. The spouses first
established their residence in Singalong, Manila, then in Apalit,
Pampanga, and later at San Matias, Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. The
spouses operated a lumber and hardware business in Sto.
Tomas, Pampanga.

On September 15, 1983, Fernando left their conjugal dwelling.

Since then, the spouses lived separately, and their two children
were in the custody of their mother. However, their son
Frederick transferred to his father's residence at Masangkay,
Tondo, Manila on May 15, 1988, and from then on, lived with
his father.

On February 11, 1987, Filipina filed a petition for legal

separation before the RTC of San Fernando, Pampanga. Later,
upon motion of petitioner, the action was later amended to a
petition for separation of property on the grounds that her
husband abandoned her without just cause; that they have been
living separately for more than one year; and that they
voluntarily entered into a Memorandum of Agreement dated
September 29, 1983, containing the rules that would govern the
dissolution of their conjugal partnership. Judgment was
rendered dissolving their conjugal partnership of gains and
approving a regime of separation of properties based on the
Memorandum of Agreement executed by the spouses. The trial
court also granted custody of the children to Filipina.

In May 1988, Filipina filed a criminal action for attempted

parricide against her husband, RTC of Manila. The trial court,
however, in its decision convicted Fernando only of the lesser
crime of slight physical injuries, and sentenced him to 20 days
imprisonment.

Petitioner later filed a new action for legal separation against

private respondent, on the following grounds: (1) repeated
physical violence; (2) sexual infidelity; (3) attempt by respondent
 120

against her life; and (4) abandonment of her by her husband

without justifiable cause for more than one year.

On August 4, 1992, Filipina filed a petition for the declaration

of absolute nullity of her marriage to Fernando on the
ground of psychological incapacity. She points out that the
final judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court in her favor,
in her petitions for separation of property and legal separation,
and Fernando's infliction of physical violence on her which led to
the conviction of her husband for slight physical injuries are
symptoms of psychological incapacity. Moreover, Filipina alleges
that such psychological incapacity of her husband existed from
the time of the celebration of their marriage and became
manifest thereafter.

In its decision, the RTC of San Fernando, Pampanga, denied the

petition of Filipina Sy for the declaration of absolute nullity of
her marriage to Fernando. It stated that the alleged acts of the
respondent, as cited by petitioner, do not constitute
psychological incapacity which may warrant the declaration of
absolute nullity of their marriage.

On appeal before the SC, petitioner Sy raised for the first time
the issue of the marriage being void for lack of a valid marriage
license at the time of its celebration. It appears that, according
to her, the date of the actual celebration of their marriage and
the date of issuance of their marriage certificate and marriage
license are different and incongruous.

Issue:
WON the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is
void from the beginning for lack of a marriage license at the time
of the ceremony.

Held:
YES. Although the Court have repeatedly ruled that litigants
cannot raise an issue for the first time on appeal, as this would
contravene the basic rules of fair play and justice, in a number
of instances, the Court have relaxed observance of procedural
rules, noting that technicalities are not ends in themselves but
exist to protect and promote substantive rights of litigants. The
Court said that certain rules ought not to be applied with
severity and rigidity if by so doing, the very reason for their
 121

existence would be defeated. Hence, when substantial justice

plainly requires, exempting a particular case from the operation
of technicalities should not be subject to cavil.

The date of issue of the marriage license and marriage

certificate, September 17, 1974, is contained in their marriage
contract which was attached in her petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court. The date of
celebration of their marriage at Our Lady of Lourdes, Sta.
Teresita Parish, on November 15, 1973, is admitted both by
petitioner and private respondent, as stated in paragraph three
of petitioner's petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage before the trial court, and private respondent's answer
admitting it. November 15, 1973, also appears as the date of
marriage of the parents in both their son's and daughter's
birth certificates, which are also attached in the petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court.

These pieces of evidence on record plainly and indubitably show

that on the day of the marriage ceremony, there was no
marriage license. A marriage license is a formal requirement; its
absence renders the marriage void ab initio. In addition, the
marriage contract shows that the marriage license, numbered
6237519, was issued in Carmona, Cavite, yet, neither petitioner
nor private respondent ever resided in Carmona.

From the documents she presented, the marriage license was

issued on September 17, 1974, almost one year after the
ceremony took place on November 15, 1973. The ineluctable
conclusion is that the marriage was indeed contracted without a
marriage license. Nowhere do we find private respondent denying
these dates on record.

Article 80 of the Civil Code is clearly applicable in this case.

There being no claim of an exceptional character, the purported
marriage between petitioner and private respondent could not be
classified among those enumerated in Articles 72-79 of the Civil
Code. We thus conclude that under Article 80 of the Civil Code,
the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is
void from the beginning.
 122

RESTITUTO M. ALCANTARA vs. ROSITA ALCANTARA & CA

G.R. No. 167746               August 28, 2007

Facts:
Petitioner Restituto Alcantara filed a petition for annulment of
marriage against respondent Rosita A. Alcantara alleging that on
8 December 1982 he and respondent, without securing the
required marriage license, went to the Manila City Hall for the
purpose of looking for a person who could arrange a marriage for
them. They met a person who, for a fee, arranged their wedding
before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel
of the CDCC BR Chapel. They got married on the same day, 8
December 1982.

Petitioner and respondent went through another marriage

ceremony at the San Jose de Manuguit Church in Tondo,
Manila, on 26 March 1983. The marriage was likewise celebrated
without the parties securing a marriage license. The alleged
marriage license, procured in Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the
marriage contract, is a sham, as neither party was a resident of
Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to apply for a license
with the local civil registrar of the said place.

Answering petitioner’s petition for annulment of marriage,

respondent asserts the validity of their marriage and maintains
that there was a marriage license issued as evidenced by a
certification from the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona,
Cavite. Contrary to petitioner’s representation, respondent gave
birth to their first child named Rose Ann Alcantara on 14
October 1985 and to another daughter named Rachel Ann
Alcantara on 27 October 1992. Petitioner has a mistress with
whom he has three children. Petitioner only filed the annulment
of their marriage to evade prosecution for concubinage.
Respondent, in fact, has filed a case for concubinage against
petitioner.

Issue:
WON there exist a valid marriage license.

Held:
YES. The marriage involved herein having been solemnized on 8
December 1982, or prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the
 123

applicable law to determine its validity is the Civil Code which

was the law in effect at the time of its celebration.

Clearly, it can be deduced that to be considered void on the

ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires that
the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on
the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a
certification from the local civil registrar that no such
marriage license was issued to the parties. In this case, the
marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects
a marriage license number. A certification to this effect was also
issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite. The
certification moreover is precise in that it specifically identified
the parties to whom the marriage license was issued, namely
Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further validating the
fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties herein.

In a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of the

marriage license, claims that neither he nor respondent is a
resident of Carmona, Cavite. Even then, we still hold that there
is no sufficient basis to annul petitioner and respondent’s
marriage. Issuance of a marriage license in a city or
municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting
parties, and issuance of a marriage license despite the
absence of publication or prior to the completion of the 10-
day period for publication are considered mere irregularities
that do not affect the validity of the marriage. An irregularity
in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its
validity but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity
are civilly, criminally and administratively liable.

Again, petitioner harps on the discrepancy between the marriage

license number in the certification of the Municipal Civil
Registrar, which states that the marriage license issued to the
parties is No. 7054133, while the marriage contract states that
the marriage license number of the parties is number 7054033.
Once more, this argument fails to sway us. It is not impossible
to assume that the same is a mere a typographical error, as a
closer scrutiny of the marriage contract reveals the overlapping
of the numbers 0 and 1, such that the marriage license may
read either as 7054133 or 7054033. It therefore does not detract
from our conclusion regarding the existence and issuance of said
marriage license to the parties.
 124

ENGRACE NIÑAL vs. NORMA BAYADOG

G.R. No. 133778             March 14, 2000

Facts:
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26,
1974. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners.
Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24,
1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11,
1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married
without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma
executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they
had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years
and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license.

On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their

father's death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said
marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was
filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the
second marriage would affect petitioner's successional rights.
Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners
have no cause of action since they are not among the persons
who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under
Article 47 of the Family Code.

The lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the
action to declare null and void their father's marriage to
respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of
the Family Code which enumerates the time and the persons
who could initiate an action for annulment of marriage.

Issue:
WON the second marriage of Pepito was void for lack of marriage
license.

Held:
YES. The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the applicable law
to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in
effect at the time of their celebration. A valid marriage license is
a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the
absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to
Article 80(3) in relation to Article 58.
 125

The requirement and issuance of marriage license is the State's

demonstration of its involvement and participation in every
marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is
interested. This interest proceeds from the constitutional
mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life and
of affording protection to the family as a basic "autonomous
social institution."

Specifically, the Constitution considers marriage as an

"inviolable social institution," and is the foundation of family life
which shall be protected by the State. This is why the Family
Code considers marriage as "a special contract of permanent
union" and case law considers it "not just an adventure but a
lifetime commitment."

However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil

Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one of which
is that provided in Article 76, referring to the marriage of a man
and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each
other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken
period of at least five years before the marriage. The rationale
why no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the
parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant
with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid
marriage due to the publication of every applicant's name for a
marriage license. The publicity attending the marriage license
may discourage such persons from legitimizing their status. To
preserve peace in the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious
eye of public exposure and contain the source of gossip arising
from the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to
preserve their privacy and exempt them from that requirement.

There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners' father

to respondent Norma was celebrated without any marriage
license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that
"they have attained the age of majority, and, being unmarried,
have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years,
and that we now desire to marry each other." The only issue that
needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is
contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant the
counting of the five year period in order to exempt the future
spouses from securing a marriage license.
 126

Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived

together as husband and wife for five years without the benefit of
marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the
basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only
missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate
the union. In other words, the five-year common-law
cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of
celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it
not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period
should be the years immediately before the day of the
marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation
characterized by exclusivity — meaning no third party was
involved at anytime within the 5 years and continuity — that is
unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is
computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were
capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years,
then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging
parties to have common law relationships and placing them on
the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their
spouse.

Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as such

and its requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption
that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and
wife is based on the approximation of the requirements of the
law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply
with every single requirement and later use the same missing
element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their
marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a
marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the
ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is
required in order to notify the public that two persons are about
to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has
knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall make
it known to the local civil registrar.

Thus, any marriage subsequently contracted during the

lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void, subject
only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior
marriage was dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal Code
complements the civil law in that the contracting of two or more
marriages and the having of extramarital affairs are considered
 127

felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and adultery. The law

sanctions monogamy.

In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage,

it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as
husband and wife for at least five years prior to their
wedding day. From the time Pepito's first marriage was
dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about
twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his
first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and
respondent had started living with each other that has already
lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period
cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It
should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the
law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage
contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he
started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when
they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in
fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage
even where there was actual severance of the filial
companionship between the spouses cannot make any
cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one
as "husband and wife".
 128

REINEL ANTHONY DE CASTRO vs. ANNABELLE DE CASTRO

G.R. No. 160172             February 13, 2008

Facts:
Petitioner Reinel De Castro and respondent Annabelle De Castro
met and became sweethearts in 1991. They planned to get
married, thus they applied for a marriage license with the Office
of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City in September 1994. They had
their first sexual relation sometime in October 1994, and had
regularly engaged in sex thereafter. When the couple went back
to the Office of the Civil Registrar, the marriage license had
already expired. Thus, in order to push through with the plan, in
lieu of a marriage license, they executed an affidavit dated 13
March 1995 stating that they had been living together as
husband and wife for at least five years. The couple got married
on the same date, with Judge Jose C. Bernabe, presiding judge
of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, administering the
civil rites. Nevertheless, after the ceremony, petitioner and
respondent went back to their respective homes and did not live
together as husband and wife.

On 13 November 1995, respondent gave birth to a child named

Reinna Tricia A. De Castro. Since the child’s birth, respondent
has been the one supporting her out of her income as a
government dentist and from her private practice. On 4 June
1998, respondent filed a complaint for support against petitioner
alleging that she is married to petitioner and that the latter has
"reneged on his responsibility/obligation to financially support
her "as his wife and Reinna Tricia as his child."

Petitioner denied that he is married to respondent, claiming that

their marriage is void ab initio since the marriage was facilitated
by a fake affidavit; and that he was merely prevailed upon by
respondent to sign the marriage contract to save her from
embarrassment and possible administrative prosecution due to
her pregnant state; and that he was not able to get parental
advice from his parents before he got married. He also averred
that they never lived together as husband and wife and that he
has never seen nor acknowledged the child.

The trial court ruled that the marriage between petitioner and
respondent is not valid because it was solemnized without a
 129

marriage license. However, it declared petitioner as the natural

father of the child, and thus obliged to give her support.  

The Court of Appeals denied the appeal. Prompted by the  rule

that a marriage is presumed to be subsisting until a judicial
declaration of nullity has been made, the appellate court
declared that the child was born during the subsistence and
validity of the parties’ marriage.  In addition, the Court of
Appeals frowned upon petitioner’s refusal to undergo DNA
testing to prove the paternity and filiation, as well as his refusal
to state with certainty the last time he had carnal knowledge
with respondent, saying that petitioner’s “forgetfulness should
not be used as a vehicle to relieve him of his obligation and
reward him of his being irresponsible.”

Moreover, the Court of Appeals noted the affidavit dated 7 April

1998 executed by petitioner, wherein he voluntarily admitted
that he is the legitimate father of the child. The appellate court
also ruled that since this case is an action for support, it was
improper for the trial court to declare the marriage of petitioner
and respondent as null and void in the very same case.   There
was no participation of the State, through the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal, to see to it that there is no collusion between
the parties, as required by the Family Code in actions for
declaration of nullity of a marriage.  The burden of proof to
show that the marriage is void rests upon petitioner, but it
is a matter that can be raised in an action for declaration of
nullity, and not in the instant proceedings.

Issue:
WON the marriage is void due to lack of marriage license.

Held:
YES. Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential
or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio,
whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall render
the marriage voidable. In the instant case, it is clear from the
evidence presented that petitioner and respondent did not have
a marriage license when they contracted their marriage. Instead,
they presented an affidavit stating that they had been living
together for more than five years.
 130

The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere

irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage. The law
dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man and a
woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other
as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at
least five years before the marriage. The aim of this provision is
to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and
embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of
persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every
applicant’s name for a marriage license.

In the instant case, there was no "scandalous cohabitation" to

protect; in fact, there was no cohabitation at all. The false
affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so they could
push through with the marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a
mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt from the marriage
license requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a
marriage license renders their marriage void ab initio.
 131

REPUBLIC vs. JOSE A. DAYOT

G.R. No. 175581               March 28, 2008

Facts:
Jose and Felisa were married at the Pasay City Hall. The
marriage was solemnized by Rev. Tomas V. Atienza. In lieu of a
marriage license, Jose and Felisa executed a sworn affidavit, also
dated 24 November 1986, attesting that both of them had
attained the age of maturity, and that being unmarried, they had
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.

On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint for Annulment and/or

Declaration of Nullity of Marriage contending that his marriage
with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was
celebrated between the parties; that he did not execute the
sworn affidavit stating that he and Felisa had lived as husband
and wife for at least five years; and that his consent to the
marriage was secured through fraud.

In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Jose’s allegations and

defended the validity of their marriage. She declared that they
had maintained their relationship as man and wife absent the
legality of marriage in the early part of 1980, but that she had
deferred contracting marriage with him on account of their age
difference. In her pre-trial brief, Felisa expounded that while her
marriage to Jose was subsisting, the latter contracted marriage
with a certain Rufina Pascual (Rufina) on 31 August 1990. On 3
June 1993, Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose.
Subsequently, she filed an administrative complaint against
Jose with the Office of the Ombudsman, since Jose and Rufina
were both employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating
Board. The Ombudsman found Jose administratively liable for
disgraceful and immoral conduct, and meted out to him the
penalty of suspension from service for one year without
emolument. The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and
evidence presented, the marriage celebrated between Jose and
Felisa on 24 November 1986 was valid.

Issue:
WON the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation in lieu of
marriage license requirement renders the marriage void ab initio
for lack of marriage license.
 132

Held:
YES. Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the
exceptions to the rule on the indispensability of the formal
requisite of a marriage license. For the exception in Article 76 to
apply, it is a sine qua non thereto that the man and the woman
must have attained the age of majority, and that, being
unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years. The exception of a marriage license under
Article 76 applies only to those who have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and desire to marry
each other. The Civil Code, in no ambiguous terms, places a
minimum period requirement of five years of cohabitation. The
minimum requisite of five years of cohabitation is an
indispensability carved in the language of the law. For a
marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this material
fact cannot be dispensed with. It is embodied in the law not as a
directory requirement, but as one that partakes of a mandatory
character.

It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not

lived together for five years at the time they executed their
sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. The Republic
admitted that Jose and Felisa started living together only in
June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their
marriage. The Court of Appeals also noted Felisa’s testimony
that Jose was introduced to her by her neighbor, Teresita
Perwel, sometime in February or March 1986 after the EDSA
Revolution. The appellate court also cited Felisa’s own testimony
that it was only in June 1986 when Jose commenced to live in
her house.

We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity

of the statements in the parties’ affidavit will not affect the
validity of marriage, since all the essential and formal requisites
were complied with. The argument deserves scant merit.
Patently, it cannot be denied that the marriage between
Jose and Felisa was celebrated without the formal requisite
of a marriage license. Neither did Jose and Felisa meet the
explicit legal requirement in Article 76, that they should have
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, so as
to be excepted from the requirement of a marriage license.
 133

Essentially, when we speak of a presumption of marriage, it is

with reference to the prima facie presumption that a man and a
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered
into a lawful contract of marriage. Restated more explicitly,
persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed,
in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special
to the case, to be in fact married. The present case does not
involve an apparent marriage to which the presumption still
needs to be applied. There is no question that Jose and Felisa
actually entered into a contract of marriage on 24 November
1986, hence, compelling Jose to institute a Complaint for
Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, which
spawned the instant consolidated Petitions.

In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code that every
intendment of law or fact leans towards the validity of marriage
will not salvage the parties’ marriage, and extricate them from
the effect of a violation of the law. The marriage of Jose and
Felisa was entered into without the requisite marriage
license or compliance with the stringent requirements of a
marriage under exceptional circumstance. The solemnization
of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law
and would lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of
fraud against innocent and unwary parties, which was one of the
evils that the law sought to prevent by making a prior license a
prerequisite for a valid marriage. To permit a false affidavit to
take the place of a marriage license is to allow an abject
circumvention of the law.

The falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the

period of Jose and Felisa’s cohabitation, which would have
qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a
marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a
quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed
and attested to by the parties under oath. If the essential matter
in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of
paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no
affidavit at all.
 134

SYED AZHAR ABBAS vs. GLORIA GOO ABBAS

G.R. No. 183896               January 30, 2013

Facts:
Petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas, a Pakistani citizen, married
respondent Gloria Goo, a Filipino on August 9, 1992 at the Taipei
Mosque in Taiwan. He went to the Philippines in December 1992.
While he was at his mother-in-law’s residence in Malate, Manila,
she arrived with two men. According to him, he was told that he
was going to undergo some ceremony, one of the requirements for
his stay in the Philippines, but was not told of the nature of said
ceremony. During the ceremony he and Gloria signed a document.
He claimed that he did not know that the ceremony was a marriage
until Gloria told him later.

He further testified that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to apply

for a marriage license, and that he had never resided in that area.
In July of 2003, he went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite, to check on their marriage license, and was asked
to show a copy of their marriage contract wherein the marriage
license number could be found. The Municipal Civil Registrar issued
a certification on July 11, 2003 to the effect that the marriage
license number appearing in the marriage contract he submitted,
Marriage License No. 9969967, was the number of another marriage
license issued to a certain Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan.

Thus, Syed filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his

marriage to Gloria Goo-Abbas (Gloria) alleging the absence of a
marriage license.

Issue:
WON a valid marriage license had been issued for the couple.

Held:
NONE. The SC held that Gloria failed to present their marriage
license or a copy thereof to the court and to explain why the
marriage license was secured in Carmona, Cavite, a location where,
admittedly, neither party resided. As Gloria failed to present this
Qualin, the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar still enjoys
probative value.

It is also noted that the solemnizing officer testified that the

marriage contract and a copy of the marriage license were
submitted to the Local Civil Registrar of Manila. Thus, a copy of the
marriage license could have simply been secured from that office
 135

and submitted to the court. However, Gloria inexplicably failed to do

so, further weakening her claim that there was a valid marriage
license issued for her and Syed.

In the case of Cariño v. Cariño, following the case of Republic, it was

held that the certification of the Local Civil Registrar that their
office had no record of a marriage license was adequate to
prove the non-issuance of said license. The case of Cariño further
held that the presumed validity of the marriage of the parties had
been overcome, and that it became the burden of the party alleging
a valid marriage to prove that the marriage was valid, and that the
required marriage license had been secured. Gloria has failed to
discharge that burden, and the only conclusion that can be
reached is that no valid marriage license was issued. It cannot
be said that there was a simple irregularity in the marriage license
that would not affect the validity of the marriage, as no license was
presented by the respondent. No marriage license was proven to
have been issued to Gloria and Syed, based on the certification of
the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite and Gloria’s failure
to produce a copy of the alleged marriage license.

All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony

was conducted and a marriage contract was signed does not operate
to cure the absence of a valid marriage license. Article 4 of the
Family Code is clear when it says, "The absence of any of the
essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab
initio, except as stated in Article 35(2)." Article 35(3) of the
Family Code also provides that a marriage solemnized without a
license is void from the beginning, except those exempt from the
license requirement under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the
same Code. Again, this marriage cannot be characterized as among
the exemptions, and thus, having been solemnized without a
marriage license, is void ab initio.
 136

LOLITA D. ENRICO vs. HEIRS OF SPS. EULOGIO B.

MEDINACELI AND TRINIDAD CATLI-MEDINACELI
G.R. No. 173614               September 28, 2007

Facts:
Eulogio B. Medinaceli (Eulogio) and Trinidad Catli-Medinaceli
(Trinidad) were married on 14 June 1962 in Lal-lo, Cagayan.
They begot seven children, herein respondents. On 1 May 2004,
Trinidad died. Eulogio married petitioner Lolita Enrico on 26
August 2004 before the Municipal Mayor of Lal-lo, Cagayan. Six
months later, or on 10 February 2005, Eulogio passed away.

In impugning petitioner’s marriage to Eulogio, respondents

averred that the same was entered into without the requisite
marriage license. They argued that Article 34 of the Family Code,
which exempts a man and a woman who have been living
together for at least five years without any legal impediment from
securing a marriage license, was not applicable to petitioner and
Eulogio because they could not have lived together under the
circumstances required by said provision. Respondents posited
that the marriage of Eulogio to Trinidad was dissolved only upon
the latter’s death, or on 1 May 2004, which was barely three
months from the date of marriage of Eulogio to petitioner.
Therefore, petitioner and Eulogio could not have lived together
as husband and wife for at least five years. To further their
cause, respondents raised the additional ground of lack of
marriage ceremony due to Eulogio’s serious illness which made
its performance impossible.

In her Answer, petitioner maintained that she and Eulogio lived

together as husband and wife under one roof for 21 years openly
and publicly; hence, they were exempted from the requirement of
a marriage license. From their union were born Elvin Enrico and
Marco Enrico, all surnamed Medinaceli, on 28 October 1988 and
30 October 1991, respectively. She further contended that the
marriage ceremony was performed in the Municipal Hall of Lal-
lo, Cagayan, and solemnized by the Municipal Mayor. As an
affirmative defense, she sought the dismissal of the action on the
ground that it is only the contracting parties while living who
can file an action for declaration of nullity of marriage.
 137

Issue:
WON respondents can file the action for declaration of nullity of
marriage between their father and herein petition.

Held:
NO. Under the rules, only an aggrieved or injured spouse may
file petitions for annulment of voidable marriages and
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petitions
cannot be filed by the compulsory or intestate heirs of the
spouses or by the State.

The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right
to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only
inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and
hence can only question the validity of the marriage of the
spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the
regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to
preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution.

Respondents clearly have no cause of action before the court a

quo. Nonetheless, all is not lost for respondents. While A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the
wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are
already without any recourse under the law. They can still
protect their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of
the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration
of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and
Provisional Orders, compulsory or intestate heirs can still
question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a
proceeding for declaration of nullity, but upon the death of a
spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.
 138

JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS vs. FELICIDAD SANDOVAL

G.R. No. 179922             December 16, 2008

Facts:
Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate. They
left six parcels of land to their compulsory heirs, Teofilo Carlos
and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos. During the lifetime of Felix
Carlos, he agreed to transfer his estate to Teofilo. The agreement
was made in order to avoid the payment of inheritance taxes.
Teofilo, in turn, undertook to deliver and turn over the share of
the other legal heir, petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos. Eventually,
the first three (3) parcels of land were transferred and registered
in the name of Teofilo.

Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by respondents Felicidad

and their son, Teofilo Carlos II. Upon Teofilo's death, Parcel Nos.
5 & 6 were registered in the name of respondent Felicidad and
co-respondent, Teofilo II. In 1994, petitioner instituted a suit
against respondents. In the said case, the parties submitted and
caused the approval of a partial compromise agreement. Under
the compromise, the parties acknowledged their respective
shares in the proceeds from the sale of a portion of the first
parcel of land.

In August 1995, petitioner commenced an action for the

declaration of nullity of marriage between his brother Teofilo and
respondent Felicidad alleging that the marriage between them
was a nullity in view of the absence of the required marriage
license. He likewise maintained that his deceased brother was
neither the natural nor the adoptive father of respondent Teofilo
Carlos II.

Issue:
WON petitioner has the capacity to file the action for nullity of
marriage AND can the marriage be declared void ab initio
through a judgment on the pleadings or a summary judgment
and without the benefit of a trial.

Held:
NO. The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
must be proved. Neither judgment on the pleadings nor
summary judgment is allowed. So is confession of judgment
disallowed.
 139

But whether it is based on judgment on the pleadings or

summary judgment, the CA was correct in reversing the
summary judgment rendered by the trial court. Both the rules
on judgment on the pleadings and summary judgments have no
place in cases of declaration of absolute nullity of marriage and
even in annulment of marriage.

With the advent of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, known as "Rule on

Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment
of Voidable Marriages," the question on the application of
summary judgments or even judgment on the pleadings in cases
of nullity or annulment of marriage has been stamped with
clarity.

By issuing said summary judgment, the trial court has divested

the State of its lawful right and duty to intervene in the case.
The participation of the State is not terminated by the
declaration of the public prosecutor that no collusion exists
between the parties. The State should have been given the
opportunity to present controverting evidence before the
judgment was rendered.

Both the Civil Code and the Family Code ordain that the court
should order the prosecuting attorney to appear and intervene
for the State. It is at this stage when the public prosecutor sees
to it that there is no suppression of evidence. Concomitantly,
even if there is no suppression of evidence, the public prosecutor
has to make sure that the evidence to be presented or laid down
before the court is not fabricated.

A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may

be filed solely by the husband or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of
marriage cases commenced before the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC; and (2) Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of
the Civil Code. Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage may not be filed by any party outside of the marriage.

The innovation incorporated in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC sets forth

a demarcation line between marriages covered by the Family
Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code. The Rule
 140

extends only to marriages entered into during the effectivity of

the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988.

The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void

Marriages marks the beginning of the end of the right of the
heirs of the deceased spouse to bring a nullity of marriage case
against the surviving spouse. But the Rule never intended to
deprive the compulsory or intestate heirs of their successional
rights.

While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for

declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be filed solely by
the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory
or intestate heirs are without any recourse under the law. They
can still protect their successional right, for, as stated in the
Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, compulsory or
intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of
the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity but
upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of
the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.

It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases

already commenced before March 15, 2003 although the
marriage involved is within the coverage of the Family Code. This
is so, as the new Rule which became effective on March 15, 2003
is prospective in its application. Petitioner commenced the
nullity of marriage case against respondent Felicidad in 1995.
The marriage in controversy was celebrated on May 14, 1962.
Which law would govern depends upon when the marriage took
place.

The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of

the Family Code, the applicable law is the Civil Code which was
the law in effect at the time of its celebration. But the Civil Code
is silent as to who may bring an action to declare the marriage
void. Nonetheless, absence of a provision in the Civil Code
cannot be construed as a license for any person to institute a
nullity of marriage case. Such person must appear to be the
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in
the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Elsewise
stated, plaintiff must be the real party-in-interest.
 141

ISIDRO ABLAZA vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 158298               August 11, 2010

Facts:
On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Cataingan, Masbate a petition for the declaration
of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on December
26, 1949 between his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and
Leonila Honato.

The petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano

and Leonila had been celebrated without a marriage license, due
to such license being issued only on January 9, 1950, thereby
rendering the marriage void ab initio for having been solemnized
without a marriage license. He insisted that his being the
surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died without any issue
entitled him to one-half of the real properties acquired by
Cresenciano before his death, thereby making him a real party
in interest; and that any person, himself included, could impugn
the validity of the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila at
any time, even after the death of Cresenciano, due to the
marriage being void ab initio.

In its decision, the RTC dismissed the petition holding that the
petition is filed out of time (action had long prescribed) and
petitioner is not a party to the marriage (contracted between
Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Nonato on December 26, 1949
and solemnized by Rev. Fr. Eusebio B. Calolot.

Issue:
WON the petitioner is a real party in interest in the action to
seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage of his deceased
brother.

Held:
A valid marriage is essential in order to create the relation of
husband and wife and to give rise to the mutual rights, duties,
and liabilities arising out of such relation. The law prescribes the
requisites of a valid marriage. Hence, the validity of a marriage is
tested according to the law in force at the time the marriage is
contracted. As a general rule, the nature of the marriage already
celebrated cannot be changed by a subsequent amendment of
the governing law. To illustrate, a marriage between a
 142

stepbrother and a stepsister was void under the Civil Code, but
is not anymore prohibited under the Family Code; yet, the
intervening effectivity of the Family Code does not affect the void
nature of a marriage between a stepbrother and a stepsister
solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code. The Civil Code
marriage remains void, considering that the validity of a
marriage is governed by the law in force at the time of the
marriage ceremony.

Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and

Leonila was contracted on December 26, 1949, the
applicable law was the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the
time of the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the rule on the
exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as having the right to
initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC had absolutely no application to the
petitioner.

The old and new Civil Codes contain no provision on who can file
a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage, and when.
Accordingly, in Niñal v. Bayadog, the children were allowed to
file after the death of their father a petition for the declaration of
the nullity of their father’s marriage to their stepmother
contracted on December 11, 1986 due to lack of a marriage
license.

Other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is

necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other
purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship,
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate,
dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter,
the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a
suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as
it is essential to the determination of the case. This is
without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When
such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is
necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The
clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that
such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of
remarriage.
 143

It is clarified, however, that the absence of a provision in the old

and new Civil Codes cannot be construed as giving a license to
just any person to bring an action to declare the absolute nullity
of a marriage. According to Carlos v. Sandoval, the plaintiff must
still be the party who stands to be benefited by the suit, or the
party entitled to the avails of the suit, for it is basic in
procedural law that every action must be prosecuted and
defended in the name of the real party in interest. Thus, only
the party who can demonstrate a "proper interest" can file
the action. Interest within the meaning of the rule means
material interest, or an interest in issue to be affected by
the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from
mere curiosity about the question involved or a mere
incidental interest. One having no material interest to protect
cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an
action. When the plaintiff is not the real party in interest, the
case is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action.

Here, the petitioner alleged himself to be the late Cresenciano’s

brother and surviving heir. Assuming that the petitioner was as
he claimed himself to be, then he has a material interest in the
estate of Cresenciano that will be adversely affected by any
judgment in the suit. Indeed, a brother like the petitioner, albeit
not a compulsory heir under the laws of succession, has the
right to succeed to the estate of a deceased brother under the
conditions stated in Article 1001 and Article 1003 of the Civil
Code, as follows:

Article 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children

survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be
entitled to one half of the inheritance and the brothers and
sisters or their children to the other half.

Article 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants,

illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral
relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in
accordance with the following articles.

Pursuant to these provisions, the presence of descendants,

ascendants, or illegitimate children of the deceased excludes
collateral relatives like the petitioner from succeeding to
the deceased’s estate. Necessarily, therefore, the right of the
petitioner to bring the action hinges upon a prior determination
 144

of whether Cresenciano had any descendants, ascendants, or

children (legitimate or illegitimate), and of whether the petitioner
was the late Cresenciano’s surviving heir. Such prior
determination must be made by the trial court, for the inquiry
thereon involves questions of fact.

Nevertheless, we note that the petitioner did not implead

Leonila, who, as the late Cresenciano’s surviving wife, stood to
be benefited or prejudiced by the nullification of her own
marriage. It is relevant to observe, moreover, that not all
marriages celebrated under the old Civil Code required a
marriage license for their validity; hence, her participation in
this action is made all the more necessary in order to shed light
on whether the marriage had been celebrated without a marriage
license and whether the marriage might have been a marriage
excepted from the requirement of a marriage license.
 145

DANILO A. AURELIO vs. VIDA MA. CORAZON P. AURELIO

G.R. No. 175367               June 6, 2011

Facts:
Petitioner Danilo A. Aurelio and respondent Vida Ma. Corazon
Aurelio were married on March 23, 1988. They have two sons,
namely: Danilo Miguel and Danilo Gabriel. On 9 May 2002,
respondent filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of
marriage alleging that she and petitioner were psychologically
incapacitated of performing and complying with their respective
essential marital obligations. In addition, respondent alleged
that such state of psychological incapacity was present prior and
even during the time of the marriage ceremony. Hence,
respondent prays that her marriage be declared null and void
under Article 36 of the Family Code.

On November 8, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the

petition. Petitioner principally argued that the petition failed to
state a cause of action and that it failed to meet the standards
set by the Court for the interpretation and implementation of
Article 36 of the Family Code.

In its decision, the RTC ruled that respondent’s petition for

declaration of nullity of marriage complied with the requirements
of the Molina doctrine, and whether or not the allegations are
meritorious would depend upon the proofs presented by both
parties during trial.

In its Decision, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC and held
that respondent’s complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage
when scrutinized in juxtaposition with Article 36 of the Family
Code and the Molina doctrine revealed the existence of a
sufficient cause of action.

Issue:
WON

Held:
It bears to point out that had respondent’s complaint been filed
after March 15, 2003, this present petition would have been
denied since Supreme Court Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10
prohibits the filing of a motion to dismiss in actions for
annulment of marriage. Be that as it may, after a circumspect
 146

review of the arguments raised by petitioner herein, this Court

finds that the petition is not meritorious.

In Republic v. Court of Appeals, this Court created the Molina

guidelines to aid the courts in the disposition of cases involving
psychological incapacity.

This Court, pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Matter

No. 02-11-10, has modified the above pronouncements,
particularly Section 2(d) thereof, stating that the certification of
the Solicitor General required in the Molina case is dispensed
with to avoid delay. Still, Article 48 of the Family Code
mandates that the appearance of the prosecuting attorney
or fiscal assigned be on behalf of the State to take steps to
prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.

It bears to stress that whether or not petitioner and respondent

are psychologically incapacitated to fulfill their marital
obligations is a matter for the RTC to decide at the first instance.
A perusal of the Molina guidelines would show that the same
contemplate a situation wherein the parties have presented their
evidence, witnesses have testified, and that a decision has been
reached by the court after due hearing. Such process can be
gleaned from guidelines 2, 6 and 8, which refer to a decision
rendered by the RTC after trial on the merits. It would certainly
be too burdensome to ask this Court to resolve at first instance
whether the allegations contained in the petition are sufficient to
substantiate a case for psychological incapacity. Let it be
remembered that each case involving the application of Article
36 must be treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of a
priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but
according to its own attendant facts. Courts should interpret the
provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines,
and by decisions of church tribunals.
 147

REPUBLIC vs. CA & EDUARDO C. DE QUINTOS, .JR.

G.R. No. 159594               November 12, 2012

Facts:
Private respondent Eduardo and Catalina were married on
March 16, 1977 in civil rites solemnized by the Municipal Mayor
of Lingayen, Pangasinan. The couple was not blessed with a
child due to Catalina’s hysterectomy following her second
miscarriage.

On April 6, 1998, Eduardo filed a petition for the declaration of

nullity of their marriage, citing Catalina’s psychological
incapacity to comply with her essential marital obligations.
Catalina did not interpose any objection to the petition, but
prayed to be given her share in the conjugal house and lot
located in Bacabac, Bugallon, Pangasinan.

Eduardo testified that Catalina always left their house without

his consent; that she engaged in petty arguments with him; that
she constantly refused to give in to his sexual needs; that she
spent most of her time gossiping with neighbors instead of doing
the household chores and caring for their adopted daughter;
that she squandered by gambling all his remittances as an
overseas worker in Qatar since 1993; and that she abandoned
the conjugal home in 1997 to live with Bobbie Castro, her
paramour.

Eduardo presented the results of the neuro-psychiatric

evaluation conducted by Dr. Annabelle L. Reyes, a psychiatrist.
Based on the tests she administered on Catalina, Dr. Reyes
opined that Catalina exhibited traits of Borderline
Personality Disorder that was no longer treatable. Dr. Reyes
found that Catalina’s disorder was mainly characterized by her
immaturity that rendered her psychologically incapacitated to
meet her marital obligations.

Catalina admitted her psychological incapacity, but denied

leaving the conjugal home without Eduardo’s consent and
flirting with different men. She insisted that she had only one
live-in partner; and that she would not give up her share in the
conjugal residence because she intended to live there or to
receive her share should the residence be sold.
 148

The RTC ruled that Catalina’s infidelity, her spending more time
with friends rather than with her family, and her incessant
gambling constituted psychological incapacity that affected her
duty to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. It held
that considering that the matter of determining whether a party
was psychologically incapacitated was best left to experts like
Dr. Reyes, the results of the neuro-psychiatric evaluation by Dr.
Reyes was the best evidence of Catalina’s psychological
incapacity.

Issue:
WON there was sufficient evidence warranting the declaration of
the nullity of Catalina’s marriage to Eduardo based on her
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Held:
NONE. Given the insufficiency of the evidence proving the
psychological incapacity of Catalina, the Court cannot but
resolve in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage
and against its dissolution and nullity. The existence or absence
of the psychological incapacity based strictly on the facts of each
case and not on a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations. Indeed, the incapacity should be established
by the totality of evidence presented during trial, making it
incumbent upon the petitioner to sufficiently prove the
existence of the psychological incapacity.

The expert evidence presented in cases of declaration of nullity

of marriage based on psychological incapacity presupposes a
thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the
psychologist or expert to make a conclusive diagnosis of a grave,
severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity. In
Lim v. Sta. Cruz-Lim, the Court stated that:

The expert opinion of a psychiatrist arrived at after a

maximum of seven (7) hours of interview, and unsupported
by separate psychological tests, cannot tie the hands of the
trial court and prevent it from making its own factual finding
on what happened in this case. The probative force of the
testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere statement of his
theory or opinion, but rather in the assistance that he can
render to the courts in showing the facts that serve as a
 149

basis for his criterion and the reasons upon which the logic
of his conclusion is founded.

But Dr. Reyes had only one interview with Catalina, and did not
personally seek out and meet with other persons, aside from
Eduardo, who could have shed light on and established the
conduct of the spouses before and during the marriage. For that
reason, Dr. Reyes’ report lacked depth and objectivity, a
weakness that removed the necessary support for the conclusion
that the RTC and the CA reached about Catalina’s psychological
incapacity to perform her marital duties.

Under the circumstances, the report and court testimony by Dr.

Reyes did not present the gravity and incurability of Catalina’s
psychological incapacity. There was, to start with, no evidence
showing the root cause of her alleged borderline personality
disorder and that such disorder had existed prior to her
marriage. We have repeatedly pronounced that the root cause
of the psychological incapacity must be identified as a
psychological illness, with its incapacitating nature fully
explained and established by the totality of the evidence
presented during trial.

It is not enough that the respondent, alleged to be

psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with
his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform these
obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor –
an adverse integral element in the respondent’s personality
structure that effectively incapacitated him from complying with
his essential marital obligations – must be shown. Mere
difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital
obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is different from
incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or
illness; irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion,
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do not by
themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under
Article 36, as the same may only be due to a person’s refusal or
unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
 150

ARABELLE MENDOZA, vs. REPUBLIC & DOMINIC MENDOZA

G.R. No. 157649               November 12, 2012

Facts:
Petitioner Arabelle J Mendoza and respondent Dominic C
Mendoza met in 1989 upon his return to the country from his
employment in Papua New Guinea. They got married on her
eighth month of pregnancy in civil rites solemnized in Pasay City
on June 24, 1991, after which they moved to her place, although
remaining dependent on their parents for support.

When petitioner delivered Alyssa Bianca, Dominic had to borrow

funds from petitioner’s best friend to settle the hospital bills. He
remained jobless and dependent upon his father for support
until he finished his college course in October 1993. She took on
various jobs to meet the family’s needs. Being the one with the
fixed income, she shouldered all of the family’s expenses. On his
part, Dominic’s irregular income as a car salesman for Toyota
could not be depended upon. He even had am illicit relationship
with Zaida, his co-employee at Toyota Motors.

In November 1995, Dominic gave her a Daihatsu Charade car as

a birthday present. Later on, he asked her to issue two blank
checks that he claimed would be for the car’s insurance
coverage. She soon found out, however, that the checks were not
paid for the car’s insurance coverage but for his personal needs.
Worse, she also found out that he did not pay for the car itself,
forcing her to rely on her father-in-law to pay part of the cost of
the car, leaving her to bear the balance of P120,000.00.

To make matters worse, Dominic was fired from his employment

after he ran away with P164,000.00 belonging to his employer.
He was criminally charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 and estafa, for which he was arrested and incarcerated. After
petitioner and her mother bailed him out of jail, petitioner
discovered that he had also swindled many clients some of
whom were even threatening petitioner, her mother and her
sister themselves.

On October 15, 1997, Dominic abandoned the conjugal abode

because petitioner asked him for "time and space to think things
over." A month later, she refused his attempt at reconciliation,
causing him to threaten to commit suicide. At that, she and her
 151

family immediately left the house to live in another place

concealed from him.

On August 5, 1998, petitioner filed in the RTC her petition for

the declaration of the nullity of her marriage with Dominic based
on his psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code.

In the RTC, petitioner presented herself as a witness, together

with a psychiatrist, Dr. Rocheflume Samson, and Professor
Marites Jimenez. Based on Dr. Samson’s clinical evaluation,
petitioner appears to be mature, strong and responsible
individual. Godly, childlike trust however, makes her vulnerable
and easy to forgive and forget. Petitioner also believes that
marriage was a partnership "for better and for worse", she gave
all of herself unconditionally to respondent. Unfortunately,
respondent cannot reciprocate. On the one hand, respondent
was found to have a personality that can be characterized as
inadequate, immature and irresponsible. His criminal acts in the
present time are mere extensions of his misconduct established
in childhood. His childhood experiences of separations and
emotional deprivation largely contributed to this antisocial
(sociopathic) attitude and lifestyle. She concluded that
respondent had evidently failed to comply with what is required
of him as a husband and father. Besides from his adulterous
relationship and irresponsibility, his malevolent conduct and
lack of true remorse indicate that he is psychologically
incapacitated to fulfill the role of a married man.

Issue:
WON personal medical or psychological examination was not a
requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity.

Held:
YES, it is not a requirement. Even if the expert opinions of
psychologists are not conditions sine qua non in the granting of
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, the actual
medical examination of Dominic was to be dispensed with
only if the totality of evidence presented was enough to
support a finding of his psychological incapacity. This did
not mean that the presentation of any form of medical or
psychological evidence to show the psychological incapacity
would have automatically ensured the granting of the petition for
 152

declaration of nullity of marriage. What was essential, we should

emphasize herein, was the "presence of evidence that can
adequately establish the party’s psychological condition," as
the Court said in Marcos.

But where, like here, the parties had the full opportunity to
present the professional and expert opinions of psychiatrists
tracing the root cause, gravity and incurability of the alleged
psychological incapacity, then the opinions should be presented
and be weighed by the trial courts in order to determine and
decide whether or not to declare the nullity of the marriages.

It bears repeating that the trial courts, as in all the other

cases they try, must always base their judgments not solely
on the expert opinions presented by the parties but on the
totality of evidence adduced in the course of their
proceedings.

The Court find the totality of the evidence adduced by petitioner

insufficient to prove that Dominic was psychologically unfit to
discharge the duties expected of him as a husband, and that he
suffered from such psychological incapacity as of the date of the
marriage. Accordingly, the CA did not err in dismissing the
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.
 153

SALUD ARCA&ALFREDO JAVIER JR. vs. ALFREDO JAVIER

G.R. No. L-6768             July 31, 1954

Facts:
Defendant-appellant Alfredo Javier was a native born citizen of
the Philippines who, in 1937, married Salud R. Arca, another
Filipino citizen. Before their marriage they had already a child,
Alfredo Javier, Jr., who thereby became legitimated. In 1937
Alfredo enlisted in the U.S. Navy and in 1938 sailed for the
United States aboard a navy ship in connection with his service
leaving behind his wife and child. On August 13, 1940, he filed
an action for divorce in the Circuit Court of Mobile County,
Alabama, U.S.A., alleging as ground abandonment by his wife.
Having received a copy of the complaint, Salud R. Arca filed an
answer alleging, among other things, that Javier was not a
resident of Mobile County, but of Naic, Cavite, Philippines, and
that it was not true that the cause of their separation was
abandonment on her part but that appellant was in the United
States, without her, because he was then enlisted in the U.S.
Navy. Nevertheless, the Circuit Court of Mobile County rendered
judgment granting appellant a decree of divorce on April 9,
1941.

After securing a divorce from plaintiff Salud R. Arca, Javier

married Thelma Francis, an American citizen, and bought a
house and lot at 248 Brooklyn, New York City. In 1949, Thelma
Francis, defendant's American wife, obtained a divorce from him
for reasons not disclosed by the evidence, and, later on, having
retired from the United States Navy, defendant Alfredo Javier
returned to the Philippines, arriving here on February 13, 1950.

On April 19, 1950, defendant Alfredo Javier married Maria

Odvina before Judge Natividad Almeda-Lopez of the Municipal
Court of Manila.

Salud R. Arca then filed information for bigamy against

defendant Alfredo Javier. However, defendant Alfredo Javier was
acquitted of the charge of Bigamy holding the proposition that
the marriage of defendant Alfredo Javier with Maria Odvina was
made in all good faith and in the honest belief that his marriage
with plaintiff Salud R. Arca had been legally dissolved by the
decree of divorce obtained by him from the Circuit Court of
Mobile County, State of Alabama, USA which had the legal effect
 154

of dissolving the marital ties between defendant Alfredo Javier

and plaintiff Salud R. Arca. At this juncture, again, it is this
court's opinion that defendant Alfredo Javier's acquittal in that
was due to the fact that the accused had no criminal intent in
contracting a second or subsequent marriage while his first
marriage was still subsisting.

Issue:
WON the divorce decree obtained by defendant Alfredo is valid in
the Philippines.

Held:
NO. In essence, it was held that one of the essential
conditions for the validity of a decree of divorce is that the
court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and in
order that this may be acquired, plaintiff must be domiciled
in good faith in the State in which it is granted. It is true that
Salud R. Arca filed an answer in the divorce case instituted at
the Mobile County in view of the summons served upon her in
this jurisdiction, but this action cannot be interpreted as placing
her under the jurisdiction of the court because its only purpose
was to impugn the claim of appellant that his domicile or legal
residence at that time was Mobile County, and to show that the
ground of desertion imputed to her was baseless and false. Such
answer should be considered as a special appearance the
purpose of which is to impugn the jurisdiction of the court over
the case.

It cannot therefore be said that the Mobile County Court of

Alabama had acquired jurisdiction over the case for the
simple reason that at the time it was filed appellant's legal
residence was then in the Philippines. He could not have
acquired legal residence or domicile at Mobile County when he
moved to that place in 1938 because at that time he was still in
the service of the U.S. Navy and merely rented a room where he
used to stay during his occasional shore leave for shift duty.
That he never intended to live there permanently is shown by the
fact that after his marriage to Thelma Francis in 1941, he moved
to New York where he bought a house and a lot, and after his
divorce from Thelma in 1949 and his retirement from the U.S.
Navy, he returned to the Philippines and married Maria Odvina
of Naic, Cavite, where he lived ever since. It may therefore be
said that appellant went to Mobile County, not with the
 155

intention of permanently residing there, or of considering

that place as his permanent abode, but for the sole purpose
of obtaining divorce from his wife. Such residence is not
sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the court.

A divorce case is not a proceeding in rem, and the reversal did

not necessarily overrule the ruling laid down therein that before
a court may acquire jurisdiction over a divorce case, it is
necessary that plaintiff be domiciled in the State in which it
is filed. At any rate, the applicability of the ruling in the Canson
case may be justified on another ground: The courts in the
Philippines can grant divorce only on the ground of adultery on
the part of the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband,
and if the decree is predicated on another ground, that decree
cannot be enforced in this jurisdiction.

The said pronouncement is sound as it is in keeping with the

well known principle of Private International Law which
prohibits the extension of a foreign judgment, or the law
affecting the same, if it is contrary to the law or
fundamental policy of the State of the forum. It is also in
keeping with our concept or moral values which has always
looked upon marriage as an institution. And such concept has
actually crystallized in a more tangible manner when in the new
Civil Code our people, through Congress, decided to eliminate
altogether our law relative to divorce. Because of such concept
we cannot but react adversely to any attempt to extend here the
effect of a decree which is not in consonance with our customs,
morals, and traditions.
 156

PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ vs. VICENTA F. ESCAÑO, ET AL

G.R. No. L-19671           November 29, 1965

Facts:
On February 1948, defendant Vicenta Escaño, 27 years of age,
who belong to a prominent family in of Spanish ancestry, got
married with Pastor B Tenchavez, 32 years of age, an engineer,
ex-army officer and of undistinguished stock before a Catholic
chaplain, Lt. Moises Lavares, in the house of one Juan Alburo in
the said city. The marriage was the culmination of a previous
love affair and was duly registered with the local civil register.

As of June, 1948 the newlyweds were already estranged. Vicenta

had gone to Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, to escape from the
scandal that her marriage stirred in Cebu society. There, a
lawyer filed for her a petition, drafted by then Senator
Emmanuel Pelaez, to annul her marriage. She did not sign the
petition. The case was dismissed without prejudice because of
her non-appearance at the hearing.

On 24 June 1950, without informing her husband, she applied

for a passport, indicating in her application that she was single,
that her purpose was to study, and she was domiciled in Cebu
City, and that she intended to return after two years. The
application was approved, and she left for the United States.

On 22 August 1950, she filed a verified complaint for divorce

against the herein plaintiff in the Second Judicial District Court
of the State of Nevada in and for the County of Washoe, on the
ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." On 21
October 1950, a decree of divorce, "final and absolute", was
issued in open court by the said tribunal. On 13 September
1954, Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo Moran, in
Nevada. She now lives with him in California, and, by him, has
begotten children. She acquired American citizenship on 8
August 1958.

On 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had initiated the proceedings at bar

by a complaint against Vicenta F. Escaño, her parents, Mamerto
and Mena Escaño, whom he charged with having dissuaded and
discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband, and alienating
her affections, and against the Roman Catholic Church, for
having, through its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the annulment of
 157

the marriage, and asked for legal separation and one million
pesos in damages. Vicenta claimed a valid divorce from plaintiff
and an equally valid marriage to her present husband, Russell
Leo Moran; while her parents denied that they had in any way
influenced their daughter's acts, and counterclaimed for moral
damages

Issue:
WON the divorce sought by Vicenta Escano is valid and binding
upon courts of the Philippines.

Held:
NO. At the time the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta
Escaño, like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen. She
was then subject to Philippine law, and Article 15 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines (Rep. Act No. 386), already in force at the
time, expressly provided:

Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status,

condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon the
citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.

The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not

admit absolute divorce, quo ad vinculo matrimonii; and in fact
does not even use that term, to further emphasize its restrictive
policy on the matter, in contrast to the preceding legislation that
admitted absolute divorce on grounds of adultery of the wife or
concubinage of the husband (Act 2710). Instead of divorce, the
present Civil Code only provides for legal separation, and,
even in that case, it expressly prescribes that "the marriage
bonds shall not be severed.”

For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or

effect to a foreign decree of absolute divorce between Filipino
citizens could be a patent violation of the declared public policy
of the state. Even more, the grant of effectivity in this
jurisdiction to such foreign divorce decrees would, in effect, give
rise to an irritating and scandalous discrimination in favor of
wealthy citizens, to the detriment of those members of our
society whose means do not permit them to sojourn abroad and
obtain absolute divorces outside the Philippines.
 158

From this point of view, it is irrelevant that appellant Pastor

Tenchavez should have appeared in the Nevada divorce court.
Primarily because the policy of our law cannot be nullified by
acts of private parties; and additionally, because the mere
appearance of a non-resident consort cannot confer
jurisdiction where the court originally had none.

From the preceding facts and considerations, there flows as a

necessary consequence that in this jurisdiction Vicenta Escaño's
divorce and second marriage are not entitled to recognition as
valid; for her previous union to plaintiff Tenchavez must be
declared to be existent and undissolved. It follows, likewise, that
her refusal to perform her wifely duties, and her denial of
consortium and her desertion of her husband constitute in law a
wrong caused through her fault, for which the husband is
entitled to the corresponding indemnity. Neither an
unsubstantiated charge of deceit nor an anonymous letter
charging immorality against the husband constitute, contrary to
her claim, adequate excuse. Wherefore, her marriage and
cohabitation with Russell Leo Moran is technically "intercourse
with a person not her husband" from the standpoint of
Philippine Law, and entitles plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez to a
decree of "legal separation under our law, on the basis of
adultery."

As a matter of legal history, our statutes did not recognize

divorces a vinculo before 1917, when Act 2710 became effective;
and the present Civil Code of the Philippines, in disregarding
absolute divorces, in effect merely reverted to the policies on the
subject prevailing before Act 2710.

Except for the fact that the successional rights of the children,
begotten from Vicenta's marriage to Leo Moran after the invalid
divorce, are not involved in the case at bar, the Gmur case is
authority for the proposition that such union is adulterous in
this jurisdiction, and, therefore, justifies an action for legal
separation on the part of the innocent consort of the first
marriage, that stands undissolved in Philippine law. In not so
declaring, the trial court committed error.
 159

ALICE REYES VAN DORN vs. HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO,

JR., & RICHARD UPTON
G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985

Facts:
Petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines
while private respondent Richard Upton is a citizen of the United
States. They were married in Hongkong in 1972. After the
marriage, they established their residence in the Philippines and
they begot two children. In 1982, petitioner and private
respondent divorced in Nevada, United States. Petitioner has re-
married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.

Private respondent filed suit against petitioner stating that

petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for
short), is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that
petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business,
and that private respondent be declared with right to manage
the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on
the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous
judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court
wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner
had "no community property" as of June 11, 1982.

The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned

case on the ground that the property involved is located in the
Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the
case. The denial is now the subject of this certiorari proceeding.

Issue:
WON the foreign divorce between the petitioner and private
respondent in Nevada is binding in the Philippines where
petitioner is a Filipino citizen.

Held:
YES. It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied
in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are
covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public police and morality.
However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in
Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the
 160

standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the

marriage.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no

longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing
to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to
exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the
Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate,
he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from
asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws,

petitioner has to be considered still married to private
respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article
109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should
not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and
fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter
should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to
conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in
her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.
 161

IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL vs. HON. CORONA IBAY-

SOMERA and ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING
G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989

Facts:
On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a
Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling,
a German national, were married in Germany. The marriage
started auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for
some time in Malate, Manila where their only child, Isabella
Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980. After about three
and a half years of marriage, Geiling filed a petition for divorce
against Imelda in Germany which was then granted. Petitioner,
on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support
and separation of property which is still pending.

On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance
of the divorce decree, private respondent filed two complaints for
adultery against Imelda alleging that the latter had an affair with
a man named William Chia in 1982 and Jesus Chua in 1983.

On appeal before the SC, petitioner contended that the court is

without jurisdiction "to try and decide the charge of adultery,
which is a private offense that cannot be prosecuted de officio
(sic), since the purported complainant, a foreigner, does not
qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce
decree under his national law prior to his filing the criminal
complaint.

Issue:
WON private respondent can prosecute petitioner on the ground
of adultery even though they are no longer husband and wife as
decree of divorce was already issued.

Held:
NO. Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of
adultery, as well as four other crimes against chastity, cannot
be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed
by the offended spouse. It has long since been established,
with unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is a
jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement. While in
point of strict law the jurisdiction of the court over the offense is
vested in it by the Judiciary Law, the requirement for a sworn
 162

written complaint is just as jurisdictional a mandate since it is

that complaint which starts the prosecutory proceeding and
without which the court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to try
the case. The law specifically provides that in prosecutions
for adultery and concubinage the person who can legally file
the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody
else.

Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended

spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that such
initiator must have the status, capacity or legal
representation to do so at the time of the filing of the
criminal action. This is a familiar and express rule in civil
actions; in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a
motion to dismiss in civil cases, is determined as of the filing of
the complaint or petition.

Hence, as cogently argued by petitioner, Article 344 of the

Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital
relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution
of the criminal action for, adultery. This is a logical
consequence since the raison d'etre of said provision of law
would be absent where the supposed offended party had ceased
to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the filing of
the criminal case.

In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and

capacity of the complainant to commence the action be definitely
established and, as already demonstrated, such status or
capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he initiates
the action. It would be absurd if his capacity to bring the action
would be determined by his status before or subsequent to the
commencement thereof, where such capacity or status existed
prior to but ceased before, or was acquired subsequent to but
did not exist at the time of, the institution of the case.

American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that

jurisdiction which are in pari materia with ours, yields the rule
that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse
no longer has the right to institute proceedings against the
offenders where the statute provides that the innocent spouse
shall have the exclusive right to institute a prosecution for
adultery. Where, however, proceedings have been properly
 163

commenced, a divorce subsequently granted can have no legal

effect on the prosecution of the criminal proceedings to a
conclusion.

We are convinced that in cases of such nature, the status of

the complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be determined
as of the time the complaint was filed. Thus, the person who
initiates the adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by
this is meant that he is still married to the accused spouse, at
the time of the filing of the complaint.

In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a

valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is
admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in
the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned 23 in
view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of
status of persons.

Thus, private respondent, being no longer the husband of

petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case
under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time
he filed suit.

The allegation of private respondent that he could not have

brought this case before the decree of divorce for lack of
knowledge, even if true, is of no legal significance or
consequence in this case. When said respondent initiated the
divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that there would no
longer be a family nor marriage vows to protect once a
dissolution of the marriage is decreed. Neither would there be a
danger of introducing spurious heirs into the family, which is
said to be one of the reasons for the particular formulation of
our law on adultery, 26 since there would thenceforth be no
spousal relationship to speak of. The severance of the marital
bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each
other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast
obloquy on the other.
 164

FE D. QUITA vs. CA & BLANDINA DANDAN

G.R. No. 124862 December 22, 1998

Facts:
Petitioner Fe D. Quita and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were
married in the Philippines on 18 May 1941. They were not
however blessed with children. Somewhere along the way their
relationship soured. Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in
San Francisco, California, U.S.A. On 23 July 1954 she obtained
a final judgment of divorce. After which, petitioner had been
married twice.

On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. Lino Javier Inciong

filed a petition for issuance of letters of administration
concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust
Company. Respondent Blandina Dandan and her children with
Arturo opposed the said petition. Petitioner is also claiming her
right to inherit from Arturo.

The trial court invoking Tenchavez v. Escaño which held that "a
foreign divorce between Filipino citizens sought and decreed
after the effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386)
was not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction,"
disregarded the divorce between petitioner and Arturo.
Consequently, it expressed the view that their marriage
subsisted until the death of Arturo in 1972. Neither did it
consider valid their extrajudicial settlement of conjugal
properties due to lack of judicial approval. On the other hand, it
opined that there was no showing that marriage existed between
private respondent and Arturo, much less was it shown that the
alleged Padlan children had been acknowledged by the deceased
as his children with her.

Private respondent stressed that the citizenship of petitioner was

relevant in the light of the ruling in Van Dorn v. Rommillo Jr
that aliens who obtain divorce abroad are recognized in the
Philippnes provided they are valid according to their national
law. The petitioner herself answered that she was an American
citizen since 1954. Through the hearing she also stated that
Arturo was a Filipino at the time she obtained the divorce.
Implying that she was no longer a Filipino citizen.
 165

Issue:
WON petitioner was still entitled to inherit from Arturo
considering that she had secured a divorce in the U.S.A. and in
fact had twice remarried.

Held:
NO. Petitioner is no longer recognized as a wife of Arturo. She
cannot therefore inherit from him. The divorce decree obtained
by petitioner is valid here since she was already an alien at the
time she obtained the said divorce, and such is valid in her
country’s national law.
 166

PAULA T. LLORENTE vs. CA and ALICIA F. LLORENTE

G.R. No. 124371               November 23, 2000

Facts:
Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the United
States Navy from March 10, 1927 to September 30, 1957. In
1937, he married petitioner Paula Llorente. Before the outbreak
of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the United States and
Paula stayed in the conjugal home in barrio Antipolo, Nabua,
Camarines Sur.

On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo became a US citizen. In 1945,

he returned to the Philippines to visit Paula. He discovered that
his wife Paula was pregnant and was "living in" and having an
adulterous relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente.

On December 4, 1945, Paula gave birth to a boy registered in the

Office of the Registrar of Nabua as "Crisologo Llorente," with the
certificate stating that the child was not legitimate and the line
for the father’s name was left blank.

Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. In fact, on

February 2, 1946, the couple drew a written agreement
suspending his support to Paula; dissolving their marital union
in accordance with judicial proceedings; they would make a
separate agreement regarding their conjugal property acquired
during their marital life; and Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula
for her adulterous act since she voluntarily admitted her fault
and agreed to separate from Lorenzo peacefully. The agreement
was signed by both Lorenzo and Paula and was witnessed by
Paula’s father and stepmother. The agreement was notarized by
Notary Public Pedro Osabel.

Lorenzo returned to the United States and on November 16,

1951 filed for divorce with the Superior Court of the State of
California in and for the County of San Diego. On December 4,
1952, the divorce decree became final.

In the meantime, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines. In 1958,

he married private respondent Alicia F. Llorente. Apparently,
Alicia had no knowledge of the first marriage even if they resided
in the same town as Paula, who did not oppose the marriage or
cohabitation.
 167

On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and

Testament. The will was notarized by Notary Public Salvador M.
Occiano, duly signed by Lorenzo with attesting witnesses
Francisco Hugo, Francisco Neibres and Tito Trajano. In the will,
Lorenzo bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their three
children.

Lorenzo filed a petition for the probate and allowance of his last
will and testament wherein Lorenzo moved that Alicia be
appointed Special Administratrix of his estate. The trial court
denied the motion for the reason that the testator Lorenzo was
still alive. On January 24, 1984, finding that the will was duly
executed, the trial court admitted the will to probate. On June
11, 1985, before the proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo
died.

Paula filed with the same court a petition for letters of

administration over Lorenzo’s estate in her favor. Paula
contended (1) that she was Lorenzo’s surviving spouse, (2) that
the various property were acquired during their marriage, (3)
that Lorenzo’s will disposed of all his property in favor of Alicia
and her children, encroaching on her legitime and 1/2 share in
the conjugal property.

Issue:
WON Paula can still inherit from Lorenzo after the latter
obtained a divorce decre.

Held:
NO. The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an
American citizen long before and at the time of: (1) his divorce
from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and
(4) death, is duly established, admitted and undisputed. Thus,
as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily
governed by foreign law.

True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our

jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take
judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be
alleged and proved. While the substance of the foreign law was
pleaded, the Court of Appeals did not admit the foreign law. The
Court of Appeals and the trial court called to the fore the renvoi
 168

doctrine, where the case was "referred back" to the law of the
decedent’s domicile, in this case, Philippine law.

We note that while the trial court stated that the law of New York
was not sufficiently proven, in the same breath it made the
categorical, albeit equally unproven statement that "American
law follows the ‘domiciliary theory’ hence, Philippine law applies
when determining the validity of Lorenzo’s will.

The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code

cannot possibly apply to general American law. There is no such
law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the
United States. Each State of the union has its own law
applicable to its citizens and in force only within the State. It can
therefore refer to no other than the law of the State of which the
decedent was a resident. There is no showing that the
application of the renvoi doctrine is called for or required by New
York State law.

The trial court held that the will was intrinsically invalid since it
contained dispositions in favor of Alice, who in the trial court’s
opinion was a mere paramour. The trial court threw the will out,
leaving Alice, and her two children, Raul and Luz, with nothing.
The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will. It declared Alice
entitled to one half (1/2) of whatever property she and Lorenzo
acquired during their cohabitation, applying Article 144 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines.

The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete

disregard of the will, already probated as duly executed in
accordance with the formalities of Philippine law, is fatal,
especially in light of the factual and legal circumstances
here obtaining.

In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., we held that owing to the nationality

principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the
same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy
and morality. In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may
obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their
national law.
 169

Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of

Appeals, that once proven that respondent was no longer a
Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the
ruling in Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could
"very well lose her right to inherit" from him.

In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, we recognized the divorce obtained by

the respondent in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany.
There, we stated that divorce and its legal effects may be
recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned
in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the status
of persons.

For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of

Appeals must be reversed. The Court held that the divorce
obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was
valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity.
 170

GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO vs. REDERICK A. RECIO

G.R. No. 138322           October 2, 2001

Facts:
Respondent Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha
Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1,
1987. They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On
May 18, 1989, a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the
marriage, was issued by an Australian family court.

On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen.

Petitioner Grace Garcia-Recio, a Filipina, and Rederick got
married on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City. In their
application for a marriage license, respondent was declared as
"single" and "Filipino."

Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived

separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage.
While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were
divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory
Declarations secured in Australia.

On March 3, 1998, Grace filed a Complaint for Declaration of

Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy alleging that
respondent had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he
married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned
of respondent's marriage to Editha Samson only in November,
1997.

Issue:
WON the divorce decree obtained in Australia by the respondent
ipso facto terminated his first marriage to Editha Samson
thereby capacitating him to contract a second marriage with the
petitioner.

Held:
YES. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence,
our courts cannot grant it. A marriage between two Filipinos
cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because
of Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code. In mixed marriages
involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code
allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the
divorce is "validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
 171

capacitating him or her to remarry." A divorce obtained abroad

by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective
national laws.

Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts,

the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.
Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.

Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian

divorce decree is a public document – a written official act of an
Australian family court. Therefore, it requires no further proof of
its authenticity and due execution.

Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign

judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the
document must first be presented and admitted in evidence.
A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself.
Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself.
The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an
officially body or tribunal of a foreign country.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a

writing or document may be proven as a public or official record
of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a
copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the
document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy
must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and
(b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson

appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family
court. However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with
the aforemetioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.

Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the

Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no longer bound
by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian
citizenship in 1992. By becoming an Australian, respondent
 172

severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris

that had tied him to Philippine personal laws.

Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian

divorce law falls upon petitioner, because she is the party
challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. We are not
persuaded. The burden of proof lies with "the party who
alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the
prosecution or defense of an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs
have the burden of proving the material allegations of the
complaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendants
have the burden of proving the material allegations in their
answer when they introduce new matters. Since the divorce was
a defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the
pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.

The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson

appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian
family court. However, appearance is not sufficient;
compliance with the aforemetioned rules on evidence must
be demonstrated.

Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under
some foreign statutes and practices, still restrict remarriage.
Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by
statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorce which was granted on
the ground of adultery may be prohibited from remarrying again.
The court may allow a remarriage only after proof of good
behavior.

To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is

determined by the national law of the party concerned. The
certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would
have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of
respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly
authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of
legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a
marriage license. As it is, however, there is absolutely no
evidence that proves respondent's legal capacity to marry
petitioner.
 173

REPUBLIC vs. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III

G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005

Facts:
In 1981, respondent Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros
M. Villanueva in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was
blessed with a son and a daughter. In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left
for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few
years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been
naturalized as an American citizen. Sometime in 2000, Cipriano
learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree
and then married a certain Innocent Stanley.

Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for

authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the
Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the
petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein
petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
sought reconsideration but it was denied.

Issue:
WON Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code.

Held:
YES. Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include
cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the
marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them
becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce
decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to
remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of
the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be
to sanction absurdity and injustice.

If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the

absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to
the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be
deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26.

In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the

application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
 174

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between

a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse

capacitating him or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the

time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at
the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.

In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an

American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been
celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the
naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce
capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the
application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this
case. Thus Cipriano, the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should be
allowed to remarry.
 175

GERBERT R. CORPUZ vs. DAISYLYN STO. TOMAS & SOLGEN

G.R. No. 186571               August 11, 2010

Facts:
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who
acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization on
November 29, 2000. On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married
respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City. Due
to work and other professional commitments, Gerbert left for
Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines
sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to
discover that his wife was having an affair with another man.
Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a
petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor,
Ontario, Canada granted Gerbert’s petition for divorce on
December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later,
on January 8, 2006.

Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has
found another Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his new
Filipina fiancée in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City
Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree
on his and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate. Despite the
registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National
Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage
between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to
be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially
recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO
Circular No. 4, series of 1982.

Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of

foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved
(petition) with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not
file any responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized
letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no opposition
to Gerbert’s petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a
similar case herself but was prevented by financial and personal
circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be considered as a
party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerbert’s.

The RTC denied Gerbert’s petition. The RTC concluded that

Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for
judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a
 176

naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino

spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code, in order for him or her to be able
to remarry under Philippine law.

Issue:
WON Article 26 of the Family Code is applicable to a foreigner
spouse.

Held:
NO. The alien spouse can claim no right under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the substantive
right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse. The Family
Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages – void
and voidable marriages. In both cases, the basis for the judicial
declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage
exists before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the
other hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union
for cause arising after the marriage. Our family laws do not
recognize absolute divorce between Filipino citizens.

Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,

EO 227 effectively incorporated into the law this Court’s holding
in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. In both
cases, the Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouse’s
assertion of marital rights after a foreign court’s divorce
decree between the alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus,
recognized that the foreign divorce had already severed the
marital bond between the spouses.

As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the

law "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a
divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse." The
legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by
clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts
created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino
spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the
alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to
remarry. Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of
divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that
 177

purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of

no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not
recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond; Article
17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute
divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a
foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article
26 of the Family Code provides the direct exception to this rule
and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the
marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien
spouse.

Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of

Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to the
recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds
that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the
courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise
capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this
jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for the
alien spouse (other than that already established by the decree),
whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his
national law.

Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the
purpose of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the
provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other
words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse
can claim no right under this provision.
 178

LLAVE VS REPUBLIC & TAMANO

GR No. 169766, March 30, 2011

Facts:
Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married
Estrellita twice -initially under the Islamic laws and tradition on
May 27, 1993 in Cotabato Cityand, subsequently, under a civil
ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao del
Sur on June 2, 1993. In their marriage contracts, Sen. Tamano's
civil status was indicated as 'divorced.'

On November 23,1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda

A. Tamano (Zorayda) and her son Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib),
in their own behalf and in behalf of the rest of Sen. Tamano's
legitimate children with Zorayda, filed a complaint with the RTC
of Quezon City for the declaration of nullity of marriage between
Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous. The complaint
alleged, inter alia, that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda on May
31, 1958 under civil rites, and that this marriage remained
subsisting when he married Estrellita in 1993.

Instead of submitting her answer, however, Estrellita filed a

Motion to Dismiss on February 20, 1995 where she declared
that Sen. Tamano and Zorayda are both Muslims who were
married under the Muslim rites, as had been averred in the
latter's disbarment complaint against Sen. Tamano. Estrellita
argued that the RTC has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of
the case because under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1083, or the
Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines (Muslim Code),
questions and issues involving Muslim marriages and divorce
fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of shari'a courts.

The RTC, finding that the marital ties of Sen. Tamano and
Zorayda were never severed, declared Sen. Tamano's subsequent
marriage to Estrellita as void ah initio for being bigamous under
Article 35 of the Family Code of the Philippines and under Article
83 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

The CA adjudged that Estrellita's marriage to Sen. Tamano is

void ab initio for being bigamous, reasoning that the marriage of
Zorayda and Sen. Tamano is governed by the Civil Code, which
does not provide for an absolute divorce. It noted that their first
nuptial celebration was under civil rites, while the subsequent
 179

Muslim celebration was only ceremonial. Zorayda then,

according to the CA, had the legal standing to file the action as
she is Sen. Tamano's wife and, hence, the injured party in the
senator's subsequent bigamous marriage with Estrellita.

Issue: 
WON the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano
was bigamous.

Held:
YES. The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda
was celebrated in 1958, solemnized under civil and Muslim rites.
The only law in force governing marriage relationships between
Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950,
under the provisions of which only one marriage can exist at any
given time. Under the marriage provisions of the Civil Code,
divorce is not recognized except during the effectivity of
Republic Act No. 394 which was not availed of during its
effectivity.

As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamano's prior marriage

to Zorayda has been severed by way of divorce under PD 1083,
the law that codified Muslim personal laws. However, PD 1083
cannot benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides
that the law applies to "marriage and divorce wherein both
parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim
and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law
or this Code in any part of the Philippines." But we already ruled
in GR. No. 126603 that "Article 13 of PD 1083 does not provide
for a situation where the parties were married both in civil and
Muslim rites."

Moreover, the Muslim Code took effect only on February 4, 1977,

and this law cannot retroactively override the Civil Code which
already bestowed certain rights on the marriage of Sen. Tamano
and Zorayda.

An instance of retroactive application of the Muslim Code is

Article 186(2) which states:

A marriage contracted by a Muslim male prior to the

effectivity of this Code in accordance with non-Muslim law
shall be considered as one contracted under Muslim law
 180

provided the spouses register their mutual desire to this

effect.

Even granting that there was registration of mutual consent for

the marriage to be considered as one contracted under the
Muslim law, the registration of mutual consent between Zorayda
and Sen. Tamano will still be ineffective, as both are Muslims
whose marriage was celebrated under both civil and Muslim
laws. Besides, as we have already settled, the Civil Code
governs their personal status since this was in effect at the
time of the celebration of their marriage. In view of Sen.
Tamano's prior marriage which subsisted at the time Estrellita
married him, their subsequent marriage is correctly adjudged by
the CA as void ab initio
 181

ALAIN M. DIÑO vs. MA. CARIDAD L. DIÑO

G.R. No. 178044               January 19, 2011

Facts:
Petitioner Alain M. Diño and respondent Ma. Caridad L. Diño
were childhood friends and sweethearts. They started living
together in 1984 until they decided to separate in 1994. In 1996,
petitioner and respondent decided to live together again. On 14
January 1998, they were married before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of
Las Piñas City.

In 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of

Marriage against respondent on the ground of psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that
respondent failed in her marital obligation to give love and
support to him, and had abandoned her responsibility to the
family, choosing instead to go on shopping sprees and
gallivanting with her friends that depleted the family assets.
Petitioner further alleged that respondent was not faithful, and
would at times become violent and hurt him.

Extrajudicial service of summons was effected upon respondent

who, at the time of the filing of the petition, was already living in
the United States of America. Despite receipt of the summons,
respondent did not file an answer to the petition within the
reglementary period. Petitioner later learned that respondent
filed a petition for divorce/dissolution of her marriage with
petitioner, which was granted by the Superior Court of California
on 25 May 2001. Petitioner also learned that on 5 October 2001,
respondent married a certain Manuel V. Alcantara.

In its 18 October 2006 Decision, the trial court granted the

petition on the ground that respondent was psychologically
incapacited to comply with the essential marital obligations at
the time of the celebration of the marriage. A DECREE OF
ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall only be issued upon
compliance with Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family Code.

Issue:
WON the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of
absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after
liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties
under Article 147 of the Family Code.
 182

Held:
YES. The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon
City that in a void marriage, regardless of its cause, the property
relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is
governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.
Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who
are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to
contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, such
as petitioner and respondent in the case before the Court.

For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following

elements must be present:

1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry

each other;

2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife;

and

3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their

marriage is void.

All these elements are present in this case and there is no

question that Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the
property relations between petitioner and respondent.

It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of

the Rule applies only to marriages which are declared void ab
initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of
the Family Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does
not apply to marriages which are declared void ab initio under
Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void
without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the
parties.

Article 40 of the Family Code contemplates a situation where a

second or bigamous marriage was contracted. Under Article 40,
"[t]he absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void."
 183

Article 45 of the Family Code, on the other hand, refers to

voidable marriages, meaning, marriages which are valid until
they are set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an
action for annulment. In both instances under Articles 40 and
45, the marriages are governed either by absolute community of
property or conjugal partnership of gains unless the parties
agree to a complete separation of property in a marriage
settlement entered into before the marriage. Since the property
relations of the parties is governed by absolute community of
property or conjugal partnership of gains, there is a need to
liquidate, partition and distribute the properties before a decree
of annulment could be issued. That is not the case for
annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code
because the marriage is governed by the ordinary rules on co-
ownership.

In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was declared

void under Article 36 of the Family Code and not under
Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of
properties owned in common by petitioner and respondent
are the rules on co-ownership.

In Valdes, the Court ruled that the property relations of parties

in a void marriage during the period of cohabitation is governed
either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. The rules
on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses
should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code
provisions on co-ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil
Code, "partition may be made by agreement between the parties
or by judicial proceedings. x x x." It is not necessary to liquidate
the properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for
declaration of nullity of marriage.
 184

ERIC U. YU vs. JUDGE REYES CARPIO & CAROLINE YU

G.R. No. 189207               June 15, 2011

Facts:
Petitioner Eric U Yu filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage against private respondent Caroline T. Yu. Private
respondent moved to submit the incident on the declaration of
nullity of marriage for resolution of the court, considering that
the incidents on custody, support, and property relations were
mere consequences of the declaration of nullity of the parties’
marriage.

On September 28, 2006, petitioner opposed private respondent’s

Motion, claiming that the incident on the declaration of
nullity of marriage cannot be resolved without the
presentation of evidence for the incidents on custody,
support, and property relations. Petitioner, therefore, averred
that the incident on nullity of marriage, on the one hand, and
the incidents on custody, support, and property relations, on the
other, should both proceed and be simultaneously resolved.

Thereafter, private respondent filed an Omnibus Motion on May

21, 2008. The Omnibus Motion sought (1) the strict observation
by the RTC-Branch 261 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages, as codified in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC,
in the subject proceedings; and (2) that the incident on the
declaration of nullity of marriage be already submitted for
resolution. Conversely, private respondent prayed that the
incident on the declaration of nullity of marriage be resolved
ahead of the incidents on custody, support, and property
relations, and not simultaneously.

Issue:
WON the CA erred in ruling on the issue of nullity of marriage
without the presentation of evidence for the incidents on
custody, support and property relations.

Held:
NO. Under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages. Particularly, Secs. 19 and 21 of the Rule, it allows the
reception of evidence on custody, support, and property
 185

relations after the trial court renders a decision granting the

petition, or upon entry of judgment granting the petition.

Evidently, Judge Reyes-Carpio did not deny the reception of

evidence on custody, support, and property relations but merely
deferred it, based on the existing rules issued by this Court, to a
time when a decision granting the petition is already at hand
and before a final decree is issued. Conversely, the trial court,
or more particularly the family court, shall proceed with the
liquidation, partition and distribution, custody, support of
common children, and delivery of their presumptive legitimes
upon entry of judgment granting the petition. And following the
pertinent provisions of the Court En Banc Resolution in A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC, this act is undoubtedly consistent with Articles 50
and 51 of the Family Code, contrary to what petitioner asserts.

The Court En Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC clearly

allows the deferment of the reception of evidence on
custody, support, and property relations. Conversely, the
trial court may receive evidence on the subject incidents
after a judgment granting the petition but before the decree
of nullity or annulment of marriage is issued. And this is
what Judge Reyes-Carpio sought to comply with in issuing the
assailed orders. As correctly pointed out by the CA, petitioner’s
assertion that ruling the main issue without receiving evidence
on the subject incidents would result in an ambiguous and
fragmentary judgment is certainly speculative and, hence,
contravenes the legal presumption that a trial judge can fairly
weigh and appraise the evidence submitted by the parties.
 186

VALERIO E. KALAW vs. MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ

G.R. No. 166357               September 19, 2011

Facts:
Petitioner Valerio E. Kalaw (Tyrone) and respondent Ma. Elena
Fernandez (Malyn) met in 1973. They maintained a relationship and
eventually married in Hong Kong on November 4, 1976. They had four
children, Valerio (Rio), Maria Eva (Ria), Ramon Miguel (Miggy or
Mickey), and Jaime Teodoro (Jay).

Shortly after the birth of their youngest son, Tyrone had an extramarital
affair with Jocelyn Quejano. In May 1985, Malyn left the conjugal home
and her four children with Tyrone. Meanwhile, Tyrone started living
with Jocelyn, who bore him three more children.

In 1990, Tyrone went to the United States (US) with Jocelyn and their
children. He left his four children from his marriage with Malyn in a
rented house in Valle Verde with only a househelp and a driver. The
househelp would just call Malyn to take care of the children whenever
any of them got sick. Also, in accordance with their custody agreement,
the children stayed with Malyn on weekends.

Meanwhile, Tyrone and Jocelyn’s family returned to the Philippines and

resumed physical custody of the two younger children, Miggy and Jay.
According to Malyn, from that time on, the children refused to go to her
house on weekends because of alleged weekend plans with their father.

On July 6, 1994, nine years since the de facto separation from his wife,
Tyrone filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage based on
Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that Malyn was psychologically
incapacitated to perform and comply with the essential marital
obligations at the time of the celebration of their marriage. He further
claimed that her psychological incapacity was manifested by her
immaturity and irresponsibility towards Tyrone and their children
during their co-habitation

After summarizing the evidence presented by both parties, the trial

court concluded that both parties are psychologically incapacitated to
perform the essential marital obligations under the Family Code. The
declared the parties’ marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 36 of
the Family Code.

The CA reversed the trial court’s ruling because it is not supported by

the facts on record. Both parties’ allegations and incriminations against
each other do not support a finding of psychological incapacity. The
parties’ faults tend only to picture their immaturity and irresponsibility
in performing their marital and familial obligations. At most, there
may be sufficient grounds for a legal separation. Moreover, the
 187

psychological report submitted by petitioner’s expert witness, Dr. Gates,

does not explain how the diagnosis of NPD came to be drawn from the
sources. It failed to satisfy the legal and jurisprudential requirements
for the declaration of nullity of marriage.

Issue:
WON the petitioner’s ground are sufficient for annulment.

Held:
NO. Given the insufficiency of evidence that respondent actually
engaged in the behaviors described as constitutive of NPD, there is no
basis for concluding that she was indeed psychologically incapacitated.
Indeed, the totality of the evidence points to the opposite conclusion. A
fair assessment of the facts would show that respondent was not totally
remiss and incapable of appreciating and performing her marital and
parental duties. Not once did the children state that they were neglected
by their mother. On the contrary, they narrated that she took care of
them, was around when they were sick, and cooked the food they like. It
appears that respondent made real efforts to see and take care of her
children despite her estrangement from their father. There was no
testimony whatsoever that shows abandonment and neglect of familial
duties. While petitioner cites the fact that his two sons, Rio and Miggy,
both failed the second elementary level despite having tutors, there is
nothing to link their academic shortcomings to Malyn’s actions.

After poring over the records of the case, the Court finds no factual
basis for the conclusion of psychological incapacity. There is no error in
the CA’s reversal of the trial court’s ruling that there was psychological
incapacity. The trial court’s Decision merely summarized the
allegations, testimonies, and evidence of the respective parties, but it
did not actually assess the veracity of these allegations, the credibility of
the witnesses, and the weight of the evidence. The trial court did not
make factual findings which can serve as bases for its legal conclusion
of psychological incapacity.

What transpired between the parties is acrimony and, perhaps,

infidelity, which may have constrained them from dedicating the best
of themselves to each other and to their children. There may be
grounds for legal separation, but certainly not psychological
incapacity that voids a marriage.
 188

CARMEN LAPUZ-SY VS EUFEMIO EUFEMIO

GR No. L-30977 January 31, 1972

Facts:
Petitioner Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation
against respondent Eufemio Eufemio alias Eufemio Sy Uy on
August 1953.  They were married civilly on September 21, 1934 and
canonically after nine days.  They had lived together as husband
and wife continuously without any children until 1943 when her
husband abandoned her.  They acquired properties during their
marriage.  Carmen then discovered that her husband cohabited
with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok on or about 1949.  She
prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal separation, which among
others, would order that the defendant Eufemio should be deprived
of his share of the conjugal partnership profits.  Eufemio
counterclaimed for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with
Lapuz-Sy on the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage with
Go Hiok celebrated according to Chinese law and customs, with one
Go Hiok, alias Ngo Hiok. 

Trial proceeded and the parties adduced their respective evidence. 

However, before the trial could be completed, respondent already
scheduled to present surrebuttal evidence, petitioner died in a
vehicular accident on May 1969.  Her counsel duly notified the
court of her death.  Eufemio moved to dismiss the petition for legal
separation on June 1969 on the grounds that the said petition was
filed beyond the one-year period provided in Article 102 of the Civil
Code and that the death of Carmen abated the action for legal
separation. Petitioner’s counsel moved to substitute the deceased
Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz. 

The Juvenile and Domestic Court issued the order under review,
dismissing the case. In the body of the order, the court stated that
the motion to dismiss and the motion for substitution had to be
resolved on the question of whether or not the plaintiff's cause of
action has survived, which the court resolved in the negative.

Issue:
WON the death of the plaintiff before final decree, in an action for
legal separation, abate the action? If it does, will abatement also
apply if the action involves property rights.
Held:
YES. An action for legal separation which involves nothing more
than the bed-and-board separation of the spouses (there being no
absolute divorce in this jurisdiction) is purely personal. The Civil
 189

Code of the Philippines recognizes this in its Article 100, by allowing

only the innocent spouse (and no one else) to claim legal separation;
and in its Article 108, by providing that the spouses can, by their
reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings and even rescind a
decree of legal separation already rendered. Being personal in
character, it follows that the death of one party to the action
causes the death of the action itself — actio personalis moritur
cum persona.

A review of the resulting changes in property relations between

spouses shows that they are solely the effect of the decree of legal
separation; hence, they can not survive the death of the
plaintiff if it occurs prior to the decree. It is apparent that the
right to the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains (or of
the absolute community of property), the loss of right by the
offending spouse to any share of the profits earned by the
partnership or community, or his disqualification to inherit by
intestacy from the innocent spouse as well as the revocation of
testamentary provisions in favor of the offending spouse made by
the innocent one, are all rights and disabilities that, by the very
terms of the Civil Code article, are vested exclusively in the
persons of the spouses; and by their nature and intent, such
claims and disabilities are difficult to conceive as assignable or
transmissible. Hence, a claim to said rights is not a claim that "is
not thereby extinguished" after a party dies, under Section 17, Rule
3, of the Rules of Court, to warrant continuation of the action
through a substitute of the deceased party.

A further reason why an action for legal separation is abated by the

death of the plaintiff, even if property rights are involved, is that
these rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their
source being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not
come into existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these
claims are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during
the pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death
producing a more radical and definitive separation; and the
expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain
unborn.
 190

SOCORRO MATUBIS vs. ZOILO PRAXEDES

G.R. No. L-11766            October 25, 1960

Facts:
Plaintiff Socorro Matubis and defendant Zoilo Praxedes were
legally married on January 10, 1943 in Iriga, Camarines Sur.
For failure to agree on how they should live as husband and
wife, the couple, on May 30, 1944, agreed to live separately from
each other, which status remained unchanged until the present.
On April 3, 1948, plaintiff and defendant entered into an
agreement stating as follows:

(a) That both of us relinquish our right over the other as legal
husband and wife.
(b) That both without any interference by any of us, nor
either of us can prosecute the other for adultery or
concubinage or any other crime or suit arising from our
separation.
(c) That I, the, wife, is no longer entitled for any support from
my husband or any benefits he may received thereafter, nor I
the husband is not entitled for anything from my wife.
(d) That neither of us can claim anything from the other from
the time we verbally separated, that is from May 30, 1944 to
the present when we made our verbal separation into
writing.

In January, 1955, defendant began cohabiting with one

Asuncion Rebulado and on September 1, 1955, said Asuncion
gave birth to a child who was recorded as the child of said
defendant. It was shown also that defendant and Asuncion
deported themselves as husband and wife and were generally
reputed as such in the community.

On April 24, 1956, plaintiff filed a complaint for Legal Separation

and changed for surname against defendant alleging
abandonment and concubinage. The allegations of the complaint
were denied by defendant spouse, who interposed the defense
that it was plaintiff who left the conjugal home.

After the trial, without the defendant adducing any evidence, the
court a quo rendered judgment holding that the acts of
defendant constituted concubinage, a ground for legal
separation. It however dismissed the complaint stating that the
 191

period to bring the action has already elapsed and that there
was consent on the part of the plaintiff to the concubinage.

Issue:
WON there was consent of the wife to her husband’s
concubinage.

Held:
YES. Under Article 102 of the new Civil Code, it provides that an
action for legal separation cannot be filed except within one
year from and after the date on which the plaintiff became
cognizant of the cause and within five years from after the
date when cause occurred.

The complaint was filed outside the periods provided for by the
above Article. By the very admission of plaintiff, she came to
know the ground (concubinage) for the legal separation in
January, 1955. She instituted the complaint only on April 24,
1956. It is to be noted that appellant did not even press this
matter in her brief.

The very wording of the agreement gives no room for

interpretation other than that given by the trial judge. Counsel
in his brief submits that the agreement is divided in two parts.
The first part having to do with the act of living separately which
he claims to be legal, and the second part — that which becomes
a license to commit the ground for legal separation which is
admittedly illegal. We do not share appellant's view.

Condonation and consent on the part of plaintiff are necessarily

the import of paragraph 6(b) of the agreement. The condonation
and consent here are not only implied but expressed. The law
(Art. 100 Civil Code), specifically provides that legal separation
may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there
has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or
concubinage.

Having condoned and/or consented in writing, the plaintiff is

now undeserving of the court's sympathy.
 192

PEOPLE vs. URSULA SENSANO and MARCELO RAMOS

G.R. No. L-37720             March 27, 1933

Facts:
Defendant Ursula Sensano and Mariano Ventura were married
on April 29, 1919. They had one child. Shortly after the birth of
his child, the Mariano left his wife to go to the Province of
Cagayan where he remained for three years without writing to
his wife or sending her anything for the support of herself and
their son.

Poor and illiterate, without relatives upon whom she could call,
Ursula struggled for an existence for herself and her son until a
she met the accused Marcelo Ramos who took her and the child
to live with him. On the return of the husband in 1924, he filed
a charge against his wife and Marcelo Ramos for adultery and
both were sentenced to four months and one day of arresto
mayor.

The court, in its decision, stated the following: "In the opinion of
the court, the husband of the accused has been somewhat cruel
in his treatment of his wife having abandoned her as he did."
After completing her sentence, the accused left her paramour.
She thereupon appealed to this municipal president and the
justice of the peace to send for her husband so that she might
ask his pardon and beg him to take her back. At the house of
the president she begged his pardon and promised to be a
faithful wife if he would take care her back. He refused to pardon
her to live with her and said she could go where she wished, that
he would have nothing more to do with her, and she could do as
she pleased.

Abandoned for the second time, she and her child went back to
her co-accused Marcelo Ramos (this was in the year 1924) and
they have lived with him ever since. The husband, knowing that
she resumed living with her codefendant in 1924, did nothing to
interfere with their relations or to assert his rights as husband.
Shortly thereafter he left for the Territory of Hawaii where he
remained for seven years completely abandoning his said wife
and child. On his return to these Islands, he presented the
second charge of adultery here involved with the sole purpose,
as he declared, of being able to obtain a divorce under the
provisions of Act No. 2710.
 193

Issue:
WON defendant Ursula can be held liable for adultery again.

Held:
NO. Apart from the fact that the husband in this case was
assuming a mere pose when he signed the complaint as the
"offended" spouse, we have come to the conclusion that the
evidence in this case and his conduct warrant the inference
that he consented to the adulterous relations existing
between the accused and therefore he is not authorized by
law to institute this criminal proceeding.

The Court cannot accept the argument of the Attorney-General

that the seven years of acquiescence on his part in the adultery
of his wife is explained by his absence from the Philippine
Islands during which period it was impossible for him to take
any action against the accused. There is no merit in the
argument that it was impossible for the husband to take any
action against the accused during the said seven years.
 194

PEOPLE vs. RODOLFO A. SCHNECKENBURGER, ET AL.,

G.R. No. L-48183            November 10, 1941

Facts:
After seven years of marital life, the accused Rodolfo A.
Schneckenburger and compliant Elena Ramirez Cartagena
agreed in writing, for reason of alleged incompatibility of
character, to live separately and that they can take other
partners.

On June 15, 1935, the accused Schneckenburger, without

leaving the Philippines, secured a decree of divorce from the civil
court of Juarez, Bravos District, State of Chihuahua, Mexico. On
May 11, 1936, he contracted another marriage with his co-
accused, Julia Medel, in the justice of the peace court of
Malabon, Rizal, and since then they lived together as husband
and wife in the city of Manila. Because of the nullity of the
divorce decreed by the Mexico Court, complaint herein instituted
two actions against the accused, one for bigamy in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal and the other concubinage in the court of
First Instance of Manila. The first culminated in the conviction of
the accused for which he was sentenced to penalty of two
months and one day of arresto mayor.

On the trial for the offense of concubinage accused interposed

the plea of double jeopardy, and the case was dismissed; but,
upon appeal by the fiscal, this Court held the dismissal before
the trial to be premature this was under the former procedure
and without deciding the question of double jeopardy, remanded
the case to the trial court for trial on the merits. Accused was
convicted of concubinage through reckless imprudence and
sentenced to a penalty of two months and one day of arresto
mayor. Hence this appeal.

Issue:
WON there was consent to defendant’s act of concubinage.

Held:
YES. The document executed by and between the accused
and the complaint in which they agreed to be "en completa
libertad de accion en cualquier acto y en todos conceptos," while
illegal for the purpose for which it was executed, constitutes
nevertheless a valid consent to the act of concubinage within
 195

the meaning of section 344 of the Revised Penal Code. There can
be no doubt that by such agreement, each party clearly intended
to forego to illicit acts of the other.

The consent which bars the offended party from instituting a

criminal prosecution in cases of adultery, concubinage,
seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness is that
which has been given expressly or impliedly after the crime
has been committed. The Court are now convinced that this is
a narrow view in way warranted by the language, as well as the
manifest policy, of the law. The second paragraph of article 344
of the Revised Penal Code provides:

The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution

without including both the guilty parties, if they are both
alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have consented or
pardoned the offenders. (Emphasis ours.)

As the term "pardon" unquestionably refers to the offense after

its commission, "consent" must have been intended agreeably
with its ordinary usage, to refer to the offense prior to its
commission. No logical difference can indeed be perceived
between prior and subsequent consent, for in both instances as
the offended party has chosen to compromise with his/her
dishonor, he/she becomes unworthy to come to court and
invoke its aid in the vindication of the wrong. For instance, a
husband who believers his wife another man for adultery, is as
unworthy, if not more, as where, upon acquiring knowledge of
the adultery after its commission, he says or does nothing. We,
therefore, hold that the prior consent is as effective as
subsequent consent to bar the offended party from
prosecuting the offense.
 196

BENJAMIN BUGAYONG vs. LEONILA GINEZ,

G.R. No. L-10033        December 28, 1956

Facts:
Plaintiff Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the United States
Navy, was married to defendant Leonila Ginez on August 27,
1949, at Asingan, Pangasinan. Immediately after their marriage,
the couple lived with their sisters who later moved to Sampaloc,
Manila. After some time, or about July 1951, Leonila Ginez left
the dwelling of her sister-in-law and informed her husband by
letter that she had gone to reside with her mother in Asingan,
Pangasinan, from which place she later moved to Dagupan City
to study in a local college there.

As early as July, 1951, Benjamin Bugayong began receiving

letters from Valeriana Polangco (plaintiff's sister-in-law) and
some from anonymous writers which were not produced at the
hearing informing him of alleged acts of infidelity of his wife.
Plaintiff admitted that his wife also informed him by letter that a
certain "Eliong" kissed her.

In August, 1952, plaintiff went to Asingan, Pangasinan, and

sought for his wife whom he met in the house of her godmother.
She came along with him and both proceeded to the house of
Pedro Bugayong, a cousin of the plaintiff-husband, where they
stayed and lived for 2 nights and 1 day as husband and wife.
Then they repaired to the plaintiff's house and again passed the
night therein as husband and wife. On the second day,
Benjamin Bugayong tried to verify from his wife the truth of the
information he received that she had committed adultery but
Leonila, instead of answering his query, merely packed up and
left, which he took as a confirmation of the acts of infidelity
imputed on her.

On November 18, 1952, Benjamin Bugayong filed a complaint

for legal separation against his wife, Leonila Ginez, who timely
filed an answer vehemently denying the averments of the
complaint and setting up affirmative defenses and filed a motion
to dismiss on the ground that the acts complained of have been
condoned.
 197

Issue:
WON there was condonation between Bugayong and Ginez that
may serve as a ground for dismissal of the action.

Held:
YES. Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense
constituting a ground for legal separation or, as stated in I
Bouver's Law Dictionary, p. 585, condonation is the
"conditional forgiveness or remission, by a husband or wife
of a matrimonial offense which the latter has committed". It
is to be noted, however, that in defendant's answer she
vehemently and vigorously denies having committed any act of
infidelity against her husband, and even if We were to give full
weight to the testimony of the plaintiff, who was the only one
that had the chance of testifying in Court and link such evidence
with the averments of the complaint, We would have to conclude
that the facts appearing on the record are far from sufficient to
establish the charge of adultery, or, as the complaint states, of
"acts of rank infidelity amounting to adultery" preferred against
the defendant. Certainly, the letter that plaintiff claims to have
received from his sister-in-law Valeriana Polangco, which must
have been too vague and indefinite as to defendant's infidelity to
deserve its production in evidence; nor the anonymous letters
which plaintiff also failed to present; nor the alleged letter that,
according to plaintiff, his wife addressed to him admitting that
she had been kissed by one Eliong, whose identity was not
established and which admission defendant had no opportunity
to deny because the motion to dismiss was filed soon after
plaintiff finished his testimony in Court, do not amount to
anything that can be relied upon.

Although no acts of infidelity might have been committed by the

wife, We agree with the trial judge that the conduct of the
plaintiff-husband above narrated despite his belief that his
wife was unfaithful, deprives him, as alleged the offended
spouse, of any action for legal separation against the
offending wife, because his said conduct comes within the
restriction of Article 100 of the Civil Code. The only general
rule in American jurisprudence is that any cohabitation with the
guilty party, after the commission of the offense, and with the
knowledge or belief on the part of the injured party of its
commission, will amount to conclusive evidence of condonation;
but this presumption may be rebutted by evidence.
 198

WILLIAM H. BROWN vs. JUANITA YAMBAO,

G.R. No. L-10699           October 18, 1957

Facts:
On July 14, 1955, plaintiff William H. Brown filed suit to obtain
legal separation from his lawful wife defendant Juanita Yambao. He
alleged under oath that his wife engaged in adulterous relations
with one Carlos Field of whom she begot a baby girl that Brown
learned of his wife’s misconduct only in 1945, upon his release from
internment. Thereafter, the spouse lived separately and later
executed a document liquidating their conjugal partnership and
assigning certain properties to the erring wife as her share. The
complaint prayed for confirmation of the liquidation agreement; for
custody of the children issued of the marriage; that the defendant
be declared disqualified to succeed the plaintiff; and for their
remedy as might be just and equitable.

Upon petition of the plaintiff, the court subsequently declared the

wife in default, for failure to answer in due time, despite service of
summons; and directed the City Fiscal or his representatives to
investigate, in accordance with Article 101 of the Civil Code,
whether or not a collusion exists between the parties. The City
Fiscal or his representative is also directed to intervene in the case
in behalf of the State.

As ordered, Assistant City Fiscal Rafael Jose appeared at the trial,

and cross-examined plaintiff Brown. His questions (strenuously
objected to by Brown's counsel) elicited the fact that after liberation,
Brown had lived maritally with another woman named Lilia Deito
and had begotten children by her. Thereafter, the court rendered
judgment denying the legal separation asked, on the ground that,
while the wife's adultery was established, Brown had incurred in
a misconduct of similar nature that barred his right of action
under Article 100 of the new Civil Code.

It was also found out that there had been consent and connivance,
and because Brown's action had prescribed under Article 102 of the
same Code since the evidence showed that the learned of his wife's
infidelity in 1945 but only filed action in 1955.

Issues:
WON proceedings for legal separation can still be instituted when
both parties are the offenders.
 199

Held:
NO. Collusion in matrimonial cases being "the act of married
persons in procuring a divorce by mutual consent, whether by
preconcerted commission by one of a matrimonial offense, or
by failure, in pursuance of agreement to defend divorce
proceedings," it was legitimate for the Fiscal to bring to light any
circumstances that could give rise to the inference that the wife's
default was calculated, or agreed upon, to enable appellant to
obtain the decree of legal separation that he sought without regard
to the legal merits of his case. One such circumstance is obviously
the fact of Brown's cohabitation with a woman other than his wife,
since it bars him from claiming legal separation by express
provision of Article 100 of the new Civil Code. Wherefore, such
evidence of such misconduct, were proper subject of inquiry as they
may justifiably be considered circumstantial evidence of collusion
between the spouses.

The court below also found, and correctly held that the appellant's
action was already barred, because Brown did not petition for legal
separation proceedings until ten years after he learned of his wife's
adultery, which was upon his release from internment in 1945.
Under Article 102 of the new Civil Code, action for legal
separation can not be filed except within one (1) year from and
after the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within
five years from and after the date when such cause occurred.
Appellant's brief does not even contest the correctness of such
findings and conclusion.

It is true that the wife has not interposed prescription as a defense.

Nevertheless, the courts can take cognizance thereof, because
actions seeking a decree of legal separation, or annulment of
marriage, involve public interest and it is the policy of our law that
no such decree be issued if any legal obstacles thereto appear upon
the record.

Hence, there being at least two well established statutory grounds

for denying the remedy sought (commission of similar offense by
petitioner and prescription of the action), it becomes unnecesary to
delve further into the case and ascertain if Brown's inaction for
ten years also evidences condonation or connivance on his
part. Even if it did not, his situation would not be improved. It is
thus needless to discuss the second assignment of error.
 200

JOSE DE OCAMPO VS. SERAFINA FLORENCIANO

G.R. No. L-13553             February 23, 1960

Facts:
Petitioner Jose de Ocampo and respondent Serafina Florenciano
were married in 1938.  They begot several children who are not
living with the petitioner.  In March 1951, Ocampo discovered on
several occasions that his wife was betraying his trust by
maintaining illicit relations with Jose Arcalas.  Having found
out, he sent Serafina to Manila in June 1951 to study beauty
culture where she stayed for one year.  Again plaintiff discovered
that the wife was going out with several other men other than
Arcalas.  In 1952, when the wife finished her studies, she left
Ocampo and since then they had lived separately.  In June
1955, Ocampo caught Serafina in the act of having illicit
relations with Nelson Orzame.  He signified his intention of filing
a petition for legal separation to which Serafina manifested
conformity provided she is not charged with adultery in a
criminal action.  Accordingly, Ocampo filed a petition for legal
separation in 1955.

Having made no answer, the court defaulted Serafina and

directed the provincial fiscal to investigate whether or not
collusion existed between the parties. The fiscal examined
Serafina under oath, and then reported to the Court that there
was no collusion.

The Court of Appeals held that the husband's right to legal

separation on account of the defendant's adultery with Jose
Arcalas had prescribed, because his action was not filed
within one year from March 1951 when plaintiff discovered
her infidelity. As to the adultery with Nelson Orzame, the
appellate court found that in the night of June 18, 1955, the
husband upon discovering the illicit connection, expressed his
wish to file a petition for legal separation and defendant readily
agreed to such filing. And when she was questioned by the
Fiscal upon orders of the court, she reiterated her conformity to
the legal separation even as she admitted having had sexual
relations with Nelson Orzame. Interpreting these facts
virtually to mean a confession of judgment the Appellate
Court declared that under Art. 101, legal separation could
not be decreed.
 201

Issue:
WON the confession made by Serafina constitute the confession
of judgment disallowed by the Family Code.

Held:
NO. The SC held that the confession of judgment does not
exclude, as evidence, any admission or confession made by
the defendant outside of the court. It merely prohibits a
decree of separation upon a confession of judgment. Confession
of judgment usually happens when the defendant appears in
court and confesses the right of plaintiff to judgment or files
a pleading expressly agreeing to the plaintiff's demand.

Yet, even supposing that the statement of defendant constituted

practically a confession of judgment, inasmuch as there is
evidence of the adultery independently of such statement, the
decree may and should be granted, since it would not be based
on her confession, but upon evidence presented by the plaintiff.
What the law prohibits is a judgment based exclusively or
mainly on defendant's confession. If a confession defeats the
action ipso facto, any defendant who opposes the separation will
immediately confess judgment, purposely to prevent it.

Needless to say, when the court is informed that defendant

equally desires the separation and admitted the commission of
the offense, it should be doubly careful lest a collusion exists.
(The Court of Appeals did not find collusion.)

Collusion in divorce or legal separation means the agreement.

. . . between husband and wife for one of them to commit, or

to appear to commit, or to be represented in court as having
committed, a matrimonial offense, or to suppress evidence of
a valid defense, for the purpose of enabling the other to
obtain a divorce. This agreement, if not express, may be
implied from the acts of the parties. It is a ground for
denying the divorce.

In this case, there would be collusion if the parties had

arranged to make it appear that a matrimonial offense had
been committed although it was not, or if the parties had
connived to bring about a legal separation even in the absence of
grounds therefor.
 202

Here, the offense of adultery had really taking place, according

to the evidence. The defendant could not have falsely told the
adulterous acts to the Fiscal, because her story might send her
to jail the moment her husband requests the Fiscal to prosecute.
She could not have practiced deception at such a personal risk.

In this connection, it has been held that collusion may not be

inferred from the mere fact that the guilty party confesses
to the offense and thus enables the other party to procure
evidence necessary to prove it. And proof that the defendant
desires the divorce and makes no defense, is not by itself
collusion.

We do not think plaintiff's failure actively to search for defendant

and take her home (after the latter had left him in 1952)
constituted condonation or consent to her adulterous relations
with Orzame. It will be remembered that she "left" him after
having sinned with Arcalas and after he had discovered her
dates with other men. Consequently, it was not his duty to
search for her to bring her home. Hers was the obligation to
return.

Two decisions are cited wherein from apparently similar

circumstances, this Court inferred the husband's consent to or
condonation of his wife's misconduct. However, upon careful
examination, a vital difference will be found: in both instances,
the husband had abandoned his wife; here it was the wife who
"left" her husband.
 203

ARABELLE MENDOZA, vs. REPUBLIC & DOMINIC MENDOZA

G.R. No. 157649               November 12, 2012

Facts:
Petitioner Arabelle J Mendoza and respondent Dominic C
Mendoza met in 1989 upon his return to the country from his
employment in Papua New Guinea. After a month of courtship,
they became intimate and their intimacy ultimately led to her
pregnancy with their daughter whom they named Allysa Bianca.
They got married on her eighth month of pregnancy in civil rites
solemnized in Pasay City on June 24, 1991, after which they
moved to her place, although remaining dependent on their
parents for support.

When petitioner delivered Alyssa Bianca, Dominic had to borrow

funds from petitioner’s best friend to settle the hospital bills. He
remained jobless and dependent upon his father for support
until he finished his college course in October 1993. She took on
various jobs to meet the family’s needs. Being the one with the
fixed income, she shouldered all of the family’s expenses. On his
part, Dominic’s irregular income as a car salesman for Toyota
could not be depended upon. He even had am illicit relationship
with Zaida, his co-employee at Toyota Motors.

In November 1995, Dominic gave her a Daihatsu Charade car as

a birthday present. She soon found out, however, that the
checks were not paid for the car’s insurance coverage but for his
personal needs. To make matters worse, Dominic was fired from
his employment after he ran away with P164,000.00 belonging
to his employer. He was criminally charged with violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and estafa, for which he was arrested
and incarcerated. After petitioner and her mother bailed him out
of jail, petitioner discovered that he had also swindled many
clients some of whom were even threatening petitioner, her
mother and her sister themselves.

On October 15, 1997, Dominic abandoned the conjugal abode

because petitioner asked him for "time and space to think things
over." A month later, she refused his attempt at reconciliation,
causing him to threaten to commit suicide. At that, she and her
family immediately left the house to live in another place
concealed from him.
 204

On August 5, 1998, petitioner filed in the RTC her petition for

the declaration of the nullity of her marriage with Dominic based
on his psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code which was granted. On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC’s
decision holding that there was no showing that Dominic’s
personality traits either constituted psychological incapacity
existing at the time of the marriage or were of the nature
contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code; that the
testimony of the expert witness, while persuasive, was not
conclusive upon the court; and that the real reason for the
parties’ separation had been their frequent quarrels over
financial matters and the criminal cases brought against
Dominic.

Petitioner assails the CA’s refusal to be bound by the expert

testimony and psychiatric evaluation she had presented in the
trial of the case, and the CA’s reliance on the pronouncements in
Dagdag, Hernandez and Pesca, supra. She contends that the
report on the psychiatric evaluation conducted by Dr. Samson
more than complied with the requirements prescribed in Santos
v. Court of Appeals and Molina.

Issue:
WON the CA’s refusal to be bound by expert testimony is valid.

Held:
YES. The RTC’s findings that Dominic’s psychological incapacity
was characterized by gravity, antecedence and incurability could
not stand scrutiny. The medical report failed to show that his
actions indicated a psychological affliction of such a grave or
serious nature that it was medically or clinically rooted. His
alleged immaturity, deceitfulness and lack of remorse for his
dishonesty and lack of affection did not necessarily constitute
psychological incapacity. His inability to share or to take
responsibility or to feel remorse over his misbehavior or to share
his earnings with family members, albeit indicative of
immaturity, was not necessarily a medically rooted psychological
affliction that was incurable. Emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility did not equate with psychological incapacity. Nor
were his supposed sexual infidelity and criminal offenses
manifestations of psychological incapacity. If at all, they would
constitute a ground only for an action for legal separation under
Article 55 of the Family Code.
 205

Petitioner contends that the Court’s Resolution in A.M. No. 02-

11-10 rendered appeals by the OSG no longer required, and that
the appeal by the OSG was a mere superfluity that could be
deemed to have become functus officio if not totally disregarded.

The contention is grossly erroneous and unfounded. The

Resolution nowhere stated that appeals by the OSG were no
longer required. On the contrary, the Resolution explicitly
required the OSG to actively participate in all stages of the
proceedings.

The obvious intent of the Resolution was to require the OSG to

appear as counsel for the State in the capacity of a defensor
vinculi (i.e., defender of the marital bond) to oppose petitions for,
and to appeal judgments in favor of declarations of nullity of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, thereby ensuring
that only the meritorious cases for the declaration of nullity of
marriages based on psychological incapacity-those sufficiently
evidenced by gravity, incurability and juridical antecedence-
would succeed.
 206

Goitia vs. Campos-Rueda

GR No. 11263 Nov. 2, 1916

Facts: 
Eloisa Goitia, plaintiff-appellant, and Jose Campos-Rueda,
defendant, were legally married in the city of Manila. They
established their residence 115 Calle San Marcelino, where they
lived together for about a month. However, the plaintiff returned
to the home of her parents. The allegations of the complaint were
that the defendant, one month after they had contracted
marriage, demanded plaintiff to perform unchaste and lascivious
acts on his genital organs in which the latter reject the said
demands. With these refusals, the defendant got irritated and
provoked to maltreat the plaintiff by word and deed. Unable to
induce the defendant to desist from his repugnant desires and
cease of maltreating her, plaintiff was obliged to leave the
conjugal abode and take refuge in the home of her parents. 

The trial court ruled in favor of respondent and stated that

Goitia could not compel her husband to support her except in
the conjugal home unless it is by virtue of a judicial decree
granting her separation or divorce from respondent.  Goitia filed
motion for review.  

Issue: 
WON Goitia can claim for support outside of the conjugal home. 

Ruling: 
YES. Marriage is something more than a mere contract. It is a
new relation, the rights, duties and obligations of which rest not
upon the agreement of the parties but upon the general law
which defines and prescribes those rights, duties and
obligations. Marriage is an institution, in the maintenance of
which in its purity the public is deeply interested.

When the legal existence of the parties is merged into one by

marriage, the new relation is regulated and controlled by the
state or government upon principles of public policy for the
benefit of society as well as the parties. When the object of a
marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to
one of the parties and productive of no possible good to the
community, relief in some way should be obtainable.
 207

The law provides that defendant, who is obliged to support

the wife, may fulfill this obligation either by paying her a
fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own home at his
option. However, the option given by law is not absolute. The
law will not permit the defendant to evade or terminate his
obligation to support his wife if the wife was forced to leave the
conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and physical
assaults of the defendant, Eloisa may claim support from the
defendant for separate maintenance even outside of the conjugal
home.

The mere act of marriage creates an obligation on the part

of the husband to support his wife. This obligation is founded
not so much on the express or implied terms of the contract of
marriage as on the natural and legal duty of the husband; an
obligation, the enforcement of which is of such vital concern to
the state itself that the laws will not permit him to terminate it
by his own wrongful acts in driving his wife to seek protection in
the parental home.

A judgment for separate maintenance is not due and payable

either as damages or as a penalty; nor is it a debt in the strict
legal sense of the term, but rather a judgment calling for the
performance of a duty made specific by the mandate of the
sovereign. This is done from necessity and with a view to
preserve the public peace and the purity of the wife; as where
the husband makes so base demands upon his wife and
indulges in the habit of assaulting her.

The pro tanto separation resulting from a decree for separate

support is not an impeachment of that public policy by which
marriage is regarded as so sacred and inviolable in its nature; it
is merely a stronger policy overruling a weaker one; and except
in so far only as such separation is tolerated as a means of
preserving the public peace and morals may be considered, it
does not in any respect whatever impair the marriage contract or
for any purpose place the wife in the situation of a feme sole.
 208

MARIANO B. ARROYO vs. DOLORES VASQUEZ DE ARROYO

G.R. No. L-17014             August 11, 1921

Facts:
Mariano B. Arroyo and Dolores C. Vasquez de Arroyo were united in
the bonds of wedlock by marriage in the year 1910, and since that
date, with a few short intervals of separation, they have lived
together as man and wife in the city of Iloilo until July 4, 1920,
when the wife went away from their common home with the
intention of living thenceforth separate from her husband.

After efforts had been made by the husband without avail to induce
her to resume marital relations, this action was initiated by him to
compel her to return to the matrimonial home and live with him as
a dutiful wife. The defendant answered, admitting the fact of
marriage, and that she had left her husband's home without his
consent; but she averred by way of defense and cross-complaint
that she had been compelled to leave by cruel treatment on the part
of her husband. Accordingly she in turn prayed for affirmative relief,
to consist of (1) a decree of separation; (2) a liquidation of the
conjugal partnership; (3) and an allowance for counsel fees and
permanent separate maintenance.

Upon hearing, the lower court gave judgment in favor of the

defendant, authorizing her to live apart from her husband. The
plaintiff thereupon removed the case with the usual formalities by
appeal to this court.

Issue:
WON defendant had sufficient cause for leaving the conjugal home.

Held:
NONE. The evidence shows that the wife is afflicted with a
disposition of jealousy towards her husband in an aggravated
degree; and to his cause are chiefly traceable without a doubt the
many miseries that have attended their married life. The tales of
cruelty on the part of the husband towards the wife, which are
the basis of the cross-action, are in our opinion no more than
highly colored versions of personal wrangles in which the
spouses have allowed themselves from time to time to become
involved and would have little significance apart from the morbid
condition exhibited by the wife. The judgment must therefore be
recorded that the abandonment by her of the marital home was
without sufficient justification in fact.
 209

The obligation which the law imposes on the husband to maintain

the wife is a duty universally recognized in civil society and is
clearly expressed in articles 142 and 143 of the Civil code. The
enforcement of this obligation by the wife against the husband is
not conditioned upon the procurance of a divorce by her, nor even
upon the existence of a cause for divorce. Accordingly it had been
determined that where the wife is forced to leave the
matrimonial abode and to live apart from her husband, she can,
in this jurisdiction, compel him to make provision for her
separate maintenance; and he may be required to pay the
expenses, including attorney's fees, necessarily incurred in
enforcing such obligation.

Nevertheless, the interests of both parties as well as of society at

large require that the courts should move with caution in enforcing
the duty to provide for the separate maintenance of the wife, for this
step involves a recognition of the de facto separation of the spouses
— a state which is abnormal and fraught with grave danger to all
concerned. From this consideration it follows that provision should
not be made for separate maintenance in favor of the wife unless it
appears that the continued cohabitation of the pair has become
impossible and separation necessary from the fault of the husband.

The same considerations that require the dismissal of the cross-

complaint conclusively prove that the plaintiff, Mariano B. Arroyo,
has done nothing to forfeit his right to the marital society of his wife
and that she is under an obligation, both moral and legal, to return
to the common home and cohabit with him.

We are therefore unable to hold that Mariano B. Arroyo in this case

is entitled to the unconditional and absolute order for the return of
the wife to the marital domicile, which is sought in the petitory part
of the complaint; though he is, without doubt, entitled to a judicial
declaration that his wife has presented herself without sufficient
cause and that it is her duty to return.

Therefore, reversing the judgment appealed from, in respect both to

the original complaint and the cross-bill, it is declared that Dolores
Vasquez de Arroyo has absented herself from the marital home
without sufficient cause; and she is admonished that it is her duty
to return.
 210

Ilusorio vs. Ilusorio-Bilner

GR No. 139789, May 12, 2000

Facts:
Potenciano Ilusorio, a lawyer, 86 year old of age, possessed
extensive property valued at millions of pesos.  For many year,
he was the Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio
Country Club.  He was married with Erlinda Ilusorio, herein
petitioner, for 30 years and begotten 6 children namely Ramon,
Lin Illusorio-Bildner (defendant), Maximo, Sylvia, Marietta and
Shereen.  They separated from bed and board in 1972. 
Potenciano lived at Makati every time he was in Manila and at
Illusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he was in
Baguio City.  On the other hand, the petitioner lived in Antipolo
City. 

In 1997, upon Potenciano’s arrival from US, he stayed with her

wife for about 5 months in Antipolo city.  The children, Sylvia
and Lin, alleged that during this time their mother overdose
Potenciano which caused the latter’s health to deteriorate.  In
February 1998, Erlinda filed with RTC petition for guardianship
over the person and property of Potenciano due to the latter’s
advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired
judgment.  In May 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in
Baguio, Potenciano did not return to Antipolo instead lived at
Cleveland Condominium in Makati.  In March 1999, petitioner
filed with CA petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of
his husband alleging that the respondents refused her demands
to see and visit her husband and prohibited Potenciano from
returning to Antipolo.

Issue:
WON a writ of habeas corpus may be issued to compel a
husband to live with his wife.

Held:
NO. The fact of illegal restraint has not been proved during the
hearing at the Court of Appeals on March 23, 1999. Potenciano
himself declared that he was not prevented by his children from
seeing anybody and that he had no objection to seeing his wife
and other children whom he loved.
 211

Erlinda highlighted that her husband suffered from various

ailments. Thus, Potenciano Ilusorio did not have the mental
capacity to decide for himself. Hence, Erlinda argued that
Potenciano be brought before the Supreme Court so that we
could determine his mental state. The Court were not convinced
that Potenciano Ilusorio was mentally incapacitated to choose
whether to see his wife or not. As to whether the children were in
fact taking control of the corporation, these are matters that may
be threshed out in a separate proceeding, irrelevant in habeas
corpus.

Erlinda states that Article XII of the 1987 Constitution and

Articles 68 and 69 of the Family Code support her position that
as spouses, they (Potenciano and Erlinda) are duty bound to live
together and care for each other. The Court agree.

The law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to
live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity. The
sanction therefor is the "spontaneous, mutual affection between
husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order" to
enforce consortium.

Obviously, there was absence of empathy between spouses

Erlinda and Potenciano, having separated from bed and board
since 1972. We defined empathy as a shared feeling between
husband and wife experienced not only by having spontaneous
sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion.
Marital union is a two-way process.

Marriage is definitely for two loving adults who view the

relationship with "amor gignit amorem" respect, sacrifice and a
continuing commitment to togetherness, conscious of its value
as a sublime social institution.
 212

SSS & LORELIE B. SOLIDUM vs. GLORIA DE LOS SANTOS

G.R. No. 164790             August 29, 2008

Facts:
Antonio de los Santos and respondent Gloria de los Santos, both
Filipinos, were married on April 29, 1964 in Manila. They had
three children: Alain Vincent, Arlene, and Armine. In February
1965, Gloria left Antonio and contracted another marriage with a
certain Domingo Talens in Nueva Ecija. Sometime in 1969,
Gloria went back to Antonio and lived with him until 1983.

In 1983, Gloria left Antonio and went to the United States (US).
On May 8, 1986, she filed for divorce and executed a document
waiving all her rights to their conjugal properties and other
matters. The divorce was granted on November 5, 1986.

On May 23, 1987, Antonio married Cirila de los Santos in

Camalig, Albay. Their union produced one child, May-Ann N. de
los Santos. On her part, Gloria married Larry Thomas Constant,
an American citizen, on July 11, 1987, in the US.

On May 15, 1989, Antonio changed his SSS beneficiaries from

Mrs. Margarita de los Santos to Cirila de los Santos; from Gloria
de los Santos to May-Ann de los Santos; and from Erlinda de los
Santos to Armine de los Santos.

Antonio retired in 1996, and from then on began receiving

monthly pension. He died in 1999. Upon his death, Cirila
applied for and began receiving his SSS pension benefit,
beginning December 1999.

On December 21, 1999, Gloria filed a claim for Antonio’s death

benefits with the SSS Cubao Branch. Her claim was denied
because she was not a qualified beneficiary of Antonio.
According to SSS, since Gloria has remarried and she is the one
who filed the divorce, these circumstances are sufficient grounds
to deny her claim.

On appeal before the SS Commission, the SSC deemed that

Gloria abandoned Antonio when she obtained a divorce against
him abroad and subsequently married another man. She thus
failed to satisfy the requirement of dependency required of
primary beneficiaries under the law. The Commission likewise
 213

rejected her efforts to use the invalidity of the divorce, which she
herself obtained, to claim benefits from the SSS for her personal
profit.

Gloria appealed the above SSC Resolution to the CA. She

insisted that she, as the legal wife, was the qualified beneficiary
to Antonio’s death benefits. The SSC added that since the
marriage of Antonio to Cirila was void, the latter was likewise not
a qualified beneficiary. The fruit of their union, May-Ann, was
considered as an illegitimate child and qualified as a secondary
beneficiary. May-Ann was entitled to 50% of the share of the
legitimate children of Antonio in accordance with Section 8(k) of
the SS Law. However, considering that the legitimate children of
Antonio have reached the age of majority, May-Ann is the only
remaining qualified beneficiary and was thus entitled to 100% of
the benefit.

The CA agreed with the SSC in its determination that the

marriage of Gloria and Antonio subsisted until his death and the
subsequent marriages contracted by both of them were void for
being bigamous. But contrary to findings of the SSC, the CA
found that being the legal wife, Gloria was entitled by law to
receive support from her husband. Thus, her status qualified
Gloria to be a dependent and a primary beneficiary under
the law.

Issue:
WON Gloria is Antonio’s primary beneficiary at the time of his
death.

Held:
NO. The reckoning point in determining the beneficiaries of the
deceased Antonio should be the time of his death. There is no
need to look into the time of his retirement, as was the course
followed by the SSC in resolving the claim of respondent.

As found by both the SSC and the CA, the divorce obtained by
respondent against the deceased Antonio was not binding in this
jurisdiction. Under Philippine law, only aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their
national law. The divorce was obtained by respondent Gloria
while she was still a Filipino citizen and thus covered by the
 214

policy against absolute divorces. It did not sever her marriage

ties with Antonio.

However, although respondent was the legal spouse of the

deceased, the Court find that she is still disqualified to be his
primary beneficiary under the SS Law. She fails to fulfill the
requirement of dependency upon her deceased husband
Antonio.

Social Security System v. Aguas is instructive in determining the

extent of the required "dependency" under the SS Law. In Aguas,
the Court ruled that although a husband and wife are obliged
to support each other, whether one is actually dependent for
support upon the other cannot be presumed from the fact of
marriage alone. Further, Aguas pointed out that a wife who left
her family until her husband died and lived with other men, was
not dependent upon her husband for support, financial or
otherwise, during the entire period.

Respondent herself admits that she left the conjugal abode on

two (2) separate occasions, to live with two different men. The
first was in 1965, less than one year after their marriage, when
she contracted a second marriage to Domingo Talens. The
second time she left Antonio was in 1983 when she went to the
US, obtained a divorce, and later married an American citizen. In
fine, these uncontroverted facts remove her from qualifying as a
primary beneficiary of her deceased husband.
 215

REPUBLIC vs. CA & RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA

G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

Facts:
Respondent Roridel Olaviano and petitioner Reynaldo Molina
were married on April 14, 1985 and has a son. After a year of
marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and
irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred to
spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he
squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for aid
and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to
their finances,

In October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a

result of which their relationship was estranged. Roridel
resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her parents
in Baguio City. A few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their
child, and had since then abandoned them.

Respondent Roridel filed a petition for declaration of nullity of

her marriage to Reynaldo Molina on the ground that he was
psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital
obligations and was highly immature. She also claimed that it
would be to the couple's best interest to have their marriage
declared null and void in order to free them from what appeared
to be an incompatible marriage from the start.

On the other hand, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could

no longer live together as husband and wife, but contended that
their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to her
strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of friends
even after their marriage, her refusal to perform some of her
marital duties such as cooking meals and failure to run the
household and handle their finances.

Issue:
WON Reynaldo failed to perform his marital obligations.

Held:
NO. There is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect
spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a
"difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of
 216

"irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in

no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough
to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and
duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be
shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological
(nor physical) illness.

The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she

and her husband could nor get along with each other. There had
been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its
juridical antecedence nor its incurability.

In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged

personality traits were constitutive of psychological incapacity
existing at the time of marriage celebration. While some effort
was made to prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial
impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on Reynaldo's
part of being "conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part of
Roridel, such failure of expectation is nor indicative of
antecedent psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows
love's temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the
beloved.

The incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically

permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or
even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage,
like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job.

The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by

Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code
in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied
marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven
by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
 217

ROMANA LOCQUIAO VALENCIA vs. BENITO A. LOCQUIAO

G.R. No. 122134             October 3, 2003

Facts:
Both cases involve a parcel of land consisting of 4,876 square
meters situated in Urdaneta, Pangasinan. This land was originally
owned by the spouses Herminigildo and Raymunda Locquiao. On
May 22, 1944, Herminigildo and Raymunda Locquiao executed a
deed of donation propter nuptias which was written in the Ilocano
dialect, denominated as Inventario Ti Sagut in favor of their son,
respondent Benito Locquiao and his prospective bride, respondent
Tomasa Mara. By the terms of the deed, the donees were gifted with
four (4) parcels of land, including the land in question, as well as a
male cow and one-third (1/3) portion of the conjugal house of the
donor parents, in consideration of the impending marriage of the
donees. The two got married on June 4, 1944.

Herminigildo and Raymunda died on December 15, 1962 and

January 9, 1968, respectively. With the permission of respondents
Benito and Tomasa, petitioner Romana Valencia (Benito’s sister)
took possession and cultivated the subject land. When respondent
Romana’s husband got sick sometime in 1977, her daughter
petitioner Constancia Valencia took over, and since then, has been
in possession of the land.

Meanwhile, respondents Benito and Tomasa registered the

Inventario Ti Sagut with the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Pangasinan on May 15, 1970. In due course, the original title was
cancelled and in lieu thereof Transfer Certificate of Title No. 84897
was issued in the name of the respondents Benito and Tomasa.

In 1973, the heirs of the Locquiao spouses, including respondent

Benito and petitioner Romana, executed a Deed of Partition with
Recognition of Rights, wherein they distributed among only three (3)
of them, the twelve (12) parcels of land left by their common
progenitors, excluding the land in question and other lots disposed
of by the Locquiao spouses earlier. Contained in the deed is a
statement that respondent Benito and Marciano Locquiao, along
with the heirs of Lucio Locquiao, "have already received our shares
in the estates of our parents, by virtue of previous donations and
conveyances," and that for that reason the heirs of Lucio Locquaio
were not made parties to the deed. All the living children of the
Locquaio spouses at the time, including petitioner Romana,
confirmed the previous dispositions and waived their rights to
 218

whomsoever the properties covered by the deed of partition were

adjudicated.

Later on, disagreements among the heirs including petitioner

Romana surfaced. The heirs then executed a compromise agreement
for the re-distribution of the two (2) lots which was also signed by
respondent Benito. Then petitioner Constancia filed an action for
annulment of title against Benito and Tomasa, which was dismissed
by the RTC.

On December 13, 1983, respondent Benito filed an Ejectment case

against petitioner Constancia to vacate the land in question.
Petitioners Romana and Constancia countered with a Complaint for
the annulment of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 84897 against
respondents Benito and Tomasa alleging that the issuance of the
transfer certificate of title was fraudulent; that the Inventario Ti
Sagut is spurious; that the notary public who notarized the
document had no authority to do so, and; that the donation did not
observe the form required by law as there was no written
acceptance on the document itself or in a separate public
instrument.

Issue:
WON the donation propter nuptias is authentic.

Held:
YES. Unlike ordinary donations, donations propter nuptias or
donations by reason of marriage are those "made before its
celebration, in consideration of the same and in favor of one or
both of the future spouses." The distinction is crucial because the
two classes of donations are not governed by exactly the same rules,
especially as regards the formal essential requisites.

Under the Old Civil Code, donations propter nuptias must be

made in a public instrument in which the property donated
must be specifically described. However, Article 1330 of the same
Code provides that "acceptance is not necessary to the validity
of such gifts". In other words, the celebration of the marriage
between the beneficiary couple, in tandem with compliance with the
prescribed form, was enough to effectuate the donation propter
nuptias under the Old Civil Code.

Under the New Civil Code, the rules are different. Article 127
thereof provides that the form of donations propter nuptias are
regulated by the Statute of Frauds. Article 1403, paragraph 2,
 219

which contains the Statute of Frauds requires that the contracts

mentioned thereunder need be in writing only to be enforceable.
However, as provided in Article 129, express acceptance "is not
necessary for the validity of these donations." Thus, implied
acceptance is sufficient.

The pivotal question, therefore, is which formal requirements should

be applied with respect to the donation propter nuptias at hand.
Those under the Old Civil Code or the New Civil Code?

It is settled that only laws existing at the time of the execution

of a contract are applicable thereto and not later statutes,
unless the latter are specifically intended to have retroactive effect.
Consequently, it is the Old Civil Code which applies in this case
since the donation propter nuptias was executed in 1944 and the
New Civil Code took effect only on August 30, 1950. It is a well-
known rule of the Law of Nations that municipal laws, as contra-
distinguished from laws of political nature, are not abrogated by a
change of sovereignty. This Court specifically held that during the
Japanese occupation period, the Old Civil Code was in force. As a
consequence, applying Article 1330 of the Old Civil Code in the
determination of the validity of the questioned donation, it does not
matter whether or not the donees had accepted the donation. The
validity of the donation is unaffected in either case.

Even the petitioners agree that the Old Civil Code should be applied.
However, they invoked the wrong provisions thereof. Even if the
provisions of the New Civil Code were to be applied, the case of the
petitioners would collapse just the same. As earlier shown, even
implied acceptance of a donation propter nuptias suffices
under the New Civil Code. With the genuineness of the donation
propter nuptias and compliance with the applicable mandatory form
requirements fully established, petitioners’ hypothesis that their
action is imprescriptible cannot take off.

As petitioner Romana was a party-signatory to the two documents,

she definitely had the opportunity to question the donation propter
nuptias on both occasions, and she should have done so if she were
of the mindset, given the fact that she was still in possession of the
land in dispute at the time. But she did not make any move. She
tarried for eleven (11) more years from the execution of the deed of
partition until she, together with petitioner Constancia, filed the
annulment case in 1985.
 220

FORTUNATA SOLIS vs. MAXIMA BARROSO

G.R. No. L-27939             October 30, 1928

Facts:
The spouses Juan Lambino and Maria A. Barroso begot three
children named Alejo, Eugenia and Marciana Lambino. On June 2,
1919 said spouses made a donation of propter nuptias of the lands
described in the complaint in favor of their son Alejo Lambino and
Fortunata Solis in a private document in consideration of the
marriage which the latter were about to enter into. One of the
conditions of this donation is that in case of the death of one of the
donees, one-half of these lands thus donated would revert to the
donors while the surviving donee would retain the other half. On the
8th of the said month of June 1919, Alejo Lambino and Fortunata
Solis were married and immediately thereafter the donors delivered
the possession of the donated lands to them. On August 3, 1919
donee Alejo Lambino died. In the same year donor Juan Lambino
also died. After the latter's death, his wife, Maxima Barroso,
recovered possession of the donated lands.

The surviving donee Fortunata Solis filed the action, which is the
subject matter of this appeal, against the surviving donor Maxima
Barroso and Eugenia and Marcelina Lambino, heirs of the deceased
donor Juan Lambino, with their respective husbands, demanding of
the defendants the execution of the proper deed of donation
according to law, transferring one-half of the donated property, and
moreover, to proceed to the partition of the donated property and its
fruits.

The court rendered judgment based upon article 1279 of the Civil
Code granting plaintiff's prayer and ordering the defendants to
execute a deed of donation in favor of the plaintiff, adequate in form
and substance to transfer to the latter the legal title to the part of
the donated lands assigned to her in the original donation.

Issue:
WON the defendant is required to execute a deed of donation in
favor of the plaintiff.

Held:
NO. In order that a donation of real property may be valid, it
must be made in a public instrument. This is the article
applicable to donation propter nuptias in so far as its formal validity
is concerned. The only exceptions to this rule are onerous and
remuneratory donations, in so far as they do not exceed the value
 221

of the charge imposed, which are then governed by the rules on

contracts (art. 622), and those which are to take effect upon the
donor's death, which are governed by the rules established for
testamentary successions (art. 620).

Therefore, a donation propter nuptias which is not valid and did

not create any right, since it was not made in a public
instrument, and hence, article 1279 of the Civil Code which the
lower court applied is not applicable thereto. The last named article
provides that, should the law require the execution of an instrument
or any other special form in order to make the obligations of a
contract effective, the contracting parties may compel each other to
comply with such formality from the moment that consent has been
given, and the other requirements for the validity of the contract
exist. Suffice it to state that this article refers to contracts and is
inapplicable to the donation in question which must be governed by
the rules on donations. It may further be noted, at first sight, that
this article presupposes the existence of a valid contract and cannot
possibly refer to the form required in order to make it valid, which it
already has, but rather to that required simply to make it effective,
and for this reason, it would, at all events, be inapplicable to the
donation in question, wherein the form is required precisely to make
it valid.

Donations for valuable consideration, as may be inferred from

article 619 of the Civil Code, are such as compensate services which
constitute debts recoverable from the donor, or which impose a
charge equal to the amount of the donation upon the donee, neither
of which is true of the present donation, which was made only in
consideration of marriage. In donations propter nuptias, the
marriage is really a consideration, but not in the sense of being
necessary to give birth to the obligation. This may be clearly
inferred from article 1333, which makes the fact that the marriage
did not take place a cause for the revocation of such donations,
thus taking it for granted that there may be a valid donation propter
nuptias, even without marriage, since that which has not existed
cannot be revoked. And such a valid donation would be forever
valid, even if the marriage never took place, if the proper action for
revocation were not instituted, or if it were instituted after the lapse
of the statutory period of prescription. This is, so because the
marriage in a donation propter nuptias is rather a resolutory
condition which, as such, presupposes the existence of the
obligation which may be resolved or revoked, and it is not a
condition necessary for the birth of the obligation.
 222

BONIFACIA MATEO, ET AL., vs. GERVASIO LAGUA, ET AL.,

G.R. No. L-26270            October 30, 1969

Facts:
Cipriano Lagua and Alejandra Dumlao, parents of Alejandro
Lagua donated two lots to him in consideration of his marriage
to petitioner Bonifacia Mateo.  The marriage was celebrated on
May 15, 1917 and thereafter the couple took possession of the
lots, but the certificates of title remained in the donor’s name. 

In 1923, the son, Alejandro, died. His widow, Bonifacia Mateo,

and her infant daughter lived with her father-in-law, Cipriano
Lagua, who then undertook the farming of the donated lots. It
seems that at the start, Cipriano Lagua was giving to Bonifacia
the owner's share of the harvest from the land. In 1926,
however, Cipriano refused to deliver the said share, thus
prompting Bonifacia to resort to the Justice of the Peace Court of
Asingan, Pangasinan, from where she obtained a judgment
awarding to her possession of the two lots plus damages.

On July 31, 1941, Cipriano executed a deed of sale of the said

lots in favor of his younger son, herein respondent Gervacio. 
Petitioner learned of this only in 1956 when Cipriano stopped
giving to petitioner her share to the harvest.  A Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) was issued under respondent’s name by
the Registry of Deeds (ROD) of Pangasinan. 

The CFI of Pangasinan declared the TCT issued to respondents

Gervacio and Sotera, null and void and ordered cancelled by the
ROD, and for respondent to vacate and deliver the lots to
petitioner.  In 1957, Gervacio and Cipriano filed with the CFI for
the annulment of the donation of the two lots.  While the case
was pending, Cipriano died in 1958.  It was dismissed for
prescription, having been filed after the lapse of 41 years. 

When appealed, the CA in 1966 held that the donation to

Alejandro of the two lots with the combined area of 11,888 sq.
m. exceeded by 494.75 sq. m. his legitime and the disposable
portion that Cipriano could have freely given by will, and to the
same extent prejudiced the legitime  of Cipriano’s other heir,
Gervacio.  The donation was thus declared inofficious and herein
petitioners were ordered to reconvey to Gervacio a portion of
494.75 sq. m. from any convenient part of the lots. 
 223

Issue:
WON the donation may be reduced on the ground of being
inoffcious. 

Held:
YES. Contrary to the views of appellants (petitioners), donations
proper nuptias (by reason of marriage) are without onerous
consideration, the marriage being merely the occasion or motive
for the donation, not its causa. Being liberalities, they remain
subject to reduction for inofficiousness upon the donor's
death, if they should infringe the legitime of a forced heir.

It is to be noted, however, that in rendering the judgment under

review, the Court of Appeals acted on several unsupported
assumptions: that the three (3) lots mentioned in the decision
(Nos. 998, 5106 and 6541) were the only properties composing
the net hereditary estate of the deceased Cipriano Lagua; that
Alejandro Lagua and Gervasio Lagua were his only legal heirs;
that the deceased left no unpaid debts, charges, taxes, etc., for
which the estate would be answerable. In the computation of the
heirs' legitime, the Court of Appeals also considered only the
area, not the value, of the properties.

The infirmity in the above course of action lies in the fact that in
its Article 908 the new Civil Code specifically provides as follows:

ART. 908. To determine the legitime, the value of the

property left at the death of the testator shall be considered,
deducting all debts, and charges, which shall not include
those imposed in the will.

To the net value of the hereditary estate, shall be added the

value of all donations by the testator that are subject to
collation, at the time he made them.

In other words, before any conclusion about the legal share due
to a compulsory heir may be reached, it is necessary that certain
steps be taken first. The net estate of the decedent must be
ascertained, by deducting an payable obligations and
charges from the value of the property owned by the
deceased at the time of his death; then, all donations
subject to collation would be added to it. With the partible
estate thus determined, the legitimes of the compulsory heir or
 224

heirs can be established; and only thereafter can it be

ascertained whether or not a donation had prejudiced the
legitimes. Certainly, in order that a donation may be reduced for
being inofficious, there must be proof that the value of the
donated property exceeds that of the disposable free portion plus
the donee's share as legitime in the properties of the donor.

In the present case, it can hardly be said that, with the evidence
then before the court, it was in any position to rule on the
inofficiousness of the donation involved here, and to order its
reduction and reconveyance of the deducted portion to the
respondents.

*****************************************

Annulment or revocation or reduction on the ground of

inofficiousness can still be allowed because, being in the
nature of a “liberality,” donations propter nuptias remain
subject to reduction, if found inofficious.

The action for reduction has not yet prescribed, the cause
having risen only in 1958, the death of the donor. It is only
from such death in 1958 when it can begin to consider the
matter of inofficiousness.

The action to revoke or reduce the inofficious dontation must

be brought by the donor’s compulsory heirs WITHIN 5
YEARS AFTER THE DONOR’S DEATH.
 225

Cornelia Matabuena v. Petronilia Cervantes

G.R. No. L-28771 (March 31, 1971)

Facts:
In 1956, herein appellant’s brother Felix Matabuena donated a
piece of lot to his common-law spouse, herein appellee Petronila
Cervantes.  Felix and Petronila got married only in 1962 or six
years after the deed of donation was executed.  Five months
later, or September 13, 1962, Felix died.  Thereafter, appellant
Cornelia Matabuena, by reason of being the only sister and
nearest collateral relative of the deceased, filed a claim over the
property, by virtue of a an affidavit of self-adjudication executed
by her in 1962, had the land declared in her name and paid the
estate and inheritance taxes thereon.

The lower court of Sorsogon declared that the donation was valid
inasmuch as it was made at the time when Felix and Petronila
were not yet spouses, rendering Article 133 of the Civil Code
inapplicable. The said article states that “Every donation
between spouses during the marriage shall be void.”

Issue:
WON the prohibition applies to donations between live-in
partners.

Held:
YES. While Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a
"donation between the spouses during the marriage", policy
considerations of the most exigent character as well as the
dictates of morality require that the same prohibition should
apply to a common-law relationship.

As stated in Buenaventura vs. Bautista (50 OG 3679, 1954), if

the policy of the law is to prohibit donations in favor of the other
consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and
improper pressure and influence upon the donor, then there is
every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to persons
living together as husband and wife without the benefit of
nuptials. 

For it is not to be doubted that assent to such irregular

connection for thirty years bespeaks greater influence of one
party over the other, so that the danger that the law seeks to
 226

avoid is correspondingly increased. Moreover, as already pointed

out by Ulpian, it would not be just that such donations should
subsist lest the condition of those who incurred guilt should
turn out to be better. So long as marriage remains the
cornerstone of our family law, reason and morality alike demand
that the disabilities attached to marriage should likewise attach
to concubinage.

****************************************

For the prohibition to apply on donation to common law

relationship, there must be cohabitation between the man and the
woman otherwise, the donation is valid.

General Rule: Husband and wife cannot donate to one another

during the marriage. The reason is founded on public policy.

Exception: Gratuitous advantage/moderate gifts during family

rejoicing.
 227

NENITA BIENVENIDO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 111717 October 24, 1994

Facts:
Aurelio P. Camacho married Consejo Velasco in 1942. On February 6,
1962, without his marriage to Consejo Velasco being dissolved, Aurelio
contracted another marriage with respondent Luisita C. Camacho with
whom he had been living since 1953 and by whom he begot a child,
respondent Aurelio Luis Faustino C. Camacho (Chito) born on May 22,
1961. The marriage was solemnized in Tokyo, Japan where Aurelio and
Luisita had been living since 1958.

In 1967 Aurelio met petitioner Nenita T. Bienvenido, who had been

estranged from her husband, Luis Rivera. In June 1968 until Aurelio's
death on May 28, 1988, he lived with Nenita. Petitioner's daughter,
Nanette, stayed with them as did Aurelio's son, Chito, who lived with
them for about a year in 1976.

On April 30, 1982, Aurelio bought a house and the lot. In the deed of
sale and TCT issued in his name, Aurelio was described as single.
Aurelio then executed a deed of sale of the property in favor of petitioner
Nenita in consideration of the sum of P250,000.00, by virtue of which a
TCT was issued in petitioner's name.

When Aurelio died in 1988, Luisita seek the annullment of the sale of
the property to petitioner and the payment to them of damages. Luisita
alleged that the deed of sale was a forgery and that in any event it was
executed in fraud of her as the legitimate wife of Aurelio.

In answer, petitioner claimed that she and the late Aurelio had
purchased the property in question using their joint funds which they
had accumulated after living together for fourteen years, that the sale of
the property by the late Aurelio to her was with respondent Luisita's
consent; and that she was a purchaser in good faith.

The RTC uphold the sale of the property to petitioner and dismissed the
complaint of Luisita. It found the deed of sale in favor of petitioner to be
genuine and respondents Luisita and Chito to be in estoppel in not
claiming the property until 1988 despite knowledge of the sale by the
late Aurelio who had represented himself to be single. Respondents
moved for a reconsideration but the trial court denied their motion.

On appeal the respondents prevailed. The Court of Appeals reversed

the decision of the trial court and declared respondents to be the
owners of the house and lot in dispute. Although Luisita had
admitted that as early as 1985 she knew that Nenita had been staying
in the premises, the appellate court held that respondents' action
was not barred by laches because Luisita allegedly did not know
 228

that Nenita had obtained title to the property. On the merit, the
Court of Appeals ruled that in the absence of proof to the contrary,
Aurelio's first wife must be presumed to have been absent for seven
years without Aurelio having news of her being alive when Aurelio
contracted a second marriage. On this premise, it held (1) that the
property in dispute belonged to the conjugal partnership of Aurelio
and Luisita and (2) that the sale of the property to Nenita was void
for the same reason that donations between persons who are guilty
of concubinage or adultery are declared void.

Issue:
WON the sale of Aurelio to Nenita of the house and lot was valid.

Held:
YES. Since Aurelio had a valid, subsisting marriage to Consejo Velaso,
his subsequent marriage to respondent Luisita was void for being
bigamous. Consequently, there is no basis for holding that the property
in question was property of the conjugal partnership of Luisita and the
late Aurelio because there was no such partnership in the first place.

In the first place, an action for declaration of the nullity of such

donations can only be brought by the innocent spouse, perhaps in
this case by the first wife, but certainly not by Luisita whose marriage
to Aurelio is itself void. The action for declaration of nullity may be
brought by the spouse of the donor or donee; and the guilt of the donor
and donee may be proved by preponderance of evidence in the same
action.

In the second place, until otherwise shown in an appropriate action,

the sale to petitioner must be presumed. Petitioner's ownership is
evidenced by a deed of absolute sale executed with all the solemnity of a
public document and by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 326681 issued
in due course in her name. Petitioner is in possession of the property. It
was error for the Court of Appeals to annul petitioner's title at the
instance of one whose marriage to the seller is void.

Indeed, the property in question was acquired by Aurelio during a long

period of cohabitation with petitioner which lasted for twenty years
(1968-1988). While petitioner knew respondent Chito to be Aurelio's son
way back in 1976, there is nothing to show that she knew Aurelio to be
married to Luisita. To the contrary, Aurelio represented himself to be
single. As far as petitioner was concerned, Chito could have been
Aurelio's child by a woman not his wife. There was, therefore, no basis
for the Court of Appeals' ruling that Nenita was not a buyer in good
faith of the property because she ought to have known that Aurelio was
married to Luisita.
 229

EMILIE T. SUMBAD vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 106060 June 21, 1999

Facts:
After the death of his wife, Agara B. Tait, in 1936, George K.
Tait, Sr. lived in common-law relationship with Maria F. Tait to
whom on April 2, 1974 he donated a certain parcel of
unregistered land in Sitio Sum-at, Bontoc

George K. Tait, Sr. himself passed away on December 24, 1977.

From 1982 to 1983, Maria F. Tait sold lots included within the
Sum-at property in favor of private respondents, who in turn
purchased the lots on the strength of a Tax Declaration over
Sum-at property showing the seller, Maria F. Tait, to be the
owner of the property in question and thereafter planted
different kinds of fruit trees and plants on the lots purchased by
them.

On July 24, 1989, petitioners Emilie T. Sumbad and Beatrice B.

Tait brought an action for quieting of title, nullification of deeds
of sale, and recovery of possession with damages against private
respondent. They alleged that they are the children and
compulsory heirs of the spouses George K. Tait, Sr. and Agata B.
Tait of Bondoc, Mountain Provinces; that said spouses died on
December 24, 1977 and April 30, 1936, respectively; that said
spouses owned real property in Otucan, Bauko, Mountain
Province; and that after the death of their mother, their father
George K. Tait, Sr. sold the Otucan property and used the
proceeds thereof to purchase a residential lot in Sum-at, Bontoc,
Mountain Province.

The trial court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint

which decision was affirmed by the CA. On appeal, petitioner
contended that deed of donation is void since it was made in
violation of Article 133 of the Civil Code now Article 87 of the
Family Code.

Issue:
WON the donation made by George to Maria was valid.

Held:
YES. Time and again, this Court has ruled that litigants cannot
raise an issue for the first time on appeal as this would
 230

contravene the basic rules of fair play and justice. Even

assuming that they are not thus precluded, petitioners were
unable to present evidence in support of such a claim. The
evidence on record does not show whether George K. Tait, Sr.
was married to Maria F. Tait and, if so, when the marriage took
place. If, as petitioner claim, Maria F. Tait was not married
to their father, evidence should have been presented to
show that at the time the deed of donation was executed,
their father and Maria F. Tait were still maintaining
common-law relations. Beatrice Tait's testimony is only to the
effect that in 1941 Maria F. Tait became their stepmother. There
is no evidence on record that George K. Tait, Sr. and Maria F.
Tait continuously maintained common-law relations until April
2, 1974 when the donation was made.

Petitioners claim that they only learned of the sales to private

respondents of lots included in the Sum-at property in 1988
when they visited Maria F. Tait in Bontoc because she was
seriously ill. As admitted by petitioners, their mother, Agata B.
Tait, died on April 30, 1936, while their father, George K. Tait,
Sr., died on December 24, 1977. Yet, petitioners waited for
twelve (12) years before claiming their inheritance, having
brought their present action only on July 24, 1989.
Petitioners are thus guilty of laches which precludes them from
assailing the donation made by their father in favor of Maria F.
Tait. Laches is the failure or neglect for an unreasonable
length of time to do that which, by exerting due diligence,
could or should have been done earlier.
 231

SSS vs. CANDELARIA D. DAVAC, ET AL

G.R. No. L-21642             July 30, 1966

Facts:
The late Petronilo Davac, a former employee of Lianga Bay
Logging Co., Inc. became a member of the SSS on September 1,
1957. As such member, he was assigned SS I.D. No. 08-007137.
In SSS form E-1 (Member's Record) which he accomplished and
filed with the SSS on November 21, 1957, he designated
respondent Candelaria Davac as his beneficiary and indicated
his relationship to her as that of "wife". He died on April 5, 1959
and, thereupon, each of the respondents (Candelaria Davac and
Lourdes Tuplano) filed their claims for death benefit with the
SSS.

It appears from their respective claims and the documents

submitted in support thereof, that the deceased contracted two
marriages, the first, with claimant Lourdes Tuplano on August
29, 1946, who bore him a child, Romeo Davac, and the second,
with Candelaria Davac on January 18, 1949, with whom he had
a minor daughter Elizabeth Davac. Due to their conflicting
claims, the processing thereof was held in abeyance, whereupon
the SSS filed this petition praying that respondents be required
to interpose and litigate between themselves their conflicting
claims over the death benefits in question.

On February 25, 1963, the Social Security Commission issued

the resolution referred to above, Not satisfied with the said
resolution, respondent Lourdes Tuplano brought to us the
present appeal.

Issue:
WON SSS benefit received by respondent Candelaria Davac is in
the nature of donation to person who is guilty of concubibage.

Held:
NO. The benefit receivable under the Social Security Act is in the
nature of a special privilege or an arrangement secured by the
law, pursuant to the policy of the State to provide social security
to the workingmen. The amounts that may thus be received
cannot be considered as property earned by the member
during his lifetime, and, hence, do not form part of the
properties of the conjugal partnership or of the estate of the
 232

said member. They are disbursed from a public special fund

created by Congress pursuant to the declared policy of the
Republic "to develop, establish gradually and perfect a social
security system which . . . shall provide protection against
the hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death."

Consequently, if there is a named beneficiary and the

designation is not invalid, it is not the heirs of the employee who
are entitled to receive the benefits, unless they are the
designated beneficiaries themselves. It is only when there is no
designated beneficiary or when the designation is void that the
laws of succession become applicable. The Social Security Act is
not a law of succession.

Without deciding whether the naming of a beneficiary of the

benefits accruing from membership in the Social Security
System is a donation, or that it creates a situation analogous to
the relation of an insured and the beneficiary under a life
insurance policy, it is enough, for the purpose of the instant
case, to state that the disqualification mentioned in Article
739 is not applicable to herein appellee Candelaria Davac
because she was not guilty of concubinage, there being no
proof that she had knowledge of the previous marriage of her
husband Petronilo.
 233

ARCABA VS. TABANCURA VDA DE BATOCAEL

GR No. 146683, November 22, 2001

Facts:
Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the
registered owners of Lot No. 437-A located at Balintawak St. and
Rizal Avenue in Dipolog City, Zamboanga del Norte in January
1956.  Zosima died in 1980 hence Francisco and his mother in
law executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with waiver of
rights, where the latter waived her share consisting of ¼ of the
property in favor of Francisco.  Since Francisco do not have any
children to take care of him after his retirement, he asked
Leticia, his niece, Leticia’s cousin, Luzviminda and Cirila Arcaba,
the petitioner, who was then a widow and took care of
Francisco’s house as well as the store inside.

According to Leticia, Francisco and Cirila were lovers since they

slept in the same room.  On the other hand, Erlinda Tabancura,
another niece of Francisco claimed that the latter told her that
Cirila was his mistress.  However, Cirila defended herself that
she was a mere helper who could enter the master’s bedroom
when Francisco asked her to and that Francisco was too old for
her. She denied having sexual intercourse with Francisco. 
When the nieces got married, Cirila who was then 34 year-old
widow started working for Francisco who was 75 year old
widower.  The latter did not pay him any wages as househelper
though her family was provided with food and lodging. 
Francisco’s health deteriorated and became bedridden. 
Tabancura testified that Francisco’s only source of income was
the rentals from his lot near the public streets. 

In January 1991, few months before Francisco died, he executed

a “Deed of Donation Inter Vivos” where he ceded a portion of Lot
437-A composed of 150 sq m., together with his house to Cirila
who accepted the same.  The larger portion of 268 sq m. was left
under his name.  This was made in consideration of the 10 year
of faithful services of the petitioner.  Atty Lacaya notarized the
deed and was later registered by Cirila as its absolute owner.

In Octoer 1991, Francisco died and in 1993, the lot received by

Cirila had a market value of P57,105 and assessed value of
P28,550.  The decedent’s nephews and nieces and his heirs by
 234

intestate succession alleged that Cirila was the common-law wife

of Francisco.

Issue: 
WON the deed of donation inter vivos executed by Francisco in
Arcaba’s favor was valid.

Held:
NO. The court in this case considered a sufficient proof of
common law relationship wherein donation is not valid.   The
conclusion was based on the testimony of Tabancura and
certain documents bearing the signature of “Cirila Comille” such
as application for business permit, sanitary permit and the
death certificate of Francisco.  Also, the fact that Cirila did not
demand her wages is an indication that she was not simply a
caregiver –employee.

Cohabitation or living together as husband and wife means not

only residing under one roof, but also having repeated sexual
intercourse. Cohabitation, of course, means more than sexual
intercourse, especially when one of the parties is already old and
may no longer be interested in sex. At the very least,
cohabitation is the public assumption by a man and a woman of
the marital relation, and dwelling together as man and wife,
thereby holding themselves out to the public as such. Secret
meetings or nights clandestinely spent together, even if often
repeated, do not constitute such kind of cohabitation; they are
merely meretricious. In this jurisdiction, this Court has
considered as sufficient proof of common-law relationship the
stipulations between the parties, a conviction of concubinage, or
the existence of illegitimate children.

Was Cirila Franciscos employee or his common-law wife? Cirila

admitted that she and Francisco resided under one roof for a
long time. It is very possible that the two consummated their
relationship, since Cirila gave Francisco therapeutic massage
and Leticia said they slept in the same bedroom. At the very
least, their public conduct indicated that theirs was not just a
relationship of caregiver and patient, but that of exclusive
partners akin to husband and wife.

Hence, the deed of donation by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void

under Art. 87 of the Family Code.
 235

CHING VS. GOYANGKO JR.

G.R. No. 165879, November 10, 2006

Facts:
The respondents in this case were the children of Joseph
Goyanko (Goyanko) and Epifania dela Cruz (Epifania), who were
married on December 30, 1949. According to them, their parents
acquired a 661 square meter property located at 29 F. Cabahug
St., Cebu City in 1961. But as their parents were Chinese
citizens at that time, the property was registered in the name of
their aunt, Sulpicia Ventura (Sulpicia). On May 1, 1993, Sulpicia
executed a deed of sale over the property in favor of respondents’
father Goyanko. In turn, Goyanko executed on October 12, 1993
a deed of sale over the property in favor of his common-law-wife-
herein petitioner Maria B. Ching. A Certificate of Title was thus
issued in petitioner’s name.

After Goyanko’s death on March 11, 1996, respondents

discovered that ownership of the property had already been
transferred in the name of petitioner. Respondents thereupon
had the purported signature of their father in the deed of sale
verified by the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory which
found the same to be a forgery. Respondents thus filed a
complaint for recovery of property and damages against
petitioner.

In defense, petitioner claimed that she is the actual owner of the

property as it was she who provided its purchase price. To
disprove that Goyanko’s signature in the questioned deed of sale
is a forgery, she presented as witness the notary public who
testified that Goyanko appeared and signed the document in his
presence.

In its decision, the RTC ruled that there is no valid and sufficient
ground to declare the sale as null and void, fictitious and
simulated. The signature on the questioned Deed of Sale is
genuine. Accordingly, the parcel of lands known as Lot No. 6
which is sought to be recovered in this case could never be
considered as the conjugal property of the original Spouses
Joseph C. Goyanko and Epifania dela Cruz or the exclusive
capital property of the husband. The acquisition of the said
property by defendant Maria Ching is well-elicited from the
 236

aforementioned testimonial and documentary evidence

presented by the defendant.

On appeal before the CA, the court reversed the decision of the
RTC and held that the subject property having been acquired
during the existence of a valid marriage between Joseph Sr. and
Epifania dela Cruz-Goyanko, is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership. Moreover, while this presumption in favor
of conjugality is rebuttable with clear and convincing proof to
the contrary, the court found no evidence on record to conclude
otherwise. The record shows that while Joseph Sr. and his wife
Epifania have been estranged for years and that he and
defendant-appellant Maria Ching, have in fact been living
together as common-law husband and wife, there has never
been a judicial decree declaring the dissolution of his marriage
to Epifania nor their conjugal partnership. Even if we were to
assume that the subject property was not conjugal, still we
cannot sustain the validity of the sale of the property by Joseph,
Sr. to defendant-appellant Maria Ching, there being
overwhelming evidence on records that they have been living
together as common-law husband and wife.

Therefore, the contract of sale in favor of the defendant-appellant

Maria Ching was null and void for being contrary to morals and
public policy. The purported sale, having been made by Joseph
Sr. in favor of his concubine, undermines the stability of the
family, a basic social institution which public policy vigilantly
protects. Furthermore, the law emphatically prohibits spouses
from selling property to each other, subject to certain exceptions.
And this is so because transfers or conveyances between
spouses, if allowed during the marriage would destroy the
system of conjugal partnership, a basic policy in civil law. The
prohibition was designed to prevent the exercise of undue
influence by one spouse over the other and is likewise applicable
even to common-law relationships otherwise, "the condition of
those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those
in legal union.

Issue:
WON the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of herein petitioner was
void and inexistent.
 237

Held:
YES. The proscription against sale of property between spouses
applies even to common law relationships. The contract of sale
was null and void for being contrary to morals and public policy.
The sale was made by a husband in favor of a concubine
after he had abandoned his family and left the conjugal
home where his wife and children lived and from whence
they derived their support. The sale was subversive of the
stability of the family, a basic social institution which public
policy cherishes and protects.

Additionally, the law emphatically prohibits the spouses

from selling property to each other subject to certain
exceptions. Similarly, donations between spouses during
marriage are prohibited. And this is so because if transfers or
conveyances between spouses were allowed during marriage,
that would destroy the system of conjugal partnership, a basic
policy in civil law. It was also designed to prevent the exercise of
undue influence by one spouse over the other, as well as to
protect the institution of marriage, which is the cornerstone of
family law. The prohibitions apply to a couple living as
husband and wife without benefit of marriage, otherwise,
"the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to
be better than those in legal union." Those provisions are
dictated by public interest and their criterion must be imposed
upon the will of the parties. As the conveyance in question was
made by Goyangko in favor of his common- law-wife-herein
petitioner, it was null and void.

Petitioner’s argument that a trust relationship was created

between Goyanko as trustee and her as does not persuade. For
petitioner’s testimony that it was she who provided the purchase
price is uncorroborated. That she may have been considered the
breadwinner of the family and that there was proof that she
earned a living do not conclusively clinch her claim.

The subject property was part of the conjugal property of the

Spouses as it was acquired during the existence of a valid
marriage between Joseph Sr and Epifania. Moreover, there was
no decree of dissolution of marriage, nor of their conjugal
partnership.
 238

ELENA B. MULLER vs. HERMUT MULLER

G.R. NO. 149615 August 29, 2006

Facts:
Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut
Muller were married in Hamburg, Germany on September 22,
1989. The couple resided in Germany at a house owned by
respondent’s parents but decided to move and reside
permanently in the Philippines in 1992. By this time,
respondent had inherited the house in Germany from his
parents which he sold and used the proceeds for the purchase of
a parcel of land in Antipolo, Rizal at the cost of P528,000.00 and
the construction of a house amounting to P2,300,000.00. The
Antipolo property was registered in the name of Elena.
 
Due to incompatibilities and respondent’s alleged womanizing,
drinking, and maltreatment, the spouses eventually separated.
On September 26, 1994, respondent filed a petition for
separation of properties before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City.
 
The trial court rendered a decision which terminated the regime
of absolute community of property between the petitioner and
respondent. It also decreed the separation of properties between
them and ordered the equal partition of personal properties
located within the country, excluding those acquired by
gratuitous title during the marriage. With regard to the Antipolo
property, the court held that it was acquired using paraphernal
funds of the respondent. However, it ruled that respondent
cannot recover his funds because the property was purchased in
violation of the Constitution. Thus -
 
However, pursuant to Article 92 of the Family Code,
properties acquired by gratuitous title by either spouse
during the marriage shall be excluded from the community
property. The real property, therefore, inherited by petitioner
in Germany is excluded from the absolute community of
property of the herein spouses. Necessarily, the proceeds of
the sale of said real property as well as the personal
properties purchased thereby, belong exclusively to the
petitioner. However, the part of that inheritance used by the
petitioner for acquiring the house and lot in this country
cannot be recovered by the petitioner, its acquisition being a
 239

violation of Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution which

provides that “save in cases of hereditary succession, no
private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations or associations qualified to acquire
or hold lands of the public domain.” The law will leave the
parties in the situation where they are in without prejudice
to a voluntary partition by the parties of the said real
property. x x x
   
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered the
assailed decision modifying the trial court’s Decision. It held that
respondent merely prayed for reimbursement for the purchase of
the Antipolo property, and not acquisition or transfer of
ownership to him. It also considered petitioner’s ownership over
the property in trust for the respondent. As regards the house,
the Court of Appeals ruled that there is nothing in the
Constitution which prohibits respondent from acquiring the
same.

Petitioner contends that respondent, being an alien, is

disqualified to own private lands in the Philippines; that
respondent was aware of the constitutional prohibition but
circumvented the same; and that respondent’s purpose for filing
an action for separation of property is to obtain exclusive
possession, control and disposition of the Antipolo property.
 
Respondent claims that he is not praying for transfer of
ownership of the Antipolo property but merely reimbursement;
that the funds paid by him for the said property were in
consideration of his marriage to petitioner; that the funds were
given to petitioner in trust; and that equity demands that
respondent should be reimbursed of his personal funds

Issue:
WON respondent is entitled to reimbursement of the funds used
for the acquisition of the Antipolo property.

Held:
NO. Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, are disqualified
from acquiring lands of the public domain. Hence, they are also
disqualified from acquiring private lands. The primary purpose
of the constitutional provision is the conservation of the national
patrimony.
 240

Respondent was aware of the constitutional prohibition and

expressly admitted his knowledge thereof to this Court. He
declared that he had the Antipolo property titled in the name of
petitioner because of the said prohibition. His attempt at
subsequently asserting or claiming a right on the said property
cannot be sustained.
 
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that an implied trust was
created and resulted by operation of law in view of petitioner’s
marriage to respondent. Save for the exception provided in cases
of hereditary succession, respondent’s disqualification from
owning lands in the Philippines is absolute. Not even an
ownership in trust is allowed. Besides, where the purchase is
made in violation of an existing statute and in evasion of its
express provision, no trust can result in favor of the party who is
guilty of the fraud. To hold otherwise would allow circumvention
of the constitutional prohibition.
 
It has been held that equity as a rule will follow the law and will
not permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public
policy, cannot be done directly. He who seeks equity must do
equity, and he who comes into equity must come with clean
hands. The latter is a frequently stated maxim which is also
expressed in the principle that he who has done inequity shall
not have equity. It signifies that a litigant may be denied relief
by a court of equity on the ground that his conduct has been
inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful as
to the controversy in issue.
 
Thus, in the instant case, respondent cannot seek
reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear that he
willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the
constitutional prohibition. Further, the distinction made
between transfer of ownership as opposed to recovery of funds is
a futile exercise on respondent’s part. To allow reimbursement
would in effect permit respondent to enjoy the fruits of a
property which he is not allowed to own.
 241

PACIFIC FINANCE ACE, LTD. Vs. EIJI YANAGISAWA

G.R. NO. 175303 April 11, 2012

Facts:
Respondent Yanagisawa, a Japanese national, and Evelyn F.
Castañeda, a Filipina, contracted marriage on July 12, 1989 in
the City Hall of Manila. On August 23, 1995, Evelyn purchased a
152 square-meter townhouse unit in Parañaque. It wa indicated
in the TCT that Evelyn was married to Yanagisawa. 

In 1986, Yanagisawa filed a complaint for the declaration of

nullity of his marriage with Evelyn on the ground of bigamy.
During the pendency of the case, Eiji filed a Motion for the
Issuance of a Restraining Order against Evelyn and an
Application for a Writ of a Preliminary Injunction. He asked that
Evelyn be enjoined from disposing or encumbering all of the
properties registered in her name. At the hearing on the said
motion, Evelyn and her lawyer voluntarily undertook not to
dispose of the properties registered in her name during the
pendency of the case, thus rendering Yanagisawa’s application
and motion moot.

Sometime in March 1997, Evelyn obtained a loan of P500,000.00

from petitioner Pacific Ace Finance Ltd. (PAFIN). To secure the
loan, Evelyn executed a real estate mortgage (REM) in favor of
PAFIN over the Parañaque townhouse. The instrument was
submitted to the Register of Deeds of Parañaque City for
annotation on the same date.

At the time of the mortgage, Eiji’s appeal in the nullity of

marriage case was pending before the CA. The Makati RTC had
dissolved Eiji and Evelyn’s marriage, and had ordered the
liquidation of their registered properties, including the
Parañaque townhouse unit, with its proceeds to be divided
between the parties. The Decision of the Makati RTC did not lift
or dissolve its October 2, 1996 Order on Evelyn’s commitment
not to dispose of or encumber the properties registered in her
name.

Yanagisawa learned of the REM upon its annotation on the TCT.

Deeming the mortgage as a violation of the Makati RTC’s October
2, 1996 Order, Yanagisawa filed a complaint for the annulment
of REM against Evelyn and PAFIN.
 242

 For its defense, PAFIN denied prior knowledge of the October 2,

1996 Order against Evelyn. It admitted, however, that it did not
conduct any verification of the title with the Registry of Deeds of
Parañaque City “because x x x Evelyn was a good, friendly and
trusted neighbor.” PAFIN maintained that Yanagisaw has no
personality to seek the annulment of the REM because a foreign
national cannot own real properties located within the
Philippines. Evelyn also denied having knowledge of the October
2, 1996 Order. Evelyn asserted that she paid for the property
with her own funds and that she has exclusive ownership
thereof.

The Parañaque RTC dismissed Yanagisawa’s complaint

explaining that, as a foreign national, he cannot possibly own
the mortgaged property. Without ownership, or any other law or
contract binding the defendants to him, Eiji has no cause of
action that may be asserted against them.

On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC’s decision holding that the

said decision was improper because it violated the doctrine of
non-interference. Courts of equal jurisdiction, such as regional
trial courts, have no appellate jurisdiction over each other.

Issue:
WON Evelyn validly disposed the subject property.

Held:
NO. A review of the complaint shows that Yanagisawa did not
claim ownership of the Parañaque townhouse unit or his right to
consent to the REM as his bases for seeking its annulment.
Instead, Yanagisawa invoked his right to rely on Evelyn’s
commitment not to dispose of or encumber the property and the
annotation of the said commitment on TCT No. 99791.
 
It was Evelyn and PAFIN that raised Yanagisawa’s incapacity to
own real property as their defense to the suit. They maintained
that Yanagisawa, as an alien incapacitated to own real estate in
the Philippines, need not consent to the REM contract for its
validity. But this argument is beside the point and is not a
proper defense to the right asserted by Eiji. This defense does
not negate Eiji’s right to rely on the October 2, 1996 Order of the
Makati RTC and to hold third persons, who deal with the
registered property, to the annotations entered on the title.
 243

Thus, the RTC erred in dismissing the complaint based on this

defense.
 
Petitioner did not question the rest of the appellate court’s
ruling, which held that Evelyn and PAFIN executed the REM in
complete disregard and violation of the October 2, 1996 Order of
the Makati RTC and the annotation on TCT No. 99791. It did
not dispute the legal effect of the October 2, 1996 Order on
Evelyn’s capacity to encumber the Parañaque townhouse unit
nor the CA’s finding that petitioner is a mortgagee in bad faith.
 
The October 2, 1996 Order, embodying Evelyn’s commitment not
to dispose of or encumber the property, is akin to an injunction
order against the disposition or encumbrance of the property.
Jurisprudence holds that all acts done in violation of a standing
injunction order are voidable as to the party enjoined and third
parties who are not in good faith. The party, in whose favor the
injunction is issued, has a cause of action to seek the
annulment of the offending actions.
 244

WILLEM BEUMER vs. AVELINA AMORES

G.R. NO. 195670 December 3, 2012

Facts:
Petitioner Beumer, a Dutch National, and respondent Amores, a
Filipina, married in March 29, 1980. After several years, the RTC
declared the nullity of their marriage in the Decision on the
basis of the former’s psychological incapacity. Consequently,
petitioner filed a Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership
praying for the distribution of the properties claimed to have
been acquired during the subsistence of their marriage.

In defense, respondent averred that, with the exception of their

two (2) residential houses, she and petitioner did not acquire any
conjugal properties during their marriage, the truth being that
she used her own personal money to purchase Lots 1, 2142,
5845 and 4 out of her personal funds and Lots 2055-A and
2055-I by way of inheritance.

She submitted a joint affidavit executed by her and petitioner

attesting to the fact that she purchased Lot 2142 and the
improvements thereon using her own money. Accordingly,
respondent sought the dismissal of the petition for dissolution as
well as payment for attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.

During trial, petitioner testified that while Lots 1, 2142, 5845

and 4 were registered in the name of respondent, these
properties were acquired with the money he received from the
Dutch government as his disability benefit since respondent did
not have sufficient income to pay for their acquisition. He also
claimed that the joint affidavit they submitted before the
Register of Deeds of Dumaguete City was contrary to Article 89
of the Family Code, hence, invalid.

The RTC rendered its decision dissolving the parties’ conjugal

partnership, awarding all the parcels of land to respondent as
her paraphernal properties; the tools and equipment in favor of
petitioner as his exclusive properties; the two (2) houses
standing on Lots 1 and 2142 as co-owned by the parties.

It was made evident by the sworn statements petitioner executed

purporting to show that the subject parcels of land were
purchased from the exclusive funds of his wife, the herein
 245

respondent. Petitioner’s plea for reimbursement for the amount

he had paid to purchase the foregoing properties on the basis of
equity was likewise denied for not having come to court with
clean hands.

On appeal, petitioner insisted that the money used to purchase

the foregoing properties came from his own capital funds and
that they were registered in the name of his former wife only
because of the constitutional prohibition against foreign
ownership. Thus, he prayed for reimbursement of one-half (1/2)
of the value of what he had paid in the purchase of the said
properties, waiving the other half in favor of his estranged ex-
wife. The CA stressed the fact that petitioner was “well-aware of
the constitutional prohibition for aliens to acquire lands in the
Philippines.” Hence, he cannot invoke equity to support his
claim for reimbursement.

Issue:
WON petitioner is entitled to reimbursement.

Held:
NO. The Court had already denied a claim for reimbursement of
the value of purchased parcels of Philippine land instituted by a
foreigner Helmut Muller, against his former Filipina spouse,
Elena Buenaventura Muller. It held that Helmut Muller cannot
seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is
clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the property
despite the prohibition against foreign ownership.

As also explained in Muller, the time-honored principle is that

he who seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes into
equity must come with clean hands. Conversely stated, he who
has done inequity shall not be accorded equity. Thus, a
litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity on the ground
that his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or
fraudulent, or deceitful.

In this case, petitioner’s statements regarding the real

source of the funds used to purchase the subject parcels of
land dilute the veracity of his claims. While admitting to have
previously executed a joint affidavit that respondent’s personal
funds were used to purchase Lot 1,28 he likewise claimed that
his personal disability funds were used to acquire the same.
 246

Evidently, these inconsistencies show his untruthfulness. Thus,

as petitioner has come before the Court with unclean hands, he
is now precluded from seeking any equitable refuge. In any
event, the Court cannot, even on the grounds of equity,
grant reimbursement to petitioner given that he acquired no
right whatsoever over the subject properties by virtue of its
unconstitutional purchase. It is well-established that equity as
a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be done
indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done
directly. Surely, a contract that violates the Constitution and the
law is null and void, vests no rights, creates no obligations and
produces no legal effect at all.

Corollary thereto, under Article 1412 of the Civil Code, petitioner

cannot have the subject properties deeded to him or allow him to
recover the money he had spent for the purchase thereof. The
law will not aid either party to an illegal contract or agreement; it
leaves the parties where it finds them. Indeed, one cannot
salvage any rights from an unconstitutional transaction
knowingly entered into.

Neither can the Court grant petitioner’s claim for reimbursement

on the basis of unjust enrichment. Nor would the denial of his
claim amount to an injustice based on his foreign citizenship.
Precisely, it is the Constitution itself which demarcates the
rights of citizens and non-citizens in owning Philippine land. To
be sure, the constitutional ban against foreigners applies only to
ownership of Philippine land and not to the improvements built
thereon, such as the two (2) houses standing on Lots 1 and 2142
which were properly declared to be co-owned by the parties
subject to partition. Needless to state, the purpose of the
prohibition is to conserve the national patrimony and it is this
policy which the Court is duty-bound to protect.
 247

ATTY. ERLANDO A. ABRENICA & JOENA ABRENICA vs. LAW

FIRM OF ABRENICA, TUNGOL and TIBAYAN
G.R. NO. 180572 June 18, 2012

Facts:
Petitioner Atty. Erlando A. Abrenica was a partner of individual
respondents, Attys. Danilo N. Tungol and Abelardo M. Tibayan,
in the Law Firm of Abrenica, Tungol and Tibayan (“the firm”). In
1998, respondents filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) two cases against petitioner. The first was for
Accounting and Return and Transfer of Partnership Funds With
Damages and Application for Issuance of Preliminary
Attachment, where they alleged that petitioner refused to return
partnership funds representing profits from the sale of a parcel
of land in Lemery, Batangas. The second was for Accounting and
Return and Transfer of Partnership Funds where respondents
sought to recover from petitioner retainer fees that he received
from two clients of the firm and the balance of the cash advance
that he obtained in 1997.

The SEC initially heard the cases but they were later transferred
RTC pursuant to Republic Act No. 8799, which transferred
jurisdiction over intra-corporate controversies from the SEC to
the courts.

The trial court issued an Order requiring petitioner to show

cause why it should take cognizance of the notice of appeal in
view of A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC. Petitioner did not comply with the
said Order. Instead, he filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion
for Leave of Court to Admit Attached Petition for Review under
Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court. Respondents opposed the
motion.

Petitioner Erlando filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion alleging that

the sheriff had levied on properties belonging to his children and
petitioner Joena. On the same day, Joena filed an Affidavit of
Third Party Claim alleging that she and her stepchildren owned
a number of the personal properties sought to be levied. She also
insisted that she owned half of the two (2) motor vehicles as well
as the house and lot, which formed part of the absolute
community of property. She likewise alleged that the real
property, being a family home, and the furniture and the
utensils necessary for housekeeping having a depreciated
 248

combined value of one hundred thousand pesos (P 100,000)

were exempt from execution. Thus, she sought their discharge
and release and likewise the immediate remittance to her of half
of the proceeds, if any.

Issue:
WON Joena and her children’s property should be included in
the execution.

Held:
NO. It appears from the records that petitioner Erlando was first
married to a certain Ma. Aline Lovejoy Padua on 13 October
1983. They had three children: Patrik Erlando (born on 14 April
1985), Maria Monica Erline (born on 9 September 1986), and
Patrik Randel (born on 12 April 1990).

After the dissolution of the first marriage of Erlando, he and

Joena got married on 28 May 1998. In her Affidavit, Joena
alleged that she represented her stepchildren; that the levied
personal properties – in particular, a piano with a chair,
computer equipment and a computer table – were owned by the
latter. We note that two of these stepchildren were already of
legal age when Joena filed her Affidavit. As to Patrik Randel,
parental authority over him belongs to his parents. Absent any
special power of attorney authorizing Joena to represent
Erlando’s children, her claim cannot be sustained.

Petitioner Joena also asserted that the two (2) motor vehicles
purchased in 1992 and 1997, as well as the house and lot
covered by TCT No. 216818 formed part of the absolute
community regime. However, Art. 92, par. (3) of the Family
Code excludes from the community property the property
acquired before the marriage of a spouse who has legitimate
descendants by a former marriage; and the fruits and the
income, if any, of that property. Neither these two vehicles
nor the house and lot belong to the second marriage.
 249

SPS ROBERTO & VENUS BUADO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. NO. 145222 April 24, 2009

Facts:
Petitioners Roberto and Venus Buado filed a civil case against
Erlinda Nicol and the latter was ordered by the court to pay
damages to petitioners. Finding Erlinda’s personal properties
insufficient to satisfy the judgment, the Deputy Sheriff levied
and auctioned the property of Erlinda. Petitioners were the
highest bidder in the auction.

On 2 February 1994, respondent Romulo Nicol, the husband of

Erlinda, filed a complaint for annulment of certificate of sale
against petitioners and the deputy sheriff. Respondent, as
plaintiff therein, alleged that the defendants, now petitioners,
connived and directly levied upon and execute his real property
without exhausting the personal properties of Erlinda Nicol.
Respondent averred that there was no proper publication and
posting of the notice of sale.
 
In response, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds
of lack of jurisdiction and that they had acted on the basis of a
valid writ of execution. Citing De Leon v. Salvador, petitioners
claimed that respondent should have filed the case with Branch
19 where the judgment originated and which issued the order of
execution, writ of execution, notice of levy and notice of sheriff’s
sale.

Petitioners insist that respondent, who is the husband of the

judgment debtor, is not the “third party” contemplated in
Section 17 (now Section 16), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court,
hence a separate action need not be filed. Furthermore,
petitioners assert that the obligation of the wife redounded
to the benefit of the conjugal partnership and cited
authorities to the effect that the husband is liable for the
tort committed by his wife.

Issue:
WON the obligation of Erlinda Nicol arising from her criminal
liability is chargeable to the conjugal partnership.
 250

Held:
NO. There is no dispute that contested property is conjugal in
nature. Article 122 of the Family Code explicitly provides that
payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the
wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the
conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to the
benefit of the family.
 
Unlike in the system of absolute community where liabilities
incurred by either spouse by reason of a crime or quasi-delict is
chargeable to the absolute community of property, in the
absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtor-
spouse, the same advantage is not accorded in the system of
conjugal partnership of gains. The conjugal partnership of gains
has no duty to make advance payments for the liability of the
debtor-spouse.
 
Parenthetically, by no stretch of imagination can it be concluded
that the civil obligation arising from the crime of slander
committed by Erlinda redounded to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership.
 
To reiterate, conjugal property cannot be held liable for the
personal obligation contracted by one spouse, unless some
advantage or benefit is shown to have accrued to the conjugal
partnership.
 251

MR. & MRS. RONNIE DAR, vs. HON. ALONZO-LEGASTO

G.R. No. 143016. August 30, 2000

Facts:
If the petitioners are husband and wife and only one of them
signs the petition (for review on certiorari and mandamus), is the
petition dismissible for violation of the Rule on Certification of
Non-Forum Shopping requiring all petitioners to certify it under
oath? This is the sole issue raised by petitioners Mr. and Mrs.
Ronnie Dar, Mr. and Mrs. Randy Angeles, Mr. and Mrs. Joy
Constantino, and Mr. and Mrs. Liberty Cruz.

In a resolution, dated January 25, 2000, the Court of Appeals

ruled in the affirmative. Said court dismissed petitioners’
petition for review on certiorari and mandamus for failure to
comply with the Rule on Certification of Non-Forum Shopping
after finding that the petition "was signed only by Ronnie Dar,
Randy Angeles, Joy Constantino, and Liberty Cruz, without
authority attached thereto to sign for and in behalf of their co-
petitioners.” In other words, while petitioners Ronnie Dar, Randy
Angeles, Joy Constantino and Liberty Cruz signed the
Certification of Non-Forum Shopping, their respective spouses
did not sign the same.

It appears from the records that herein private respondent

Nenita Co Bautista filed a case for unlawful detainer against
herein petitioners in the Metropolitan Trial Court, Quezon City.
They were sued as “Mr. and Mrs.” in the said case. Petitioners
now contend that since what is involved in the instant case is
their common rights and interest to abode under the the system
of absolute community of property, either of the spouses can
sign the petition.

Issue:
WON if the petition signed only by the wife dismissible for
violation of the Rule on Certification of Non-Forum Shopping
requiring all petitioners to certify it under oath?

Held:
NO. With respect to the contents of the certification which the
pleader may prepare, the rule of substantial compliance may be
availed of. While this section requires that it be strictly complied
with, it merely underscores its mandatory nature in that it
 252

cannot be altogether dispensed with or its requirements

completely disregarded but it does not thereby prevent
substantial compliance on this aspect of its provisions under
justifiable circumstances. Circular No. 28-91 was designed to
serve as an instrument to promote and facilitate the orderly
administration of justice and should not be interpreted with
such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and
legitimate objective or the goal of all rules of procedure - which is
to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible.

In the instant case, the Court of Appeals should have taken

into consideration the fact that the petitioners were sued
jointly, or as “Mr. and Mrs.” over a property in which they
have a common interest. Such being the case, the signing of
one of them in the certification substantially complies with
the rule on certification of non-forum shopping.
 253

PHILIP MATTHEWS vs. BENJAMIN & JOSELYN TAYLOR

G.R. No. 164584               June 22, 2009

Facts:
Respondent Benjamin Taylor, a British national, married Joselyn, a 17-
year old Filipina. While their marriage was subsisting, Joselyn bought a
property in Boracay which they eventually converted to a resort. The
sale allegedly financed by Benjamin. All the required permit permits
and licenses for the operation of the resort were in the name of Ginna
Celestino, Joselyn’s sister.

Benjamin and Joselyn had a falling out and the latter ran away with
another man. In June 1992, Joselyn executed an SPA in favour of
Benjamin authorizing the latter to maintain, sell, lease, sub-lease and
otherwise enter into contract with 3 rd parties with respect to the
Boracay property. In July 1992, Joselyn entered into a Lease Agreement
with petitioner Philip Matthews involving the Boracay property.

Claiming that the Agreement was null and void since it was entered into
by Joselyn without his consent, Benjamin instituted an action for
Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of Lease with Damages against
Joselyn and the petitioner. Benjamin claimed that his funds were used
in the acquisition and improvement of the Boracay property, and
coupled with the fact that he was Joselyn’s husband, any transaction
involving said property required his consent.

After declaring Joselyn and the petitioner in default, the RTC rendered a
decision declaring the Lease Agreement null and void. The decision was
however set aside by the CA and ordered the RTC to allow the petitioner
to file his Answer.

In his Answer, petitioner claimed good faith in transacting business

with Joselyn. He asserted that since Joselyn appeared to be the owner
of the Boracay property, he found it unnecessary to obtain the consent
of Benjamin. Moreover, as appearing in the Agreement, Benjamin
signed as a witness to the contract, indicating his knowledge of the
transaction and, impliedly, his conformity to the agreement entered into
by his wife. Benjamin was, therefore, estopped from questioning the
validity of the Agreement.

The RTC still declared the agreement null and void. The RTC considered
the Boracay property as community property of Benjamin and Joselyn;
thus, the consent of the spouses was necessary to validate any
contract involving the property. Benjamin’s right over the Boracay
property was bolstered by the court’s findings that the property was
purchased and improved through funds provided by Benjamin.
Although the Agreement was evidenced by a public document, the trial
court refused to consider the alleged participation of Benjamin in the
 254

questioned transaction primarily because his signature appeared only

on the last page of the document and not on every page thereof.

On appeal to the CA, petitioner still failed to obtain a favorable decision.

The CA affirmed the conclusions made by the RTC. The appellate court
was of the view that if, indeed, Benjamin was a willing participant in the
questioned transaction, the parties to the Agreement should have used
the phrase "with my consent" instead of "signed in the presence of." The
CA noted that Joselyn already prepared an SPA in favor of Benjamin
involving the Boracay property; it was therefore unnecessary for Joselyn
to participate in the execution of the Agreement.

Issue:
WON the marital consent of Benjamin is required in the Lease
Agreement.

Held:
NO. The trial and appellate courts both focused on the property
relations of petitioner and respondent in light of the Civil Code and
Family Code provisions. They, however, failed to observe the applicable
constitutional principles, which, in fact, are the more decisive. Under
the Constitution, aliens, whether individuals or corporations, are
absolutely not allowed to acquire public or private lands in the
Philippines. In a long line of cases, the Court have settled issues that
directly or indirectly involve the said constitutional provision.

In light of the foregoing jurisprudence, we find and so hold that

Benjamin has no right to nullify the Agreement of Lease between
Joselyn and petitioner. Benjamin, being an alien, is absolutely
prohibited from acquiring private and public lands in the
Philippines. Considering that Joselyn appeared to be the designated
"vendee" in the Deed of Sale of said property, she acquired sole
ownership thereto. This is true even if we sustain Benjamin’s claim that
he provided the funds for such acquisition. By entering into such
contract knowing that it was illegal, no implied trust was created
in his favor; no reimbursement for his expenses can be allowed;
and no declaration can be made that the subject property was part
of the conjugal/community property of the spouses. In any event,
he had and has no capacity or personality to question the
subsequent lease of the Boracay property by his wife on the theory
that in so doing, he was merely exercising the prerogative of a
husband in respect of conjugal property. To sustain such a theory
would countenance indirect controversion of the constitutional
prohibition. If the property were to be declared conjugal, this would
accord the alien husband a substantial interest and right over the land,
as he would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition.
This is a right that the Constitution does not permit him to have.
 255

HEIRS OF PROTACIO GO,SR. vs. ESTER SERVACIO

G.R. No. 157537               September 7, 2011

Facts:
In 1976, petitioner Protacio Go, Jr., purchased two parcels of land
situated in Southern Leyte. In 1987, Marta Marola Go died. She is the
wife of Protacio Go, Sr. and mother of petitioners. In March 1999,
Protacio, Jr executed an Affidavit of Renunciation and Waiver whereby
he affirmed under oath that it was his father, Protacio, Sr, not he, who
had purchased the said two parcels of land.

In December 1999, Protacio, Sr. and his son respondent Rito Go sold a
portion of the property to respondent Servacio. In 2001, petitioners
demanded the return of the property, but Servacio refused to heed their
demand. Thus, petitioners sued Servacio and Rito for the annulment of
the sale of the property.

The petitioners averred that following Protacio, Jr.’s renunciation, the

property became conjugal property; and that the sale of the property to
Servacio without the prior liquidation of the community property
between Protacio, Sr. and Marta was null and void. Servacio and Rito
countered that Protacio, Sr. had exclusively owned the property because
he had purchased it with his own money.

In its decision, the RTC declared that the property was the conjugal
property of Protacio, Sr. and Marta Go. Nonetheless, the RTC affirmed
the validity of the sale of the property holding that as long as the
portion sold does not encroach upon the legitime of other heirs, it is
valid.

Issue:
WON a conjugal property may be sold even without prior liquidation.

Held:
NO. It is clear that conjugal partnership of gains established before and
after the effectivity of the Family Code are governed by the rules found
in Chapter 4 (Conjugal Partnership of Gains) of Title IV (Property
Relations Between Husband And Wife) of the Family Code. Hence, any
disposition of the conjugal property after the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership must be made only after the liquidation; otherwise, the
disposition is void.

Before applying such rules, however, the conjugal partnership of gains

must be subsisting at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code.
There being no dispute that Protacio, Sr. and Marta were married prior
to the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, their property
relation was properly characterized as one of conjugal partnership
governed by the Civil Code. Upon Marta’s death in 1987, the conjugal
 256

partnership was dissolved, pursuant to Article 175 (1) of the Civil

Code, and an implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among
Protacio, Sr. and the other heirs of Marta with respect to her share
in the assets of the conjugal partnership pending a liquidation
following its liquidation.

Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his children in respect

of Marta’s share in the conjugal partnership, could not yet assert or
claim title to any specific portion of Marta’s share without an actual
partition of the property being first done either by agreement or by
judicial decree. Until then, all that he had was an ideal or abstract
quota in Marta’s share. Nonetheless, a co-owner could sell his
undivided share; hence, Protacio, Sr. had the right to freely sell
and dispose of his undivided interest, but not the interest of his
co-owners. Consequently, the sale by Protacio, Sr. and Rito as co-
owners without the consent of the other co-owners was not
necessarily void, for the rights of the selling co-owners were
thereby effectively transferred, making the buyer (Servacio) a co-
owner of Marta’s share. This result conforms to the well-established
principle that the binding force of a contract must be recognized as far
as it is legally possible to do so (quando res non valet ut ago, valeat
quantum valere potest).

Article 105 of the Family Code expressly provides that the applicability
of the rules on dissolution of the conjugal partnership is "without
prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil
Code or other laws." This provision gives another reason not to declare
the sale as entirely void. Indeed, such a declaration prejudices the
rights of Servacio who had already acquired the shares of Protacio, Sr.
and Rito in the property subject of the sale.

Thus, it is now settled that the appropriate recourse of co-owners in

cases where their consent were not secured in a sale of the entire
property as well as in a sale merely of the undivided shares of some of
the co-owners is an action for PARTITION under Rule 69 of the Revised
Rules of Court. In the meanwhile, Servacio would be a trustee for the
benefit of the co-heirs of her vendors in respect of any portion that
might not be validly sold to her.
 257

LOREA DE UGALDE vs. JON DE YSASI

G.R. No. 130623             February 29, 2008

Facts:
Petitioner Ugalde and respondent Ysasi got married before a municipal
judge followed by a church wedding on 1 March 1951. Petitioner and
respondent did not execute any ante-nuptial agreement. They had a son
named Jon de Ysasi III. In April 1975, petitioner and respondent
separated. In 1964, respondent allegedly contracted another marriage
with Victoria Eleanor Smith. Petitioner further alleged that respondent
and Smith had been acquiring and disposing of real and personal
properties to her prejudice as the lawful wife. Petitioner alleged that she
had been defrauded of rental income, profits, and fruits of their
conjugal properties.

In 1984, petitioner filed a petition for dissolution of the conjugal

partnership of gains against respondent. In particular, petitioner asked
for her conjugal share in respondent's inheritance as per the settlement
of the estate of respondent's parents, Juan Ysasi and Maria Aldecoa de
Ysasi, who died on 17 November 1975 and 25 February 1979,
respectively. Petitioner also prayed for a monthly support of P5,000 to
be deducted from her share in the conjugal partnership; the
appointment of a receiver during the pendency of the litigation; the
annulment of all contracts, agreements, and documents signed and
ratified by respondent with third persons without her consent; and
payment of appearance and attorney's fees.

Respondent countered that on 2 June 1961, he and petitioner entered

into an agreement which provided, among others, that their conjugal
partnership of gains shall be deemed dissolved as of 15 April 1957.
Pursuant to the agreement, they submitted an Amicable Settlement
which was approved by the trial court.

Respondent further alleged that petitioner already obtained a divorce

from him before the Supreme Court of Mexico. Petitioner then
contracted a second marriage with Richard Galoway (Galoway). After
Galoway's death, petitioner contracted a third marriage with Frank
Scholey. Respondent moved for the dismissal of the petition for
dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains on the grounds of
estoppel, laches, and res judicata. In his Supplemental Affirmative
Defense, respondent alleged that the marriage between him and
petitioner was void because it was executed without the benefit of a
marriage license.

The trial court ruled that the existence of a conjugal partnership of

gains is predicated on a valid marriage. Considering that the marriage
between petitioner and respondent was solemnized without a marriage
license, the marriage was null and void, and no community of property
 258

was formed between them. The trial court further ruled that assuming
that the marriage was valid, the action was barred by res judicata. The
trial court noted that petitioner and respondent entered into an
amicable settlement. The amicable settlement was approved by the CFI
and petitioner may no longer repudiate it. Finally, the trial court ruled
that there was no proof to show that during their union, petitioner
and respondent acquired properties.

On appeal, the CA ruled that the absence of a marriage license is fatal

and made the marriage between petitioner and respondent a complete
nullity. Hence, the trial court did not err in finding that there was
no conjugal partnership of gains between petitioner and
respondent. The CA further ruled that the compromise agreement is a
valid contract between the parties Since the compromise agreement was
entered into freely, voluntarily, and with the full understanding of its
consequences, it is conclusive and binding on the parties. The Court of
Appeals also ruled that the action was barred by laches since it was
filed by petitioner 23 years from the time the CFI approved the
additional amicable settlement. The CA sustained the trial court's ruling
that respondent's right over the estate of his deceased parents was only
inchoate and there was no evidence that petitioner and respondent
acquired any property that could be considered conjugal.

Issue:
WON the amicable settlement dissolved the property relation between
the petitioner and respondent.

Held:
YES. The finality of the CFI Order approving the parties' separation
of property resulted in the termination of the conjugal partnership
of gains in accordance with Article 175 of the Family Code. Hence,
when the trial court decided Special Proceedings No. 3330, the conjugal
partnership between petitioner and respondent was already dissolved.

Petitioner alleges that the CFI had no authority to approve the

Compromise Agreement because the case was for custody, and the
creditors were not given notice by the parties, as also required under
Article 191 of the Civil Code. Petitioner cannot repudiate the
Compromise Agreement on this ground. A judgment upon a
compromise agreement has all the force and effect of any other
judgment, and conclusive only upon parties thereto and their
privies, and not binding on third persons who are not parties to it.

The Amicable Settlement had become final as between petitioner and

respondent when it was approved by the CFI on 6 June 1961. The
CFI's approval of the Compromise Agreement on 6 June 1961
resulted in the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains
between petitioner and respondent on even date.
 259

BRIGIDO B. QUIAO vs. RITA C. QUIAO

G.R. No 176556               July 4, 2012

Facts:
Respondent Rita Quiao filed a complaint for legal separation against
petitioner Brigido Quiao which was granted on October 10, 2005. One
of the dispositive portion of the RTC’s decision “except for thepersonal
and real properties already foreclosed by the RCBC, all the remaining
properties shall be divided equally between Rita and Brigido subject to
the legitimes of the children and the payment of the unpaid conjugal
liabilities. Petitioner’s share, however, of the net profits earned by the
conjugal partnership is forfeited in favour of the common children.”
Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration or appeal within the
period provided by the Rule on Legal Separation.

On December 12, 2005, respondents filed a motion for execution which

the trial court granted. On February 10, 2006, the RTC issued a Writ of
Execution.

On July 7, 2006, petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for

Clarification asking the RTC to define the term “Net Profits.” The RTC
held that the phrase “NET PROFIT EARNED” denotes “the remainder
of the properties of the parties after deducting the separate
properties of each of the spouse and the debts." The Order further
held that after determining the remainder of the properties, it shall be
forfeited in favor of the common children because the offending spouse
does not have any right to any share of the net profits earned.

On Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC held that although the Decision
dated October 10, 2005 has become final and executory, on November
8, 2006, the RTC held that the NET PROFIT EARNED, which is subject
of forfeiture in favor of the parties' common children, is ordered to be
computed in accordance with par. 4 of Article 102 of the Family Code.

On November 21, 2006, the respondents filed a Motion for

Reconsideration, praying for the correction and reversal of the Order
dated November 8, 2006. Thereafter, on January 8, 2007, the RTC
changed its ruling again and granted the respondents' Motion for
Reconsideration whereby the Order dated November 8, 2006 was set
aside to reinstate the Order dated August 31, 2006. On appeal,
petitioner claims that the court a quo is wrong when it applied Article
129 of the Family Code, instead of Article 102. He confusingly argues
that Article 102 applies because there is no other provision under the
Family Code which defines net profits earned subject of forfeiture as a
result of legal separation.
 260

Issue:
WON Article 129 should be applied in the dissolution and the
consequent liquidation of the common properties of the husband and
wife.

Held:
YES. From the record, petitioner and the respondent tied the marital
knot on January 6, 1977. Since at the time of the exchange of marital
vows, the operative law was the Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No.
386) and since they did not agree on a marriage settlement, the
property relations between the petitioner and the respondent is the
system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains. And
under this property relation, "the husband and the wife place in a
common fund the fruits of their separate property and the income
from their work or industry." The husband and wife also own in
common all the property of the conjugal partnership of gains.

Since at the time of the dissolution of the petitioner and the

respondent's marriage the operative law is already the Family Code, the
same applies in the instant case and the applicable law in so far as the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and liabilities is
concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of
the Family Code. The latter provision is applicable because according to
Article 256 of the Family Code "this Code shall have retroactive effect
insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other law."

As earlier discussed, Article 129 of the Family Code applies as to the

property relations of the parties. In other words, the computation and
the succession of events will follow the provisions under Article 129 of
the said Code. Moreover, as to the definition of "net profits," we cannot
but refer to Article 102(4) of the Family Code, since it expressly provides
that for purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture
under Article 43, No. (2) and Article 63, No. (2), Article 102(4) applies. In
this provision, net profits "shall be the increase in value between the
market value of the community property at the time of the celebration of
the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution." Thus,
without any iota of doubt, Article 102(4) applies to both the dissolution
of the absolute community regime under Article 102 of the Family Code,
and to the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime under Article
129 of the Family Code. The difference lies in the processes used
under the dissolution of the absolute community regime under
Article 102 of the Family Code, and in the processes used under
the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime under Article
129 of the Family Code.
 261

On Absolute Community Regime:

When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the

husband and the wife becomes joint owners of all the properties of the
marriage. Whatever property each spouse brings into the marriage, and
those acquired during the marriage (except those excluded under Article
92 of the Family Code) form the common mass of the couple's
properties. And when the couple's marriage or community is dissolved,
that common mass is divided between the spouses, or their respective
heirs, equally or in the proportion the parties have established,
irrespective of the value each one may have originally owned.

Applying Article 102 of the Family Code, the "net profits" requires that
we first find the market value of the properties at the time of the
community's dissolution. From the totality of the market value of all the
properties, we subtract the debts and obligations of the absolute
community and this result to the net assets or net remainder of the
properties of the absolute community, from which we deduct the
market value of the properties at the time of marriage, which then
results to the net profits.

On Conjugal Partnership Regime:

Before we go into our disquisition on the Conjugal Partnership Regime,

we make it clear that Article 102(4) of the Family Code applies in the
instant case for purposes only of defining "net profit." As earlier
explained, the definition of "net profits" in Article 102(4) of the Family
Code applies to both the absolute community regime and conjugal
partnership regime as provided for under Article 63, No. (2) of the
Family Code, relative to the provisions on Legal Separation.

Considering that the couple's marriage has been dissolved under the
Family Code, Article 129 of the same Code applies in the liquidation of
the couple's properties in the event that the conjugal partnership of
gains is dissolved. In the normal course of events, the following are the
steps in the liquidation of the properties of the spouses:

(a) An inventory of all the actual properties shall be made, separately

listing the couple's conjugal properties and their separate properties. In
the instant case, the trial court found that the couple has no
separate properties when they married.

(b) Ordinarily, the benefit received by a spouse from the conjugal

partnership during the marriage is returned in equal amount to the
assets of the conjugal partnership; and if the community is enriched at
the expense of the separate properties of either spouse, a restitution of
the value of such properties to their respective owners shall be made.
 262

(c) Subsequently, the couple's conjugal partnership shall pay the debts
of the conjugal partnership; while the debts and obligation of each of
the spouses shall be paid from their respective separate properties. But
if the conjugal partnership is not sufficient to pay all its debts and
obligations, the spouses with their separate properties shall be
solidarily liable.

(d) Now, what remains of the separate or exclusive properties of the

husband and of the wife shall be returned to each of them.

***************************************

A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent do not

depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder, or to the
exercise of which no obstacle exists, and which is immediate and
perfect in itself and not dependent upon a contingency. The term
"vested right" expresses the concept of present fixed interest which, in
right reason and natural justice, should be protected against arbitrary
State action, or an innately just and imperative right which enlightened
free society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable individual rights,
cannot deny. To be vested, a right must have become a title—legal
or equitable—to the present or future enjoyment of property.

From the foregoing, it is clear that while one may not be deprived of his
"vested right," he may lose the same if there is due process and such
deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence. In the present case,
the petitioner was accorded his right to due process. Thus, the
petitioner cannot claim being deprived of his right to due process.
 263

ALAIN M. DIÑO vs. MA. CARIDAD L. DIÑO

G.R. No. 178044               January 19, 2011

Facts:
Petitioner Alain M. Diño and respondent Ma. Caridad L. Diño
were childhood friends and sweethearts. They started living
together in 1984 until they decided to separate in 1994. In 1996,
petitioner and respondent decided to live together again. On 14
January 1998, they were married before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of
Las Piñas City.

In 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of

Marriage against respondent on the ground of psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that
respondent failed in her marital obligation to give love and
support to him, and had abandoned her responsibility to the
family, choosing instead to go on shopping sprees and
gallivanting with her friends that depleted the family assets.
Petitioner further alleged that respondent was not faithful, and
would at times become violent and hurt him.

Extrajudicial service of summons was effected upon respondent

who, at the time of the filing of the petition, was already living in
the United States of America. Despite receipt of the summons,
respondent did not file an answer to the petition within the
reglementary period. Petitioner later learned that respondent
filed a petition for divorce/dissolution of her marriage with
petitioner, which was granted by the Superior Court of California
on 25 May 2001. Petitioner also learned that on 5 October 2001,
respondent married a certain Manuel V. Alcantara.

In its 18 October 2006 Decision, the trial court granted the

petition on the ground that respondent was psychologically
incapacited to comply with the essential marital obligations at
the time of the celebration of the marriage. Petitioner filed a
motion for partial reconsideration questioning the dissolution of
the absolute community of property and the ruling that the
decree of annulment shall only be issued upon compliance with
Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code.

Issue:
WON the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of
absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after
 264

liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties

under Article 147 of the Family Code.

Held:
YES. The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon
City that in a void marriage, regardless of its cause, the property
relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is
governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.
Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who
are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to
contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, such
as petitioner and respondent in the case before the Court.

For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following

elements must be present:

1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry

each other;

2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and

wife; and

3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their

marriage is void.

All these elements are present in this case and there is no

question that Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the
property relations between petitioner and respondent.

It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of

the Rule applies only to marriages which are declared void ab
initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of
the Family Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does
not apply to marriages which are declared void ab initio under
Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void
without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the
parties.

Article 40 of the Family Code contemplates a situation where a

second or bigamous marriage was contracted. Under Article 40,
"[t]he absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void."
 265

Article 45 of the Family Code, on the other hand, refers to

voidable marriages, meaning, marriages which are valid until
they are set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an
action for annulment. In both instances under Articles 40 and
45, the marriages are governed either by absolute community of
property or conjugal partnership of gains unless the parties
agree to a complete separation of property in a marriage
settlement entered into before the marriage. Since the property
relations of the parties is governed by absolute community
of property or conjugal partnership of gains, there is a need
to liquidate, partition and distribute the properties before a
decree of annulment could be issued. That is not the case for
annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code
because the marriage is governed by the ordinary rules on co-
ownership.

In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was declared

void under Article 36 of the Family Code and not under
Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of
properties owned in common by petitioner and respondent
are the rules on co-ownership.

In Valdes, the Court ruled that the property relations of parties

in a void marriage during the period of cohabitation is governed
either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. The rules
on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses
should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code
provisions on co-ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil
Code, "partition may be made by agreement between the
parties or by judicial proceedings. x x x." It is not necessary to
liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same proceeding
for declaration of nullity of marriage.
 266

ERIC U. YU vs. JUDGE REYES CARPIO & CAROLINE YU

G.R. No. 189207               June 15, 2011

Facts:
Petitioner Eric U Yu filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage against private respondent Caroline T. Yu. Private
respondent moved to submit the incident on the declaration of
nullity of marriage for resolution of the court, considering that
the incidents on custody, support, and property relations were
mere consequences of the declaration of nullity of the parties’
marriage.

On September 28, 2006, petitioner opposed private respondent’s

Motion, claiming that the incident on the declaration of
nullity of marriage cannot be resolved without the
presentation of evidence for the incidents on custody,
support, and property relations. Petitioner, therefore, averred
that the incident on nullity of marriage, on the one hand, and
the incidents on custody, support, and property relations, on the
other, should both proceed and be simultaneously resolved.

Thereafter, private respondent filed an Omnibus Motion on May

21, 2008. The Omnibus Motion sought (1) the strict observation
by the RTC-Branch 261 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages, as codified in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC,
in the subject proceedings; and (2) that the incident on the
declaration of nullity of marriage be already submitted for
resolution. Conversely, private respondent prayed that the
incident on the declaration of nullity of marriage be resolved
ahead of the incidents on custody, support, and property
relations, and not simultaneously.

Issue:
WON the CA erred in ruling on the issue of nullity of marriage
without the presentation of evidence for the incidents on
custody, support and property relations.

Held:
NO. Under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages. Particularly, Secs. 19 and 21 of the Rule, it allows the
reception of evidence on custody, support, and property
 267

relations after the trial court renders a decision granting the

petition, or upon entry of judgment granting the petition.

Evidently, Judge Reyes-Carpio did not deny the reception of

evidence on custody, support, and property relations but merely
deferred it, based on the existing rules issued by this Court, to a
time when a decision granting the petition is already at hand
and before a final decree is issued. Conversely, the trial court,
or more particularly the family court, shall proceed with the
liquidation, partition and distribution, custody, support of
common children, and delivery of their presumptive legitimes
upon entry of judgment granting the petition. And following the
pertinent provisions of the Court En Banc Resolution in A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC, this act is undoubtedly consistent with Articles 50
and 51 of the Family Code, contrary to what petitioner asserts.

The Court En Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC clearly

allows the deferment of the reception of evidence on
custody, support, and property relations. Conversely, the
trial court may receive evidence on the subject incidents
after a judgment granting the petition but before the decree
of nullity or annulment of marriage is issued. And this is
what Judge Reyes-Carpio sought to comply with in issuing the
assailed orders. As correctly pointed out by the CA, petitioner’s
assertion that ruling the main issue without receiving evidence
on the subject incidents would result in an ambiguous and
fragmentary judgment is certainly speculative and, hence,
contravenes the legal presumption that a trial judge can fairly
weigh and appraise the evidence submitted by the parties.
 268

ESTRELLA ADUAN ORPIANO vs. SPOUSES TOMAS

G.R. No. 178611               January 14, 2013

Facts:
Petitioner Orpiano is the widow of Alejandro Orpiano. Part of their
conjugal estate is a lot located in Quezon City. In 1979, a Decision was
rendered by the defunct Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court (JDRC)
of Quezon City declaring Estrella an absent/absentee spouse and
granting Alejandro the authority to sell the lot.

On March 19, 1996, Alejandro sold the lot on installment basis to

respondent spouses Antonio and Myrna Tomas. The very same day, a
new title was issued in the name of the Tomas spouses despite the fact
that the purchase price has not been paid in full, the spouses having
been given until December of that same year to complete their payment.

On October 28, 1996, Alejandro filed a collection of the balance of the

price supposedly left unpaid by the Tomas spouses, with damages.
During the pendency of the collection case, Alejandro passed away. His
heirs, Estrella included, were substituted in his stead in the collection
case. Estrella moved to amend the Complaint to one for
rescission/annulment of sale and cancellation of title, but the court
denied her motion. She next moved to be dropped as party plaintiff but
was again rebuffed.

On June 11, 2005, Estrella filed for annulment of the sale and
cancellation of Title against the Tomas spouses and the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City which was impleaded as a nominal party. In her
Complaint, Estrella claimed that the 1979 declaration of her absence
and accompanying authority to sell the lot were obtained by Alejandro
through misrepresentation, fraud and deceit, adding that the May 1979
JDRC Decision was not published as required by law and by the
domestic relations court. Thus, the declaration of absence and
Alejandro’s authority to sell the lot are null and void. Correspondingly,
the ensuing sale to the Tomas spouses should be voided, and TCT
cancelled.

In their Answer to the annulment Complaint, the Tomas spouses

prayed for the dismissal thereof on the ground of forum shopping,
arguing that the filing of the annulment case was prompted by the
denial of Estrella’s motion initiated in the collection case to amend the
Complaint to one for annulment of sale. The annulment case is
Estrella’s attempt at securing a remedy which she could not obtain in
the collection case. The Tomas spouses added that the dismissal of the
annulment case would preclude the possibility that the two courts
might render conflicting decisions.
 269

The RTC rendered a decision dismissing the annulment case. It

sustained the view taken by the Tomas spouses that Estrella filed the
annulment case only because the collection court denied her motion to
amend the case to one for annulment of the sale, and thus the
annulment case was Estrella’s attempt at obtaining a remedy which she
could not secure in the collection case. It added that because the two
cases involve the same subject matter, issues, and parties, there indeed
is a possibility that conflicting decisions could be rendered by it and the
collection court, the possibility made even greater because the two
cases involve antithetical remedies.

On appeal, the CA found that Estrella was indeed guilty of forum

shopping in filing the annulment suit while the collection case was
pending.

Issue:
WON

Held:
It must be remembered that "the absence of the consent of one (spouse
to a sale) renders the entire sale null and void, including the portion of
the conjugal property pertaining to the spouse who contracted the sale.

As plaintiff in the collection case, Estrella – though merely succeeding

to Alejandro’s rights – was an indispensable party, or one without whom
no final determination can be had in the collection case. Strictly, she
may not be dropped from the case. However, because of her dual
identity, first as heir and second as owner of her conjugal share, she
has been placed in the unique position where she has to succeed to her
husband’s rights, even as she must protect her separate conjugal share
from Alejandro’s perceived undue disposition. She may not seek to
amend the cause of action in the collection case to one for annulment of
sale, because this adversely affects the interests of her co-heirs, which
is precisely to obtain payment of the supposed balance of the sale price.

Nor may Estrella simultaneously maintain the two actions in both

capacities, as heir in the collection case and as separate owner of her
conjugal share in the annulment case. This may not be done, because,
as was earlier on declared, this amounts to simultaneously accepting
and rejecting the same deed of sale. Nor is it possible to prosecute the
annulment case simultaneously with the collection case, on the premise
that what is merely being annulled is the sale by Alejandro of Estrella’s
conjugal share. To repeat, the absence of the consent of one spouse
to a sale renders the entire sale null and void, including the
portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the spouse who
contracted the sale.
 270

Undoubtedly, Estrella had the right to maintain the annulment case

as a measure of protecting her conjugal share. There thus exists a
just cause for her to be dropped as party plaintiff in the collection case
so that she may institute and maintain the annulment case without
violating the rule against forum shopping. Unless this is done, she
stands to lose her share in the conjugal property. But the issue of
whether the sale should be annulled is a different matter altogether.

Under the Rules, parties may be dropped or added by order of the court
on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action
and on such terms as are just. Indeed, it would have been just for the
collection court to have allowed Estrella to prosecute her annulment
case by dropping her as a party plaintiff in the collection case, not only
so that she could protect her conjugal share, but also to prevent the
interests of her co-plaintiffs from being adversely affected by her
conflicting actions in the same case. By seeking to be dropped from the
collection case, Estrella was foregoing collection of her share in the
amount that may be due and owing from the sale. It does not imply a
waiver in any manner that affects the rights of the other heirs.

While she may have been frustrated by the collection court’s repeated
rejection of her motions and its apparent inability to appreciate her
plight, her proper recourse nevertheless should have been to file a
petition for certiorari or otherwise question the trial court’s denial
of her motion to be dropped as plaintiff, citing just reasons which
call for a ruling to the contrary. Issues arising from joinder or
misjoinder of parties are the proper subject of certiorari.

In fine, we reiterate that considerations of expediency cannot justify a

resort to procedural shortcuts. The end does not justify the means; a
meritorious case cannot overshadow the condition that the means
employed to pursue it must be in keeping with the Rules.
 271

TITAN CONSTRUCTION CORP. vs. MANUEL A. DAVID, SR.

G.R. No. 169548               March 15, 2010

Facts:
Respondents Manuel A. David, Sr. and Martha S. David were
married on March 25, 1957. In 1970, the spouses acquired a lot
located at White Plains, Quezon City, which was registered in the
name of "MARTHA S. DAVID, of legal age, Filipino, married to
Manuel A. David" and covered by TCT. In 1976, the spouses
separated de facto, and no longer communicated with each
other.

Sometime in March 1995, Manuel discovered that Martha had

previously sold the property to Titan Construction Corporation
and the TCT in favour of Titan had been issued.

Thus, in March 1996, he filed a complaint for Annulment of

Contract and Recovenyance against Titan. Manuel alleged that
the sale executed by Martha in favor of Titan was without his
knowledge and consent, and therefore void. He prayed that the
Deed of Sale and TCT issued in favour of be invalidated, that the
property be reconveyed to the spouses, and that a new title be
issued in their names.

In its Answer, Titan claimed that it was a buyer in good faith

and for value because it relied on a SPA dated January 4, 1995
signed by Manuel which authorized Martha to dispose of the
property on behalf of the spouses. Titan thus prayed for the
dismissal of the complaint. Manuel claimed that the SPA was
spurious, and that the signature purporting to be his was a
forgery; hence, Martha was wholly without authority to sell the
property.

Titan is claiming that it was a buyer in good faith and for value,
that the property was Martha’s paraphernal property, that it
properly relied on the SPA presented by Martha, and that the
RTC erred in giving weight to the alleged expert testimony to the
effect that Manuel’s signature on the SPA was spurious. Titan
also argues, for the first time, that the CA should have ordered
Martha to reimburse the purchase price paid by Titan.

Issue:
WON the subject property was Martha’s paraphernal property.
 272

Held:
NO. The property is part of the spouses’ conjugal
partnership. The Court are not persuaded by Titan’s arguments
that the property was Martha’s exclusive property because
Manuel failed to present before the RTC any proof of his income
in 1970, hence he could not have had the financial capacity to
contribute to the purchase of the property in 1970; and that
Manuel admitted that it was Martha who concluded the original
purchase of the property. In consonance with our ruling in
Spouses Castro v. Miat, Manuel was not required to prove that
the property was acquired with funds of the partnership.
Rather, the presumption applies even when the manner in
which the property was acquired does not appear. Here, we
find that Titan failed to overturn the presumption that the
property, purchased during the spouses’ marriage, was part of
the conjugal partnership. In the absence of Manuel’s consent,
the Deed of Sale is void.

Since the property was undoubtedly part of the conjugal

partnership, the sale to Titan required the consent of both
spouses. Article 165 of the Civil Code expressly provides that
"the husband is the administrator of the conjugal
partnership". Likewise, Article 172 of the Civil Code ordains
that "the wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without
the husband’s consent, except in cases provided by law".

Similarly, Article 124 of the Family Code requires that any

disposition or encumbrance of conjugal property must have
the written consent of the other spouse, otherwise, such
disposition is void.
 273

EVANGELINE D. IMANI vs. METROPOLITAN BANK

G.R. No. 187023               November 17, 2010

Facts:
On August 28, 1981, petitioner Imani signed a Continuing
Suretyship Agreement in favor of respondent Metro Bank, with
Cesar P. Dazo, Nieves Dazo, Benedicto C. Dazo, Cynthia C. Dazo,
Doroteo Fundales, Jr., and Nicolas Ponce as her co-sureties. As
sureties, they bound themselves to pay Metrobank whatever
indebtedness C.P. Dazo Tannery, Inc. (CPDTI) incurs, but not
exceeding Six Million Pesos (P6,000,000.00).

Later, CPDTI obtained loans evidenced by promissory notes signed

by Cesar and Nieves Dazo. CPDTI defaulted in the payment of its
loans. Metrobank made several demands for payment upon CPDTI,
but to no avail. This prompted Metrobank to file a collection suit
against CPDTI and its sureties, including herein petitioner. After
due proceedings, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of
Metrobank.

Metrobank then filed with the RTC a motion for execution, which
was granted on December 7, 1999. A writ of execution was issued
against CPDTI and its co-defendants. The sheriff levied on a
property registered in the name of petitioner. A public auction was
conducted and the property was awarded to Metrobank, as the
highest bidder. Metrobank undertook to consolidate the title
covering the subject property in its name, and ptrayed that spouses
Sina and Evangline Imani be directed to surrender the owner’s copy
of the TCT for cancellation.

Petitioner opposed the motion arguing that the subject property

belongs to the conjugal partnership; as such, it cannot be held
answerable for the liabilities incurred by CPDTI to Metrobank.
Neither can it be subject of levy on execution or public auction.
Hence, petitioner prayed for the nullification of the levy on execution
and the auction sale, as well as the certificate of sale in favor of
Metrobank.

Issue:
WON the property in question can be subject to execution.

Held:
YES. Indeed, all property of the marriage is presumed to be
conjugal. However, for this presumption to apply, the party who
invokes it must first prove that the property was acquired
 274

during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the coverture

is a condition sine qua non to the operation of the presumption
in favor of the conjugal partnership. Thus, the time when the
property was acquired is material.

To support her assertion that the property belongs to the conjugal

partnership, petitioner submitted the Affidavit of Crisanto Origen,
attesting that petitioner and her husband were the vendees of the
subject property, and the photocopies of the checks allegedly issued
by Sina Imani as payment for the subject property.

Unfortunately for petitioner, the said Affidavit can hardly be

considered sufficient evidence to prove her claim that the property is
conjugal. In the same vein, the photocopies of the checks cannot be
given any probative value. Thus, the CA was correct in disregarding
the said pieces of evidence.

Similarly, the certificate of title could not support petitioner’s

assertion. As aptly ruled by the CA, the fact that the land was
registered in the name of Evangelina Dazo-Imani married to
Sina Imani is no proof that the property was acquired during
the spouses’ coverture. Acquisition of title and registration thereof
are two different acts. It is well settled that registration does not
confer title but merely confirms one already existing.

Indubitably, petitioner utterly failed to substantiate her claim that

the property belongs to the conjugal partnership. Thus, it cannot be
rightfully said that the CA reversed the RTC ruling without valid
basis.

As a last ditch effort, petitioner asserts that the property is a road

right of way; thus, it cannot be subject of a writ of execution.

The argument must be rejected because it was raised for the first
time in this petition. In the trial court and the CA, petitioner’s
arguments zeroed in on the alleged conjugal nature of the property.
It is well settled that issues raised for the first time on appeal and
not raised in the proceedings in the lower court are barred by
estoppel. Points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not brought
to the attention of the trial court ought not to be considered by a
reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal. To consider the alleged facts and arguments raised belatedly
would amount to trampling on the basic principles of fair play,
justice, and due process.
 275

ELENITA M. DEWARA vs. SPOUSES LAMELA

G.R. No. 179010               April 11, 2011

Facts:
Eduardo Dewara and petitioner Elenita were married before the
enactment of the Family Code. Thus, the Civil Code governed their
marital relations. Husband and wife were separated-in-fact because
Elenita went to work in California, United States of America, while
Eduardo stayed in Bacolod City.

In 1985, Eduardo, while driving a private jeep registered in the

name of Elenita, hit respondent Ronnie Lamela. Ronnie filed a
criminal case for serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence against Eduardo. The MTCC found Eduardo guilty of
the charge and sentenced him to imprisonment and to pay damages
to Ronnie.

The writ of execution on the civil liability was served on Eduardo,

but it was returned unsatisfied because he had no property in his
name. Ronnie requested the City Sheriff, respondent Stenile Alvero,
to levy a lot, in the name of "ELENITA M. DEWARA, of legal age,
Filipino, married to Eduardo Dewara, and resident of Bacolod City,"
to satisfy the judgment on the civil liability of Eduardo. The City
Sheriff served a notice of embargo on the title of the lot and
subsequently sold the lot in a public auction. In the execution sale,
there were no interested buyers other than Ronnie. The City Sheriff
issued a certificate of sale to spouses Ronnie and Gina Lamela to
satisfy the civil liability in the decision against Eduardo. Ronnie
then caused the consolidation of title. The RTC ordered the
cancellation of the in the name of Elenita and the issuance of a new
certificate of title in the name of respondent spouses.

The levy on execution, public auction, issuance of certificate of sale,

and cancellation of title of the lot in the name of Elenita were done
while Elenita was working in California. Thus, Elenita, represented
by her attorney-in-fact, filed a case for annulment of sale and for
damages against respondent spouses and ex-officio sheriff Stenile
Alvero before the RTC of Bacolod City. Petitioner claimed that the
levy on execution of Lot No. 234-C was illegal because the said
property was her paraphernal or exclusive property and could not
be made to answer for the personal liability of her husband.
Furthermore, as the registered owner of the property, she received
no notice of the execution sale. She sought the annulment of the
sale and the annulment of the issuance of the new TCT in the name
of respondent spouses.
 276

On the other hand, respondent spouses averred that the subject lot
was the conjugal property of petitioner Elenita and Eduardo. They
asserted that the property was acquired by Elenita during her
marriage to Eduardo; that the property was acquired with the
money of Eduardo because, at the time of the acquisition of the
property, Elenita was a plain housewife; that the jeep involved in
the accident was registered in the name of petitioner; and that
Elenita did not interpose any objection pending the levy on
execution of the property.

The RTC declared that said property was paraphernal in nature.

Based on the documentary evidence submitted, Elenita purchased
the said property from her father and aunts who inherited the same
from her grandfather.

In reversing the decision of the RTC, the CA ruled that Elenita and
Eduardo acquired the property by onerous title during their
marriage through their common fund. Thus, it belonged to the
conjugal partnership of gains and might be levied upon to answer
for civil liabilities adjudged against Eduardo.

Issue:
WON the subject property is the paraphernal/exclusive property of
Elenita or the conjugal property of spouses Elenita and Eduardo,
thus, subject to execution.

Held:
YES. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Registration in the
name of the husband or the wife alone does not destroy this
presumption. The separation-in-fact between the husband and the
wife without judicial approval shall not affect the conjugal
partnership. The lot retains its conjugal nature. Moreover, the
presumption of conjugal ownership applies even when the
manner in which the property was acquired does not appear.
The use of the conjugal funds is not an essential requirement
for the presumption to arise.

There is no dispute that the subject property was acquired by

spouses Elenita and Eduardo during their marriage. It is also
undisputed that their marital relations are governed by the
conjugal partnership of gains, since they were married before the
enactment of the Family Code and they did not execute any
prenuptial agreement as to their property relations. Thus, the legal
 277

presumption of the conjugal nature of the property applies to

the lot in question. The presumption that the property is
conjugal property may be rebutted only by strong, clear,
categorical, and convincing evidence—there must be strict proof
of the exclusive ownership of one of the spouses, and the burden of
proof rests upon the party asserting it. Aside from the assertions of
Elenita that the sale of the property by her father and her aunt was
in the nature of a donation because of the alleged gross disparity
between the actual value of the property and the monetary
consideration for the sale, there is no other evidence that would
convince this Court of the paraphernal character of the property.
Elenita proffered no evidence of the market value or assessed value
of the subject property in 1975. Thus, we agree with the CA that
Elenita has not sufficiently proven that the prices involved in the
sales in question were so inadequate for the Court to reach a
conclusion that the transfers were in the nature of a donation
rather than a sale.

However, even after having declared that Lot No. 234-C is the
conjugal property of spouses Elenita and Eduardo, it does not
necessarily follow that it may automatically be levied upon in an
execution to answer for debts, obligations, fines, or indemnities of
one of the spouses. Before debts and obligations may be charged
against the conjugal partnership, it must be shown that the
same were contracted for, or the debts and obligations should
have redounded to, the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
Fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon the husband or the
wife, as a rule, may not be charged to the partnership. However, if
the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property or if the
property should be insufficient, the fines and indemnities may be
enforced upon the partnership assets only after the responsibilities
enumerated in Article 161 of the Civil Code have been covered.

In this case, it is just and proper that Ronnie be compensated for

the serious physical injuries he suffered. It should be remembered
that even though the vehicle that hit Ronnie was registered in the
name of Elenita, she was not made a party in the said criminal case.
Thus, she may not be compelled to answer for Eduardo’s
liability. Nevertheless, their conjugal partnership property may
be held accountable for it since Eduardo has no property in his
name. The payment of indemnity adjudged by the RTC of Bacolod
City in Criminal Case No. 7155 in favor of Ronnie may be enforced
against the partnership assets of spouses Elenita and Eduardo after
the responsibilities enumerated under Article 161 of the Civil Code
have been covered.
 278

PROCOPIO VILLANUEVA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 143286             April 14, 2004

Facts:
Plaintiff Eusebia Napisa Retuya, is the legal wife of defendant
Nicolas Retuya, having been married in 1926. Out of the lawful
wedlock, they begot five (5) children, namely, Natividad, Angela,
Napoleon, Salome, and Roberta. Spouses Retuya resided at
Tipolo, Mandaue City. During their marriage they acquired real
properties and all improvements situated in Mandaue City, and
Consolacion, Cebu.

Also, defendant, Nicolas Retuya, is co-owner of a parcel of land

situated in Mandaue City which he inherited from his parents
Esteban Retuya and Balbina Solon as well as the purchasers of
hereditary shares of approximately eight (8) parcels of land in
Mandaue City. Some of these properties above-mentioned earn
income from coconuts and the other lands/houses are on
leased.

In 1945, defendant Nicolas Retuya no longer lived with his

legitimate family and cohabited with defendant, Pacita
Villanueva, wherein defendant, Procopio Villanueva, is their
illegitimate son. Nicolas, then, was the only person who received
the income of the above-mentioned properties. Defendant, Pacita
Villanueva, from the time she started living in concubinage with
Nicolas, has no occupation, she had no properties of her own
from which she could derive income.

In 1985, Nicolas suffered a stroke. From the time defendant

Nicolas Retuya suffered a stroke and until the present, it is
defendant Procopio Villanueva, one of Nicolas’ illegitimate
children who have been receiving the income of these properties.
Witness Natividad Retuya went to Procopio to negotiate because
at this time their father Nicolas was already senile and has a
childlike mind. She told defendant, Procopio that their father
was already incapacitated and they had to talk things over and
the latter replied that it was not yet the time to talk about the
matter. Thus, plaintiff filed an action for settlement.

The trial court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff

holding that the documents and other evidence Eusebia
presented constitute "solid evidence" which proved that the
 279

subject properties were acquired during her marriage with

Nicolas. This made the presumption in Article 116 applicable to
the subject properties. Thus, the trial court ruled that Eusebia
had proved that the subject properties are conjugal in nature.
On the other hand, the trial court found that petitioners failed to
meet the standard of proof required to maintain their claim that
the subject properties are paraphernal properties of Nicolas. The
trial court added that Pacita presented no "factual solidity" to
support her claim that she bought Lot No. 152 2 exclusively with
her own money.

Issue:
WON the subject properties are conjugal properties of Nicolas
Retuya and Eusebia Retuya.

Held:
YES. The Family Code provisions on conjugal partnerships
govern the property relations between Nicolas and Eusebia even
if they were married before the effectivity of Family Code. Thus,
under the Family Code, if the properties are acquired during
the marriage, the presumption is that they are conjugal. The
burden of proof is on the party claiming that they are not
conjugal. This is counter-balanced by the requirement that the
properties must first be proven to have been acquired during the
marriage before they are presumed conjugal.

Nicolas and Eusebia were married on 7 October 1926. Nicolas

and Pacita started cohabiting in 1936. Eusebia died on 23
November 1996. Pacita and Nicolas were married on 16
December 1996. Petitioners themselves admit that Lot No.
152 was purchased on 4 October 1957. The date of acquisition
of Lot No. 152 is clearly during the marriage of Nicolas and
Eusebia.

Since the subject properties, including Lot No. 152, were

acquired during the marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia, the
presumption under Article 116 of the Family Code is that all
these are conjugal properties of Nicolas and Eusebia. The
burden is on petitioners to prove that the subject properties are
not conjugal. The presumption in Article 116, which subsists
"unless the contrary is proved," stands as an obstacle to any
claim the petitioners may have. The burden of proving that a
property is exclusive property of a spouse rests on the party
 280

asserting it and the evidence required must be clear and

convincing.

Petitioners point out that the deed of sale, the transfer certificate
of title and the tax declaration of Lot No. 152 are all in the name
of Pacita. Petitioners maintain that this can only mean that
Pacita is the real owner of Lot No. 152. We disagree. The totality
of the evidence reveals that this was merely just one of the
several schemes Nicolas employed to deprive Eusebia of their
conjugal property. Ironically, petitioners themselves submitted
in evidence a decision rendered by the RTC involving the
acquisition of Lot No. 152.

Petitioners also point out that all the other tax declarations
presented before the trial court are in the name of Nicolas alone.
Petitioners argue that this serves as proof of Nicolas’ exclusive
ownership of these properties. Petitioners are mistaken. The tax
declarations are not sufficient proof to overcome the
presumption under Article 116 of the Family Code.

All property acquired by the spouses during the marriage,

regardless in whose name the property is registered, is
presumed conjugal unless proved otherwise. The presumption
is not rebutted by the mere fact that the certificate of title of the
property or the tax declaration is in the name of one of the
spouses only. Article 116 of the Family Code expressly provides
that the presumption remains even if the property is "registered
in the name of one or both of the spouses."
 281

EFREN R. MENDOZA vs. PONCIANO S. REYES & CA

G.R. No. L-31618 August 17, 1983

Facts:
Respondents Ponciano Reyes and Julia de Reyes were married in
1915. The spouses bought a property including the buildings
erected thereon situated at Retiro Street, Quezon City, in
instalment, from J. M. Tuason & Co., represented by Gregorio
Araneta, Inc. They were always in arrears in the payment of the
instalments to Araneta due to lack of money.

Thus, they jointly obtained some loans from the Rehabilitation

Finance Corporation (RFC) for the completion of the construction of
their residential building and to pay the Araneta. After payment,
Araneta issued the deed of absolute sale indicating “Julia de Reyes”
as vendee. Her signatures appear over the caption vendee and those
of Ponciano under the phrase: 'with my marital consent. The TCT’s
were issued in the name of "JULIA REYES married to PONCIANO
REYES." The mortgage contracts executed by the spouses in favor of
the RFC were duly registered and annotated on the said transfer
Certificates of Title.

The spouses then built a house and later a camarin on the two lots,
where the camarin was subjected to leased. The contract of lease
was signed by Julia as lessor, with the marital consent of Ponciano.

On March 3, 1961, while Ponciano was absent attending his farm in

Arayat, Pampanga, Julia sold absolutely the lots in question,
together with their improvements to appellees Mendozas for the sum
of P80,000.00 without the knowledge and consent of Ponciano. At
the same time the spouses were living separately and were not in
speaking terms. By virtue of such sale, Transfer Certificates of Title
Nos. 561 10 and 56111 were subsequently issued in the name of
the Mendozas.

Thus, Ponciano filed a complaint for the annulment of a deed of sale

of two parcels of land with their improvements, executed by his wife,
Julia R. De Reyes as vendor and the spouses Efren V. Mendoza and
Inocencia R. De Mendoza, as vendees. Ponciano averred that said
properties were conjugal properties of himself and his wife and that
she had sold them to petitioners "all by herself" and without his
knowledge or consent.

Petitioners spouses Mendoza’s averred that the properties were

paraphernal properties of Julia R. de Reyes and that they had
 282

purchased the same in good faith and for adequate consideration. In

a separate answer, petitioner Julia, supported the spouses
Mendozas' contentions.

In its decision, the RTC dismissed the complaint and declared the
properties in question exclusive and paraphernal properties of
petitioner Julia R. De Reyes. It ruled that she could validly dispose
of the same without the consent of her husband and that the
Mendozas are innocent purchasers. The CA reversed the RTC’s
decision.

Issue:
WON the subject property is paraphernal property of Julia.

Held:
NO. There is no question that the disputed property was acquired
by onerous title during the marriage. The records show that the
funds came from loans obtained by the spouses from the
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation. Under Article 161 of the Civil
Code, all debts and obligations contracted by the husband and
the wife for the benefit of the conjugal partnership are
liabilities of the partnership.

To rebut the presumption and the evidence of the conjugal

character of the property, the petitioners have only the testimony of
Julia de Reyes to offer. As a matter of fact, Mrs. Reyes' testimony
about a loan from Mrs. Rosa Borja, the sale of a lot in Cabiao,
Nueva Ecija given by her mother, and the loan from PNB only
emphasize the conjugal nature of the disputed properties because
she stated that these sums were also used to put up their gravel
and sand business, a poultry farm, and a banana plantation plus a
jeepney transportation line although according to her, every
business venture handled by her husband failed. The two were
establishing businesses and buying properties together as husband
and wife, in happier times.

It turns out that in 1948, Ponciano Reyes was sued in the then
Municipal Court of Manila for ejectment from a leased hotel that he
was then operating. Judgment was rendered against Reyes in favor
of the lessors. It was in this latter case where Mr. Reyes stated in
his special defenses that he and his wife never had any kind of
fund which could be called conjugal partnership funds, that they
acted independently from one another whenever either one engaged
in any business.
 283

There is no showing that the respondent had intentionally and

deliberately led the petitioners Mendozas to believe what was
contained in the pleading, and to make them act upon it. As
observed by the respondent, they were not even a party in the case
where the said pleading was filed. Neither is there any assertion by
the Mendozas that the said pleading was shown to them or that
they happened to see it or to have any knowledge about it before
they purchased the properties in question. The alleged
representation was never addressed to the petitioners, much less
made with the intention that they would act upon it. Moreover,
there is no specific and clear reference to the disputed lots as
paraphernal in the cited answer. The petitioners cannot invoke
estoppel in these petitions.

Property acquired during a marriage is presumed to be conjugal

and the fact that the land is later registered in the name of only
one of the spouses does not destroy its conjugal nature. Section
46 of P.D. 1529, the Property Registration Decree, reiterates the
proviso in Section 70 of the former Land Registration Act that
registration cannot be construed to relieve registered land or the
owners thereof from any rights incident to the relation of husband
and wife.

If the fact that property acquired during marriage was registered in

the name of the husband alone does not affect its conjugal nature,
neither does registration in the name of the wife. Any person who
buys land registered in the married name of the wife is put on
notice about its conjugal nature.

The mortgage contracts executed by the spouses Ponciano S. Reyes

and Julia Reyes in favor of RFC were duly registered in the Registry
of Deeds of Quezon City and seasonably annotated on transfer
certificates of title Nos. 8550 and 19998, which were issued in the
name of Julia Reyes "married to Ponciano Reyes". Their dates of
inscription were November 29, 1948 and October 11, 1952,
respectively. On December 10, 1952, the lots and the building were
leased by Julia, with the marital consent of Ponciano to the
petitioners Mendozas The contract of lease was registered in the
Registry of Deeds and was annotated in the transfer certificates of
title on May 5, 1952. At that time, the RFC mortgages were already
noted at the back of the transfer certificates of title. The petitioners,
therefore, are unquestionably charged with notice of the existence
and contents of said mortgages, their joint execution by the spouses
Ponciano Reyes and Julia Reyes and the application of the loans to
the payment to Araneta of the purchase price of the lots in question.
 284

JOE A. ROS & ESTRELLA AGUETE vs. PNB-LAOAG

G.R. No. 170166               April 6, 2011

Facts:
In 1974, petitioner Ros obtained a loan from respondent PNB
and as a security he executed a real estate mortgage involving a
parcel of land with all the improvements thereon. Upon
maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result, PNB
instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged
property. After the extrajudicial sale thereof, a Certificate of Sale
was issued in favor of PNB as the highest bidder. After the lapse
of one (1) year without the property being redeemed, the
property was consolidated and registered in the name of PNB on
August 10, 1978.

In 1983, petitioner spouses Ros and Aguete filed a complaint for

the annulment of the Real Estate Mortgage and all legal
proceedings taken thereunder against respondent PNB. The
spouses claimed that Estrella has no knowledge of the loan
obtained by her husband nor she consented to the mortgage
instituted on the conjugal property – a complaint was filed to
annul the proceedings pertaining to the mortgage, sale and
consolidation of the property – interposing the defense that her
signatures affixed on the documents were forged and that the
loan did not redound to the benefit of the family.

In its answer, PNB prays for the dismissal of the complaint for
lack of cause of action, and insists that it was plaintiffs-
appellees’ own acts of omission/connivance that bar them from
recovering the subject property on the ground of estoppel,
laches, abandonment and prescription.

In its decision, the RTC rendered its Decision in favor of

petitioners. The trial court declared that Aguete did not sign the
loan documents, did not appear before the Notary Public to
acknowledge the execution of the loan documents, did not
receive the loan proceeds from PNB, and was not aware of the
loan until PNB notified her in 14 August 1978 that she and her
family should vacate the mortgaged property because of the
expiration of the redemption period.

Under the Civil Code, the effective law at the time of the
transaction, Ros could not encumber any real property of the
 285

conjugal partnership without Aguete’s consent. Aguete may,

during their marriage and within ten years from the transaction
questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of the contract her
husband entered into without her consent, especially in the
present case where her consent is required. The trial court,
however, ruled that its decision is without prejudice to the right
of action of PNB to recover the amount of the loan and its
interests from Ros.

On appeal, the CA reversed the trial court’s decision, and

dismissed petitioners’ complaint. The appellate court stated that
the trial court concluded forgery without adequate proof; thus it
was improper for the trial court to rely solely on Aguete’s
testimony that her signatures on the loan documents were
forged. The appellate court declared that Aguete affixed her
signatures on the documents knowingly and with her full
consent. Assuming arguendo that Aguete did not give her
consent to Ros’ loan, the appellate court ruled that the
conjugal partnership is still liable because the loan proceeds
redounded to the benefit of the family. The records of the
case reveal that the loan was used for the expansion of the
family’s business. Therefore, the debt obtained is chargeable
against the conjugal partnership.

Issue:
WON the loan contracted by Ros with PNB redounded to the
benefit of the family, thus, chargeable to the CPG.

Held:
YES. There is no doubt that the subject property was
acquired during Ros and Aguete’s marriage. Ros and Aguete
were married on 16 January 1954, while the subject property
was acquired in 1968. There is also no doubt that Ros
encumbered the subject property when he mortgaged it for
P115,000.00 on 23 October 1974. PNB Laoag does not doubt
that Aguete, as evidenced by her signature, consented to Ros’
mortgage to PNB of the subject property. On the other hand,
Aguete denies ever having consented to the loan and also denies
affixing her signature to the mortgage and loan documents.

The husband cannot alienate or encumber any conjugal real

property without the consent, express or implied, of the wife.
Should the husband do so, then the contract is voidable. 17
 286

Article 173 of the Civil Code allows Aguete to question Ros’

encumbrance of the subject property. However, the same article
does not guarantee that the courts will declare the annulment of
the contract. Annulment will be declared only upon a finding
that the wife did not give her consent. In the present case, we
follow the conclusion of the appellate court and rule that Aguete
gave her consent to Ros’ encumbrance of the subject property.

The application for loan shows that the loan would be used
exclusively "for additional working [capital] of buy & sell of garlic
& virginia tobacco." In her testimony, Aguete confirmed that Ros
engaged in such business, but claimed to be unaware whether it
prospered. Aguete was also aware of loans contracted by Ros,
but did not know where he "wasted the money." Debts
contracted by the husband for and in the exercise of the
industry or profession by which he contributes to the
support of the family cannot be deemed to be his exclusive
and private debts.

If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract,

i.e., he directly received the money and services to be used in or
for his own business or his own profession, that contract falls
within the term "x x x x obligations for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership." Here, no actual benefit may be proved. It is
enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at the
signing of the contract. From the very nature of the contract of
loan or services, the family stands to benefit from the loan
facility or services to be rendered to the business or profession of
the husband. It is immaterial, if in the end, his business or
profession fails or does not succeed. Simply stated, where the
husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family
business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that such
obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership.
 287

ANTONIA & ALVIN JOHN B. DELA PEÑA vs. GEMMA

REMILYN C. AVILA & FAR EAST BANK & TRUST CO
G.R. No. 187490               February 8, 2012

Facts:
In May 1996, petitioner Antonia obtained a loan from A.C. Aguila
& Sons, Co. eveidenced by a Promissory Note stating that it was
payable on or before 7 July 1996. She then executed a notarized
Deed of Real Estate Mortgage covering a residential land together
with the improvements thereon situated in Marikina City. The
subject land was registered in the name of petitioner Antonia R.
Dela Peña (Antonia), "married to Antegono A. Dela Peña."

On 4 November 1997, Antonia executed a notarized Deed of

Absolute Sale over the property in favor of respondent Avila.
Utilizing the document, Gemma caused the cancellation of TCT
and issuing a new one naming her as the owner of the subject
realty. On 26 November 1997, Gemma also constituted a real
estate mortgage over said parcel in favor of respondent Far East
Bank and Trust Company. In March 1998, Antonia filed with the
Register of Deeds of Marikina an Affidavit of Adverse Claim to
the effect, among others, that she was the true and lawful owner
of the property which had been titled in the name of Gemma and
that the Deed of Absolute Sale Gemma utilized in procuring her
title was simulated. As a consequence, Antonia’s Affidavit of
Adverse Claim was inscribed.

In view of Gemma’s failure to pay the principal as well as the

accumulated interest and penalties on the loans she obtained,
FEBTC-BPI caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate
mortgage constituted over the property. As the highest bidder at
the public auction conducted in the premises, FEBTC-BPI later
consolidated its ownership over the realty and caused the same
to be titled in its name.

In May 1998, Antonia and her son, petitioner Alvin John B. Dela
Peña, filed against Gemma the complaint for annulment of deed
of sale claiming that the subject realty was conjugal property,
the Dela Peñas alleged, among other matters. That the mortgage
executed by Antonia in favor of Aguila was not consented to by
Antegono who had, by then, already died; that despite its
intended 1998 maturity date, the due date of the loan secured
by the mortgage was shortened by Gemma who, taking
 288

advantage of her "proximate relationship" with Aguila, altered

the same to 1997. In addition to the annulment of said Deed of
Absolute Sale for being simulated and derogatory of Alvin’s
successional rights, the Dela Peñas sought the reconveyance of
the property as well as the grant of their claims for moral and
exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and the costs.

Served with summons, Gemma specifically denied the material

allegations of the foregoing complaint maintaining that the
subject property was the exclusive property of Antonia who
misrepresented that her husband was still alive. In their answer,
FEBTC-BPI, in turn, asserted that the property was already
titled in Gemma’s name when she executed the mortgage.

In its decision, the RTC ruled that the subject property was
conjugal in nature and that the Deed of Absolute Sale Antonia
executed in favor of Gemma was void as a disposition without
the liquidation required under Article 130 of the Family Code.
On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC’s decision holding that the
property was paraphernal in nature for failure of the Dela Peñas
to prove that the same was acquired during Antonia’s marriage
to Antegono.

Issue:
WON the subject property is Antonia’s paraphernal property.

Held:
YES. Pursuant to Article 160 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Although it is not
necessary to prove that the property was acquired with funds of
the partnership, proof of acquisition during the marriage is an
essential condition for the operation of the presumption in favor
of the conjugal partnership.

As the parties invoking the presumption of conjugality under

Article 160 of the Civil Code, the Dela Peñas did not even
come close to proving that the subject property was
acquired during the marriage between Antonia and
Antegono. Beyond Antonia’s bare and uncorroborated assertion
that the property was purchased when she was already married,
the record is bereft of any evidence from which the actual date of
 289

acquisition of the realty can be ascertained. When queried about

the matter during his cross-examination, even Alvin admitted
that his sole basis for saying that the property was owned by
his parents was Antonia’s unilateral pronouncement to the
effect. Considering that the presumption of conjugality does not
operate if there is no showing of when the property alleged to be
conjugal was acquired, we find that the CA cannot be faulted for
ruling that the realty in litigation was Antonia’s exclusive
property.

Not having established the time of acquisition of the property,

the Dela Peñas insist that the registration thereof in the
name of "Antonia R. Dela Peña, of legal age, Filipino,
married to Antegono A. Dela Peña" should have already
sufficiently established its conjugal nature. Confronted with
the same issue in the case Ruiz vs. Court of Appeals, this Court
ruled, however, that the phrase "married to" is merely
descriptive of the civil status of the wife and cannot be
interpreted to mean that the husband is also a registered
owner. Because it is likewise possible that the property was
acquired by the wife while she was still single and registered
only after her marriage, neither would registration thereof in
said manner constitute proof that the same was acquired during
the marriage and, for said reason, to be presumed conjugal in
nature. "Since there is no showing as to when the property in
question was acquired, the fact that the title is in the name of
the wife alone is determinative of its nature as paraphernal, i.e.,
belonging exclusively to said spouse.
 290

ROBERTO LAPERAL, JR. vs. RAMON L. KATIGBAK, ET AL.

G.R. No. L-16991             March 31, 1964

Facts:
CFI Manila declared the property covered by TCT No.57626 as
separate or paraphernal property of Evelina Kalaw-Katigbak. 
The spouses Laperal disagree with this finding reiterating that
its improvements and income are conjugal assets of the Spouses
Katigbak.

When the spouses Katigbak got married, neither of them

brought properties unto the marriage.  Ramon’s occupation
rendered him a monthly income of P200.00.  The property in
question was registered in the name of “Evelina Kalaw-Katigbak
married to Ramon Katigbak”.  The latter declared that her
mother was the one who bought the property for her and had
placed it only in her name as the practice of her mother in
buying properties and placing them directly in the names of her
children.  The husband having no interest with the property only
signed the document for the purpose of assisting his wife.

 In August 1950, the Laperals filed a case and was granted by
the trial court against the Katigbaks in recovery of P14,000 and
jewelry amounting to P97,500 or in lieu thereof, to pay such
amount.  A month after the decision was rendered, Evelina filed
a complaint against her husband for judicial separation of
property and separate administration which was granted by the
court and was sought for annulment by the Laperals. 

Issue:
WON the property in question constitutes the paraphernal
property of Evelina.

Held:
YES. There is no denying that all properties acquired during the
marriage are, by law, presumed conjugal. The presumption,
however, is not conclusive but merely rebuttable, for the
same law is unequivocal that it exists only "unless it be proved
that it the property belongs exclusively to the husband or the
wife." And, examining the records and evidence in this suit, the
Court hold that this is a case where the presumption has been
sufficiently and convincingly disproven. The facts recited by the
trial judge in explanation of his view that the property in dispute
 291

is paraphernal despite its having been acquired during

coverture, impress the Court as adequate and conclusive.

In the present case, on the other hand, the Court note that other
than invoking the presumption, the burden of denying the
evidence so presented was shifted to the appellant. In this latter
task, the appellant failed completely.

The deed to the disputed land is in the name of the wife. At the
time of its purchase, the property was already of such
substantial value as admittedly, the husband, by himself could
not have afforded to buy, considering that singular source of
income then was his P200.00 a month salary from a Manila
Bank. As in the Casiano case, supra, the defendant herein
testified, and was believe by the trial court, that the purchase
price was furnish by her mother so she could buy the property
for herself. Furthermore, it was established during the trial that
it was a practice of defendant's parents to so provide their
children with money to purchase realties for themselves.

These facts, quite obviously, more than measure up to the

circumstances obtaining in the two cases previous cited wherein
We held the conjugal presumption to have been rebutted.
 292

MARIANO VELOSO vs. LUCIA MARTINEZ

G.R. No. L-8715             October 24, 1914

Facts:
Plaintiff Veloso commenced an action to recover from defendant
Lucia, personally and as administratrix of the estate of Domingo
Franco, deceased, the possession of a certain parcel of land
particularly together with the sum of P125 per month, from the
1st day of June, 1911.

Lucia, in her answer, filed a counterclaim for services rendered

by the deceased to the plaintiff and recovery of certain jewelry
alleged to be in thepossession in the plaintif. It is admitted that
the jewels in question, before the possession of the same was
given to the plaintiff, belonged to the defendant personally and
that she had inherited the same from her mother.

The defendant, Lucia Martinez, is the widow of Domingo Franco,

and after the death of her husband she was appointed
administratrix of his estate. A short time before the death of
Domingo Franco he borrowed from the plaintiff the sum of
P4,500 and gave as security for the payment of said sum the
subject jewelry.

After hearing the evidence, the Honorable Adoph Wislizenus,

judge, found that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the
possession of the land in question, together with the sum of
P100 for each month from the month of June, 1911, until the
possession of the land was returned to him.

The lower court further found that the defendant was entitled to
the possession of said jewelry, and ordered the plaintiff to return
the same to her and in case of the plaintiff's failure to return
said jewelry to the defendant, then and in that case, he shall pay
to the defendant, for such failure, the sum of P6,000.
     
Issue:
WON the subject jewelry is paraphernal property of Lucia.

Held:
YES. The record shows that the jewels were the sole and
separate property of the wife, acquired from her mother, and
in the absence of further proof, we must presume that they
 293

constituted a part of her paraphernal property. As such

paraphernal property she exercised dominion over the same.
She had the exclusive control and management of the same,
until and unless she had delivered it to her husband, before
a notary public, with the intent that the husband might
administer it properly. There is no proof in the record that she
had ever delivered the same to her husband, in any manner, or
for any purpose. That being true, she could not be deprived of
the same by any act of her husband, without her consent, and
without compliance with the provisions of the Civil Code above
cited.

During the trial of the cause the plaintiff attempted to show that
the jewels in question were pawned to him by Domingo Franco,
with the full knowledge and consent of the defendant. And not
only that, the plaintiff further attempts to show that after the
death of Domingo Franco, the defendant promised to pay the
amount for which the said jewels were pawned. The defendant
positively denies that she knew that her husband had pawned
her jewels or that she promised to redeem the same by paying
the amount due. No explanation is contained in the record why
the jewels were placed in said box (presumably a money safe).

On administration of exclusive property

It is not clear whether or not the jewelry, at the time of the

execution of said document, was in fact delivered to the plaintiff.
Said exhibit states that the jewelry was contained in a box which
remains closed after the jewels were shown to Mariano Veloso.

The document further admits the the key shall remain in

possession of Domingo Franco. After the death of Domingo
Franco it appears that said jewelry was found in the same "caja"
and that the key was in the possession of the defendant. It is
very doubtful, indeed, under the facts, whether the plaintiff ever
obtained the actual possession of the jewelry. His possession,
however, seems to be admitted by the defendant in the present
action. So far as the record shows the jewelry was in the same
box where it was found at the time of the execution and delivery
of said Exhibit C and that the defendant still has the key to said
box.
 294

ILUMINADA BERCILES vs. GSIS

G.R. NO. L-57257 March 5, 1984

Facts:
Judge Pascual G. Berciles died in office on August 21, 1979 at
the age of sixty-six years due to cardiac arrest. Having served
the government for more than thirty-four (34) years, twenty-six
(26) years in the judiciary, the late Judge Berciles was eligible for
retirement under Republic Act No. 910, as amended by Republic
Act No. 5095 so that his heirs were entitled to survivors benefits
amounting to P311,460.00 under Section 2 of said Act. Other
benefits accruing to the heirs of the deceased consist of the
unpaid salary, the money value of his terminal leave and
representation and transportation allowances, computed at
P60,817.52, all of which are to be paid by this Court as the
deceased’s last employer, and the return of retirement premiums
paid by the retiree in the amount of P9,700.00 to be paid by the
GSIS. Such benefits are now being claimed by two families, both
of whom claim to be the deceased’s lawful heirs.

Iluminada Ponce and her four children, filed with Us an

application for survivors benefits as the legal spouse and
legitimate children of the late Judge Pascual G. Berciles, duly
supported by the required documents. The other set of claimants
are Flor Fuentebella, and her four children, the latter filing her
family’s claim by means of a letter dated November 10, 1979 and
supporting documents were also submitted with their claim. The
SC approved the application of Ms. Iluminada P. Berciles for
survivor’s benefits.

Records from the Retirement Section, Administrative Services

Office of this Court show that the claim of Iluminada Ponce and
her children was already approved by the GSIS and that in fact,
the five years lump sum as retirement gratuity of the deceased
had been remitted by the Budget and Finance Office of this
Court to the GSIS for payment to the heir-beneficiaries on
October 15, 1980.

It was found out that Judge Berciles married Iluminada in 1941.

Fuentebella claimed, on the other hand, that she married Judge
Berciles in 1937. Payment was made to them on the assumption
that they are the only legal heirs of Judge Berciles.
 295

The Committee on Claims Settlement awarded the benefits to

Iluminada, her children and the illegitimate children from
Fuentebella, claiming that it is partly conjugal and partly
exclusive in nature.

Both families, raising grave abuse of discretion, question the

legality of the GSIS Resolution based on the same undisputed
facts, the petitioners herein claiming they are the legal heirs,
whereas, according to private respondents, they are the ones
legally entitled to the retirement benefits. The issue here then is
one of law which the contending parties concede in their
respective pleadings and thus correctible by certiorari.

Issue:
WON the retirement premiums is part of the conjugal property.

Held:
YES. As to the retirement premiums totalling P9,700.00, the
same is presumed conjugal property, there being no proof that
the premiums were paid from the exclusive funds of the
deceased Judge (Article 160, New Civil Code). Such being the
case, one-half of the amount belongs to the wife as her property
in the conjugal partnership and the other half shall go to the
estate of the deceased Judge which shall in turn be distributed
to his legal heirs.

     
 296

AMALIA PLATA vs. JUDGE NICASIO YATCO

G.R. No. L-20825      December 28, 1964

Facts:
Petitioner Plata purchased a parcel ofland located in Caloocan, Rizal
in 1954. The TCT was issued in the name Amalia Plata, single,
Filipino citizen. On 13 February 1958, she sold the property to one
Celso Saldaña who obtained another TCT, but seven months
afterwards, on 24 September 1958, Saldaña resold the same
property to Amalia Plata, married to Gaudencio Begosa," and a new
certificate of Title was issued to the vendee, Amalia Plata.

On the same date, 24 September 1958, "Amalia Plata of legal age,

Filipino, married to Gaudencio Begosa," mortgaged to Cesarea
Villanueva married to Gregorio Leaño, the identical property and its
improvements "of which the mortgagor declares to be hers as the
absolute owner thereof." The mortgage was also signed by
Gaudencio Begosa, as co-mortgagor.

For failure to pay the mortgage, the same was extrajudicially

foreclosed and sold to the mortgagee as the highest bidder. The
Sheriff issued a final deed of sale. Subsequently, the respondent,
Villanueva, sued Gaudencio Begosa alone for illegal detainer and
obtained judgment against him in the court of first instance, that
became final. A writ of execution was duly issued, but Amalia Plata
resisted all efforts to eject her from the property, and she filed a
third party claim, averring ownership of the property. Upon motion
of the judgment creditors, the court below cited both Begosa and
Plata for contempt and finding her explanation unsatisfactory,
found her guilty and sentenced her, as stated at the beginning of
this decision.

Petitioner denies it, claiming that she was never lawfully married to
Begosa, and that she had acquired the property while still single,
and was in possession thereof when the Sheriff of Rizal attempted to
enforce the writ of ejectment. Respondent Villanueva and her
husband maintain, on the other hand, that Plata had repeatedly
acknowledged being married to Begosa; that she had lived with him
openly as his wife, and their marriage is presumed; that, therefore,
she is to be deemed as holding under Begosa, and is bound by the
judgment against the latter.

Issue:
WON the subject property is paraphernal.
 297

Held:
YES. Granting that the evidence before us against the marriage of
petitioner Amalia Plata to Gaudencio Begosa is weak, considering
the admissions of married status in public documents; the well
known presumption that persons openly living together as
husband and wife are legally married to each other, and that
the prior marriage of Begosa to someone else does not
necessarily exclude the possibility of a valid subsequent
marriage to herein petitioner; still the respondents Villanueva
could not ignore the paraphernal character of the property in
question, which had been unquestionably acquired by Plata while
still single. The subsequent conveyance thereof to Celso Saldaña,
and the reconveyance of her several months afterward of the same
property, did not transform it from paraphernal to conjugal
property, there being no proof that the money paid to Saldaña came
from common or conjugal funds. The deed of mortgage in favor of
respondents Villanueva actually recites that the petitioner was the
owner of the tenement in question and so does the conveyance of it
by Saldaña to her.

It is true that Gaudencio Begosa signed the mortgage as a co-

mortgagor; but by itself alone that circumstance would not
suffice to convert the land into conjugal property, considering
that it was paraphernal in origin. This is particularly the case
where the addition of Begosa as co-mortgagor was clearly an after
thought, the text of the deed showing that Plata was the sole
mortgagor.

Since the property was paraphernal, and the creditors and

purchasers were aware of it, the fact being clearly spread on the
land records, it is plain that Plata's possession, therefore, was
not derived from Gaudencio Begosa. The illegal detainer judgment
against the husband alone cannot bind nor affect the wife's
possession of her paraphernal, which by law she holds and
administers independently, and which she may even encumber or
alienate without his knowledge or consent. Hence, as she was not
made party defendant in the eviction suit, the petitioner-wife could
validly ignore the judgment of eviction against her husband, and it
was no contempt of court for her to do so, because the writ of
execution was not lawful against her.
 298

TERESITA C. FRANCISCO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 102330 November 25, 1998

Facts:
Petitioner Teresita is the legal wife of private respondent Eusebio
Francisco by his second marriage. Private respondents Conchita
Evangelista, Araceli F. Marilla and Antonio Francisco are children of
Eusebio by his first marriage. Petitioner alleges that since their
marriage on February 10, 1962, she and Eusebio have acquired a
sari-sari store, a residential house and lot, and an apartment
house, all situated in Rodriguez, Rizal, and; a house and lot at
Barrio San Isidro, Rodriguez, Rizal. Petitioner further avers that
these properties were administered by Eusebio until he was
invalidated on account of tuberculosis, heart disease and cancer,
thereby, rendering him unfit to administer them. Petitioner also
claims that private respondents succeeded in convincing their father
to sign a general power of attorney which authorized Conchita
Evangelista to administer the house and lot together with the
apartments situated in Rodriguez, Rizal.

On August 31, 1988, petitioner filed a suit for damages and for
annulment of said general power of attorney, and thereby enjoining
its enforcement. Petitioner also sought to be declared as the
administratrix of the properties in dispute. In due course, the trial
court rendered judgment in favor of private respondents. It held that
the petitioner failed to adduce proof that said properties were
acquired during the existence of the second conjugal partnership, or
that they pertained exclusively to the petitioner. Hence, the court
ruled that those properties belong exclusively to Eusebio, and that
he has the capacity to administer them.

On appeal, petitioner contends that the subject properties are

conjugal, thus, she should administer these on account of the
incapacity of her husband. On the other hand, private respondents
maintain that the assets in controversy claimed by petitioner as
"conjugal" are capital properties of Eusebio exclusively as these
were acquired by the latter either through inheritance or through
his industry prior to his second marriage. Moreover, they stress that
Eusebio is not incapacitated contrary to petitioner's allegation.

Issue:
WON the subject properties are capital properties of Eusebio.
 299

Held:
YES. Art. 160 of the New Civil Code provides that "all property of
the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership,
unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband
or to the wife". However, the party who invokes this presumption
must first prove that the property in controversy was acquired
during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the coverture is
a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption
in favor of the conjugal partnership. The party who asserts this
presumption must first prove said time element. Needless to say,
the presumption refers only to the property acquired during the
marriage and does not operate when there is no showing as to
when property alleged to be conjugal was acquired. Moreover,
this presumption in favor of conjugality is rebuttable, but only with
strong, clear and convincing evidence; there must be a strict proof
of exclusive ownership of one of the spouses.

In this case, petitioner failed to adduce ample evidence to show that

the properties which she claimed to be conjugal were acquired
during her marriage with Eusebio. With respect to the land at Col.
Cruz St., Balite, Rodriguez, Rizal, petitioner failed to refute the
testimony of Eusebio that he inherited the same from his parents.
Interestingly, petitioner even admitted that Eusebio brought into
their marriage the said land, albeit in the concept of a possessor
only as it was not yet registered in his name.

Whether Eusebio succeeded to the property prior or subsequent to

his second marriage is inconsequential. The property should be
regarded as his own exclusively, as a matter of law, pursuant to
Article 148 of the New Civil Code. Essentially, property already
owned by a spouse prior to the marriage, and brought to the
marriage, is considered his or her separate property.
Acquisitions by lucrative title refer to properties acquired
gratuitously and include those acquired by either spouse during the
marriage by inheritance, devise, legacy, or donation. Hence, even if
it be assumed that Eusebio's acquisition by succession of the land
took place during his second marriage, the land would still be his
"exclusive property" because it was acquired by him, "during the
marriage, by lucrative title."

As regards the house, apartment and sari-sari store, private

respondents aver that these properties were either constructed or
established by their father during his first marriage. On the other
hand, petitioner insists that the said assets belong to conjugal
partnership. In support of her claim, petitioner relied on the
 300

building permits for the house and the apartment, with her as the
applicant although in the name of Eusebio. She also invoked the
business license for the sari-sari store issued in her name alone.

It must be emphasized that the aforementioned documents in no

way prove that the improvements were acquired during the second
marriage. And the fact that one is the applicant or licensee is not
determinative of the issue as to whether or not the property is
conjugal or not

Regarding the property at San Isidro, Rodriguez, Rizal, private

respondents assert that their father purchased it during the lifetime
of their mother. In contrast, petitioner claims ownership over said
property in as much as the title thereto is registered in the name of
"Eusebio Francisco, married to Teresita Francisco."

It must be stressed that the certificate of title upon which petitioner

anchors her claim is inadequate. The fact that the land was
registered in the name of "Eusebio Francisco, married to Teresita
Francisco", is no proof that the property was acquired during the
spouses coverture. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are
two different acts. It is well settled that registration does not confer
title but merely confirms one already existing. The phrase "married
to" preceding "Teresita Francisco" is merely descriptive of the civil
status of Eusebio Francisco.

Now, insofar as the administration of the subject properties is

concerned, it follows that Eusebio shall retain control thereof
considering that the assets are exclusively his capital. Even
assuming for the sake of argument that the properties are conjugal,
petitioner cannot administer themn inasmuch as Eusebio is not
incapacitated. Contrary to the allegation of petitioner, Eusebio, as
found by the lower court, is not suffering from serious illness so as
to impair his fitness to administer his properties. That he is
handicapped due to a leg injury sustained in a bicycle accident,
allegedly aggravated when petitioner pushed him to the ground in
one of their occasional quarrels, did not render him, in the Court's
view, incapacitated to perform acts of administration over his own
properties.
 301

SPOUSES RICKY WONG and ANITA CHAN vs. IAC

G.R. No. 70082 August 19, 1991

Facts:
Romario Henson married Katrina on January 1964.  They had 3
children however, even during the early years of their marriage,
the spouses had been most of the time living separately.  During
the marriage or on about January 1971, the husband bought a
parcel of land in Angeles from his father using the money
borrowed from an officemate.  Sometime in June 1972, Katrina
entered an agreement with Anita Chan where the latter
consigned the former pieces of jewelry valued at P321,830.95. 
Katrina failed to return the same within the 20 day period thus
Anita demanded payment of their value.  Katrina issued in
September 1972, check of P55,000 which was dishonored due to
lack of funds.  The spouses Anita Chan and Ricky Wong filed
action for collection of the sum of money against Katrina and her
husband Romarico.  The reply with counterclaim filed was only
in behalf of Katrina.  Trial court ruled in favor of the Wongs then
a writ of execution was thereafter issued upon the 4 lots in
Angeles City all in the name of Romarico Henson married to
Katrina Henson.  2 of the lots were sold at public auction to
Juanito Santos and the other two with Leonardo Joson.  A
month before such redemption, Romarico filed an action for
annulment of the decision including the writ and levy of
execution.

Issue:
WON debt of the wife without the knowledge of the husband can
be satisfied through the conjugal property.

Held:
NO. Having been acquired during the marriage, they are still
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership even though
Romarico and Katrina had been living separately. The
presumption of the conjugal nature of the properties
subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing
evidence to overcome said presumption or to prove that the
properties are exclusively owned by Romarico. While there is
proof that Romarico acquired the properties with money he had
borrowed from an officemate, it is unclear where he obtained the
money to repay the loan. If he paid it out of his salaries, then the
money is part of the conjugal assets and not exclusively his.
 302

Proof on this matter is of paramount importance considering

that in the determination of the nature of a property acquired by
a person during covertrue, the controlling factor is the source of
the money utilized in the purchase.

The conjugal nature of the properties notwithstanding, Katrina's

indebtedness may not be paid for with them her obligation
not having been shown by the petitioners to be one of the
charges against the conjugal partnership. In addition to the
fact that her rights over the properties are merely inchoate prior
to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the consent of her
husband and her authority to incur such indebtedness had not
been alleged in the complaint and proven at the trial.

Furthermore, under the Civil Code (before the effectivity of the

Family Code on August 3, 1988), a wife may bind the conjugal
partnership only when she purchases things necessary for
the support of the family or when she borrows money for the
purpose of purchasing things necessary for the support of
the family if the husband fails to deliver the proper sum;
when the administration of the conjugal partnership is
transferred to the wife by the courts or by the husband and
when the wife gives moderate donations for charity. Having
failed to establish that any of these circumstances occurred, the
Wongs may not bind the conjugal assets to answer for Katrina's
personal obligation to them.
 303

WILHELMINA JOVELLANOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS,

G.R. No. 100728 June 18, 1992

Facts:
In 1955, Daniel Jovellanos and Philamlife entered into a contract
denominated as a lease and conditional sale agreement over a lot
in Quezon City Community Development Project, including a
bungalow thereon, located in Philamlife Homes, Quezon City. At
that time, Daniel Jovellanos was married to Leonor Dizon, with
whom he had three children, the petitioners herein. Leonor
Dizon died on January 2, 1959. In 1967, Daniel married private
respondent Annette H. Jovellanos with whom he begot two
children, her herein co-respondents.

In 1971, petitioner Mercy Jovellanos married Gil Martinez and,

at the behest of Daniel Jovellanos, they built a house on the
back portion of the premises. In 1975, with the lease amounts
having been paid, Philamlife executed to Daniel Jovellanos a
deed of absolute sale and, on the next day, the latter donated to
herein petitioners all his rights, title and interests over the lot
and bungalow thereon. In 1985, Daniel Jovellanos died.

Private respondent Annette claimed that the aforestated property

was acquired by her deceased husband while their marriage was
still subsisting, by virtue of the deed of absolute sale dated
January 8, 1975 executed by Philamlife in favor of her husband,
Daniel Jovellanos and which forms part of the conjugal
partnership of the second marriage. Petitioners, on the other
hand, contend that the property, specifically the lot and the
bungalow erected thereon, as well as the beneficial and equitable
title thereto, were acquired by their parents during the existence
of the first marriage under their lease and conditional sale
agreement with Philamlife of September 2, 1955.

Issue:
WON the full ownership of the subject property belong to the
conjugal property of Daniel and Annette.

Held:
YES. The right of Daniel Jovellanos to the property under the
contract with Philamlife was merely an inchoate and expectant
right which would ripen into a vested right only upon his
acquisition of ownership which, as aforestated, was contingent
 304

upon his full payment of the rentals and compliance with all his
contractual obligations thereunder. A vested right as an
immediate fixed right of present and future enjoyment. It is to be
distinguished from a right that is expectant or contingent. It is a
right which is fixed, unalterable, absolute, complete and
unconditional to the exercise of which no obstacle exists, and
which is perfect in itself and not dependent upon a contingency.
Thus, for a property right to be vested, there must be a
transition from the potential or contingent to the actual, and the
proprietary interest must have attached to a thing; it must have
become fixed or established and is no longer open to doubt or
controversy.

The trial court which was upheld by respondent court, correctly

ruled that the cases cited by petitioners are inapplicable to the
case at bar since said cases involved friar lands which are
governed by a special law, Act 1120, which was specifically
enacted for the purpose.

We have earlier underscored that the deed of absolute sale was

executed in 1975 by Philamlife, pursuant to the basic contract
between the parties, only after full payment of the rentals. Upon
the execution of said deed of absolute sale, full ownership was
vested in Daniel Jovellanos. Since, as early as 1967, he was
already married to Annette, this property necessarily
belonged to his conjugal partnership with his said second
wife.
 305

SPS. LITA DE LEON & FELIX TARROSA vs. ANITA DE LEON

G.R. No. 185063               July 23, 2009

Facts:
On July 20, 1965, Bonifacio O. De Leon, then single, and the
People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC) entered into
a Conditional Contract to Sell for the purchase on installment of
a lot situated in Fairview, Quezon City. Subsequently, on April
24, 1968, Bonifacio married Anita de Leon in a civil rite. To this
union were born respondents Danilo and Vilma.

Following the full payment of the cost price for the lot thus
purchased, PHHC executed, on June 22, 1970, a Final Deed of
Sale in favor of Bonifacio. Accordingly, TCT was issued in the
name of Bonifacio, "single." Subsequently, Bonifacio, for PhP
19,000, sold the subject lot to her sister, petitioners Lita, and
husband Felix Rio Tarrosa. The conveying Deed of Sale dated
January 12, 1974 (Deed of Sale) did not bear the written consent
and signature of Anita.

In 1977, Bonifacio and Anita renewed their vows in a church

wedding at St. John the Baptist Parish in San Juan, Manila. In
1996, Bonifacio died. Three months later, the Tarrosas
registered the Deed of Sale and had TCT cancelled. They secured
the issuance in their names of another TCT.

Thus, Danilo and Vilma filed a Notice of Adverse Claim before

the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to protect their rights over
the subject property. Very much later, Anita, Danilo, and Vilma
filed a reconveyance suit alleging, among other things, that
fraud attended the execution of the Deed of Sale and that
subsequent acts of Bonifacio would show that he was still the
owner of the parcel of land. The Tarrosas averred that the lot
Bonifacio sold to them was his exclusive property inasmuch as
he was still single when he acquired it from PHHC. As further
alleged, they were not aware of the supposed marriage between
Bonifacio and Anita at the time of the execution of the Deed of
Sale.

The RTC, on the finding that the lot in question was the conjugal
property of Bonifacio and Anita, rendered judgment in favor of
Anita and her children.
 306

Issue:
WON the land purchased on installment by Bonifacio O. De Leon
before marriage although some installments were paid during
the marriage is conjugal and not his exclusive property.

Held:
YES. Article 160 of the 1950 Civil Code, the governing provision
in effect at the time Bonifacio and Anita contracted marriage,
provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership unless it is proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or the wife. For the
presumption to arise, it is not even necessary to prove that the
property was acquired with funds of the partnership. Only proof
of acquisition during the marriage is needed to raise the
presumption that the property is conjugal. In fact, even when
the manner in which the properties were acquired does not
appear, the presumption will still apply, and the properties will
still be considered conjugal.

In the case at bar, ownership over what was once a PHHC lot
and covered by the PHHC-Bonifacio Conditional Contract to Sell
was only transferred during the marriage of Bonifacio and
Anita. Evidently, title to the property in question only passed to
Bonifacio after he had fully paid the purchase price on June 22,
1970. This full payment, to stress, was made more than two (2)
years after his marriage to Anita on April 24, 1968. In net effect,
the property was acquired during the existence of the marriage;
as such, ownership to the property is, by law, presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership.

Such presumption is rebuttable only with strong, clear,

categorical, and convincing evidence. There must be clear
evidence of the exclusive ownership of one of the spouses, and
the burden of proof rests upon the party asserting it. The
defendants, however, did not adduce any proof that the property
in question was acquired solely by the efforts of Bonifacio. In
fact, defendant even admitted that Bonifacio brought into his
marriage with plaintiff Anita the said land, albeit in the concept
of a possessor only as it was not yet registered in his name. The
property was registered only in 1972 during the existence of the
marriage. However, the absence of evidence on the source of
funding has called for the application of the presumption under
Article 160 in favor of the plaintiffs.
 307

There can be no quibbling that Anita’s conformity to the sale of

the disputed lot to petitioners was never obtained or at least not
formally expressed in the conveying deed. The parties admitted
as much in their Joint Stipulation of Facts with Motion earlier
reproduced. Not lost on the Court of course is the fact that
petitioners went to the process of registering the deed after
Bonifacio’s death in 1996, some 22 years after its execution. In
the interim, petitioners could have had work—but did not—
towards securing Anita’s marital consent to the sale.

To a specific point, the sale of a conjugal piece of land by the

husband, as administrator, must, as a rule, be with the wife’s
consent. Else, the sale is not valid. So it is that in several cases
we ruled that the sale by the husband of property belonging to
the conjugal partnership without the consent of the wife is void
ab initio, absent any showing that the latter is incapacitated,
under civil interdiction, or like causes. The nullity, as we have
explained, proceeds from the fact that sale is in contravention of
the mandatory requirements of Art. 166 of the Code. Since Art.
166 of the Code requires the consent of the wife before the
husband may alienate or encumber any real property of the
conjugal partnership, it follows that the acts or transactions
executed against this mandatory provision are void except when
the law itself authorized their validity

As a final consideration, the Court agrees with the CA that the

sale of one-half of the conjugal property without liquidation of
the partnership is void. Prior to the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership, the interest of each spouse in the conjugal assets is
inchoate, a mere expectancy, which constitutes neither a legal
nor an equitable estate, and does not ripen into a title until it
appears that there are assets in the community as a result of the
liquidation and settlement. The interest of each spouse is limited
to the net remainder or "remanente liquido" (haber ganancial)
resulting from the liquidation of the affairs of the partnership
after its dissolution. Thus, the right of the husband or wife to
one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest until the
dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership, or
after dissolution of the marriage, when it is finally determined
that, after settlement of conjugal obligations, there are net
assets left which can be divided between the spouses or their
respective heirs.
 308

FRANCISCO MUÑOZ, JR. vs. ERLINDA RAMIREZ

G.R. No. 156125               August 25, 2010

Facts:
Subject of the present case is a seventy-seven (77)-square meter
residential house and lot located in Mandaluyong City under the
name Francisco. The residential lot in the subject property was
previously covered by TCT No. 1427, in the name of Erlinda
Ramirez, married to Eliseo Carlos respondents.

Respondent Eliseo, a BIR employee, mortgaged TCT No. 1427, with

Erlinda’s consent, to the GSIS to secure a housing loan. The
respondents then constructed a thirty-six (36)-square meter, two-
story residential house on the lot. The title to the subject property
was transferred to the petitioner Francisco by virtue of a Deed of
Absolute Sale, executed by Erlinda, for herself and as attorney-in-
fact of Eliseo, for a stated consideration of P602,000.00.

In 1993, respondents filed a complaint with the RTC for the

nullification of the deed of absolute sale, claiming that there was no
sale but only a mortgage transaction, and the documents
transferring the title to the petitioner’s name were falsified. During
the pendency of the RTC case, or on March 29, 1995, the MeTC
decided the ejectment case. It ordered Erlinda and her family to
vacate the subject property, to surrender its possession to the
petitioner, and to pay the overdue rentals.

In the RTC, the respondents presented the results of the scientific

examination conducted by the NBI of Eliseo’s purported signatures
in the Special Power of Attorney dated April 29, 1992 and the
Affidavit of waiver of rights dated April 29, 1992, showing that they
were forgeries.

The petitioner, on the other hand, introduced evidence on the

paraphernal nature of the subject property since it was registered in
Erlinda’s name; the residential lot was part of a large parcel of land
owned by Pedro Ramirez and Fructuosa Urcla, Erlinda’s parents.

The RTC dismissed the complaint. It found that the subject property
was Erlinda’s exclusive paraphernal property that was inherited
from her father. It also upheld the sale to the petitioner, even
without Eliseo’s consent as the deed of absolute sale bore the
genuine signatures of Erlinda and the petitioner as vendor and
vendee, respectively. It concluded that the NBI finding that Eliseo’s
signatures in the special power of attorney and in the affidavit were
 309

forgeries was immaterial because Eliseo’s consent to the sale was

not necessary.

The CA held that the subject property, originally Erlinda’s exclusive

paraphernal property, became conjugal property when it was used
as collateral for a housing loan that was paid through conjugal
funds – Eliseo’s monthly salary deductions; the subject property,
therefore, cannot be validly sold or mortgaged without Eliseo’s
consent, pursuant to Article 124 of the Family Code. Thus, the CA
declared void the deed of absolute sale, and set aside the RTC
decision.

Issue:
WON the improvements converted the subject property from
paraphernal to conjugal.

Held:
NO. As a general rule, all property acquired during the marriage,
whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or
registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be
conjugal unless the contrary is proved.

In the present case, clear evidence that Erlinda inherited the

residential lot from her father has sufficiently rebutted this
presumption of conjugal ownership. Pursuant to Articles 92 and 109
of the Family Code, properties acquired by gratuitous title by
either spouse, during the marriage, shall be excluded from the
community property and be the exclusive property of each
spouse. The residential lot, therefore, is Erlinda’s exclusive
paraphernal property.

However, the residential lot became conjugal when the house

was built thereon through conjugal funds, applying the second
paragraph of Article 158 of the Civil Code and Calimlim-Canullas.
Under the second paragraph of Article 158 of the Civil Code, a land
that originally belonged to one spouse becomes conjugal upon
the construction of improvements thereon at the expense of
the partnership. We applied this provision in Calimlim-Canullas,
where we held that when the conjugal house is constructed on
land belonging exclusively to the husband, the land ipso facto
becomes conjugal, but the husband is entitled to
reimbursement of the value of the land at the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership.
 310

Article 120 of the Family Code, which supersedes Article 158 of the
Civil Code, provides the solution in determining the ownership
of the improvements that are made on the separate property of
the spouses, at the expense of the partnership or through the
acts or efforts of either or both spouses. Under this provision,
when the cost of the improvement and any resulting increase in
value are more than the value of the property at the time of the
improvement, the entire property of one of the spouses shall belong
to the conjugal partnership, subject to reimbursement of the value
of the property of the owner-spouse at the time of the improvement;
otherwise, said property shall be retained in ownership by the
owner-spouse, likewise subject to reimbursement of the cost of the
improvement.

In the present case, we find that Eliseo paid a portion only of the
GSIS loan through monthly salary deductions. From April 6, 1989
to April 30, 1992, Eliseo paid about P60,755.76, not the entire
amount of the GSIS housing loan plus interest, since the petitioner
advanced the P176,445.27 paid by Erlinda to cancel the mortgage
in 1992. Considering the P136,500.00 amount of the GSIS housing
loan, it is fairly reasonable to assume that the value of the
residential lot is considerably more than the P60,755.76 amount
paid by Eliseo through monthly salary deductions.

Thus, the subject property remained the exclusive paraphernal

property of Erlinda at the time she contracted with the petitioner;
the written consent of Eliseo to the transaction was not necessary.
The NBI finding that Eliseo’s signatures in the special power of
attorney and affidavit were forgeries was immaterial.
 311

AYALA CORP. vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 118305 February 12, 1998

Facts:
Philippine Blooming Mills obtained a loan from petitioner Ayala
Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC). As added
security for the credit line extended to PBM, respondent Alfredo
Ching, Executive Vice President of PBM, executed security
agreements making himself jointly and severally answerable with
PBM's indebtedness to AIDC.

PBM failed to pay the loan. Thus, AIDC filed a case for sum of
money against PBM and respondent-husband Alfredo Ching.
After trial, the court rendered judgment ordering PBM and
respondent-husband Alfredo Ching to jointly and severally pay
AIDC the principal amount of P50,300,000.00 with interests.

After which, the lower court issued a writ of execution pending

appeal. Thereafter, petitioner Abelardo Magsajo, Sr., Deputy
Sheriff of Rizal caused the issuance and service upon
respondents-spouses of a notice of sheriff sale of their conjugal
properties. Petitioner Magsajo then scheduled the auction sale of
the properties levied.

Private respondents spouses Ching filed a case of injunction

against petitioners, to enjoin the auction sale alleging that
petitioners cannot enforce the judgment against the conjugal
partnership levied on the ground that, among others, the subject
loan did not redound to the benefit of the said conjugal
partnership. Upon application of private respondents, the lower
court issued a temporary restraining order to prevent petitioner
Magsajo from proceeding with the enforcement of the writ of
execution and with the sale of the said properties at public
auction.

In 1982, the auction sale took place. AIDC being the only bidder,
was issued a Certificate of Sale by petitioner Magsajo, which was
registered on July 2, 1982. Upon expiration of the redemption
period, petitioner sheriff issued the final deed of sale on August
4, 1982 which was registered on August 9, 1983. The RTC
promulgated its decision declaring the sale on execution null
and void.
 312

Issue:
WON the conjugal partnership can be held liable for the
obligation of the husband.

Held:
NO. If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the
contract, i.e., he directly received the money and services to be
used in or for his own business or his own profession, that
contract falls within the term . . . . obligations for the benefit of
the conjugal partnership." Here, no actual benefit may be
proved. It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at
the time of the signing of the contract. From the very nature of
the contract of loan or services, the family stands to benefit from
the loan facility or services to be rendered to the business or
profession of the husband. It is immaterial, if in the end, his
business or profession fails or does not succeed. Simply stated,
where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the
family business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that such
obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership.

On the other hand, if the money or services are given to another

person or entity, and the husband acted only as a surety or
guarantor, that contract cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as
falling within the context of "obligations for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership." The contract of loan or services is
clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the
surety or his family. No presumption can be inferred that,
when a husband enters into a contract of surety or
accommodation agreement, it is "for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership." Proof must be presented to establish benefit
redounding to the conjugal partnership.

The evidence of petitioner indubitably show that co-respondent

Alfredo Ching signed as surety for the P50M loan contracted on
behalf of PBM. Petitioner should have adduced evidence to
prove that Alfredo Ching's acting as surety redounded to the
benefit of the conjugal partnership. Absent such proof, the
conjugal partnership is not liable.

The conjugal partnership should not be made liable for the

surety agreement which was clearly for the benefit of a third
party. Such opinion merely registered an exception to what may
 313

be construed as a sweeping statement that in all cases actual

profit or benefit must accrue to the conjugal partnership. The
opinion merely made it clear that no actual benefits to the family
need be proved in some cases such as in the Javier case. There,
the husband was the principal obligor himself. Thus, said
transaction was found to be "one that would normally
produce . . . benefit for the partnership."

Article 121, paragraph 3, of the Family Code is emphatic that

the payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the
wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the
conjugal partnership except to the extent that they redounded to
the benefit of the family.

Here, the property in dispute also involves the family home. The
loan is a corporate loan not a personal one. Signing as a surety
is certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession nor an
act of administration for the benefit of the family.
 314

ALFREDO & ENCARNACION CHING vs. CA & ALLIED BANK

G.R. No. 124642             February 23, 2004

Facts:
Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc. (PBMCI) obtained a
loan respondent Allied Banking Corporation (ABC). By virtue of
this loan, the PBMCI, through its Executive Vice-President
Alfredo Ching, executed a promissory note for the said loan. On
September 28, 1978, Alfredo Ching, together with Emilio Tañedo
and Chung Kiat Hua, executed a continuing guaranty with the
ABC binding themselves to jointly and severally guarantee the
payment of all the PBMCI obligations owing the ABC to the
extent of P38,000,000.00. Subsequently loans were obtained by
PBMCI. The PBMCI defaulted in the payment of all its loans.

Hence, ABC filed a complaint for sum of money with prayer for a
writ of preliminary attachment against the PBMCI to collect the
P12,612,972.88 exclusive of interests, penalties and other bank
charges. Impleaded as co-defendants in the complaint were
Alfredo Ching, Emilio Tañedo and Chung Kiat Hua in their
capacity as sureties of the PBMCI.

In its decision, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary attachment

against defendant Alfredo Ching requiring the sheriff to attach
all the properties of said Alfredo Ching not exceeding
P12,612,972.82 in value. The deputy sheriff of the trial court
levied on attachment the 100,000 common shares of Citycorp
stocks in the name of Alfredo Ching.

Petitioner Encarnacion T. Ching, assisted by her husband

Alfredo Ching, filed a Motion to Set Aside the levy on
attachment. She alleged inter alia that the 100,000 shares of
stocks levied on by the sheriff were acquired by her and her
husband during their marriage out of conjugal funds after
the Citycorp Investment Philippines was established in
1974. Furthermore, the indebtedness covered by the continuing
guaranty/comprehensive suretyship contract executed by
petitioner Alfredo Ching for the account of PBMCI did not
redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. She, likewise,
alleged that being the wife of Alfredo Ching, she was a third-
party claimant entitled to file a motion for the release of the
properties. She attached therewith a copy of her marriage
contract with Alfredo Ching.
 315

In its decision, the RTC issued an order lifting the writ of

preliminary attachment on the shares of stocks and ordering the
sheriff to return the said stocks to the petitioners. On appeal,
the CA reversed the RTC’s decision.

The petitioner-spouses filed the instant petition for review on

certiorari, averred that the source of funds in the acquisition
of the levied shares of stocks is not the controlling factor
when invoking the presumption of the conjugal nature of
stocks under Art. 160, and that such presumption subsists
even if the property is registered only in the name of one of the
spouses, in this case, petitioner Alfredo Ching. According to the
petitioners, the suretyship obligation was not contracted in
the pursuit of the petitioner-husband’s profession or
business. And, contrary to the ruling of the CA, where conjugal
assets are attached in a collection suit on an obligation
contracted by the husband, the wife should exhaust her motion
to quash in the main case and not file a separate suit. 45
Furthermore, the petitioners contend that under Art. 125 of the
Family Code, the petitioner-husband’s gratuitous suretyship is
null and void ab initio, and that the share of one of the spouses
in the conjugal partnership remains inchoate until the
dissolution and liquidation of the partnership.

Issue:
WON shares of stock can be held liable for the continuing
guaranty/suretyship of the husband.

Held:
NO. Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all the
properties acquired during the marriage are presumed to belong
to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband, or to the wife.

In this case, the evidence adduced by the petitioners in the RTC

is that the 100,000 shares of stocks in the Citycorp Investment
Philippines were issued to and registered in its corporate books
in the name of the petitioner-husband when the said corporation
was incorporated on May 14, 1979. This was done during the
subsistence of the marriage of the petitioner-spouses. The
shares of stocks are, thus, presumed to be the conjugal
partnership property of the petitioners. The private
respondent failed to adduce evidence that the petitioner-
 316

husband acquired the stocks with his exclusive money. The

barefaced fact that the shares of stocks were registered in the
corporate books of Citycorp Investment Philippines solely in the
name of the petitioner-husband does not constitute proof that
the petitioner-husband, not the conjugal partnership, owned the
same.

For the conjugal partnership to be liable for a liability that

should appertain to the husband alone, there must be a
showing that some advantages accrued to the spouses.
Certainly, to make a conjugal partnership responsible for a
liability that should appertain alone to one of the spouses is to
frustrate the objective of the New Civil Code to show the utmost
concern for the solidarity and well being of the family as a unit.
The husband, therefore, is denied the power to assume
unnecessary and unwarranted risks to the financial stability of
the conjugal partnership.

In this case, the private respondent failed to prove that the

conjugal partnership of the petitioners was benefited by the
petitioner-husband’s act of executing a continuing guaranty
and suretyship agreement with the private respondent for
and in behalf of PBMCI. The contract of loan was between the
private respondent and the PBMCI, solely for the benefit of the
latter. No presumption can be inferred from the fact that when
the petitioner-husband entered into an accommodation
agreement or a contract of surety, the conjugal partnership
would thereby be benefited. The private respondent was
burdened to establish that such benefit redounded to the
conjugal partnership.

It could be argued that the petitioner-husband was a member of

the Board of Directors of PBMCI and was one of its top twenty
stockholders, and that the shares of stocks of the petitioner-
husband and his family would appreciate if the PBMCI could be
rehabilitated through the loans obtained; that the petitioner-
husband’s career would be enhanced should PBMCI survive
because of the infusion of fresh capital. However, these are not
the benefits contemplated by Article 161 of the New Civil Code.
The benefits must be those directly resulting from the loan. They
cannot merely be a by-product or a spin-off of the loan itself.
 317

HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK VS. MIGUELA DAILO

GR No. 153802, March 11, 2005

Facts:
Respondent Miguela C. Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr. were married
on August 8, 1967. During their marriage, the spouses purchased a
house and lot in San Pablo City. The Deed of Absolute Sale,
however, was executed only in favor of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr.
as vendee thereof to the exclusion of respondent Miguela.

On December 1, 1993, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. executed an SPA in favor

of one Lilibeth Gesmundo, authorizing the latter to obtain a loan
from petitioner Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank to be secured
by the spouses Dailo’s house and lot in San Pablo City. The
abovementioned transactions, including the execution of the SPA in
favor of Gesmundo, took place without the knowledge and consent
of respondent Miguel Dailo.

Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result,

petitioner instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the
mortgaged property. After the lapse of one year without the property
being redeemed, petitioner, through its vice-president, consolidated
the ownership thereof.

In the meantime, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. died on December 20, 1995.

In one of respondent’s visits to the subject property, she learned
that petitioner had already employed a certain Roldan Brion to
clean its premises and that her car, a Ford sedan, was razed
because Brion allowed a boy to play with fire within the premises.
Claiming that she had no knowledge of the mortgage constituted on
the subject property, which was conjugal in nature, respondent
instituted complaint for Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage and
Certificate of Sale, Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership, Deed of
Sale, Reconveyance with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and
Damages against petitioner.

After trial, the RTC ruled the real estate mortgage as null and void.
This was affirmed by the CA declaring that the subject property was
conjugal in nature, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence
to rebut the presumption that the subject property acquired during
the marriage of spouses Dailo belongs to their conjugal partnership.
 318

Issue:
WON the conjugal partnership is liable for the payment of the loan
obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. the same having
redounded to the benefit of the family

Held:
NO. Under Article 121 of the Family Code, "The conjugal
partnership shall be liable for: . . . (3) Debts and obligations
contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the
extent that the family may have been benefited; . . . ." For the
subject property to be held liable, the obligation contracted by
the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. must have redounded to the
benefit of the conjugal partnership. There must be the requisite
showing then of some advantage which clearly accrued to the
welfare of the spouses. Certainly, to make a conjugal partnership
respond for a liability that should appertain to the husband
alone is to defeat and frustrate the avowed objective of the new
Civil Code to show the utmost concern for the solidarity and
well-being of the family as a unit.

The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of
the conjugal partnership of gains lies with the creditor-party litigant
claiming as such. Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (he
who asserts, not he who denies, must prove). Petitioner’s sweeping
conclusion that the loan obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. to
finance the construction of housing units without a doubt
redounded to the benefit of his family, without adducing adequate
proof, does not persuade this Court. Other than petitioner’s bare
allegation, there is nothing from the records of the case to compel a
finding that, indeed, the loan obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo,
Jr. redounded to the benefit of the family. Consequently, the
conjugal partnership cannot be held liable for the payment of
the principal obligation.
 319

PAQUITO V. ANDO vs. ANDRESITO Y. CAMPO, ET AL.

G.R. No. 184007               February 16, 2011

Facts:
Petitioner Ando was the president of Premier Allied and
Contracting Services, Inc. (PACSI), an independent labor
contractor. Respondents were hired by PACSI as pilers or
haulers tasked to manually carry bags of sugar from the
warehouse of Victorias Milling Company and load them on
trucks. In June 1998, respondents were dismissed from
employment. They filed a case for illegal dismissal and some
money claims with the NLRC.

Petitioner and PACSI appealed to the NLRC. In a decision dated

October 20, 2004, the NLRC ruled that petitioner failed to
perfect his appeal because he did not pay the supersedeas bond.
It also affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s decision with modification of
the award for separation pay to four other employees who were
similarly situated. Upon finality of the decision, respondents
moved for its execution. To answer for the monetary award,
NLRC Acting Sheriff Romeo Pasustento issued a Notice of Sale
on Execution of Personal Property over the property covered by
TCT in the name of "Paquito V. Ando x x x married to Erlinda S.
Ando."

This prompted petitioner to file an action for prohibition and

damages with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order (TRO) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 50,
Bacolod City. Petitioner claimed that the property belonged to
him and his wife, not to the corporation, and, hence, could not
be subject of the execution sale. Since it is the corporation that
was the judgment debtor, execution should be made on the
latter’s properties.

Issue:
WON the subject property can be subject of execution.

Held:
NO. Petitioner claims that the property sought to be levied does
not belong to PACSI, the judgment debtor, but to him and his
wife. Since he was sued in a representative capacity, and not
in his personal capacity, the property could not be made to
answer for the judgment obligation of the corporation.
 320

The TCT of the property bears out that, indeed, it belongs to

petitioner and his wife. Thus, even if we consider petitioner as
an agent of the corporation – and, therefore, not a stranger to
the case – such that the provision on third-party claims will not
apply to him, the property was registered not only in the name of
petitioner but also of his wife. She stands to lose the property
subject of execution without ever being a party to the case. This
will be tantamount to deprivation of property without due
process.

Moreover, the power of the NLRC, or the courts, to execute its

judgment extends only to properties unquestionably belonging to
the judgment debtor alone. A sheriff, therefore, has no authority
to attach the property of any person except that of the judgment
debtor. Likewise, there is no showing that the sheriff ever tried
to execute on the properties of the corporation.
 321

SECURITY BANK vs. MAR TIERRA CORPORATION

G.R. No. 143382             November 29, 2006

Facts:
Respondent Mar Tierra Corporation, through its president,
Wilfrido C. Martinez, applied for a P12,000,000 credit
accommodation with petitioner Security Bank. Petitioner
approved the application and entered into a credit line
agreement with respondent corporation. It was secured by an
indemnity agreement executed by individual respondents
Wilfrido C. Martinez, Miguel J. Lacson and Ricardo A. Lopa who
bound themselves jointly and severally with respondent
corporation for the payment of the loan.

The respondent corporation was not able to pay the balances as

it suffered business reversals, eventually ceasing operations in
1984. Unable to collect the balance of the loan, petitioner filed a
complaint for a sum of money with a prayer for preliminary
attachment against respondent corporation and individual
respondents. On August 10, 1982, the RTC issued a writ of
attachment on all real and personal properties of respondent
corporation and individual respondent Martinez. As a
consequence, the conjugal house and lot of the spouses Wilfrido
and Josefina Martinez in Caloocan City was levied on.

Issue:
WON the conjugal partnership of the Martinez spouses could be
held liable for the obligation incurred by individual respondent
Martinez.

Held:
NO. Under Article 161(1) of the Civil Code, the conjugal
partnership is liable for "all debts and obligations contracted by
the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." If the
money or services are given to another person or entity and the
husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, the transaction
cannot by itself be deemed an obligation for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership. It is for the benefit of the principal debtor
and not for the surety or his family. No presumption is raised
that, when a husband enters into a contract of surety or
accommodation agreement, it is for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership. Proof must be presented to establish the
benefit redounding to the conjugal partnership. In the absence
 322

of any showing of benefit received by it, the conjugal partnership

cannot be held liable on an indemnity agreement executed by
the husband to accommodate a third party.

In this case, the principal contract, the credit line agreement

between petitioner and respondent corporation, was solely
for the benefit of the latter. The accessory contract (the
indemnity agreement) under which individual respondent
Martinez assumed the obligation of a surety for respondent
corporation was similarly for the latter’s benefit. Petitioner had
the burden of proving that the conjugal partnership of the
spouses Martinez benefited from the transaction. It failed to
discharge that burden.

To hold the conjugal partnership liable for an obligation

pertaining to the husband alone defeats the objective of the Civil
Code to protect the solidarity and well being of the family as a
unit. The underlying concern of the law is the conservation of
the conjugal partnership. Hence, it limits the liability of the
conjugal partnership only to debts and obligations contracted by
the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
 323

RAVINA VS. VILLA ABRILLE

G.R. No. 160708, October 16, 2009

Facts:
Respondent Mary Ann Pasaol Villa Abrille and Pedro Villa Abrille
are husband and wife. They have four children, who are also
parties to the instant case and are represented by their mother,
Mary Ann. In 1982, the spouses acquired a parcel of land
located at Kamuning Street, Juna Subdivision, Matina, Davao
City, and covered by TCT in their names. Said lot is adjacent to a
parcel of land which Pedro acquired when he was still single and
which is registered solely in his name under TCT No. T-26471.

Through their joint efforts and the proceeds of a loan from the
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), the spouses built a
house on Lot 7 and Pedro’s lot. The house was finished in the
early 1980’s but the spouses continuously made improvements,
including a poultry house and an annex.

In 1991, Pedro got a mistress and began to neglect his family.

Mary Ann was forced to sell or mortgage their movables to
support the family and the studies of her children. By himself,
Pedro offered to sell the house and the two lots to herein
petitioners, Patrocinia and Wilfredo Ravina. Mary Ann objected
and notified the petitioners of her objections, but Pedro
nonetheless sold the house and the two lots without Mary Ann’s
consent, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale dated June 21, 1991. It
appears on the said deed that Mary Ann did not sign on top of
her name.

On July 5, 1991 while Mary Ann was outside the house and the
four children were in school, Pedro together with members of
CAFGU and acting in connivance with petitioners began
transferring all their belongings from the house to an apartment.
When Mary Ann and her daughter Ingrid Villa Abrille came
home, they were stopped from entering it. They waited outside
the gate until evening under the rain. Thus, respondents Mary
Ann and her children filed a complaint for Annulment of Sale,
Specific Performance, Damages and Attorney’s Fees with
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction against Pedro and herein
petitioners (the Ravinas) in the RTC of Davao City.
 324

During the trial, Pedro declared that the house was built with
his own money. Petitioner Patrocinia Ravina testified that they
bought the house and lot from Pedro, and that her husband,
petitioner Wilfredo Ravina, examined the titles when they bought
the property.

Issue: 
WON the property is an exclusive property of Pedro.

Held:
NO. Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides, "All property of
the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership,
unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or
to the wife."

There is no issue with regard to the lot covered by TCT No. T-

26471, which was an exclusive property of Pedro, having been
acquired by him before his marriage to Mary Ann. However, the
lot covered by TCT No. T-88674 was acquired in 1982 during the
marriage of Pedro and Mary Ann. No evidence was adduced to
show that the subject property was acquired through exchange
or barter. The presumption of the conjugal nature of the
property subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactory and
convincing evidence to overcome said presumption or to
prove that the subject property is exclusively owned by
Pedro. Petitioners’ bare assertion would not suffice to overcome
the presumption that TCT No. T-88674, acquired during the
marriage of Pedro and Mary Ann, is conjugal. Likewise, the
house built thereon is conjugal property, having been
constructed through the joint efforts of the spouses, who had
even obtained a loan from DBP to construct the house.
 325

HEIRS DOMINGO HERNANDEZ, SR. vs. PLARIDEL MINGOA

G.R. No. 146548               December 18, 2009

Facts:
In the early part of 1958, Domingo Hernandez, Sr. (who was then a
Central Bank employee) and his spouse Sergia V. Hernandez were
awarded a piece of real property by the Philippine Homesite and
Housing Corporation (PHHC) by way of salary deduction. After having
paid in full the entire amount, petitioners were issued by the PHHC a
Deed of Absolute Sale and in 1966, a TCT No. 107534, covering the
property was issued to the petitioners. It bears an annotation of the
retention period of the property by the awardee (i.e., restriction of any
unauthorized sale to third persons within a certain period). Tax
payments due on the property were religiously paid until 1955 by the
petitioners as evidenced by receipts under the petitioners’ name.

According to respondents, Hernadez, Sr. failed to pay all the

instalments due on the said property. Thus, afraid that he would forfeit
his right to purchase the property awarded to him, Hernandez, Sr. sold
to Dolores Camisura his rights, through a deed of transfer of rights.
Simultaneous to this, Hernandez, Sr. and his spouse executed an
irrevocable special power of attorney, appointing Dolores Camisura as
their attorney-in-fact with express power to sign, execute and
acknowledge any contract of disposition, alienation and conveyance of
her right over the aforesaid parcel of land.

Apparently, this special power of attorney was executed for the purpose
of securing her right to transfer the property to a third person
considering that there was a prohibition to dispose of the property by
the original purchaser within one (1) year from full payment. Else wise
stated, the irrevocable power of attorney was necessary in order to
enable the buyer, Dolores Camisura, to sell the lot to another, Plaridel
Mingoa, without the need of requiring Hernandez, to sign a deed of
conveyance.

Hernandez, Sr. died intestate in April 1983 and it was only after his
burial that his heirs found out that TCT No. 107534 was already
cancelled a year before, and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 290121 was issued
to the respondents. Upon diligent inquiry, petitioners came to know that
the cancellation of TCT No. 107534 in favor of the respondents’ xxx TCT
No. 290121 was based upon three sets of documents, namely, (1)
Irrevocable Power of Attorney; (2) Irrevocable Special Power of Attorney;
and (3) Deed of Absolute Sale.

Thus, petitioners filed a complaint against respondents asking for the

annulment and/or declaration of nullity of TCT No. 290121 including
all its derivative titles, the irrevocable SPA in favour of Dolores
Camisura, the SPA in favour of Plaridel Mingoa Sr. and the Deed of
 326

Aboslute Sale of real Estate executed by Plaridel Mingoa, Sr. in favor of

Melanie Mingoa for being products of forgery and falisification. The
petitioners also asked for the reconveyance and/or issuance to them by
the Quezon City Register of Deeds of the certificate of title covering the
subject property. Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint.

Issue:
WON there was a valid alienation involving the subject property.

Held:
YES. The consent of Domingo Hernandez, Sr. to the contract is
undisputed, thus, the sale of his ½ share in the conjugal property was
valid. With regard to the consent of his wife, Sergia Hernandez, to the
sale involving their conjugal property, the trial court found that it was
lacking because said wife’s signature on the SPA was falsified. Notably,
even the CA observed that the forgery was so blatant as to be
remarkably noticeable to the naked eye of an ordinary person. Having
compared the questioned signature on the SPA with those of the
documents bearing the sample standard signature of Sergia Hernandez,
we affirm both lower courts' findings regarding the forgery. However,
Sergia’s lack of consent to the sale did not render the transfer of her
share invalid.

Petitioners contend that such lack of consent on the part of Sergia

Hernandez rendered the SPAs and the deed of sale fictitious, hence null
and void in accordance with Article 1409 of the Civil Code. Petitioners
likewise contend that an action for the declaration of the non-existence
of a contract under Article 1410 does not prescribe.

It bears stressing that the subject matter herein involves conjugal

property. Said property was awarded to Domingo Hernandez, Sr. in
1958. The assailed SPAs were executed in 1963 and 1964. Title in the
name of Domingo Hernandez, Sr. covering the subject property was
issued on May 23, 1966. The sale of the property to Melanie Mingoa and
the issuance of a new title in her name happened in 1978. Since all
these events occurred before the Family Code took effect in 1988, the
provisions of the New Civil Code govern these transactions

Notwithstanding the foregoing, petitioners argue that the disposition of

conjugal property made by a husband without the wife’s consent is null
and void and the right to file an action thereon is imprescriptible, in
accordance with Garcia v. CA and Bucoy v. Paulino.

Concededly, in the aforementioned cases of Garcia and Bucoy, the

contracts involving the sale of conjugal property by the husband
without the wife's consent were declared null and void by this Court. In
succeeding cases, we held that alienation and/or encumbrance of
 327

conjugal property by the husband without the wife’s consent is not null
and void but merely voidable.

Here, the husband’s first act of disposition of the subject property

occurred in 1963 when he executed the SPA and the Deed of Transfer of
Rights in favor of Dolores Camisura. Thus, the right of action of the
petitioners accrued in 1963, as Article 173 of the Civil Code provides
that the wife may file for annulment of a contract entered into by the
husband without her consent within ten (10) years from the transaction
questioned. Petitioners filed the action for reconveyance in 1995. Even if
we were to consider that their right of action arose when they learned of
the cancellation of TCT No. 107534 and the issuance of TCT No. 290121
in Melanie Mingoa’s name in 1993, still, twelve (12) years have lapsed
since such discovery, and they filed the petition beyond the period
allowed by law. Moreover, when Sergia Hernandez, together with her
children, filed the action for reconveyance, the conjugal partnership of
property with Hernandez, Sr. had already been terminated by virtue of
the latter's death on April 16, 1983. Clearly, therefore, petitioners’
action has prescribed.

Thus, the failure of Sergia Hernandez to file with the courts an action
for annulment of the contract during the marriage and within ten (10)
years from the transaction necessarily barred her from questioning the
sale of the subject property to third persons.

In sum, the rights and interests of the spouses Hernandez over the
subject property were validly transferred to respondent Dolores
Camisura. Since the sale of the conjugal property by Hernandez, Sr.
was without the consent of his wife, Sergia, the same is voidable; thus,
binding unless annulled. Considering that Sergia failed to exercise her
right to ask for the annulment of the sale within the prescribed period,
she is now barred from questioning the validity thereof. And more so,
she is precluded from assailing the validity of the subsequent transfers
from Camisura to Plaridel Mingoa and from the latter to Melanie
Mingoa. Therefore, title to the subject property cannot anymore be
reconveyed to the petitioners by reason of prescription and laches. The
issues of prescription and laches having been resolved, it is no longer
necessary to discuss the other issues raised in this petition.
 328

MANUEL & LETICIA L. FUENTES vs. CONRADO G. ROCA

G.R. No. 178902               April 21, 2010

Facts:
Sabina Tarroza owned a lot in Canelar, Zamboanga City. On
October 11, 1982 she sold it to her son, Tarciano T. Roca under
a deed of absolute sale. But Tarciano did not for the meantime
have the registered title transferred to his name. In 1988,
Tarciano offered to sell the lot to petitioners Fuentes spouses.
Their transaction involves a condition where if Traciano was
unable to comply, the Fuentes spouses would become owners of
the lot without any further formality and payment.

In 1989, Tarciano executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of the

Fuentes spouses. A new title was issued in the name of the
spouses Fuentes who immediately constructed a building on the
lot. In 1990, Tarciano passed away, followed by his wife Rosario
who died nine months afterwards.

In 1997, the children of Tarciano and Rosario, herein

respondents, filed an action for annulment of sale and
reconveyance of the land against the Fuentes spouses claiming
that the sale to the spouses was void since Tarciano’s wife,
Rosario, did not give her consent to it. Her signature on the
affidavit of consent had been forged. They thus prayed that the
property be reconveyed to them upon reimbursement of the price
that the Fuentes spouses paid Tarciano. The spouses denied the
Rocas’ allegations. They pointed out that the claim of forgery was
personal to Rosario and she alone could invoke it. Besides, the
four-year prescriptive period for nullifying the sale on ground of
fraud had already lapsed.

The RTC rendered judgment, dismissing the case. It ruled that

the action had already prescribed since the ground cited by the
Rocas for annulling the sale, forgery or fraud.

On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC decision declaring that

there is sufficient evidence of forgery. Tarciano and Rosario had
been living separately for 30 years since 1958 also reinforced the
conclusion that her signature had been forged. Since Tarciano
and Rosario were married in 1950, the CA concluded that their
property relations were governed by the Civil Code under which
an action for annulment of sale on the ground of lack of spousal
 329

consent may be brought by the wife during the marriage within

10 years from the transaction. Consequently, the action that the
Rocas, her heirs, brought in 1997 fell within 10 years of the
January 11, 1989 sale. Considering, however, that the sale
between the Fuentes spouses and Tarciano was merely voidable,
the CA held that its annulment entitled the spouses to
reimbursement of what they paid him plus legal interest
computed from the filing of the complaint until actual payment.

Issue:
WON Rosario’s signature is genuine indicating that she gave her
consent to the sale.

Held:
NO. Rosario had been living separately from Tarciano for 30
years since 1958. And she resided so far away in Manila. It
would have been quite tempting for Tarciano to just forge her
signature and avoid the risk that she would not give her consent
to the sale or demand a stiff price for it. What is more, Atty.
Plagata admittedly falsified the jurat of the affidavit of consent.
That jurat declared that Rosario swore to the document and
signed it in Zamboanga City on January 11, 1989 when, as Atty.
Plagata testified, she supposedly signed it about four months
earlier at her residence in Paco, Manila on September 15, 1988.

When Tarciano sold the conjugal lot to the Fuentes spouses on

January 11, 1989, the law that governed the disposal of that lot
was already the Family Code. In contrast to Article 173 of the
Civil Code, Article 124 of the Family Code does not provide a
period within which the wife who gave no consent may assail her
husband’s sale of the real property. It simply provides that
without the other spouse’s written consent or a court order
allowing the sale, the same would be void.

Under the provisions of the Civil Code governing contracts, a

void or inexistent contract has no force and effect from the
very beginning. And this rule applies to contracts that are
declared void by positive provision of law, as in the case of a
sale of conjugal property without the other spouse’s written
consent. A void contract is equivalent to nothing and is
absolutely wanting in civil effects. It cannot be validated either
by ratification or prescription.
 330

JOE A. ROS & ESTRELLA AGUETE vs. PNB-LAOAG

G.R. No. 170166               April 6, 2011

Facts:
In 1974, petitioner Ros obtained a loan from respondent PNB
and as a security he executed a real estate mortgage involving a
parcel of land with all the improvements thereon. Upon
maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result, PNB
instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged
property. After the extrajudicial sale thereof, a Certificate of Sale
was issued in favor of PNB as the highest bidder. After the lapse
of one (1) year without the property being redeemed, the
property was consolidated and registered in the name of PNB on
August 10, 1978.

In 1983, petitioner spouses Ros and Aguete filed a complaint for

the annulment of the Real Estate Mortgage and all legal
proceedings taken thereunder against respondent PNB. The
spouses claimed that Estrella has no knowledge of the loan
obtained by her husband nor she consented to the mortgage
instituted on the conjugal property – a complaint was filed to
annul the proceedings pertaining to the mortgage, sale and
consolidation of the property – interposing the defense that her
signatures affixed on the documents were forged and that the
loan did not redound to the benefit of the family.

In its answer, PNB prays for the dismissal of the complaint for
lack of cause of action, and insists that it was plaintiffs-
appellees’ own acts of omission/connivance that bar them from
recovering the subject property on the ground of estoppel,
laches, abandonment and prescription.

In its decision, the RTC rendered its Decision in favor of

petitioners. The trial court declared that Aguete did not sign the
loan documents, did not appear before the Notary Public to
acknowledge the execution of the loan documents, did not
receive the loan proceeds from PNB, and was not aware of the
loan until PNB notified her in 14 August 1978 that she and her
family should vacate the mortgaged property because of the
expiration of the redemption period.

Under the Civil Code, the effective law at the time of the
transaction, Ros could not encumber any real property of the
 331

conjugal partnership without Aguete’s consent. Aguete may,

during their marriage and within ten years from the transaction
questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of the contract her
husband entered into without her consent, especially in the
present case where her consent is required. The trial court,
however, ruled that its decision is without prejudice to the right
of action of PNB to recover the amount of the loan and its
interests from Ros.

On appeal, the CA reversed the trial court’s decision, and

dismissed petitioners’ complaint. The appellate court stated that
the trial court concluded forgery without adequate proof; thus it
was improper for the trial court to rely solely on Aguete’s
testimony that her signatures on the loan documents were
forged. The appellate court declared that Aguete affixed her
signatures on the documents knowingly and with her full
consent. Assuming arguendo that Aguete did not give her
consent to Ros’ loan, the appellate court ruled that the
conjugal partnership is still liable because the loan proceeds
redounded to the benefit of the family. The records of the
case reveal that the loan was used for the expansion of the
family’s business. Therefore, the debt obtained is chargeable
against the conjugal partnership.

Issue:
WON the loan contracted by Ros with PNB is chargeable to the
CPG.

Held:
YES. The application for loan shows that the loan would be used
exclusively "for additional working [capital] of buy & sell of garlic
& virginia tobacco." In her testimony, Aguete confirmed that Ros
engaged in such business, but claimed to be unaware whether it
prospered. Aguete was also aware of loans contracted by Ros,
but did not know where he "wasted the money." Debts
contracted by the husband for and in the exercise of the
industry or profession by which he contributes to the
support of the family cannot be deemed to be his exclusive
and private debts.

If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract,

i.e., he directly received the money and services to be used in or
for his own business or his own profession, that contract falls
 332

within the term "x x x x obligations for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership." Here, no actual benefit may be proved. It is
enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at the
signing of the contract. From the very nature of the contract of
loan or services, the family stands to benefit from the loan
facility or services to be rendered to the business or profession of
the husband. It is immaterial, if in the end, his business or
profession fails or does not succeed. Simply stated, where the
husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family
business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that such
obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership.

For this reason, we rule that Ros’ loan from PNB redounded to
the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Hence, the debt is
chargeable to the conjugal partnership.
 333

HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK VS. MIGUELA DAILO

GR No. 153802, March 11, 2005

Facts:
Respondent Miguela C. Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr. were married
on August 8, 1967. During their marriage, the spouses purchased a
house and lot in San Pablo City. The Deed of Absolute Sale,
however, was executed only in favor of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr.
as vendee thereof to the exclusion of respondent Miguela.

On December 1, 1993, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. executed an SPA in favor

of one Lilibeth Gesmundo, authorizing the latter to obtain a loan
from petitioner Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank to be secured
by the spouses Dailo’s house and lot in San Pablo City. The
abovementioned transactions, including the execution of the SPA in
favor of Gesmundo, took place without the knowledge and consent
of respondent Miguel Dailo.

Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result,

petitioner instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the
mortgaged property. After the lapse of one year without the property
being redeemed, petitioner, through its vice-president, consolidated
the ownership thereof.

In the meantime, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. died on December 20, 1995.

In one of respondent’s visits to the subject property, she learned
that petitioner had already employed a certain Roldan Brion to
clean its premises and that her car, a Ford sedan, was razed
because Brion allowed a boy to play with fire within the premises.
Claiming that she had no knowledge of the mortgage constituted on
the subject property, which was conjugal in nature, respondent
instituted complaint for Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage and
Certificate of Sale, Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership, Deed of
Sale, Reconveyance with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and
Damages against petitioner.

After trial, the RTC ruled the real estate mortgage as null and void.
This was affirmed by the CA declaring that the subject property was
conjugal in nature, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence
to rebut the presumption that the subject property acquired during
the marriage of spouses Dailo belongs to their conjugal partnership.
 334

Issue:
WON the mortgage constituted by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. on
the subject property as co-owner thereof is valid as to his undivided
share.

Held:
NO. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise
unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include the powers of
disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the
court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of
such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be
void.

Petitioner argues that although Article 124 of the Family Code

requires the consent of the other spouse to the mortgage of conjugal
properties, the framers of the law could not have intended to curtail
the right of a spouse from exercising full ownership over the portion
of the conjugal property pertaining to him under the concept of co-
ownership. Thus, petitioner would have this Court uphold the
validity of the mortgage to the extent of the late Marcelino Dailo,
Jr.’s share in the conjugal partnership

Respondent and the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. were married on

August 8, 1967. In the absence of a marriage settlement, the system
of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains governed the
property relations between respondent and her late husband. With
the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, Chapter 4 on
Conjugal Partnership of Gains in the Family Code was made
applicable to conjugal partnership of gains already established
before its effectivity unless vested rights have already been acquired
under the Civil Code or other laws.

The rules on co-ownership do not even apply to the property

relations of respondent and the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. even in a
suppletory manner. The regime of conjugal partnership of gains
is a special type of partnership, where the husband and wife
place in a common fund the proceeds, products, fruits and
income from their separate properties and those acquired by
either or both spouses through their efforts or by chance.
Unlike the absolute community of property wherein the rules on co-
ownership apply in a suppletory manner, the conjugal partnership
shall be governed by the rules on contract of partnership in all
that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined in the
 335

chapter (on conjugal partnership of gains) or by the spouses in

their marriage settlements. Thus, the property relations of
respondent and her late husband shall be governed, foremost, by
Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the Family Code and,
suppletorily, by the rules on partnership under the Civil Code. In
case of conflict, the former prevails because the Civil Code
provisions on partnership apply only when the Family Code is silent
on the matter.

The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, without
the knowledge and consent of his wife, Marcelino Dailo, Jr.
constituted a real estate mortgage on the subject property, which
formed part of their conjugal partnership. By express provision of
Article 124 of the Family Code, in the absence of (court) authority
or written consent of the other spouse, any disposition or
encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be void.

The aforequoted provision does not qualify with respect to the share
of the spouse who makes the disposition or encumbrance in the
same manner that the rule on co-ownership under Article 493 of the
Civil Code does. Where the law does not distinguish, courts should
not distinguish. Thus, both the trial court and the appellate court
are correct in declaring the nullity of the real estate mortgage on the
subject property for lack of respondent’s consent.
 336

SPOUSES ONESIFORO & ROSARIO ALINAS vs.

SPOUSES VICTOR and ELENA ALINAS
G.R. No. 158040             April 14, 2008

Facts:
Petitioner spouses Onesiforo and Rosario Alinas separated
sometime in 1982, with Rosario moving to Pagadian City and
Onesiforo moving to Manila. They left behind two lots with a
bodega standing on it and Lot 896-B-9-B with petitioners' house.

Petitioner Onesiforo and respondent Victor Alinas are brothers.

Petitioners allege that they entrusted their properties to
respondent Victor and Elena Alinas with the agreement that any
income from rentals of the properties should be remitted to the
SSS and to the Rural Bank of Oroquieta City (RBO), as such
rentals were believed sufficient to pay off petitioners' loans with
said institutions. Lot 896-B-9-A with the bodega was mortgaged
as security for the loan obtained from the RBO, while Lot 896-B-
9-B with the house was mortgaged to the SSS. Onesiforo alleges
that he left blank papers with his signature on them to facilitate
the administration of said properties.

Sometime in 1993, petitioners discovered that their two lots were

already titled in the name of respondent spouses. The two lots
were foreclosed by the RBO and SSS. Onesiforo’s signature
appears in the Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of the respondent
spouses. There is also a notarized document whereby Onesifor
acknowledged that his brother Victor used his own money to
redeem the lot from the SSS and, thus, Victor became the owner
of said lot. In the same Agreeement, petitioner Onesiforo waived
whatever rights, claims, and interests he or his heirs, successors
and assigns have or may have over the subject property.

On June 25, 1993, petitioners filed complaint for recovery of

possession and ownership of their conjugal properties with
damages against respondent spouses.

Issue:
WON the sale of Onesiforo of the land with the house standing
thereon is valid.
 337

Held:
NO. Pursuant to Article 124 of the Family Code and
jurisprudence, the sale of petitioners' conjugal property made
by petitioner Onesiforo alone is void in its entirety. It is true
that in a number of cases, this Court abstained from applying
the literal import of a particular provision of law if doing so
would lead to unjust, unfair and absurd results.

In the present case, the Court does not see how applying Article
124 of the Family Code would lead to injustice or absurdity. It
should be noted that respondent spouses were well aware that
Lot 896-B-9-B is a conjugal property of petitioners. They also
knew that the disposition being made by Onesiforo is without
the consent of his wife, as they knew that petitioners had
separated, and, the sale documents do not bear the signature of
petitioner Rosario. The fact that Onesiforo had to execute two
documents, namely: the Absolute Deed of Sale dated March 10,
1989 and a notarized Agreement likewise dated March 10, 1989,
reveals that they had full knowledge of the severe infirmities of
the sale.

As held in Heirs of Aguilar-Reyes v. Spouses Mijares, "a

purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a
reasonable man on his guard and still claim he acted in good
faith." Such being the case, no injustice is being foisted on
respondent spouses as they risked transacting with Onesiforo
alone despite their knowledge that the subject property is a
conjugal property.

Verily, the sale of Lot 896-B-9-B to respondent spouses is

entirely null and void
 338

ANTONIO & ALFREDA DOCENA vs. HON. LAPESURA

G.R. No. 140153       March 28, 2001

Facts:
Private respondent Casiano Hombria filed a Complaint for the recovery
of a parcel of land against his lessees, petitioner-spouses Antonio and
Alfreda Docena. The petitioners claimed ownership of the land based on
occupation since time immemorial. A certain Guillermo Abuda
intervened in the case. In a Decision dated November 24, 1989, the trial
court ruled in favor of the petitioners and the intervenor Abuda. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court
and ordered the petitioners to vacate the land they have lease from
Hombria.

Private respondent Hombria filed a Motion for Execution of the above

decision which has already become final and executory. The motion was
granted by the public respondent judge, and a Writ of Execution was
issued therefor.

A Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition was filed by the petitioners with
the Court of Appeals, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the trial court judge in issuing the Orders dated November 18, 1998
and March 17, 1999, and of the sheriff in issuing the alias Writ of
Demolition. In a Resolution dated 4 June 18, 1999, the Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition on the grounds that the petition was
filed beyond the 60-day period and that the certification of non-forum
shopping attached thereto was signed by only one of the petitioners.

Issue:
WON it is sufficient that the certification of non-forum shopping was
signed by only one of the petitioners.

Held:
YES. The property involved is a conjugal property, the petition
questioning the writ of demolition thereof originated from an action for
recovery brought against the spouses, and is clearly intended for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership, and the wife, as pointed out in the
Motion for Reconsideration in respondent court, was in the province of
Guian, Samar, whereas the petition was prepared in Metro Manila, a
rigid application of the rules on forum shopping that would disauthorize
a husband's signing the certification in his behalf and that of his wife is
too harsh and is clearly uncalled for.

In the case at bar, however, we hold that the subject Certificate of

Non-Forum Shopping signed by the petitioner Antonio Docena
alone should be deemed to constitute substantial compliance with
the rules. There are only two petitioners in this case and they are
husband and wife. Their residence is the subject property alleged to be
 339

conjugal in the instant verified petition. The Verification/Certification

on Non-Forum Shopping attached to the Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition was signed only by the husband who certified, inter alia,
that he and his wife have not commenced any other action or
proceeding involving the same issues raised in the petition in any court,
tribunal or quasi- judicial agency; xxx. It is believed that the
certificate on non-forum shopping filed in the Court of Appeals
constitutes sufficient compliance with the rules on forum-
shopping.

Under the New Civil Code, the husband is the administrator of the
conjugal partnership. In fact, he is the sole administrator, and the wife
is not entitled as a matter of right to join him in this endeavor. The
husband may defend the conjugal partnership in a suit or action
without being joined by the wife. Corollarily, the husband alone may
execute the necessary certificate of non-forum shopping to accompany
the pleading. The husband as the statutory administrator of the
conjugal property could have filed the petition for certiorari and
prohibition34 alone, without the concurrence of the wife. If suits to
defend an interest in the conjugal properties may be filed by the
husband alone, with more reason, he may sign the certificate of non-
forum shopping to be attached to the petition.

Under the Family Code, the administration of the conjugal property

belongs to the husband and the wife jointly. However, unlike an act
of alienation or encumbrance where the consent of both spouses is
required, joint management or administration does not require that the
husband and wife always act together. Each spouse may validly
exercise full power of management alone, subject to the
intervention of the court in proper cases as provided under Article
124 of the Family Code. It is believed that even under the provisions
of the Family Code, the husband alone could have filed the petition for
certiorari and prohibition to contest the writs of demolition issued
against the conjugal property with the Court of Appeals without being
joined by his wife. The signing of the attached certificate of non-
forum shopping only by the husband is not a fatal defect.

More important, the signing petitioner here made the certification

in his behalf and that of his wife. The husband may reasonably be
presumed to have personal knowledge of the filing or non-filing by his
wife of any action or claim similar to the petition for certiorari and
prohibition given the notices and legal processes involved in a legal
proceeding involving real property. We also see no justifiable reason
why he may not lawfully undertake together with his wife to inform the
court of any similar action or proceeding which may be filed. If anybody
may repudiate the certification or undertaking for having been
incorrectly made, it is the wife who may conceivably do so.
 340

SPOUSES AGGABAO vs. DIONISIO Z. PARULAN, JR.

G.R. No. 165803               September 1, 2010

Facts:
Petitioner spouses Aggabao, through a real estate broker Marta
K. Atanacio, bought two parcels of land located in BF Homes,
Paranaque City. Prior to the sale, the subject properties are
registered in the name of respondents Spouses Maria Elena A.
Parulan and Dionisio Z. Parulan, Jr. (Dionisio), who have been
estranged from one another.

During the negotiation, Ma Elena showed to petitioners certain

documents related to the properties except the Owner’s
Duplicate Copy of the TCT. Petitioners then went to the Office of
the Register of Deeds and the Assessor’s Office of Parañaque City
to verify the TCTs shown by Ma. Elena in the company of
Atanacio and her husband (also a licensed broker). There, they
discovered that the lot under TCT No. 63376 had been
encumbered to Banco Filipino in 1983 or 1984, but that the
encumbrance had already been cancelled due to the full
payment of the obligation. They noticed that the Banco Filipino
loan had been effected through an SPA executed by Dionisio in
favor of Ma. Elena. They found on TCT No. 63377 the annotation
of an existing mortgage in favor of the Los Baños Rural Bank,
also effected through an SPA executed by Dionisio in favor of
Ma. Elena, coupled with a copy of a court order authorizing Ma.
Elena to mortgage the lot to secure a loan of P500,000.00.
Petitioners and Atanacio next inquired about the mortgage and
the court order annotated on TCT No. 63377 at the Los Baños
Rural Bank.

After which, petitioners delivered the final amount of

P700,000.00 to Ma. Elena, who executed a deed of absolute sale
in their favor. However, Ma. Elena did not turn over the owner’s
duplicate copy of TCT No. 63376, claiming that said copy was in
the possession of a relative who was then in Hongkong. She
assured them that the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 63376
would be turned over after a week.

In due time, the petitioners learned that the duplicate owner’s

copy of TCT No. 63376 had been all along in the custody of Atty.
Jeremy Z. Parulan, who appeared to hold an SPA executed by
his brother Dionisio authorizing him to sell both lots. They met
 341

with Atty. Paraluan, Jr. who demanded P800,000.00 in

exchange for the duplicate owner’s copy of TCT No. 63376. As a
counter-offer, however, they tendered P250,000.00, which Atty.
Parulan declined, giving them only until April 5, 1991 to decide.
Hearing nothing more from the petitioners, Atty. Parulan decided
to call them on April 5, 1991, but they informed him that they
had already fully paid to Ma. Elena.

Thus, on April 15, 1991, Dionisio, through Atty. Parulan,

commenced an action entitled Dionisio Z. Parulan, Jr.,
represented by Jeremy Z. Parulan, as attorney in fact, v. Ma.
Elena Parulan, Sps. Rex and Coney Aggabao), praying for the
declaration of the nullity of the deed of absolute sale executed by
Ma. Elena, and the cancellation of the title issued to the
petitioners by virtue thereof.

Issue:
WON the sale between Mrs. Elena and the petitioners is valid.

Held:
YES. Article 124 of the Family Code categorically requires the
consent of both spouses before the conjugal property may be
disposed of by sale, mortgage, or other modes of disposition
Thus, the buyers of conjugal property must observe two kinds of
requisite diligence, namely: (a) the diligence in verifying the
validity of the title covering the property; and (b) the diligence in
inquiring into the authority of the transacting spouse to sell
conjugal property in behalf of the other spouse.

The petitioners knew fully well that the law demanded the
written consent of Dionisio to the sale, but yet they did not
present evidence to show that they had made inquiries into the
circumstances behind the execution of the SPA purportedly
executed by Dionisio in favor of Ma. Elena. Had they made the
appropriate inquiries, and not simply accepted the SPA for what
it represented on its face, they would have uncovered soon
enough that the respondents had been estranged from each
other and were under de facto separation, and that they
probably held conflicting interests that would negate the
existence of an agency between them. To lift this doubt, they
must, of necessity, further inquire into the SPA of Ma. Elena.
 342

Lastly, the petitioners’ insistence that Atty. Parulan’s making of

a counter-offer during the March 25, 1991 meeting ratified the
sale merits no consideration. Under Article 124 of the Family
Code, the transaction executed sans the written consent of
Dionisio or the proper court order was void; hence, ratification
did not occur, for a void contract could not be ratified.

On the other hand, we agree with Dionisio that the void sale was
a continuing offer from the petitioners and Ma. Elena that
Dionisio had the option of accepting or rejecting before the offer
was withdrawn by either or both Ma. Elena and the petitioners.
The last sentence of the second paragraph of Article 124 of the
Family Code makes this clear, stating that in the absence of
the other spouse’s consent, the transaction should be
construed as a continuing offer on the part of the
consenting spouse and the third person, and may be
perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the
other spouse or upon authorization by the court before the
offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
 343

JOSE & GLENDA J. UY and GILDA L. JARDELEZA vs. CA

G.R. No. 109557               November 29, 2000

Facts:
Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., and Gilda Jardeleza are married.
They are the parent of herein respondent Teodoro Jardeleza. In
1991, Dr. Jardeleza suffered a stroke which left him comatose
and renders him incapacitated to manage their properties.

Upon learning that one piece of real property belonging to the

senior Jardeleza spouses was about to be sold, petitioner
Teodoro filed a petition as Special Proceeding in the matter of the
guardianship of Dr. Jardeleza, Sr. It was prayed in the petition
that Letters of Guardianship be issued in favor of herein private
respondent Gilda Ledesma Jardeleza. It was further prayed that
in the meantime, no property of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. be
negotiated, mortgaged or otherwise alienated to third persons.

Respondent filed a petition regarding the declaration of

incapacity of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., assumption of sole powers
of administration of conjugal properties, and authorization to
sell the same. Therein, Gilda averred the physical and mental
incapacity of her husband, who was then confined for intensive
medical care and treatment at the Iloilo Doctor’s Hospital. She
signified to the court her desire to assume sole powers of
administration of their conjugal properties. She also alleged that
her husband’s medical treatment and hospitalization expenses
were piling up, accumulating to several hundred thousands of
pesos already. For this, she urgently needed to sell one piece of
real property. Thus, she prayed for authorization from the court
to sell said property.

The RTC of IloIlo granted Gilda’s petition. While the motion for
reconsideration was pending, Gilda disposed by absolute sale
Lot No. 4291 and all its improvements to her daughter, Ma.
Glenda Jardeleza Uy. The CA promulgated its decision reversing
the appealed decision and ordering the trial court to dismiss the
special proceedings to approve the deed of sale, which was also
declared void.
 344

Issue:
WON petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza as the wife of Ernesto
Jardeleza, Sr. can manage and assume sole powers of
administration of the conjugal property.

Held:
NO. The Court of Appeals ruled that in the condition of Dr.
Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., the procedural rules on summary
proceedings in relation to Article 124 of the Family Code are
not applicable. Because Dr. Jardeleza, Sr. was unable to take
care of himself and manage the conjugal property due to illness
that had rendered him comatose, the proper remedy was the
appointment of a judicial guardian of the person or estate or
both of such incompetent, under Rule 93, Section 1, 1964
Revised Rules of Court. Indeed, petitioner earlier had filed such
a petition for judicial guardianship.

In regular manner, the rules on summary judicial proceedings

under the Family Code govern the proceedings under Article 124
of the Family Code. The situation contemplated is one where
the spouse is absent, or separated in fact or has abandoned
the other or consent is withheld or cannot be obtained. Such
rules do not apply to cases where the non-consenting spouse is
incapacitated or incompetent to give consent.

In this case, the trial court found that the subject spouse "is an
incompetent" who was in comatose or semi-comatose condition,
a victim of stroke, cerebrovascular accident, without motor and
mental faculties, and with a diagnosis of brain stem infarct. In
such case, the proper remedy is a judicial guardianship
proceedings under Rule 93 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court.

Even assuming that the rules of summary judicial proceedings

under the Family Code may apply to the wife's administration of
the conjugal property, the law provides that the wife who
assumes sole powers of administration has the same powers and
duties as a guardian under the Rules of Court.

Consequently, a spouse who desires to sell real property as such

administrator of the conjugal property must observe the
procedure for the sale of the ward’s estate required of judicial
guardians under Rule 95, 1964 Revised Rules of Court, not the
summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code.
 345

In the case at bar, the trial court did not comply with the
procedure under the Revised Rules of Court. Indeed, the trial
court did not even observe the requirements of the summary
judicial proceedings under the Family Code. Thus, the trial court
did not serve notice of the petition to the incapacitated spouse; it
did not require him to show cause why the petition should not
be granted.

Hence, we agree with the Court of Appeals that absent an

opportunity to be heard, the decision rendered by the trial
court is void for lack of due process. The doctrine consistently
adhered to by this Court is that a denial of due process suffices
to cast on the official act taken by whatever branch of the
government the impress of nullity. A decision rendered without
due process is void ab initio and may be attacked directly or
collaterally. "A decision is void for lack of due process if, as a
result, a party is deprived of the opportunity of being heard." "A
void decision may be assailed or impugned at any time
either directly or collaterally, by means of a separate action,
or by resisting such decision in any action or proceeding
where it is invoked."
 346

THOMAS C. CHEESMAN vs. IAC & ESTELITA PADILLA

G.R. No. 74833 January 21, 1991

Facts:
Petitioner Thomas Cheesman and Criselda P. Cheesman were
married in 1970 but have been separated since February 1981.
In 1974, a "Deed of Sale and Transfer of Possessory Rights" was
executed by Armando Altares conveying a parcel of unregistered
land and the house thereon in favor of "Criselda P. Cheesman, of
legal age, Filipino citizen, married to Thomas Cheesman...”
Thomas Cheesman, although aware of the deed, did not object to
the transfer being made only to his wife.
Thereafter—and again with the knowledge of Thomas Cheesman
and also without any protest by him—tax declarations for the
property purchased were issued in the name only of Criselda
Cheesman and Criselda assumed exclusive management and
administration of said property, leasing it to tenants. On July 1,
1981, Criselda Cheesman sold the property to respondent
Padilla, without the knowledge or consent of Thomas Cheesman.
The deed described Criselda as being" . . . of legal age, married
to an American citizen,. . ."

On July 31, 1981, Thomas Cheesman brought suit his wife,

Criselda, and Padilla, praying for the annulment of the sale on
the ground that the transaction had been executed without his
knowledge and consent.

Issue:
WON Thomas can question the sale made by Criselda.

Held:
NO. The fundamental law prohibits the sale to aliens of
residential land. Petitioner Thomas Cheesman was, of course,
charged with knowledge of this prohibition. Thus, assuming
that it was his intention that the lot in question be
purchased by him and his wife, he acquired no right
whatever over the property by virtue of that purchase; and
in attempting to acquire a right or interest in land, vicariously
and clandestinely, he knowingly violated the Constitution; the
sale as to him was null and void. In any event, he had and has
no capacity or personality to question the subsequent sale of the
same property by his wife on the theory that in so doing he is
merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of
 347

conjugal property. To sustain such a theory would permit

indirect controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If the
property were to be declared conjugal, this would accord to
the alien husband a not insubstantial interest and right over
land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer
or disposition. This is a right that the Constitution does not
permit him to have.

As already observed, the finding that his wife had used her own
money to purchase the property cannot, and will not, at this
stage of the proceedings be reviewed and overturned. But even if
it were a fact that said wife had used conjugal funds to make the
acquisition, the considerations just set out militate, on high
constitutional grounds, against his recovering and holding the
property so acquired or any part thereof. And whether in such
an event, he may recover from his wife any share of the money
used for the purchase or charge her with unauthorized
disposition or expenditure of conjugal funds is not now inquired
into; that would be, in the premises, a purely academic exercise.

An equally decisive consideration is that Estelita Padilla is a

purchaser in good faith, both the Trial Court and the Appellate
Court having found that Cheesman's own conduct had led her to
believe the property to be exclusive property of the latter's wife,
freely disposable by her without his consent or intervention. An
innocent buyer for value, she is entitled to the protection of the
law in her purchase, particularly as against Cheesman, who
would assert rights to the property denied him by both letter and
spirit of the Constitution itself.

ALFRED FRITZ FRENZEL vs. EDERLINA P. CATITO

 348

G.R. No. 143958             July 11, 2003

Facts:
Petitioner Frenzel is an Australian citizen of German descent. He is
an electrical engineer by profession, but worked as a pilot with the
New Guinea Airlines. He arrived in the Philippines in 1974, started
engaging in business in the country two years thereafter, and
married Teresita Santos, a Filipino citizen. In 1981, Alfred and
Teresita separated from bed and board without obtaining a divorce.

Sometime in February 1983, Frenzel met respondent Catito, a

Filipina, in Australia. Unknown to Alfred, she resided for a time in
Germany and was married to Klaus Muller, a German national. She
left Germany and tried her luck in Sydney, Australia, where she
found employment as a masseuse in the King's Cross nightclub.
She was fluent in German, and Alfred enjoyed talking with her. The
two saw each other again; this time Catito ended up staying in
Alfred's hotel for three days. Alfred gave Catito sums of money for
her services.

When they met again in the Philippines, Ederlinda was able to

established a beauty parlor in Ermita, Manila and it is Alfred who
paid for rights over the property and gave P300,000.00 to Ederlina
for the purchase of equipment and furniture for the parlor.

Alfred purchased a house and lot in San Francisco del Monte,

Quezon City. Since Alfred knew that as an alien he was disqualified
from owning lands in the Philippines, he agreed that only Ederlina's
name would appear in the deed of sale as the buyer of the property,
as well as in the title covering the same. Thus, a Contract to Sell
was entered into between Victoria Binuya Steckel as the vendor and
Ederlina as the sole vendee.

When Alfred decided to stay in the Philippines for good and live with
Ederlina, he sold his properties and businesses in Australia and
Papua New Guinea. He also opened saving account with HSBC in
Kowloon Branch and HSBC, Manila. They opened another account
with HSBC, Kowloon, this time in the name of Ederlina. Alfred
transferred his deposits with the said bank to this new account.

In the meantime, Alfred decided to purchase another house and lot

in Bajada, Davao City and Babak, Davao. Alfred agreed to have the
Deed Of Absolute Sale made out in the name of Ederlina.
Meanwhile, Ederlina deposited on December 27, 1985, the total
amount of US$250,000 with the HSBC Kowloon under Joint Deposit
 349

Account No. 018-462341-145. Beach houses were forthwith

constructed on a portion of the property and were eventually rented
out by Ederlina's father, Narciso Catito.

In the meantime, Ederlina's petition for divorce was denied because

Klaus opposed the same. A second petition filed by her met the
same fate. Klaus wanted half of all the properties owned by Ederlina
in the Philippines before he would agree to a divorce. Worse, Klaus
threatened to file a bigamy case against Ederlina.

Alfred and Ederlina's relationship started deteriorating. Ederlina

had not been able to secure a divorce from Klaus. The latter could
charge her for bigamy and could even involve Alfred, who himself
was still married. To avoid complications, Alfred decided to live
separately from Ederlina and cut off all contacts with her.

Alfred filed a Complaint against Ederlina for recovery of real and

personal properties located in Quezon City and Manila. In his
complaint, Alfred alleged, inter alia, that Ederlina, without his
knowledge and consent, managed to transfer funds from their joint
account in HSBC Hong Kong, to her own account with the same
bank. Using the said funds, Ederlina was able to purchase the
properties subject of the complaints. He also alleged that the beauty
parlor in Ermita was established with his own funds, and that the
Quezon City property was likewise acquired by him with his
personal funds.

In her answer, Ederlina denied all the material allegations in the

complaint, insisting that she acquired the said properties with her
personal funds, and as such, Alfred had no right to the same. She
alleged that the deeds of sale, the receipts, and certificates of titles
of the subject properties were all made out in her name. 38 By way of
special and affirmative defense, she alleged that Alfred had no cause
of action against her. She interposed counterclaims against the
petitioner.

The trial court ruled that even if Alfred was the buyer of the
properties; he had no cause of action against Ederlina for the
recovery of the same because as an alien, he was disqualified from
acquiring and owning lands in the Philippines. The sale of the three
parcels of land to the petitioner was null and void ab initio. Applying
the pari delicto doctrine, the petitioner was precluded from
recovering the properties from the respondent.
 350

On appeal, the CA rendered a decision affirming in toto the decision

of the RTC. The appellate court ruled that the petitioner knowingly
violated the Constitution; hence, was barred from recovering the
money used in the purchase of the three parcels of land. It held that
to allow the petitioner to recover the money used for the purchase of
the properties would embolden aliens to violate the Constitution,
and defeat, rather than enhance, the public policy

Issue:
WON petitioner can still recover the said properties.

Held:
NO. Lands of the public domain, which include private lands, may
be transferred or conveyed only to individuals or entities qualified to
acquire or hold private lands or lands of the public domain. Aliens,
whether individuals or corporations, have been disqualified from
acquiring lands of the public domain. Hence, they have also been
disqualified from acquiring private lands.

Even if, as claimed by the petitioner, the sales in question were

entered into by him as the real vendee, the said transactions are in
violation of the Constitution; hence, are null and void ab initio. A
contract that violates the Constitution and the law, is null and void
and vests no rights and creates no obligations. It produces no legal
effect at all. The petitioner, being a party to an illegal contract,
cannot come into a court of law and ask to have his illegal objective
carried out. One who loses his money or property by knowingly
engaging in a contract or transaction which involves his own moral
turpitude may not maintain an action for his losses. To him who
moves in deliberation and premeditation, the law is unyielding. The
law will not aid either party to an illegal contract or agreement; it
leaves the parties where it finds them.

Under Article 1412 of the New Civil Code, the petitioner cannot have
the subject properties deeded to him or allow him to recover the
money he had spent for the purchase thereof. 56 Equity as a rule will
follow the law and will not permit that to be done indirectly which,
because of public policy, cannot be done directly. Where the wrong
of one party equals that of the other, the defendant is in the
stronger position . . . it signifies that in such a situation, neither a
court of equity nor a court of law will administer a remedy. The rule
is expressed. in the maxims: EX DOLO ORITUR ACTIO and IN PARI
DELICTO POTIOR EST CONDITIO DEFENDENTIS.
 351

The petitioner cannot feign ignorance of the constitutional

proscription, nor claim that he acted in good faith, let alone assert
that he is less guilty than the respondent. The petitioner is charged
with knowledge of the constitutional prohibition. As can be gleaned
from the decision of the trial court, the petitioner was fully aware
that he was disqualified from acquiring and owning lands under
Philippine law even before he purchased the properties in question;
and, to skirt the constitutional prohibition, the petitioner had the
deed of sale placed under the respondent's name as the sole vendee
thereof:

It is evident that the plaintiff was fully aware that as a non-citizen of

the Philippines, he was disqualified from validly purchasing any
land within the country.

The respondent was herself married to Klaus Muller, a German

citizen. Thus, the petitioner and the respondent could not lawfully
join in wedlock. The evidence on record shows that the petitioner in
fact knew of the respondent's marriage to another man, but
nonetheless purchased the subject properties under the name of the
respondent and paid the purchase prices therefor. Even if it is
assumed gratia arguendi that the respondent and the petitioner
were capacitated to marry, the petitioner is still disqualified to own
the properties in tandem with the respondent.
 352

SPOUSES ONESIFORO & ROSARIO ALINAS vs.

SPOUSES VICTOR and ELENA ALINAS
G.R. No. 158040             April 14, 2008

Facts:
Petitioner spouses Onesiforo and Rosario Alinas separated
sometime in 1982, with Rosario moving to Pagadian City and
Onesiforo moving to Manila. They left behind two lots with a
bodega standing on it and Lot 896-B-9-B with petitioners' house.

Petitioner Onesiforo and respondent Victor Alinas are brothers.

Petitioners allege that they entrusted their properties to
respondent Victor and Elena Alinas with the agreement that any
income from rentals of the properties should be remitted to the
SSS and to the Rural Bank of Oroquieta City (RBO), as such
rentals were believed sufficient to pay off petitioners' loans with
said institutions. Lot 896-B-9-A with the bodega was mortgaged
as security for the loan obtained from the RBO, while Lot 896-B-
9-B with the house was mortgaged to the SSS. Onesiforo alleges
that he left blank papers with his signature on them to facilitate
the administration of said properties.

Sometime in 1993, petitioners discovered that their two lots were

already titled in the name of respondent spouses. The two lots
were foreclosed by the RBO and SSS. Onesiforo’s signature
appears in the Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of the respondent
spouses. There is also a notarized document whereby Onesifor
acknowledged that his brother Victor used his own money to
redeem the lot from the SSS and, thus, Victor became the owner
of said lot. In the same Agreeement, petitioner Onesiforo waived
whatever rights, claims, and interests he or his heirs, successors
and assigns have or may have over the subject property.

On June 25, 1993, petitioners filed complaint for recovery of

possession and ownership of their conjugal properties with
damages against respondent spouses.

Issue:
WON the sale of Onesiforo of the land with the house standing
thereon is valid.
 353

Held:
NO. Although petitioners were married before the enactment of
the Family Code on August 3, 1988, the sale in question
occurred in 1989. Thus, their property relations are governed by
Chapter IV on Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the Family Code.
Pursuant to Article 124 of the Family Code and jurisprudence,
the sale of petitioners' conjugal property made by petitioner
Onesiforo alone is void in its entirety. It is true that in a
number of cases, this Court abstained from applying the literal
import of a particular provision of law if doing so would lead to
unjust, unfair and absurd results.

In the present case, the Court does not see how applying Article
124 of the Family Code would lead to injustice or absurdity. It
should be noted that respondent spouses were well aware that
Lot 896-B-9-B is a conjugal property of petitioners. They also
knew that the disposition being made by Onesiforo is without
the consent of his wife, as they knew that petitioners had
separated, and, the sale documents do not bear the signature of
petitioner Rosario. The fact that Onesiforo had to execute two
documents, namely: the Absolute Deed of Sale dated March 10,
1989 and a notarized Agreement likewise dated March 10, 1989,
reveals that they had full knowledge of the severe infirmities of
the sale.

As held in Heirs of Aguilar-Reyes v. Spouses Mijares, "a

purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a
reasonable man on his guard and still claim he acted in good
faith." Such being the case, no injustice is being foisted on
respondent spouses as they risked transacting with Onesiforo
alone despite their knowledge that the subject property is a
conjugal property.

Verily, the sale of Lot 896-B-9-B to respondent spouses is

entirely null and void
 354

MARIO SIOCHI vs. ALFREDO GOZON

G.R. No. 169900               March 18, 2010

Facts:
Respondents Alfredo Gozon and Elvira Gozon are married. They owned
a property situated in Malabon, Rizal. InDecember 1991, Elvira filed a
petition for Legal Separation against Alfredo. In January 1992, she filed
a notice of lis pendens, over the subject property.

While the legal separation case was still pending, Alfredo and Mario
Siochi entered into an Agreement to Buy and Sell involving the property
for the price of P18 million. Among the stipulations in the Agreement is
for Alfredo to secure an Affidavit from Elvira that the property is
Alfredo’s exclusive property and to annotate the Agreement. However,
despite repeated demands from Mario, Alfredo failed to comply with
these stipulations. After paying the P5 million earnest money as partial
payment of the purchase price, Mario took possession of the property in
September 1993. On 6 September 1993, the Agreement was annotated
on TCT No. 5357.

On 29 June 1994, the RTC issued the decree of legal separation

between Alfredo and Elvira. As regards the property, the Cavite RTC
held that it is deemed conjugal property. On 22 August 1994, Alfredo
executed a Deed of Donation over the property in favor of their
daughter, Winfred. Thus, a TCT under the name of the daughter was
issued without Annotating the Agreement and the notice of lis pendens.

On 26 October 1994, Alfredo, by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney

executed in his favor by Winifred, sold the property to Inter-
Dimensional Realty, Inc. (IDRI) for P18 million. IDRI paid Alfredo P18
million, representing full payment for the property. Subsequently, the
Register of Deeds of Malabon cancelled TCT No. M-10508 and issued
TCT No. M-10976 to IDRI.

Mario then filed a complaint for Specific Performance and Damages,

Annulment of Donation and Sale, with Preliminary Mandatory and
Prohibitory Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order.

Issue:
WON the disposition of Alfredo of the subject property is valid.

Held:
NO. This case involves the conjugal property of Alfredo and Elvira. Since
the disposition of the property occurred after the effectivity of the
Family Code, the applicable law is the Family Code. Article 124 of the
Family Code.
 355

In this case, Alfredo was the sole administrator of the property because
Elvira, with whom Alfredo was separated in fact, was unable to
participate in the administration of the conjugal property. However, as
sole administrator of the property, Alfredo still cannot sell the
property without the written consent of Elvira or the authority of
the court. Without such consent or authority, the sale is void. The
absence of the consent of one of the spouse renders the entire sale void,
including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the spouse
who contracted the sale. Even if the other spouse actively participated
in negotiating for the sale of the property, that other spouse’s written
consent to the sale is still required by law for its validity. The Agreement
entered into by Alfredo and Mario was without the written consent of
Elvira. Thus, the Agreement is entirely void. As regards Mario’s
contention that the Agreement is a continuing offer which may be
perfected by Elvira’s acceptance before the offer is withdrawn, the fact
that the property was subsequently donated by Alfredo to Winifred and
then sold to IDRI clearly indicates that the offer was already withdrawn.

However, we disagree with the finding of the Court of Appeals that the
one-half undivided share of Alfredo in the property was already forfeited
in favor of his daughter Winifred, based on the ruling of the Cavite RTC
in the legal separation case. The Court of Appeals misconstrued the
ruling of the Cavite RTC that Alfredo, being the offending spouse, is
deprived of his share in the net profits and the same is awarded to
Winifred.

Thus, among the effects of the decree of legal separation is that the
conjugal partnership is dissolved and liquidated and the offending
spouse would have no right to any share of the net profits earned by the
conjugal partnership. It is only Alfredo’s share in the net profits which
is forfeited in favor of Winifred. Article 102(4) of the Family Code
provides that "[f]or purposes of computing the net profits subject to
forfeiture in accordance with Article 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2), the said
profits shall be the increase in value between the market value of the
community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and
the market value at the time of its dissolution." Clearly, what is forfeited
in favor of Winifred is not Alfredo’s share in the conjugal partnership
property but merely in the net profits of the conjugal partnership
property.

Had IDRI been more prudent before buying the property, it would have
discovered that Alfredo’s donation of the property to Winifred was
without the consent of Elvira. Under Article 125of the Family Code, a
conjugal property cannot be donated by one spouse without the
consent of the other spouse. Clearly, IDRI was not a buyer in good
faith.
 356

RAVINA VS. VILLA ABRILLE

G.R. No. 160708, October 16, 2009

Facts:
Respondent Mary Ann Pasaol Villa Abrille and Pedro Villa Abrille
are husband and wife. They have four children, who are also
parties to the instant case and are represented by their mother,
Mary Ann. In 1982, the spouses acquired a parcel of land
located at Kamuning Street, Juna Subdivision, Matina, Davao
City, and covered by TCT in their names. Said lot is adjacent to a
parcel of land which Pedro acquired when he was still single and
which is registered solely in his name under TCT No. T-26471.

Through their joint efforts and the proceeds of a loan from the
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), the spouses built a
house on Lot 7 and Pedro’s lot. The house was finished in the
early 1980’s but the spouses continuously made improvements,
including a poultry house and an annex.

In 1991, Pedro got a mistress and began to neglect his family.

Mary Ann was forced to sell or mortgage their movables to
support the family and the studies of her children. By himself,
Pedro offered to sell the house and the two lots to herein
petitioners, Patrocinia and Wilfredo Ravina. Mary Ann objected
and notified the petitioners of her objections, but Pedro
nonetheless sold the house and the two lots without Mary Ann’s
consent, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale dated June 21, 1991. It
appears on the said deed that Mary Ann did not sign on top of
her name.

On July 5, 1991 while Mary Ann was outside the house and the
four children were in school, Pedro together with members of
CAFGU and acting in connivance with petitioners began
transferring all their belongings from the house to an apartment.
When Mary Ann and her daughter Ingrid Villa Abrille came
home, they were stopped from entering it. They waited outside
the gate until evening under the rain. Thus, respondents Mary
Ann and her children filed a complaint for Annulment of Sale,
Specific Performance, Damages and Attorney’s Fees with
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction against Pedro and herein
petitioners (the Ravinas) in the RTC of Davao City.
 357

During the trial, Pedro declared that the house was built with
his own money. Petitioner Patrocinia Ravina testified that they
bought the house and lot from Pedro, and that her husband,
petitioner Wilfredo Ravina, examined the titles when they bought
the property.

Issue: 
WON Pedro has the capacity to dispose the subject property.

Held:
NONE. A sale or encumbrance of conjugal property concluded
after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, is
governed by Article 124 of the same Code that now treats such a
disposition to be void if done (a) without the consent of both the
husband and the wife, or (b) in case of one spouse’s inability, the
authority of the court. Article 124 of the Family Code, the
governing law at the time the assailed sale was contracted,

The particular provision in the New Civil Code giving the wife ten
(10) years to annul the alienation or encumbrance was not
carried over to the Family Code. It is thus clear that alienation
or encumbrance of the conjugal partnership property by the
husband without the consent of the wife is null and void.

Hence, just like the rule in absolute community of property, if

the husband, without knowledge and consent of the wife, sells
conjugal property, such sale is void. If the sale was with the
knowledge but without the approval of the wife, thereby
resulting in a disagreement, such sale is annullable at the
instance of the wife who is given five (5) years from the date the
contract implementing the decision of the husband to institute
the case.

Here, respondent Mary Ann timely filed the action for annulment
of sale within five (5) years from the date of sale and execution of
the deed. However, her action to annul the sale pertains only to
the conjugal house and lot and does not include the property
exclusively belonging to Pedro and which he can dispose of freely
without Mary Ann’s consent.

A person dealing with land registered in the name of and

occupied by the seller whose capacity to sell is restricted, such
as by Articles 166 and 173 of the Civil Code or Article 124 of
 358

the Family Code, he must show that he inquired into the latter’s
capacity to sell in order to establish himself as a buyer for value
in good faith.

In the present case, the property is registered in the name of

Pedro and his wife, Mary Ann. Petitioners cannot deny
knowledge that during the time of the sale in 1991, Pedro was
married to Mary Ann. However, Mary Ann’s conformity did not
appear in the deed. Even assuming that petitioners believed in
good faith that the subject property is the exclusive property of
Pedro, they were apprised by Mary Ann’s lawyer of her objection
to the sale and yet they still proceeded to purchase the property
without Mary Ann’s written consent. Moreover, the respondents
were the ones in actual, visible and public possession of the
property at the time the transaction was being made. Thus, at
the time of sale, petitioners knew that Mary Ann has a right to or
interest in the subject properties and yet they failed to obtain
her conformity to the deed of sale. Hence, petitioners cannot now
invoke the protection accorded to purchasers in good faith.
 359

MANUEL & LETICIA L. FUENTES vs. CONRADO G. ROCA

G.R. No. 178902               April 21, 2010

Facts:
Sabina Tarroza owned a lot in Canelar, Zamboanga City. On
October 11, 1982 she sold it to her son, Tarciano T. Roca under
a deed of absolute sale. But Tarciano did not for the meantime
have the registered title transferred to his name. In 1988,
Tarciano offered to sell the lot to petitioners Fuentes spouses.
Their transaction involves a condition where if Traciano was
unable to comply, the Fuentes spouses would become owners of
the lot without any further formality and payment.

In 1989, Tarciano executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of the

Fuentes spouses. A new title was issued in the name of the
spouses Fuentes who immediately constructed a building on the
lot. In 1990, Tarciano passed away, followed by his wife Rosario
who died nine months afterwards.

In 1997, the children of Tarciano and Rosario, herein

respondents, filed an action for annulment of sale and
reconveyance of the land against the Fuentes spouses claiming
that the sale to the spouses was void since Tarciano’s wife,
Rosario, did not give her consent to it. Her signature on the
affidavit of consent had been forged. They thus prayed that the
property be reconveyed to them upon reimbursement of the price
that the Fuentes spouses paid Tarciano. The spouses denied the
Rocas’ allegations. They pointed out that the claim of forgery was
personal to Rosario and she alone could invoke it. Besides, the
four-year prescriptive period for nullifying the sale on ground of
fraud had already lapsed.

The RTC rendered judgment, dismissing the case. It ruled that

the action had already prescribed since the ground cited by the
Rocas for annulling the sale, forgery or fraud.

On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC decision declaring that

there is sufficient evidence of forgery. Tarciano and Rosario had
been living separately for 30 years since 1958 also reinforced the
conclusion that her signature had been forged. Since Tarciano
and Rosario were married in 1950, the CA concluded that their
property relations were governed by the Civil Code under which
an action for annulment of sale on the ground of lack of spousal
 360

consent may be brought by the wife during the marriage within

10 years from the transaction. Consequently, the action that the
Rocas, her heirs, brought in 1997 fell within 10 years of the
January 11, 1989 sale. Considering, however, that the sale
between the Fuentes spouses and Tarciano was merely voidable,
the CA held that its annulment entitled the spouses to
reimbursement of what they paid him plus legal interest
computed from the filing of the complaint until actual payment.

Issue:
WON the Rocas’ action for the declaration of nullity of that sale
to the spouses already prescribed.

Held:
NO. When Tarciano married Rosario, the Civil Code put in place
the system of conjugal partnership of gains on their property
relations. While its Article 165 made Tarciano the sole
administrator of the conjugal partnership, Article 166
prohibited him from selling commonly owned real property
without his wife’s consent. Still, if he sold the same without
his wife’s consent, the sale is not void but merely voidable.
Article 173 gave Rosario the right to have the sale annulled
during the marriage within ten years from the date of the sale.
Failing in that, she or her heirs may demand, after dissolution of
the marriage, only the value of the property that Tarciano
fraudulently sold.

Consequently, when Tarciano sold the conjugal lot to the

Fuentes spouses on January 11, 1989, the law that governed
the disposal of that lot was already the Family Code. In contrast
to Article 173 of the Civil Code, Article 124 of the Family Code
does not provide a period within which the wife who gave no
consent may assail her husband’s sale of the real property.
It simply provides that without the other spouse’s written
consent or a court order allowing the sale, the same would
be void.

But, although a void contract has no legal effects even if no

action is taken to set it aside, when any of its terms have been
performed, an action to declare its inexistence is necessary to
allow restitution of what has been given under it. This action,
according to Article 1410 of the Civil Code does not prescribe.
 361

JOE A. ROS & ESTRELLA AGUETE vs. PNB-LAOAG

G.R. No. 170166               April 6, 2011

Facts:
In 1974, petitioner Ros obtained a loan from respondent PNB
and as a security he executed a real estate mortgage involving a
parcel of land with all the improvements thereon. Upon
maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result, PNB
instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged
property. After the extrajudicial sale thereof, a Certificate of Sale
was issued in favor of PNB as the highest bidder. After the lapse
of one (1) year without the property being redeemed, the
property was consolidated and registered in the name of PNB on
August 10, 1978.

In 1983, petitioner spouses Ros and Aguete filed a complaint for

the annulment of the Real Estate Mortgage and all legal
proceedings taken thereunder against respondent PNB. The
spouses claimed that Estrella has no knowledge of the loan
obtained by her husband nor she consented to the mortgage
instituted on the conjugal property – a complaint was filed to
annul the proceedings pertaining to the mortgage, sale and
consolidation of the property – interposing the defense that her
signatures affixed on the documents were forged and that the
loan did not redound to the benefit of the family.

In its answer, PNB prays for the dismissal of the complaint for
lack of cause of action, and insists that it was plaintiffs-
appellees’ own acts of omission/connivance that bar them from
recovering the subject property on the ground of estoppel,
laches, abandonment and prescription.

In its decision, the RTC rendered its Decision in favor of

petitioners. The trial court declared that Aguete did not sign the
loan documents, did not appear before the Notary Public to
acknowledge the execution of the loan documents, did not
receive the loan proceeds from PNB, and was not aware of the
loan until PNB notified her in 14 August 1978 that she and her
family should vacate the mortgaged property because of the
expiration of the redemption period.

Under the Civil Code, the effective law at the time of the
transaction, Ros could not encumber any real property of the
 362

conjugal partnership without Aguete’s consent. Aguete may,

during their marriage and within ten years from the transaction
questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of the contract her
husband entered into without her consent, especially in the
present case where her consent is required. The trial court,
however, ruled that its decision is without prejudice to the right
of action of PNB to recover the amount of the loan and its
interests from Ros.

On appeal, the CA reversed the trial court’s decision, and

dismissed petitioners’ complaint. The appellate court stated that
the trial court concluded forgery without adequate proof; thus it
was improper for the trial court to rely solely on Aguete’s
testimony that her signatures on the loan documents were
forged. The appellate court declared that Aguete affixed her
signatures on the documents knowingly and with her full
consent. Assuming arguendo that Aguete did not give her
consent to Ros’ loan, the appellate court ruled that the
conjugal partnership is still liable because the loan proceeds
redounded to the benefit of the family. The records of the
case reveal that the loan was used for the expansion of the
family’s business. Therefore, the debt obtained is chargeable
against the conjugal partnership.

Issue:
WON

Held:
There is no doubt that the subject property was acquired
during Ros and Aguete’s marriage. Ros and Aguete were
married on 16 January 1954, while the subject property was
acquired in 1968. There is also no doubt that Ros encumbered
the subject property when he mortgaged it for P115,000.00 on
23 October 1974. PNB Laoag does not doubt that Aguete, as
evidenced by her signature, consented to Ros’ mortgage to PNB
of the subject property. On the other hand, Aguete denies ever
having consented to the loan and also denies affixing her
signature to the mortgage and loan documents.

The husband cannot alienate or encumber any conjugal real

property without the consent, express or implied, of the
wife. Should the husband do so, then the contract is
voidable. Article 173 of the Civil Code allows Aguete to question
 363

Ros’ encumbrance of the subject property. However, the same

article does not guarantee that the courts will declare the
annulment of the contract. Annulment will be declared only
upon a finding that the wife did not give her consent. In the
present case, we follow the conclusion of the appellate court and
rule that Aguete gave her consent to Ros’ encumbrance of the
subject property.

The execution of a document that has been ratified before a

notary public cannot be disproved by the mere denial of the
alleged signer. PNB was correct when it stated that petitioners’
omission to present other positive evidence to substantiate their
claim of forgery was fatal to petitioners’ cause. Petitioners did
not present any corroborating witness, such as a handwriting
expert, who could authoritatively declare that Aguete’s
signatures were really forged.

A notarized document carries the evidentiary weight conferred

upon it with respect to its due execution, and it has in its favor
the presumption of regularity which may only be rebutted by
evidence so clear, strong and convincing as to exclude all
controversy as to the falsity of the certificate. Absent such, the
presumption must be upheld. The burden of proof to overcome
the presumption of due execution of a notarial document lies on
the one contesting the same. Furthermore, an allegation of
forgery must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, and
whoever alleges it has the burden of proving the same.

Ros in legal effect admitted in the complaint that the signatures

of his wife in the questioned documents are forged, incriminating
himself to criminal prosecution. If he were alive today, he would
be prosecuted for forgery. This strengthens the testimony of his
wife that her signatures on the questioned documents are not
hers.

In filing the complaint, it must have been a remorse of

conscience for having wronged his family; in forging the
signature of his wife on the questioned documents; in
squandering the P115,000.00 loan from the bank for himself,
resulting in the foreclosure of the conjugal property; eviction of
his family therefrom; and, exposure to public contempt,
embarassment and ridicule.
 364

ARTURO FLORES vs. SPOUSES LINDO

G.R. NO. 183984 April 13, 2011

Facts:
Respondent Edna Lindo obtained a loan from petitioner Arturo
Flores. To secure the loan, Edna executed a Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage covering a property in the name of Edna and her
husband Enrico Lindo, Jr. Edna also signed a Promissory Note
and the Deed for herself and for Enrico as his attorney-in-fact.
 
Edna issued three checks as partial payments for the loan. All
checks were dishonored for insufficiency of funds, prompting
petitioner to file a Complaint for Foreclosure of Mortgage with
Damages against respondents.
 
In its decision, the RTC 33 ruled that petitioner was not entitled
to judicial foreclosure of the mortgage. The RTC found that the
Deed was executed by Edna without the consent and authority
of Enrico. The RTC noted that the Deed was executed on 31
October 1995 while the SPA executed by Enrico was only dated
4 November 1995. The RTC, Branch 42 ruled that res judicata
will not apply to rights, claims or demands which, although
growing out of the same subject matter, constitute separate or
distinct causes of action and were not put in issue in the former
action.
   
Issue:
WON Deed of Mortgage between Edna and Flores is valid.

Held:
YES. Article 124 of the Family Code of which applies to conjugal
partnership property, is a reproduction of Article 96 of the
Family Code which applies to community property.
 
Both Article 96 and Article 127 of the Family Code provide that
the powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without
the written consent of the other spouse. Any disposition or
encumbrance without the written consent shall be void.
However, both provisions also state that “the transaction shall
be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting
spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a
binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse x
x x before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.”
 365

 In this case, the Promissory Note and the Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage were executed on 31 October 1995. The Special Power
of Attorney was executed on 4 November 1995. The execution
of the SPA is the acceptance by the other spouse that
perfected the continuing offer as a binding contract between
the parties, making the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage a valid
contract.

There is unjust enrichment “when a person unjustly retains a

benefit to the loss of another, or when a person retains money or
property of another against the fundamental principles of
justice, equity and good conscience.” The principle of unjust
enrichment requires two conditions: (1) that a person is
benefited without a valid basis or justification, and (2) that such
benefit is derived at the expense of another.
 
The main objective of the principle against unjust enrichment is
to prevent one from enriching himself at the expense of another
without just cause or consideration. The principle is applicable
in this case considering that Edna admitted obtaining a loan
from petitioners, and the same has not been fully paid without
just cause. The Deed was declared void erroneously at the
instance of Edna, first when she raised it as a defense before the
RTC, Branch 33 and second, when she filed an action for
declaratory relief before the RTC, Branch 93. Petitioner could not
be expected to ask the RTC, Branch 33 for an alternative
remedy, as what the Court of Appeals ruled that he should have
done, because the RTC, Branch 33 already stated that it had no
jurisdiction over any personal action that petitioner might have
against Edna.
 366

PRIMA PARTOSA-JO vs. CA

G.R. No. 82606 December 18, 1992

Facts:
The petitioner, Prima Partosa-Jo, is the legal wife of Jose Jo, herein
private respondent. The latter admitted to have cohabited with 3
women and fathered 15 children.  Prima filed a complaint against
the husband for judicial separation of conjugal property in addition
to an earlier action for support which was consolidated. RTC
decision was a definite disposition of the complaint for support but
none of that for the judicial separation of conjugal property. Jose
elevated the decision to CA which affirmed rulings of the trial
court. The complaint on the separation of property was dismissed
for lack of cause of action on the ground that separation by
agreement was not covered in Article 178 of the Civil Code. Prima
contested that the agreement between her and Jose was for her to
temporarily live with her parents during the initial period of her
pregnancy and for him to visit and support her. They never agreed
to be separated permanently. She even returned to him but the
latter refused to accept her. 

Issue:
WON there is abandonment on the part of Jose Jo to warrant
judicial separation of conjugal property.

Held:
NONE. Abandonment implies a departure by one spouse with the
avowed intent never to return, followed by prolonged absence
without just cause, and without in the meantime providing in the
least for one's family although able to do so. There must be
absolute cessation of marital relations, duties and rights, with
the intention of perpetual separation. This idea is clearly
expressed in the above-quoted provision, which states that "a
spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he or she has
left the conjugal dwelling without any intention of returning."

The record shows that as early as 1942, the private respondent had
already rejected the petitioner, whom he denied admission to their
conjugal home in Dumaguete City when she returned from
Zamboanguita. The fact that she was not accepted by Jo
demonstrates all too clearly that he had no intention of resuming
their conjugal relationship. Moreover, beginning 1968 until the
determination by this Court of the action for support in 1988, the
private respondent refused to give financial support to the
petitioner. The physical separation of the parties, coupled with the
 367

refusal by the private respondent to give support to the petitioner,

sufficed to constitute abandonment as a ground for the judicial
separation of their conjugal property.

In addition, the petitioner may also invoke the second ground

allowed by Article 128, for the fact is that he has failed without just
cause to comply with his obligations to the family as husband or
parent. Apart form refusing to admit his lawful wife to their conjugal
home in Dumaguete City, Jo has freely admitted to cohabiting with
other women and siring many children by them. It was his refusal
to provide for the petitioner and their daughter that prompted her to
file the actions against him for support and later for separation of
the conjugal property, in which actions, significantly, he even
denied being married to her. The private respondent has not
established any just cause for his refusal to comply with his
obligations to his wife as dutiful husband.

The order of judicial separation of the properties in question is

based on the finding of both the trial and respondent courts that
the private respondent is indeed their real owner. It is these
properties that should now be divided between him and the
petitioner, on the assumption that they were acquired during
coverture and so belong to the spouses half and half. As the private
respondent is a Chinese citizen, the division must include such
properties properly belonging to the conjugal partnership as may
have been registered in the name of other persons in violation of the
Anti-Dummy Law.

The past has caught up with the private respondent. After his
extramarital flings and a succession of illegitimate children, he
must now make an accounting to his lawful wife of the properties he
denied her despite his promise to their of his eternal love and care.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed decision of

the respondent court is MODIFIED. Civil Case No. 51 is hereby
decided in favor the plaintiff, the petitioner herein, and the conjugal
property of the petitioner and the private respondent is hereby
ordered divided between them, share and share alike. This division
shall be implemented by the trial court after determination of all the
properties pertaining to the said conjugal partnership, including
those that may have been illegally registered in the name of the
persons.
 368

SPS. LITA DE LEON & FELIX TARROSA vs. ANITA DE LEON

G.R. No. 185063               July 23, 2009

Facts:
On July 20, 1965, Bonifacio O. De Leon, then single, and the
People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC) entered into
a Conditional Contract to Sell for the purchase on installment of
a lot situated in Fairview, Quezon City. Subsequently, on April
24, 1968, Bonifacio married Anita de Leon in a civil rite. To this
union were born respondents Danilo and Vilma.

Following the full payment of the cost price for the lot thus
purchased, PHHC executed, on June 22, 1970, a Final Deed of
Sale in favor of Bonifacio. Accordingly, TCT was issued in the
name of Bonifacio, "single." Subsequently, Bonifacio, for PhP
19,000, sold the subject lot to her sister, petitioners Lita, and
husband Felix Rio Tarrosa. The conveying Deed of Sale dated
January 12, 1974 did not bear the written consent and
signature of Anita.

In 1977, Bonifacio and Anita renewed their vows in a church

wedding at St. John the Baptist Parish in San Juan, Manila. In
1996, Bonifacio died. Three months later, the Tarrosas
registered the Deed of Sale and had TCT cancelled. They secured
the issuance in their names of another TCT.

Thus, Danilo and Vilma filed a Notice of Adverse Claim before

the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to protect their rights over
the subject property. Very much later, Anita, Danilo, and Vilma
filed a reconveyance suit alleging, among other things, that
fraud attended the execution of the Deed of Sale and that
subsequent acts of Bonifacio would show that he was still the
owner of the parcel of land. The Tarrosas averred that the lot
Bonifacio sold to them was his exclusive property inasmuch as
he was still single when he acquired it from PHHC. As further
alleged, they were not aware of the supposed marriage between
Bonifacio and Anita at the time of the execution of the Deed of
Sale.

The RTC, on the finding that the lot in question was the conjugal
property of Bonifacio and Anita, rendered judgment in favor of
Anita and her children.
 369

Issue:
WON ½ shares in the conjugal assets do not vest to Bonifacio O.
De Leon because of the absence of liquidation.

Held:
YES. The Court agrees with the CA that the sale of one-half of
the conjugal property without liquidation of the partnership
is void. Prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the
interest of each spouse in the conjugal assets is inchoate, a mere
expectancy, which constitutes neither a legal nor an equitable
estate, and does not ripen into a title until it appears that there
are assets in the community as a result of the liquidation and
settlement. The interest of each spouse is limited to the net
remainder or "remanente liquido" (haber ganancial) resulting
from the liquidation of the affairs of the partnership after its
dissolution. Thus, the right of the husband or wife to one-half of
the conjugal assets does not vest until the dissolution and
liquidation of the conjugal partnership, or after dissolution of the
marriage, when it is finally determined that, after settlement of
conjugal obligations, there are net assets left which can be
divided between the spouses or their respective heirs.

Therefore, even on the supposition that Bonifacio only sold his

portion of the conjugal partnership, the sale is still theoretically
void, for, as previously stated, the right of the husband or the
wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest until the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership.

Nevertheless, this Court is mindful of the fact that the Tarrosas

paid a valuable consideration in the amount of PhP 19,000 for
the property in question. Thus, as a matter of fairness and
equity, the share of Bonifacio after the liquidation of the
partnership should be liable to reimburse the amount paid by
the Tarrosas. It is a well-settled principle that no person should
unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another.
 370

AMPARO ROBLES CABREZA vs. CEFERINO S. CABREZA, JR.,

G.R. No. 171260               September 11, 2009

Facts:
Respondent Cabreza, Jr. filed a petition for the declaration of
nullity of his marriage (Article 36) to petitioner Amparo Robles
Cabreza. The RTC rendered a decision granting the petition.
Further, the conjugal partnership is hereby dissolved and
must be liquidated in accordance with Article 129 of the
Family Code, without prejudice to the prior rights of known
and unknown creditors of the conjugal partnership. Said
Decision is final and executory.

Respondent filed with the RTC a Motion for Execution (Re:

Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership). In said motion, respondent
sought to implement the order for the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership, which consisted solely in the real property located
in Pasig City. For this purpose, he moved that said property be
sold and the proceeds be divided and distributed. The RTC
issued an Order granting respondent’s motion to allow
prospective buyers to inspect the property. The RTC issued
another order granting respondent’s motion which prayed for the
approval of the deed of absolute sale, for the authorization for
respondent to sign said deed in behalf of petitioner, and for an
order requiring the occupants to vacate the property.

The RTC issued another order granting respondent’s prayer for

the issuance of a writ of possession. On June 25, 2004, the RTC
issued an Order granting a writ of possession in favor of the
buyer of the property, BJD Holdings Corporation. On July 5,
2004, a Notice to Vacate was served on petitioner.

On July 8, 2004, petitioner filed a Motion to Hold in Abeyance

the Writ of Possession and Notice to Vacate, arguing that Article
129(9) of the New Civil Code provides that, in the partition of the
properties, the conjugal dwelling and lot on which it is situated
shall be adjudicated to the spouse with whom majority of the
children choose to remain. Hence, since the majority of the
children, albeit of legal age, opted to stay with petitioner, she
asserted that the family home should be given to her. The RTC
denied the motion of the petitioner.
 371

On appeal, the CA ruled that the assailed issuances were tainted

by lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. Instead, we
consider the contention of the respondent husband, that Art.
129 (9), Family Code, supra, is applicable only when the spouses
had other assets to be divided between them, to be correct.
Indeed Art. 129(9), Family Code, supra, obviously refers to
"partition of the properties". Hence, the respondent Judge was
not guilty of any arbitrariness, whimsicality or capriciousness in
issuing the assailed orders and writ. It is not disputed that the
conjugal dwelling in question (Transfer Certificate of Title No.
17460) was the only asset of the conjugal partnership that was
the subject of partition between the spouses.

The petitioner wife wants to change the final judgment, insisting

that the conjugal dwelling should be awarded exclusively to her
because the common children of the spouses, albeit of legal age,
have chosen to live with her. We cannot permit what
petitioner wants because it does not (sic) accord with the
decree of the final judgment dated May 26, 2003, which
specifically and plainly directed that the property was to be
sold and the proceeds of the sale was divided and
distributed, x x x

Issue:
WON the RTC erred in ordering the issuances which permits the
disposition of the conjugal home.

Held:
NO. The May 26, 2003 Order of the RTC is already final and
executory as a necessary consequence of the Entry of Judgment
dated July 23, 2004. Said Order categorically authorized the sale
of the family home. Although the CA may have mistakenly
denominated the May 26, 2003 Order as a "judgment", the same
does not detract from the fact that the said order should be
considered final and executory, as petitioners’ attempt to
question the same has already been denied by this Court.

The decision of the RTC regarding the dissolution and

liquidation of the conjugal partnership as well as the order to
sell the conjugal home has already attained its finality.
 372

HEIRS OF PROTACIO GO,SR. vs. ESTER SERVACIO

G.R. No. 157537               September 7, 2011

Facts:
In 1976, petitioner Protacio Go, Jr., purchased two parcels of
land situated in Southern Leyte. In 1987, Marta Marola Go died.
She is the wife of Protacio Go, Sr. and mother of petitioners. In
March 1999, Protacio, Jr executed an Affidavit of Renunciation
and Waiver whereby he affirmed under oath that it was his
father, Protacio, Sr, not he, who had purchased the said two
parcels of land.

In December 1999, Protacio, Sr. and his son respondent Rito Go

sold a portion of the property to respondent Servacio. In 2001,
petitioners demanded the return of the property, but Servacio
refused to heed their demand. Thus, petitioners sued Servacio
and Rito for the annulment of the sale of the property.

The petitioners averred that following Protacio, Jr.’s

renunciation, the property became conjugal property; and that
the sale of the property to Servacio without the prior liquidation
of the community property between Protacio, Sr. and Marta was
null and void. Servacio and Rito countered that Protacio, Sr. had
exclusively owned the property because he had purchased it
with his own money.

In its decision, the RTC declared that the property was the
conjugal property of Protacio, Sr. and Marta Go. Nonetheless,
the RTC affirmed the validity of the sale of the property holding
that as long as the portion sold does not encroach upon the
legitime of other heirs, it is valid.

Issue:
WON a conjugal property may be sold even without prior
liquidation.

Held:
YES. It is clear that conjugal partnership of gains established
before and after the effectivity of the Family Code are governed
by the rules found in Chapter 4 (Conjugal Partnership of Gains)
of Title IV (Property Relations Between Husband And Wife) of the
Family Code. Hence, any disposition of the conjugal property
 373

after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership must be made

only after the liquidation; otherwise, the disposition is void.

Before applying such rules, however, the conjugal partnership of

gains must be subsisting at the time of the effectivity of the
Family Code. There being no dispute that Protacio, Sr. and
Marta were married prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code on August 3, 1988, their property relation was
properly characterized as one of conjugal partnership
governed by the Civil Code. Upon Marta’s death in 1987, the
conjugal partnership was dissolved, pursuant to Article 175 (1)
of the Civil Code, and an implied ordinary co-ownership
ensued among Protacio, Sr. and the other heirs of Marta
with respect to her share in the assets of the conjugal
partnership pending a liquidation following its liquidation.

Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his children in

respect of Marta’s share in the conjugal partnership, could not
yet assert or claim title to any specific portion of Marta’s share
without an actual partition of the property being first done either
by agreement or by judicial decree. Until then, all that he had
was an ideal or abstract quota in Marta’s share. Nonetheless, a
co-owner could sell his undivided share; hence, Protacio, Sr.
had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided
interest, but not the interest of his co-owners. Consequently,
the sale by Protacio, Sr. and Rito as co-owners without the
consent of the other co-owners was not necessarily void, for
the rights of the selling co-owners were thereby effectively
transferred, making the buyer (Servacio) a co-owner of
Marta’s share. This result conforms to the well-established
principle that the binding force of a contract must be recognized
as far as it is legally possible to do so (quando res non valet ut
ago, valeat quantum valere potest).

Article 105 of the Family Code expressly provides that the

applicability of the rules on dissolution of the conjugal
partnership is "without prejudice to vested rights already
acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This
provision gives another reason not to declare the sale as entirely
void. Indeed, such a declaration prejudices the rights of Servacio
who had already acquired the shares of Protacio, Sr. and Rito in
the property subject of the sale.
 374

ANTONIO A. S. VALDEZ vs.QC RTC

G.R. No. 122749 July 31, 1996

Facts:
Petitioner Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married on
05 January 1971. Begotten during the marriage were five
children. In a petition, Valdez sought the declaration of nullity of
the marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code which
was granted hence, marriage is null and void on the ground of
their mutual psychological incapacity.  Stella and Joaquin are
placed under the custody of their mother while the other 3
siblings are free to choose which they prefer.

Gomez sought a clarification asserting that the Family Code

contained no provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of
common property in "unions without marriage." Parenthetically,
during the hearing of the motion, the children filed a joint
affidavit expressing their desire to remain with their father,
Antonio Valdez, herein petitioner.  

The RTC ruled that considering that the Court has already
declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent as null
and void ab initio, pursuant to Art. 147, the property regime of
petitioner and respondent shall be governed by the rules on
ownership. On appeal, petitioner submits that Articles 50, 51
and 52 of the Family Code should be held controlling.

Issue:
WON Article 147 of the Family Code applies to cases where the
parties are psychologically incapacitated.

Held:
YES. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the
property relations of the parties during the period of
cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or
Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code.

This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a

woman, suffering no illegal impediment to marry each other, so
exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void
marriage or without the benefit of marriage. The term
"capacitated" in the provision (in the first paragraph of the law)
refers to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e.,
 375

any "male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not

under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38"
of the Code.

Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses

through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules
on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union
is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their
joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of
the property shall be considered as having contributed thereto
jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family household." Unlike the conjugal
partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's separate property
are not included in the co-ownership.

When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment

to marry or when they do not live exclusively with each other (as
husband and wife), only the property acquired by both of them
through their actual joint contribution of money, property or
industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to their
respective contributions. Such contributions and corresponding
shares, however, are prima facie presumed to be equal. The
share of any party who is married to another shall accrue to the
absolute community or conjugal partnership, as the case may
be, if so existing under a valid marriage. If the party who has
acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her
share shall be forfeited in the manner already heretofore
expressed.

Between common-law spouses or spouses of void marriages,

leaving to ordain, on the latter case, the ordinary rules on co-
ownership subject to the provisions of the Family Code on the
"family home," i.e., remain in force and effect regardless of the
property regime of the spouses.
 376

CARINO VS. CARINO

GR No. 132529, February 2, 2001

Facts:
The late SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño contracted two marriages.
First was on June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao
Cariño (hereafter referred to as Susan Nicdao), with whom he
had two children; and the second was on November 10, 1992,
with respondent Susan Yee Cariño (hereafter referred to as
Susan Yee), with whom he had no children in their almost ten
year cohabitation starting way back in 1982.

When SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño passed away on November 23,

1992, he was under the care of Susan Yee, who spent for his
medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent
filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance
pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies.
Petitioner Susan Nicdao was able to collect a total of
P146,000.00 from “MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM,
[and] Pag-ibig,” while respondent Susan Yee received a total of
P21,000.00 from “GSIS Life, Burial (GSIS) and burial (SSS).”

Respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case for collection of

sum of money against petitioner Susan Nicdao praying, inter
alia, that petitioner be ordered to return to her at least one-half
of the one hundred forty-six thousand pesos (P146,000.00)
collectively denominated as “death benefits” which she
(petitioner) received from “MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation,
NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig.” Despite service of summons,
petitioner failed to file her answer, prompting the trial court to
declare her in default.

Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the

deceased took place during the subsistence of, and without first
obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage
between petitioner and the deceased. She, however, claimed that
she had no knowledge of the previous marriage and that she
became aware of it only at the funeral of the deceased, where
she met petitioner who introduced herself as the wife of the
deceased. To bolster her action for collection of sum of money,
respondent contended that the marriage of petitioner and the
deceased is void ab initio because the same was solemnized
without the required marriage license. In support thereof,
 377

respondent presented: 1) the marriage certificate of the deceased

and the petitioner which bears no marriage license number; 5
and 2) a certification dated March 9, 1994, from the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila. Both the trial court and
the CA decided in favour of Yee.

Issue: 
What are the property relations between the deceased and
Susan Yee and Susan Nicdao.

Held:
One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the
separation of the property of the spouses according to the
applicable property regime. Considering that the two marriages
are void ab initio, the applicable property regime would not be
absolute community or conjugal partnership of property, but
rather, be governed by the provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of
the Family Code on “Property Regime of Unions Without
Marriage.” Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to
the property regime of bigamous marriages, adulterous
relationships, relationships in a state of concubine, relationships
where both man and woman are married to other persons,
multiple alliances of the same married man, -

“... [O]nly the properties acquired by both of the parties

through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or
industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to
their respective contributions ...”

In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties

through their actual joint contribution shall belong to the co-
ownership. Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to
him or her exclusively. Then too, contributions in the form of
care of the home, children and household, or spiritual or moral
inspiration, are excluded in this regime. Considering that the
marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is a
bigamous marriage, having been solemnized during the
subsistence of a previous marriage then presumed to be
valid (between petitioner and the deceased), the application
of Article 148 is therefore in order.

The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit

Association, Inc.], NAPOLCOM, Commutation, Pag-ibig, and
 378

PCCUI, are clearly renumerations, incentives and benefits from

governmental agencies earned by the deceased as a police
officer. Unless respondent Susan Yee presents proof to the
contrary, it could not be said that she contributed money,
property or industry in the acquisition of these monetary
benefits. Hence, they are not owned in common by
respondent and the deceased, but belong to the deceased
alone and respondent has no right whatsoever to claim the
same. By intestate succession, the said “death benefits” of the
deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. And, respondent, not
being the legal wife of the deceased is not one of them.

As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and

the deceased, Article 147 of the Family Code governs. This
article applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated
and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but
whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like the
absence of a marriage license.

In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article, wages and

salaries earned by either party during the cohabitation shall
be owned by the parties in equal shares and will be divided
equally between them, even if only one party earned the
wages and the other did not contribute thereto. Conformably,
even if the disputed “death benefits” were earned by the
deceased alone as a government employee, Article 147 creates a
co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling the petitioner to share
one-half thereof. As there is no allegation of bad faith in the
present case, both parties of the first marriage are presumed to
be in good faith. Thus, one-half of the subject “death benefits”
under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her share in the
property regime, and the other half pertaining to the deceased
shall pass by, intestate succession, to his legal heirs, namely,
his children with Susan Nicdao.
 379

GONZALES VS. GONZALES

GR No. 159521, December 16, 2005

Facts:
In March 1977, petitioner Francisco Gonzales and respondent
Erminda Gonzales started living as husband and wife. After two
(2) years, or on February 4, 1979, they got married. From this
union, four (4) children were born. On October 29, 1992,
respondent filed for annulment of marriage with prayer for
support pendente lite. The complaint alleges that petitioner is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the obligations of
marriage. He beats her for no justifiable reason, humiliates and
embarrasses her, and denies her love, sexual comfort and
loyalty. During the time they lived together, they acquired
properties. She managed their pizza business and worked hard
for its development. She prays for the declaration of the nullity
of their marriage and for the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains.

In his answer to the complaint, petitioner averred that it is

respondent who is psychologically incapacitated. He denied that
she was the one who managed the pizza business and claimed
that he exclusively owns the properties "existing during their
marriage." In her reply, respondent alleged that "she controlled
the entire generation of Fiesta Pizza representing 80% of the
total management of the same and that all income from said
business are conjugal in nature."

In its decision, the RTC declared the marriage between petitioner

and respondent as null and void ab initio and ordered the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains and dividing the
conjugal properties between them. In his appeal before the CA,
petitioner did not contend the decision as regards to the validity
of his marriage. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Issue:
WON the CA erred in ruling that the properties should be
divided equally between petitioner and respondent.

Held:
NO. The SC held that the property relation between petitioner
and respondent shall be governed by the provisions of Article
147 of the Family Code. In the absence of proof to the contrary,
 380

properties acquired while they lived together shall be

presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work
or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For
purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the
acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to
have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's
efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and
of the household."

These provisions enumerate the two instances when the

property relations between spouses shall be governed by the
rules on co-ownership. These are: (1) when a man and woman
capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each other
as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage; and (2)
when a man and woman live together under a void marriage.
Under this property regime of co-ownership, properties acquired
by both parties during their union, in the absence of proof to the
contrary, are presumed to have been obtained through the joint
efforts of the parties and will be owned by them in equal shares.

Article 147 creates a presumption that properties acquired

during the cohabitation of the parties have been acquired
through their joint efforts, work or industry and shall be owned
by them in equal shares. It further provides that a party who did
not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any
property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the
acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts consisted in the care
and maintenance of the family and of the household.

While it is true that all the properties were bought from the
proceeds of the pizza business, petitioner himself testified that
respondent was not a plain housewife and that she helped him
in managing the business. In his handwritten letter to her dated
September 6, 1989, he admitted that "You’ve helped me for what
we are now and I won’t let it be destroyed." It appeared that
before they started living together, petitioner offered respondent
to be his partner in his pizza business and to take over its
operations. Respondent started managing the business in 1976.
Her job was to: (1) take care of the daily operations of the
business; (2) manage the personnel; and (3) meet people during
inspection and supervision of outlets. She reported for work
everyday, even on Saturdays and Sundays, without receiving
any salary or allowance.
 381

JOSEPHINE B. BELCODERO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.

G.R. No. 89667 October 20, 1993

Facts:
Alayo D. Bosing, married Juliana Oday in 1927, with whom he
had three children, namely, Flora, Teresita, and Gaido. In 1946,
he left the conjugal home, and he forthwith started to live
instead with Josefa Rivera with whom he later begot one child,
petitioner Josephine Bosing, now Josephine Balcobero.

In 1949, Alayo purchased a parcel of land on installment basis

from the Magdalena Estate, Inc. In the deed, he indicated his
civil status as, "married to Josefa R. Bosing," the common-law
wife. In a letter, dated 06 October 1959, which he addressed to
Magdalena Estate, Inc., he authorized the latter to transfer the
lot in the name of his "wife Josefa R. Bosing." The final deed of
sale was executed by Magdalena Estate, Inc., on 24 October
1959. A few days later, or on 09 November 1959, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 48790 was issued in the name of "Josefa
R. Bosing, . . . married to Alayo Bosing, . . ."

In 1958, Alayo married Josefa even while his prior marriage with
Juliana was still subsisting. Alayo died in 1967. About three
years later, or on 17 September 1970, Josefa and Josephine
executed a document of extrajudicial partition and sale of the lot
in question, which was there described as "conjugal property" of
Josefa and deceased Alayo.

On 30 October 1980, Juliana (deceased Alayo's real widow) and

her three legitimate children filed with the court a quo an action
for reconveyance of the property. The RTC rendered a judgment
in favor respondents Juliana.

Issue:
WON the subject property belongs to the conjugal partnership
between Alayo and Josefa.

Held:
NO. The property remained as belonging to the conjugal
partnership of Alayo and his legitimate wife Juliana. Under both
the new Civil Code (Article 160) and the old Civil Code (Article
1407), "all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to
the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains
 382

exclusively to the husband or to the wife." This presumption

has not been convincingly rebutted.

It cannot be seriously contended that, simply because the

property was titled in the name of Josefa at Alayo's request, she
should thereby be deemed to be its owner. The property
unquestionably was acquired by Alayo. Alayo's letter, dated 06
October 1959, to Magdalena Estate, Inc., merely authorized the
latter to have title to the property transferred to her name. More
importantly, she implicitly recognized Alayo's ownership when,
three years after the death of Alayo, she and Josephine executed
the deed of extrajudicial partition and sale in which she asserted
a one-half (1/2) interest in the property in what may be
described as her share in the "conjugal partnership" with Alayo,
plus another one-fourth (1/4) interest as "surviving widow," the
last one-fourth (1/4) going to Josephine as the issue of the
deceased. Observe that the above adjudication would have
exactly conformed with a partition in intestacy had they been the
sole and legitimate heirs of the decedent.

As regards the property relation between common-law spouses,

Article 144 of the Civil Code merely codified the law established
through judicial precedents under the old code. In both regimes,
the co-ownership rule had more than once been repudiated
when either or both spouses suffered from an impediment to
marry. The present provisions under Article 147 and Article 148
of the Family Code did not much deviate from the old rules; in
any case, its provisions cannot apply to this case without
interdicting prior vested rights.

It was at the time that 'the adjudication of ownership was made

following Alayo's demise (not when Alayo merely allowed the
property to be titled in Josefa's name which clearly was not
intended to be adversarial to Alayo's interest), that a
constructive trust was deemed to have been created by operation
of law under the provisions of Article 1456 of the Civil Code.
 383

ERLINDA A. AGAPAY vs. CARLINA V. PALANG

G.R. No. 116668 July 28, 1997

Facts:
Miguel Palang and respondent Carlina Vallesterol got married in
1949. A few months after the wedding, in October 1949, he left to
work in Hawaii. Miguel and Carlina's only child, Herminia Palang,
was born on May 12, 1950. The trial court found evidence that as
early as 1957, Miguel had attempted to divorce Carlina in Hawaii.
When he returned for good in 1972, he refused to live with private
respondents, but stayed alone in a house in Pozorrubio,
Pangasinan.

In 1973, the 63 year old Miguel contracted his second marriage with
19 year old petitioner Erlinda Agapay. Two months earlier, on May
17, 1973, Miguel and Erlinda, as evidenced by the Deed of Sale,
jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land located in Binalonan.
A house and lot in Binalonan, Pangasinan was likewise purchased
in September 1975, allegedly by Erlinda as the sole vendee and the
title was issued in her name.

On October 30, 1975, Miguel and Carlina Palang executed a Deed of

Donation as a form of compromise agreement to settle and end a
case filed by the latter. The parties therein agreed to donate their
conjugal property consisting of six parcels of land to their only
child, Herminia Palang.

Miguel and Erlinda's cohabitation produced a son, Kristopher A.

Palang, born on December 6, 1977. In 1979, Miguel and Erlinda
were convicted of Concubinage upon Carlina's complaint. On
February 15, 1981, Miguel died.

Carlina Palang and her daughter Herminia Palang de la Cruz,

herein private respondents instituted an action for recovery of
ownership. Private respondents sought to get back the riceland and
the house and lot both located at Binalonan, Pangasinan allegedly
purchased by Miguel during his cohabitation with petitioner.

Petitioner, as defendant below, contended that while the riceland is

registered in their names (Miguel and Erlinda), she had already
given her half of the property to their son Kristopher Palang. She
added that the house and lot is her sole property, having bought the
same with her own money. Erlinda added that Carlina is precluded
from claiming aforesaid properties since the latter had already
donated their conjugal estate to Herminia.
 384

After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered its decision
dismissing the complaint after declaring that there was little
evidence to prove that the subject properties pertained to the
conjugal property of Carlina and Miguel Palang. On appeal, the CA
reversed the RTC’s decision.

Issue:
WON the agricultural land and the house and lot should be awarded
in favor of Erlinda Agapay.

Held:
NO. The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was made in favor of
Miguel and Erlinda. The provision of law applicable here is Article
148 of the Family Code providing for cases of cohabitation when a
man and a woman who are not capacitated to marry each other live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit
of marriage or under a void marriage. While Miguel and Erlinda
contracted marriage on July 15, 1973, said union was patently
void because the earlier marriage of Miguel and Carlina was still
subsisting and unaffected by the latter's de facto separation.

Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the

parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property or
industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. It must be stressed that actual
contribution is required by this provision, in contrast to Article 147
which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family
and household, are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of
common property by one who has no salary or income or work or
industry. If the actual contribution of the party is not proved, there
will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares.
In the case at bar, Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that
she is engaged in the business of buy and sell and had a sari-sari
store but failed to persuade us that she actually contributed money
to buy the subject riceland. Worth noting is the fact that on the date
of conveyance, May 17, 1973, petitioner was only around twenty
years of age and Miguel Palang was already sixty-four and a
pensioner of the U.S. Government. Considering her youthfulness, it
is unrealistic to conclude that in 1973 she contributed P3,750.00 as
her share in the purchase price of subject property, 11 there being no
proof of the same.

Petitioner now claims that the riceland was bought two months
before Miguel and Erlinda actually cohabited. In the nature of an
 385

afterthought, said added assertion was intended to exclude their

case from the operation of Article 148 of the Family Code. Proof of
the precise date when they commenced their adulterous
cohabitation not having been adduced, we cannot state definitively
that the riceland was purchased even before they started living
together. In any case, even assuming that the subject property was
bought before cohabitation, the rules of co-ownership would still
apply and proof of actual contribution would still be essential.

Since petitioner failed to prove that she contributed money to the

purchase price of the riceland in Binalonan, Pangasinan, we find no
basis to justify her co-ownership with Miguel over the same.
Consequently, the riceland should, as correctly held by the
Court of Appeals, revert to the conjugal partnership property of
the deceased Miguel and private respondent Carlina Palang.

Furthermore, it is immaterial that Miguel and Carlina previously

agreed to donate their conjugal property in favor of their daughter
Herminia in 1975. Separation of property between spouses during
the marriage shall not take place except by judicial order or without
judicial conferment when there is an express stipulation in the
marriage settlements. The judgment which resulted from the parties'
compromise was not specifically and expressly for separation of
property and should not be so inferred.

With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda allegedly bought the
same for P20,000.00 on September 23, 1975 when she was only 22
years old. The testimony of the notary public who prepared the deed
of conveyance for the property reveals the falsehood of this claim.
Atty. Constantino Sagun testified that Miguel Palang provided the
money for the purchase price and directed that Erlinda's name
alone be placed as the vendee.
The transaction was properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda,
but one which was clearly void and inexistent by express provision
of law because it was made between persons guilty of adultery or
concubinage at the time of the donation, under Article 739 of the
Civil Code. Moreover, Article 87 of the Family Code expressly
provides that the prohibition against donations between spouses
now applies to donations between persons living together as
husband and wife without a valid marriage, for otherwise, the
condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better
than those in legal union.
GUILLERMA TUMLOS vs. SPOUSES FERNANDEZ
G.R. No. 137650             April 12, 2000
 386

Facts:
Respondent spouses Mario and Lourdes Fernandez were the
plaintiffs in an action for ejectment against petitioners Guillerma
Tumlos, Toto Tumlos, and Gina Tumlos. The said spouses
alleged that they are the absolute owners of an apartment
building located in Lawang Bato, Valenzuela, Metro Manila; that
through tolerance they had allowed the petitioners to occupy the
apartment building for the last seven (7) years, since 1989,
without the payment of any rent; that it was agreed upon that
after a few months, Guillerma Tumlos will pay P1,600.00 a
month while the other petitioners promised to pay P1,000.00 a
month, both as rental, which agreement was not complied with
by the said defendants. Spouses Fernandez have demanded
several times for the petitioners to vacate the premises, as they
are in need of the property for the construction of a new
building, but the said demands went unheeded.

Petitioner Guillerma Tumlos was the only one who filed an

answer to the complaint. She averred therein that the Fernandez
spouses had no cause of action against her, since she is a co-
owner of the subject premises as evidenced by a Contract to Sell
wherein it was stated that she is a co-vendee of the property in
question together with respondent Mario Fernandez. She then
asked for the dismissal of the complaint.

Further, Guillerma and Mario had an amorous relationship, and

that they acquired the property in question as their "love nest."
It was further alleged that they lived together in the said
apartment building with their two (2) children for around ten
(10) years, and that Guillerma administered the property by
collecting rentals from the lessees of the other apartments, until
she discovered that Mario deceived her as to the annulment of
his marriage. It was also during the early part of 1996 when
Mario accused her of being unfaithful and demonstrated his
baseless jealousy.

Issue:
WON Guillerma is a co-owner of the said apartment under
Article 148.

Held:
NO. Even considering the evidence presented before the MTC
and the RTC, we cannot accept petitioner's submission that she
 387

is a co-owner of the disputed property pursuant to Article 144 of

the Civil Code. As correctly held by the CA, the applicable law is
not Article 144 of the Civil Code, but Article 148 of the Family
Code.

Art. 144 of the Civil Code applies only to a relationship between

a man and a woman who are not incapacitated to marry each
other, or to one in which the marriage of the parties is void from
the beginning. It does not apply to a cohabitation that amounts
to adultery or concubinage, for it would be absurd to create a co-
ownership where there exists a prior conjugal partnership or
absolute community between the man and his lawful wife.

Based on evidence presented by respondents, as well as those

submitted by petitioner herself before the RTC, it is clear that
Mario Fernandez was incapacitated to marry petitioner because
he was legally married to Lourdes Fernandez. It is also clear
that, as readily admitted by petitioner, she cohabited with Mario
in a state of concubinage. Therefore, Article 144 of the Civil Code
is inapplicable.

As stated above, the relationship between petitioner and

Respondent Mario Fernandez is governed by Article 148 of the
Family Code. Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy points out that "the
Family Code has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code
by expressly regulating in its Article 148 the property relations of
couples living in a state of adultery or concubinage.

Hence, petitioner’s argument — that the Family Code is

inapplicable because the cohabitation and the acquisition of the
property occurred before its effectivity — deserves scant
consideration. Suffice it to say that the law itself states that it
can be applied retroactively if it does not prejudice vested or
acquired rights. In this case, petitioner failed to show any
vested right over the property in question. Moreover, to
resolve similar issues, we have applied Article 148 of the Family
Code retroactively.

In this case, petitioner fails to present any evidence that she

had made an actual contribution to purchase the subject
property. Indeed, she anchors her claim of co-ownership merely
on her cohabitation with Respondent Mario Fernandez.
 388

Likewise, her claim of having administered the property during

the cohabitation is unsubstantiated. In any event, this fact by
itself does not justify her claim, for nothing in Article 148 of the
Family Code provides that the administration of the property
amounts to a contribution in its acquisition.

Clearly, there is no basis for petitioner’s claim of co-ownership.

The property in question belongs to the conjugal partnership of
respondents. Hence, the MTC and the CA were correct in
ordering the ejectment of petitioner from the premises.

LUPO ATIENZA vs. YOLANDA DE CASTRO

G.R. No. 169698             November 29, 2006

Facts:
 389

Despite petitioner Lupo Atienza being married, he had a

relationship with respondent Yolanda De Castro. They lived
together in consortium beginning the later part of 1983. Out of
their union, two children were born. However, after the birth of
their second child, their relationship turned sour until they
parted ways.

In 1992, Lupo filed in a complaint against Yolanda for the

judicial partition between them of a parcel of land with
improvements located in Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati City. In his
complaint, Lupo alleged that the subject property was acquired
during his union with Yolanda as common-law husband and
wife, hence the property is co-owned by them.

Lupo averred that the property in question was acquired by

Yolanda sometime in 1987 using his exclusive funds and that
the title thereto was transferred by the seller in Yolanda’s name
without his knowledge and consent. In her answer, Yolanda
denied Lupo’s allegations. According to her, she acquired the
same property for Two Million Six Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P2,600,000.00) using her exclusive funds. She insisted having
bought it thru her own savings and earnings as a
businesswoman.

In a decision, the trial court rendered judgment for Lupo by

declaring the contested property as owned in common by him
and Yolanda and ordering its partition between the two in equal
shares. In decreeing the as exclusively owned by Yolanda, the
CA ruled that under the provisions of Article 148 of the Family
Code vis-à-vis the evidence on record and attending
circumstances, Yolanda’s claim of sole ownership is meritorious,
as it has been substantiated by competent evidence. To the CA,
Lupo failed to overcome the burden of proving his allegation that
the subject property was purchased by Yolanda thru his
exclusive funds

Issue:
WON the subject property is the sole ownership of Yolanda.

Held:
YES. It is not disputed that the parties herein were not
capacitated to marry each other because petitioner Lupo Atienza
was validly married to another woman at the time of his
 390

cohabitation with the respondent. Their property regime,

therefore, is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code,
which applies to bigamous marriages, adulterous
relationships, relationships in a state of concubinage,
relationships where both man and woman are married to
other persons, and multiple alliances of the same married
man. Under this regime, …only the properties acquired by both
of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions....Proof of actual
contribution is required.

As it is, the regime of limited co-ownership of property governing

the union of parties who are not legally capacitated to marry
each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and
wife, applies to properties acquired during said cohabitation in
proportion to their respective contributions. Co-ownership will
only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of
money, property or industry. Absent proof of the extent
thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be
presumed to be equal.

Here, although the adulterous cohabitation of the parties

commenced in 1983, or way before the effectivity of the Family
Code on August 3, 1998, Article 148 thereof applies because this
provision was intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article
144 of the Civil Code. Before Article 148 of the Family Code was
enacted, there was no provision governing property relations of
couples living in a state of adultery or concubinage. Hence, even
if the cohabitation or the acquisition of the property occurred
before the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs.

It is the petitioner’s posture that the respondent, having no

financial capacity to acquire the property in question, merely
manipulated the dollar bank accounts of his two (2) corporations
to raise the amount needed therefor. Unfortunately for
petitioner, his submissions are burdened by the fact that his
claim to the property contradicts duly written instruments, i.e.,
the Contract to Sell dated March 24, 1987, the Deed of
Assignment of Redemption dated March 27, 1987 and the Deed
of Transfer dated April 27, 1987, all entered into by and between
the respondent and the vendor of said property, to the exclusion
of the petitioner.
 391

As we see it, petitioner’s claim of co-ownership in the disputed

property is without basis because not only did he fail to
substantiate his alleged contribution in the purchase thereof but
likewise the very trail of documents pertaining to its purchase as
evidentiary proof redounds to the benefit of the respondent. In
contrast, aside from his mere say so and voluminous records of
bank accounts, which sadly find no relevance in this case, the
petitioner failed to overcome his burden of proof. Allegations
must be proven by sufficient evidence. Simply stated, he who
alleges a fact has the burden of proving it; mere allegation is not
evidence.

True, the mere issuance of a certificate of title in the name of

any person does not foreclose the possibility that the real
property covered thereby may be under co-ownership with
persons not named in the certificate or that the registrant may
only be a trustee or that other parties may have acquired
interest subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title.
However, as already stated, petitioner’s evidence in support of
his claim is either insufficient or immaterial to warrant the trial
court’s finding that the disputed property falls under the
purview of Article 148 of the Family Code. In contrast to
petitioner’s dismal failure to prove his cause, herein respondent
was able to present preponderant evidence of her sole
ownership. There can clearly be no co-ownership when, as here,
the respondent sufficiently established that she derived the
funds used to purchase the property from her earnings, not only
as an accountant but also as a businesswoman engaged in
foreign currency trading, money lending and jewelry retail. She
presented her clientele and the promissory notes evincing
substantial dealings with her clients. She also presented her
bank account statements and bank transactions, which reflect
that she had the financial capacity to pay the purchase price of
the subject property.

YOLANDA SIGNEY vs. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM

G.R. No. 173582             January 28, 2008

Facts:
 392

Rodolfo Signey, Sr., a member of the SSS, died on 21 May 2001.

In his member’s records, he had designated petitioner Yolanda
Signey as primary beneficiary and his four children with her as
secondary beneficiaries. Petitioner then filed a claim for death
benefits with the public respondent SSS. She revealed in her
SSS claim that the deceased had a common-law wife, Gina
Servano, with whom he had two minor children namey, Ginalyn
Servano and Rodelyn Signey.

Petitioner’s declaration was confirmed when Gina herself filed a

claim for the same death benefits in which she also declared that
both she and petitioner were common-law wives of the deceased
and that Editha Espinosa (Editha) was the legal wife. In
addition, in October 2001, Editha also filed an application for
death benefits with the SSS stating that she was the legal wife of
the deceased.

The SSS denied the death benefit claim of petitioner. However, it

recognized Ginalyn and Rodelyn, the minor children of the
deceased with Gina, as the primary beneficiaries under the SSS
Law. The SSS also found that the 20 March 1992 marriage
between petitioner and the deceased was null and void because
of a prior subsisting marriage between the deceased and Editha,
as confirmed with the Local Civil Registry of Cebu City.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition with the SSC in which she
attached a waiver of rights executed by Editha.

Issue:
WON

Held:
Whoever claims entitlement to the benefits provided by law
should establish his or her right thereto by substantial evidence.
Since petitioner is disqualified to be a beneficiary and because
the deceased has no legitimate child, it follows that the
dependent illegitimate minor children of the deceased shall be
entitled to the death benefits as primary beneficiaries. The SSS
Law is clear that for a minor child to qualify as a "dependent" the
only requirements are that he/she must be below 21 years of
age, not married nor gainfully employed.

In this case, the minor illegitimate children Ginalyn and Rodelyn

were born on 13 April 1996 and 20 April 2000, respectively. Had
 393

the legitimate child of the deceased and Editha survived and

qualified as a dependent under the SSS Law, Ginalyn and
Rodelyn would have been entitled to a share equivalent to only
50% of the share of the said legitimate child. Since the legitimate
child of the deceased predeceased him, Ginalyn and Rodelyn, as
the only qualified primary beneficiaries of the deceased, are
entitled to 100% of the benefits.

CAMILO F. BORROMEO vs. ANTONIETTA O. DESCALLAR

G.R. No. 159310               February 24, 2009

Facts:
 394

Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian citizen, arrived in the Philippines

in 1983 after he was assigned by his employer, Simmering-Graz
Panker A.G., an Austrian company, to work at a project in
Mindoro. He was then transferred in Cebu in 1984. During that
time, he met respondent Antonietta Opalla-Descallar, a
separated mother of two boys who was working as a waitress at
St. Moritz Hotel. Jambrich befriended respondent and asked her
to tutor him in English. In due time Jambrich and respondent
fell in love started to live together.

After which, they bought their own house in Cabancalan,

Mandaue City. In the Contracts to Sell covering the properties,
Jambrich and respondent were referred to as the buyers. A Deed
of Absolute Sale was likewise issued in their favor. However,
when the Deed of Absolute Sale was presented for registration
before the Register of Deeds, registration was refused on the
ground that Jambrich was an alien and could not acquire
alienable lands of the public domain. Consequently, Jambrich’s
name was erased from the document. But it could be noted that
his signature remained on the left hand margin of page 1, beside
respondent’s signature as buyer, and at the bottom of the last
page. Transfer Certificate of Title over the properties were issued
in respondent’s name alone.

Jambrich also formally adopted respondent’s two sons. However,

the idyll lasted only until April 1991. By then, respondent found
a new boyfriend while Jambrich began to live with another
woman in Danao City. Jambrich supported respondent’s sons
for only two months after the break up.

Meantime, Jambrich met petitioner Borromeo sometime in 1986,

who was engaged in the real estate business and built and
repaired speedboats as a hobby. In 1989, Jambrich purchased
an engine and some accessories for his boat from petitioner, for
which he became indebted to the latter. To pay for his debt, he
sold his rights and interests in the Agro-Macro properties to
petitioner as evidenced by a "Deed of Absolute
Sale/Assignment.", when petitioner sought to register the deed
of assignment, he discovered that titles to the three lots have
been transferred in the name of respondent, and that the subject
property has already been mortgaged.
 395

Petitioner filed a complaint against respondent for recovery of

real property alleging that the Contracts to Sell and the Deed of
Absolute Sale over the properties which identified both Jambrich
and respondent as buyers do not reflect the true agreement of
the parties since respondent did not pay a single centavo of the
purchase price and was not in fact a buyer; that it was Jambrich
alone who paid for the properties using his exclusive funds; that
Jambrich was the real and absolute owner of the properties;
and, that petitioner acquired absolute ownership by virtue of the
Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment dated July 11, 1991 which
Jambrich executed in his favor.

In her Answer, respondent belied the allegation that she did not
pay a single centavo of the purchase price. On the contrary, she
claimed that she "solely and exclusively used her own personal
funds to defray and pay for the purchase price of the subject lots
in question," and that Jambrich, being an alien, was prohibited
to acquire or own real property in the Philippines.

Issue:
WON Jambrich may transfer the subject properties.

Held:
YES. At the time of the acquisition of the properties in 1985 to
1986, Jambrich was gainfully employed at Simmering-Graz
Panker A.G., an Austrian company. He was earning an
estimated monthly salary of P50,000.00. Then, Jambrich was
assigned to Syria for almost one year where his monthly salary
was approximately P90,000.00. Thus, Jambrich has all authority
to transfer all his rights, interests and participation over the
subject properties to petitioner by virtue of the Deed of
Assignment he executed on July 11, 1991.

The fact that the disputed properties were acquired during the
couple’s cohabitation also does not help respondent. The rule
that co-ownership applies to a man and a woman living
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage, but are otherwise capacitated to marry
each other, does not apply. In the instant case, respondent
was still legally married to another when she and Jambrich lived
together. In such an adulterous relationship, no co-ownership
exists between the parties. It is necessary for each of the
partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the
 396

acquisition of property in order to be able to lay claim to any

portion of it. Presumptions of co-ownership and equal
contribution do not apply.

Respondent argued that aliens are prohibited from acquiring

private land. The capacity to acquire private land is dependent
on the capacity "to acquire or hold lands of the public domain."
Private land may be transferred only to individuals or entities
"qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain." Only
Filipino citizens or corporations at least 60% of the capital of
which is owned by Filipinos are qualified to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain. Thus, as the rule now stands, the
fundamental law explicitly prohibits non-Filipinos from
acquiring or holding title to private lands, except only by way of
legal succession or if the acquisition was made by a former
natural-born citizen.

Therefore, in the instant case, the transfer of land from Agro-

Macro Development Corporation to Jambrich, who is an
Austrian, would have been declared invalid if challenged, had
not Jambrich conveyed the properties to petitioner who is a
Filipino citizen.

While the acquisition and the purchase of Wilhelm Jambrich of

the properties under litigation [were] void ab initio since [they
were] contrary to the Constitution of the Philippines, he being a
foreigner, yet, the acquisition of these properties by plaintiff who
is a Filipino citizen from him, has cured the flaw in the original
transaction and the title of the transferee is valid.

HEIRS OF LORETO C. MARAMAG vs. EVA DE GUZMAN

G.R. No. 181132               June 5, 2009
 397

Facts:
Petitioners were the legitimate wife and children of Loreto Maramag
(Loreto), whilerespondents were Loreto’s illegitimate family. Loreto
designated respondents as beneficiaries in his life insurance policies
fromInsular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. (Insular) and Great Pacific
Life AssuranceCorporation (Grepalife).

Petitioners insituted in the RTC a petition for revocation and/or

reduction of insurance proceeds for being void and/or inofficious, with
prayer for a temporaryrestraining order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary
injunction. Pursuant to the motion to dismiss incorporated in Insular
and Grepalife’s respectiveanswers, the TC dismissed the complaint with
respect to the illegitimate children,who are the the designated primary
beneficiaries in the life insurance policies, for lack of cause action.
However, trial court ruled that the action may proceed againstthe
concubine, Insular Life, and Grepalife.

Insular and Grepalife filed their respective motions for reconsideration,

arguing, inthe main, that the petition failed to state a cause of action
against them. TC granted, and dismissed the case against them. In
doing so, the TC courtconsidered the allegations found in Insular’s
answer.

CA dismissed petitioners’appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the

decision of the trial court dismissing the complaint for failure to state a
cause of action involved a pure question of law. Further, it found that
due to petitioners’ failure to timely file amotion for reconsideration, the
dismissal against Insular and Grepalife had alreadyattained finality

Issue:
WON

Held:
Although petitioners are the legitimate heirs of Loreto, they were not
named as beneficiaries in the insurance policies issued by Insular and
Grepalife. The basis of petitioners’ claim is that Eva, being a concubine
of Loreto and a suspect in his murder, is disqualified from being
designated as beneficiary of the insurance policies, and that Eva’s
children with Loreto, being illegitimate children, are entitled to a lesser
share of the proceeds of the policies. They also argued that pursuant to
Section 12 of the Insurance Code, Eva’s share in the proceeds should be
forfeited in their favor, the former having brought about the death of
Loreto. Thus, they prayed that the share of Eva and portions of the
shares of Loreto’s illegitimate children should be awarded to them,
being the legitimate heirs of Loreto entitled to their respective legitimes.

It is evident from the face of the complaint that petitioners are not
entitled to a favorable judgment in light of Article 2011 of the Civil Code
 398

which expressly provides that insurance contracts shall be governed by

special laws, i.e., the Insurance Code.

Pursuant thereto, it is obvious that the only persons entitled to claim

the insurance proceeds are either the insured, if still alive; or the
beneficiary, if the insured is already deceased, upon the maturation of
the policy. The exception to this rule is a situation where the insurance
contract was intended to benefit third persons who are not parties to
the same in the form of favorable stipulations or indemnity. In such a
case, third parties may directly sue and claim from the insurer.

Petitioners are third parties to the insurance contracts with Insular and
Grepalife and, thus, are not entitled to the proceeds thereof.
Accordingly, respondents Insular and Grepalife have no legal obligation
to turn over the insurance proceeds to petitioners. The revocation of
Eva as a beneficiary in one policy and her disqualification as such in
another are of no moment considering that the designation of the
illegitimate children as beneficiaries in Loreto’s insurance policies
remains valid. Because no legal proscription exists in naming as
beneficiaries the children of illicit relationships by the insured, the
shares of Eva in the insurance proceeds, whether forfeited by the court
in view of the prohibition on donations under Article 739 of the Civil
Code or by the insurers themselves for reasons based on the insurance
contracts, must be awarded to the said illegitimate children, the
designated beneficiaries, to the exclusion of petitioners. It is only in
cases where the insured has not designated any beneficiary, or when
the designated beneficiary is disqualified by law to receive the proceeds,
that the insurance policy proceeds shall redound to the benefit of the
estate of the insured.

In this regard, the assailed June 16, 2005 Resolution of the trial court
should be upheld. In the same light, the Decision of the CA dated
January 8, 2008 should be sustained. Indeed, the appellate court had
no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the appeal; the issue of failure to
state a cause of action is a question of law and not of fact, there being
no findings of fact in the first place.

BETTY B. LACBAYAN vs. BAYANI S. SAMOY, JR.,

G.R. No. 165427               March 21, 2011
 399

Facts:
Petitioner and respondent met each other through a common
friend sometime in 1978. Despite respondent being already
married, their relationship developed until petitioner gave birth
to respondent’s son on October 12, 1979. During their illicit
relationship, petitioner and respondent, together with three more
incorporators, were able to establish a manpower services
company. Five parcels of land were also acquired during the said
period and were registered in petitioner and respondent’s names,
ostensibly as husband and wife.

Initially, petitioner lived with her parents in Quezon City. In

1983, petitioner left her parents and decided to reside in the
property located in Project 4, Quezon City. Later, she and their
son transferred to Zobel St., also in Project 4, and finally to the
400-square meter property in Don Enrique Heights.

Eventually, however, their relationship turned sour and they

decided to part ways sometime in 1991. In 1998, both parties
agreed to divide the said properties and terminate their business
partnership by executing a Partition Agreement. Initially,
respondent agreed to petitioner’s proposal that the properties in
Malvar St. and Don Enrique Heights be assigned to the latter,
while the ownership over the three other properties will go to
respondent. However, when petitioner wanted additional
demands to be included in the partition agreement, respondent
refused. Feeling aggrieved, petitioner filed a complaint for
judicial partition of the said properties.

In her complaint, petitioner averred that she and respondent

started to live together as husband and wife in 1979 without the
benefit of marriage and worked together as business partners,
acquiring real properties. Respondent, in his Answer, however,
denied petitioner’s claim of cohabitation and said that the
properties were acquired out of his own personal funds without
any contribution from petitioner.

During the trial, petitioner admitted that although they were

together for almost 24 hours a day in 1983 until 1991,
respondent would still go home to his wife usually in the wee
hours of the morning. Petitioner likewise claimed that they
 400

acquired the said real estate properties from the income of the
company which she and respondent established.

Respondent, meanwhile, testified that the properties were

purchased from his personal funds, salaries, dividends,
allowances and commissions. He countered that the said
properties were registered in his name together with petitioner to
exclude the same from the property regime of respondent and
his legal wife, and to prevent the possible dissipation of the said
properties since his legal wife was then a heavy gambler.
Respondent added that he also purchased the said properties as
investment, with the intention to sell them later on for the
purchase or construction of a new building.

In its decision, the RTC decided to give considerable weight to

petitioner’s own admission that the properties were acquired not
from her own personal funds but from the income of the
manpower services company over which she owns a measly
3.33% share. The appeal was denied by the CA.

Issue:
WON petitioner and respondents were co-owners of the subject
properties.

Held:
NO. While it is true that the complaint involved here is one for
partition, the same is premised on the existence or non-
existence of co-ownership between the parties. Petitioner insists
she is a co-owner pro indiviso of the five real estate properties
based on the transfer certificates of title (TCTs) covering the
subject properties. Respondent maintains otherwise.
Indubitably, therefore, until and unless this issue of co-
ownership is definitely and finally resolved, it would be
premature to effect a partition of the disputed properties. More
importantly, the complaint will not even lie if the claimant, or
petitioner in this case, does not even have any rightful interest
over the subject properties.

There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be

collaterally attacked, but that rule is not material to the case at
bar. What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title
and not the title itself. The certificate referred to is that
document issued by the Register of Deeds known as the TCT. In
 401

contrast, the title referred to by law means ownership which is,

more often than not, represented by that document. Petitioner
apparently confuses title with the certificate of title. Title as a
concept of ownership should not be confused with the certificate
of title as evidence of such ownership although both are
interchangeably used.

Moreover, placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the

Torrens system does not mean that ownership thereof can no
longer be disputed. Ownership is different from a certificate of
title, the latter only serving as the best proof of ownership over a
piece of land. The certificate cannot always be considered as
conclusive evidence of ownership. In fact, mere issuance of the
certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose
the possibility that the real property may be under co-ownership
with persons not named in the certificate, or that the registrant
may only be a trustee, or that other parties may have acquired
interest over the property subsequent to the issuance of the
certificate of title. Needless to say, registration does not vest
ownership over a property, but may be the best evidence thereof.

EDWIN N. TRIBIANA vs. LOURDES M. TRIBIANA

 402

G.R. No. 137359             September 13, 2004

Facts:
Edwin and Lourdes are husband and wife who have lived
together since 1996 but formalized their union only on 28
October 1997. On 30 April 1998, Lourdes filed a petition for
habeas corpus before the RTC claiming that Edwin left their
conjugal home with their daughter, Khriza Mae Tribiana. Edwin
has since deprived Lourdes of lawful custody of their daughter.

Later, it turned out that Khriza was being held by Edwin’s

mother, Rosalina Tribiana. Edwin moved to dismiss Lourdes’
petition on the ground that the petition failed to allege that
earnest efforts at a compromise were made before its filing as
required by Article 151 of the Family Code. Lourdes filed her
opposition to Edwin’s motion to dismiss claiming that there were
prior efforts at a compromise, which failed. Lourdes attached to
her opposition a copy of the Certification to File Action from their
Barangay.

The RTC denied Edwin’s motion to dismiss and reiterated a

previous order requiring Edwin and his mother, Rosalina to
bring Khriza before the RTC. Upon denial of his motion for
reconsideration, Edwin filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
for prohibition and certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure. The appellate court denied Edwin’s petition. Hence,
this petition.

Issue:
WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition for habeas corpus
on the ground of failure to comply with the condition precedent
under Article 151 of the Family Code.

Held:
NO. It is true that the petition for habeas corpus filed by Lourdes
failed to allege that she resorted to compromise proceedings
before filing the petition. However, in her opposition to Edwin’s
motion to dismiss, Lourdes attached a Barangay Certification to
File Action dated 1 May 1998. Edwin does not dispute the
authenticity of the Barangay Certification and its contents. This
effectively established that the parties tried to compromise but
were unsuccessful in their efforts. However, Edwin would have
 403

the petition dismissed despite the existence of the Barangay

Certification, which he does not even dispute.

Evidently, Lourdes has complied with the condition

precedent under Article 151 of the Family Code. A dismissal
under Section 1(j) of Rule 16 is warranted only if there is a
failure to comply with a condition precedent. Given that the
alleged defect is a mere failure to allege compliance with a
condition precedent, the proper solution is not an outright
dismissal of the action, but an amendment under Section 1 of
Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It would have been
a different matter if Edwin had asserted that no efforts to arrive
at a compromise have been made at all.

In addition, the failure of a party to comply with a condition

precedent is not a jurisdictional defect. Such defect does not
place the controversy beyond the court’s power to resolve. If a
party fails to raise such defect in a motion to dismiss, such
defect is deemed waived. Such defect is curable by amendment
as a matter of right without leave of court, if made before the
filing of a responsive pleading. A motion to dismiss is not a
responsive pleading. More importantly, an amendment alleging
compliance with a condition precedent is not a jurisdictional
matter. Neither does it alter the cause of action of a petition for
habeas corpus. We have held that in cases where the defect
consists of the failure to state compliance with a condition
precedent, the trial court should order the amendment of the
complaint. Courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to
pleadings to avoid multiplicity of suits and to present the real
controversies between the parties.

Moreover, in a habeas corpus proceeding involving the welfare

and custody of a child of tender age, the paramount concern is
to resolve immediately the issue of who has legal custody of the
child. Technicalities should not stand in the way of giving such
child of tender age full protection. This rule has sound statutory
basis in Article 213 of the Family Code, which states, "No child
under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother
unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise." In
this case, the child (Khriza) was only one year and four months
when taken away from the mother.
 404

HIYAS SAVINGS vs. HON. EDMUNDO T. ACUÑA

G.R. NO. 154132 August 31, 2006

Facts:
Private respondent Alberto Moreno filed a complaint against
petitioner Hiyas Savings, his wife Remedios, the spouses Felipe
and Maria Owe and the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City for
cancellation of mortgage contending that he did not secure any
loan from petitioner, nor did he sign or execute any contract of
mortgage in its favour. His wife, acting in conspiracy with Hiyas
and the spouses Owe, who were the ones that benefited from the
loan, made it appear that he signed the contract of mortgage;
that he could not have executed the said contract because he
was then working abroad.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that private

respondent failed to comply with Article 151 of the Family Code
wherein it is provided that no suit between members of the same
family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified
complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise
have been made, but that the same have failed.

Private respondent argues that in cases where one of the parties

is not a member of the same family as contemplated under
Article 150 of the Family Code, failure to allege in the complaint
that earnest efforts toward a compromise had been made by the
plaintiff before filing the complaint is not a ground for a motion
to dismiss. Alberto asserts that since three of the party-
defendants are not members of his family the ground relied upon
by Hiyas in its Motion to Dismiss is inapplicable and
unavailable. Alberto also prayed that defendants be declared in
default for their failure to file their answer on time.

Issue:
WON Article 151 of the Family Code is required in this case.

Held:
NO. Once a stranger becomes a party to a suit involving
members of the same family, the law no longer makes it a
condition precedent that earnest efforts be made towards a
compromise before the action can prosper.
 405

In the subsequent case of De Guzman, the case involved spouses

and the alleged paramour of the wife. The Court ruled that due
to the efforts exerted by the husband, through the Philippine
Constabulary, to confront the wife, there was substantial
compliance with the law, thereby implying that even in the
presence of a party who is not a family member, the
requirements that earnest efforts towards a compromise have
been exerted must be complied with, pursuant to Article 222 of
the Civil Code, now Article 151 of the Family Code. Thus, Article
151 of the Family Code applies to cover when the suit is
exclusively between or among family members.

Petitioner makes much of the fact that the present case involves
a husband and his wife while Magbaleta is a case between
brothers. However, the Court finds no specific, unique, or special
circumstance that would make the ruling in Magbaleta as well
as in the abovementioned cases inapplicable to suits involving a
husband and his wife, as in the present case. In the first place,
Article 151 of the Family Code and Article 222 of the Civil Code
are clear that the provisions therein apply to suits involving
"members of the same family" as contemplated under Article 150
of the Family Code.

Petitioner also contends that the trial court committed grave

abuse of discretion when it ruled that petitioner, not being a
member of the same family as respondent, may not invoke the
provisions of Article 151 of the Family Code.

Suffice it to say that since the Court has ruled that the
requirement under Article 151 of the Family Code is applicable
only in cases which are exclusively between or among members
of the same family, it necessarily follows that the same may be
invoked only by a party who is a member of that same family.
 406

PATRICIO VS. DARIO III

GR No. 70829, November 20, 2006

Facts:
Marcelino V. Dario died intestate. He was survived by his wife,
petitioner Perla G. Patricio and their two sons, Marcelino Marc Dario
and private respondent Marcelino G. Dario III. Among the properties he
left was a parcel of land with a residential house and a pre-school
building built in Cubao, Quezon City. Petitioner, Marcelino Marc and
private respondent, extra-judicially settled the estate of Marcelino V.
Dario.

Thereafter, petitioner and Marcelino Marc formally advised private

respondent of their intention to partition the subject property and
terminate the co-ownership. Private respondent refused to partition the
property hence petitioner and Marcelino Marc instituted an action for
partition. The RTC ordered the partition of the subject property.

Private respondent appealed before the CA, which dismissed the

complaint for partition filed by petitioner and Marcelino Marc for lack of
merit. It held that the family home should continue despite the death of
one or both spouses as long as there is a minor beneficiary thereof. The
heirs could not partition the property unless the court found compelling
reasons to rule otherwise. The appellate court also held that the minor
son of private respondent, who is a grandson of spouses Marcelino V.
Dario and Perla G. Patricio, was a minor beneficiary of the family home

Issue:
WON Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, the minor son of private
respondent, can be considered as a beneficiary under Article 154 of the
Family Code.

Held:
NO. As to the first requisite, the beneficiaries of the family home are: (1)
The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a
family; and (2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and
sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate. The term
"descendants" contemplates all descendants of the person or persons
who constituted the family home without distinction; hence, it must
necessarily include the grandchildren and great grandchildren of the
spouses who constitute a family home. Thus, private respondent’s
minor son, who is also the grandchild of deceased Marcelino V. Dario
satisfies the first requisite.

As to the second requisite, minor beneficiaries must be actually living in

the family home to avail of the benefits derived from Art. 159. Marcelino
Lorenzo R. Dario IV, also known as Ino, the son of private respondent
and grandson of the decedent Marcelino V. Dario, has been living in the
 407

family home since 1994, or within 10 years from the death of the
decedent, hence, he satisfies the second requisite.

However, as to the third requisite, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot

demand support from his paternal grandmother if he has parents who
are capable of supporting him. The liability for legal support falls
primarily on Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV’s parents, especially his
father, herein private respondent who is the head of his immediate
family. The law first imposes the obligation of legal support upon the
shoulders of the parents, especially the father, and only in their default
is the obligation imposed on the grandparents.

Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV is dependent on legal support not from

his grandmother, but from his father. Thus, despite residing in the
family home and his being a descendant of Marcelino V. Dario,
Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot be considered as beneficiary
contemplated under Article 154 because he did not fulfill the third
requisite of being dependent on his grandmother for legal support. It is
his father whom he is dependent on legal support, and who must now
establish his own family home separate and distinct from that of his
parents, being of legal age.

Legal support, also known as family support, is that which is provided

by law, comprising everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling,
clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping
with the financial capacity of the family.

There is no showing that private respondent is without means to

support his son; neither is there any evidence to prove that petitioner,
as the paternal grandmother, was willing to voluntarily provide for her
grandson’s legal support. On the contrary, herein petitioner filed for the
partition of the property which shows an intention to dissolve the family
home, since there is no more reason for its existence after the 10-year
period ended in 1997. With this finding, there is no legal impediment to
partition the subject property.
 408

ARRIOLA VS. ARRILOA

GR No. 177703, January 28, 2008

Facts:
Respondent John Nabor C. Arriola is the son of decedent Fidel
Arriola with his first wife Victoria C Calabia while petitioner
Anthony Ronald G Arriola is the son of Fidel with his second wife
petitioner Vilma G Arriola. When Fidel died, respondent filed for
judicial partition of the properties of the decedent Fidel.

In its decision, the RTC ordered the partition and such order
became final. As the parties failed to agree on how to partition
among them the subject land, respondent sought its sale
through public auction, and petitioners acceded to it.
Accordingly, the RTC ordered the public auction of the subject
land. The public auction sale was scheduled on May 31, 2003
but it had to be reset when petitioners refused to include in the
auction the house (subject house) standing on the subject land.
This prompted respondent to file with the RTC an Urgent
Manifestation and Motion for Contempt of Court, praying that
petitioners be declared in contempt.

The RTC denied the Motion for the reason that petitioners were
justified in refusing to have the subject house included in the
auction. According to the RTC, in the absence of any other
declaration, obvious or otherwise, only the land should be
partitioned in accordance to[sic] the aforementioned Decision as
the house cannot be said to have been necessarily adjudicated
therein. Thus, plaintiff cannot be declared as a co-owner of the
same house without evidence thereof and due hearing thereon.

On appeal before the CA, the court concluded that any decision
in the action for partition of said estate should cover not just the
subject land but also the subject house.

Issue:
WON the subject house should be included in the public
auction.

Held:
NO. The SC held that although the subject house is covered by
the judgment of partition, however, it does not necessarily
countenance the immediate and actual partition of the subject
 409

house by way of public auction in view of the suspensive

proscription imposed under Article 159 of The Family Code. It is
true that the existence of the subject house was not specifically
alleged in the complaint for partition. Such omission
notwithstanding, the subject house is deemed part of the
judgment of partition for two compelling reasons.

First, as correctly held by the CA, under the provisions of the

Civil Code, the subject house is deemed part of the subject land.
Second, respondent has repeatedly claimed that the subject
house was built by the deceased. Petitioners never controverted
such claim.

There is then no dispute that the subject house is part of the

estate of the deceased; as such, it is owned in common by the
latter's heirs, the parties herein, any one of whom, under Article
494 of the Civil Code, may, at any time, demand the partition of
the subject house. Therefore, respondent's recourse to the
partition of the subject house cannot be hindered, least of all by
the mere technical omission of said common property from the
complaint for partition.

That said notwithstanding, we must emphasize that, while

we treat the subject house as part of the co-ownership of
the parties, we stop short of authorizing its actual
partition by public auction at this time. It bears emphasis
that an action for partition involves two phases: first, the
declaration of the existence of a state of co-ownership; and
second, the actual termination of that state of co-ownership
through the segregation of the common property. What is settled
thus far is only the fact that the subject house is under the co-
ownership of the parties, and therefore susceptible of partition
among them.

Respondent claims that the subject house was built by decedent

Fidel on his exclusive property. Petitioners add that said house
has been their residence for 20 years. Taken together, these
averments on record establish that the subject house is a family
home within the contemplation of the provisions of The Family
Code,

One significant innovation introduced by The Family Code is the

automatic constitution of the family home from the time of its
 410

occupation as a family residence, without need anymore for the

judicial or extrajudicial processes provided under the defunct
Articles 224 to 251 of the Civil Code and Rule 106 of the Rules of
Court. Furthermore, Articles 152 and 153 specifically extend the
scope of the family home not just to the dwelling structure in
which the family resides but also to the lot on which it stands.
Thus, applying these concepts, the subject house as well as the
specific portion of the subject land on which it stands is deemed
constituted as a family home by the deceased and petitioner
Vilma from the moment they began occupying the same as a
family residence 20 years back.

It being settled that the subject house (and the subject lot on
which it stands) is the family home of the deceased and his
heirs, the same is shielded from immediate partition under
Article 159 of The Family Code.

The purpose of Article 159 is to avert the disintegration of the

family unit following the death of its head. More importantly,
Article 159 imposes the proscription against the immediate
partition of the family home regardless of its ownership.
This signifies that even if the family home has passed by
succession to the co-ownership of the heirs, or has been willed
to any one of them, this fact alone cannot transform the family
home into an ordinary property, much less dispel the protection
cast upon it by the law. The rights of the individual co-owner or
owner of the family home cannot subjugate the rights granted
under Article 159 to the beneficiaries of the family home.

Thus, for 10 years from said date or until March 10, 2013, or for
a longer period, if there is still a minor beneficiary residing
therein, the family home he constituted cannot be partitioned,
much less when no compelling reason exists for the court to
otherwise set aside the restriction and order the partition of the
property.
 411

JOSE MODEQUILLO vs. HON. AUGUSTO V. BREVA

G.R. No. 86355 May 31, 1990

Facts:
Judgment was rendered by the Court of Appeals ordering
petitioner Modequillo to pay a sum of money to respondent
Francisco Salinas. The said judgment having become final and
executory, a writ of execution was issued by the RTC to satisfy
the said judgment on the goods and chattels of the petitioner.
The sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land registered in the
name of petitioner and a parcel of agricultural land, both located
in Davao del Sur.

A motion to quash and/or to set aside levy of execution was filed

by Modequillo alleging therein that the residential land located
at Poblacion Malalag is where the family home is built since
1969 prior to the commencement of this case and as such is
exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment under Articles
152 and 153 of the Family Code except for liabilities mentioned
in Article 155 thereof, and that the judgment debt sought to be
enforced against the family home of defendant is not one of
those enumerated under Article 155 of the Family Code. In an
order, the trial court denied the motion.

Issue:
WON the subject property is deemed to be a family home.

Held:
Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted
on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family
residence. There is no need to constitute the same judicially or
extrajudicially as required in the Civil Code. If the family actually
resides in the premises, it is, therefore, a family home as
contemplated by law. Thus, the creditors should take the
necessary precautions to protect their interest before extending
credit to the spouses or head of the family who owns the home.

The exemption provided as aforestated is effective from the time

of the constitution of the family home as such, and lasts so long
as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein.

In the present case, the residential house and lot of petitioner

was not constituted as a family home whether judicially or
 412

extrajudicially under the Civil Code. It became a family home by

operation of law only under Article 153 of the Family Code. It is
deemed constituted as a family home upon the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988 not August 4, one year after its
publication in the Manila Chronicle on August 4, 1987.

The contention of petitioner that it should be considered a family

home from the time it was occupied by petitioner and his family
in 1969 is not well- taken. Under Article 162 of the Family Code,
it is provided that "the provisions of this Chapter shall also
govern existing family residences insofar as said provisions are
applicable." It does not mean that Articles 152 and 153 of said
Code have a retroactive effect such that all existing family
residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes
at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code and are exempt from execution for the payment of
obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code.
Article 162 simply means that all existing family residences at
the time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are considered
family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits
accorded to a family home under the Family Code. Article 162
does not state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a
retroactive effect.

Is the family home of petitioner exempt from execution of the

money judgment aforecited No. The debt or liability which was
the basis of the judgment arose or was incurred at the time of
the vehicular accident on March 16, 1976 and the money
judgment arising therefrom was rendered by the appellate court
on January 29, 1988. Both preceded the effectivity of the Family
Code on August 3, 1988. This case does not fall under the
exemptions from execution provided in the Family Code.
 413

SIMEON CABANG vs. MR. & MRS. GUILLERMO BASAY

G.R. No. 180587               March 20, 2009

Facts:
Deceased Felix Odong was the registered owner of a lot located
in Molave, Zamboanga del Sur. However, Felix Odong and his
heirs never occupied nor took possession of the lot. In 1987,
plaintiff-appellants bought said real property from the heirs of
Felix Odong. Consequently, a new title was issued in the name
of plaintiff-appellants. The latter also did not occupy the said
property.

Defendant-appellees, on the other hand, had been in

continuous, open, peaceful and adverse possession of the same
parcel of land since 1956 up to the present. During the said
cadastral proceedings, defendant-appellees claimed Lot No. 7778
on the belief that the area they were actually occupying was Lot
No. 7778. As it turned out, however, when the Municipality of
Molave relocated the townsite lots in the area in 1992 as a big
portion of Lot No. 7778 was used by the government as a public
road and as there were many discrepancies in the areas
occupied, it was then discovered that defendant-appellees were
actually occupying Lot No. 7777.

On June 23, 1992, plaintiff-appellants filed a Complaint for

Recovery of Property against defendant-appellees. The RTC
rendered a decision in favor of the defendants holding that the
rights of the plaintiffs to recover the land registered in their
names, have been effectively barred by laches. On appeal, the
CA reversed the RTC’s decision claiming that plaintiffs-
appellants to be entitled to the possession of Lot No. 7777.

Petitioners insist that the property subject of the controversy is a

duly constituted family home which is not subject to execution,
thus, they argue that the appellate tribunal erred in reversing
the judgment of the trial court.

Issue:
WON the subject property is considered as a family home.

Held:
NO. As defined, "The family home is a sacred symbol of family
love and is the repository of cherished memories that last during
 414

one’s lifetime. It is the dwelling house where the husband and

wife, or an unmarried head of a family reside, including the land
on which it is situated. It is constituted jointly by the husband
and the wife or by an unmarried head of a family."

The actual value of the family home shall not exceed, at the time
of its constitution, the amount of P300,000.00 in urban areas
and P200,000.00 in rural areas. Under the afore-quoted
provision, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and a
lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. There is no
need to constitute the same judicially or extra-judicially.

There can be no question that a family home is generally exempt

from execution, provided it was duly constituted as such. It is
likewise a given that the family home must be constituted on
property owned by the persons constituting it. Indeed as pointed
out in Kelley, Jr. v. Planters Products, Inc. "The family home
must be part of the properties of the absolute community or the
conjugal partnership, or of the exclusive properties of either
spouse with the latter’s consent, or on the property of the
unmarried head of the family.

Therein lies the fatal flaw in the postulate of petitioners. For all
their arguments to the contrary, the stark and immutable fact is
that the property on which their alleged family home stands is
owned by respondents and the question of ownership had been
long laid to rest with the finality of the appellate court’s
judgment in CA-G.R. CV No. 55207. Thus, petitioners’ continued
stay on the subject land is only by mere tolerance of
respondents.

All told, it is too late in the day for petitioners to raise this issue.
Without doubt, the instant case where the family home issue
has been vigorously pursued by petitioners is but a clear-cut
ploy meant to forestall the enforcement of an otherwise final and
executory decision. The execution of a final judgment is a matter
of right on the part of the prevailing party whose implementation
is mandatory and ministerial on the court or tribunal issuing the
judgment.
 415

JUANITA TRINIDAD RAMOS vs. DANILO PANGILINAN

G.R. No. 185920               July 20, 2010

Facts:
Respondents filed in 2003 a complaint for illegal dismissal
against E.M. Ramos Electric, Inc., a company owned by Ernesto
M. Ramos, the patriarch of herein petitioners. The Labor Arbiter
ruled in favor of respondents and ordered Ramos and the
company to pay the backwages, separation pay, 13th month pay
& service incentive leave pay.

The Decision having become final and executory and no

settlement having been forged by the parties, the Labor Arbiter
issued a writ of execution which the Deputy Sheriff of the NLRC
implemented by levying a property in Ramos’ name situated in
Pandacan, Manila.

Alleging that the Pandacan property was the family home, hence,
exempt from execution to satisfy the judgment award, Ramos
and the company moved to quash the writ of execution.
Respondents, however, averred that the Pandacan property is
not the Ramos family home, as it has another in Antipolo, and
the Pandacan property in fact served as the company’s business
address as borne by the company’s letterhead. Respondents
added that, assuming that the Pandacan property was indeed
the family home, only the value equivalent to P300,000 was
exempt from execution.

The NLRC brushed aside petitioners’ contention that they should

have been given a fresh period of 1 year from the time of Ramos’
death on July 29, 2008 or until July 30, 2009 to redeem the
property, holding that to do so would give petitioners, as mere
heirs, a better right than the Ramos’. As to petitioners’ claim
that the property was covered by the regime of conjugal
partnership of gains and as such only Ramos’ share can be
levied upon, the NLRC ruled that petitioners failed to
substantiate such claim and that the phrase in the TCT
indicating the registered owner as "Ernesto Ramos, married to
Juanita Trinidad, Filipinos," did not mean that both owned the
property, the phrase having merely described Ramos’ civil
status. Before the appellate court, petitioners alleged that Art.
153 of the Family Code was applicable, hence, they no longer
had to resort to judicial or extrajudicial constitution.
 416

In the assailed Decision, the appellate court, in denying

petitioners’ appeal, held that the Pandacan property was not
exempted from execution, for while "Article 153 of the Family
Code provides that the family home is deemed constituted on a
house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence,
[it] did not mean that the article has a retroactive effect such
that all existing family residences are deemed to have been
constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior
to the effectivity of the Family Code."

The appellate court went on to hold that what was applicable law
were Articles 224 to 251 of the Civil Code, hence, there was still
a need to either judicially or extrajudicially constitute the
Pandacan property as petitioners’ family home before it can be
exempted; and as petitioners failed to comply therewith, there
was no error in denying the motion to quash the writ of
execution.

Issue:
WON the levy on the Pandacan property is valid.

Held:
YES. The general rule is that the family home is a real right
which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment,
constituted over the dwelling place and the land on which it
is situated, which confers upon a particular family the right
to enjoy such properties, which must remain with the
person constituting it and his heirs. It cannot be seized by
creditors except in certain special cases.

For the family home to be exempt from execution, distinction

must be made as to what law applies based on when it was
constituted and what requirements must be complied with by
the judgment debtor or his successors claiming such privilege.
Hence, two sets of rules are applicable.

If the family home was constructed before the effectivity of the

Family Code or before August 3, 1988, then it must have been
constituted either judicially or extra-judicially as provided under
Articles 225, 229-231 and 233 of the Civil Code. Judicial
constitution of the family home requires the filing of a verified
petition before the courts and the registration of the court’s
order with the Registry of Deeds of the area where the property
 417

is located. Meanwhile, extrajudicial constitution is governed by

Articles 240 to 242 of the Civil Code and involves the execution
of a public instrument which must also be registered with the
Registry of Property. Failure to comply with either one of these
two modes of constitution will bar a judgment debtor from
availing of the privilege.

On the other hand, for family homes constructed after the

effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, there is no
need to constitute extrajudicially or judicially, and the
exemption is effective from the time it was constituted and lasts
as long as any of its beneficiaries under Art. 154 actually resides
therein. Moreover, the family home should belong to the
absolute community or conjugal partnership, or if exclusively by
one spouse, its constitution must have been with consent of the
other, and its value must not exceed certain amounts depending
upon the area where it is located. Further, the debts incurred for
which the exemption does not apply as provided under Art. 155
for which the family home is made answerable must have been
incurred after August 3, 1988.

And in both cases, whether under the Civil Code or the Family
Code, it is not sufficient that the person claiming exemption
merely alleges that such property is a family home. This claim
for exemption must be set up and proved.

In the present case, since petitioners claim that the family home
was constituted prior to August 3, 1988, or as early as 1944,
they must comply with the procedure mandated by the Civil
Code. There being absolutely no proof that the Pandacan
property was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as the
Ramos’ family home, the law’s protective mantle cannot be
availed of by petitioners. Parenthetically, the records show that
the sheriff exhausted all means to execute the judgment but
failed because Ramos’ bank accountswere already closed while
other properties in his or the company’s name had already been
transferred, and the only property left was the Pandacan
property.
 418

EQUITABLE PCI BANK vs. OJ-MARK TRADING, INC. and

SPOUSES OSCAR AND EVANGELINE MARTINEZ,
G.R. No. 165950               August 11, 2010

Facts:
Respondent-spouses Martinez obtained loans from petitioner
Equitable Bank in the aggregate amount of P4,048,800.00. As
security for the said amount, a Real Estate Mortgage (REM) was
executed over a condominium unit in Valle Verde 5, Pasig City
where the spouses are residing. Respondent Oscar Martinez
signed the REM both as principal debtor and as President of the
registered owner and third-party mortgagor, respondent OJ-
Mark Trading, Inc. Respondent-spouses defaulted in the
payment of their outstanding loan obligation. They offered to
settle their indebtedness "with the assignment to the Bank of a
commercial lot of corresponding value" and also requested for
recomputation at a lower interest rate and condonation of
penalties. However, respondent Oscar Martinez failed to submit
the required documents. Consequently, petitioner initiated the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the REM.

Respondents filed for TRO, Injunction and Annulment of

Extrajudicial Foreclosure Sale which was granted by the RTC.

In its decision, the CA ruled that respondent spouses have

sufficiently shown that they have a right over the condominium
unit which is subject of the mortgage. This proprietary right over
the condominium is what they are trying to protect when they
applied for preliminary injunction. As respondent spouses have
alleged in their complaint, the issuance of notice of foreclosure
sale is at most premature as there are still several factual issues
that need to be resolved before a foreclosure can be effected.
Such already constitute the ostensible right which respondent
spouses possess in order for the foreclosure sale to be
temporarily enjoined.

Petitioner argued that the appellate court’s conclusion that

respondents possess proprietary right over the mortgaged
property subject of foreclosure is utterly baseless, for the
following reasons: first, while the condominium unit is
supposedly a family home, it is admittedly owned by respondent
corporation and not by the conjugal partnership or absolute
community of respondent-spouses; and second, even assuming
 419

that OJ-Mark Trading, Inc. is a family corporation, respondents’

stance contravenes the established rule that properties
registered in the name of the corporation are owned by it as an
entity separate and distinct from its members or stockholders.

Issue:
WON respondents sps. martinez have proprietary right over the
mortgaged condominium unit.

Held:
NONE. Respondent-spouses’ alleged "proprietary right" in the
mortgaged condominium unit appears to be based merely on
respondents’ averment that respondent OJ-Mark Trading, Inc. is
a family corporation. However, there is neither allegation nor
evidence to show prima facie that such purported right, whether
as majority stockholder or creditor, was superior to that of
petitioner as creditor-mortgagee. The rule requires that in order
for a preliminary injunction to issue, the application should
clearly allege facts and circumstances showing the existence of
the requisites. It must be emphasized that an application for
injunctive relief is construed strictly against the pleader.

We note that the claim of exemption under Art. 153 of the

Family Code, thereby raising issue on the mortgaged
condominium unit being a family home and not corporate
property, is entirely inconsistent with the clear contractual
agreement of the REM. Assuming arguendo that the mortgaged
condominium unit constitutes respondents’ family home, the
same will not exempt it from foreclosure as Article 155 (3) of
the same Code allows the execution or forced sale of a
family home "for debts secured by mortgages on the
premises before or after such constitution." Respondents
thus failed to show an ostensible right that needs protection of
the injunctive writ. Clearly, the appellate court seriously erred in
sustaining the trial court’s orders granting respondents’
application for preliminary injunction.
 420

SPOUSES DE MESA vs. SPOUSES ACERO

G.R. NO. 185064 January 16, 2011

Facts:
Petitioner spouses De Mesa jointly purchased a parcel of land in
Meycauayan, Bulacan on April 17, 1984 while they were still
merely cohabiting before their marriage. The said land was
registered under the name of Arceli De Mesa. A house was later
on constructed on the subject property, which the petitioners De
mesa occupied as their family home after they got married in
January 1987.

Sometime in September 1988, Araceli obtained a loan from

respondent Claudio D. Acero, Jr. which was secured by a
mortgage over the subject property. As payment, Araceli issued a
check payable to Claudio but which was later on dishonored.
The petitioners failed to heed Claudio’s subsequent demand for
payment.

Thus, on April 26, 1990, Claudio filed a complaint for violation

of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. 22) against the petitioners. The
RTC rendered a Decision acquitting the petitioners but ordering
them to pay Claudio. A writ of execution was issued and the
Sheriff levied the subject property and was sold on public
auction; Claudio was the highest bidder and the corresponding
certificate of sale was issued to him.

In February 1995, Claudio leased the subject property to the

petitioners and a certain Juanito Oliva. However, the petitioners
and Juanito defaulted in the payment of the rent. On March 24,
1995, a Final Deed of Sale over the subject property was issued
to Claudio and a TCT was issued in his favor. Unable to collect,
Claudio filed a complaint for ejectment with the MTC of
Meycauayan, Bulacan against the petitioners and Juanito.

Petitioners then filed against the respondents a complaint to

nullify TCT issued under Claudio’s name asserting that the
subject property is a family home, which is exempt from
execution under the Family Code and, thus, could not have been
validly levied upon for purposes of satisfying the March 15, 1993
writ of execution.
 421

Issue:
WON the subject property is a family home.

Held:
NO. The subject property became a family residence sometime in
January 1987. There was no showing, however, that the same
was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family home in
accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code. Still, when the
Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988, the subject property
became a family home by operation of law and was thus
prospectively exempt from execution. The petitioners were thus
correct in asserting that the subject property was a family home.

Despite the fact that the subject property is a family home and,
thus, should have been exempt from execution, we nevertheless
rule that the CA did not err in dismissing the petitioners’
complaint for nullification of TCT No. T-221755 (M). We agree
with the CA that the petitioners should have asserted the
subject property being a family home and its being exempted
from execution at the time it was levied or within a reasonable
time thereafter.

Having failed to set up and prove to the sheriff the supposed

exemption of the subject property before the sale thereof at
public auction, the petitioners now are barred from raising the
same. Failure to do so estop them from later claiming the said
exemption.

Indeed, the family home is a sacred symbol of family love and is

the repository of cherished memories that last during one’s
lifetime. It is likewise without dispute that the family home, from
the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries
actually resides therein, is generally exempt from execution,
forced sale or attachment.

The family home is a real right, which is gratuitous, inalienable

and free from attachment. It cannot be seized by creditors except
in certain special cases. However, this right can be waived or be
barred by laches by the failure to set up and prove the status of
the property as a family home at the time of the levy or a
reasonable time thereafter.
 422

In this case, it is undisputed that the petitioners allowed a

considerable time to lapse before claiming that the subject
property is a family home and its exemption from execution and
forced sale under the Family Code. The petitioners allowed the
subject property to be levied upon and the public sale to
proceed. One (1) year lapsed from the time the subject property
was sold until a Final Deed of Sale was issued to Claudio and,
later, Araceli’s Torrens title was cancelled and a new one issued
under Claudio’s name, still, the petitioner remained silent. In
fact, it was only after the respondents filed a complaint for
unlawful detainer, or approximately four (4) years from the time
of the auction sale, that the petitioners claimed that the subject
property is a family home, thus, exempt from execution.

For all intents and purposes, the petitioners’ negligence or

omission to assert their right within a reasonable time gives rise
to the presumption that they have abandoned, waived or
declined to assert it. Since the exemption under Article 153 of
the Family Code is a personal right, it is incumbent upon the
petitioners to invoke and prove the same within the prescribed
period and it is not the sheriff’s duty to presume or raise the
status of the subject property as a family home.

The petitioners’ negligence or omission renders their present

assertion doubtful; it appears that it is a mere afterthought and
artifice that cannot be countenanced without doing the
respondents injustice and depriving the fruits of the judgment
award in their favor. Simple justice and fairness and equitable
considerations demand that Claudio’s title to the property be
respected. Equity dictates that the petitioners are made to suffer
the consequences of their unexplained negligence.
 423

SPOUSES FORTALEZA vs. SPOUSES LAPITAN

G.R. No. 178288               August 15, 2012

Facts:
Petitioner spouses Charlie and Ofelia Fortaleza obtained a loan
from spouses Rolando and Amparo Lapitan. As security, spouses
Fortaleza executed on January 28, 1998 a Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage over their residential house and lot situated in Los
Baños, Laguna. When spouses Fortaleza failed to pay the
indebtedness including the interests and penalties, spouses
Lapitan applied for extrajudicial foreclosure of the REM.

At the sale, the creditors’ son Dr. Raul Lapitan and his wife Rona
(spouses Lapitan) emerged as the highest bidders, thus, a
Certificate of Sale was registered. The one-year redemption
period expired without the spouses Fortaleza redeeming the
mortgage. Thus, spouses Lapitan executed an affidavit of
consolidation of ownership and caused the cancellation of TCT.
Despite the foregoing, the spouses Fortaleza refused spouses
Lapitan’s formal demand to vacate and surrender possession of
the subject property.

The RTC ordered the issuance of a writ of possession explaining

that it is a ministerial duty of the court especially since the
redemption period had expired and a new title had already been
issued in the name of the spouses Lapitan. On appeal, spouses
Fortaleza maintain that the subject property is a family home
exempt from forced sale. Hence, in the spirit of equity and
following the rulings in Tolentino v. Court of Appeals, and De los
Reyes v. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Court should allow
them to exercise the right of redemption even after the expiration
of the one-year period.

Issue:
WON the subject property is exempt from forced sale.

Held:
As a rule, the family home is exempt from execution, forced sale
or attachment. However, Article 155(3) of the Family Code
explicitly allows the forced sale of a family home "for debts
secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such
constitution." In this case, there is no doubt that spouses
Fortaleza voluntarily executed on January 28, 1998 a deed of
 424

Real Estate Mortgage over the subject property which was even
notarized by their original counsel of record. And assuming that
the property is exempt from forced sale, spouses Fortaleza did
not set up and prove to the Sheriff such exemption from forced
sale before it was sold at the public auction.

Certainly, reasonable time for purposes of the law on exemption

does not mean a time after the expiration of the one-year period
for a judgment debtor to redeem the property.

Equally without merit is spouses Fortaleza’s reliance on the

cases of Tolentino and De Los Reyes in praying for the exercise of
the right of redemption even after the expiration of the one-year
period. In Tolentino, we held that an action to redeem filed within
the period of redemption, with a simultaneous deposit of the
redemption money tendered to the sheriff, is equivalent to an
offer to redeem and has the effect of preserving the right to
redemption for future enforcement even beyond the one-year
period. And in De Los Reyes, we allowed the mortgagor to
redeem the disputed property after finding that the tender of the
redemption price to the sheriff was made within the one-year
period and for a sufficient amount.

The circumstances in the present case are far different. The

spouses Fortaleza neither filed an action nor made a formal offer
to redeem the subject property accompanied by an actual and
simultaneous tender of payment. It is also undisputed that they
allowed the one-year period to lapse from the registration of the
certificate of sale without redeeming the mortgage. For all
intents and purposes, spouses Fortaleza have waived or
abandoned their right of redemption.

Although the rule on redemption is liberally interpreted in favor

of the original owner of the property, we cannot apply the
privilege of liberality to accommodate the spouses Forteza due to
their negligence or omission to exercise the right of redemption
within the prescribed period without justifiable cause.
 425

VOLTAIRE ARBOLARIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 129163            April 22, 2003

Facts:
The original owners of the controverted lot, spouses Anselmo Baloyo
and Macaria Lirazan had five (5) children, namely: (1) Agueda
Colinco, (2) Catalina Baloyo, (3) Eduardo Baloyo, Gaudencia Baloyo,
and (5) Julian Baloyo. All of the above-named persons are now
dead. Agueda Colinco was survived by her two children, namely,
Antonio Colinco and respondent Irene Colinco. Antonio Colinco
predeceased his three daughters, herein respondents, Ruth, Orpha,
and Goldelina, all surnamed Colinco.

Catalina Baloyo was married to Juan Arbolario. Their union was

blessed with the birth of only one child, Purificacion Arbolario,
who, in 1985, died a spinster and without issue. Purificacion’s
father, Juan Arbolario, consorted with another woman by the name
of Francisca Malvas. From this cohabitation was born the
petitioners Voltaire Arbolario, Lucena Arbolario Taala, Fe Arbolario,
Exaltacion Arbolario, and Carlos Arbolario. It is significant to note,
at this juncture, that all the foregoing petitioners were born well
before the year 1951.

In 1946, Eduardo Baloyo sold his entire interest to his sister,

Agueda Baloyo Colinco, by virtue of a notarized document
acknowledged before Notary Public Deogracias Riego. In 1951, a
notarized declaration of heirship was executed by and between
Agueda, Catalina, Gaudencia, and their brothers Eduardo and
Julian, who extrajudicially declared themselves to be the only heirs
of the late spouses Anselmo Baloyo and Macaria Lirazan.

The fourth child, Gaudencia Baloyo, conveyed her interest in the

said lot in favor of her two nieces, Irene Colinco to one-half (1/2)
and Purificacion Arbolario to the other half. And as far as Julian
Baloyo -- the fifth and last child --was concerned, records could
only show that he was married to a certain Margarita Palma; and
that he died, presumably after 1951 without any issue.

Purificacion Arbolario was then allowed to take possession of a

portion of the disputed parcel until her death sometime in 1984 or
1985.

Respondents Irene Colinco, Ruth Colinco, Orpha Colinco, and

Goldelina Colinco, believing themselves to be the only surviving
heirs of Anselmo Baloyo and Macaria Lirazan, executed a
 426

‘Declaration of Heirship and Partition Agreement’, dated May 8,

1987 where they adjudicated upon themselves their proportionate
or ideal shares the subject lot. On October 2, 1987, the Colincos
filed a case against Spouses Rosalita Rodriguez Salhay and Carlito
Salhay, seeking to recover possession of a portion of the aforesaid
lot occupied by respondent spouses Salhays since 1970.

The Salhays alleged in their defense that they have been the lawful
lessees of the late Purificacion Arbolario since 1971 up to 1978; and
that said spouses allegedly purchased the disputed portion of Lot
No. 323 from the deceased lessor sometime in September 1978.

The Arbolario’s, on the other hand, filed for Cancellation of Title

with Damages’, against the respondents claiming that the
‘Declaration of Heirship and Partition Agreement’ executed by he
Colincos was defective and thus voidable as they (Arbolarios) were
excluded therein. The Arbolarios claim that they succeeded intestate
to the inheritance of their alleged half-sister, Purificacion Arbolario;
and, as forced heirs, they should be included in the distribution of
the aforesaid lot.

In its decision, the RTC ruled in favor of the Arbolarios declaring

that the Declaration of Heirship and Partition Agreement executed
by the Colincos as null and void and of no effect insofar as the
share of Purificacion Arbolario is concerned. The trial court held
that the Arbolarios were the brothers and the sisters of the deceased
Purificacion Arbolario, while the Colincos were her cousins and
nieces. Pursuant to Article 1009 of the Civil Code, the Colincos
could not inherit from her, because she had half-brothers and half-
sisters. Their 1987 Declaration of Heirship and Partition Agreement
was made in bad faith, because they knew all along the existence of,
and their relationship with, the Arbolarios.

On appeal, the CA rejected the contention of petitioners that "the

cohabitation of their father with their natural mother, Francisca
Malvas, was by virtue of a valid marriage." The appellate court
observed that the Arbolarios had all been born before the death
of Catalina Baloyo, as shown by the Deed of Declaration of
Heirship, which she had executed in 1951. No evidence was ever
presented showing that her conjugal union with Juan Arbolario had
been judicially annulled or lawfully ended before that year. Because
it was also in 1951 when Juan Arbolario cohabited with
Francisca Malvas, their union was presumably extramarital.
Consequently, their children are illegitimate half-brothers and
half-sisters of Purificacion, the daughter of Juan and Catalina.
 427

Illegitimate children are barred by Article 992 of the Civil Code from
inheriting intestate from the legitimate children and relatives of
their father or mother. As the illegitimate siblings of the late
Purificacion Arbolario, petitioners cannot conveniently
undermine the legal limitations by insisting that they were
treated as half-brothers and half-sisters by the deceased. On the
other hand, there is no impediment for respondents to declare
themselves as the sole and forced heirs of Anselmo Baloyo and
Macaria Lirazan

Issue:
WON the Arbolarios were entitled to inherit from their half-sister
Purificacion.

Held:
NO. There is no solid basis for the argument of petitioners that
Juan Arbolario’s marriage to Francisca Malvas was valid,
supposedly because Catalina Baloyo was already dead when they
were born. It does not follow that just because his first wife has
died, a man is already conclusively married to the woman who bore
his children. A marriage certificate or other generally accepted proof
is necessary to establish the marriage as an undisputable fact.

Clear and substantial evidence is required to support the claim of

petitioners that they were preterited from the 1951 Declaration of
Heirship. The RTC Decision merely declared that they were half-
brothers and half-sisters of Purificacion, while respondents were her
cousins and nieces (collateral relatives). It made no pronouncement
as to whether they were her legitimate or illegitimate siblings.

Paternity or filiation, or the lack of it, is a relationship that

must be judicially established. It stands to reason that children
born within wedlock are legitimate. Petitioners, however, failed to
prove the fact (or even the presumption) of marriage between their
parents, Juan Arbolario and Francisca Malvas; hence, they cannot
invoke a presumption of legitimacy in their favor.

As it is, we have to follow the settled rule that the CA’s factual
findings cannot be set aside, because they are supported by the
evidence on record. As held by the appellate court, without proof
that Catalina died in 1903, her marriage to Juan is presumed to
have continued. Even where there is actual severance of the filial
companionship between spouses, their marriage subsists, and
either spouse’s cohabitation with any third party cannot be
presumed to be between "husband and wife."
 428

FELICIDAD BARIÑAN TAN vs. ATTY. GALILEO J. TROCIO

A.C. No. 2115. November 27, 1990.

Facts:
Complainant Tan, owner and directress of Harlyn Vocational
School in Baroy, Lanao del Norte, declares that sometime in
April, 1971, at about 8:30 PM, after classes were dismissed,
respondent Atty. Trocio, who is the legal counsel of the school,
overpowered her inside the office and, against her will,
succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her. As a result, she
begot a son on 5 February 1972 whom she named and registered
as Jewel Tan. She avers that respondent used to support Jewel
but subsequently lost interest in doing so thereby neglecting to
defray the needed expenses for Jewel’s well-being. Complainant
also alleges that the respondent threatened her with the
deportation of her alien husband if she complained to the
authorities since she was violating the Anti-Dummy Law in
operating the vocational school. This threat, aside from the fact
that Complainant is a married woman with eight children and a
school directress at the time of the sexual assault, made her
desist from filing a charge against the Respondent. However,
after eight years and thorough soul-searching, she decided to file
this administrative complaint.

Respondent vehemently denies that he had sexually assaulted

the Complainant. He argues that her motivation in filing this
charge was to get even with him after having been humiliated
when he declined her request to commit a "breach of trust."

Issue:
WON respondet had, in fact, sexually assault the Complainant,
as a consequence of which the latter begot a child by him.

Held:
NO. Complainant’s contention that Respondent continued
supporting the child for several years for which reason she
desisted from charging him criminally, has not been
substantiated. The testimonies of Complainant and witness
Marilou Pangandaman, another maid, to show unusual
closeness between Respondent and Jewel, like playing with him
and giving him toys, are not convincing enough to prove
paternity, as Complainant would want us to believe. The same
must be said of Exhibits A, A1, B and B1, which are pictures of
 429

Jewel and the Respondent showing allegedly their physical

likeness to each other. Such evidence is inconclusive to prove
paternity, and much less would it prove violation of
Complainant’s person and honor.

More importantly, Jewel Tan was born in 1972, during wedlock

of Complainant and her husband and the presumption should
be in favor of legitimacy unless physical access between the
couple was impossible. From the evidence on hand, the
presumption has not been overcome by adequate and convincing
proof. In fact, Jewel was registered in his birth certificate the
legitimate child of the Complainant and her husband, Tan Le
Pok.
 430

BELEN ANGELES VS. CORAZON ANGELES-MAGLAYA

GR No. 153798, September 2, 2005

Facts:
Respondent Corazon Angeles-Maglaya filed a petition for letters
of administratix and her appointment as administratix of the
intestate estate of Francisco Angeles. She claimed that she is the
sole legitimate heir of Francisco Angeles and Genoveva Mercado,
who according to her got married on 1938.

On the other hand, petitioner Belen Angeles is the 2 nd wife of

Francisco, whom the latter married in 1948. Franscisco died
intestate in 1998 leaving behind 4 parcels of land and a
building. Belen opposed this petition and prayed that she,
instead of Corazon, be proclaimed the admistratrix of Francisco‘s
estate.

After establishing the circumstances of her marriage to

Francisco (i.e. married before a Judge and ratified two months
later in religious rites; Francisco presented himself to be single
that time), Belen attacked the legitimacy of Corazon, saying that
her birth certificate was not signed by Francisco. She has also
failed to present the marriage contract between her parents,
Francisco and Genoveva. Furthermore, Belen averred that she
and Francisco legally adopted Concesa Yamat during their
marriage.

In her reply to opposition, respondent alleged, inter alia, that per

certification of the appropriate offices, the January to December
1938 records of marriages of the Civil Registrar of Bacolor,
Pampanga where the alleged 1938 Francisco-Genoveva wedding
took place, were destroyed. In the same reply, respondent
dismissed as of little consequence the adoption adverted to
owing to her having interposed with the Court of Appeals a
petition to nullify the decree of adoption entered by the RTC at
Caloocan. Respondent also maintained that she has been in
open and continuous possession of the status of legitimate child
as testified by 4 witnesses. In her birth certificate presented, it
contains a handwritten word ― “Yes, under the question ―
Legitimate?”

 Trial court dismissed petition for lack of proof of filiation as

legitimate child, but the Court of Appeals reversed this on the
 431

grounds that petitioner‘s motion being a demurrer (under Sec 1

Rule 33) thereby waived her right to present opposing evidence,
and that respondent has sufficiently established her filiation

Issue:
WON respondent is the legitimate child of decedent Francisco M.
Angeles and Genoveva Mercado.

Held:
NO. A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a
valid and lawful marriage. Remove the element of lawful union
and there is strictly no legitimate filiation between parents and
child. Article 164 of the Family Code cannot be more emphatic
on the matter: "Children conceived or born during the marriage of
the parents are legitimate."

A party in whose favor the legal presumption exists may rely on

and invoke such legal presumption to establish a fact in issue.
He need not introduce evidence to prove that fact. For, a
presumption is prima facie proof of the fact presumed. However,
it cannot be over-emphasized, that while a fact thus prima facie
established by legal presumption shall, unless overthrown,
stand as proved, the presumption of legitimacy under Article 164
of the Family Code may be availed only upon convincing proof of
the factual basis therefor, i.e., that the child’s parents were
legally married and that his/her conception or birth occurred
during the subsistence of that marriage. Else, the presumption
of law that a child is legitimate does not arise.

In the case at bench, respondent’s gratuitous assertion and the

entry in her certificate of birth, are absolutely no proof of the
decedent’s marriage to respondent’s mother, Genoveva Mercado.
To stress, no marriage certificate or marriage contract of
Francisco’s and Genoveva’s marriage, if one had been
solemnized – was offered in evidence. No priest, judge, mayor, or
other solemnizing authority was called to the witness box to
declare that he solemnized the marriage between the two. None
of the four (4) witnesses respondent presented could say
anything about, let alone affirm, that supposed marriage. At
best, their testimonies proved that respondent was Francisco’s
daughter.
 432

Parenthetically, the Birth Certificate presented was not signed by

Francisco against whom legitimate filiation is asserted. Not even
by Genoveva. It was signed by the attending physician, one
Rebecca De Guzman, who certified to having attended the birth
of a child. Such certificate, albeit considered a public record of a
private document is, under Section 23, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court, evidence only of the fact which gave rise to its execution:
the fact of birth of a child. Jurisprudence teaches that a birth
certificate, to be considered as validating proof of paternity
and as an instrument of recognition, must be signed by the
father and mother jointly, or by the mother alone if the
father refuses.

In the case at bench, other than the self-serving declaration of

the petitioner, there is nothing in the record to support
petitioner’s claim that she is indeed a legitimate child of the late
Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Y. Mercado. xxx In other
words, Francisco M. Angeles was never married before or at
anytime prior to his marriage to Belen Sagad, contrary to the
claim of petitioner that Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Y.
Mercado were married in 1938.

While petitioner may have submitted certifications to the effect

that the records of marriages during the war years . . . were
totally destroyed, no secondary evidence was presented by
petitioner to prove the existence of the marriage between
Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Y. Mercado, even as no
witness was presented to confirm the celebration of such
marriage . . . .

Having failed to prove that she is the legitimate daughter or

acknowledged natural child of the late Francisco M. Angeles,
petitioner cannot be a real party in interest in the adoption
proceedings, as her consent thereto is not essential or required.
 433

SSS vs. ROSANNA H. AGUAS

G.R. No. 165546             February 27, 2006

Facts:
Pablo Aguas, SSS pensioner, died on December 8, 1996. His
surviving spouse Rosanna Aguas filed a claim with the SSS for
death benefits. In her claim, Rosanna indicated that Pablo was
survived by his minor child Jeylnn. Her claim was approved on
February 13, 1997. 

In April 1997, deceased sister, Leticia Aguas-Macapinlac

contested Rosanna’s claim, saying that Rosanna abandoned the
family abode about 6 years earlier and that she was living with
another man. Leticia further alleged that Pablo did not have any
children with Rosanna but Rosanna had several children with a
certain Romeo dela Pena. SSS suspended the payment of the
pension and conducted an investigation. The investigation
confirmed that Pablo did not have any children with Rosanna
and that Pablo was incapable of having children based on the
certification of Dr. Manuel Macapinlac that Pablo was infertile. 

It was on this ground that the SSS denied Rosanna’s request to

resume payment and ordered Rosanna to refund to SSS the
Php10,350.00 death benefits already released to her and
Jeylnn. 

When Rosanna filed a petition with the Social Security

Commission, Janet H. Aguas also claiming to be a child of the
deceased, joined Rosanna and Jeylnn as claimants. As proof, the
petition included a photocopy of Jeylnn and Janet’s certificates
of live birth. SSS denied their claims but decided to conduct
hearings. During the hearings, the SSC found sufficient proof
that Rosanna contracted marriage with Romeo dela Pena while
still being married to Pablo; that Rosanna had a child with
Romeo dela Pena while still married to Pablo (as evidenced by
the baptismal certificate presented to the court for Jenelyn H.
dela Pena showing that the showing that she was the child of
Rosanna Hernandez and Romeo dela Pena) 

The SSC ruled that because of her adultery, Rosanna was no

longer entitled to support from Pablo. As for Jeylnn, the SCC
ruled that Jeylnn was not Pablo’s legitimate child, even if her
birth certificate was signed by Pablo. The SSC deduced from the
 434

records that Jeylnn and Jenelyn was one and the same person.
Janet on the other hand was only adopted by Pablo and
Rosanna but with no legal papers. 

The Court of Appeals reversed the ruling based on the birth

certificates of Janet and Jeylnn showing that they were children
of the deceased. 

Issue:
WON the petitioners may be considered primary beneficiaries of
the deceased for his SSS pension and therefore entitled to the
SSS death benefits.

Held:
Only Jeylnn has sufficiently established her right to a monthly
pension. Jeylnn’s claim is justified by the photocopy of her birth
certificate showing the signature of Pablo as her father
authenticating that Jeylnn was born on October 29, 1991.
Records show that Rosanna and Pablo were married on
December 4, 1977 which continued, as far as the records are
concerned, until the death of Pablo on December 8, 1996.
Based on the records, Jeylnn was born during the marriage of
Rosanna and Pablo. It bears stressing that under Article 164 of
the Family Code, children conceived or born during the marriage
of the parents are legitimate. Since Jeylnn was conceived or
born during the marriage of the parents, she is considered
legitimate. 

Petitioner Rosanna married Romeo dela Pena during her

marriage to Pablo. A wife who is already separated de facto from
her husband cannot be said to be “dependent from support”
upon the husband. 

The presumption of legitimacy under Article 164, however, can

not extend to Janet because her date of birth was not
substantially proven. Such presumption may be availed only
upon convincing proof of the factual basis therefor, i.e., that the
child’s parents were legally married and that his/her conception
or birth occurred during the subsistence of that marriage. Even
if the records show that the spouses adopted Janet, there were
no legal papers to prove it. She therefore does not qualify as a
primary beneficiary
 435

ELINO RIVERA vs. HEIRS OF ROMUALDO VILLANUEVA

G.R. No. 141501             July 21, 2006

Facts:
Petitioners are allegedly the half-brothers (Elino and
Dominador), the half-sister-in-law (Soledad), and the children of
a half-brother (Teofila and Cecilia) of the deceased Pacita
Gonzales (hereinafter Gonzales). Respondents Catalino, Lucia,
Purificacion and Melchor, all surnamed Villanueva, and Arnaldo
V. Avendano are allegedly the siblings, full and half-blood of
Romualdo Villanueva (hereinafter Villanueva). They are
denominated as the heirs of Villanueva and are represented by
Melchor. They were allowed to substitute for Villanueva upon his
death.

From 1927 until her death in 1980, Pacita Gonzales cohabited

with Romualdo Villanueva without the benefit of marriage
because the latter was married to one Amanda Musngi who died
on April 20, 1963. In the course of their cohabitation, they
acquired several properties including the properties contested in
this case. Respondents, Angelina Villanueva and husband
Victoriano de Luna, are allegedly the daughter and the son-in-
law, respectively, of the late Villanueva. Gonzales died on July 3,
1980 without leaving a will.

On August 8, 1980, Villanueva and respondent Angelina

executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with sale, that is, an
extrajudicial settlement of Gonzales' estate comprising a number
of the aforementioned properties. In this document, Villanueva,
conveyed his interests in the estate to Angelina.

Petitioners (Gonzales' half-brothers, etc.) filed a case for partition

of Gonzales' estate and annulment of titles and damages. The
RTC dismissed the complaint holding that Gonzales was never
married to Villanueva and respondent Angelina was her
illegitimate child by Villanueva and therefore her sole heir, to the
exclusion of petitioners.

Petitioners contend that the RTC and CA erred in finding that

respondent Angelina was Gonzales' illegitimate daughter despite
the RTC's ruling in another case in which the trial court
appointed Epifanio Rivera as administrator of Gonzales' estate.
 436

Issue:
WON respondent Angelina was Gonzalez’s illegitimate daughter.

Held:
NO. A closer examination of the birth certificate reveals that
respondent Angelina was listed as "adopted" by both Villanueva
and Gonzales. It is well-settled that a record of birth is merely a
prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. It is not
conclusive evidence of the truthfulness of the statements made
there by the interested parties. Following the logic of Benitez,
respondent Angelina and her co-defendants in SD-857 should
have adduced evidence of her adoption, in view of the contents of
her birth certificate. The records, however, are bereft of any such
evidence.

There are several parallels between this case and Benitez-Badua

that are simply too compelling to ignore. First, both Benitez-
Badua and respondent Angelina submitted birth certificates as
evidence of filiation. Second, both claimed to be children of
parents relatively advanced in age. Third, both claimed to have
been born after their alleged parents had lived together childless
for several years.

There are, however, also crucial differences between Benitez-

Badua and this case which ineluctably support the conclusion
that respondent Angelina was not Gonzales' daughter,
whether illegitimate or adopted. Gonzales, unlike Benitez-
Badua's alleged mother Chipongian, was not only 36 years old
but 44 years old, and on the verge of menopause at the time of
the alleged birth. Gonzales had been living childless with
Villanueva for 20 years. Under the circumstances, it was not
sufficiently established that respondent Angelina was Gonzales'
biological daughter, nor even her adopted daughter. Thus, she
cannot inherit from Gonzales. Since she could not have validly
participated in Gonzales' estate, the extrajudicial partition which
she executed with Villanueva on August 8, 1980 was invalid.
 437

EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III vs. ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY

G.R. No. 183053               October 10, 2012

Facts:
Decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay died intestate. Cristina was
survived by her spouse, Dr. Federico Suntay and five
grandchildren: three legitimate grandchildren, including herein
respondent, Isabel; and two illegitimate grandchildren, including
petitioner Emilio III, all by Federico’s and Cristina’s only child,
Emilio A. Suntay (Emilio I), who predeceased his parents. On 27
September 1993, more than three years after Cristina’s death,
Federico adopted his illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and
Nenita.

Respondent Isabel filed a petition for the issuance of letters of

administration over Cristina’s estate which was opposed by
Federico alleging that Isabel had no right of representation to the
estate of Cristina, she being an illegitimate grandchild of the
latter as a result of Isabel’s parents’ marriage being declared null
and void. However, in Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay, we
categorically declared that Isabel and her siblings, having been
born of a voidable marriage as opposed to a void marriage based
on paragraph 3, Article 85 of the Civil Code, were legitimate
children of Emilio I, who can all represent him in the estate of
their legitimate grandmother, the decedent, Cristina.

Undaunted by the set back, Federico nominated Emilio III to

administer the decedent’s estate on his behalf in the event
letters of administration issues to Federico. On 13 November
2000, Federico died. On 9 November 2001, the RTC rendered a
decision appointing Emilio III as administrator of decedent
Cristina’s intestate estate. On appeal, the CA reversed and set
aside the decision of the RTC, revoked the Letters of
Administration issued to Emilio III, and appointed respondent as
administratrix of the subject estate. As previously adverted to,
on appeal by certiorari, we reversed and set aside the ruling of
the appellate court. We decided to include Emilio III as co-
administrator of Cristina’s estate, giving weight to his interest in
Federico’s estate.

Isabel contends that Emilio III is an illegitimate grandchild and

therefore, not an heir of the decedent. Corollary thereto, Emilio
 438

III, not being a "next of kin" of the decedent, has no interest in

the estate to justify his appointment as administrator thereof.

Issue:
WON Emilio III is qualified to be an administrator of Cristina’s
estate.

Held:
NO. The person to be appointed administrator of a decedent’s
estate must demonstrate not only an interest in the estate, but
an interest therein greater than any other candidate. It is to this
requirement of observation of the order of preference in the
appointment of administrator of a decedent’s estate, that the
appointment of co-administrators has been allowed, but as an
exception.

The Court zeroed in on Emilio III demonstrable interest in the

estate and glossed over the order of preference set forth in the
Rules. We gave weight to Emilio IIIs demonstrable interest in
Cristina’s estate and without a closer scrutiny of the attendant
facts and circumstances, directed co-administration thereof. We
are led to a review of such position by the foregoing survey of
cases.

The collected teaching is that mere demonstration of interest in

the estate to be settled does not ipso facto entitle an interested
person to co-administration thereof. Neither does squabbling
among the heirs nor adverse interests necessitate the
discounting of the order of preference set forth in Section 6, Rule
78. Indeed, in the appointment of administrator of the estate of a
deceased person, the principal consideration reckoned with is
the interest in said estate of the one to be appointed as
administrator. Given Isabel’s unassailable interest in the estate
as one of the decedents legitimate grandchildren and undoubted
nearest "next of kin," the appointment of Emilio III as co-
administrator of the same estate, cannot be a demandable right.
It is a matter left entirely to the sound discretion of the Court
and depends on the facts and the attendant circumstances of
the case.
 439

FEDERICO C. SUNTAY vs. ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY

G.R. No. 132524 December 29, 1998

Facts:
Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay (son of petitioner Federico Suntay) and
Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay were married in the Portuguese Colony
of Macao. Out of this marriage, three children were born namely:
Margarita Guadalupe, Isabel Aguinaldo and Emilio Aguinaldo all
surnamed Cojuangco Suntay. Emilio Aguinaldo filed a complaint
for legal separation against his wife, charging her, among others,
with infidelity and praying for the custody and care of their
children who were living with their mother. On 3 October 1967,
the RTC declared that the marriage celebrated between Emilio
Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay on July 9, 1958
is declared null and void and of no effect as between the parties.

On June 1, 1979, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay predeceased his

mother, the decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay. The latter is
respondent Isabel's paternal grandmother. The decedent died on
June 4, 1990 without leaving a will.

Five years later or on October 26, 1995, respondent Isabel

Aguinaldo Cojuangco Suntay filed a petition for issuance in her
favor of Letters of Administration of the Intestate Estate of her
late grandmother Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay alleging among
others, that she is one of the legitimate grandchildren of the
decedent and prayed that she be appointed as administratrix of
the estate.

This was opposed by petitioner Federico Suntay claiming that he

is the surviving spouse of the decedent, that he has been
managing the conjugal properties even while the decedent has
been alive and is better situated to protect the integrity of the
estate than the petitioner, that petitioner and her family have
been alienated from the decedent and the Oppositor for more
than thirty (30) years and thus, prayed that Letters of
Administration be issued instead to him. Further, he also alleged
that respondent Isabel should not be appointed as
administratrix of the decedent's estate arguing that under Article
992 of the Civil Code an illegitimate child has no right to
succeed by right of representation the legitimate relatives of her
father or mother. Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay, respondent Isabel's
father predeceased his mother, the late Cristina Aguinaldo
 440

Suntay and thus, opened succession by representation.

Petitioner contends that as a consequence of the declaration by
the then CFI of Rizal that the marriage of respondent Isabel's
parents is "null and void," the latter is an illegitimate child, and
has no right nor interest in the estate of her paternal
grandmother — the decedent. The trial court issued the assailed
order denying petitioner's Motion to Dismiss.

Issue:
WON Cristina became an illegitimate child of Emilio and Isabel
after the RTC declared her parent’s marriage as null and void.

Held:
The fundamental distinction between void and voidable
marriages is that a void marriage is deemed never to have
taken place at all. The effects of void marriages, with respect to
property relations of the spouses are provided for under Article
144 of the Civil Code. Children born of such marriages who
are called natural children by legal fiction have the same
status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural
children under Article 89 irrespective of whether or not the
parties to the void marriage are in good faith or in bad faith.

On the other hand, a voidable marriage, is considered valid

and produces all its civil effects, until it is set aside by final
judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment.
Juridically, the annulment of a marriage dissolves the special
contract as if it had never been entered into but the law makes
express provisions to prevent the effects of the marriage from
being totally wiped out. Children conceived of voidable marriages
before the decree of annulment shall be considered legitimate ;
and children conceived thereafter shall have the same status,
rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children, and
are also called natural children by legal fiction.

Indeed, the terms "annul" and "null and void" have different legal
connotations and implications, Annul means to reduce to
nothing; annihilate; obliterate; to make void or of no effect; to
nullify; to abolish; to do away with whereas null and void is
something that does not exist from the beginning. A marriage
that is annulled presupposes that it subsists but later ceases to
have legal effect when it is terminated through a court action.
 441

But in nullifying a marriage, the court simply declares a status

or condition which already exists from the very beginning.

Thus, a reading of the pertinent portions of the decision of the

CFI of Rizal quoted earlier shows that the marriage is voidable.
Inevitably, the decision of the CFI of Rizal declared null and void
the marriage of respondent Isabel's parents based on paragraph
3, Article 85 of the New Civil Code. The legal consequences as to
the rights of the children are therefore governed by the first
clause of the second paragraph of Article 89. A contrary
interpretation would be anathema to the rule just above-
mentioned. Based on said provision the children of Emilio
Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay who were
conceived and born prior to the decree of the trial court setting
aside their marriage on October 3, 1967 are considered
legitimate. For purposes of seeking appointment as estate
administratrix, the legitimate grandchildren, including
respondent Isabel, may invoke their successional right of
representation the estate of their grandmother Cristina
Aguinaldo Suntay after their father, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay,
had predeceased their grandmother. This is, however, without
prejudice to a determination by the courts of whether the Letters
of Administration may be granted to her. Neither do the Court
adjudged herein the successional rights of the personalities
involved over the decedent's estate.
 442

ARTURIO TRINIDAD vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 118904 April 20, 1998

Facts:
Petitioner Arturio Trinidad filed an action for partition of four (4)
parcels of land claiming that he was the son of the late Inocentes
Trinidad, one of three (3) children of Patricio Trinidad, who was
the original owner of the parcels of land. Patricio Trinidad died
in 1940, leaving the four (4) parcels of land to his three (3)
children, Inocentes, Lourdes and Felix. In 1970, Arturio
demanded from the defendants to partition the land into three
(3) equal shares and to give him the one-third (1/3) individual
share of his late father, but the defendants refused.

In their answerdefendants denied that plaintiff was the son of

the late Inocentes Trinidad. Defendants contended that
Inocentes was single when he died in 1941, before Arturio's
birth. Defendants also denied that Arturio had lived with them,
and claimed that the parcels of land described in the complaint
had been in their possession since the death of their father in
1940 and that they had not given plaintiff a share in the produce
of the land.

Arturio Trinidad, born on July 21, 1943, claimed to be the

legitimate son of the late Inocentes Trinidad.

Issue:
WON petitioner has adduced sufficient evidence to prove his
filiation with the late Inocentes Trinidad.

Held:
YES. In the absence of a marriage certificate, any of the four can
be sufficient proof of marriage: fact of marriage ceremony,
open cohabitation of the parties, birth certificate of the
child, and other documents. Arturio presented the first 3.
For filiation, when the birth certificate can’t be produced, other
evidence like the baptismal certificate, is admissible. Use of
surname without objection is also presumptive evidence of
legitimacy.

Petitioner secured a certification from the Office of the Civil

Registrar of Aklan that all records of births, deaths and
marriages were either lost, burned or destroyed during the
 443

Japanese occupation of said municipality. This fact, however, is

not fatal to petitioner's case. Although the marriage contract is
considered the primary evidence of the marital union,
petitioner's failure to present it is not proof that no marriage
took place, as other forms of relevant evidence may take its
place.

In place of a marriage contract, two witnesses were presented by

petitioner: Isabel Meren, who testified that she was present
during the nuptial of Felicidad and Inocentes on May 5, 1942 in
New Washington, Aklan; and Jovita Gerardo, who testified that
the couple deported themselves as husband and wife after the
marriage. Gerardo, the 77-year old barangay captain of Tigayon
and former board member of the local parent-teachers'
association, used to visit Inocentes and Felicidad's house twice
or thrice a week, as she lived only thirty meters away. On July
21, 1943, Gerardo dropped by Inocentes' house when Felicidad
gave birth to petitioner. She also attended petitioner's baptismal
party held at the same house. Her testimony constitutes
evidence of common reputation respecting marriage. It further
gives rise to the disputable presumption that a man and a
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered
into a lawful contract of marriage. Petitioner also presented
his baptismal certificate in which Inocentes and Felicidad
were named as the child's father and mother.

Although a baptismal certificate is indeed not a conclusive proof

of filiation, it is one of "the other means allowed under the Rules
of Court and special laws" to show pedigree.
 444

DE JESUS VS ESTATE OF DIZON

GR NO. 142877, OCTOBER 2, 2001

Facts:
Petitioners Jacqueline and Jinkie Christie De Jesus were born during
the marriage of Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus.
However, in a notarized document, dated 07 June 1991, Juan G. Dizon
acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as being his own
illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de Jesus. Juan G. Dizon died
intestate on 12 March 1992, leaving behind considerable assets
consisting of shares of stock in various corporations and some real
property. It was on the strength of his notarized acknowledgement that
petitioners filed a complaint for "Partition with Inventory and
Accounting" of the Dizon estate.

Respondent, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the

decedent Juan G. Dizon, including the corporations of which the
deceased was a stockholder, sought the dismissal of the case, arguing
that the complaint, even while denominated as being one for partition,
would nevertheless call for altering the status of petitioners from being
the legitimate children of the spouses Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de
Jesus to instead be the illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus and
deceased Juan Dizon.

Finding credence in the argument of respondents, the trial court,

ultimately, dismissed the complaint of petitioners for lack of cause of
action and for being improper. It decreed that the declaration of
heirship could only be made in a special proceeding in asmuch as
petitioners were seeking the establishment of a status or right.

In the instant petition for review on certiorari, petitioners maintain that

their recognition as being illegitimate children of the decedent,
embodied in an authentic writing, is in itself sufficient to establish their
status as such and does not require a separate action for judicial
approval following the doctrine enunciated in Divinagracia vs. Bellosillo.

In the comment, respondents submit that the rule in Divinagracia being

relied by petitioners is inapplicable to the case because there has been
no attempt to impugn legitimate filiation in Divinagracia. In praying for
the affirmance of dismissal of the complaint, respondents count on the
case of Sayson vs. Court of Appeals, which has ruled that the issue of
legitimacy cannot be questioned in a complaint for partition and
accounting but must be seasonably brought up in direct action frontally
addressing the issue.

Issue:
WON petitioners can assail their legitimacy.
 445

Held:
NO. The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is
established by (1) the record of birth appearing the civil register or a
final judgement; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and
continuos possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other
means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. The due
recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court or record, or in any authentic writing is,
in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgement of the child, and
no further court action is required. In fact, any writing is treated not
just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself voluntary
recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval.
Where, instead, a claim for recognition is predicted on other
evidence merely tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a
record of birth, a will, a statement before a court or record or an
authentic writing, judicial action within the applicable statue of
limitations is essential in order to establish the child's
acknowledgement.

The presumption of the law is that children born in wedlock are

legitimate. This presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the absence
of proof that there is physical impossibility of access between the
spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately
precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the
husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact the
husband and wife are living separately in such a way that sexual
intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which
absolutely prevents sexual intercourse. Quite remarkably, upon the
expiration of the periods set forth in Article 170, and in proper
cases Article 171, of the Family Code (which took effect on 03
August 1988), the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child would
no longer be legally feasible and the status conferred by the
presumption becomes fixed and unassailable.

Succinctly, in an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the

late Juan G. Dizon, petitioners, in effect, would impugn their legitimate
status as being children of Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus.
This step cannot be aptly done because the law itself establishes the
legitimacy of children conceived or born during the marriage of the
parents. The presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil status for the
child born in wedlock, and only the father, or in exceptional
instances the latter's heirs, can contest in an appropriate action
the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. Thus, it is only when the
legitimacy of a child has been successfully impugned that the
paternity of the husband can be rejected.
 446

ESTATE OF ROGELIO G. ONG vs. JOANNE RODJIN DIAZ

G.R. No. 171713             December 17, 2007

Facts:
Jinky met Rogelio in 1993. This developed into friendship and
later blossomed into love. At this time, Jinky was already
married to a Japanese national, Hasegawa Katsuo. From
January 1994 to September 1998, Jinky and Rogelio cohabited
and lived together in Tarlac City. From this live-in relationship,
minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz was born on 25 February 1998.

Rogelio brought Jinky to the hospital and took minor Joanne

and Jinky home after delivery. Rogelio paid all the hospital bills
and the baptismal expenses and provided for all of minor
Joanne’s needs – recognizing the child as his. In September
1998, Rogelio abandoned minor Joanne and Jinky, and stopped
supporting minor Joanne, falsely alleging that he is not the
father of the child. Thus, Jinky filed a complaint for compulsory
recognition with prayer for support pending litigation against
Rogelio.

Although the presumption was that Joanne was the legitimate

child of Jinky and her Japanese husband because of their
subsisting marriage, this was turned down by the RTC. It was
established that Jinky’s husband lived abroad and only visited
the Philippines once a year. No evidence was also found that he
visited 1 year preceding the birth of Joanne. RTC ruled that
Joanne was the illegitimate child of Rogelio because he admitted
paying for the hospital bills connectedto her birth, picking up
Jinky after giving birth. During the pendency of the case with
the CA, Rogelio died on 21 February 2005C. Nonetheless, the CA
reversed the RTC’s decision and remanded the case to make way
for DNA analysis. The Estate of Rogelio files for reconsideration
alleging that the death of Rogelio makes DNA testing no longer
possible.

Issue:
WON the death of Rogelio affected the possibility of a DNA test to
prove his filiation with Joanne.

Held:
NO. Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate
paternity but also to secure a legal right associated with
 447

paternity, such as citizenship, support (as in the present case),

or inheritance. The burden of proving paternity is on the person
who alleges that the putative father is the biological father of the
child. There are four significant procedural aspects of a
traditional paternity action which parties have to face: a prima
facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and
physical resemblance between the putative father and child.

A child born to a husband and wife during a valid marriage is

presumed legitimate. The law requires that every reasonable
presumption be made in favor of legitimacy. The presumption of
legitimacy of the child, however, is not conclusive and
consequently, may be overthrown by evidence to the contrary.

Amidst the protestation of petitioner against the DNA analysis,

the resolution thereof may provide the definitive key to the
resolution of the issue of support for minor Joanne. The alleged
impossibility of complying with the order of remand for purposes
of DNA testing is more ostensible than real. Petitioner’s
argument is without basis especially as the New Rules on DNA
Evidence allows the conduct of DNA testing, either motu proprio
or upon application of any person who has a legal interest in the
matter in litigation,

From the foregoing, it can be said that the death of the petitioner
does not ipso facto negate the application of DNA testing for as
long as there exist appropriate biological samples of his DNA. As
defined, the term "biological sample" means any organic material
originating from a person’s body, even if found in inanimate
objects, that is susceptible to DNA testing. This includes blood,
saliva, and other body fluids, tissues, hairs and bones.

Thus, even if Rogelio already died, any of the biological samples

as enumerated above as may be available, may be used for DNA
testing. In this case, petitioner has not shown the impossibility
of obtaining an appropriate biological sample that can be utilized
for the conduct of DNA testing. And even the death of Rogelio
cannot bar the conduct of DNA testing.
 448

IN RE: PETITION FOR CANCELLATION&CORRECTION OF

ENTRIES IN THE RECORD OF BIRTH, EMMA K. LEE vs.CA
G.R. No. 177861               July 13, 2010

Facts:
Spouses Lee Tek Sheng (Lee) and Keh Shiok Cheng (Keh) were
immigrants from China. They had 11 children. In 1948, Lee
brought from China a young woman named Tiu Chuan (Tiu),
supposedly to serve as housemaid. The respondent Lee-Keh
children believe that Tiu left the Lee-Keh household, moved into
another property of Lee nearby, and had a relation with him.

Shortly after Keh died in 1989, the Lee-Keh children learned that
Tiu’s children with Lee (collectively, the Lee’s other children)
claimed that they, too, were children of Lee and Keh. This
prompted the Lee-Keh children to request the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) to investigate the matter.

The NBI found, for example, that in the hospital records, the
eldest of the Lee’s other children, Marcelo Lee (who was recorded
as the 12th child of Lee and Keh), was born of a 17-year-old
mother, when Keh was already 38 years old at the time. Another
of the Lee’s other children, Mariano Lee, was born of a 23-year-
old mother, when Keh was then already 40 years old, and so
forth. In other words, by the hospital records of the Lee’s other
children, Keh’s declared age did not coincide with her actual age
when she supposedly gave birth to such other children,
numbering eight.

On the basis of this report, the respondent Lee-Keh children filed

two separate petitions, one of them is for the deletion from the
certificate of live birth of the petitioner Emma Lee, one of Lee’s
other children, the name Keh and replace the same with the
name Tiu to indicate her true mother’s name.

In April 2005 the Lee-Keh children filed with the RTC an ex

parte request for the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum to
compel Tiu, Emma Lee’s presumed mother, to testify in the case.
The RTC granted the motion but Tiu moved to quash the
subpoena, claiming that it was oppressive and violated the rule
on parental privilege, she being Emma Lee’s stepmother. On
August 5, 2005 the RTC quashed the subpoena it issued for
being unreasonable and oppressive considering that Tiu was
 449

already very old and that the obvious object of the subpoena was
to badger her into admitting that she was Emma Lee’s mother.

On appeal, the Ca held that Tiu’s advanced age alone does not
render her incapable of testifying. The party seeking to quash
the subpoena for that reason must prove that she would be
unable to withstand the rigors of trial, something that petitioner
Emma Lee failed to do.

Issue:
WON Tiu can be compel to testify in the correction of entry case
that respondent Lee-Keh children filed for the correction of the
certificate of birth of petitioner Emma Lee to show that she is not
Keh’s daughter.

Held:
YES. The above is an adaptation from a similar provision in
Article 315 of the Civil Code that applies only in criminal cases.
But those who revised the Rules of Civil Procedure chose to
extend the prohibition to all kinds of actions, whether civil,
criminal, or administrative, filed against parents and other direct
ascendants or descendants.

But here Tiu, who invokes the filial privilege, claims that she is
the stepmother of petitioner Emma Lee. The privilege cannot
apply to them because the rule applies only to "direct"
ascendants and descendants, a family tie connected by a
common ancestry. A stepdaughter has no common ancestry by
her stepmother. Article 965 thus provides:

Art. 965. The direct line is either descending or ascending.

The former unites the head of the family with those who
descend from him. The latter binds a person with those from
whom he descends.

Consequently, Tiu can be compelled to testify against petitioner

Emma Lee.
 450

MAKATI SHANGRI-LA HOTEL vs. ELLEN JOHANNE HARPER

G.R. No. 189998               August 29, 2012

Facts:
Christian Harper came to Manila on a business trip. He checked in at
the Shangri-La Hotel and was billeted at Room 1428. He was due to
check out on November 6, 1999. In the early morning of that date,
however, he was murdered inside his hotel room by still unidentified
malefactors. He was then 30 years old. Respondent Ellen Johanne
Harper, Jonathan Christopher Harper, widow and son of Christian filed
a suit against petitioner for damages due to Christian’s death. The RTC
rendered a decision in favor of the respondents which was affirmed by
the CA.

Issue:
WON the plaintiffs-appellees were able to established their filiation to
the late Christian Harper.

Held:
YES. The respondents presented several documents, like the birth
certificates of Harper and respondent Jonathan Harper, the marriage
certificate of Harper and Ellen Johanne Harper, and the probate court
certificate. All theses documents were presumably regarded as public
documents under the laws of Norway. Such documentary evidence
sufficed to competently establish the relationship and filiation under the
standards of our Rules of Court.

The principle of substantial compliance recognizes that exigencies and

situations do occasionally demand some flexibility in the rigid
application of the rules of procedure and the laws. That rules of
procedure may be mandatory in form and application does not forbid a
showing of substantial compliance under justifiable circumstances,
because substantial compliance does not equate to a disregard of basic
rules. In the interest of substantial justice, even procedural rules of the
most mandatory character in terms of compliance are frequently
relaxed. Similarly, the procedural rules should definitely be liberally
construed if strict adherence to their letter will result in absurdity and
in manifest injustice, or where the merits of a party’s cause are
apparent and outweigh considerations of non-compliance with certain
formal requirements. It is more in accord with justice that a party-
litigant is given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his
claim or defense than for him to lose his life, liberty, honor or property
on mere technicalities. Truly, the rules of procedure are intended to
promote substantial justice, not to defeat it, and should not be applied
in a very rigid and technical sense.
 451

EUGENIO R. REYES vs. LIBRADA F. MAURICIO (deceased)

G.R. No. 175080               November 24, 2010

Facts:
Petitioner was the registered owner of a parcel of land. The subject
property was adjudicated to him by virtue of an extrajudicial settlement
among the hiers following the death of his parents.

Respondents Librada and her daughter Leonida are the legal heirs of
the late Godofredo Mauricio. According to them, Godofredo was the
lawful and registered tenant of petitioner’s parents to the subject land.
They also claimed that there is a tenancy relationship exists between
them and Eugenio.

One of Eugenio’s assertions is that Leonida had no legal personality to

file the present suit. The death of Librada, Godofredo’s sole compulsory
heir, rendered the complaint moot. He contended that Leonida is a mere
ward of Godofredo and Librada, thus, not a legal heir.

Issue:
WON Eugenio can question the filiation of Leonida to Godofredo and
Librada.

Held:
NO. The SC is in full accord with the Court of Appeals when it ruled
that Eugenio cannot collaterally attack the status of Leonida in the
instant petition. It is settled law that filiation cannot be collaterally
attacked. Well-known civilista Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino, in his book
"Civil Code of the Philippines, Commentaries and Jurisprudence," noted
that the aforecited doctrine is rooted from the provisions of the Civil
Code of the Philippines. He explained thus:

The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of

defense or as a collateral issue in another action for a different
purpose. The necessity of an independent action directly impugning
the legitimacy is more clearly expressed in the Mexican code (article
335) which provides: "The contest of the legitimacy of a child by the
husband or his heirs must be made by proper complaint before the
competent court; any contest made in any other way is void." This
principle applies under our Family Code. Articles 170 and 171 of
the code confirm this view, because they refer to "the action to
impugn the legitimacy." This action can be brought only by the
husband or his heirs and within the periods fixed in the present
articles.
 452

REPUBLIC vs. JULIAN COSETENG-MAGPAYO

G.R. No. 189476               February 2, 2011

Facts:
Born in Makati on September 9, 1972, Julian Edward Emerson
Coseteng Magpayo (respondent) is the son of Fulvio M. Magpayo Jr. and
Anna Dominique Marquez-Lim Coseteng who, as respondent’s
certificate of live birth shows, contracted marriage on March 26, 1972.
Claiming, however, that his parents were never legally married,
respondent filed a Petition to change his name to Julian Edward
Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng.

In support of his petition, respondent submitted a certification from the

National Statistics Office stating that his mother Anna Dominique "does
not appear in [its] National Indices of Marriage." Respondent also
submitted his academic records from elementary up to college showing
that he carried the surname "Coseteng," and the birth certificate of his
child where "Coseteng" appears as his surname. In the 1998, 2001 and
2004 Elections, respondent ran and was elected as Councilor of Quezon
City’s 3rd District using the name "JULIAN M.L. COSETENG."

No opposition to the petition having been filed, an order of general

default was entered by the trial court which then allowed respondent to
present evidence ex parte. The trial court granted respondent’s petition
and directed the Civil Registrar of Makati City:

1. Delete the entry "March 26, 1972" in Item 24 for "DATE AND
PLACE OF MARRIAGE OF PARTIES" [in herein respondent’s
Certificate of live Birth];
2. Correct the entry "MAGPAYO" in the space for the Last Name of
the [respondent] to "COSETENG";
3. Delete the entry "COSETENG" in the space for Middle Name of
the [respondent]; an
4. Delete the entry "Fulvio Miranda Magpayo, Jr." in the space for
FATHER of the [respondent]… (emphasis and underscoring
supplied; capitalization in the original)

The Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed a motion for

reconsideration but it was denied by the trial court by Order of July 2,
2009, hence, it, thru the OSG, lodged the present petition for review to
the Court on pure question of law.

The Republic contends that the deletion of the entry on the date and
place of marriage of respondent’s parents from his birth certificate has
the effect of changing his civil status from legitimate to illegitimate,
hence, any change in civil status of a person must be effected through
an appropriate adversary proceeding. The Republic adds that by
ordering the deletion of respondent’s parents’ date of marriage and the
 453

name of respondent’s father from the entries in respondent’s birth

certificate, the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction.

Issue:
WON a child can impugn his own legitimacy.

Held:
NO. In the present case, however, respondent denies his legitimacy. The
change being sought in respondent’s petition goes so far as to affect his
legal status in relation to his parents. It seeks to change his legitimacy
to that of illegitimacy. Rule 103 then would not suffice to grant
respondent’s supplication.

Since respondent’s desired change affects his civil status from

legitimate to illegitimate, Rule 108 applies. Rule 108 clearly directs that
a petition which concerns one’s civil status should be filed in the civil
registry in which the entry is sought to be cancelled or corrected – that
of Makati in the present case, and "all persons who have or claim any
interest which would be affected thereby" should be made parties to the
proceeding.

As earlier stated, however, the petition of respondent was filed not in

Makati where his birth certificate was registered but in Quezon City.
And as the above-mentioned title of the petition filed by respondent
before the RTC shows, neither the civil registrar of Makati nor his father
and mother were made parties thereto.

Even assuming arguendo that respondent had simultaneously availed

of these two statutory remedies, respondent cannot be said to have
sufficiently complied with Rule 108. For, as reflected above, aside from
improper venue, he failed to implead the civil registrar of Makati and all
affected parties as respondents in the case.

Republic v. Labrador mandates that "a petition for a substantial

correction or change of entries in the civil registry should have as
respondents the civil registrar, as well as all other persons who have or
claim to have any interest that would be affected thereby." It cannot be
gainsaid that change of status of a child in relation to his parents is a
substantial correction or change of entry in the civil registry.
 454

MARIANO ANDAL VS. EDUVIGIS MACARAIG

G.R. NO. L-2474 May 30, 1951

Facts: 
Mariano Andal, assisted by his mother Maria Dueñas, as guardian ad
litem, brought an action in the CIF of Camarines Sur for the recovery of
the ownership and possession of a parcel of land situated in Camarines
Sur. The complaint alleges that Mariano Andal is the surviving son of
Emiliano Andal and Maria Dueñas and that Emiliano was the owner of
the parcel of land in question having acquired it from his mother
Eduvigis Macaraig by virtue of a donation propter nuptias executed by
the latter in favor of the former. 

The lower court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs (a) declaring
Mariano Andal the legitimate son of Emiliano Andal and such entitled to
inherit the land in question; (b) declaring Mariano Andal owner of said
land; and (c) ordering the defendant to pay the costs of suit. Defendant
took the case to this Court upon the plea that only question of law are
involved. 

Emiliano Andal became sick of tuberculosis. Sometime thereafter, his

brother, Felix, went to live in his house to help him work his house to
help him work his farm. His sickness became worse, he became so
weak that he could hardly move and get up from his bed. Maria
Dueñas, his wife, eloped with Felix, and both went to live in the house
of Maria's father. Felix and Maria had sexual intercourse and treated
each other as husband and wife. Emiliano died without the presence of
his wife, who did not even attend his funeral. Maria Dueñas gave birth
to a boy, who was given the name of Mariano Andal. 

Issue: 
WON the child is considered as the legitimate son of Emiliano. 

Ruling: 
YES. Emiliano died on January 1, 1943 and Mariano was born on June
17, 1943. It is then presumed that Mariano is a legitimate son of
Emiliano and Maria having been born within 300 days following the
dissolution of the marriage. The presumption can only be rebutted by
proof that it was physically impossible for the husband to have had
access to his wife during the first 120 days of the 300 next preceding
the birth of the child. The fact that the wife has committed adultery
cannot overcome this presumption.
 455

GERARDO CONCEPCION VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 123450, August 31, 2005

Facts:
Gerardo Concepcion, the petitioner, and Ma. Theresa Almonte,
private respondent, were married in December 1989, and begotten a
child named Jose Gerardo in December 1990.  The husband filed on
December 1991, a petition to have his marriage annulled on the
ground of bigamy since the wife married a certain Mario Gopiao
sometime in December 1980, whom according to the husband was
still alive and living in Loyola Heights, QC.  Trial court ruled that
the son was an illegitimate child and the custody was awarded to
the wife while Gerardo was granted visitation rights.  Theresa
argued that there was nothing in the law granting “visitation rights
in favor of the putative father of an illegitimate child”.  She further
wanted to have the surname of the son changed from “Concepcion
to Almonte”, her maiden name, since an illegitimate child should
use his mother’s surname.  After the requested oral argument, trial
court reversed its ruling and held the son to be not the son of
Gerardo but of Mario.  Hence, the child was a legitimate child of
Theresa and Mario.

Issue:
WON Jose Gerardo is the illegitimate child of Gerardo.

Held:
NO. Considering that Theresa’s marriage with Gerardo was void ab
initio, the latter never became the former’s husband and never
acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of the child.  Theresa’s
contention was to have his son be declared as not the legitimate
child of her and Mario but her illegitimate child with Gerardo.  In
this case, the mother has no right to disavow a child because
maternity is never uncertain.  Hence, she is not permitted by law to
question the son’s legitimacy.  Under Article 167 of the Family Code,
“the child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may
have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as
an adulteress”.  Having the best interest of the child in mind, the
presumption of his legitimacy was upheld by the Court.  As a
legitimate child, the son shall have the right to bear the surnames of
Mario and Theresa, in conformity with the provisions of Civil Code
on surnames.  Gerardo cannot then impose his surname to be used
by the child, since in the eyes of the law, the child is not related to
him in any way.
 456

JESSE U. LUCAS vs. JESUS S. LUCAS

G.R. No. 190710               June 6, 2011

Facts:
Petitioner, Jesse U. Lucas, filed a Petition to Establish Illegitimate
Filiation. He claimed that sometime in 1967, his mother, Elsie Uy (Elsie)
worked in a prominent nightspot in Manila. Through that work, Elsie
met respondent, Jesus S. Lucas and an intimate relationship developed
between the two. Elsie eventually got pregnant and, on March 11, 1969,
she gave birth to petitioner. The name of petitioner’s father was not
stated in petitioner’s certificate of live birth. However, Elsie later on told
petitioner that his father is respondent.

On August 1, 1969, petitioner was baptized at San Isidro Parish, Taft

Avenue, Pasay City. Respondent allegedly extended financial support to
Elsie and petitioner for a period of about two years. When the
relationship of Elsie and respondent ended, Elsie refused to accept
respondent’s offer of support and decided to raise petitioner on her own.
While petitioner was growing up, Elsie made several attempts to
introduce petitioner to respondent, but all attempts were in vain.

Attached to the petition were the following: (a) petitioner’s certificate of

live birth; (b) petitioner’s baptismal certificate; (c) petitioner’s college
diploma, showing that he graduated from Saint Louis University in
Baguio City with a degree in Psychology; (d) his Certificate of
Graduation from the same school; (e) Certificate of Recognition from the
University of the Philippines, College of Music; and (f) clippings of
several articles from different newspapers about petitioner, as a musical
prodigy.

Respondent averred that the petition was not in due form and
substance because petitioner could not have personally known the
matters that were alleged therein. He argued that DNA testing cannot
be had on the basis of a mere allegation pointing to respondent as
petitioner’s father. Moreover, jurisprudence is still unsettled on the
acceptability of DNA evidence.

The RTC dismissed the case. The court remarked that, based on the
case of Herrera v. Alba, there are four significant procedural aspects of
a traditional paternity action which the parties have to face: a prima
facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical
resemblance between the putative father and the child. The court
opined that petitioner must first establish these four procedural aspects
before he can present evidence of paternity and filiation, which may
include incriminating acts or scientific evidence like blood group test
and DNA test results. The court observed that the petition did not show
that these procedural aspects were present. The court opined that,
 457

having failed to establish a prima facie case, respondent had no

obligation to present any affirmative defenses.

The CA remarked that petitioner filed the petition to establish

illegitimate filiation, specifically seeking a DNA testing order to
abbreviate the proceedings. It noted that petitioner failed to show that
the four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action
had been met. The CA further held that a DNA testing should not be
allowed when the petitioner has failed to establish a prima facie case.

Issue:
WON DNA testing should be allowed in order for petitioner to establish
his filiation with the respondent.

Held:
NO. A prima facie case is built by a party’s evidence and not by mere
allegations in the initiatory pleading. Clearly then, it was also not the
opportune time to discuss the lack of a prima facie case vis-à-vis the
motion for DNA testing since no evidence has, as yet, been presented by
petitioner. More essentially, it is premature to discuss whether, under
the circumstances, a DNA testing order is warranted considering that
no such order has yet been issued by the trial court. In fact, the latter
has just set the said case for hearing.

In light of this observation, we find that there is a need to supplement

the Rule on DNA Evidence to aid the courts in resolving motions for
DNA testing order, particularly in paternity and other filiation cases.
The Rule on DNA Testing shall not preclude a DNA testing, without
need of a prior court order, at the behest of any party, including law
enforcement agencies, before a suit or proceeding is commenced. This
does not mean, however, that a DNA testing order will be issued as a
matter of right if, during the hearing, the said conditions are
established.

In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there
must be a show cause hearing wherein the applicant must first present
sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case or a reasonable
possibility of paternity or "good cause" for the holding of the test. In
these states, a court order for blood testing is considered a "search,"
which, under their Constitutions (as in ours), must be preceded by a
finding of probable cause in order to be valid. Hence, the requirement
of a prima facie case, or reasonable possibility, was imposed in civil
actions as a counterpart of a finding of probable cause.

Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the constitutional

prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is still
applicable, and a proper showing of sufficient justification under the
particular factual circumstances of the case must be made before a
 458

court may order a compulsory blood test. Courts in various

jurisdictions have differed regarding the kind of procedures which are
required, but those jurisdictions have almost universally found that a
preliminary showing must be made before a court can constitutionally
order compulsory blood testing in paternity cases. We agree, and find
that, as a preliminary matter, before the court may issue an order for
compulsory blood testing, the moving party must show that there is a
reasonable possibility of paternity. As explained hereafter, in cases in
which paternity is contested and a party to the action refuses to
voluntarily undergo a blood test, a show cause hearing must be held in
which the court can determine whether there is sufficient evidence to
establish a prima facie case which warrants issuance of a court order
for blood testing.
The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to
protect the putative father from mere harassment suits. Thus, during
the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present
prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.

Notwithstanding these, it should be stressed that the issuance of a DNA

testing order remains discretionary upon the court. The court may, for
example, consider whether there is absolute necessity for the DNA
testing. If there is already preponderance of evidence to establish
paternity and the DNA test result would only be corroborative, the court
may, in its discretion, disallow a DNA testing.

*********************************

The herein petition to establish illegitimate filiation is an action

in rem. By the simple filing of the petition to establish
illegitimate filiation before the RTC, which undoubtedly had
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition, the latter
thereby acquired jurisdiction over the case. An in rem proceeding
is validated essentially through publication. Publication is notice
to the whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar
indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection of any
sort to the right sought to be established. Through publication,
all interested parties are deemed notified of the petition.
 459

PEOPLE vs. EDGARDO QUITORIANO

G.R. No. 118852 January 20, 1997

Facts:
On 24 December 1992, private complainant Edna P. Pergis was
raped by petitioner Quitoriano. In June 1993, her aunt, Teresa
Pergis, discovered that she was pregnant. On August 2, 1993,
private complainant filed a complaint for rape against accused-
appellant. Private complainant gave birth on October 31, 1993.

Accused-appellant interposed the defense of alibi. He testified

that from 7:00 until 10:00 in the evening on December 24, 1992,
he was at the house of Paulino Rioflorido in Barangay
Pakaskasan, Torrijos, Marinduque. He was then having a
drinking session with Reynaldo Rioflorido, the son of Paulino. At
10:00, they attended a party at the house of Jose Ampiloquio
which was about 400 meters from the Rioflorido residence. The
party ended at around 1:00 in the morning, afterwhich, they
proceeded to accused-appellant's house.

Issue:
WON giving birth more than 10 months after the incident
discredit private complainant’s testimony.

Held:
NO. The fact that private complainant gave birth more than ten
months after the alleged rape does not discredit her testimony.
Dr. Honesto Marquez, a physician from the Marinduque
Provincial Hospital, explained that the normal gestation period is
40 weeks or 280 days, but it can also extend beyond 40 weeks if
the woman is having her first pregnancy. It is undisputed that
the child delivered by private complainant on October 31, 1993
was her first. Hence, it is not impossible that the child was
conceived in December, 1992, the date of the alleged rape.
 460

JOANIE SURPOSA UY vs. JOSE NGO CHUA

G.R. No. 183965               September 18, 2009

Facts:
Petitioner Joanie Surposa Uy filed on 27 October 2003 before the
RTC a Petition for the issuance of a decree of illegitimate filiation
against respondent Jose Ngo Chua. Petitioner alleged in her
Complaint that respondent, who was then married, had an illicit
relationship with Irene Surposa. Respondent and Irene had two
children, namely, petitioner and her brother, Allan. Respondent
attended to Irene when the latter was giving birth to petitioner
and instructed that petitioner’s birth certificate be filled out with
the following names: "ALFREDO F. SURPOSA" as father and
"IRENE DUCAY" as mother.

Actually, Alfredo F. Surposa was the name of Irene’s father, and

Ducay was the maiden surname of Irene’s mother. Respondent
financially supported petitioner and Allan. Respondent had
consistently and regularly given petitioner allowances before she
got married. He also provided her with employment. When
petitioner was still in high school, respondent required her to
work at the Cebu Liberty Lumber, a firm owned by his family.
She was later on able to work at the Gaisano- Borromeo Branch
through respondent’s efforts. Petitioner and Allan were
introduced to each other and became known in the Chinese
community as respondent’s illegitimate children. During
petitioner’s wedding, respondent sent his brother Catalino Chua
as his representative, and it was the latter who acted as father of
the bride. Respondent’s relatives even attended the baptism of
petitioner’s daughter.

In his Answer, respondent denied that he had an illicit

relationship with Irene, and that petitioner was his daughter.
Petitioner presented documentary evidence to prove her claim of
illegitimate filiation.

Subsequently, respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence on the

ground of res judicata. It turned out that prior to institution of
this case, petitioner had already filed a similar Petition for the
issuance of a decree of illegitimate affiliation against respondent.
Petitioner and respondent eventually entered into a Compromise
Agreement.
 461

Issue:
WON petitioner is an illegitimate child of the respondent.

Held:
The Compromise Agreement between petitioner and respondent
obviously intended to settle the question of petitioner’s status
and filiation, i.e., whether she is an illegitimate child of
respondent. In exchange for petitioner and her brother Allan
acknowledging that they are not the children of respondent,
respondent would pay petitioner and Allan P2,000,000.00 each.
Although unmentioned, it was a necessary consequence of said
Compromise Agreement that petitioner also waived away her
rights to future support and future legitime as an illegitimate
child of respondent. Evidently, the Compromise Agreement
between petitioner and respondent is covered by the prohibition
under Article 2035 of the Civil Code.

It is settled, then, in law and jurisprudence, that the status and

filiation of a child cannot be compromised. Public policy
demands that there be no compromise on the status and filiation
of a child. Paternity and filiation or the lack of the same, is a
relationship that must be judicially established, and it is for
the Court to declare its existence or absence. It cannot be left
to the will or agreement of the parties.

Being contrary to law and public policy, the Compromise

Agreement between petitioner and respondent is void ab initio
and vests no rights and creates no obligations. It produces no
legal effect at all. The void agreement cannot be rendered
operative even by the parties' alleged performance (partial or full)
of their respective prestations.

Neither can it be said that RTC-Branch 9, by approving the

Compromise Agreement, already made said contract valid and
legal. Obviously, it would already be beyond the jurisdiction of
RTC-Branch 9 to legalize what is illegal. RTC-Branch 9 had no
authority to approve and give effect to a Compromise Agreement
that was contrary to law and public policy, even if said contract
was executed and submitted for approval by both parties. RTC-
Branch 9 would not be competent, under any circumstances, to
grant the approval of the said Compromise Agreement. No court
can allow itself to be used as a tool to circumvent the explicit
prohibition under Article 2035 of the Civil Code.
 462

DOLORES&LAURENCE MONTEFALCON vs. RONNIE VASQUEZ

G.R. No. 165016             June 17, 2008

Facts:
In 1999, petitioner Dolores P. Montefalcon filed a Complaint for
acknowledgment and support against respondent Ronnie S.
Vasquez before the RTC of Naga City. Alleging that her son
Laurence is the illegitimate child of Vasquez, she prayed that
Vasquez be obliged to give support to co-petitioner Laurence
Montefalcon, whose certificate of live birth he signed as father.
According to petitioners, Vasquez only gave a total of P19,000 as
support for Laurence since Laurence was born in 1993. Vasquez
allegedly also refused to give him regular school allowance
despite repeated demands. Petitioner Dolores added that she
and Vasquez are not legally married, and that Vasquez has his
own family.

The court ordered Vasquez to acknowledge Laurence and to pay

P 5000 monthly. In the same year, Vasquez surfaced. He filed
notice of appeal to which petitioners opposed. Appeal was
granted by the court. Before the appellate court, he argued that
the trial court erred in tryingand deciding the case as it "never"
acquired jurisdiction over his person, aswell as in awarding
P5,000-per-month support, which was allegedly “excessive and
exorbitant." The appellate court granted Vasquez’s contention.

Issue: 
WON Vasquez is obliged to give support to co-petitioner
Laurence.

Held: 
YES. Article 175 of the Family Code of the Philippines mandates
that illegitimate filiation may be established in the same way and
on the same evidence as legitimate children. Under Article 172,
appearing in the civil register or a final order; or (2) by admission
of filiation in a public document or private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned; or in default of
these two, by open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child or by any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws.

Laurence's record of birth is an authentic, relevant and

admissible piece of evidence to prove paternity and filiation.
 463

Vasquez did not deny that Laurence is his child with Dolores. He
signed as father in Laurence’s certificate of live birth, a public
document. He supplied the data entered in it. Thus, it is a
competent evidence of filiation as he had a hand in its
preparation. In fact, if the child had been recognized by any of
the modes in the first paragraph of Article 172, there is no
further need to file any action for acknowledgment because any
of said modes is by itself a consummated act. As filiation is
beyond question, support follows as matter of obligation.
Petitioners were able to prove that Laurence needs Vasquez's
support and that Vasquez is capable of giving such support.

Under Article 195 (4) of the Family Code, a parent is obliged to

support his illegitimate child. The amount is variable. There is
no final judgment thereof as it shall be in proportion to the
resources or means of the giver and the necessities of the
recipient. It may be reduced or increased proportionately
according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the
recipient and the resources or means of the person obliged to
support. Support comprises everything indispensable for
sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education
and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the
family. Under the premises, the award of P5,000 monthly
support to Laurence is reasonable, and not excessive nor
exorbitant.

In sum, we rule that the Court of Appeals erred in invalidating

the substituted service of summons and remanding the case. As
there was valid substituted service of summons under the
circumstances of this case, the lower court acquired jurisdiction
over his person and correctly ordered him to pay past and
present monthly support to his illegitimate child as well as
attorney's fees and litigation expenses to petitioners.
 464

HEIRS OF LORETO C. MARAMAG vs. EVA DE GUZMAN

G.R. No. 181132               June 5, 2009

Facts:
Petitioners were the legitimate wife and children of Loreto Maramag
(Loreto), whilerespondents were Loreto’s illegitimate family. Loreto
designated respondents as beneficiaries in his life insurance policies
from Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. (Insular) and Great
Pacific Life AssuranceCorporation (Grepalife).

Petitioners insituted in the RTC a petition for revocation and/or

reduction of insurance proceeds for being void and/or inofficious,
with prayer for a temporaryrestraining order (TRO) and a writ of
preliminary injunction. Pursuant to the motion to dismiss
incorporated in Insular and Grepalife’s respectiveanswers, the TC
dismissed the complaint with respect to the illegitimate children,
who are the the designated primary beneficiaries in the life
insurance policies, for lack of cause action. However, trial court
ruled that the action may proceeds against the concubine, Insular
Life, and Grepalife.

Insular and Grepalife filed their respective motions for

reconsideration, arguing, inthe main, that the petition failed to state
a cause of action against them. TC granted, and dismissed the case
against them. In doing so, the TC courtconsidered the allegations
found in Insular’s answer.

CA dismissed petitioners’appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that

the decision of the trial court dismissing the complaint for failure to
state a cause of action involved a pure question of law. Further, it
found that due to petitioners’ failure to timely file amotion for
reconsideration, the dismissal against Insular and Grepalife had
alreadyattained finality

Issue:
WON the illegitimate children is entitled to the insurance benefits.

Held:
YES. It is evident from the face of the complaint that petitioners are
not entitled to a favorable judgment in light of Article 2011 of the
Civil Code which expressly provides that insurance contracts shall
be governed by special laws, i.e., the Insurance Code.

Pursuant thereto, it is obvious that the only persons entitled to

claim the insurance proceeds are either the insured, if still alive; or
 465

the beneficiary, if the insured is already deceased, upon the

maturation of the policy. The exception to this rule is a situation
where the insurance contract was intended to benefit third persons
who are not parties to the same in the form of favorable stipulations
or indemnity. In such a case, third parties may directly sue and
claim from the insurer.

Petitioners are third parties to the insurance contracts with Insular

and Grepalife and, thus, are not entitled to the proceeds thereof.
Accordingly, respondents Insular and Grepalife have no legal
obligation to turn over the insurance proceeds to petitioners. The
revocation of Eva as a beneficiary in one policy and her
disqualification as such in another are of no moment considering
that the designation of the illegitimate children as beneficiaries in
Loreto’s insurance policies remains valid. Because no legal
proscription exists in naming as beneficiaries the children of
illicit relationships by the insured, the shares of Eva in the
insurance proceeds, whether forfeited by the court in view of
the prohibition on donations under Article 739 of the Civil
Code or by the insurers themselves for reasons based on the
insurance contracts, must be awarded to the said illegitimate
children, the designated beneficiaries, to the exclusion of
petitioners. It is only in cases where the insured has not
designated any beneficiary, or when the designated beneficiary is
disqualified by law to receive the proceeds, that the insurance policy
proceeds shall redound to the benefit of the estate of the insured.

In this regard, the assailed June 16, 2005 Resolution of the trial
court should be upheld. In the same light, the Decision of the CA
dated January 8, 2008 should be sustained. Indeed, the appellate
court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the appeal; the issue
of failure to state a cause of action is a question of law and not of
fact, there being no findings of fact in the first place.
 466

DIOSDADO S. MANUNGAS vs. MARGARITA AVILA LORETO

G.R. No. 193161               August 22, 2011

Facts:
Engracia Manungas was the wife of Florentino Manungas. They
had no children. Instead, they adopted Samuel David Avila
(Avila) on August 12, 1968. Florentino Manungas died intestate
on May 29, 1977, while Avila predeceased his adoptive mother.
Avila was survived by his wife Sarah Abarte Vda. de Manungas.

Thereafter, Engracia Manungas filed a Motion for Partition of

Estate in the intestate estate proceedings of Florentino
Manungas, of which she was the administratrix. There, she
stated that there are no other legal and compulsory heirs of
Florentino Manungas except for herself, Avila and a Ramon
Manungas whom she acknowledged as the natural son of
Florentino Manungas. Meanwhile, Avila’s widow executed a
Waiver of Rights and Participation, renouncing her rights over
the separate property of her husband in favor of Engracia
Manungas. Thereafter, a Decree of Final Distribution was issued
in the intestate estate proceedings of Florentino Manungas
distributing the properties to Engracia Manungas and Ramon
Manungas, the surviving heirs. The RTC appointed Parreño, the
niece of Engracia Manungas, as the Judicial Guardian of the
properties and person of her incompetent aunt.

Engracia Manungas, through Parreño, then instituted a case

against the spouses Diosdado Salinas Manungas and Milagros
Pacifico for illegal detainer. In their answer, the spouses Salinas
claimed that Diosdado is the illegitimate son of Florentino
Manungas.

Thereafter, Diosdado instituted a petition for the issuance of

letters of administration over the Estate of Engracia Manungas
in his favor. He alleged that he, being an illegitimate son of
Florentino Manungas, is an heir of Engracia Manungas. The
petition was opposed by Margarita Avila Loreto claiming that
Diosdado was not a Manungas, that he was not an heir of
Engracia Manungas.

Issue:
WON Diosdado is qualified to be the administrator of Engracia
Manungas’ estate.
 467

Held:
The fact that Diosdado is an heir to the estate of Florentino
Manungas does not mean that he is entitled or even qualified to
become the special administrator of the Estate of Manungas.
Jurisprudence teaches us that the appointment of a special
administrator lies within the discretion of the court.

While the trial court has the discretion to appoint anyone as a

special administrator of the estate, such discretion must be
exercised with reason, guided by the directives of equity, justice
and legal principles. It may, therefore, not be remiss to reiterate
that the role of a special administrator is to preserve the estate
until a regular administrator is appointed.

Given this duty on the part of the special administrator, it

would, therefore, be prudent and reasonable to appoint someone
interested in preserving the estate for its eventual distribution to
the heirs. Such choice would ensure that such person would not
expose the estate to losses that would effectively diminish his or
her share. While the court may use its discretion and depart
from such reasoning, still, there is no logical reason to appoint a
person who is a debtor of the estate and otherwise a stranger to
the deceased. To do so would be tantamount to grave abuse of
discretion.

To reiterate, the subject of the intestate proceedings is the estate

of Engracia Manungas. It must be remembered that the estate of
Florentino Manungas was already the subject of intestate
proceedings that have long been terminated with the proceeds
distributed to the heirs with the issuance of a Decree of Final
Distribution. With the termination of the intestate estate
proceedings of Florentino Manungas, Diosdado, as an
illegitimate heir of Florentino Manungas, is still not an heir of
Engracia Manungas and is not entitled to receive any part of the
Estate of Manungas. In fact, Diosdado is a debtor of the estate
and would have no interest in preserving its value. There is no
reason to appoint him as its special administrator. The trial
court acted with grave abuse of discretion in appointing
Diosdado as special administrator of the Estate of Manungas.
 468

CHARLES GOTARDO vs. DIVINA BULING

G.R. No. 165166               August 15, 2012

Facts:
Respondent Divina Buling met petitioner Charles Gotardo on
December 1, 1992 at the Philippine Commercial and Industrial
Bank, Maasin, Southern Leyte branch where she had been hired
as a casual employee, while the petitioner worked as accounting
supervisor. The petitioner started courting the respondent in the
third week of December 1992 and they became sweethearts in
the last week of January 1993. Sometime in September 1993,
the petitioner started intimate sexual relations with the
respondent in the former’s rented room in the boarding house
managed by Rodulfo, the respondent’s uncle, in Maasin,
Southern Leyte. The petitioner rented the room from March 1,
1993 to August 30, 1994. The sexual encounters occurred twice
a month and became more frequent in June 1994; eventually, on
August 8, 1994, the respondent found out that she was
pregnant. When told of the pregnancy, the petitioner was happy
and made plans to marry the respondent. They in fact applied
for a marriage license. Subsequently, however, the petitioner
backed out of the wedding plans.

The respondent filed a complaint for damages against the

petitioner for breach of promise to marry. Later, however, the
petitioner and the respondent amicably settled the case. The
respondent gave birth to their son Gliffze on March 9, 1995.
When the petitioner did not show up and failed to provide
support to Gliffze, the respondent sent him a letter on July 24,
1995 demanding recognition of and support for their child.
When the petitioner did not answer the demand, the respondent
filed her complaint for compulsory recognition and support
pendente lite.

Petitioner denied the imputed paternity, claiming that he first

had sexual contact with the respondent in the first week of
August 1994 and she could not have been pregnant for twelve
(12) weeks (or three (3) months) when he was informed of the
pregnancy on September 15, 1994. During the pendency of the
case, the RTC, on the respondent’s motion, granted a P2,000.00
monthly child support, retroactive from March 1995.
 469

The RTC dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence

proving Gliffze’s filiation. It found the respondent’s testimony
inconsistent on the question of when she had her first sexual
contact with the petitioner. On appeal, the CA set aside the RTC
decision and ordered the petitioner to recognize his minor son
Gliffze.

Issue:
WON petitioner is the father of Gliffze, thus, obliged to support
the latter.

Held:
YES. Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate
paternity but also to secure a legal right associated with
paternity, such as citizenship, support (as in this case) or
inheritance. In paternity cases, the burden of proof is on the
person who alleges that the putative father is the biological
father of the child.

One can prove filiation, either legitimate or illegitimate, through

the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment, an admission of filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned, or the open and continuous possession of the status
of a legitimate or illegitimate child, or any other means allowed
by the Rules of Court and special laws. We have held that such
other proof of one's filiation may be a "baptismal certificate, a
judicial admission, a family bible in which his name has been
entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission
by silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof
admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

The Court explained that a prima facie case exists if a woman

declares — supported by corroborative proof — that she had
sexual relations with the putative father; at this point, the
burden of evidence shifts to the putative father. We explained
further that the two affirmative defenses available to the putative
father are: (1) incapability of sexual relations with the mother
due to either physical absence or impotency, or (2) that the
mother had sexual relations with other men at the time of
conception.
 470

In this case, the respondent established a prima facie case

that the petitioner is the putative father of Gliffze through
testimony that she had been sexually involved only with one
man, the petitioner, at the time of her conception. Rodolfo
corroborated her testimony that the petitioner and the
respondent had intimate relationship.

On the other hand, the petitioner did not deny that he had
sexual encounters with the respondent, only that it occurred on
a much later date than the respondent asserted, such that it
was physically impossible for the respondent to have been three
(3) months pregnant already in September 1994 when he was
informed of the pregnancy. However, the petitioner failed to
substantiate his allegations of infidelity and insinuations of
promiscuity. His allegations, therefore, cannot be given credence
for lack of evidentiary support. The petitioner’s denial cannot
overcome the respondent’s clear and categorical assertions.

Since filiation is beyond question, support follows as a matter of

obligation; a parent is obliged to support his child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate. Support consists of everything
indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical
attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the
financial capacity of the family. Thus, the amount of support is
variable and, for this reason, no final judgment on the amount of
support is made as the amount shall be in proportion to the
resources or means of the giver and the necessities of the
recipient. It may be reduced or increased proportionately
according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the
recipient and the resources or means of the person obliged to
support.
 471

FRANCISCO L. JISON vs. CA & MONINA JISON

G.R. No. 124853 February 24, 1998

Facts:
Respondent Monina alleged that petitioner Francisco had been
married to a certain Lilia Lopez Jison since 1940. At the end of
1945 or the start of 1946, however, Francisco impregnated
Esperanza F. Amolar (who was then employed as the nanny of
Francisco's daughter, Lourdes). As a result, Monina was born on
6 August 1946, in Dingle, Iloilo, and since childhood, had
enjoyed the continuous, implied recognition as an illegitimate
child of Francisco by his acts and that of his family. Monina
further alleged that Francisco gave her support and spent for her
education, such that she obtained a Master's degree, became a
certified public accountant (CPA) and eventually, a Central Bank
examiner. In view of Francisco's refusal to expressly recognize
her, Monina prayed for a judicial declaration of her illegitimate
status and that Francisco support and treat her as such.

In his answer, Francisco alleged that he could not have had

sexual relations with Esperanza Amolar during the period
specified in the complaint as she had ceased to be in his employ
as early as 1944, and did not know of her whereabouts since
then; further, he never recognized Monina, expressly or
impliedly, as his illegitimate child. As affirmative and special
defenses, Francisco contended that Monina had no right or
cause of action against him and that her action was barred by
estoppel, laches and/or prescription. He thus prayed for
dismissal of the complaint and an award of damages due to the
malicious filing of the complaint.

Issue:
WON Monina should be declared as illegitimate child of
Francisco Jison.

Held:
YES. Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation,
such as Monina's, may be established in the same way and on
the same evidence as that of legitimate children. For the success
of an action to establish illegitimate filiation under the second
paragraph, which MONINA relies upon given that she has none
of the evidence mentioned in the first paragraph, a "high
standard of proof" is required. Specifically, to prove open and
 472

continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child,

there must be evidence of the manifestation of the
permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the
child as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of
parental affection and care, which cannot be attributed to
pure charity. Such acts must be of such a nature that they
reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but also the apparent
desire to have and treat the child as such in all relations in
society and in life, not accidentally, but continuously.
By "continuous" is meant uninterrupted and consistent, but
does not require any particular length of time. The foregoing
standard of proof required to establish one's filiation is founded
on the principle that an order for recognition and support may
create an unwholesome atmosphere or may be an irritant in the
family or lives of the parties, so that it must be issued only if
paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing
evidence.

Simply put, he who alleges the affirmative of the issue has the
burden of proof, and upon the plaintiff in a civil case, the burden
of proof never parts. However, in the course of trial in a civil
case, once plaintiff makes out a prima facie case in his favor, the
duty or the burden of evidence shifts to defendant to controvert
plaintiff's prima facie case, otherwise, a verdict must be returned
in favor of plaintiff. Moreover, in civil cases, the party having the
burden of proof must produce a preponderance of evidence
thereon, with plaintiff having to rely on the strength of his own
evidence and not upon the weakness of the defendant's. The
concept of "preponderance of evidence" refers to evidence which
is of greater weight, or more convincing, that which is offered in
opposition to it; at bottom, it means probability of truth.

All told, Monina's evidence hurdled "the high standard of proof"

required for the success of an action to establish one's
illegitimate filiation when relying upon the provisions regarding
"open and continuous possession'' or "any other means allowed
by the Rules of Court and special laws". Moreover, Monina
proved her filiation by more than mere preponderance of
evidence.

JOSE RIVERO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

 473

G.R. No. 141273             May 17, 2005

Facts:
During his lifetime, Benito Dy Chiao, Sr. was engaged in
business, under the business name Benito Commercial in Naga
City. He courted Shirley Arevalo (Benedick's mother) in 1991,
assuring her of his sincere love, likewise promising that her
college education would be financed and that she would be
provided with a better life. Blinded by his promises and
assurances of his love for her, Shirley agreed to an amorous
relationship with Benito, Sr. True to his word, Benito, Sr. then
provided her with a residential house and lot located in
Canaman, Camarines Sur, where they cohabited and resided. He
also financed her college education in midwifery. On October 5,
1995, "Benedick Arevalo Dy Chiao, Jr.," was born, whom Benito,
Sr. acknowledged as his son. He also continued to give Shirley
and their son financial and moral support.

The Dy Chiao siblings recognized Benedick as the illegitimate

son of their father. Moreover, when he died intestate, Benito, Sr.
there was a need for the appointment of an administrator of the
estate to preserve Benedick's rights over the same before its
partition. It was prayed that upon the filing of the complaint,
Benedick's mother be appointed as his guardian ad litem, that
an administrator of the estate of the deceased be appointed, and
that after due proceedings.

In an answer to the complaint, Mary Jane, through counsel, for

herself, and purportedly in behalf of her brothers, denied the
allegations that Shirley and her father had an amorous
relationship and that Benedick was the illegitimate son of their
father for want of knowledge or information; the allegation that
they had recognized Benedick as the illegitimate son of their
father was, likewise, specifically denied. Finally, she alleged that
the plaintiff's action was for a claim against the estate of their
father, which should be filed in an action for the settlement of
the estate of their deceased parents.

On December 6, 1996, a "Compromise Agreement" was filed by

Mary Jane in behlf of her brothers. The agreement stated among
others, that Mary Jane recognizes Benedick as the illegitimate
son of her deceased father Benito Dy Chiao, Sr. The said
agreement was approved by the RTC.
 474

Issue:
WON Benedick was able to prove his filiation.

Held:
NO. The Court finds and so holds that the decision of the RTC
based on the compromise agreement executed by Mary Jane is
null and void. Article 2035(1) of the New Civil Code provides that
no compromise upon the civil status of persons shall be valid. As
such, paternity and filiation, or the lack of the same, is a
relationship that must be judicially established, and it is for the
court to determine its existence or absence. It cannot be left to
the will or agreement of the parties.

A compromise is a contract whereby parties, making reciprocal

concerns, avoid litigation or put an end to one already
commenced. Like any other contract, it must comply with the
requisite provisions in Article 1318 of the New Civil Code, to wit:
(a) consent of the contracting parties; (b) object certain which is
the subject matter of the contract; and (c) cause of the obligation
which is established. Like any other contract, the terms and
conditions of a compromise agreement must not be contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public policy and public order. Any
compromise agreement which is contrary to law or public policy
is null and void, and vests no rights and holds no obligation to
any party. It produces no legal effect at all. Considering all these,
there can be no other conclusion than that the decision of the
RTC on the basis of a compromise agreement where
Benedick was recognized as the illegitimate child of Benito,
Sr. is null and void.

Article 1878 of the New Civil Code provides that an SPA is

required for a compromise. Furthermore, the power of attorney
should expressly mention the action for which it is drawn; as
such, a compromise agreement executed by one in behalf of
another, who is not duly authorized to do so by the principal, is
void and has no legal effect, and the judgment based on such
compromise agreement is null and void. The judgment may thus
be impugned and its execution may be enjoined in any
proceeding by the party against whom it is sought to be
enforced. A compromise must be strictly construed and can
include only those expressly or impliedly included therein.
 475

As previously stated, the Court is convinced that the

compromise agreement signed by Mary Jane and Benedick was
a compromise relating to the latter's filiation. Mary Jane
recognized Benedick as the illegitimate son of her deceased
father, the consideration for which was the amount of
P6,000,000.00 to be taken from the estate, the waiver of other
claims from the estate of the deceased, and the waiver by the Dy
Chiao siblings of their counterclaims against Benedick. This is
readily apparent, considering that the compromise agreement
was executed despite the siblings' unequivocal allegations in
their answer to the complaint filed only two months earlier, that
Benedick was merely an impostor.

To stress, the compromise agreement executed by Benedick and

Mary Jane is null and void; as such, the decision of the RTC
based thereon is also without force and effect. It is, likewise,
plain as day that only Mary Jane recognized Benedick as the
illegitimate son of her deceased father. Such recognition,
however, is ineffectual, because under the law, the
recognition must be made personally by the putative parent
and not by any brother, sister or relative.

It is conceded that Mary Jane, in her behalf, and purportedly in

behalf of her brothers, agreed and bound herself to pay Benedick
the amount of P6,000,000.00 to be taken from the estate of their
deceased father. However, a cursory reading of the SPA on
record will show that the Dy Chiao brothers did not authorize
their sister to recognize Benedick as the illegitimate son of their
father. They could not have agreed to pay P6,000,000.00 to be
taken from the estate, because they had denied that Benedick
was the illegitimate son of their father in their answer to the
complaint.

INTESTATE ESTATE DELGADO VS. HEIRS OF RUSTIA

G.R. NO. 155733 January 27, 2006
 476

Facts:
The claimants to the estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado
may be divided into two groups: (1) the alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado,
consisting of her half- and full-blood siblings, nephews and nieces, and
grandnephews and grandnieces, and (2) the alleged heirs of Guillermo
Rustia, particularly, his sisters, his nephews and nieces, his illegitimate
child, and the de facto adopted child (ampun-ampunan) of the
decedents.

The deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of Felisa Delgado by one
Lucio Campo. Aside from Josefa, five other children were born to the
couple, namely, Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, and Gorgonio, all
surnamed Delgado. Felisa Delgado was never married to Lucio Campo,
hence, Josefa and her full-blood siblings were all natural children of
Felisa Delgado. However, Lucio Campo was not the first and only man
in Felisa Delgado’s life. Before him was Ramon Osorio with whom Felisa
had a son, Luis Delgado. But, unlike her relationship with Lucio Campo
which was admittedly one without the benefit of marriage, the legal
status of Ramon Osorio’s and Felisa Delgado’s union is in dispute.

Petitioners allege that Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado were never
married. In support thereof, they assert that no evidence was ever
presented to establish it, not even so much as an allegation of the date
or place of the alleged marriage. What is clear, however, is that Felisa
retained the surname Delgado. So did Luis, her son with Ramon Osorio.
Nevertheless, oppositors (now respondents) insist that the absence of a
record of the alleged marriage did not necessarily mean that no
marriage ever took place.

Josefa Delgado died on September 8, 1972 without a will. She was

survived by Guillermo Rustia and some collateral relatives, the
petitioners herein. Several months later, on June 15, 1973, Guillermo
Rustia executed an affidavit of self-adjudication of the remaining
properties comprising her estate.

Sometime in 1917, Guillermo Rustia proposed marriage to Josefa

Delgado but whether a marriage in fact took place is disputed.
According to petitioners, the two eventually lived together as husband
and wife but were never married. To prove their assertion, petitioners
point out that no record of the contested marriage existed in the civil
registry. Moreover, a baptismal certificate naming Josefa Delgado as one
of the sponsors referred to her as "Señorita" or unmarried woman.

The oppositors (respondents here), on the other hand, insist that the
absence of a marriage certificate did not of necessity mean that no
marriage transpired. They maintain that Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado were married on June 3, 1919 and from then on lived together
as husband and wife until the death of Josefa on September 8, 1972.
 477

During this period spanning more than half a century, they were known
among their relatives and friends to have in fact been married.

Issue:
Who are the legal heirs of Josefa Delgado.

Held:
Although a marriage contract is considered a primary evidence of
marriage, its absence is not always proof that no marriage in fact took
place. Once the presumption of marriage arises, other evidence may be
presented in support thereof. The evidence need not necessarily or
directly establish the marriage but must at least be enough to
strengthen the presumption of marriage. Here, the certificate of identity
issued to Josefa Delgado as Mrs. Guillermo Rustia, the passport issued
to her as Josefa D. Rustia, the declaration under oath of no less than
Guillermo Rustia that he was married to Josefa Delgado and the titles
to the properties in the name of "Guillermo Rustia married to Josefa
Delgado," more than adequately support the presumption of marriage.
These are public documents which are prima facie evidence of the facts
stated therein. No clear and convincing evidence sufficient to overcome
the presumption of the truth of the recitals therein was presented by
petitioners.

Elisa vda. de Anson, petitioners’ own witness whose testimony they

primarily relied upon to support their position, confirmed that
Guillermo Rustia had proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado and that
eventually, the two had "lived together as husband and wife." This again
could not but strengthen the presumption of marriage.

The baptismal certificate was conclusive proof only of the baptism

administered by the priest who baptized the child. It was no proof of the
veracity of the declarations and statements contained therein, such as
the alleged single or unmarried ("Señorita") civil status of Josefa Delgado
who had no hand in its preparation.

Petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of marriage of Guillermo

Rustia and Josefa Delgado. In this jurisdiction, every intendment of the
law leans toward legitimizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together
apparently in marriage are presumed to be in fact married. This is the
usual order of things in society and, if the parties are not what they
hold themselves out to be, they would be living in constant violation of
the common rules of law and propriety.Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio. Always presume marriage.

As mentioned earlier, presumptions of law are either conclusive or

disputable. Conclusive presumptions are inferences which the law
makes so peremptory that no contrary proof, no matter how strong,
may overturn them. On the other hand, disputable presumptions, one
 478

of which is the presumption of marriage, can be relied on only in the

absence of sufficient evidence to the contrary.

Little was said of the cohabitation or alleged marriage of Felisa Delgado

and Ramon Osorio. The oppositors (now respondents) chose merely to
rely on the disputable presumption of marriage even in the face of such
countervailing evidence as (1) the continued use by Felisa and Luis (her
son with Ramon Osorio) of the surname Delgado and (2) Luis Delgado’s
and Caridad Concepcion’s Partida de Casamiento identifying Luis as
"hijo natural de Felisa Delgado" (the natural child of Felisa Delgado).

All things considered, we rule that these factors sufficiently

overcame the rebuttable presumption of marriage. Felisa Delgado
and Ramon Osorio were never married. Hence, all the children born
to Felisa Delgado out of her relations with Ramon Osorio and Lucio
Campo, namely, Luis and his half-blood siblings Nazario, Edilberta,
Jose, Jacoba, Gorgonio and the decedent Josefa, all surnamed Delgado,
were her natural children.

Intervenor (now co-respondent) Guillerma Rustia is an illegitimate child

of Guillermo Rustia. As such, she may be entitled to successional rights
only upon proof of an admission or recognition of paternity. She,
however, claimed the status of an acknowledged illegitimate child of
Guillermo Rustia only after the death of the latter on February 28,
1974 at which time it was already the new Civil Code that was in effect.
Under the old Civil Code (which was in force till August 29, 1950),
illegitimate children absolutely had no hereditary rights. This draconian
edict was, however, later relaxed in the new Civil Code which granted
certain successional rights to illegitimate children but only on
condition that they were first recognized or acknowledged by the
parent.

On the other hand, voluntary recognition may be made in the record

of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or in any
authentic writing. Intervenor Guillerma sought recognition on two
grounds: first, compulsory recognition through the open and
continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child and second,
voluntary recognition through authentic writing.

There was apparently no doubt that she possessed the status of an

illegitimate child from her birth until the death of her putative father
Guillermo Rustia. However, this did not constitute acknowledgment but
a mere ground by which she could have compelled acknowledgment
through the courts. Furthermore, any (judicial) action for compulsory
acknowledgment has a dual limitation: the lifetime of the child and
the lifetime of the putative parent. On the death of either, the action
for compulsory recognition can no longer be filed. In this case,
 479

intervenor Guillerma’s right to claim compulsory acknowledgment

prescribed upon the death of Guillermo Rustia on February 28, 1974.

The claim of voluntary recognition (Guillerma’s second ground) must

likewise fail. An authentic writing, for purposes of voluntary
recognition, is understood as a genuine or indubitable writing of
the parent (in this case, Guillermo Rustia). This includes a public
instrument or a private writing admitted by the father to be his.

The report card of intervenor Guillerma did not bear the signature of
Guillermo Rustia. The fact that his name appears there as intervenor’s
parent/guardian holds no weight since he had no participation in its
preparation. Similarly, while witnesses testified that it was Guillermo
Rustia himself who drafted the notice of death of Josefa Delgado which
was published in the Sunday Times on September 10, 1972, that
published obituary was not the authentic writing contemplated by the
law. What could have been admitted as an authentic writing was the
original manuscript of the notice, in the handwriting of Guillermo
Rustia himself and signed by him, not the newspaper clipping of the
obituary. The failure to present the original signed manuscript was fatal
to intervenor’s claim.

The same misfortune befalls the ampun-ampunan, Guillermina Rustia

Rustia, who was never adopted in accordance with law. Although a
petition for her adoption was filed by Guillermo Rustia, it never came to
fruition and was dismissed upon the latter’s death. We affirm the ruling
of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals holding her a legal
stranger to the deceased spouses and therefore not entitled to inherit
from them ab intestato.

Premises considered, we rule that two of the claimants to the estate of

Guillermo Rustia, namely, intervenor Guillerma Rustia and the ampun-
ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia, are not lawful heirs of the
decedent. Under Article 1002 of the new Civil Code, if there are no
descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or surviving spouse, the
collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased.
Therefore, the lawful heirs of Guillermo Rustia are the remaining
claimants, consisting of his sisters, nieces and nephews.

Heirs of TEOFILO GABATAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 150206               March 13, 2009
 480

Facts:
Subject of the present controversy is a 1.1062 hectare parcel of land
declared for taxation in the name of Juan Gabatan. In the complaint
before the RTC, respondent alleged that she is the sole owner of Lot
3095 C-5, having inherited the same from her deceased mother,
Hermogena Gabatan Evero (Hermogena). Respondent further claimed
that her mother, Hermogena, is the only child of Juan Gabatan and his
wife, Laureana Clarito. Respondent alleged that upon the death of Juan
Gabatan, Lot 3095 C-5 was entrusted to his brother, Teofilo Gabatan
(Teofilo), and Teofilo’s wife, Rita Gabatan, for administration. It was also
claimed that prior to her death Hermogena demanded for the return of
the land but to no avail.

After Hermogena’s death, respondent also did the same but petitioners
refused to heed the numerous demands to surrender the subject
property. According to respondent, when Teofilo and his wife died,
petitioners Jesus Jabinis and Catalino Acantilado took possession of
the disputed land despite respondent’s demands for them to vacate the
same.

In their answer, petitioners denied that respondent’s mother

Hermogena was the daughter of Juan Gabatan with Laureana Clarito
and that Hermogena or respondent is the rightful heir of Juan Gabatan.
Petitioners maintained that Juan Gabatan died single in 1934 and
without any issue and that Juan was survived by one brother and two
sisters, namely: Teofilo (petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest), Macaria
and Justa. These siblings and/or their heirs, inherited the subject land
from Juan Gabatan and have been in actual, physical, open, public,
adverse, continuous and uninterrupted possession thereof in the
concept of owners for more than fifty (50) years and enjoyed the fruits of
the improvements thereon, to the exclusion of the whole world including
respondent.

Issue:
WON respondent’s mother is an only child of Juan Gabatan.

Held:
NO. The Court found insufficient and questionable the basis of the RTC
in conferring upon respondent the status of sole heir of Juan Gabatan.
Respondent, in asserting to be entitled to possession and ownership of
the property, pinned her claim entirely on her alleged status as sole heir
of Juan Gabatan. It was incumbent upon her to present
preponderant evidence in support of her complaint.

Here, two conflicting birth certificates of respondent were presented at

the RTC. Respondent, during her direct testimony, presented and
identified a purported certified true copy of her typewritten birth
certificate which indicated that her mother’s maiden name was
 481

"Hermogena Clarito Gabatan." Petitioners, on the other hand, presented

a certified true copy of respondent’s handwritten birth certificate which
differed from the copy presented by respondent. Among the differences
was respondent’s mother’s full maiden name which was indicated as
"Hermogena Calarito" in the handwritten birth certificate.

We cannot subscribe to the trial court’s view that since the entries in
Exhibit 1 were handwritten, Exhibit 1 was the one of dubious
credibility. Verily, the certified true copies of the handwritten birth
certificate of respondent (petitioners’ Exhibits 1 and 8) were duly
authenticated by two competent witnesses. Thus, between respondent’s
Exhibit A and petitioners’ Exhibits 1 and 8, the latter documents
deserve to be given greater probative weight.

Even assuming purely for the sake of argument that the birth certificate
presented by respondent (Exhibit A) is a reliable document, the same on
its face is insufficient to prove respondent’s filiation to her alleged
grandfather, Juan Gabatan. All that Exhibit A, if it had been credible
and authentic, would have proven was that respondent’s mother was a
certain "Hermogena Clarito Gabatan." It does not prove that same
"Hermogena Clarito Gabatan" is the daughter of Juan Gabatan. Even
the CA held that the conflicting certificates of live birth of respondent
submitted by the parties only proved the filiation of respondent to
Hermogena.

It was absolutely crucial to respondent’s cause of action that she

convincingly proves the filiation of her mother to Juan Gabatan. To
reiterate, to prove the relationship of respondent’s mother to Juan
Gabatan, our laws dictate that the best evidence of such familial tie
was the record of birth appearing in the Civil Register, or an
authentic document or a final judgment. In the absence of these,
respondent should have presented proof that her mother enjoyed
the continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child. Only
in the absence of these two classes of evidence is the respondent
allowed to present other proof admissible under the Rules of Court of
her mother’s relationship to Juan Gabatan.

However, respondent’s mother’s (Hermogena’s) birth certificate, which

would have been the best evidence of Hermogena’s relationship to Juan
Gabatan, was never offered as evidence at the RTC. Neither did
respondent present any authentic document or final judgment
categorically evidencing Hermogena’s relationship to Juan Gabatan.

Respondent relied on the testimony of her witnesses, Frisco Lawan,

Felicisima Nagac Pacana and Cecilia Nagac Villareal who testified that
they personally knew Hermogena (respondent’s mother) and/or Juan
Gabatan, that they knew Juan Gabatan was married to Laureana
Clarito and that Hermogena was the child of Juan and Laureana.
 482

However, none of these witnesses had personal knowledge of the fact of

marriage of Juan to Laureana or the fact of birth of Hermogena to Juan
and Laureana. They were not yet born or were very young when Juan
supposedly married Laureana or when Hermogena was born and they
all admitted that none of them were present at Juan and Laureana’s
wedding or Hermogena’s birth. These witnesses based their testimony
on what they had been told by, or heard from, others as young children.
Their testimonies were, in a word, hearsay.

In other words, although these witnesses are indeed blood relatives of

petitioners, they are also the mother and the aunt of respondent’s
husband. They cannot be said to be entirely disinterested in the
outcome of the case.

Aside from the testimonies of respondent’s witnesses, both the RTC and
the CA relied heavily on a photocopy of a Deed of Absolute Sale (Exhibit
H) presented by respondent and which appeared to be signed by the
siblings and the heirs of the siblings of Juan Gabatan. In this document
involving the sale of a lot different from Lot 3095 C-5, "Hermogena
Gabatan as heir of the deceased Juan Gabatan" was indicated as one of
the vendors. The RTC deemed the statement therein as an affirmation
or recognition by Teofilo Gabatan, petitioners’ predecessor in interest,
that Hermogena Gabatan was the heir of Juan Gabatan. The CA
considered the same statement as a declaration against interest on the
part of Teofilo Gabatan.

After a close scrutiny of the said photocopy of the Deed of Absolute

Sale, this Court cannot uphold the admissibility of the same.

JENIE SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ and minor CHRISTIAN DELA

CRUZ "AQUINO," vs. RONALD PAUL S. GRACIA
G.R. No. 177728               July 31, 2009

Facts:
 483

For several months in 2005, then 21-year old petitioner Jenie

San Juan Dela Cruz (Jenie) and then 19-year old Christian
Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino (Dominique) lived together as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. They resided
in the house of Dominique’s parents Domingo B. Aquino and
Raquel Sto. Tomas Aquino at Pulang-lupa, Dulumbayan, Teresa,
Rizal.

On September 4, 2005, Dominique died. After almost two

months, or on November 2, 2005, Jenie, who continued to live
with Dominique’s parents, gave birth to her herein co-petitioner
minor child Christian Dela Cruz "Aquino" at the Antipolo
Doctors Hospital, Antipolo City.

Jenie applied for registration of the child’s birth, using

Dominique’s surname Aquino, with the Office of the City Civil
Registrar, Antipolo City, in support of which she submitted the
child’s Certificate of Live Birth, Affidavit to Use the Surname of
the Father (AUSF) which she had executed and signed, and
Affidavit of Acknowledgment executed by Dominique’s father
Domingo Butch Aquino. Both affidavits attested, inter alia, that
during the lifetime of Dominique, he had continuously
acknowledged his yet unborn child, and that his paternity had
never been questioned. Jenie attached to the AUSF a document
entitled "AUTOBIOGRAPHY" which Dominique, during his
lifetime, wrote in his own handwriting.

By letter dated November 11, 2005, the City Civil Registrar of

Antipolo City, Ronald Paul S. Gracia (respondent), denied Jenie’s
application for registration of the child’s name.

In summary, the child cannot use the surname of his father

because he was born out of wedlock and the father
unfortunately died prior to his birth and has no more capacity to
acknowledge his paternity to the child (either through the back
of Municipal Form No. 102 – Affidavit of
Acknowledgment/Admission of Paternity – or the Authority to
Use the Surname of the Father). (Underscoring supplied)
Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint for
injunction/registration of name against respondent before the
RTC of Antipolo City. The complaint alleged that, inter alia, the
denial of registration of the child’s name is a violation of his right
to use the surname of his deceased father under Article 176 of
 484

the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No.

9255. They maintained that the Autobiography executed by
Dominique constitutes an admission of paternity in a "private
handwritten instrument" within the contemplation of the above-
quoted provision of law.

Issue:
WON the unsigned handwritten statement of the deceased father
can be considered as a recognition of paternity in a "private
handwritten instrument" within the contemplation of article 176
of the family code, as amended by R.A. 9255.

Held:
YES. Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by R.A. 9255,
permits an illegitimate child to use the surname of his/her
father if the latter had expressly recognized him/her as his
offspring through the record of birth appearing in the civil
register, or through an admission made in a public or private
handwritten instrument. The recognition made in any of these
documents is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment
of the child’s paternity; hence, no separate action for judicial
approval is necessary.

Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does not, indeed,

explicitly state that the private handwritten instrument
acknowledging the child’s paternity must be signed by the
putative father. This provision must, however, be read in
conjunction with related provisions of the Family Code which
require that recognition by the father must bear his signature.

This Court's rulings further specify what incriminating acts are

acceptable as evidence to establish filiation. Under Article 278 of
the New Civil Code, voluntary recognition by a parent shall be
made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of
record, or in any authentic writing. To be effective, the claim of
filiation must be made by the putative father himself and the
writing must be the writing of the putative father.

In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the earlier quoted

statements in Dominique’s Autobiography have been made and
written by him. Taken together with the other relevant facts
extant herein – that Dominique, during his lifetime, and Jenie
were living together as common-law spouses for several months
 485

in 2005 at his parents’ house in Pulang-lupa, Dulumbayan,

Teresa, Rizal; she was pregnant when Dominique died on
September 4, 2005; and about two months after his death, Jenie
gave birth to the child – they sufficiently establish that the child
of Jenie is Dominique’s.

In view of the pronouncements herein made, the Court sees it fit

to adopt the following rules respecting the requirement of
affixing the signature of the acknowledging parent in any private
handwritten instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a
legitimate or illegitimate child is made:

1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone

piece of evidence submitted to prove filiation, there should be
strict compliance with the requirement that the same must
be signed by the acknowledging parent; and

2) Where the private handwritten instrument is

accompanied by other relevant and competent evidence, it
suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have
been made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as
it is merely corroborative of such other evidence.

Our laws instruct that the welfare of the child shall be the
"paramount consideration" in resolving questions affecting him.
In the eyes of society, a child with an unknown father bears the
stigma of dishonor. It is to petitioner minor child’s best interests
to allow him to bear the surname of the now deceased
Dominique and enter it in his birth certificate.

ANTONIO PERLA vs. MIRASOL BARING and RANDY PERLA

G.R. No. 172471               November 12, 2012

Facts:
 486

Respondent Mirasol Baring and her then minor son, Randy filed a
Complaint for support against Antonio. Mirasol and Antonio lived
together as common-law spouses for two years. As a result of said
cohabitation, Randy was born on November 11, 1983. However,
when Antonio landed a job as seaman, he abandoned them and
failed to give any support to his son. Respondents thus prayed that
Antonio be ordered to support Randy.

In his Answer with Counterclaim, Antonio, who is now married and

has a family of his own, denied having fathered Randy. Although he
admitted to having known Mirasol, he averred that she never
became his common-law wife nor was she treated as such. And
since Mirasol had been intimidating and pestering him as early as
1992 with various suits by insisting that Randy is his son, Antonio
sought moral and exemplary damages by way of counterclaim from
respondents.

Mirasol presented Randy’s Certificate of Live Birth and Baptismal

Certificate indicating her and Antonio as parents of the child.
Mirasol testified that she and Antonio supplied the information in
the said certificates. Antonio supplied his name and birthplace after
Erlinda Balmori (Erlinda), the "hilot" who assisted in Mirasol’s
delivery of Randy, went to his house to solicit the said information.
Mirasol also claimed that it was Erlinda who supplied the date and
place of marriage of the parents so that the latter can file the birth
certificate. Mirasol likewise confirmed that she is the same "Mirasol
Perla" who signed as the informant therein.

Antonio admitted having sexual intercourse with Mirasol in

February and August of 1981. When shown with Randy’s Certificate
of Live Birth and asked whether he had a hand in the preparation of
the same, Antonio answered in the negative.

Anent Randy’s Certificate of Live Birth, Antonio testified as to

several inaccuracies in the entries thereon. According to him, his
middle initial is "E" and not "A" as appearing in the said certificate
of live birth. Also, he is not a protestant and a laborer as indicated
in said certificate. Antonio likewise alleged that Mirasol only made
up the entries with respect to their marriage on October 28, 1981.

After trial, the RTC rendered a ordering Antonio to support Randy.

The RTC ruled that Mirasol and Randy are entitled to the relief
sought since Antonio himself admitted that he had sex with Mirasol.
It also noted that when the 15-year old Randy testified, he
categorically declared Antonio as his father. The RTC opined that
 487

Mirasol would not have gone through the trouble of exposing herself
to humiliation, shame and ridicule of public trial if her allegations
were untrue. Antonio’s counterclaim was denied due to the absence
of bad faith or ill-motive on the part of Mirasol and Randy.

The CA upheld Randy’s illegitimate filiation based on the certified

true copies of his birth certificate and of his baptismal certificate
identifying Antonio as his father. According to the appellate court,
while these documents do not bear the signature of Antonio, they
are proofs that Antonio is the known, imputed and identified father
of Randy.

Issue:
WON lower courts correctly ordered Antonio to support Randy.

Held:
YES. The SC held that respondent failed to establish Randy’s
illegitimate filiation to Antonio.

Respondents presented the Certificate of Live Birth of Randy

identifying Antonio as the father. However, said certificate has no
probative value to establish Randy’s filiation to Antonio since the
latter had not signed the same. It is settled that "a certificate of
live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not
competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that
the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said
certificate."

Aside from Antonio’s denial in having any participation in the

preparation of the document as well as the absence of his signature
thereon, respondents did not present Erlinda to confirm that
Antonio indeed supplied certain entries in Randy’s birth certificate.
Besides, the several unexplained discrepancies in Antonio’s
personal circumstances as reflected in the subject birth certificate
are manifestations of Antonio’s non-participation in its preparation.
Most important, it was Mirasol who signed as informant thereon
which she confirmed on the witness stand.

Neither does the testimony of Randy establish his illegitimate

filiation. That during their first encounter in 1994 Randy called
Antonio "Papa" and kissed his hand while Antonio hugged him and
promised to support him; or that his Aunt Lelita treated him as a
relative and was good to him during his one-week stay in her place,
cannot be considered as indications of Randy’s open and
continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child under
 488

the second paragraph of Article 172(1). The single instance that

Antonio allegedly hugged Randy and promised to support him
cannot be considered as proof of continuous possession of the
status of a child. To emphasize, "the father’s conduct towards his
son must be spontaneous and uninterrupted for this ground to
exist."

Just like in a birth certificate, the lack of participation of the

supposed father in the preparation of a baptismal certificate
renders this document incompetent to prove paternity. And
"while a baptismal certificate may be considered a public document,
it can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacrament
on the date specified but not the veracity of the entries with respect
to the child’s paternity. Thus, x x x baptismal certificates are per se
inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation and they cannot be
admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove the same."

It is well to stress that as plaintiff, Mirasol has the burden of

proving her affirmative allegation that Antonio is the father of her
son Randy. She must rely on the strength of her evidence and not
on the weakness of the defense. As Randy was born on November
11, 1983, it was incumbent upon Mirasol to prove that she had
sexual intercourse with Antonio prior to the usual period of
pregnancy or nine months before the birth of Randy. This crucial
period therefore is during the early part of the first quarter of 1983.
However, nothing from Mirasol’s testimony indicates that she had
sexual intercourse with Antonio during that time. Antonio’s
admission of sexual intercourse with Mirasol does not likewise by
any means strengthen respondents’ theory that he fathered Randy.

All told, it is clear that respondents failed to establish Randy’s

illegitimate filiation to Antonio. Hence, the order for Antonio to
support Randy has no basis.

PEOPLE vs. RAYMUND MAGTIBAY

G.R. NO. 142985 August 6, 2002

Facts:
 489

Accused-appellant Magtibay raped Rachel. Because of the incident,

Rachel became pregnant and eventually gave birth to a baby boy. In his
defense, Magtibay claimed that when the alleged rape incident
happened he was suffering from influenza and in the house of his
parents-in-law. His testimony was corroborated by his wife.

The RTC convicted Magtibay for the crime of rape and sentenced to
suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, together with the accessory
penalty provided by law and to pay the cost.

Issue:
WON accused-appellant may be compelled to support and recognize the
child.

Held:
YES. The record shows that when Rachelle’s mother, Gaudiosa Recto,
discovered about her ordeal, Rachelle was already eight months
pregnant. 37 She eventually gave birth to a baby boy. 38 These facts
confirm the commission of rape sometime in September 1997. There
was no showing that Rachelle has previously been sexually abused or
she had sexual relations with other men during that time. Thus, with
respect to the acknowledgment and support of the child born out of
rape our recent ruling in People v. Justiniano Glabo states:

Concerning the acknowledgment and support of the offspring of

rape, Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code provides for three kinds
of civil liability that may be imposed on the offender: a)
indemnification, b) acknowledgment of the offspring, unless the
law should prevent him from so doing, and c) in every case to
support the offspring. With the passage of the Family Code, the
classification of acknowledged natural children and natural
children by legal fiction was eliminated and they now fall under the
specie of illegitimate children. Since parental authority is vested by
Article 176 of the Family Code upon the mother and considering
that an offender sentenced to reclusion perpetua automatically
loses parental authority over his children, no "further positive act is
required of the parent as the law itself provides for the child’s
status." However, the amount and terms of support shall be
determined by the trial court after due notice and hearing in
accordance with Article 201 of the Family Code.

WHEREFORE, accused-appellant is further ordered to provide support

to the victim’s child born out of the rape, subject to the amount and
terms to be determined by the trial court in a proper proceeding.
PEOPLE vs. MARLON BARSAGA ABELLA
G.R. No. 177295               January 6, 2010
 490

Facts:
Accused-appellant Abella raped a woman who is a mental
retardate. Because of the incident, the victim became pregnant
and eventually gave birth to a baby girl. Thus, the accused-
appellant was convicted for the crime of rape. The RTC also
directed the accused-appellant to recognize the as his
illegitimate daughter, and provide for her support as soon as his
financial means permit.

Issue:
WON the order of the RTC is proper.

Held:
YES. The accused-appellant was the biological father of the two-
year old daughter of AAA as a result of the rape incident and in
view of their "striking facial similarities and features." The order
to acknowledge and support accused-appellant’s offspring is in
accordance with Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code.

MA. BLYTH B. ABADILLA vs. JUDGE JOSE TABILIRAN, JR.

Adm. Matter No. MTJ-92-716. October 25, 1995.
 491

Facts:
Ma. Blyth Abadilla, a Clerk of Court, filed a complaint against
Judge Tabiliran on the grounds of gross immorality, deceitful
conduct, and corruption unbecoming of a judge.  With respect to
the charge on gross immorality, she contended that the judge
scandalously and publicly cohabited with Priscilla Baybayan
during subsistence of his marriage with Teresita Banzuela. 
Tabiliran and Priscilla got married in May 1986.  On the other
hand, with respect to the charge on deceitful conduct, petitioner
claims that the judge caused his 3 illegitimate children with
Priscilla be registered as “legitimate” by falsely executing
separate affidavits stating the delayed registration was due to
inadvertence, excusable negligence or oversight when in fact, he
knew these children cannot be legally registered as legitimate. 
The judge averred that 25 years had already elapsed since the
disappearance of her wife in 1966 when he married Priscilla
hence the cohabitation was neither bigamous nor immoral. 
However, as early as 1970, based on the record, Priscilla had
begotten her 3 children (1970, 1971 and 1975).

Issue:
WON the 3 children can be considered legitimate.

Held:
NO. An examination of the birth certificates of respondent’s
three illegitimate children with Priscilla Baybayan clearly
indicates that these children are his legitimate issues. It was
respondent who caused the entry therein. It is important to note
that these children, namely, Buenasol, Venus and Saturn, all
surnamed Tabiliran, were born in the year 1970, 1971, and
1975, respectively, and prior to the marriage of respondent to
Priscilla, which was in 1986.

As a lawyer and a judge, respondent ought to know that, despite

his subsequent marriage to Priscilla, these three children
cannot be legitimated nor in any way be considered
legitimate since at the time they were born, there was an
existing valid marriage between respondent and his first
wife, Teresita B. Tabiliran.
Under Article 269, only natural children can be legitimated.
Children born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of
the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any
impediment to marry each other, are natural. Legitimation is
 492

limited to natural children and cannot include those born of

adulterous relations. The Family Code (Executive Order No.
209), which took effect on August 3, 1988, reiterated the above-
mentioned provision thus: Art. 177. Only children conceived
and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of
the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any
impediment to marry each other may be legitimated.

The reasons for this limitation are given as follows: 1) The

rationale of legitimation would be destroyed; 2) It would be
unfair to the legitimate children in terms of successional rights;
3) There will be the problem of public scandal, unless social
mores change; 4) It is too violent to grant the privilege of
legitimation to adulterous children as it will destroy the sanctity
of marriage; 5) It will be very scandalous, especially if the
parents marry many years after the birth of the child.

RENATO LAZATIN vs. JUDGE JOSE C. CAMPOS

G.R. No. L-43955-56 July 30, 1979

Facts:
 493

Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin died intestate in Pasay City, survived by

his wife, Margarita de Asis, and his adopted twin daughters,
respondent Nora L. de Leon, married to respondent Bernardo de
Leon, and respondent Irma Lazatin, married to Francisco Veloso.
One month after Mariano’s death, his widow, Margarita de Asis,
commenced an intestate proceeding. Mariano, Oscar, Virgilio
and Yvonne, claiming to be admitted illegitimate (not natural)
children of Dr. Lazatin with one Helen Muñoz, intervened.
Subsequently, one Lily Lazatin also intervened, claiming to be
another admitted illegitimate (not natural) child.

Two months after or on April 11, 1974, the widow, Margarita de

Asis, also died, leaving a & holographic will executed on May 29,
1970, providing, among others, for a legacy of cash, jewelry, and
stocks to respondent Arlene de Leon, a granddaughter; a legacy
of support to Rodolfo Gallardo, a son of her late sister; and a
legacy of education to Ramon Sta. Clara, son of petitioner
Renato Lazatin alias Renato Sta. Clara.

On June 3, 1974, private respondents filed a petition to probate

the will of the late Margarita de Asis. Days after having learned
that respondent Nora L. de Leon had opened this safety deposit
box, petitioner's son, Ramon Sta. Clara, filed a motion in the
probate court, claiming that the deceased had executed a will
subsequent to that submitted for probate and demanding its
production. He likewise prayed for the opening of the safety
deposit box.

On November 22, 1974, or seven months after, the death of

Margarita de Asis, petitioner intervened for the first time in the
proceedings to settle the estate of the late Dr. Mariano M.
Lazatin as an admitted illegitimate (not natural) child.
Petitioner's son, Ramon, filed a petition in the estate proceedings
of Margarita de Asis to examine private respondents on the
contents of the safety deposit box,

Judge Campos issued an order requiring counsel for

respondents Nora L. de Leon and Bernardo de Leon to produce
all those papers and items removed from the safety deposit box
and to deliver the same to the custody of the court within one
week. Within the period ordered, respondent Nora L. de Leon
deposited with the Clerk of Court, not the items themselves, but
 494

two keys to a new safety deposit box which could only be opened
upon order of the court.

Petitioner Renato Lazatin alias Renato Sta. Clara filed a motion

to intervene in the estate of Margarita de Asis, as an adopted
child, on the basis of an affidavit executed by Benjamin Lazatin,
brother of the deceased Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin, the petitioner
was an "illegitimate son" of Dr. Lazatin and was later adopted by
him. This affidavit was later modified on August 19, 1975 to
state that petitioner was adopted by both Mariano M. Lazatin
and his wife Margarita de Asis.

Respondent court heard petitioner’s motion to intervene as an

adopted son in the estate of Margarita de Asis at which hearings
petitioner presented no decree of adoption in his favor. In its
decision, respondent court ruled that petitioner has failed to
establish the status of his adoption.

Issue:
WON petitioner was able to prove his adoption.

Held:
NO. Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem which
creates between two persons a relationship similar to that
which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. Only an
adoption made through the court, or in pursuance with the
procedure laid down under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court is valid
in this jurisdiction. It is not of natural law at all, but is wholly
and entirely artificial. To establish the relation, the statutory
requirements must be strictly carried out, otherwise, the
adoption is an absolute nullity. The fact of adoption is never
presumed, but must be affirmatively proved by the person
claiming its existence. The destruction by fire of a public
building in which the adoption papers would have been filed if
existent does not give rise to a presumption of adoption nor is
the destruction of the records of an adoption proceeding to be
presumed. On the contrary, the absence of a record of
adoption has been said to evolve a presumption of its non-
existence. Where, under the provisions of the statute, an
adoption is effected by a court order, the records of such court
constitute the evidence by which such adoption may be
established.
 495

Petitioner's flow of evidence in the case below does not lead us to

any proof of judicial adoption. His proofs do not show or tend to
show that at one time or another a specific court of competent
jurisdiction rendered in an adoption proceeding initiated by the
late spouses an order approving his adoption as a child of the
latter. No judicial records of such adoption or copies thereof
are presented or attempted to be presented. Petitioner merely
proceeds from a nebulous assumption that he was judicially
adopted between the years 1928 and 1932. By what particular
court was the adoption decreed or by whom was the petition
heard, petitioner does not even manifest, much less show. There
are no witnesses cited to that adoption proceeding or to the
adoption decree.

The absence of proof of such order of adoption by the court, as

provided by the statute, cannot be substituted by parol evidence
that a child has lived with a person, not his parent, and has
been treated as a child to establish such adoption. Even
evidence of declaration of the deceased, made in his lifetime,
that he intended to adopt a child as his heir, and that he had
adopted him, and of the fact that the child resided with the
deceased, as a member of his family, from infancy until he
attained his majority, is not sufficient to establish the fact of
adoption. Nor does the fact that the deceased spouses fed,
clothed, educated, recognized and referred to one like petitioner
as an adopted child, recognized and referred to one like
petitioner as an adopted child, necessarily establish adoption of
the child. Withal, the attempts of petitioner to prove his
adoption by acts and declarations of the deceased do not
discharge the mandatory presentation of the judicial decree
of adoption. The thrust of petitioner's evidence is rather to
establish his status as an admitted illegitimate child, not an
adopted child which status of an admitted illegitimate child was
— the very basis of his petitioner for intervention in the estate
proceedings of the late Dr. Lazatin, as above stated.

Secondary evidence is nonetheless admissible where the records

of adoption proceedings were actually lost or destroyed. But,
prior to the introduction of such secondary evidence, the
proponent must establish the former existence of the
instrument. Assuming the mere fact that the deceased spouses
treated petitioner as their child does not justify the conclusion
 496

that petitioner had been in fact judicially adopted by the spouses

nor does it constitute admissible proof of adoption.

As a necessary consequence, petitioner Renato Lazatin alias

Renato Sta. Clara cannot properly intervene in the settlement of
the estate of Margarita de Asis, as an adopted child because of
lack of proof thereof. For one to intervene in an estate
proceeding, it is a requisite that he has an interest in the estate,
either as one who would be benefited as an heir or one who has
a claim against the estate like a creditor. A child by adoption
cannot inherit from the parent creditor by adoption unless the
act of adoption has been done in strict accord with the statue.
Until this is done, no rights are acquired by the child and
neither the supposed adopting parent or adopted child could be
bound thereby. The burden of proof in establishing adoption
is upon the person claiming such relationship. He must prove
compliance with the statutes relating to adoption in the
jurisdiction where the adoption occurred. A fortiori if no
hereditary interest in the estate can be gained by a claimant who
failed to submit proof thereof, whether the will is probated or
not, intervention should be denied as it would merely result in
unnecessary complication. To succeed, a child must be
ligitimate, legitimated, adopted, acknowledged illegitimate
natural child or natural child by legal fiction or recognized
spurious child.

ANGELIE ANNE C. CERVANTES vs. GINA FAJARDO

G.R. No. 79955 January 27, 1989
 497

Facts:
The minor Angeline Anne Cervantes was born to respondents
Conrado Fajardoand Gina Carreon, who are common-law
husband and wife.Respondents offered the child for adoption to
Gina Carreon'ssister and brother-in-law, the herein petitioners
ZenaidaCarreon-Cervantes and Nelson Cervantes, spouses, who
tookcare and custody of the child when she was barely two
(2)weeks old. An Affidavit of Consent to the adoption of the
childby herein petitioners, was also executed by respondent
Gina Carreon.

The adoptive parents received a letter from therespondents

demanding to be paid the amount of P150,000.00, otherwise,
they would get back their child.Petitioners refused to accede to
the demand. Subsequently,the respondents took the child

Issue:
WON respondents can take back their child.

Held:
NO. The minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with the
full knowledge and consent of respondents. A decree of
adoption has the effect, among others, of dissolving the
authority vested in natural parents over the adopted child,
except where the adopting parent is the spouse of the
natural parent of the adopted, in which case, parental
authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by both
spouses. The adopting parents have the right to the care and
custody of the adopted child and exercise parental authority and
responsibility over him.

IN RE PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P LIM

G.R. No. 168992-93, May 21, 2009
 498

Facts:
Petitioner Monina P Lim is an optometrist by profession and
married Primo Lim in June 1974. The couple were childless.
When a certain Lucia Ayuban entrusted to them minor children,
whose parents were unknown, petitioner and Lim registered the
children to make it appear that they were the children’s parents.
The children were named Michelle P. Lim (Michelle) and Michael
Jude P. Lim (Michael). Michelle was born on 15 March 1977
while Michael’s date of birth is 1 August 1983.

The children used the surname "Lim" in all their school records
and documents. On 28 November 1998, Primo Lim died and
petitioner married Angel Olario (Olario), an American citizen, on
27 December 2000. Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the
children by availing of the amnesty given under Republic Act No.
8552 (RA 8552) to those individuals who simulated the birth of a
child. Thus, on 24 April 2002, petitioner filed separate petitions
for the adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court. At
the time of the filing of the petitions for adoption, Michelle was
25 years old and already married, while Michael was 18 years
and seven months old.

Michelle and her husband as well as Michael gave their consent

to the adoption as evidenced by their Affidavits of Consent.
Petitioner’s husband Olario likewise executed an Affidavit of
Consent for the adoption of Michelle and Michael. In the
Certification issued by the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD), Michelle and Michael were considered as
abandoned children and the whereabouts of their natural
parents were unknown. In its decision, the RTC dismissed the
petitions holding that since petitioner had remarried, she should
have filed the petition jointly with her new husband. The trial
court ruled that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is
mandatory citing Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552 and Article
185 of the Family Code.

On her appeal before the SC, petitioner contends that the rule
on joint adoption must be relaxed because it is the duty of the
court and the State to protect the paramount interest and
welfare of the child to be adopted. Petitioner argues that the
legal maxim "dura lex sed lex" is not applicable to adoption
cases. She argues that joint parental authority is not necessary
 499

in this case since, at the time the petitions were filed, Michelle
was 25 years old and already married, while Michael was already
18 years of age. Parental authority is not anymore necessary
since they have been emancipated having attained the age of
majority.

Issue:
WON petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt.

Held:
NO. The time the petitions were filed, petitioner had already
remarried.  Husband and wife shall jointly adopt except in 3
instances which was not present in the case at bar.  In case
spouses jointly adopts, they shall jointly exercised parental
authority.  The use of the word “shall” signifies that joint
adoption of husband and wife is mandatory.  This is in
consonance with the concept of joint parental authority since the
child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it
is but natural to require spouses to adopt jointly.  The affidavit
of consent given by Olario will not suffice since there are certain
requirements that he must comply as an American Citizen.  He
must meet the qualifications set forth in Sec7 of RA8552.  The
requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s
qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Sec
7.  Parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal
adoption.  It includes caring and rearing the children for civic
consciousness and efficiency and development of their moral
mental and physical character and well-being.

REPUBLIC vs. HONORABLE RODOLFO TOLEDANO

G.R. No. 94147 June 8, 1994
 500

Facts:
Private respondent Alvin Clouse, a natural born US citizen and
his wife Evelyn Clouse, a former Filipino who became a
naturalized US citizen, sought to adopt the minor, Solomon
Joseph Alcala, the younger brother of private respondent Evelyn
A. Clouse. They are physically, mentally, morally, and financially
capable of adopting Solomon, a twelve (12) year old minor.

Since 1981 to 1984, then from November 2, 1989 up to the

present, Solomon Joseph Alcala was and has been under the
care and custody of private respondents. Solomon gave his
consent to the adoption. His mother, Nery Alcala, a widow,
likewise consented to the adoption due to poverty and inability
to support and educate her son. Mrs. Nila Corazon Pronda, the
social worker assigned to conduct the Home and Child Study,
favorably recommended the granting of the petition for adoption

Issue:
WON private respondents spouses Alvin A. Clouse and Evelyn A.
Clouse who are aliens may adopt under Philippine Law.

Held:
NO. Under Articles 184, paragraph (3) of Executive Order (E.O.)
No. 209, expressly enumerates the persons who are not qualified
to adopt, viz.:

An alien, except:

(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by

consanguinity;

(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her
Filipino spouse; or

(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to

adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by
consanguinity of the latter.

Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt

Filipino children in accordance with the rules on inter-country
adoption as may be provided by law.
 501

There can be no question that private respondent Alvin A.

Clouse is not qualified to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala under
any of the exceptional cases in the aforequoted provision. In the
first place, he is not a former Filipino citizen but a natural born
citizen of the United States of America. In the second place,
Solomon Joseph Alcala is neither his relative by consanguinity
nor the legitimate child of his spouse. In the third place, when
private respondents spouses Clouse jointly filed the petition to
adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala on February 21, 1990, private
respondent Evelyn A. Clouse was no longer a Filipino citizen.
She lost her Filipino citizenship when she was naturalized as a
citizen of the United States in 1988.

Private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse, on the other hand, may

appear to qualify pursuant to paragraph 3(a) of Article 184 of
E.O. 209. She was a former Filipino citizen. She sought to adopt
her younger brother. Unfortunately, the petition for adoption
cannot be granted in her favor alone without violating Article
185 which mandates a joint adoption by the husband and
wife.

DIWATA RAMOS LANDINGIN vs. REPUBLIC

G.R. No. 164948             June 27, 2006

Facts:
 502

Petitioner Diwata Ramos Landingin, a citizen of the United States of

America (USA), of Filipino parentage and a resident of Guam, USA,
filed a petition for the adoption of minors Elaine Dizon Ramos who
was born on August 31, 1986; Elma Dizon Ramos, who was born on
September 7, 1987; and Eugene Dizon Ramos who was born on
August 5, 1989. The minors are the natural children of Manuel
Ramos, petitioner’s brother, and Amelia Ramos.

Landingin, claimed that when Manuel died, the children were left to
their paternal grandmother, Maria Taruc Ramos; their biological
mother, Amelia, went to Italy, re-married there and now has two
children by her second marriage and no longer communicated with
her children by Manuel Ramos nor with her in-laws from the time
she left up to the institution of the adoption. The minors are being
financially supported by the petitioner and her children, and
relatives abroad. When the grandmother passed away, petitioner
desires to adopt the children and the minors have given their
written consent to the adoption. She is qualified to adopt as shown
by the fact that she is a 57-year-old widow, has children of her own
who are already married, gainfully employed and have their
respective families; she lives alone in her own home in Guam, USA,
where she acquired citizenship, and works as a restaurant server.
She came back to the Philippines to spend time with the minors;
her children gave their written consent to the adoption of the
minors. Petitioner’s brother, Mariano Ramos, who earns substantial
income, signified his willingness and commitment to support the
minors while in petitioner’s custody.

Issue:
WON the petition for adoption is invalid for lack of consent of the
biological mother.

Held:
NO. The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural
parents is intended to protect the natural parental relationship from
unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the
opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child in the
manner of the proposed adoption. Clearly, the written consent of
the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of a
decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his
child requires that his consent must be obtained before his parental
rights and duties may be terminated and re-established in adoptive
parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit the written
consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption.
 503

When petitioner filed her petition with the trial court, Rep. Act No.
8552 was already in effect. Section 9 thereof provides that if the
written consent of the biological parents cannot be obtained,
the written consent of the legal guardian of the minors will
suffice. If, as claimed by petitioner, that the biological mother of the
minors had indeed abandoned them, she should, thus have
adduced the written consent of their legal guardian.

Ordinarily, abandonment by a parent to justify the adoption of his

child without his consent, is a conduct which evinces a settled
purpose to forego all parental duties. The term means neglect and
refusal to perform the filial and legal obligations of love and support.
If a parent withholds presence, love, care, the opportunity to display
filial affection, and neglects to lend support and maintenance, the
parent, in effect, abandons the child. Merely permitting the child to
remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others is not such
abandonment. To dispense with the requirement of consent, the
abandonment must be shown to have existed at the time of
adoption.

Nevertheless, the adoption of the minors herein will have the effect
of severing all legal ties between the biological mother, Amelia, and
the adoptees, and that the same shall then be vested on the
adopter. It would thus be against the spirit of the law if financial
consideration were to be the paramount consideration in deciding
whether to deprive a person of parental authority over his/her
children. More proof has to be adduced that Amelia has emotionally
abandoned the children, and that the latter will not miss her
guidance and counsel if they are given to an adopting parent. Again,
it is the best interest of the child that takes precedence in adoption.

Since the primary consideration in adoption is the best interest of

the child, it follows that the financial capacity of prospective parents
should also be carefully evaluated and considered. Certainly, the
adopter should be in a position to support the would-be adopted
child or children, in keeping with the means of the family.

MACARIO TAMARGO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 85044 June 3, 1992

Facts:
 504

In October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of

age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries
which resulted in her death. Accordingly, a civil complaint for
damages was filed by petitioner Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's
adopting parent, and petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia
Tamargo, Jennifer's natural parents against respondent spouses
Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents with whom
he was living at the time of the tragic incident.

Prior to the incident, or in December 1981, the spouses Sabas

and Felisa Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt the minor
Adelberto Bundoc. This petition for adoption was grunted on, 18
November 1982, that is, after Adelberto had shot and killed
Jennifer.

In their Answer, respondent spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's

natural parents, reciting the result of the foregoing petition for
adoption, claimed that not they, but rather the adopting parents,
namely the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura, were
indispensable parties to the action since parental authority had
shifted to the adopting parents from the moment the successful
petition for adoption was filed.

Petitioners in their Reply contended that since Adelberto Bundoc

was then actually living with his natural parents, parental
authority had not ceased nor been relinquished by the mere
filing and granting of a petition for adoption.

Issue:
WON parental authority concerned may be given retroactive
effect so as to make adopting parents the indispensable parties
in a damage case filed against the adopted child where actual
custody was lodged with the biological parents.

Held:
NO. The principle of parental liability is a species of what is
frequently designated as vicarious liability or the doctrine of
"imputed negligence" under Anglo-American tort law, where a
person is not only liable for torts committed by himself, but also
for torts committed by others with whom he has a certain
relationship and for whom he is responsible. Thus, parental
liability is made a natural or logical consequence of the
duties and responsibilities of parents — their parental
 505

authority — which includes the instructing, controlling and

disciplining of the child.

The civil liability imposed upon parents for the torts of their
minor children living with them, may be seen to be based upon
the parental authority vested by the Civil Code upon such
parents. Parental liability is, in other words, anchored upon
parental authority coupled with presumed parental dereliction in
the discharge of the duties accompanying such authority. The
parental dereliction is, of course, only presumed and the
presumption can be overturned under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code by proof that the parents had exercised all the diligence of
a good father of a family to prevent the damage.

In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with an

air rifle occurred when parental authority was still lodged in
respondent Bundoc spouses, the natural parents of the minor
Adelberto. It would thus follow that the natural parents who had
then actual custody of the minor Adelberto, are the
indispensable parties to the suit for damages.

The Court do not believe that parental authority is properly

regarded as having been retroactively transferred to and vested
in the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, at the time the
air rifle shooting happened. The Court do not consider that
retroactive effect may be given to the decree of adoption so
as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing
at a time when the adopting parents had no actual or
physical custody over the adopted child. Retroactive effect
may perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for adoption
where such is essential to permit the accrual of some benefit or
advantage in favor of the adopted child. In the instant case,
however, to hold that parental authority had been retroactively
lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with
liability for a tortious act that they could not have foreseen and
which they could not have prevented (since they were at the time
in the United States and had no physical custody over the child
Adelberto) would be unfair and unconscionable. Such a result,
moreover, would be inconsistent with the philosophical and
policy basis underlying the doctrine of vicarious liability. Put a
little differently, no presumption of parental dereliction on the
part of the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, could have
 506

arisen since Adelberto was not in fact subject to their control at

the time the tort was committed.

Under Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, parental

authority is provisionally vested in the adopting parents during
the period of trial custody, i.e., before the issuance of a decree of
adoption, precisely because the adopting parents are given
actual custody of the child during such trial period. In the
instant case, the trial custody period either had not yet begun or
had already been completed at the time of the air rifle shooting;
in any case, actual custody of Adelberto was then with his
natural parents, not the adopting parents. Accordingly, we
conclude that respondent Bundoc spouses, Adelberto’s natural
parents, were indispensable parties to the suit for damages
brought by petitioners, and that the dismissal by the trial court
of petitioners’ complaint, the indispensable parties being already
before the court, constituted grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY

ASTORGA GARCIA
G.R. No. 148311, March 31, 2005
 507

Facts:
Petitioner Honorato B. Catindig filed a petition to adopthis minor
illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged
therein, among others, that Stephanie was born on June 26,
1994; that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie
has been using her mother's middle name and surname; and
that he is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting
parent. He prayed that Stephanie's middle name Astorga be
changed to Garcia, her mother's surname, and that her surname
Garcia be changed to Catindig, his surname.

Finding the petition to be meritorious, the same is GRANTED.

Henceforth, Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia is hereby freed from
all obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to her
natural mother, and for civil purposes, shall henceforth be the
petitioner's legitimate child and legal heir. Pursuant to Article
189 of the Family Code of the Philippines, the minor shall be
known as STEPHANIE NATHY CATINDIG.

On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for clarification

and/or reconsideration praying that Stephanie should be
allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as
her middle name

Issue: 
WON an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father,
use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name.

Held:
YES. Adoption is defined as the process of making a child,
whether related or not to the adopter, possess in general, the
rights accorded to a legitimate child. It is a juridical act, a
proceeding in rem which creates between two persons a
relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity
and filiation. The modern trend is to consider adoption not merely
as an act to establish a relationship of paternity and filiation, but
also as an act which endows the child with a legitimate status.

One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed

to be a legitimate child of the adopter for all intents and
purposes pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code and
Section 17 Article V of RA 8552. Being a legitimate child by
virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all
 508

the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without

discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the
surname of her father and her mother, as discussed above.
This is consistent with the intention of the members of the Civil
Code and Family Law Committees as earlier discussed. In fact, it
is a Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the mother
should immediately precede the surname of the father.

Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanie’s

continued use of her mother’s surname (Garcia) as her middle
name will maintain her maternal lineage. It is to be noted that
Article 189(3) of the Family Code and Section 18, Article V of RA
8552 (law on adoption) provide that the adoptee remains an
intestate heir of his/her biological parent. Hence, Stephanie can
well assert or claim her hereditary rights from her natural
mother in the future.

It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and

salutary, should be liberally construed to carry out the
beneficent purposes of adoption. The interests and welfare of the
adopted child are of primary and paramount consideration,
hence, every reasonable intendment should be sustained to
promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of
the law.

Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child

adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle
name her mother’s surname, we find no reason why she should
not be allowed to do so.

ISABELITA S. LAHOM vs. JOSE MELVIN SIBULO

GR No. 143989, July 14, 2003

Facts:
 509

Dr. Diosdado Lahom and petitioner Isabelita Lahom has been

taking care the respondent Jose Melvin Sibulo since he was two
(2) years old. Only in 1971, that the couple finally decided to file
a petition for adoption. On 05 May 1972, an order granting the
petition was issued that made all the more intense than before
the feeling of affection of the spouses for Melvin. In keeping with
the court order, the Civil Registrar of Naga City changed the
name "Jose Melvin Sibulo" to "Jose Melvin Lahom."

However, respondent continued using his surname Sibulo to the

utter disregard of the feelings of herein petitioner, and his
records with the Professional Regulation Commission showed his
name as Jose Melvin M. Sibulo originally issued in 1978 until
the present, and in all his dealings and activities in connection
with his practice of his profession, he is Jose Melvin M. Sibulo.

Further, knowing that petitioner is already a widow, respondent

would only visit her once a year and for the last three or four
years, respondent all the more remained callous and utterly
indifferent towards petitioner which is not expected of a son.
Respondent has even been jealous of petitioner's nephews and
nieces whenever they would find time to visit her, alleging that
they were only motivated by their desire for some material
benefits from petitioner.

In view of respondent's insensible attitude resulting in a strained

and uncomfortable relationship between him and petitioner and
knowing that after all respondent's only motive to his adoption is
his expectancy of his alleged rights over the properties of herein
petitioner and her late husband, clearly shown by his recent
filing of a case for partition against petitioner, hence petitioner
filed for revocation of the adoption decree.

Issue:
WON an adopter may rescind the adoption.

Held:
NO. Prior to the institution of the case, specifically on 22 March
1998, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8552, also known as the Domestic
Adoption Act, went into effect. The new statute deleted from the
law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption.
 510

Interestingly, even before the passage of the statute, an action to

set aside the adoption is subject to the five-year bar rule under
Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and that the adopter would lose
the right to revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that
period. The exercise of the right within a prescriptive period is a
condition that could not fulfill the requirements of a vested right
entitled to protection. It must also be acknowledged that a
person has no vested right in statutory privileges. While
adoption has often been referred to in the context of a "right,"
the privilege to adopt is itself not naturally innate or
fundamental but rather a right merely created by statute. It is a
privilege that is governed by the state's determination on what it
may deem to be for the best interest and welfare of the child.
Matters relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of the
right of an adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are subject to
regulation by the State. Concomitantly, a right of action given by
statute may be taken away at anytime before it has been
exercised.

While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from an

adopter a consequential right to rescind the adoption decree
even in cases where the adoption might clearly turn out to be
undesirable, it remains, nevertheless, the bounden duty of the
Court to apply the law. Dura lex sed lex would be the hackneyed
truism that those caught in the law have to live with. It is still
noteworthy, however, that an adopter, while barred from
severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid
reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise
accruing to an undeserving child. For instance, upon the
grounds recognized by law, an adopter may deny to an adopted
child his legitime and, by a will and testament, may freely
exclude him from having a share in the disposable portion of his
estate.

ARTURO PELAYO vs. MARCELO LAURON, ET AL.

G.R. No. L-4089             January 12, 1909
 511

Facts:
Arturo Pelayo, a physician residing in Cebu, filed a complaint
against Marcelo Lauron and Juana Abella. He alleged that on or
about the 13th of October of said year, at night, the plaintiff was
called to the house of the defendants, situated in San Nicolas,
and that upon arrival he was requested by them to render
medical assistance to their daughter-in-law who was about to
give birth to a child. After consultation with the attending
physician, Dr. Escaño, it was found necessary, on account of the
difficult birth, to remove the fetus by means of forceps which
operation was performed by the plaintiff, who also had to remove
the afterbirth, in which services he was occupied until the
following morning, and that afterwards, on the same day, he
visited the patient several times; that the just and equitable
value of the services rendered by him was P500, which the
defendants refuse to pay without alleging any good reason
therefor; that for said reason he prayed that the judgment be
entered in his favor as against the defendants, or any of them,
for the sum of P500 and costs, together with any other relief that
might be deemed proper.

Thus, the defendant refuses to pay. The defendants argue that

their daughter-in-law lived with her husband independently and
in a separate house without any relation, that her stay there was
accidental and due to fortuitous event. 

Issue:
WON the defendants should be held liable for the fees demanded
by the plaintiff upon rendering medical assistance to the
defendants’ daughter-in-law.

Held:
NO. Among the reciprocal obligations existing between a
husband and wife is that of support, which obligation is
established by law. The law does not compel any person to
support a stranger unless such person bound himself to do so
by an express contract. Where a husband whom the law compel
to support his wife in living, the father and mother-in-law of the
latter are under no liability to provide for her.

FELICIANO SANCHEZ vs. JUDGE FRANCISCO ZULUETA

G.R. No. L-45616             May 16, 1939
 512

Facts:
Respondents are the wife and child, respectively, of petitioner
Feliciano Sanchez. Since 1932, petitioner refused and still
refuses to support the respondents and that he has no means of
subsistence, while the petitioner receives from the United States
Army a monthly pension of P174.20; that the petitioner
abandoned the respondents without any justifiable cause and
now refuses to allow them to live with him.

Petitioner alleges, as special defense, that the respondent Josefa

Diego abandoned the conjugal home on October 27, 1930,
without his knowledge or consent, because she committed
adultery with Macario Sanchez, with whom she had, as a result
of the illicit relations, a child which is the other plaintiff Mario
Sanchez.

The month following the filing of the complaint, the respondents

asked the court to compel the defendant to give them, by way of
allowance pendente lite, the sum of P50 a month. In opposition
to his petition, the defendant alleged that Mario Sanchez is not
his legitimate child but is the adulterous child of the plaintiff
with Macario Sanchez, and he asked for an oppurtunity to
adduce evidence in support of this defense.

The court, without acceding to this petition of the petitioner to

adduce evidence, favorably acted upon the application of the
respondents and ordered the petitioner to pay a monthly
allowance pendente lite of P50 to the plaintiffs, from July 1,
1936.

Issue:
WON the CA erred in not allowing the petitioner to present
evidence.

Held:
YES. The Court of Appeals erred in not allowing the defendant to
present his evidence for the purpose of de determining whether
it is sufficient, prima facie to overcome the application. Adultery
on the part of the wife is a valid defense against an action for
support (Quintana v. Lerma, 24 Phil., 285). Consequently, as to
the child, it is also a defense that it is the fruit of such
adulterous relations, for in that case, it would not be the child of
the defendant and, hence, would not be entitled to support as
 513

such. But as this defense should be established, and not merely

alleged, it would be unavailing if proof thereof is not permitted. It
is not of course necessary to go fully into the merits of the case,
it being sufficient that the court ascertain the kind and amount
of evidence which it may deem sufficient to enable it to justly
resolve the application, one way or the other, in view of the
merely provisional character of the resolution to be entered.

Although mere affidavits may satisfy the court to pass upon the
application, nevertheless, the failure to accompany the
opposition therewith did not justify the court in ignoring said
opposition, just because of this omission, inasmuch as an
opportunity to present evidence has been asked. It may be that
the defendant could not get hold of affidavits in support of his
opposition, but he may have on hand other evidence of greater
weight. If the defendant has a valid defense which calls for proof,
and he asks for an opportunity to present evidence, it is error to
deny him this opportunity.

MANUEL DE ASIS VS CA
GR No. 127578, February 15, 1999
 514

Facts:
Vircel Andres as legal guardian of Glen Camil Andres de Asis, filed
an action in 1988 for maintenance and support against the alleged
father Manuel De Asis who failed to provide support and
maintenance despite repeated demands.  Vircel later on withdrew
the complaint in 1989 for the reason that Manuel denied paternity
of the said minor and due to such denial, it seems useless to pursue
the said action.  They mutually agreed to move for the dismissal of
the complaint with the condition that Manuel will not pursue his
counter claim.  However in 1995, Vircel filed a similar complaint
against the alleged father, this time as the minor’s legal
guardian/mother.  Manuel interposed maxim of res judicata for the
dismissal of the case.  He maintained that since the obligation to
give support is based on existence of paternity between the child
and putative parent, lack thereof negates the right to claim support.

Issue: 
WON the action for support is barred by res judicata.

Held:
NO. The right to give support cannot be renounced nor can it be
transmitted to a third person.  The original agreement between the
parties to dismiss the initial complaint was in the nature of a
compromise regarding future support which is prohibited by law. 
With respect to Manuel’s contention for the lack of filial relationship
between him and the child and agreement of Vircel in not pursuing
the original claim, the Court held that existence of lack thereof of
any filial relationship between parties was not a matter which the
parties must decide but should be decided by the Court itself. 
While it is true that in order to claim support, filiation or paternity
must be first shown between the parties, but the presence or lack
thereof must be judicially established and declaration is vested in
the Court.  It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties. 

Hence, the first dismissal cannot bar the filing of another action
asking for the same relief (no force and effect).  Furthermore, the
defense of res judicata claimed by Manuel was untenable since
future support cannot be the subject of any compromise or waiver.

VICTOR RONDINA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 179059               June 13, 2012

Facts:
 515

Petitioner ondina was accused of raping the 16-year old victim.

Due to the incident, the victim became pregnant and eventually
gave birth to a baby girl. The RTC found the petitioner guilty of
the crime of rape and ordered him, among others, to
acknowledge the offspring and to give her support.

Issue:
WON petitioner may be compelled to provide support.

Held:
YES. Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code provides for three
different kinds of civil liability that may be imposed on the
offender: a) indemnification, b) acknowledgement of the
offspring, unless the law should prevent him from so doing, and
c) in every case to support the offspring. With the passage of
the Family Code, the classification of acknowledged natural
children and natural children by legal fiction was eliminated
and they now fall under the specie of illegitimate children.
Since parental authority is vested by Article 176 of the Family
Code upon the mother and considering that an offender
sentenced to reclusion perpetua automatically loses the power to
exercise parental authority over his children, no ‘further positive
act is required of the parent as the law itself provides for the
child’s status’. Hence, petitioner should only be ordered to
indemnify and support the victim’s child. The amount and terms
of support shall be determined by the trial court after due notice
and hearing in accordance with Article 201 of the Family Code.

WHEREFORE, petitioner Victor Rondina is further ordered to

give support to "AAA’s" offspring, "CCC," in such amount and
under such terms to be determined by the Regional Trial Court
of Ormoc City in a proper proceeding with support arrears to be
reckoned from the finality of this Decision.

MA. CARMINIA C. CALDERON vs. JOSE ANTONIO F. ROXAS

G.R. No. 185595               January 9, 2013

Facts:
 516

Petitioner Calderon and private respondent Roxas were married

on December 4, 1985 and their union produced four children.
On January 16, 1998, petitioner filed an Amended Complaint for
the declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code of
the Philippines. On May 19, 1998, the trial court issued an
Order granting petitioner’s application for support pendente lite.

On motion of petitioner’s counsel, the trial court directed private

respondent to give support in the amount of P42,292.50 per
month starting April 1, 1999 pursuant to the May 19, 1998
Order. Roxas filed a Motion to Reduce Support citing, among
other grounds, that the P42,292.50 monthly support for the
children as fixed by the court was even higher than his then
P20,800.00 monthly salary as city councilor. The RTC reduced
the amount to P30,000.00.

Issue:
WON the order of support pende lite are final and interlocutory.

Held:
NO. The assailed orders relative to the incident of support
pendente lite and support in arrears, as the term suggests, were
issued pending the rendition of the decision on the main action
for declaration of nullity of marriage, and are therefore
interlocutory. They did not finally dispose of the case nor did
they consist of a final adjudication of the merits of petitioner’s
claims as to the ground of psychological incapacity and other
incidents as child custody, support and conjugal assets.

The Rules of Court provide for the provisional remedy of support

pendente lite which may be availed of at the commencement of
the proper action or proceeding, or at any time prior to the
judgment or final order. On March 4, 2003, this Court
promulgated the Rule on Provisional Orders which shall govern
the issuance of provisional orders during the pendency of cases
for the declaration of nullity of marriage, annulment of voidable
marriage and legal separation. These include orders for spousal
support, child support, child custody, visitation rights, hold
departure, protection and administration of common property.

The word interlocutory refers to something intervening between

the commencement and the end of the suit which decides some
 517

point or matter but is not a final decision of the whole

controversy. An interlocutory order merely resolves
incidental matters and leaves something more to be done to
resolve the merits of the case. In contrast, a judgment or
order is considered final if the order disposes of the action
or proceeding completely, or terminates a particular stage of
the same action. Clearly, whether an order or resolution is final
or interlocutory is not dependent on compliance or non-
compliance by a party to its directive, as what petitioner
suggests. It is also important to emphasize the temporary or
provisional nature of the assailed orders.

Provisional remedies are writs and processes available during

the pendency of the action which may be resorted to by a litigant
to preserve and protect certain rights and interests therein
pending rendition, and for purposes of the ultimate effects, of a
final judgment in the case. They are provisional because they
constitute temporary measures availed of during the pendency of
the action, and they are ancillary because they are mere
incidents in and are dependent upon the result of the main
action. The subject orders on the matter of support pendente lite
are but an incident to the main action for declaration of nullity
of marriage.

Moreover, private respondent’s obligation to give monthly

support in the amount fixed by the RTC in the assailed
orders may be enforced by the court itself, as what
transpired in the early stage of the proceedings when the
court cited the private respondent in contempt of court and
ordered him arrested for his refusal/failure to comply with
the order granting support pendente lite. A few years later,
private respondent filed a motion to reduce support while
petitioner filed her own motion to increase the same, and in
addition sought spousal support and support in arrears. This
fact underscores the provisional character of the order granting
support pendente lite. Petitioner’s theory that the assailed orders
have ceased to be provisional due to the arrearages incurred by
private respondent is therefore untenable.
TEODORO E. LERMA vs. CA and CONCEPCION DIAZ
G.R. No. L-33352 December 20, 1974

Facts:
 518

Petitioner Lerma and respondent Diaz are husband and wife. They
married on May 19, 1951. On August 22, 1969 the petitioner filed a
complaint for adultery against the respondent and a certain Teodoro
Ramirez. On November 18, 1969 the respondent filed with the lower
court, a complaint gainst the petitioner for legal separation and/or
separation of properties, custody of their children and support, with
an urgent petition for support pendente lite for her and their
youngest son, Gregory, who was then and until now is in her
custody. The respondent's complaint for legal separation is based on
two grounds: concubinage and attempt against her life.

The petitioner filed his opposition to the respondent's application for

support pendente lite, setting up as defense the adultery charge he
had filed against the respondent. Judge Luciano granted the
respondent's application for support pendente lite in an order dated
December 24, 1969, which she amended in an order dated February
15, 1970.

Petitioner's urgent motion for preliminary injunction, the

respondent filed an opposition, with a prayer for the immediate
lifting of the temporary restraining order issued ex-parte. The
opposition reiterated that under Article 292 of the New Civil Code,
which provides that "during the proceedings for legal separation, or
for annulment of marriage, the spouses and children shall be
supported from the conjugal partnership property ...," such support
is mandatory even if there be a showing that the wife is guilty of
adultery.

Issue:
WON adultery is a good defense against the respondent's claim for
support pendente lite.

Held:
YES. It is suggested that while adultery may be a defense in an
action for personal support, that is, support of the wife by the
husband from his own funds, it is not a defense when the support is
to be taken from the conjugal partnership property.
In the first place Article 292 is not in itself the source of the legal
right to receive support. It merely states that the support, not
only of the spouses but also of the children, shall be taken from
the conjugal property during the pendency of the legal
separation proceeding. It does not preclude the loss of such right
in certain cases. In the second place, the said article contemplates
the pendency of a court action and, inferentially at least, a prima
facie showing that the action will prosper. For if the action is
 519

shown to be groundless, the mere filing thereof will not

necessarily set Article 292 in operation. This is also the sense of
Section 5 of Rule 61, which requires, among other things, when
support pendente lite is applied for, that the court determine
provisionally "the probable outcome of the case."

In a provisional sense at least, within the meaning of Rule 61

(Section 5), the probable failure of the respondent's suit for legal
separation can be foreseen since she is not an innocent spouse,
having been convicted of adultery by the Court of First Instance. It
is true that the judgment of conviction is on appeal in the Court of
Appeals, but the same undoubtedly satisfies the standard of
provisional showing set by the aforesaid Rule. If legal separation
cannot be claimed by the guilty spouse in the first place, the fact
that an action for that purpose is filed anyway should not be
permitted to be used as a means to obtain support pendente lite,
which, without such action, would be denied on the strength of the
decisions of this Court recognizing adultery as a good defense.
Otherwise, as pointed out by the petitioner, all that an erring
spouse has to do to circumvent such defense would be to file a suit
for legal separation no matter how groundless.

The right to separate support or maintenance, even from the

conjugal partnership property, presupposes the existence of a
justifiable cause for the spouse claiming such right to live
separately. This is implicit in Article 104 of the Civil Code, which
states that after the filing of the petition for legal separation the
spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other. A
petition in bad faith, such as that filed by one who is himself or
herself guilty of an act which constitutes a ground for legal
separation at the instance of the other spouse, cannot be considered
as within the intendment of the law granting separate support. In
fact under Article 303 of the same Code the obligation to give
support shall cease "when the recipient, be he a forced heir or
not, has committed some act which gives rise to
disinheritance;" and under Article 921 one of the causes for
disinheriting a spouse is "when the spouse has given cause for
legal separation." The loss of the substantive right to support in
such a situation is incompatible with any claim for support
pendente lite.

MANUEL J. C. REYES vs. JUDGE LEONOR INES-LUCIANO

G.R. No. L-48219 February 28, 1979

Facts:
 520

Private petitioner, Celia Ilustre-Reyes, filed in the Juvenile and

Domestic Relations Court a complaint against her husband,
Manuel J. C. Reyes, for legal separation on the ground that the
defendant had attempted to kill plaintiff. The plaintiff asked for
support pendente lite for her and her three children. The
defendant, petitioner herein, opposed the application for support
pendente lite on the ground that his wife had committed adultery
with her physician.

Despite petitioner’s opposition on the ground that his wife had

committed adultery, the Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court
directed petitioner to pay his wife alimony pendente lite in the
amount of P4,000 a month, In certiorari, petitioner asked the
Court of Appeals that the order be annulled on the ground that
the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion or that it be
modified inasmuch as the amount awarded as support pendente
lite is excessive. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition,
and held that (a) in actions for separation the wife is entitled to
support from the husband despite the fact that a case for
adultery had been filed by the husband against her and (b) in
determining the amount of support pendente lite, it is enough
that the court ascertain the kind and amount of evidence even
by affidavits only or other documentary evidence appearing in
the records.

Issue:
WON adultery is a defense in an action for support.

Held:
YES. Adultery of the wife is a defense in an action for support.
However, the the alleged adultery of wife must be established by
competent evidence. The allegation that the wife has committed
adultery will not bar her from the right receive support pendente
lite. Adultery is a good defense and if properly proved and
sustained will defeat the action.

In the instant case, at the hearing of the application for support

pendente lite before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
presided by the respondent Judge, Hon. Leonor Ines-Luciano the
petitioner did not present any evidence to prove the allegation
that his wife, private respondent Celia Ilustre-Reyes, had
committed adultery with any person.
 521

In determining the amount to be awarded as support pendente

lite it is not necessary to go fully into the merits of the case, it
being sufficient that the court ascertain the kind and amount of
evidence which it may deem sufficient to enable it to justly
resolve the application, one way or the other, in view of the
merely provisional character of the resolution to be entered.
Mere affidavits may satisfy the court to pass upon the
application for support pendente lite. It is enough the the facts
be established by affidavits or other documentary evidence
appearing in the record

MA. BELEN B. MANGONON vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 125041             June 30, 2006

Facts:
 522

Petitioner Ma. Belen B. Mangonon filed, in behalf of her then

minor children Rica and Rina, a Petition for Declaration of
Legitimacy and Support, with application for support pendente
lite. It was alleged that petitioner and respondent Federico
Delgado were civilly married. As the marriage was solemnized
without the required consent per Article 85 of the New Civil
Code, it was annulled on 11 August 1975 by the Quezon City
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court.

As legitimate children and grandchildren, Rica and Rina are

entitled to general and educational support under Articles 174
and 195(b) in relation to Articles 194(1 and 2) and 199(c) of the
Family Code. Petitioner alleged that under these provisions, in
case of default on the part of the parents, the obligation to
provide support falls upon the grandparents of the children;
thus, respondent Federico, or in his default, respondent
Francisco should be ordered to provide general and educational
support for Rica and Rina in the amount of US$50,000.00, more
or less, per year.

In his Answer, respondent Francisco stated that as the birth

certificates of Rica and Rina do not bear the signature of
respondent Federico, it is essential that their legitimacy be first
established as "there is no basis to claim support until a final
and executory judicial declaration has been made as to the civil
status of the children." Whatever good deeds he may have done
to Rica and Rina, according to respondent Francisco, was
founded on pure acts of Christian charity. He, likewise, averred
that the order of liability for support under Article 199 of the
Family Code is not concurrent such that the obligation must be
borne by those more closely related to the recipient. In this case,
he maintained that responsibility should rest on the shoulders of
petitioner and her second husband, the latter having voluntarily
assumed the duties and responsibilities of a natural father. Even
assuming that he is responsible for support, respondent
Francisco contends that he could not be made to answer beyond
what petitioner and the father could afford.

Issue:
WON the grandfather is obliged to support his grandchildren.

Held:
 523

YES. A court may temporarily grant support pendente lite prior

to the rendition of judgment or final order. Because of its
provisional nature, a court does not need to delve fully into the
merits of the case before it can settle an application for this
relief. All that a court is tasked to do is determine the kind and
amount of evidence which may suffice to enable it to justly
resolve the application. It is enough that the facts be established
by affidavits or other documentary evidence appearing in the
record. After the hearings conducted on this matter as well as
the evidence presented, we find that petitioner was able to
establish, by prima facie proof, the filiation of her twin daughters
to private respondents and the twins’ entitlement to support
pendente lite. Under Article 199 of the Family Code, whenever
two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability
shall devolve upon the following persons in the order herein
provided:

(1) The spouse;

(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
(4) The brothers and sisters.

An eminent author on the subject explains that the obligation to

give support rests principally on those more closely related to
the recipient. However, the more remote relatives may be held to
shoulder the responsibility should the claimant prove that those
who are called upon to provide support do not have the means to
do so. In this case, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
held respondent Federico liable to provide monthly support
pendente lite in the total amount of P10,000.00 by taking into
consideration his supposed income of P30,000.00 to P40,000.00
per month.

There being prima facie evidence showing that petitioner and

respondent Federico are the parents of Rica and Rina, petitioner
and respondent Federico are primarily charged to support their
children’s college education. In view however of their
incapacities, the obligation to furnish said support should be
borne by respondent Francisco. Under Article 199 of the
Family Code, respondent Francisco, as the next immediate
relative of Rica and Rina, is tasked to give support to his
granddaughters in default of their parents. It having been
established that respondent Francisco has the financial means
 524

to support his granddaughters’ education, he, in lieu of

petitioner and respondent Federico, should be held liable for
support pendente lite.

Anent respondent Francisco and Federico’s claim that they have

the option under the law as to how they could perform their
obligation to support Rica and Rina, respondent Francisco
insists that Rica and Rina should move here to the Philippines to
study in any of the local universities. After all, the quality of
education here, according to him, is at par with that offered in
the USA. The applicable provision of the Family Code on this
subject provides:

Art. 204. The person obliged to give support shall have

the option to fulfill the obligation either by paying the
allowance fixed, or by receiving and maintaining in the
family dwelling the person who has a right to receive
support. The latter alternative cannot be availed of in
case there is a moral or legal obstacle thereto.

Under the abovecited provision, the obligor is given the choice as

to how he could dispense his obligation to give support. Thus, he
may give the determined amount of support to the claimant or
he may allow the latter to stay in the family dwelling. The second
option cannot be availed of in case there are circumstances,
legal or moral, which should be considered.

In this case, this Court believes that respondent Francisco

could not avail himself of the second option. From the
records, we gleaned that prior to the commencement of this
action, the relationship between respondent Francisco, on one
hand, and petitioner and her twin daughters, on the other, was
indeed quite pleasant. The correspondences exchanged among
them expressed profound feelings of thoughtfulness and concern
for one another’s well-being. The photographs presented by
petitioner as part of her exhibits presented a seemingly typical
family celebrating kinship. All of these, however, are now things
of the past. With the filing of this case, and the allegations
hurled at one another by the parties, the relationships among
the parties had certainly been affected. Particularly difficult for
Rica and Rina must be the fact that those who they had
considered and claimed as family denied having any familial
relationship with them. Given all these, we could not see Rica
 525

and Rina moving back here in the Philippines in the company of

those who have disowned them.

Finally, as to the amount of support pendente lite, we take our

bearings from the provision of the law mandating the amount of
support to be proportionate to the resources or means of the
giver and to the necessities of the recipient. Guided by this
principle, we hold respondent Francisco liable for half of the
amount of school expenses incurred by Rica and Rina as
support pendente lite. As established by petitioner, respondent
Francisco has the financial resources to pay this amount given
his various business endeavors.

Considering, however, that the twin sisters may have already

been done with their education by the time of the promulgation
of this decision, we deem it proper to award support pendente
lite in arrears to be computed from the time they entered college
until they had finished their respective studies.

PRUDENCIO & FILOMENA LIM vs. MA. CHERYL S. LIM

G.R. No. 163209               October 30, 2009

Facts:
 526

In 1979, respondent Cheryl Lim married Edward Lim, son of

petitioner spouses Lim. Cheryl bore Edward three children and
their children resided at the house of petitioners in Forbes Park,
Makati City, together with Edward’s ailing grandmother, Chua
Giak and her husband Mariano Lim. Edward’s family business,
which provided him with a monthly salary of P6,000, shouldered
the family expenses. Cheryl had no steady source of income.

In 1990, Cheryl abandoned the Forbes Park residence, bringing

the children with her, after a violent confrontation with Edward
whom she caught with the in-house midwife of Chua Giak in
what the trial court described "a very compromising situation."

Cheryl, for herself and her children, sued petitioners, Edward,

Chua Giak and Mariano for support. The trial court ordered
Edward and petitioners to "jointly" provide P40,000 monthly
support to respondents, with Edward shouldering P6,000 and
petitioners the balance of P34,000 subject to Chua Giak’s
subsidiary liability. The petitioner sought reconsideration,
questioning their liability.

Issue:
WON petitioners are concurrently liable with Edward to provide
support to respondents.

Held:
YES. By statutory and jurisprudential mandate, the liability of
ascendants to provide legal support to their descendants is
beyond cavil. Petitioners themselves admit as much – they
limit their petition to the narrow question of when their
liability is triggered, not if they are liable. Relying on
provisions found in Title IX of the Civil Code, as amended, on
Parental Authority, petitioners theorize that their liability is
activated only upon default of parental authority, conceivably
either by its termination or suspension during the children’s
minority. Because at the time respondents sued for support,
Cheryl and Edward exercised parental authority over their
children, petitioners submit that the obligation to support the
latter’s offspring ends with them.
Neither the text of the law nor the teaching of jurisprudence
supports this severe constriction of the scope of familial
obligation to give support. In the first place, the governing text
are the relevant provisions in Title VIII of the Civil Code, as
 527

amended, on Support, not the provisions in Title IX on Parental

Authority. While both areas share a common ground in that
parental authority encompasses the obligation to provide legal
support, they differ in other concerns including the duration of
the obligation and its concurrence among relatives of differing
degrees. Thus, although the obligation to provide support
arising from parental authority ends upon the emancipation
of the child, the same obligation arising from spousal and
general familial ties ideally lasts during the obligee's
lifetime. Also, while parental authority under Title IX (and the
correlative parental rights) pertains to parents, passing to
ascendants only upon its termination or suspension, the
obligation to provide legal support passes on to ascendants not
only upon default of the parents but also for the latter’s inability
to provide sufficient support.

The persons entitled to receive support are petitioners’

grandchildren and daughter-in-law. Granting petitioners the
option in Article 204 will secure to the grandchildren a well-
provided future; however, it will also force Cheryl to return to the
house which, for her, is the scene of her husband’s infidelity.
While not rising to the level of a legal obstacle, as indeed,
Cheryl’s charge against Edward for concubinage did not prosper
for insufficient evidence, her steadfast insistence on its
occurrence amounts to a moral impediment bringing the case
within the ambit of the exception clause of Article 204,
precluding its application.

ZENAIDA MEDINA vs. DRA. VENANCIA L. MAKABALI

G.R. No. L-26953               March 28, 1969

Facts:
 528

In February 1961, petitioner Zenaida Medina gave birth to a

baby boy named Joseph Casero in the Makabali Clinic in San
Fernando, Pampanga, owned and operated by respondent Dra.
Venancia Makabali, single, who assisted at the delivery. The boy
was Zenaida's third, with a married man, Feliciano Casero.

The mother left the child with Dra. Makabali from his birth. The
latter took care and reared Joseph as her own son; had him
treated at her expense for poliomyelitis by Dra. Fe del Mundo, in
Manila, until he recovered his health; and sent him to school.
From birth until August 1966, the real mother never visited her
child, and never paid for his expenses.

The trial disclosed that petitioner Zenaida Medina lived with

Feliciano Casero with her two other children apparently with the
tolerance, if not the acquiescence, of Caseros lawful wife who
resides elsewhere, albeit the offspring of both women are in good
terms with each other; that Casero makes about P400.00 a
month as a mechanic, and Zenaida herself earns from 4 to 5
pesos a day.

The Court, upon calling Joseph on the witness stand, observed

that the boy is fairly intelligent as a witness. He never knew his
mother, Zenaida. He was calling the respondent his "Mammy".
The Court informed him that his real mother is Zenaida. He was
asked with whom to stay with his real mother or the respondent.
The boy pointed to the respondent and said "Mammy!" The Court
asked him, "Why do you choose to stay with your "Mammy?" He
answered, "She is the one rearing me."

After extracting from Dra. Makabali a promise to allow the minor

a free choice with whom to live when he reaches the age of 14,
the Court held that it was for the child's best interest to be left
with his foster mother and denied the writ prayed for. The real
mother appealed, as already stated.

Issue:
WON a petition for habeas corpus may enforce the custody of a
parent.
Held:
NO. While our law recognizes the right of a parent to the custody
of her child, Courts must not lose sight of the basic principle
that "in all questions on the care, custody, education and
 529

property of children, the latter’s welfare shall be paramount"

(Art. 363, Civil Code,) and that for compelling reasons, even a
child under seven may be ordered separated from the mother.
This is as it should be, for in the continual evolution of legal
institutions, the patria potestas has been transformed from the
jus vitae ac necis (right of life and death) of the Roman law,
under which the offspring was virtually a chattel of his parents,
into a radically different institution, due to the influence of
Christian faith and doctrines. The obligational aspect is now
supreme. As pointed out by Puig Peña, now "there is no power,
but a task; no complex of rights (of parents) but a sum of duties;
no sovereignty, but a sacred trust for the welfare of the minor.

The right of parents to the company and custody of their

children is but ancillary to the proper discharge of parental
duties to provide the children with adequate support,
education, moral, intellectual and civic training and
development (Art. 356, Civil Code). As remarked by the Court
below, petitioner Zenaida Medina proved remiss in these sacred
duties; she not only failed to provide the child with love and
care but actually deserted him, with not even a visit, in his
tenderest years, when he needed his mother the most. It
may well be doubted what advantage the child could derive from
being coerced to abandon respondent’s care and love to be
compelled to stay with his mother and witness her irregular
menage a trois with Casero and the latter’s legitimate wife.

MIGUEL UNSON III VS, HON. NAVARRO

GR No. L-52242, November 17, 1980

Facts:
 530

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari to have the order of

respondent judge of December 28, 1979 ordering petitioner to
produce the child, Maria Teresa Unson, his daughter barely eight
years of age, with private respondent Edita N. Araneta and return
her to the custody of the later, further obliging petitioner to
"continue his support of said daughter by providing for her
education and medical needs," allegedly issued without a "hearing"
and the reception of testimony in violation of Section 6 of Rule 99.

Petitioner Miguel Unson III and private respondent Edita N Araneta

were married on April 19, 1971 and out of that marriage the child in
question, Teresa, was born on December 1, 1971. However, as
stated in a decision rendered on August 23, 1974 of respondent
judge himself, on July 13, 1974 they executed an agreement for the
separation of their properties and to live separately, as they have in
fact been living separately since June 1972. The agreement was
approved by the Court. The parties are agreed that no specific
provision was contained in said agreement about the custody of the
child because the husband and wife would have their own private
arrangement in that respect.

According to the affidavit submitted by the petitioner, he affirmed

that when Maria Teresa started going to school, she will stay with
petitioner during school days and spend weekends with her mother,
but there were times when her mother would not even bother to
pick her up during non-school days. During the early part of 1978,
petitioner found out private respondent Edita has been living with
her brother-in-law Agustin F Reyes, whom she had a child. Private
respondent also changed her religion to Protestant. Petitioner also
found out that Reyes was confined twice at the Makati Medical
Center for “Manic Depressive” disorder. These are the reasons why
petitioner tightened his custody over his daughter.

On the other hand, private respondent affirmed that she has reared
and brought up the child to the best of her ability. She has not in
any way spoken ill of nor turned the child against her father and
insisted that petitioner have custody of Maria Teresa every week end
and half of summer and Christmas vacation so that the child could
establish a healthy and viable relationship with her father. Further,
she added that petitioner, his family, affiants family (Mr. and Mrs.
Teodoro Araneta), affiant's relatives and friends, since 1973, have
long known of and accepted the circumstances involving private
respondent and Agustin F. Reyes.

Issue:
 531

WON petitioner should return his child to the custody of her

mother, herein private respondent.

Held:
NO. It is axiomatic in Our jurisprudence that in controversies
regarding the custody of minors the sole and foremost consideration
is the physical, education, social and moral welfare of the child
concerned, taking into account the respective resources and social
and moral situations of the contending parents. Never has this
Court diverted from that criterion.

With this premise in view, the Court finds no difficulty in this case
in seeing that it is in the best interest of the child Teresa to be freed
from the obviously unwholesome, not to say immoral influence, that
the situation in which private respondent has placed herself, as
admitted by her, might create in the moral and social outlook of
Teresa who is now in her formative and most impressionable stage
in her life. The fact, that petitioner might have been tolerant about
her stay with her mother in the past when she was still too young to
distinguish between right and wrong and have her own correct
impressions or notions about the unusual and peculiar relationship
of her mother with her own uncle-in-law, the husband of her sister's
mother, is hardly of any consequence now that she has reached a
perilous stage in her life. No respectable father, properly concerned
with the moral well-being of his child, specially a girl, can be
expected to have a different attitude than petitioner's in this case.

Under the circumstances thus shown in the record, the Court finds
no alternative than to grant private respondent no more than
visitorial rights over the child in question. Anyway, decisions
even of this Supreme Court on the custody of minor children are
always open to adjustment as the circumstances relevant to the
matter may demand in the light of the inflexible criterion.

SAGALA-ESLAO VS CA
GR No. 116773, January 16, 1997
 532

Facts:
Respondent Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye is married to Reynaldo
Eslao. After their marriage, the couple stayed with petitioner
Teresita Sagala-Eslao, mother of the husband. Out of their
marriage, two children were begotten, namely, Leslie Eslao and
Angelica Eslao. In the meantime, Leslie was entrusted to the
care and custody of respondent’s parents, while Angelica stayed
with the petitioner. When Reynaldo Eslao died, respondent
intended to bring Angelica with her to Pampanga but the
petitioner prevailed upon her to entrust the custody of Angelica
to her, petitioner reasoning out that her son just died and to
assuage her grief therefor, she needed the company of the child
to at least compensate for the loss of her late son. In the
meantime, the respondent returned to her mother's house in
Pampanga where she stayed with Leslie.

Subsequently, respondent married Dr. James Manabu-Ouye, a

Japanese-American, who is an orthodontist practicing in the
United States. She then migrated to San Francisco, California,
USA, to join her new husband. On June 24, 1993, the petitioner
returned to the Philippines to be reunited with her children and
bring them to the United States. She informed petitioner about
her desire to take custody of Angelica and explained that her
present husband, Dr. James Ouye, expressed his willingness to
adopt Leslie and Angelica and to provide for their support and
education. However, petitioner resisted the idea by way of
explaining that the child was entrusted to her when she was ten
days old and accused the respondent of having abandoned
Angelica.

As such, respondent, thru her lawyer, wrote a letter to the

petitioner demanding for the return of the custody of Angelica to
her natural mother and when the demand remained unheeded,
the respondent filed a petition to recover the custody of her
minor daughter from her mother-in-law, petitioner Teresita
Eslao-Sagala.

After the trial on the merits, the lower court granted the petition
and directed Teresita Sagala-Eslao or anyone acting under her
behalf to cause the immediate transfer of the custody of the
minor Angelica Cordero Eslao, to her natural mother, Maria Paz
Cordero-Ouye. On appeal, the respondent court affirmed the
decision of the lower court.
 533

Issue:
WON the grandmother can gain custody of her granddaughter.

Held:
NO. The SC held that when private respondent entrusted the
custody of her minor child to the petitioner, what she gave to
the latter was merely temporary custody and it did not
constitute abandonment or renunciation of parental
authority. For the right attached to parental authority, being
purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority
only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a
children's home or an orphan institution which do not appear in
the case at bar.

Of considerable importance is the rule long accepted by the

courts that "the right of parents to the custody of their minor
children is one of the natural rights incident to parenthood, a
right supported by law and sound public policy. The right is an
inherent one, which is not created by the state or decisions of
the courts, but derives from the nature of the parental
relationship.

Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and

may not be transferred or renounced except in cases
authorized by law. The right attached to parental authority,
being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental
authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender
to a children's home or an orphan institution. When a parent
entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or
godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely
temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of
parental authority. Even if a definite renunciation is manifest,
the law still disallows the same.

The father and mother, being the natural guardians of

unemancipated children, are duty-bound and entitled to keep
them in their custody and company.

Reynaldo Espiritu vs. CA

GR No. 115640, March 15, 1995
 534

Facts:
Reynaldo Espiritu and Teresita Masanding began to maintain a
common law relationship of husband while in US.  Teresita works as a
nurse while Reynaldo was sent by his empolyer, National Steel
Corporation, to Pittsburgh for a temporary post.  They begot a child in
1986 named Rosalind.  After a year, they went back to the Philippines
for a brief vacation when they also got married.  Subsequently, they had
a second child named Reginald.  In 1990, they decided to separate. 
Reynaldo pleaded for second chance but instead of Teresita granting it,
she left Reynaldo and the children and went back to California. 
Reynaldo brought the children in the Philippines, but because his
assignment in Pittsburgh was not yet completed, he was sent back by
his company to Pittsburgh. He had to leave his children with his sister,
co-petitioner Guillerma Layug and her family.  

Teresita claims that she did not immediately follow her children
because Reynaldo filed a criminal case for bigamy against her and she
was afraid of being arrested. The judgment of conviction in the bigamy
case was actually rendered only on September 29, 1994. When Teresita
returned in the Philippines sometime in 1992, he filed a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus against Reynaldo and his sister to gain custody of
the children.

The trial court dismissed the petition for habeas corpus. It suspended
Teresita's parental authority over Rosalind and Reginald and declared
Reynaldo to have sole parental authority over them but with rights of
visitation to be agreed upon by the parties and to be approved by the
Court. However, the CA reversed the trial court’s decision and gave the
custody to Teresita dn visitation rights on weekends to Reynaldo.

Issue:
WON the custody of the 2 children should be awarded to the mother.

Held:
NO. The task of choosing the parent to whom custody shall be awarded
is not a ministerial function to be determined by a simple determination
of the age of a minor child. Whether a child is under or over seven years
of age, the paramount criterion must always be the child’s interests.
Discretion is given to the court to decide who can best assure the
welfare of the child, and award the custody on the basis of that
consideration.

While our law recognizes the right of a parent to the custody of her
child, courts must not lose sight of the basic principle that, in cases of
care, custody, education and property of children, the latter’s welfare
shall be the paramount concern.  As pointed out by Puig Pena, now
"there is no power, but a task; no complex of rights (of parents) but
a sum of duties; no sovereignty, but a sacred trust for the welfare
 535

of the minor." As a result, the right of parents to the company and

custody of their children is but ancillary to the proper discharge of
parental duties to provide the children with adequate support,
education, moral, intellectual and civic training and development.

In ascertaining the welfare and best interests of the child, courts are
mandated by the Family Code to take into account all relevant
considerations. If a child is under seven years of age, the law presumes
that the mother is the best custodian. The presumption is strong but it
is not conclusive. It can be overcome by ‘’compelling reasons." If a child
is over seven, his choice is paramount but, again, the court is not
bound by that choice. In its discretion, the court may find the chosen
parent unfit and award custody to the other parent, or even to a third
party as it deems fit under the circumstances.

Considerations involving the choice made by a child must be

ascertained at the time that either parent is given custody over the
child. The matter of custody is not permanent and unalterable. If the
parent who was given custody suffers a future character change and
becomes unfit, the matter of custody can always be re-examined and
adjusted. To be sure, the welfare, the best interests, the benefit,
and the good of the child must be determined as of the time that
either parent is chosen to be the custodian.

At the time the judgment was rendered, the 2 children were both over 7
years of age.  The choice of the child to whom she preferred to stay
must be considered.  It is evident in the records submitted that
Rosalind chose to stay with his father/aunt.  She was found of
suffering from emotional shock caused by her mother’s infidelity. 
Furthermore, there was nothing in the records to show that Reynaldo is
unfit well in fact he has been trying his best to give the children the
kind of attention and care which their mother is not in the position to
extend.  On the other hand, the mother’s conviction for the crime of
bigamy and her illicit relationship had already caused emotional
disturbances and personality conflicts at least with the daughter.    

Hence, petition was granted.  Custody of the minors was reinstated to

their father

LEOUEL SANTOS, vs. CA & SPOUSES BEDIA

G.R. No. 113054 March 16, 1995

Facts:
 536

Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr., an army lieutenant, and Julia Bedia a

nurse by profession, were married in Iloilo City in 1986. Their union
beget only one child, Leouel Santos, Jr. who was born July 18, 1987.
From the time the boy was released from the hospital until sometime
thereafter, he had been in the care and custody of his maternal
grandparents, private respondents herein, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia.
Petitioner and wife Julia agreed to place Leouel Jr. in the temporary
custody of the respondent spouses Bedia. The latter alleged that they
paid for all the hospital bills, as well as the subsequent support of the
boy because petitioner could not afford to do so.

The boy's mother, Julia Bedia-Santos, left for the United States in May
1988 to work. Petitioner alleged that he is not aware of her whereabouts
and his efforts to locate her in the United States proved futile. Private
respondents claim that although abroad, their daughter Julia had been
sending financial support to them for her son.

On September 2, 1990, petitioner along with his two brothers, visited

the Bedia household, where three-year old Leouel Jr. was staying.
Private respondents contend that through deceit and false pretensions,
petitioner abducted the boy and clandestinely spirited him away to his
hometown in Bacong, Negros Oriental.

The spouses Bedia then filed a "Petition for Care, Custody and Control
of Minor Ward Leouel Santos Jr.," with Santos, Sr. as respondent. After
an ex-parte hearing, the trial court issued an order on the same day
awarding custody of the child Leouel Santos, Jr. to his grandparents,
Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s
decision.
According to petitioner, the CA erred in awarding custody of the boy to
his grandparents and not to himself. He contends that since private
respondents have failed to show that petitioner is an unfit and
unsuitable father, substitute parental authority granted to the boy's
grandparents under Art. 214 of the Family Code is inappropriate.

Issue:
WON Santos, Sr., should be awarded custody of Leouel, Jr.

Held:
YES. The right of custody accorded to parents springs from the
exercise of parental authority. Parental authority or patria potestas in
Roman Law is the juridical institution whereby parents rightfully
assume control and protection of their unemancipated children to the
extent required by the latter’s needs. It is a mass of rights and
obligations which the law grants to parents for the purpose of the
children’s physical preservation and development, as well as the
cultivation of their intellect and the education of their heart and senses.
As regards parental authority, "there is no power, but a task; no
 537

complex of rights, but a sum of duties; no sovereignty but a sacred trust

for the welfare of the minor.

Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not

be transferred or renounced except in cases authorized by law. The
right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law
allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption,
guardianship and surrender to a children’s home or an orphan
institution. When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to
another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is
given is merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a
renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite renunciation is
manifest, the law still disallows the same.

The father and mother, being the natural guardians of

unemancipated children, are duty-bound and entitled to keep them
in their custody and company. The child’s welfare is always the
paramount consideration in all questions concerning his care and
custody. The law vests on the father and mother joint parental authority
over the persons of their common children. In case of absences or death
of either parent, the parent present shall continue exercising parental
authority. Only in case of the parents’ death, absence or unsuitability
may substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving
grandparent.

Private respondents’ demonstrated love and affection for the boy,

notwithstanding, the legitimate father is still preferred over the
grandparents. The latter’s wealth is not a deciding factor, particularly
because there is no proof that at the present time, petitioner is in no
position to support the boy. The fact that he was unable to provide
financial support for his minor son from birth up to over three years
when he took the boy from his in-laws without permission, should not
be sufficient reason to strip him of his permanent right to the child’s
custody.

While petitioner’s previous inattention is inexcusable and merits only

the severest criticism, it cannot be construed as abandonment. His
appeal of the unfavorable decision against him and his efforts to keep
his only child in his custody may be regarded as serious efforts to
rectify his past misdeeds. To award him custody would help enhance
the bond between parent and son. It would also give the father a chance
to prove his love for his son and for the son to experience the warmth
and support which a father can give.
DAISIE T. DAVID vs. CA & RAMON R. VILLAR
G.R. No. 111180 November 16, 1995

Facts:
 538

Petitioner David worked as secretary of private respondent Villar,

married and a businessman in Angeles City. After a while, the
relationship between petitioner and private respondent
developed into an intimate one, as a result of which a son,
Christopher J., was born on March 9, 1985 to them. Christopher
J. was followed by two more children, both girls.

The relationship became known to private respondent's wife

when Daisie took Christopher J, to Villar's house at Villa Teresa
in Angeles City sometime in 1986 and introduced him to Villar's
legal wife. After this, the children of Daisie were freely brought
by Villar to his house as they were eventually accepted by his
legal family. In the summer of 1991, Villar asked Daisie to allow
Christopher J., then six years of age, to go with his family to
Boracay. Daisie agreed, but after the trip, Villar refused to give
back the child. Villar said he had enrolled Christopher J. at the
Holy Family Academy for the next school year.

On July 30, 1991, Daisie filed a petition for habeas corpus on

behalf of Christopher J. In its decision, the RTC rendered a
judgment giving the rightful custody of the minor Christopher J.
T. David is hereby given to the natural mother, the herein
petitioner Daisie T. David.

On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC’s decision holding that the

question of custody of a minor child may be decided in a habeas
corpus case contemplate a situation where the parents are
married to each other but are separated. This is so because
under the Family Code, the father and mother have joint
parental authority over their legitimate children and in case of
separation of the parents there is need to determine rightful
custody of their children.

Issue:
WON habeas corpus is proper in action for custody of minor.

Held:
YES. Christopher J. is an illegitimate child since at the time of
his conception, his father, private respondent Villar, was
married to another woman other than the child’s mother. As
such, pursuant to Article 176 of the Family Code, Christopher
J. is under the parental authority of his mother, the herein
petitioner, who, as a consequence of such authority, is entitled
 539

to have custody of him. Since, admittedly, petitioner has been

deprived of her rightful custody of her child by private
respondent, she is entitled to issuance of the writ of habeas
corpus. Indeed, Rule 102, makes no distinction between the
case of a mother who is separated from her husband and is
entitled to the custody of her child and that of a mother of an
illegitimate child who, by law, is vested with sole parental
authority, but is deprived of her rightful custody of her child.

In the case at bar, as has already been pointed out, Christopher

J., being less than seven years of age at least at the time the
case was decided by the RTC, cannot be taken from the mother’s
custody. Even now that the child is over seven years of age the
mother’s custody over him will have to be upheld because the
child categorically expressed preference to live with his mother.
Under Article 213 of the Family Code, courts must respect the
"choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent
chosen is unfit" and here it has not been shown that the mother
is in any way unfit to have custody of her child. Indeed, if private
respondent loves his child, he should not condition the grant of
support for him on the award of his custody to him (private
respondent).

JOEY D. BRIONES vs. MARICEL P. MIGUEL

G.R. No. 156343             October 18, 2004

Facts:
 540

Petitioner Briones claimed that the minor Michael Kevin Pineda is his
illegitimate son with respondent Loreta P. Miguel. He was born in Japan
on September 17, 1996 as evidenced by his Birth Certificate. The
respondent Loreta P. Miguel is now married to a Japanese national and
is presently residing in Japan.

In November 1998, Briones brought the minor child to the Philippines

so that he could take care of him and send him to school. According to
the petitioner, his parents, who are both retired and receiving monthly
pensions, assisted him in taking care of the child.

In May 2001, respondents Maricel and Francisca P. Miguel came to the

house of the petitioner in Caloocan City on the pretext that they were
visiting the minor child and requested that they be allowed to bring the
said child for recreation at the SM Department store. They promised
him that they will bring him back in the afternoon, to which the
petitioner agreed. However, the respondents did not bring him back as
promised by them.

Petitioner went several times to respondent Maricel in Tanza,

Tuguegarao City but he was informed that the child is with the latter’s
mother at Batal Heights, Santiago City. When he went there,
respondent Francisca told him that Michael Kevin Pineda is with her
daughter at Tuguegarao City. He sought the assistance of the police and
the Department of Social Welfare to locate his son and to bring him
back to him, but all his efforts were futile.

Hence, Briones filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus against respondents

Maricel Pineda Miguel and Francisca Pineda Miguel, to obtain custody
of his minor child Michael Kevin Pineda. He filed an Amended Petition
to include Loreta P. Miguel, the mother of the minor, as one of the
respondents. A Writ of Habeas Corpus was issued by the Court ordering
the respondents to produce before this Court the living body of the
minor Michael Kevin Pineda. Respondent Loreta P. Miguel prays that
the custody of her minor child be given to her and invokes Article 213,
Paragraph 2 of the Family Code and Article 363 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines.

Issue:
WON the natural father, may be denied the custody and parental care
of his own child in the absence of the mother who is away.

Held:
YES. Having been born outside a valid marriage, the minor is deemed
an illegitimate child of petitioner and Respondent Loreta. Article 176 of
the Family Code of the Philippines explicitly provides that "illegitimate
 541

children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in
conformity with this Code." This is the rule regardless of whether
the father admits paternity.

Parental authority over recognized natural children who were under the
age of majority was vested in the father or the mother recognizing them.
If both acknowledge the child, authority was to be exercised by the one
to whom it was awarded by the courts; if it was awarded to both, the
rule as to legitimate children applied. In other words, in the latter case,
parental authority resided jointly in the father and the mother.

Under Article 176 of the Family Code, all illegitimate children are
generally placed under one category, without any distinction between
natural and spurious. The concept of "natural child" is important only
for purposes of legitimation. Without the subsequent marriage, a
natural child remains an illegitimate child. Obviously, Michael is a
natural ("illegitimate," under the Family Code) child, as there is nothing
in the records showing that his parents were suffering from a legal
impediment to marry at the time of his birth. Both acknowledge that
Michael is their son. As earlier explained and pursuant to Article 176,
parental authority over him resides in his mother, Respondent
Loreta, notwithstanding his father’s recognition of him.

There is thus no question that Respondent Loreta, being the mother of

and having sole parental authority over the minor, is entitled to have
custody of him. She has the right to keep him in her company. She
cannot be deprived of that right, and she may not even renounce or
transfer it "except in the cases authorized by law." Not to be ignored in
Article 213 of the Family Code is the caveat that, generally, no child
under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, except
when the court finds cause to order otherwise.

Only the most compelling of reasons, such as the mother’s unfitness to

exercise sole parental authority, shall justify her deprivation of parental
authority and the award of custody to someone else. In the past, the
following grounds have been considered ample justification to deprive a
mother of custody and parental authority: neglect or abandonment,
unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction,
maltreatment of the child, insanity, and affliction with a communicable
disease.

JOYCELYN P. GUALBERTO vs. CRISANTO GUALBERTO V

G.R. No. 154994               June 28, 2005

Facts:
 542

Respondent Crisanto V filed a petition for declaration of nullity

of his marriage to petitioner Joycelyn, with an ancillary prayer
for custody pendente lite of their almost 4-year-old son, minor
Rafaello, whom Joycelyn allegedly took away with her from the
conjugal home and his school when she decided to abandon him
sometime in early February 2002.

In April 2, 2002, the RTC heard the ancillary prayer of Crisanto

for custody pendente lite. The RTC then issued a decision
awarding custody pendente lite of the child to Crisanto.
However, the RTC reversed its decision and awarded the custody
pendete lite to Jocelyn.

On the one hand, the mother insists that, based on Article 213
of the Family Code, her minor child cannot be separated from
her. On the other hand, the father argues that she is "unfit" to
take care of their son; hence, for "compelling reasons," he must
be awarded custody of the child.

Issue:
WON the mother being a lesbian renders him undqualified to
have custody of the minor child.

Held:
NO. The general rule that children under seven years of age shall
not be separated from their mother finds its raison d’etre in the
basic need of minor children for their mother’s loving care.
Article 213 and Rule 99 similarly contemplate a situation in
which the parents of the minor are married to each other, but
are separated by virtue of either a decree of legal separation or a
de facto separation. In the present case, the parents are living
separately as a matter of fact.

The principle of "best interest of the child" pervades Philippine

cases involving adoption, guardianship, support, personal
status, minors in conflict with the law, and child custody. In
these cases, it has long been recognized that in choosing the
parent to whom custody is given, the welfare of the minors
should always be the paramount consideration. Courts are
mandated to take into account all relevant circumstances that
would have a bearing on the children’s well-being and
development. Aside from the material resources and the moral
and social situations of each parent, other factors may also be
 543

considered to ascertain which one has the capability to attend to

the physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the
children. Among these factors are the previous care and devotion
shown by each of the parents; their religious background, moral
uprightness, home environment and time availability; as well as
the children’s emotional and educational needs.

As pointed out earlier, there is express statutory recognition

that, as a general rule, a mother is to be preferred in awarding
custody of children under the age of seven. The caveat in Article
213 of the Family Code cannot be ignored, except when the
court finds cause to order otherwise. The so-called "tender-age
presumption" under Article 213 of the Family Code may be
overcome only by compelling evidence of the mother’s
unfitness. The mother has been declared unsuitable to have
custody of her children in one or more of the following instances:
neglect, abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual
drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity
or affliction with a communicable disease.

Here, Crisanto cites immorality due to alleged lesbian relations

as the compelling reason to deprive Joycelyn of custody. It has
indeed been held that under certain circumstances, the mother’s
immoral conduct may constitute a compelling reason to deprive
her of custody. But sexual preference or moral laxity alone
does not prove parental neglect or incompetence. Not even
the fact that a mother is a prostitute or has been unfaithful to
her husband would render her unfit to have custody of her
minor child. To deprive the wife of custody, the husband must
clearly establish that her moral lapses have had an adverse
effect on the welfare of the child or have distracted the offending
spouse from exercising proper parental care.

It is therefore not enough for Crisanto to show merely that

Joycelyn was a lesbian. He must also demonstrate that she
carried on her purported relationship with a person of the same
sex in the presence of their son or under circumstances not
conducive to the child’s proper moral development. Such a fact
has not been shown here. There is no evidence that the son was
exposed to the mother’s alleged sexual proclivities or that his
proper moral and psychological development suffered as a
result.
 544

As we have ruled that Joycelyn has the right to keep her

minor son in her custody, the writ of habeas corpus and the
preliminary mandatory injunction prayed for by Crisanto
have no leg to stand on. A writ of habeas corpus may be issued
only when the "rightful custody of any person is withheld
from the person entitled thereto," a situation that does not
apply here.

On the other hand, the ancillary remedy of preliminary

mandatory injunction cannot be granted, because Crisanto’s
right to custody has not been proven to be "clear and
unmistakable." Unlike an ordinary preliminary injunction, the
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction is more cautiously
regarded, since the latter requires the performance of a
particular act that tends to go beyond the maintenance of the
status quo. Besides, such an injunction would serve no purpose,
now that the case has been decided on its merits.

Marie Antonette Abigail Salientes vs. Loran S.D. Abanilla

GR No. 162734, August 29, 2006

Facts:
 545

Private respondent Loran S.D. Abanilla and petitioner Marie

Antonette Abigail C. Salientes are the parents of the minor
Lorenzo Emmanuel S. Abanilla. They lived with Marie
Antonette’s parents, petitioners Orlando B. Salientes and
Rosario C. Salientes. Due to in-laws problems, private
respondent suggested to his wife that they transfer to their own
house, but Marie Antonette refused. So, he alone left the house
of the Salientes. Thereafter, he was prevented from seeing his
son. Later, Loran S.D. Abanilla in his personal capacity and as
the representative of his son, filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus
and Custody before the RTC.

In its decision, the RTC issued an order directing respondents to

produce and bring before this Court the body of minor Lorenzo
Emmanuel Salientes Abanilla on January 31, 2003 at 1:00
o’clock in the afternoon and to show cause why the said child
should not be discharged from restraint. On appeal, the CA
affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Petitioners contend that the order is contrary to Article 213 of

the Family Code, which provides that no child under seven years
of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise. They maintain that
herein respondent Loran had the burden of showing any
compelling reason but failed to present even a prima facie proof
thereof.

Petitioners posit that even assuming that there were compelling

reasons, the proper remedy for private respondent was simply an
action for custody, but not habeas corpus. Petitioners assert that
habeas corpus is unavailable against the mother who, under the
law, has the right of custody of the minor. They insist there was
no illegal or involuntary restraint of the minor by his own
mother. There was no need for the mother to show cause and
explain the custody of her very own child

Issue:
WON petition for habeas corpus may be availed of by the father
to gain custody of his child.
Held:
YES. Habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where rightful
custody is withheld from a person entitled thereto. Under Article
211 of the Family Code, respondent Loran and petitioner Marie
 546

Antonette have joint parental authority over their son and

consequently joint custody. Further, although the couple is
separated de facto, the issue of custody has yet to be
adjudicated by the court. In the absence of a judicial grant of
custody to one parent, both parents are still entitled to the
custody of their child. In the present case, private respondent’s
cause of action is the deprivation of his right to see his child as
alleged in his petition. Hence, the remedy of habeas corpus is
available to him.

In a petition for habeas corpus, the child’s welfare is the

supreme consideration. The Child and Youth Welfare Code
unequivocally provide that in all questions regarding the care
and custody, among others, of the child, his welfare shall be the
paramount consideration.

Again, it bears stressing that the order did not grant custody of
the minor to any of the parties but merely directed petitioners to
produce the minor in court and explain why private respondent
is prevented from seeing his child.

PEOPLE vs. AIDA MARQUEZ

G.R. No. 181440               April 13, 2011

Facts:
 547

Accused-appellant Marquez was charged with Kidnapping for

failing to return to her parent, Caolina Merano, the latter’s child.
Marquez has been entrusted with the custody of the minor,
Justine Bernadette C. Merano, a three (3) month old baby girl.

Issue:
WON custody over the minor has been vested to Marquez to
make her liable for failure to return a minor.

Held:
YES. It is clear from the records of the case that Marquez was
entrusted with the custody of Justine. Whether this is due to
Merano’s version of Marquez borrowing Justine for the day, or
due to Marquez’s version that Merano left Justine at her house,
it is undeniable that in both versions, Marquez agreed to the
arrangement, i.e., to temporarily take custody of Justine. It does
not matter, for the first element to be present, how long
said custody lasted as it cannot be denied that Marquez was
the one entrusted with the custody of the minor Justine.
Thus, the first element of the crime is satisfied.

Neither party disputes that on September 6, 1998, the custody

of Justine was transferred or entrusted to Marquez. Whether
this lasted for months or only for a couple of days, the fact
remains that Marquez had, at one point in time, physical and
actual custody of Justine. Marquez’s deliberate failure to return
Justine, a minor at that time, when demanded to do so by the
latter’s mother, shows that the second element is likewise
undoubtedly present in this case.

Finally, even if it were true that Merano subsequently agreed to

have Castillo adopt Justine, as evidenced by the "Kasunduan sa
Pagtalikod sa Karapatan at Pagpapa-ampon sa Isang Anak," this
would still not affect Marquez’s liability as the crime of
kidnapping and failure to return the minor had been fully
consummated upon her deliberate failure to return Justine to
Merano.

VANCIL VS. BELMES

GR No. 132223, June 19, 2001
 548

Facts:
Petitioner, Bonifacia Vancil, is the mother of Reeder C. Vancil, a Navy
serviceman of the United States of America who died in the said country
on December 22, 1986. During his lifetime, Reeder had two (2) children
named Valerie and Vincent by his common-law wife, Helen G. Belmes.
Since petitioner’s son left an estate consisting of proceeds from death
pension benefits with probable value of P100,000.00, petitioner
commenced before the RTC of Cebu City a guardianship proceedings. At
the time, Valerie was only 6 years old while Vincent was 2 years old.

After trial, the trial court appointed petitioner as legal and judicial
guardian over the persons and estate of Valerie Vancil and Vincent
Vancil Jr. Helen Belmes, the natural mother of the minors, submitted
and opposition to the subject guardianship proceedings and claimed
that she had already filed a similar petition for guardianship before the
RTC of Pagadian City. Further, respondent Belmes asserted that she is
the natural mother in actual custody of and exercising parental
authority over the subject minors and that at the time the petition was
filed Bonifacia Vancil was a resident of Colorado, U.S.A. being a
naturalized American citizen.

After due proceedings, the trial court rejected and denied Belmes’
motion to remove and/or to disqualify Bonifacia as guardian of Valerie
and Vincent Jr. and instead ordered petitioner Bonifacia Vancil to enter
the office and perform her duties as such guardian upon the posting of
a bond of P50,000.00.

On appeal, the CA reversed the trial court’s decision and held that the
Civil Code considers parents, the father, or in the absence, the mother,
as natural guardian of her minor children. Section 7 of Rule 93 of the
Revised Rules of Court confirms the designation of the parents as ipso
facto guardian of their minor children without need of a court
appointment and only for good reason may another person be named.
Ironically, for the petitioner, there is nothing on record of any reason at
all why Helen Belmes, the biological mother, should be deprived of her
legal rights as natural guardian of her minor children. To give away
such privilege from Helen would be an abdication and grave violation of
the very basic fundamental tenets in civil law and the constitution on
family solidarity.

Issue:
WON the grandmother has preferential right over that of the mother as
guardian.

Held:
NO. The SC held that the respondent, being the natural mother of the
minor, has the preferential right over that of petitioner to be his
guardian. Indeed, being the natural mother of minor Vincent,
 549

respondent has the corresponding natural and legal right to his

custody.Petitioner’s claim to be the guardian of said minor can only be
realized by way of substitute parental authority pursuant to Article 214
of the Family Code.

Petitioner, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute

parental authority only in case of death, absence or unsuitability of
respondent. Considering that respondent is very much alive and has
exercised continuously parental authority over Vincent, petitioner has
to prove, in asserting her right to be the minor’s guardian, respondent’s
unsuitability. Petitioner, however, has not proffered convincing evidence
showing that respondent is not suited to be the guardian of Vincent.
Petitioner merely insists that respondent is morally unfit as guardian of
Valerie considering that her (respondent’s) live-in partner raped Valerie
several times. But Valerie, being now of major age, is no longer a
subject of this guardianship proceeding.

Even assuming that respondent is unfit as guardian of minor Vincent,

still petitioner cannot qualify as a substitute guardian. It bears
stressing that she is an American citizen and a resident of Colorado.
Obviously, she will not be able to perform the responsibilities and
obligations required of a guardian. In fact, in her petition, she admitted
the difficulty of discharging the duties of a guardian by an expatriate,
like her. To be sure, she will merely delegate those duties to someone
else who may not also qualify as a guardian.

Moreover, we observe that respondent’s allegation that petitioner has

not set foot in the Philippines since 1987 has not been controverted by
her. Besides, petitioner’s old age and her conviction of libel by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Cebu City in Criminal Case No. CBU-
168846 filed by one Danilo R. Deen, will give her a second thought of
staying here. Indeed, her coming back to this country just to fulfill the
duties of a guardian to Vincent for only two years is not certain.

Significantly, this Court has held that courts should not appoint
persons as guardians who are not within the jurisdiction of our courts
for they will find it difficult to protect the wards.

ST. MARY’S ACADEMY vs. WILLIAM CARPITANOS

G.R. No. 143363. February 6, 2002
 550

Facts:
Petitioner St. Mary’s Academy of Dipolog City conducted an
enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996. A facet of the
enrollment campaign was the visitation of schools from where
prospective enrollees were studying. As a student of St. Mary’s
Academy, Sherwin Carpitanos was part of the campaigning
group. 

Accordingly, on the fateful day, Sherwin, along with other high

school students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by
defendant Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan
Elementary School, Dapitan City. The jeep was driven by James
Daniel II then 15 years old and a student of the same school.
Allegedly, the latter drove the jeep in a reckless manner and as a
result the jeep turned turtle. Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result
of the injuries he sustained from the accident. The parents of
Sherwin filed a case against James Daniel II and his parents,
James Daniel Sr. and Guada Daniel, the vehicle owner, Vivencio
Villanueva and St. Mary’s Academy before the RTC of Dipolog
City and claimed for damages. 

Issue:
WON petitioner St. Mary’s should be liable for damages for the
death of Sherwin Carpitanos

Held:
NO. Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall
have special parental authority over a minor child while
under their supervision, instruction or custody: (1) the
school, its administrators and teachers; or (2) the individual,
entity or institution engaged in child care. This special
parental authority and responsibility applies to all authorized
activities, whether inside or outside the premises of the school,
entity or institution. Thus, such authority and responsibility
applies to field trips, excursions and other affairs of the pupils
and students outside the school premises whenever authorized
by the school or its teachers.

Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under

custody is a minor, those exercising special parental authority
are principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the
acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor while under their
supervision, instruction, or custody. However, for petitioner to
 551

be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission

considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the
injury caused because the negligence, must have a causal
connection to the accident.

In this case, the respondents failed to show that the negligence

of petitioner was the proximate cause of the death of the victim.
Respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted that the
immediate cause of the accident was not the negligence of
petitioner or the reckless driving of James Daniel II, but the
detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep.

Significantly, respondents did not present any evidence to show

that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of
the school authorities, or the reckless driving of James Daniel II.
Hence, the respondents’ reliance on Article 219 of the Family
Code that those given the authority and responsibility under the
preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for
damages caused by acts or omissions of the unemancipated
minor was unfounded.

Further, there was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the

minor James Daniel II to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio
Villanueva. It was Ched Villanueva, grandson of respondent
Vivencio Villanueva, who had possession and control of the jeep.
He was driving the vehicle and he allowed James Daniel II, a
minor, to drive the jeep at the time of the accident.

Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the

negligence of the minor driver or mechanical detachment of the
steering wheel guide of the jeep, must be pinned on the minor’s
parents primarily. The negligence of petitioner St. Mary’s
Academy was only a remote cause of the accident. Between the
remote cause and the injury, there intervened the negligence of
the minor’s parents or the detachment of the steering wheel
guide of the jeep.

CHILD LEARNING CENTER, INC. vs. TIMOTHY TAGARIO

G.R. No. 150920 November 25, 2005
 552

Facts:
Timothy was a Grade IV student at Marymount School, an
academic institution operated and maintained by Child Learning
Center, Inc. (CLC). In the afternoon, Timothy entered the boy’s
comfort room at the third floor of the Marymount building to
answer the call of nature. He, however, found himself locked
inside and unable to get out. Timothy started to panic and so he
banged and kicked the door and yelled several times for help.
When no help arrived he decided to open the window to call for
help. In the process of opening the window, Timothy went right
through and fell down three stories. Timothy was hospitalized
and given medical treatment for serious multiple physical
injuries.

An action under Article 2176 of the Civil Code was filed by

Timothy’s parents against the CLC, the members of its Board of
Directors, namely Spouses Edgardo and Sylvia Limon, Alfonso
Cruz, Carmelo Narciso and Luningning Salvador, and the
Administrative Officer of Marymount School, Ricardo Pilao. In its
defense, CLC maintained that there was nothing defective about
the locking mechanism of the door and that the fall of Timothy
was not due to its fault or negligence. CLC further maintained
that it had exercised the due care and diligence of a good father
of a family to ensure the safety, well-being and convenience of its
students.

After trial, the court a quo found in favor of respondents and

ordered petitioners CLC and Spouses Limon to pay respondents,
jointly and severally. The trial court disregarded the corporate
fiction of CLC and held the Spouses Limon personally liable
because they were the ones who actually managed the affairs of
the CLC.

Issue:
WON CLC and spouses Limon are liable.

Held:
YES. The fact, however, that Timothy fell out through the
window shows that the door could not be opened from the
inside. That sufficiently points to the fact that something was
wrong with the door, if not the door knob, under the principle of
res ipsa loquitor. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor applies where
(1) the accident was of such character as to warrant an inference
 553

that it would not have happened except for the defendant’s

negligence; (2) the accident must have been caused by an agency
or instrumentality within the exclusive management or control of
the person charged with the negligence complained of; and (3)
the accident must not have been due to any voluntary action or
contribution on the part of the person injured. Petitioners are
clearly answerable for failure to see to it that the doors of
their school toilets are at all times in working condition. The
fact that a student had to go through the window, instead of the
door, shows that something was wrong with the door.

As to the absence of grills on the window, petitioners contend

that there was no such requirement under the Building Code.
Nevertheless, the fact is that such window, as petitioners
themselves point out, was approximately 1.5 meters from the
floor, so that it was within reach of a student who finds the
regular exit, the door, not functioning. Petitioners, with the due
diligence of a good father of the family, should have anticipated
that a student, locked in the toilet by a non-working door, would
attempt to use the window to call for help or even to get out.
Considering all the circumstances, therefore, there is
sufficient basis to sustain a finding of liability on
petitioners’ part.

Petitioners’ argument that CLC exercised the due diligence of a

good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its
employees is not decisive. Due diligence in the selection and
supervision of employees is applicable where the employer is
being held responsible for the acts or omissions of others under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code. In this case, CLC’s liability is
under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, premised on the fact of its
own negligence in not ensuring that all its doors are properly
maintained.

SCHOOL OF THE HOLY SPIRIT OF QUEZON CITY vs.

CORAZON P. TAGUIAM,
G.R. No. 165565               July 14, 2008
 554

Facts:
Respondent Corazon P. Taguiam was the Class Adviser of Grade
5-Esmeralda of the petitioner, School of the Holy Spirit of
Quezon City. The class president, wrote a letter to the grade
school principal requesting permission to hold a year-end
celebration at the school grounds. The principal authorized the
activity and allowed the pupils to use the swimming pool. In this
connection, respondent distributed the parent’s/guardian’s
permit forms to the pupils.

Respondent admitted that Chiara Mae Federico’s permit form

was unsigned. Nevertheless, she concluded that Chiara Mae was
allowed by her mother to join the activity since her mother
personally brought her to the school with her packed lunch and
swimsuit. Before the activity started, respondent warned the
pupils who did not know how to swim to avoid the deeper area.
However, while the pupils were swimming, two of them sneaked
out. Respondent went after them to verify where they were going.

Unfortunately, while respondent was away, Chiara Mae

drowned. When respondent returned, the maintenance man was
already administering cardiopulmonary resuscitation on Chiara
Mae. She was still alive when respondent rushed her to the
General Malvar Hospital where she was pronounced dead on
arrival.

Petitioner charged respondent for alleged gross negligence and

required her to submit her written explanation. After hearing,
petitioner dismissed respondent on the ground of gross
negligence resulting to loss of trust and confidence. Meanwhile,
Chiara Mae’s parents filed a P7 Million damage suit against
petitioners and respondent, among others. They also filed
against respondent a criminal complaint for reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide.

Issue:
WON the dismissal of the respondent is valid and legal.

Held:
YES. As a teacher who stands in loco parentis to her pupils,
respondent should have made sure that the children were
 555

protected from all harm while in her company. Respondent

should have known that leaving the pupils in the swimming pool
area all by themselves may result in an accident. A simple
reminder "not to go to the deepest part of the pool" was
insufficient to cast away all the serious dangers that the
situation presented to the children, especially when respondent
knew that Chiara Mae cannot swim. Dismally, respondent
created an unsafe situation which exposed the lives of all the
pupils concerned to real danger. This is a clear violation not only
of the trust and confidence reposed on her by the parents of the
pupils but of the school itself.

It was respondent’s responsibility as Class Adviser to supervise

her class in all activities sanctioned by the school. Thus, she
should have coordinated with the school to ensure that proper
safeguards, such as adequate first aid and sufficient adult
personnel, were present during their activity. She should have
been mindful of the fact that with the number of pupils involved,
it would be impossible for her by herself alone to keep an eye on
each one of them. As it turned out, since respondent was the
only adult present, majority of the pupils were left unsupervised
when she followed the two pupils who sneaked out. In the light
of the odds involved, respondent should have considered that
those who sneaked out could not have left the school premises
since there were guards manning the gates. The guards would
not have allowed them to go out in their swimsuits and without
any adult accompanying them. But those who stayed at the pool
were put at greater risk, when she left them unattended by an
adult.

Finally, we note that based on the criminal complaint filed by

Chiara Mae’s parents, the Assistant City Prosecutor found
probable cause to indict respondent for the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide. The Assistant City Prosecutor
held that respondent "should have foreseen the danger lurking
in the waters." By leaving her pupils in the swimming pool,
respondent displayed an "inexcusable lack of foresight and
precaution." While this finding is not controlling for purposes of
the instant case, this only supports our conclusion that
respondent has indeed been grossly negligent.
AQUINAS SCHOOL vs. SPOUSES INTON
G.R. No. 184202               January 26, 2011
 556

Facts:
Respondent Sister Margarita Yamyamin is the religion teacher of
respondent Jose Luis Inton, a grade three student at Aquinas School.
While Yamyamin was writing on the blackboard, Jose Luis kept on
leaving his seat and going over to a classmate to play a joke of
surprising him. Unable to tolerate the child’s behavior, Yamyamin
approached Jose Luis and kicked him on the legs several times. She
also pulled and shoved his head on the classmate’s seat. Finally, she
told the child to stay where he was on that spot of the room and finish
copying the notes on the blackboard while seated on the floor.

As a result of the incident, respondents Jose and Victoria Inton filed an

action for damages on behalf of their son Jose Luis against Yamyamin
and Aquinas. The Intons also filed a criminal action against Yamyamin
for violation of Republic Act 7610 to which she pleaded guilty and was
sentenced accordingly.

In its decision, the RTC found Yamyamin liable for damages. On appeal,
the Intons asked the CA to increase the award of damages and hold
Aquinas solidarily liable with Yamyamin which was granted by the CA.

Issue:
WON Aquinas is solidarily liable with Yamyamin.

Held:
NO. In this case, the school directress testified that Aquinas had an
agreement with a congregation of sisters under which, in order to fulfill
its ministry, the congregation would send religion teachers to Aquinas
to provide catechesis to its students. Aquinas insists that it was not the
school but Yamyamin’s religious congregation that chose her for the
task of catechizing the school’s grade three students, much like the way
bishops designate the catechists who would teach religion in public
schools. Under the circumstances, it was quite evident that Aquinas did
not have control over Yamyamin’s teaching methods. The Intons had
not refuted the school directress’ testimony in this regard.
Consequently, it was error for the CA to hold Aquinas solidarily liable
with Yamyamin.

Of course, Aquinas still had the responsibility of taking steps to ensure

that only qualified outside catechists are allowed to teach its young
students. In this regard, it cannot be said that Aquinas took no steps to
avoid the occurrence of improper conduct towards the students by their
religion teacher.

MARIA TERESA Y. CUADRA vs. ALFONSO MONFORT

G.R. No. L-24101 September 30, 1970
 557

Facts:
Maria Teresa Cuadra, 12, and Maria Teresa Monfort, 13, were
classmates at the Mabini Elementary School in Bacolod City.
Their teacher assigned them, together with three other
classmates, to weed the grass in the school premises. While thus
engaged Maria Teresa Monfort found a plastic headband and
jokingly said aloud that she had found an earthworm and,
evidently to frighten the Cuadra girl, tossed the object at her.

The object hit Maria Tesesa’s right eye. Smarting from the pain,
she rubbed the injured part and treated it with some powder.
The eye became swollen and it was then that the girl related the
incident to her parents, who thereupon took her to a doctor for
treatment. She underwent surgical operation twice and stayed in
the hospital for a total of twenty-three days. Despite the medical
efforts, however, Maria Teresa Cuadra completely lost the sight
of her right eye.

Mara Teresa Cuadra’s parents sued Alfonso Monfort, father of

Maria Teresa Monfort’s dad based on Article 2180 of the Civil
Code. The lower court ruled that Monfort should pay for actual
damages (cost of hospitalization), moral damages and attorney’s
fees.

Issue:
WON the father is liable.

Held:
YES. The underlying basis of the liability imposed by Article
2176 is the fault or negligence accompanying the act or the
omission, there being no willfulness or intent to cause damage
thereby. When the act or omission is that of one person for
whom another is responsible, the latter then becomes himself
liable under Article 2180, in the different cases enumerated
therein, such as that of the father or the mother under the
circumstances above quoted. The basis of this vicarious,
although primary, liability is, as in Article 2176, fault or
negligence, which is presumed from that which accompanied the
causative act or omission. The presumption is merely prima facie
and may therefore be rebutted. This is the clear and logical
inference that may be drawn from the last paragraph of Article
2180, which states "that the responsibility treated of in this
Article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove
 558

that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to

prevent damage."

In the present case there is nothing from which it may be

inferred that the defendant could have prevented the damage by
the observance of due care, or that he was in any way remiss in
the exercise of his parental authority in failing to foresee such
damage, or the act which caused it. On the contrary, his child
was at school, where it was his duty to send her and where she
was, as he had the right to expect her to be, under the care and
supervision of the teacher. And as far as the act which caused
the injury was concerned, it was an innocent prank not unusual
among children at play and which no parent, however careful,
would have any special reason to anticipate much less guard
against. Nor did it reveal any mischievous propensity, or indeed
any trait in the child's character which would reflect unfavorably
on her upbringing and for which the blame could be attributed
to her parents.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NORA FE SAGUN

G.R. No. 187567               February 15, 2012
 559

Facts:
Respondent is the legitimate child of Albert S. Chan, a Chinese
national, and Marta Borromeo, a Filipino citizen. She was born on
August 8, 1959 in Baguio City and did not elect Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority. In 1992, at the age of 33 and after
getting married to Alex Sagun, she executed an Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines. Said document was notarized by Atty.
Cristeta Leung on December 17, 1992, but was not recorded and
registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City.

Sometime in September 2005, respondent applied for a Philippine

passport. Her application was denied due to the citizenship of her father
and there being no annotation on her birth certificate that she has
elected Philippine citizenship. Consequently, she sought a judicial
declaration of her election of Philippine citizenship and prayed that the
Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City be ordered to annotate the same on
her birth certificate.

In her petition, respondent averred that she was raised as a Filipino,

speaks Ilocano and Tagalog fluently and attended local schools in
Baguio City, including Holy Family Academy and the Saint Louis
University. Respondent claimed that despite her part-Chinese ancestry,
she always thought of herself as a Filipino. She is a registered voter of
Barangay Manuel A. Roxas in Baguio City and had voted in local and
national elections as shown in the Voter Certification issued by Atty.
Maribelle Uminga of the Commission on Elections of Baguio City. She
asserted that by virtue of her positive acts, she has effectively elected
Philippine citizenship and such fact should be annotated on her record
of birth so as to entitle her to the issuance of a Philippine passport.

Issue:
WON

Held:
NO. Being a legitimate child, respondent’s citizenship followed that of
her father who is Chinese, unless upon reaching the age of majority,
she elects Philippine citizenship. It is a settled rule that only legitimate
children follow the citizenship of the father and that illegitimate
children are under the parental authority of the mother and follow her
nationality. An illegitimate child of Filipina need not perform any act to
confer upon him all the rights and privileges attached to citizens of the
Philippines; he automatically becomes a citizen himself. But in the
case of respondent, for her to be considered a Filipino citizen, she
must have validly elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the
age of majority.
AMELIA B. HEBRON vs. FRANCO L. LOYOLA
G.R. No. 168960               July 5, 2010
 560

Facts:
Spouses Remigia Baylon and Januario Loyola owned two parcels of
land. They have seven children, namely Conrado, Jose, Benjamin,
Candida, Soledad, Cristeta and Encarnacion, all surnamed Loyola. The
administration of the said lots was entrusted to Encarnacion Loyola-
Bautista. All the heirs of Januario and Remigia received their shares in
the fruits of the subject properties during Encarnacion's administration
thereof. With the latter's death on September 15, 1969, administration
of the subject properties was assumed by her daughter, Amelia
Bautista-Hebron, who, after some time, started withholding the shares
of Candida and the heirs of Conrado. By the time partition of the said
properties was formally demanded on November 4, 1990, Candida was
the only one still living among the children of Januario and Remigia.
The rest were survived and represented by their respective descendants
and children.

For petitioner's failure to heed their formal demand, respondents filed a

complaint for partition and damages from which the instant suit
stemmed. While manifesting her conformity to the partition demanded
by her co-heirs, petitioner claimed in her amended answer that Candida
and the heirs of Conrado have already relinquished their shares in
consideration of the financial support extended them by her mother,
Encarnacion. In the pre-trial order, the trial court consequently limited
the issue to be resolved to the veracity of the aforesaid waiver or
assignment of shares claimed by petitioner.

Issue:
WON the relinquishment of the mother of the properties of her minor
children were valid.

Held:
NO. The minor children of Conrado inherited by representation in the
properties of their grandparents Remigia and Januario. These children,
not their mother Victorina, were the co-owners of the inherited
properties. Victorina had no authority or had acted beyond her powers
in conveying, if she did indeed convey, to the petitioner’s mother the
undivided share of her minor children in the property involved in this
case. "The powers given to her by the laws as the natural guardian
covers only matters of administration and cannot include the power of
disposition. She should have first secured the permission of the court
before she alienated that portion of the property in question belonging
to her minor children." In a number of cases, where the guardians,
mothers or grandmothers, did not seek court approval of the sale of
properties of their wards, minor children, the Court declared the sales
void.
NAPOLEON D. NERI vs. HEIRS OF HADJI YUSOP UY
G.R. No. 194366               October 10, 2012
 561

Facts:
During her lifetime, Anunciacion Neri had seven children, two (2)
from her first marriage with Gonzalo Illut, namely: Eutropia and
Victoria, and five (5) from her second marriage with Enrique
Neri, namely: Napoleon, Alicia, Visminda, Douglas and Rosa. On
September 21, 1977, Anunciacion died intestate. Her husband,
Enrique, in his personal capacity and as natural guardian of his
minor children Rosa and Douglas, together with Napoleon,
Alicia, and Visminda executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of
the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale adjudicating among
themselves the homestead properties, and thereafter, conveying
them to the late spouses Uy.

The children of Enrique filed a complaint for annulment of saleof

the said homestead properties against spouses Uy assailing the
validity of the sale for having been sold within the prohibited
period. The complaint was later amended to include Eutropia
and Victoriaas additional plaintiffs for having been excluded and
deprived of their legitimes as childrenof Anunciacion from her
first marriage. In their amended answer with counterclaim, the
heirs of Uy denied knowledge of Eutropia and Victoria’s
exclusion from the extrajudicial settlement and sale of the
subject properties, and interposed further the defenses of
prescription and laches.

Issue:
WON the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute
Deed of Sale was valid as to Eutropia and Victoria.

Held:
NO. In the execution of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the
Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of spouses Uy, all the
heirs of Anunciacion should have participated. Considering that
Eutropia and Victoria were admittedly excluded and that then
minors Rosa and Douglas were not properly represented therein,
the settlement was not valid and binding upon them and
consequently, a total nullity.

However, while the settlement of the estate is null and void,

the subsequent sale of the subject properties made by
Enrique and his children, Napoleon, Alicia and Visminda, in
favor of the respondents is valid but only with respect to
 562

their proportionate shares therein. It cannot be denied that

these heirs have acquired their respective shares in the
properties of Anunciacion from the moment of her death and
that, as owners thereof, they can very well sell their undivided
share in the estate.

With respect to Rosa and Douglas who were minors at the time
of the execution of the settlement and sale, their natural
guardian and father, Enrique, represented them in the
transaction. However, on the basis of the laws prevailing at that
time, Enrique was merely clothed with powers of
administration and bereft of any authority to dispose of
their 2/16 shares in the estate of their mother,
Anunciacion.

Administration includes all acts for the preservation of the

property and the receipt of fruits according to the natural
purpose of the thing. Any act of disposition or alienation, or any
reduction in the substance of the patrimony of child, exceeds the
limits of administration. Thus, a father or mother, as the
natural guardian of the minor under parental authority, does
not have the power to dispose or encumber the property of
the latter. Such power is granted by law only to a judicial
guardian of the ward’s property and even then only with courts’
prior approval secured in accordance with the proceedings set
forth by the Rules of Court.

Consequently, the disputed sale entered into by Enrique in

behalf of his minor children without the proper judicial
authority, unless ratified by them upon reaching the age of
majority, is unenforceable. Ratification means that one under no
disability voluntarily adopts and gives sanction to some
unauthorized act or defective proceeding, which without his
sanction would not be binding on him. It is this voluntary
choice, knowingly made, which amounts to a ratification of what
was theretofore unauthorized, and becomes the authorized act of
the party so making the ratification. Once ratified, expressly or
impliedly such as when the person knowingly received benefits
from it, the contract is cleansed from all its defects from the
moment it was constituted, as it has a retroactive effect.
Records, however, show that Rosa had ratified the
extrajudicial settlement of the estate with absolute deed of
sale. Clearly, the foregoing statements constitutedratification of
 563

the settlement of the estate and the subsequent sale, thus,

purging all the defects existing at the time of its execution and
legitimizing the conveyance of Rosa’s 1/16 share in the estate of
Anunciacion to spouses Uy. The same, however, is not true
with respect to Douglas for lack of evidence showing
ratification.

Considering, thus, that the extrajudicial settlement with sale is

invalid and therefore, not binding on Eutropia, Victoria and
Douglas, only the shares of Enrique, Napoleon, Alicia, Visminda
and Rosa in the homestead properties have effectively been
disposed in favor of spouses Uy. "A person can only sell what he
owns, or is authorized to sell and the buyer can as a
consequence acquire no more than what the sellercan legally
transfer.”

LINDAIN vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 95305 August 20, 1992
 564

Facts:
When the plaintiffs were still minors, they were already the
registered owners of a parcel of land. Their mother, Dolores
Luluquisin, then already a widow and acting as guardian of her
minor children, sold the land to the spouses Apolonia Valiente
and Federico Ila. The Deed of Absolute Sale was registered in the
office of the Register of Deeds for the Province of Nueva Ecija.
TCT No. NT-66311 was issued to the vendees, Apolonia Valiente
and Federico Ila.

The spouses Valiente admitted that the property in question was

sold to them by the mother of the minors as evidenced by a Deed
of Sale and although at first they were reluctant to buy the
property as the sale would not be legal, the registered owners
thereof being all minors, upon advice of their counsel, that the
property could be sold without the written authority of the court,
considering that its value was less than P2,000, they bought the
property and had it registered in their names.

Plaintiffs contend, however, that the sale of the lot by their

mother to the defendants is null and void because it was made
without judicial authority and/or court approval.

Issue:
WON the sale of a guardian of a minor’s property require judicial
approval.

Held:
YES. Under the law, a parent, acting merely as the legal
administrator of the property of his/her minor children,
does not have the power to dispose of, or alienate, the
property of said children without judicial approval. The
powers and duties of the widow as legal administrator of her
minor children’s property are only powers of possession and
management. Her power to sell, mortgage, encumber or
otherwise dispose of the property of her minor children must
proceed from the court, as provided in Rule 89 which requires
court authority and approval.