Ronald Satorre BPA 1-A October 11, 2021

Phil. Consti.

1. Binay vs Domingo Case Digest

Facts:
Petitioner Municipality of Makati, through its Council, approved Resolution No. 60 which
extends P500 burial assistance to bereaved families whose gross family income does
not exceed P2,000.00 a month. The funds are to be taken out of the unappropriated
available funds in the municipal treasury. The Metro Manila Commission approved the
resolution. Thereafter, the municipal secretary certified a disbursement of P400,000.00
for the implementation of the program. However, the Commission on Audit disapproved
said resolution and the disbursement of funds for the implementation thereof for the
following reasons: (1) the resolution has no connection to alleged public safety, general
welfare, safety, etc. of the inhabitants of Makati; (2) government funds must be
disbursed for public purposes only; and, (3) it violates the equal protection clause since
it will only benefit a few individuals.
Issues:
1. Whether Resolution No. 60 is a valid exercise of the police power under the general
welfare clause
2. Whether the questioned resolution is for a public purpose
3. Whether the resolution violates the equal protection clause
Held:
1. The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of sovereignty,
which was born with civilized government. It is founded largely on the maxims, "Sic
utere tuo et ahenum non laedas and "Salus populi est suprema lex. Its fundamental
purpose is securing the general welfare, comfort and convenience of the people.
Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations. Before a
municipal corporation may exercise such power, there must be a valid delegation of
such power by the legislature which is the repository of the inherent powers of the State.
Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause. Pursuant
thereto they are clothed with authority to "enact such ordinances and issue such
regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities
conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for the
health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public
morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and the
inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of property therein.
2. Police power is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in
general terms to underscore its all comprehensiveness. Its scope, over-expanding to
meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done,
provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and
circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits.

The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been said to be
commensurate with, but not to exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs of the
people in their health, safety, comfort, and convenience as consistently as may be with
private rights. It extends to all the great public needs, and, in a broad sense includes all
legislation and almost every function of the municipal government. It covers a wide
scope of subjects, and, while it is especially occupied with whatever affects the peace,
security, health, morals, and general welfare of the community, it is not limited thereto,
but is broadened to deal with conditions which exists so as to bring out of them the
greatest welfare of the people by promoting public convenience or general prosperity,
and to everything worthwhile for the preservation of comfort of the inhabitants of the
corporation. Thus, it is deemed inadvisable to attempt to frame any definition which
shall absolutely indicate the limits of police power.
Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited
number of persons. As correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, "the
drift is towards social welfare legislation geared towards state policies to provide
adequate social services, the promotion of the general welfare, social justice as well as
human dignity and respect for human rights." The care for the poor is generally
recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has long been an accepted
exercise of police power in the promotion of the common good.
3. There is no violation of the equal protection clause. Paupers may be reasonably
classified. Different groups may receive varying treatment. Precious to the hearts of our
legislators, down to our local councilors, is the welfare of the paupers. Thus, statutes
have been passed giving rights and benefits to the disabled, emancipating the tenant-
farmer from the bondage of the soil, housing the urban poor, etc. Resolution No. 60, re-
enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of Makati is a paragon of the
continuing program of our government towards social justice. The Burial Assistance
Program is a relief of pauperism, though not complete. The loss of a member of a family
is a painful experience, and it is more painful for the poor to be financially burdened by
such death. Resolution No. 60 vivifies the very words of the late President Ramon
Magsaysay 'those who have less in life, should have more in law." This decision,
however must not be taken as a precedent, or as an official go-signal for municipal
governments to embark on a philanthropic orgy of inordinate dole-outs for motives
political or otherwise. (Binay vs Domingo, G.R. No. 92389, September 11, 1991)
source: https://policasedigests.blogspot.com/2015/01/binay-vs-domingo-case-digest.html

Brief Discussion:
The validity of the approved Resolution No. 60 was being questioned if it justified
to the General Welfare Clause. If such Resolution will be good for public purpose and
being determined if the police power under the powers of municipal corporations was
right and just to approve such Resolution. The case also determined if the Resolution
No. 60 violated the Equal Protection Clause.

2. Beltran v. Secretary of Health

FACTS:
RA 7719 (National Blood Services Act) was enacted in 1994, seeking to provide an
adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood donation and by regulating
blood banks in the country. Section 7 thereof provided for the phaseout of all
commercial blood banks within 2 years after its effectivity.
The Act was passed after studies showed that blood transfusions could lead to
transmission of diseases, and that blood sold by persons to commercial blood banks
are three times more likely to have blood transfusion transmissible diseases than those
donated to the Philippine National Red Cross.
Prior to the expiration of the commercial blood banks’ licenses, they filed a petition
assailing the constitutionality and validity of RA 7719 and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations, for discriminating against freestanding blood banks in a manner, which is
not germane to the purpose of the law.
ISSUES:
1. W/N RA 7719 violates the equal protection clause.
2. W/N Section 7 of RA 7719 constitutes unlawful deprivation of personal liberty and
property.
HELD
:1. NO. One, RA 7719 is based on substantial distinctions. Nonprofit blood banks
operate for purely humanitarian reasons and as a medical service, and encourage
voluntary blood donation. On the other hand, commercial blood banks are motivated by
profit and treat blood as a sale of commodity.
Two, the classification and the consequent phaseout of blood banks is germane to the
purpose of the law, which is to provide the nation with an adequate supply of safe blood
by promoting voluntary blood donation and treating blood transfusion as a humanitarian
or medical service rather than a commodity. This necessarily involves the phaseout of
commercial blood banks based on the fact that they operate as a business enterprise,
and they source their blood supply from paid blood donors who are considered unsafe.
Three, the Legislature intended for the general application of the law. Its enactment was
not solely to address the peculiar circumstances of the situation nor was it intended to
apply only to existing conditions.
Four, the law applies equally to all commercial blood banks without exception.
2. NO. In serving the interest of the public, and to give meaning to the purpose of the
law, the Legislature deemed it necessary to phaseout commercial blood banks. This
action may seriously affect the owners and operators, as well as the employees, of
commercial blood banks but their interests must give way to serve a higher end for the
interest of the public.
DOCTRINE: Class legislation, discriminating against some and favoring others is
prohibited; but classification on a reasonable basis and not made arbitrarily or
capriciously is permitted.
source: https://pdfcoffee.com/beltran-v-secretary-of-health-pdf-free.html

Brief Discussion:
The RA 7719 underwent the trial of whether it violates the equal protection law
and constitutes unlawful deprivation of liberty and property after its effectivity. Under this
RA, it phase-out commercial blood banks after 2 years of its effectivity to ensure the
safety of public heath from transmission of diseases through blood transmutation. Such
RA, provides a safer blood transmutation for public purposes without profiting and
ensure that such service can be benefited by all with strict monitoring of one’s health.

3. CELERINA J. SANTOS, petitioner, vs. RICARDO T. SANTOS,

respondent.
G.R. No. 187061. October 8, 2014.
Ponente: LEONEN, J p:
Action: Petition for review on certiorari filed by Celerina J. Santos, assailing the Court of
Appeals' resolutions dated November 28, 2008 and March 5, 2009. Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition for the annulment of the trial court's judgment declaring her
presumptively dead.
Summary: Celerina was declared presumptively dead after her husband had filed a
petition for declaration of absence or presumptive death for the purpose of remarriage.
According to the husband, she was unheard of for 12 years. Petitioner sought
nullification of said Order declaring her presumptively dead, arguing that she was never
missing in the first place and that her husband committed extrinsic fraud in declaring
that her whereabouts for 12 years were unknown to him. CA ruled that annulment of
judgment was wrong remedy and that she should have filed an Affidavit of
reappearance before the Civil Registry. Court ruled to reverse CA. Case was remanded
to CA for determination of the existence of extrinsic fraud, grounds for nullity/annulment
of the first marriage, and the merits of the petition.
Facts:
According to respondent Ricardo:
-Celerina and Ricardo got married on June 18, 1980. They rented an apartment in San
Juan, MM and a year after their marriage they went to Tarlac and went into a buy and
sell business, which failed.
-To recover financially, Celerina sought respondent’s permission to work in HK as
domestic helper. In Feb. 1995, she applied in an employment agency in Manila then left
Tarlac after 2 months and was never heard from again.
-He tried looking for Celerina at her parent’s house in Cubao, through her relatives and
friends but no one gave him information.
-From the time he filed petition before RTC, Celerina was not heard from for 12 years
already. He believed that Celerina has passed away.
According to Petitioner Celerina:
-Her true residence was in Neptune Extension, Congressional Avenue, Quezon City,
which is their conjugal dwelling since 1989 until Ricardo left in May 2008.
-She never resided in Tarlac.
-She also never left and worked as a domestic helper abroad. Neither did she go to an
employment agency in February 1995.
-Ricardo left the conjugal dwelling in May 2008 to cohabit with another woman.
-Celerina referred to a joint affidavit executed by their children to support her contention
that Ricardo made false allegations in his petition.
Procedural History:
-On July 27, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City declared petitioner Celerina J.
Santos (Celerina) presumptively dead after her husband, respondent Ricardo T. Santos
(Ricardo), had filed a petition for declaration of absence or presumptive death for the
purpose of remarriage on June 15, 2007.
-Ricardo remarried on September 17, 2008.
-On November 17, 2008, Celerina filed a petition for annulment of judgment before CA
on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
(1) She argued that she was deprived her day in court when Ricardo, despite his
knowledge of her true residence, misrepresented to the court that she was
a resident of Tarlac City.
(2) court did not acquire jurisdiction over Ricardo's petition because it had never
been published in a newspaper
(3) Office of the Solicitor General and the Provincial Prosecutor's Office were not
furnished copies of Ricardo's petition
-CA dismissed Celerina's petition for annulment of judgment for being a wrong mode of
remedy. According to CA, the proper remedy was to file a sworn statement before the
civil registry, declaring her reappearance in accordance with Article 42 of the Family
Code.
-MR filed, likewise denied
Issue: WON the correct remedy is an annulment of judgment (of RTC’s declaration of
petitioner’s absence or presumptive death) instead of merely filing an Affidavit of
Reappearance – YES
-In filing petition for review on certiorari, Celerina argued that filing an affidavit of
reappearance under Article 42 of the Family Code is appropriate only when the spouse
is actually absent and the spouse seeking the declaration of presumptive death actually
has a well-founded belief of the spouse's death.
-She added that it would be inappropriate to file an affidavit of reappearance if she did
not disappear in the first place and that an action for annulment of judgment is proper
when the declaration of presumptive death is obtained fraudulently.
RATIO:
-Annulment of judgment is the remedy when the Regional Trial Court's judgment, order,
or resolution has become final, and the "remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief
(or other appropriate remedies) are no longer available through no fault of the
petitioner."
-There are 2 grounds for annulment of judgment (1) extrinsic fraud and (2) lack of
jurisdiction.“ It is extrinsic or collateral when a litigant commits acts outside of the trial
which prevents a party from having a real contest, or from presenting all of his case,
such that there is no fair submission of the controversy.
-The choice of remedy is important because remedies carry with them certain
admissions, presumptions, and conditions.
-The Family Code provides that it is the proof of absence of a spouse for four
consecutive years, coupled with a well-founded belief by the present spouse that the
absent spouse is already dead, that constitutes a justification for a second marriage
during the subsistence of another marriage.
-It also provides that the second marriage is in danger of being terminated by the
presumptively dead spouse when he or she reappears.
Article 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall be
automatically terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent
spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void
ab initio.
-In other words, the Family Code provides the presumptively dead spouse with the
remedy of terminating the subsequent marriage by mere reappearance. However, the
filing of an affidavit of reappearance is an admission on the part of the first spouse that
his or her marriage to the present spouse was terminated when he or she was declared
absent or presumptively dead.
Moreover, a close reading of the entire Article 42 reveals that the termination of the
subsequent marriage by reappearance is subject to several conditions: (1) the non-
existence of a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio; (2)
recording in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage
of the sworn statement of fact and circumstances of reappearance; (3) due notice to the
spouses of the subsequent marriage of the fact of reappearance; and (4) the fact of
reappearance must either be undisputed or judicially determined.
The existence of these conditions means that reappearance does not always
immediately cause the subsequent marriage's termination.
-A Petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages may be filed solely by
the husband or wife. This means that even if Celerina is a real party in interest who
stands to be benefited or injured by the outcome of an action to nullify the second
marriage, this remedy is not available to her.
-Therefore, for the purpose of not only terminating the subsequent marriage but also of
nullifying the effects of the declaration of presumptive death and the subsequent
marriage, mere filing of an affidavit of reappearance would not suffice. Celerina's choice
to file an action for annulment of judgment will, therefore, lie.
Fallo: Court ruled to reverse CA. Case was remanded to CA for determination of the
existence of extrinsic fraud, grounds for nullity/annulment of the first marriage, and the
merits of the petition
source: https://pdfcoffee.com/santos-vs-santos-5-pdf-free.html

Brief Discussions:
Filling a case for a presumptive death of a wife was the reason for Ricardo
Santos to get remarried as it nullifies the first marriage. It was being said that he never
heard of his wife for 12 years and he believed that she passed away. Meanwhile, the
presumptive death wife, Celerina Santos, filled a counterargument case to justify that
she was alive and all testimonies of her husband was false.

4. METRAN vs. PAREDES, 79 Phil. 819

FACTS: Prior to the Court of Industrial Relations a petition was filed in case No. 36-V
entitled "National Labor Union, versus Metropolitan Transportation Service (Metran),"
wherein petitioner alleged that it was a legitimate labor organization, thirty of whose
affiliated members were working and under the employ of the respondent; that the
respondent "is a semi-governmental transportation entity, popularly known as `Metran,
having nine demands at length set forth in said petition be granted. Wherefore, Metran
filed a petition for the dismissal of the case "on the ground that it belongs to the
Republic of the Philippines and as such, it cannot be sued". It is an office "under the
supervision and control of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications," under
Executive Order No. 59.
ISSUE: Whether or not Metran can be able to invoke the Doctrine of State Immunity.
RULING: Yes, the court held that Metran was a mere office or agency of the
government, unincorporated and possessing no juridical personality under the law,
incapable of suing or being sued and that a claim against it would in effect be a suit
against the Government, which suit may not prosper without the Government's consent.
source: https://pdfcoffee.com/metran-vs-paredes-case-digest-pdf-free.html

Brief Discussions:
The case questioned the identity of such agency if it is part of the government
and being bestowed under the Doctrine of State Immunity. It was proven that it is right
and such agency cannot be sued as it possesses mere public services without profiting.

5. PROVIDENCE WASHINGTON INSURANCE CO. v. REPUBLIC, GR No.

L-26386, 1969-09-30
Facts:
appellant against an order of the lower court dismissing its suit for the non-delivery of
thirty cases of steel files, which cargo was insured by it against loss and damage,
naming as defendants the Republic of the Philippines and the Bureau of Customs as
the operator of the arrastre service
"The Bureau of Customs, acting as part of the machinery of the national government in
the operation of the arrastre service, pursuant to express legislative mandate and as a
necessary incident of its prime governmental function, is immune from suit, there being
no statute to the contrary."
Issues:
Bureau of Customs, acting as part of the machinery of the national government in the
operation of the arrastre service, pursuant to express legislative mandate and as a
necessary incident of its prime governmental function, is immune from suit
Ruling:
For a suit of this character to prosper, there must be a showing of consent either in
express terms or by implication through the use of statutory language too plain to be
misinterpreted. Its absence being obvious, the lower court acted correctly.
Nonetheless, a continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability is not to be
deplored for as against the inconvenience that may be caused private parties, the loss
of governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its multifarious
functions are far greater if such a fundamental principle were abandoned and the
availability of judicial remedy were not thus restricted.
It is worthy of note likewise that in the pursuit of its activities affecting business, the
government has increasingly relied on private corporations possessing the power to sue
and be sued
Thus, the doctrine of non-suability of the government without its consent, as it has
operated in practice, hardly lends itself to the charge that it could be the fruitful parent of
injustice, considering the vast and ever-widening scope of state activities at present
being undertaken. Whatever difficulties for private claimants may still exist, is, from an
objective appraisal of all factors, minimal. In the balancing of interests, so unavoidable
in the determination of what principles must prevail if government is to satisfy the public
weal, the verdict must be, as it has been these so many years, for its continuing
recognition as a fundamental postulate of constitutional law.
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal of the lower court of May 23, 1966 is affirmed.
With costs against plaintiff-appellant.
Principles:
The classic formulation of Holmes of this doctrine of non-suability thus bears
restatement: "A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or
obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right
as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.
source: https://lawyerly.ph/digest/c4bdb?user=1663

Brief Discussion:
This case shows how certain department of government which exist to provide
public service under the law cannot be sued unless there is a transparent violation of
providing such services. It implied that the Bureau of Customs as part of the machinery
of the national government can have a case to prosper which leads to judicial decision
when there is a consent between the two parties.