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Blackwell Publishering Ltd Oxford, UK MUWO The MuslimWorld 1478-1913 2004 Hartford Seminary 2004 94 11000

ORIGINAL ARTICLES

Avicennas Position on the Divine Creative Action The MuslimWorld Volume 94 2004

Avicennas Position
Concerning the Basis of the
Divine Creative Action*

Rahim Acar

Marmara University
Istanbul, Turkey

A

vicenna maintains that Gods creative action is similar to the actions of
natural things. This interpretation of Avicennas position is supported
by his denial of intention to God in creation and by his claim that the
universe is necessary. Despite the above, Avicenna argues that creation is a
voluntary action. When he argues that God cannot have an intention in
creation, he simply states that other things do not constitute a nal cause for
God. Furthermore, the necessity of the universe does not make creation like
the actions of natural beings. Nor does it take Gods freedom away, since for
Avicenna, the necessity of the universe is neither imposed on God from
outside, nor is it required by something internal to God. The existence of the
universe, as well as the form the universe takes, is necessary because God is
necessary in all respects.
In the following, I will rst articulate the way Avicennas position is
interpreted concerning creation: Is it to be compared to a natural or a
voluntary action? Then I will introduce Avicennas conception of the divine
will, and his account of why and how things other than God exist. I will also
explore the sense in which God is a free creator for Avicenna, and how he
reconciles the necessity of the universe with divine freedom. Without
attempting to question the validity of Avicennas arguments for divine freedom

vis--vis

his act of creation, I will rather show how creation is a voluntary
action for Avicenna, even though he argues that God has no intention in
creation, and that the universe is necessary.

Interpretation of Avicennas Position

To distinguish the theistic conception of God from the Neoplatonic, pagan
conceptions of God, some contemporary scholars employ strategic pairs of
opposites: necessary emanation versus creation, eternal versus created
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universe, God as natural agent versus God as free creator.

1

In this context,
one may easily contrast Avicennas theory of emanation, to explain how the
universe comes to exist, to voluntary creation. On this contrast, emanation
denies intention to the efcient cause and implies the necessity of the effect,
whereas creation as a voluntary action signals the intention of the efcient
cause as well as the contingency of the effect.
Avicenna is regularly presented as insisting that God creates by the
necessity of nature. The term nature in the expression necessity of nature
may be understood as nature in inanimate things like re or stone. It may also
be taken in the sense of the essence or quiddity of anything that exists. In
inanimate things nature is the principle of action. They act on account of their
natures because they do not have the volition or desire with which animate
beings are endowed. Let us take re as an example. The characteristic action
of re is to burn. Obviously, re cannot refrain from burning. Within the
natural order,

ceteris paribus

, re acts by way of natural necessity in burning.
Avicennas position is usually associated with nature in this sense.
In one of the detailed studies discussing Avicennas theory of creation,
Beatrice H. Zedler

2

employs the term nature in this sense of acting through
nature as opposed to will. Zedler supports the thesis that Aquinas wrote the

De potentia

3

as a Christian reply to Avicennas theory of emanation.

4

Zedler
interprets Aquinas many arguments as being directed against Avicennas
teachings, specically that the world as eternal and necessary presumes that
God acts

ex necessitate naturae

.

5

As Zedler argues, Aquinas traces Avicennas
insistence on the principle from one only one can proceed to Avicennas
conception of Gods creative action: God acts by necessity of nature.

6

The fact
that Avicenna assimilates Gods creative action to natural actions may also
be observed from Aquinas identication of natural action, for he states
throughout the

De potentia

that Nature is determined to one effect, and
explains this as meaning that nature is determined to one thing, both as
regards what is produced by the power of nature and as regards producing or
not producing.

7

Since for Avicenna emanation is necessary, God has to create,
and to create this actual universe. This conrms the contention that God acts
by the necessity of nature.
Zedler must explain away the passages in which Avicenna states that Gods
action is not like natural actions. On Zedlers interpretation, Avicennas denial
is not directed to the nature of natural things, but rather intends to deny that
Gods nature (intelligence) has any part in his act of creation, since for
Avicenna, things are concomitants of God. This means, however, that the
production of the world is accomplished almost in spite of Him. Hence,
Aquinas understanding of Avicennas account of Gods creative action, that
God acts by the necessity of nature, was correct.

8
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Combined with the necessity of the universe, Avicennas denial of
intention to God in creation conrms that for Avicenna, creation is not a
voluntary action but a natural one. Avicennas adherence to the principle that
from one only one can proceed reects this point. Since for Avicenna, God
does not intend what emanates from him, the things that emanate from
him can only be in accordance with the divine simplicity, which suggests
comparing emanation to a natural agent producing an effect similar to it. So
re, being devoid of intention, cannot design its effect, but simply produces
something similar to itself.

9

Since intention is found only in voluntary agents,
if an agent lacks intention, its action cannot stem from volition. This, in turn,
implies that the divine knowledge does not have a part in creation. Since
willing and intention are based on knowledge, if one denies that God is an
intentional or a voluntary creator, then divine knowledge can have no part in
creation. Hence Avicennas contentions that the universe is necessary and that
God does not intend anything in creating apparently support interpreting his
position that creation is a natural action, and not a voluntary one based on
knowledge.

10

God Creates by Will not by Nature

Before beginning to discuss how Avicenna explains the creation of the
universe and the role the divine plays in the act of creation, it is proper to state
that for Avicenna, Gods will is in accordance with his being, as a result of the
identity of Gods attributes with his being. That is, Gods will is (1) simple:
In other words, God has one act of self-will, which includes Gods willing of
other things; (2) unique: nothing else is the end of Gods will, so it does not
depend on anything external; (3) necessary, eternal and immutable. Avicenna
takes the divine will into account only insofar as it is simple, necessary, and
eternal, that is, insofar as it is understood together with the divine formal
features.

11

In understanding Gods will with respect to creation, one should keep
in mind that, unlike human will, it is simple, eternal and immutable. It goes
without saying that it is necessary as well. Since the divine will is simple, God
has one act of will. God primarily wills and loves himself; Gods willing of
other things must be subsumed under Gods self-willing.

12

Besides being
simple, Gods will is eternal and immutable. This follows from Gods eternity
and Gods being a pure act without any potency. Avicenna touches on the
eternity and immutability of the divine will in various contexts, albeit
indirectly, but notably to support the contention that God creates eternally.
Since creation can be traced back to the divine will, if Gods will were not
eternal and immutable, then God would be subject to change, or, in other
words, receptive and in need of something external in order to be an efcient
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cause. Since God is eternal and since there is no change in God, Gods action
must also be eternal.

13

If God did not will eternally to create, nothing would
be created because this implies a change both in Gods will and in Gods
knowledge, because of the identity of will and knowledge in God.

14

Avicenna explicitly argues that creation is a voluntary action, following
upon Gods knowledge of things, which follows from Gods self-knowledge.

15


Gods will is the cause of the existence and the order of things, the modality
of their existence. However, Avicenna is much concerned lest the divine will
be put on a par with human voluntary actions.

The First knows (

ya

qilu

) his essence, and the order (

niz

a

m

) of
good existing (

al-mawj

u

d

) in everything (

f

i

al-kull

), i.e., how it [i.e.,
everything] is according to this order, since he knows (

ya

qiluh

u

) it
[i.e., everything] as something emanating (

mustaf d

), becoming (

k

a

in

)
and existing (

mawj

u

d

). And everything that is known to be (

ma

l

u

m
al-kawn

), and the direction of [its] coming to be (

jiha al-kawn

) on
account of its place of origin is known by its principle. And it [i.e.,
everything that is known to be] is good, and is not contradictory (

ghayr
mun

a

f

) [to good], since it [i.e., everything that is known to be] follows
(

t

a

bi

)

the goodness of the essence of the principle and its perfection,
which are loved in themselves. And this thing [i.e., what emanates from
the principle] is that which is willed. However, the object of volition of
the First is not in the manner of our object of volition, such that he
would have an aim in what comes to be because of him. It appears that
you know its impossibility, and you will know. On the contrary, he is
the willer of his essence. This kind of pure intellectual volition and this
life of his, similarly, are identical to him.

16

This passage can be divided into two parts. In the rst part Avicenna
asserts Gods knowledge of things, and in the second part how Gods will is
related to things. In the rst part, Avicenna states that (1) God knows himself,
(2) God knows the order by which all things exist, and (3) God knows
everything that exists as well as how they exist. In the second part Avicenna
attempts to explain how the divine will is related to things. Gods will is not
directed at the emanation of things primarily, but as Gods self-knowledge
includes his being the principle, the creator of things, it also includes the
knowledge of things to be created. Gods essence and perfection are loved in
themselves, so Gods essence is what is willed. Other things come to exist
through Gods self-volition. They are known and willed, but they are not a
nal cause for Gods will. By willing himself, God also wills the existence of
other things. Avicenna does not explain further how Gods will with respect to
himself and his will with respect to other things differ from each other.
For Avicenna, nothing else constitutes an end for God, and God does not
pursue an end distinct from himself in creating the universe. He gives two
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basic reasons for arguing this: 1) that only God exists by himself and
everything else depends on him, and 2) Gods simplicity. Avicenna explains
the rst by arguing that there is nothing to be intended. Only God exists
without a cause, and there can be no reason (

sabab) unless it be because
of God, in God or by God, or belongs to God. If we assume that God has
an end distinct from himself, we propose a voluntary action similar to human
voluntary actions, with possibilities already set up independent of the agent.
A voluntary agent may seek to realize one of the possibilities. However,
with regard to God, since there can be nothing outside and independent of
God to be intended, God does not act for the sake of something else. Hence,
God creates other things, even though other things do not constitute an end
for God.
17
Avicennas second reason concerns Gods simplicity and perfection. If God
is supposed to have an intention for the existence of other things, three things
follow from this supposition: 1) In God there is something distinct from Gods
self-knowledge, which is the ground for whatever God intends. This thing is
Gods knowledge of the necessity or lovability or goodness necessitating this
act of intention. 2) God intends. 3) There is a benet to which the intention is
directed. This is impossible for Avicenna, given that God is simple.
18
Gods
simplicity for Avicenna requires that God have one knowledge and one will,
which are in turn identical to each other. Since God primarily knows, wills and
loves himself, Gods will cannot be directed to an end other than God.
Avicenna not only argues that creation is a voluntary act, but also
underscores that creation cannot be similar to actions stemming from nature,
where nature is taken to mean the principle of action in inanimate things.
19

For Avicenna, a natural action excludes 1) knowledge and 2) approbation
(rida) of the result of action by the agent.
20
After stating that the act of creation
is different from human voluntary acts, he continues:
The existence (kawn) of everything from him is not in the way of nature
[either], such that the existence (kawn) of everything from him is
without a cognition and without his permission. How could it be so,
while he is a pure intellect who knows his essence? Thus ( fa) he must
know that the existence of everything necessarily follows ( yalzamuh)
from him, because he does not know his essence, except as he is the
pure (mahd ) intellect and the rst principle. And he only knows
everything from himself in accordance with that he is their principle, and
that there is nothing in his essence preventing (man ), or repugnant to
(karih) the emanation of everything from him. And he (dhatuhu) knows
that his perfection (kamalahu) and his transcendence (uluwwahu) is
such that [403] good emanates from him, and that this [i.e., emanation of
things] is of the necessary concomitants (min lawazim) of his majesty
(jalalatihi ), which is loved in itself (al-mashuqa lahu li dhatiha).
21
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70
In this passage, Avicenna contrasts natural action and voluntary action on
the basis of the agents knowledge, attributing the difference between them to
knowledge and approbation. Approbation for the existence of other things
may be an expression suitable for the divine will concerning other things
because, for Avicenna, the universe is not the end of Gods will.
22
What
Avicennas text suggests is that whatever God does not know to exist and
whatever God does allow to exist does not come to exist.
23
God Freely and Necessarily Creates the Universe
Based on Avicennas statements that God is a voluntary creator, can we say
that for him, God is a free creator? If God primarily wills only himself, and if
creation is not an end for God, does the fact that other things come to exist
imply that God is compelled or required to create? Gods freedom to create
may be taken away either by something external, or by something internal that
is required by Gods nature. Avicenna rejects both of these constraints on the
divine will.
Avicenna argues that no cause external to the agent can be assigned to
Gods volition concerning the universe. He emphasizes that Gods will is
different from human will because the divine will does not depend on anything
external to the agent. While for human volition there is an end distinct from
the willing agent, for Gods will there cannot be anything causing God to will
something. To express this idea Avicenna sometimes uses the term dain, i.e.,
a motive, or a reason, pushing God to do something.
24
Most of the time, he
uses the terms intention (qasd ) and purpose ( gharad ).
25
As I have already
stated, there is nothing outside God, nothing that might compel God to will
something, so God is not to be conceived as seeking after something that exists
independently of God. Nor does God create to make compensation (iwad ).
26
Nor can there be anything internal requiring that God should create,
though this seems difcult for Avicenna to defend, since he argues that God
knows himself in such a way that the existence of things is the necessary
concomitant of Gods majesty, which is loved in itself. Avicennas statements
lead one to think that Gods volition concerning other things must be included
in Gods essence, so that God would be the natural agent of the universe in
the sense that God creates because of his nature. So one is led think that
creating other things must be a constitutive element of Gods essence: God
would not be what he is if he did not create. To elucidate how Avicenna
defends his case, I will rst present his more negative way of explaining
why other things exist, followed by his more positive explanation. Avicenna
explains the existence of the universe through generosity and concomitance.
While generosity concerns the negative aspect of this account, concomitance
offers a positive dimension.
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For Avicenna, God creates out of his generosity, since he neither expects
nor attains anything in return. Generosity requires that the generous agent be
free from internal as well as external constraints. Avicenna argues that anything
in this case, the existence of the universe may be considered with
respect to the agent or with respect to the patient. So something may be
deemed generous with respect to the agent, while it may be called good with
respect to the thing that receives and becomes perfect by it. In this case, the
act of creation will be generous with regard to God and good with regard to
the universe. He denes generosity ( jud ) to be the case where the agent is not
in any way affected (munfail ) by what it does, or by something following on
what it does. Generosity is giving out what is proper to be given not because
of a debt, or compensation, without pursuing a desire or expecting revenue.
27

By excluding payment of a debt and compensation from generous actions,
Avicenna indicates that in order for an action to be an act of generosity, it must
be free from external factors compelling the agent, as well as free from
anything internal to the agent, like expecting to attain something through the
object of volition (murad ) or intention (maqsud ). If God were to pursue
something willed or intended, God would be imperfect. An agent might be
pursuing a purpose ( gharad) with regard to himself in his being (bi hasabi
nafsihi dhatihi ), or with regard to the exigency (masalih) of his being
(dhat ), or with regard to something else in his being, or with regard to his
benet (masalih). All these imply that the agent obtains something in return.
Yet any agent obtaining something in return for its action is imperfect either
with respect to its being or with respect to one of its perfections (kamalat ).
28

God is truly generous, since Gods giving being to things can neither be
compelled by something external nor required by something internal to God.
Clearly, Avicenna employs denial of intention to God in order to support
his argument that there is nothing external compelling God to create, as well
as his argument that there is nothing in Gods essence requiring God to create.
He seems to consider the intention both with regard to what is intended
and with regard to the intending agent. Yet intention cannot be attributed to
God insofar as it is considered with respect to the intended object, as in
compensation and debt, since there can be nothing external compelling God
to create. Similarly, since intention cannot be attributed to God as it implies
imperfection of the agent there is nothing internal requiring God to create.
So for Avicenna, God is a free creator since God creates out of his generosity,
without any external motive and without internal requirements, such as
expecting a benet or perfection.
To Avicennas mind, Gods having free will does not mean that God has
free choice. For Avicenna, the idea that God does not have free choice follows
from the assertion that other things are not Gods end. If other things could be
Tnr Mtsii Worir Voitr 94 J:t:r 2004
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ends for God, then God would have free choice because one end could be
distinguished from alternatives (naqid ) in a free choice (ikhtiyar ). The one
with free choice (ikhtiyar ) chooses one end as better than the alternative,
which would place alternatives in front of God. Then God would be required
to choose the better alternative.
29
However, there can be no set of independent
possible universes facing God so that he may choose one. Since there is
nothing for God to intend, there is nothing for God to choose over others.
So the necessity of the universe, which Avicenna unwaveringly upholds,
may or may not contradict maintaining that God is a free creator. Avicenna
argues for the necessity of the universe through his theory of concomitance,
which I have called the more positive aspect of his account of why the
universe exists: it is a necessary concomitant of Gods essence (dhat ). Even
though God does not will the universe for something external, so that he
would depend on it, the existence of the universe is a necessary concomitant
(lazim) of Gods essence (dhat ).
30
Here, one may question whether there is a
tension between Avicennas conception of generosity and concomitance. If
other things necessarily follow from Gods essence, does that show God to be
in need of creating? Or does it make God dependent upon his creatures such
that God would not be what he is if creatures did not come to exist?
We may nd an answer to these questions by identifying the relation
between a concomitant and the thing of which it is a concomitant. A
concomitant, states Avicenna, is the thing that necessarily follows (yalzamu)
something because of what it is that [the thing] is (li annahu huwa), [however]
it does not make subsist (la yuqawwim) the thing [it follows].
31
Although the
concomitant necessarily follows the thing of which it is a concomitant, the
thing that has this concomitant does not subsist through its concomitant. That
is, the thing that has a concomitant does not depend on its concomitant in
order to be the thing it is. Friendship in a narrower sense may serve as an
example. The constitutive element of friendship between two people consists
in the fact that they love each other. But they do not make one another friends
simply by expecting to get help from each other. A relationship based on
mutual interests would be a business transaction rather than a relationship of
loving and caring. But helping each other, when the need arises, necessarily
follows from a relationship based on love. It is almost inconceivable that two
friends who love each other would not help each other. In this sense, benet
is a necessary concomitant of friendship but is not constitutive of what
friendship is.
Avicenna distinguishes two kinds of concomitants in the Taliqat:
32
Concomitance is of two kinds (wajhayn): [1] One of them is that
something is a concomitant (laziman) [stemming] from (an) some other
thing because of (li ) its nature and substance, such as light [stemming]
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from the source of light (al-mudI ) and burning [following] something
hot. [2] The other is that it [i.e., something] is the concomitant (laziman)
[stemming] from it [i.e., the thing, of which it is a concomitant]. And it
[the concomitant] follows (taban) its [the thing that has the concomitant]
self-knowledge, and it knows that this concomitant emanates from itself.
This is the concomitance (al-luzum) that necessarily follows (yalzamu)
from the Creator (al-bari ). This is because he is in himself ( f i dhatihi )
perfect (kamil ), complete (tamm), loved (mashuq), and he knows
(alim) himself. Indeed magnicence (majd ) and nobility (uluww)
belong to him. And these things, which are existent on account of him
(anhu), are concomitants (lazima) of his self-knowledge, magnicence,
nobility and of his goodness (khayriyyatihi ). Goodness is not
something different from his essence (dhatihi ).
Here, Avicenna attempts to distinguish between the concomitants of God
and the concomitants of natural beings. While concomitants of other things
stem from their nature, Gods concomitants stem from his knowledge. It is, of
course, open to discussion whether such an explanation can work without
difculty, but he makes a clear distinction between God and other things with
regard to their concomitants. While for other things their nature necessitates
their concomitants, in the case of God, it is his self-knowledge that determines
the emanation of concomitants. The concomitants of natural things, such as
re or water, follow the course of nature because they are concomitants of
natural things without knowledge and will. Similarly, Gods concomitants
follow what God is, the divine nature. In contrast to natural things, however,
Gods concomitants follow from the divine knowledge and will, which are
identical to Gods essence (dhat).
Through his theory of generosity and concomitance, Avicenna wants to
assert both Gods independence from the universe and the necessary existence
of the universe on account of the divine will. While Gods being and goodness
do not depend on the existence of the universe, the universe necessarily
follows from God essence.
33
Yet, if Gods being and goodness do not depend
on the existence of the universe, God does not need to create in order to be
what he is.
We may further ask: if creation is not constitutive of God, why must the
universe be a necessary concomitant? The answer to this question concerns
not what God is, but rather how God is. That is, it does not concern the divine
perfections, specically the divine will, but divine formal features like
simplicity and necessity. Avicenna does not consider this question separately;
hence, he does not say outright that the necessary concomitance of the
universe is due to Gods being necessary, immutable, or fully actual.
Nevertheless, the evidence for such an interpretation can be gathered from his
writings. To give one example, at the beginning of the rst chapter of Book IX
Tnr Mtsii Worir Voitr 94 J:t:r 2004
74
of the Metaphysics of The Healing, when he is about to begin his explanation
of why the universe must be sempiternal, he reminds the reader that God is a
necessary being. He is necessary in all respects: nothing new or additional
could happen to him.
34
On the basis of the necessity of God, the universe
necessarily follows the divine knowledge and will. Yet divine knowledge and
the divine will concerning the universe are also necessary. Why? Because God
is necessary in all respects. So Gods will concerning the universe is included
in the divine self-volition not because Gods being what he is includes or
depends on the existence of creatures, but because of the formal features of
simplicity and necessity.
Objections Revisited
Arguments that creation for Avicenna is a natural action rather than a
voluntary one have in part been based on Avicennas contention that the
universe is necessary. Indeed, the universe is necessary, but does the necessity
of the universe imply that God has to create in the manner a natural agent
must act? The question Does God have to create? is intriguing. It can be
understood as a question asking (1) whether God is compelled or forced to
create, in the sense that there be something external to God compelling God
to create. The question may also be understood to be asking (2) whether there
is something in God requiring that he create: whether God needs to create in
order to be what he is. In this way, one can take it to be inquiring whether
Gods being and goodness depend on the existence of creatures.
With regard to the rst interpretation of the question, whether there is
something external compelling God to create, Avicennas answer is an
unqualied no. As should be clear from the discussion thus far, for Avicenna,
nothing can compel God to create. Gods will, unlike a human will, does not
have a motive or a cause. Indeed, there cannot be anything independent
of God. God does not seek after anything, nor does he create to make
compensation. Hence, there is nothing external, compelling or moving God
to create.
With regard to the second interpretation of the question: whether there be
something in God requiring that he create, Avicennas answer is again no.
There is nothing in God requiring that God create the universe, because Gods
being and goodness do not depend on the fact that God creates. If God is
independent of the existence of other things, then Gods being good does
not require that God create other things: God is good without creating the
universe. Thus, creation is not a constitutive element of what God is, but
follows from what God is.
If Gods being and goodness do not depend on the existence of the
universe, is the universe not-necessary? Avicennas answer to this question
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would be, again, no, because the universe is Gods necessary concomitant.
God cannot have a freedom such that he could choose to create or not to
create. For Avicenna, one may not even consider that God could have not
created, because God is necessary in all respects. And saying that God could
not have created assumes a possibility which is laid out ahead before God. The
idea that the universe is a necessary concomitant of God does not simply take
into account Gods perfections, willing and goodness in this case, but also
Gods formal features, Gods simplicity and necessity. Thus, the universe is
necessary because God is necessary in all respects.
As we have seen, the fact that for Avicenna God is not an intentional cause
of the universe has been employed to support the argument that for Avicenna
creation is a natural action. If creation is not something intentional, then
creation must be the brute emanation of things. However, by denying intention
to God, Avicenna simply wants to establish that other things do not constitute
a nal cause for the divine will. As I have tried to show, intending something
meant for Avicenna two things. With respect to the object of intention, it
implied the existence of something external to and independent of the agent.
With respect to the intending agent, it implied that the agent is imperfect.
Hence, attributing intention to God with regard to creation meant, for
Avicenna, both internal and external constraints on divine freedom. So, he
argued, God is free from such constraints. They do not constitute a nal cause
compelling or requiring God to create.
On the contrary, God is the nal cause of creatures. God does not will the
universe in itself but primarily wills himself, so God himself is the nal cause
of the existence of other things.
35
As an heir to the Neoplatonic heritage,
Avicenna identies existence with goodness. Good is what is desired. Since
God is the perfect being even above perfection as we know it he is the
ultimate good toward which all other things strive. They exist overowing
from his being.
36
God, and nothing else, is the nal cause of creation.
For Avicenna denial of intention on Gods part does not mean that God
is a non-voluntary agent. His denial of intention has been interpreted as
if Avicenna were saying that God does not know and is indifferent to
the existence of the universe. One may consider will and intention to be
inseparable. One may even equate intending and willing and say, for example,
if an agent wills something, then this agent intends that it be, or it be such
and such. But however one may conceive the relationship between intending
and willing, clearly Avicenna does not consider them to be identical in regard
to God. For him, intending something cannot be devoid of acting for a
revenue, seeking after something distinct from the agent, yet willing does not
have to be connected with the expectation of a gain, nor should its nal cause
be something distinct from the agent. Even though he rejects the idea that God
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has an intention in creation, this does not make him conceive God to be
indifferent to the existence of things. Since he argues that God wills things by
willing himself, and it is his willing that allows them to exist, God cannot be
indifferent to the existence of things.
In sum, for Avicenna creation should be likened to voluntary actions rather
than to natural actions, because God is an intellect with will. However, Gods
will should not be confused with human volition. God wills only himself.
Nothing else can be Gods end. Gods being and perfection are independent
of the existence of the universe. There is nothing external pushing God
to create, nor does Gods essence require that God create. However, the
universe is a necessary concomitant of Gods essence. In arguing both Gods
independence of the existence of other things as well as their being necessary
concomitants of God, Avicenna takes into account not only Gods will but also
Gods formal features. Considering Gods will together with its eternity and
necessity, he argues that the universe is necessary.
Avicennas argument that the universe is necessary and that God does not
intend anything in creation caused his interpreters to think that for Avicenna,
creation is more like a natural action than a voluntary action. Avicenna would
respond to such interpretations of his position by insisting that creation and
this universe are necessary, not because creation is the action of an agent
acting through nature, but because it is the action of a necessary immutable
and perfect being. God is a free voluntary creator because nothing, either
internal or external, requires God to create. However, given that this universe
exists and given that God is necessary in all respects, creation and this universe
are necessary.
Endnotes
* This is a revised and somewhat altered version of chapter 3,171193, of my
dissertation, Creation: A Comparative Study between Avicennas and Aquinas Positions
(Harvard University, 2002; Ph. D. Dissertation).
1. For these assumptions see, for example, Thomas Aquinas, Aquinas on Creation:
Writings on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, Book 2, Distinction 1, Question 1, trans.
Steven E. Baldner & William E. Carroll (Toronto: Pontical Institute of Mediaeval Studies,
1997), Introduction by translators, 120; Herbert A. Davidson, Proofs, p. 1 footnote: 1;
Rudi A. Te Velde, Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas (Leiden & New
York: E. J. Brill, 1995), 110111. Cf. Andrew Louth, The Origins of the Christian Mystical
Tradition from Plato to Denys (Oxford: Clarendon, 1981). He underlines the afnity of
Greek Fathers to Neoplatonic thought.
2. Beatrice H. Zedler, Saint Thomas and Avicenna in the De Potentia Dei, Traditio
VI (1948), 105159. The idea that for Avicenna creation is like a natural action is the popular
interpretation of Avicennas position among scholars. In a passing reference, Etienne Gilson,
when discussing Duns Scotus conception of the function of the divine will and intellect with
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regard to creatures, writes: Exterminating Avicennas necessitarianism at its very root, Duns
Scotus proves, therefore, that far from owing from the rst being in virtue of any natural
law, creatures could not even have any distinct ideas in the rst being without a free
intervention of His will. Etienne Gilson, The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy, trans. A. H. C.
Downes (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame, 1991), 255. In a similar fashion, Oliver
Leaman presents Avicennas conception of creation, as if, for Avicenna, things were planned
by something other than God and God said yes and had to do so. Consequently, God plays
hardly any part in the existence of things. For the latter [i.e., Avicenna], God is the ultimate
cause of everything which exists, but it is not clear whether, once a thing has passed the
test of possibility, God can prevent it from coming into existence. God is rather in the
position of a constitutional monarch, who is required to sign the legislation passed by
parliament, which makes the legislation royal, so legal. But all that the crown does in this
sort of situation is rubber-stamp, as it were, a decision which has already been taken
elsewhere. Oliver Leaman, A Brief Introduction to Islamic Philosophy (Cambridge: Polity,
1999), 44. Although Arthur Hyman does not clearly articulate why the necessity opposes the
divine will, he assumes a sharp opposition. He argues that by holding that God created
through the divine will, Maimonides disagrees with Aristotle, as well as with the
emanationists, who afrmed that the world emanated from God by necessity. Arthur
Hyman Maimonides on Creation and Emanation, in Studies in Medieval Philosophy, ed.
John F. Wippel, (Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America, 1987), 5051, cf.
53, 57. Rudi A. Te Velde, Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas, 1045.
3. Thomas Aquinas, Questiones Disputatae de Potentia Dei in Quaestiones
disputatae, volumen II. editio X. Taurini. Ed. P. Bazzi, [et al.] (Rome: 1965). English
translation, On the Power of God (Quaestiones de potentia Dei ), trans. English Dominican
Fathers (London: Burns Oates & Washbourne, 19321934).
4. Zedler, op. cit., 108109.
5. Ibid., 113.
6. Ibid., 114115.
7. Ibid., 115.
8. Ibid., 121122. Whether Aquinas specically intended Avicenna when he argued
that God does not act by the necessity of nature should be established through Aquinass
texts. Engaging in verifying this claim falls beyond my objective in this article.
9. Ibid., 114115. See also Edward Michael Macierowski, The Thomistic Critique
of Avicennian Emanationism from the Viewpoint of the Divine Simplicity with Special
Reference to the Summa Contra Gentiles (University of Toronto, 1979, Ph. D. dissertation),
196199.
10. David B. Burrell, siding with L. Gardet, contrasts Avicennas theory of necessary
emanation to intentional creation, and argues that Avicennas and al-Farabis insistence
on the from one only one can proceed is because of an insufciently intentional view
of the divine nature. Louis Gardet, La pense religieuse dAvicenne (Ibn Sina) (Paris:
J. Vrin, 1951), 157158, as cited by David B. Burrell, Gods Eternity, Faith and Philosophy
I/4 (1984), 395. Necessary emanation for Burrell may not even be counted as divine
action. See op. cit., 404. I agree with Burrell and Gardet that Avicenna did not pursue
the logical consequences of his concept of God as pure intelligible being. But I would
not say that for Avicenna God acts by necessity of nature, devoid of willing and
intention, because all Avicenna aims to do is distinguish between creaturely volition
and divine volition.
11. See for the divine formal features and the discussion of the divine simplicity David
B. Burrell, Knowing the Unknowable God: Ibn-Sina, Maimonides, Aquinas (Notre Dame,
IN: University of Notre Dame, 1986), 3550.
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12. Avicenna, al-Shifa, al-Ilahiyyat, ed. G. C. Anawati and S. Zayed (Cairo:
Imprimeries Gouvernementales, 1960), (Henceforth Metaphysics), VIII.4, 363 lines: 1416;
VIII.7, 366 lines: 1213; Avicenna, Taliqat, ed. A. Badawi (Cairo 1973) (Henceforth
Taliqat ), 157 God is self-lover; Avicenna, Kitab al-Najah fi al-Hikmah al-Mantiqiyyah
wa-al-Tabi iyyah wa-al Ilahiyyah, ed. Majid Fakhry (Beirut 1985) (Henceforth Najat), 286,
lines: 811 and 1119.
13. Avicenna, Metaphysics IX, 1, 373, 376377; see also Avicenna, Metaphysics VI.1,
263; VI. 2, 266.
14. Ibid., VIII.6, 358 line: 14359 line: 2; Avicenna, Taliqat, 158.
15. Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.4, 402 lines: 16.
16. Ibid., VIII.7, 366 lines: 813.
17. Ibid., IX.4, 402 lines: 610.
18. Ibid., IX.4, 402 lines: 1013. However, the kind intention Avicenna denies to God
regarding the creation is an intention of something extraneous to the act of creation of
things, and something extraneous to Gods knowledge and will of himself, as Avicenna
indicates just before his statement that Gods action is the action of a knowing agent. This
extraneous intention consists of intending creation for the sake of creation, or creatures.
19. For Avicennas conception of nature, see A. M. Goichon (ed. trans. & annot.),
Introduction Avicenne: Son pitre de Dnitions (Paris: Descle, 1933), 9297.
20. Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.4, 402 lines: 13403 line: 1. See also Metaphysics VIII,
7, 363 ln: 1013. G. Anawati translates lines 1315 in the passage quoted above: <<wa
kayfa . . . yaqilu dhatahu>>: De plus, que le tout provienne de lui par mode de nature
ne signie pas que lexistence du tout proviendrait de lui sans connaissance ni agrment de
sa part. Comment cela serait-il possible, alors quil est intelligence pure, sintelligeant
lui-mme? G. Anawati (trans. & ed.), La Mtaphysique du Shifa (Paris: J. Vrin, 19781985),
vol. 2, 137. I think Anawatis translation misses the very point Avicenna is trying to make.
While Avicenna is trying to separate actions stemming from nature from actions stemming
from knowledge and approval, Anawati conates them. Hence the translation gives the
impression that for Avicenna the idea that Gods action is like a natural action is not
opposed to the idea that God is pure intellect. On the basis of such translation, one may
argue that although, for Avicenna, God is a pure intellect, his act of creation is like the action
of natural things, i.e., devoid of knowledge and volition. After stating that Gods action
should not be identied with the action of natural agents, Avicenna quite understandably
asks how the action of an intelligent agent could be identied with the action of natural
agents, which are devoid of knowledge. The reason Anawati provides for his translation is
this: Parce que le ncessairement existant na daucune manire un principe; sa cration du
tout ne peut pas avoir lieu par mode dintention par essence, car cela impliquerait une
recherche de perfection; il serait, de ce point de vue, caus. G. Anawati, op. cit., 227.
Anawatis reason does not seem to be justied, since Avicenna does not identify will and
intention, as will be discussed below.
21. Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.4, 402 line: 13403 line: 1. Beatrice Zedler misses
the very point Avicenna is trying to make in this passage. Despite the textual counter-
evidence, she equates Avicennas conception of concomitance with acting by way of
nature. Beatrice H. Zedler, Saint Thomas and Avicenna in the De potentia Dei, 121122.
One may tend to equate Avicennas position with the position of Plotinus. Whereas for
Plotinus the one is beyond being and knowledge, and beyond activity, Avicenna clearly
argues that things follow from the divine knowledge and will. To the best of my knowledge,
Avicenna never attributes nature to God. It would be unusual of him if he were to do this,
unless he uses it in a broader sense, given his subscription to the Neo-Platonic hierarchy of
being. In this hierarchy, nature is placed below soul. In this respect, even human actions,
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in the proper sense, do not fall under the category of natural actions. For Plotinus
conception of the hierarchy, see Dominic J. Omeara, Plotinus: an Introduction (Oxford:
1993), 6078.
22. Aquinas expresses pretty much the same thing as what Avicenna calls rid in
Summa Theologiae (Hencefoth ST ) Ia. 14, 8. Summa Theologiae: Latin Text and English
Translation, Introductions, Notes, Appendices, and Glossaries, ed. Thomas Gilby (New
York: McGraw-Hill, 19641980). Although Gods will is the cause of things in the proper
sense, Gods knowledge may be considered the cause of them because of the identity of
knowledge and will in God. In this respect, Aquinas states: Gods knowledge as the cause
of things has come to be called the knowledge of approbation (scientia approbationis).
23. See Avicenna, al-Isharat wa al-Tanbihat. Ed. J. Forget (Leyde: E. J. Brill, 1892)
(Henceforth Isharat), 185.
24. Avicenna, Taliqat, 103, 117.
25. Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.7, 366 lines: 1117; IX.3; Isharat VI, 159; VII, 185;
Taliqat, 149.
26. Avicenna, Isharat VI, 159.
27. Avicenna, Metaphysics VI.5, 296 lines: 611. Isharat, VI, 159. See also Taliqat,
106, Metaphysics VIII.7, 367 lines: 712.
28. Ibid., VI.5, 297 lines: 711. Thomas Aquinas has a similar contention in ST Ia. 19,
3, ad. 2. 2. That God necessarily wills his own goodness does not demand that he will other
things as well on that account, for his goodness can well be without them.
29. Avicenna, Isharat, 159160.
30. Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.4, 403 line: 1; Taliqat, 103.
31. Avicenna, Taliqat, 180.
32. Ibid., 103. Cf. G. Verbekes statement of Avicennas position. Verbeke argues,
. . . der Schpfer wrde nicht sein, was er ist, wenn er die Welt hervorzubringen aufhielte.
G. Verbeke, Avicenna im Westen: Eine historische Begegnung, in Acta Antiqua
Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae 29 (1981), 9.
33. For the independence of Gods being and perfection from the existence of other
things, see also: Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.7, 366 line: 1367 line: 12. See especially,
op. cit., 366 lines: 17, 367 lines: 712.
34. Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.1, 373 lines: 1517.
35. Nasir al-Din Tusi interpreted Avicenna in such a way that for him God is only
the efcient cause of the universe. For a discussion of Tss interpretation see, Robert
Wisnovsky, Avicennas Metaphysics in Context, (forthcoming), 273274.
36. Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.6, 355 line: 6356 line: 5. For a thorough analysis of
Avicennas conception of the relation between efcient cause and nal cause with regard
to explanation of effect, see Robert Wisnovsky, Avicennas Metaphysics in Context,
(forthcoming), ch. 10, 266286. The question of giving a successful account of cases where
one thing is both the efcient and the nal cause of the effect had a long history before
Avicenna. In order to explain how the nal cause is prior to the efcient cause without
falling into circularity and without making any of the causes supercial, Avicenna employs
his distinction between essence and existence. The nal cause is the cause of the causality
of the efcient cause by its essence, and the efcient cause is the cause of the realization
of the nal cause. The pair essence-existence is an evolution of the pair thingness and
existence. For an explanation of this evolution and Avicennas sources in developing the
distinction, see Robert Wisnovsky, op. cit., ch. 79. See also his Notes on Avicennas
Concept of Thingness (shayiyya), Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 10/2 (2000), 181221.