d

U.S. ARMY TRAINING IN THE TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS: A FLAW IN OUR CHEMICAL DETERRENCE?

A Monograph
by
Major Charles A. Peddy
Infantry

School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas First Term AY 88-89
Approved l o r Public Rclcase; Dlstributlon is Unllmiled

8403131

U Army T r a i n i n g I n The T a c t i c a l Zmploymen: O f Chemical Wea2ons: S A F l a v I n Our Chemical a e t e r r e n c e ?

Major C h a r l e s A . ??Cdy
Infantry

School of Advanced E i l i t a r y S t u d i e s U.S. Army Command and G e ~ e r a lS t a f f Col:s,;r

F o r t L e a v e n v c r t t , Kansas

9 December 1?38

Approved f o r p u b l i c r e l e a s e ;

distribution i s ui;:initd

School of Advanced Military Studies

Monograph Approval

Name of Student: Title of Monograph

Major Charles A. Peddy

US Army Training in the Use of Chemical Weapons
A Flaw in US Chemical Retaliatory Policy?

Monograph Director
Colonel Julialh MT'-Ympbell, M.S.
.;

. ,
Col'm61

L. D. Holder, MA

Director, School of Advanced Military Studies

Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.

Director, Graduate
Degree Programs

Accepted th

ABSTRACT
US Army Training In The Tactical Employment Of Chemical Weapons: In Our Chemical Deterrence?
By Major Charles A Peddy, USA, 51 pages.
Chemical veapons were introduced in World War I by the Germam 1i1 1916, durlng the battle of Ypres. The military's appreciation for the effectiveness of this veapon of mass destruction has continually conflicted vith society's horror of its cruel effects. As a compromise, many nations agreed not to employ them in future vars, vith the reservation that they vould retain a retaliatory capability that vould deter an adversary's impulse to introduce chemicals into the battle. While those measures served to prevent chemical use in World War 11,
events since then Eorce us to reevaluate our retaliatory capability and
its deterrence value. Increased use of chemical agents by the 5oviet
Union and its client states, and the development of chemical weapnn
programs in other third vorld nations, points to an ever increasing futore
risk that the US'S "retaliation in kind" policy vill be challenged.
Meanwhile the US Army has neglected the training of its officers and
units in the tactical employment of chemical veapons to the point that it
seriously undermines the credibility of the deterrence value of our
chemical veapons policy.
This paper concludes that the lack of training prevents the US Army from realizing that it is prepared to fight vith an obsolete chemical doctrine, and recommends actions that vill update its chemical varflghting capability and thereby enhance the deterrence effect of our chemical veapons policy. A F?av

TAELE OF CQSTENTS

SECTION I
SECTION I1
SECTION 111
SECTIO?I I V
SECTION V
SECTION VI
APPENDIX
ENDNOTES
BIBLIOGRAPHY

INTRODUCTION
WORLD WAR 11- AN HISTORICAL CASE
POST WORLi WAR I1
NATO SCENARIO
HOW WELL TRAINED ARE WE?
CONCLUSION

I - INTRODUCTION

'Why have t h e C e r r a n ' s n o t used [ g a s ] ? They have o ~ t used i t because i t does not pay them. The g r e a t e s t t e m p t a t i o n e v e r o f f e r e d t o them was t h e beaches of Normandy. T h l s t h e y could have drenched v i t h g a s g r e a t l y t c t h e h i n d r a n c e of our t r o o p s . That t h e y t h o u g h t a t o u t i t i z c e r t a i n and t h a t t h e y prepared a g a i n s t our use i s a l s o c e r t a i n . B u t t h e o n l y r e a s o n t h e y have n o t used i t a g a i n s t us is t h a t t h e y f e a r t h e r e t a l i a t i o n " 1 Winston C h u r c h i l l H i s t o r y has shovn t h a t when a nev veapon i s i n t r o d u c e d t o t h e battlefie:<,
i t remains u n t i l i t i s no l o n g e r e f f e c t i v e .
L

Nation:

ha.^?

1, n-ver been s u c c e s s f u l i n removing e f f e c t i v e weapons from ..,e

b a t t l e f i e l t a s long a s one s t i l l s e e s an a z v a n t a g e t o t b e i r u s ? . Modern chemical waxfare vas i n t r o d u c e d t o t k e 20th c e c t x y 5y :I:+ Germans i n 1916 a s t h e y a t t e m p t e d t o break t h e s t a t i c d e f e n s e s c: allies. kind. The a l l i e s acknowledged i t s e f f e c t i v e n e s s by r e t a l i a ' i 3 g
:k:e

:n

By v a r ' s end, a l i s i d e s v e r e pushing t h e i r c h e m i c ~ ! :rdlis:ri?s

t o d e v e l o p more l e t h a l chemical a g e n t s t h a t c o u l d be used b e f o r e being c u u n t e r e d by t h e t h e o t h e r s i d e . The h o r r i b l e impact t h a t g a s w a r f a r e had made on t h e s o l d i e r s and populace l e d t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l e f f o r t s t o ban t o x i c chemical weapons. Most n o t a b l e was t h e 1925 Geneva Convention 1imiteZ because S o v i e t Union,

I t s effectiveness

,v~;;

many n a t i o n s , i n c l u d i n g t h e United S t a t e s an:! t!>e reservcd the r i g h t t o maintain s t o c k p i l e s

2s

d e t e r r e n c e a g a i n s t f i r s t use by o t h e r p a r t i e s .

S i n c e t h e conver:ic!!

v a s s i g n e d , almost e v e r y decade i n t h e 20th c e n t u r y has s e c s ::.e o f f e n s i v e use of chemical veapons

In World War I1 all sides admitted to having prepared to employ

chemical weapons but claimed their stockpiles were for retaliatory
purposes only. After WW 11, the US maintainea a large chemical

it3

stockpile but de-emphasized the use of chemicals as it shifted focus to the nuclear operations in future var.

During the Vietnam conflict the US did not use toxic chemical veapons but did continue research and development intu both chemical and blologlcal agents.

It dld use vhat it considered tvo form: of !ion

toxic chemicals, riot control agents to force guerillas out of bunker complexes and herbicide to defoliate the jungle to reto.;? q!ierill,;
sanctuaries. With antl-mllltary srnt!ment

at its peak, an12 a

$. - C cV' .-. - ?~, - . . : . .-I ~.

growing against US use of chemical defoliant and riot contro! g : . :

:i

Vietnam, an incident prompted President Nixun to shut down all f:hi u:r chemical and biological testing, effectively crippling the United State's chrmlcal varfare program.
Hls action vas triggered Ly t h e

public outcry to a chemical accident in 1969 at the Oqden Provinc Grounds in Utah, vhen an F-4 aircraft carryin7 VI agent Xri'!?n:!y released part of its load outside t ! t e t . ; r i a , .
I

. 1 1

I . .

..

over 5,?2:

atialysls of captured Sovlet-made Egyptlan and Syr!ar. ei;uipn!e:!t

5,:uf::i

that the Soviets had vigorously improved their chemical po~?;am

instead of following the unilateral effort by the Unites ftates to
decrease the employment of chemicals in var. This prompt?:: the reevaluate its policy, with the result that i t reenergized its
chemical program. The new chemical policy was stated in terms zeali!~.;

objective
J ':

L:.

with arms control. The prlmary

was t o elielnatc the t h i r a :

of c h e m l c a l weapon:,

but t o achieve t h a t goal i t vas e s s e n t i a l f o r t h c

US t o have a n effective c h c ~ r l c a ld e f e i i s i v e p o s t u r e arid a c.rrJlLl? retaliatory capability. By 1920 t h e Army Chemical b r a n c h s c h o o l v z s Moreover, t h e Ey 1 / 8 5 ,

reopened a t F t . X c C l e l l a n a f t e r b c l n g c l o s e d i n 1972.

b r a n c h ' s s i z e had doubled from i t s 1 9 7 5 s t r e n g t h t o 4,CCO.

t h e c h e m i c a l S r s n c h had a n a c t i v e d u t y s t r e n g t h of 9,000. EVeh : d a y , t h e a g i n g c h e m i c a l s t o c k p i l e i s s l o v l y b e i n g modernized v i t h s a f e r b:nary m u ~ l i t i o a v r e p l a c i n g o l d ~ l i c l l s011 a one f o r on? bas!;.'

Ouz c u r r e n t n a t i o n a l c h e m i c a l p o l i c y emp!iasizes r e t a l i a t i h r , s t r e s s e s t h a t t h e offen::.ive d e t e r r e n c e value only: c a y d b i l i t y sl!nuld be considc:ed

A:;<

f,>r i t ;

F i r s t and Eoremost, d e t e r t h e u s e of n u c l e a r reapon; and c h e m i c a l a g e n t s . If t h i s f a i l s , t o terminate the c o n f l i c t a t the l o v e s t l e v e l of i n t e n s i t y p o s s i b i e , and on t e r z s a c c e p t a b l e t o t h e United S t a t e s and i t s a l l i e s . The N a t i o n a l Commanc? A u t h o r i t y must a 2 t h s : i z e i s r O F c h e m i c a l and n u c l e a r veapons. Thc objective o f u s i n g c h e m i c a l and n u c l e a r veaaons is t o convince t h e enemy t h a t i t s o b j e c t i v e s c a n n v t be a c > i c v d v i t h o a t u n a c c e p t a b l e l o s s e s ( d e t e r r e n c e ! . US c h e m i c a l use w i l l Se c c t a l i a t o r y o n l y , based on .? '4 p o l i c y of no f i r s t u s e . Our c u r r e n t k e y s t o n e manual, F 100-5 O v e r ~ i t i u i i c , L . i' i1y siippu:l; M .l that policy. S e v e r a l t i m e s i t mentions t h a t t h e b a t t l e f i e l d may iiriits must he p r e p a r e 6 ti,

i n v o l v e t h e us? of ctiemical v ~ a p o n s , and do more t h a n :?im;:y "...because

Ecfend t h e m e l v e s i n a " d i r t y " e n v i r o m e n t ,

t h e United S t a t e ; y e s e r v e s t h e z i y h t t o r e t a l i a t e i f

enemies use c h e m i c a l veapons any u n i t must be p r e p a r e d t o c o ~ d u c : o f f e n s i v e chemical o p e r a t i o n s . t o enemy use of chemicals''

5

Such ? r e p a r a t i o n s a c t a s a d e t o r r e n :
The c o n s e n s u s a p p e a r s t o be t h a t a gdnZ

defensive posture is not deterrent enough, that if there is no risk to

using chemical varfare the Soviets will consider it. If there is a

perceived risk because of our retaliatory potential, the Sovlets might

not consider first use.
For our chemical offensive capability to have a credible deterrent value, ve must convince our adversaries that ve Rave t h e means, the training, and the villingness to use our chemical weapons.
1 The capability in the form of our chemical stockpile is admit:?dl\.

weak. The stockpile is filled vith aged, leaking munitions, many so old that thelr dellvery syntems oo lcnger ? . ! t ::s. -ever.3i thousarld art1lle:y There ,; :e
+,::-.

. ,,

shells availaS1e, Lovevrz, atid to t ! x

pessimistic Soviets the large chemical.industria1 bas? in the CS l u ; ~ as a potential source of chemical munitions. The US demonstrated its villingness to employ chsmica! wtapons in World War I and ve vere openly prepared to employ them in World War
11.

Our current manuals discuss the possibility of employinq chemical

weapons .so that our enemies can conceive of us using chemica'. ves>ortif we felt it necessary. The only factor that degrades the credltlllty of our offri~s:vr ability is our training in the employment of chemic~:
.deajons.
:: ; :

cc~rpsare responsible for planning, controlling an3 coo:dinatin~ chemical veapons until allocation release has been act!-~iri:??, Su: detailed planning and coordination is done at division level-.
Brigade ancl battalio~~ Curnman?ers, s ,
I

fir? ~ i t i ~ ? ~ c t
ci~:::j:,'it;,:;.

(FSCOORD), must be sufficiently knovledgeablr of chrmic;!

fires

:, :

plan for their use and integrate them into their scheme of maneuver

ramlficatlons. tactlcal matter.

Hovever, the employment of chemical veapons 1s a Our tactlcal commanders are expected to lnteg~ate
Additionally,

Eire and maneuver vith concurrent chemical strikes.'

the only delivery systems ve now have are the 155mm and 8" artillery systems so ve are concerned vith our tactical expertise in the employment of these veapons. If o t x enemirs do not Scl:e,~c t h a t ve

knov how to use our chemical veapons effectively our deterrec: vcluc vill suffer. The following sections vill shov historically how a crediktir "retaliation only'' policy deterred the use of chemical veapons in battle, and that commanders and staffs, trained and familiar 'With the
use of chemical veapons enhanced that credibi!ity.

E:<a.nples vi:l

cite
o:
7

hov the lack of credible chemical deterrence has led t h c Soviets their client states to use chemical veapona.

A Europaan scenari,> u ., ~ i a credible

sanx::,

shov vhy there is a real need for the US to 'ave retaliatory capability.

Finally, an examination of c-:rent

school curriculums and experiences at the Xationa? Training Ssnter

(NTC) vill determine if our officers are being adequately traine,: :

:

employ chemical veapons.

XI- AN HISTORICAL CASE FOR A RETALIATORY POLICY

"...it may be several weeks or even months before I shall
ask you to drench Germany vith poison gas, and if ve do it,
let us do it one hundred per cent. In the meanwhile, I want
the matter studied in cold blood by sensible people and i;ot by that particular set of psaln singing uni,Formed defeatists
vhich one runs across now here nov there." 1 Winston Churchil? to his Chiefs of Staff, 1 9 4 4
A

World War 11 is significant because it serves as an example of a conflict that had the belligerents preparing and planning to us? an effective veapon, yet refraining from employing it. Both sides cor~sidci.rd the concept of employing chemical weapons important enough to divert preclous clvilian labor and other var resourcrs to its researc!~, development, manufacture and storage. This chapter vil: show that al! sides vere prepared to employ cheaicals vhen they considered it
advantageous but held back, not for mara! reasons, but out of fear of
retaliation.
While most nations had chemical stockpiles on the eve
3E

World W:
nr:.!?

!:,

only Germany had the advantjge of a nev class of chemical c:e :l?

named Tabun 2 . The German mllitary clearly understood the value :,f this potent poison and tva years later, in 1340, they built
. i

p;lot pl;!::

:i h:

vas producing 3,000 tons of ncrve agcnt a year by 1943. 3y ??44 Geraiar.) had stockpiled 2,000 tons of nerve agent in artillery shells and another
10,000 tons stored in bombs. J Japarl is ur~iqce u f all the Pvrld War
i:

belligrrt~iit:: :i:

is

documented evidence that she actually employed chemical weapons i c coxbat agairist an enemy force. Beginning in 1939, the Chinese documer.ted over

1,000

sfparate .Japanese cheilcal attacks a g a i n s t hot!! Ct!ii~??e ! i ! i l i t i r i

6

forces and civilian population centers

The nationallst government of

cklna cont.lnually charged the JapaIWJc lnvaders vlth Go~ablng c:ltlc: aiid spraying Chinese troop formations vith mustard and phosgene. Agains: the unprotected Chinese the chemical agents became weapons of mas; destrcction,
instilling terror in the civllian populace and greatly reducing the
rnilltary effectlvene~sof those targeted mllltary unlts.
When the Allied military leaderu contemplated potential cheaical use by the Axis powers they had to consider that Italy had been the last Western nation to employ chemicals in combat vhen it invaZed Ethiopia.
:r.
..I

1935 and 1936 Italy had shipped 700 tons of mustard agent t o b r -as--i. Z., : * l
its A : Force against the Ethiopians. i First using the ,age-t I ?
hlbs,

t!,?

:talians in 1936, svitched to the more effective method of s?rayi~; the unprotected natives from multiple aircraft so as to envelop a c o l u ~ no: natives in a fog of mustard mist. The unprotected and lightly c l ~ t h e d

natives suffered tremendous casualties to include large numbers of women

and children vho had travelled through previously contaminate2 are.is
Almost 1/3 of the total Ethiopian casualties were attributed tc I t ? : i a ? chemical weapons 5 . On the eve of World lar I1 Sritizh intrl:igeLce believed that the Italians had the capability to produce u to 2' to-?, cf ; m x t a r d agent a day 6
. If nothing else, it ic?i:ated :t.ily ::a?
i :

?~t,?~.t a

potent capability to produce chemicals and a demonst:ate:! cse them, if only against a primitive enemy who had no ho;r or protection.

~il:in.;::z.;.~ :o
of r~tali3ti..1i-l

The Allies themselves may have had less advancrd toxic chem:c,-+ls thi;
Germany, but their combined industrial might alloved them to make up Eor
quality vith a greater quantity of agents and a superior delivery meacs ic
the form of the strategic bombe:.

England began the war with almost no chemical stockpile.

Under Frime

Minister Churchill's insistent prodding, England's stockpile had increased

from one day's supply to over 20,000 tons by 1942 7 . By the seconC veek cf June 1940, England's forces had managed to scrape together e n o u ~ hof
.3

chemical stockpile to plan for the 12th Royal Air Force td use gas born55 and spray against the feared German amphibious assault force on ths beaches 8 . The Uhltcd States placed an effort in its chrmlcal prod~~ctlon comparable to its overall industrial var effort. By 1943 the VS had month supply of air dellverable chemical v e a p a n ~ i n the f?r:ri c: >u-!-,: ..,. spray units, and had a 4 month suyply u f sruund employell cheeica:~. .
F.

l-:e:,,LL.,~

a '

2
,c:;:.'
'"I:.:

.,

following year as part of its Overlord preparation, the Europeac TCcjter of

Operations had stockpiled enough chemical munitions to last for over 1 : days of full scale use. Those stockpiles follnved the advancing zrmies Ir;

every theater of the war in Europe. One example is the sad case o f t h r CSS John Harvey, docked at port in Bari, Italy. Sunk during a German a i r :alC, it spilled its secret cargo of mustard agent into the waters o f t!!r >a;.. The exylaslons of the b ~ u ~ r ~ iship sent mustard agent i l a vapi)r for:!^
ng l throughout the t a v n causing bond:eds

o f civill.?i~i..islln!tle~.

?!'he

5 3 1 1 ~ : ~

who escaped the ship by svimn~ing thuug!: t k cortaminatei: watc:. -.:;;: I,E..! co. burns from the blister agent a d hnl! to be treated by inexperienced o : : ; who vere intentionally left i i ~the dark regarding :he cause victims' suffering 10 .
!il .t: !?

By 1945, the United States had built 13 chemical mnufa?:uricg employing thousands of scarce civilian workers. Arkansas, alone required 10,000 workers. nucilbered over :O,OIICI so!dlers

:la!;?;

The plant a t Fine 91sf5,

The Cheniical Warfare :ervice

.?c,cl

serving in both the A ~ m yand Aii Gorp:.,

8

had over 1,000 vorking in its rrsearcti and develupmcnt departwnt, ey tFle .1 , end of the var the uniteJ States had amssed a stockplle of aver 135,000 tons11

setween WW I and WW I1 the US Army's chemical doctrine and unit structure continued to evolve. By the late 1930s tbe Chemical Warfare

Service was fully integrated at every command level, providing both the expertise and the means to transport, stock ant employ chemical agents. A t the heart o the service vas the chemical battalion vith i t - 96 s:ga;lc :
4.2" mortars. A theater of operations asset, it vas n r a : om!y

attach?? t s

division1'.

The battalion provide2 50th gas, smoke, ir~cendhriesaci? ii;:

explosive (HE) fires depending on the situation. The 1933 Coctrice called for one of the four mortar platoons to be dedicated to chemical fires only, but by the beginning of the var the basic loads of all platoons ver? :!e iid vith smoke and

HE'^.

The battalion commarder vas the expert on the He vorked vith the division chemical offlc?: t c
Ye .das .i:s::.

employment of his mortars.

integrate chemical fires vith the general scheme of maneuver.

responsible for drawing the chemical rounds vhen neede2. Tc help him t ! , o Chemical Warfare Service had a complete supply infrastruzt~re vkcs?
r315

Eunction vas the transporting, varehousing, and disbursing oE chemic;: munitions and protectiie gear. The chnical munitions vere ?ie!i.~eret: chemical units at the ports and vere then stored in special chemic~l ammunition supply points. The chemical battalion had its ovn
. . -

:u

transportation assets dedicated to picking'-up t!~r chemical r o u G s delivering them to the mortar companies1 4
.

a;:?

The Air Corps had its complement of chemical units as vell. Thei: organization called for two specialized units, one that handled the chemical bombs and spray units and the other dedicated to the defensive decontamination mission 15 . Along vith the chemical battalion commander, the division con~manter could also rely on recent Command and General Staff School graduates f c r advice on the employment of chemical veapons. Chemicals vere not a popular weapon but their employment vas routinely considered in planning.
,: ;. It a

aEter all, another tool in the military tool box and staff officers ve:e expected to be famlllar vlth the characteristics of the vario,~sc!-1or:c6! agents and the techniques of their employmeat. To that end the ~ c h o i l published tvo different reference manuals, and the Tactical Emoloment o f Chemical Aaents ftentatlve). These
-8

textbooks helped the student plan his chemica? fires based on the situation, provided the tables that determined the nunber of :ourids needed based on veapons system selected, and suggested the types 05 agents employ for maximum effects.
:o

It provided an example of the chemical .~ni~ei; lntc

vhlch alloved the student tu incorporate all forms of chcmicai fi:es the fleld order as operations orders vcre called then The Army took advintage of the 1a:ge
16

.
+el? i; ; r v c i > l
in

sc.3:- mane:.we:s

southern stater in 1941 to test its chemical doctzine. The 2nd A:sy Arkansas, for example, encourayed the offensive use of siau:%[;eL:

':~13 .,2c:

aqents against opposing unit command posts. Based on their experieace operating in the swampy terrain, 2nd Army developed aircraft sp:ayin~j techniques that vere effective against road bound units
17

2y the time the

United States vent to var, its staffs and chemical units vere confident

that should they encounter gas on the battlefield, they were ready to
respond in kind
That gas would be encountered on the World War 11 battlefield vas a
foregone conclusion. After all, both Japan and Italy had employed it
The
stated th.it

recently, and everyone had uscd chemicalv in the prevIous war. difference nov vas that the Allies and Germany both publicly

they would not employ chemicals first; that they would respond i r ~ retaliation only. Although cloaked in the trappings of moral sanctity, all

nations rattled their chemical sabers at each other, and, as Xinston Churchill's remarks show, the morality of chemical use took a back s e a t :r military pragmatism and fear of retaliation: "It is absurd to consider morality on thls toplc [poison
gas1 when everybody used it in the last war vithout a word
of complaint from the moralists or the Church. On the other
hand, in the last war the bombing of open cities vas
regarded as forbidden. Now everybody toes it as a matter of
course. It i sisply a question of fashion chfjging as stc
s does betveen long and short skirts for vomen."

The Allies several times showed the vi1lingne:;s to x e c c . : i hni:l veapons if sufficiently provoked. On : I ! May 1941, Churchi?: ?ct:ic:y

warned Germany that he would use bombers to drop chemical b m b s shocl' Ge:ma:,y begin tising cliemicals on the eastern f:ont.
Even P:esi,le:i:

Roosevelt, vho 2ersonally aShu1rt.d using chemicals, felt cijmpe:lt=d

: u

threaten Japan on 6 June 1'343 vith "retaliation in kind" if tht chemical attacks against the Chinese continued 19 . When the Germans beq;,qn ::-unc?::.,j
t h e V-1 bombs against England, Churchill vanted to r e s p n d by ujing his

. .

large English bombe: fleet to "drench the cities of the Ruhr and many oiher cities in Germany in such a vay that most of the population woul2 be requiring constant ne2ical attention. "20 . His military staff i'i3s11.~Zcd his:

by e x p l a i n i n g t h a t , i t vould be i m p r a c t i c a l t o maintain the needed l e t h a ?

..
.

dose f o r a l l t h e i a r g e t s he vanted h i t , t h a t t h e Germans had a s i z a b l e chemical s t o c k p i l e of t h e i r own, and t h a t t h e y vould probably r e t a l i a t e by r e p l a c i n g t h e V - 1 varheads v i t h chemical warheads and cause even g r e a t e r problems Eor English c i t i e s 21

.
A t h e i r p u l e s of Land Warfare, F i e l d s

The US m i l l t a r y made i t c l e a r t h a t t h e y v e r e l e g a l l y c o r r e c t i n employing a g e n t s vhen r e q u i r e d .

Manual F 27-10, s p e l l e d out, t h e US was not l e g a l l y bound by t!~rp:~t:csl H of t h e Geneva Convention p r o h i b i t i n g f i r s t use of chemicals even t h o c ~ ts;,e was a s i ~ n a t o r yt o i t , because Congress had never r a t i f i e d the Convention

2 2 , General Eisenhover s e n t a v e i l e d t h r e a t t o the Germar,~z k n

he used t h e unfortunate episode of t h e USS John Harvey t o acknovlcd3e vkat u n t i l then had been kept s e c r e t : t h a t t h e a l l i e s were keeping stock?;1+-

of chemlcals i n a l l t h e a t e r s of t h e var and v e r e ever ready t o r e t a l i d i e with them should the Germans use them f i r s t 2 3 . The t h r e a t worked. The
2

~ . d g r e a t e s t f e a r t h e a l l i e s had was t h a t t h e Germans vould use them'--'- ~

a g a i n s t t h e landing f o r c e s on t h e beaches of Normandy.

A t the NueznSerg

t r i a l s held a t t h e end of t h e var, Goeri:;g s t a t e d t h a t t!:c Ct.;mz;~s 2:.I::'! employ gas on the Normandy beaches bec.ause they fezred the ? T : e c t ~ all:?:! chemical r e t a l i a t i o n would have on t h e i r mostly h6:se t r a n s p o r t a t i o n system
~. . ..

d:awn

m!lita:y

?4

.
. .. .

As Germany began t a s u f f e r r e v e r s e s i n France d d on t h e east?:::

~

.-

f r o n t , H i t l e r , vho i n i t i a l l y had been a g a i n i t - thL-use of gas bekaose o: experience i n World War I , began t o d i s c u s s i t more openly. too l a t e .

!;is

By the11 i L vds

Most of Germany's chemical a r s e n a l vas in t h e form of bombs and

s h e no longer had t h e bombers t o d e l i v e r t h e bombs.

His m i l i t a r y advi50r-

vere also concerned by the Allies' incredible iblllty to retaliate. As Albert Speer, one of Hltler': closest advlsor~,recalled:

"All sensible Army people turned gas varfarc down as being utterly insane, since, in viev of America's superiority in the air, it vould not be long before it vould bring do?? the most terrible catastrophe upon German cities."
Other indicators, vhlle accldental, prompted the Germans to be?i+ve the US
vas ready and villing to employ chemical veapons. German intelligence

cited the sudden and complete censure in print of previously mentione?

a chemical compounds the Germans used to make nerve .agents. The U? v : kee2ing a close hol? on informa:lon on these chenica: icgredirn:~ A t :t vas to hide the development of the pesticide 3DT, not nerve aqent 2':

During the Battle of the Bulge the US vas so sure that the Fernans were about to employ chemicals in a last ditch, desperate effort, that cheaic.~! protective masks vere rushed forward. When these fell into German hands, it convinced the Germans that the US vas getting ready t o attack vitL chemicals
Interestingly, the US actcally did cor.si2er usincj checical;
33,:;~:

:es;3~1:

:3

:!lei:

LI

the Japanese in the Pacific. The tremendous casua?ti?s the US ha?, scfferd digging out the tenacious defenders from their island caves led many to advocate the use of ga& to minimize IJS casualties. The Lethhri+3e ;$r:::L,

approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and Adiniral Chester "imitz, recommended "soakingn the island of Iwo Jima vith chemicals prior to
jil

amphibious assault. President Boosevrlt disapproved t 3 c r c c ~ n m e i - A t i x.? i : the US suffered over 20,000 casualties taking the island 2 3 . When the invasion of Japan vas being planned, chemical veapons had already bce: naCc obsolete by another weapon of mass destruction, the atomic bomb.

111-

POST WORLD WAR I1 CHEMICAL USE

"Victims realize they had been exposed to chemical attack only vhen they become faint and dizzy. Subsequently, they begin to vomit blood and bleed from the eyes, nose and mouth. Death occurs vithin a short time." Mujahadern account of Soviet Chemical attack1 Since the end of World War I1 there have been several ocazisns .dht;rc one nation used chemlcal agents aga:nst another. The frequency
3'

these

attacks has increased over the last fev years. Two common factors in these events are, one, that the natlon using the chemical weapons has either been a client state of the Soviet Union or the Soviet Union itself. Sword, tAe nation attacked has had no cspabllity either to protect itsclf ,r kc ) retaliate vlth chemicals of its ovn. The first documented instance of a Soviet client state involved in the employment of chemical veapons vas Egypt's support oE the Republican faction during the Yemeni civil var in the 1960s. War coirespcndents Red Cross representatives reported that the Soviet armed-and Egyptian supported-faction had used chemical veapons against the roya:ists civilians. Eyevitnesses reported the victims shoved symptu:X an2
and

323cc:3?d

vlth exposure to mustard and nerve agents. The Eritlsh governre:lt, Its interests in ndtn.felt the ieports rrli;!blt tnough that in :36?, Prlme Minlster Harold wil:on, of chemical use in the area .
L

:'t :i

ttc

adires:ed

the 3,use

6:

C o ~ ~ l n . r ;..ii tl;? :,::a!:.:t:c:. ~s

In 1982, the State Department published a report dccumi:~tir.g thc recent chemical attacks that had been previously reported in nrvspaper accounts. Secause of the nature of the events, the remoteness of the areas in vhich the attacks took place and the transitory nature of the chemicals employed, it took several years before the State Department Eel: it had t > e

rcquislte proof to charge Vletnam, Laos and the sovlet Union with the t~se
of toxic chemicals lo violation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925.
The evidence brought to the State Department shoved consicsively :a
:t , the Vietnamese used aircraft to deliver chemicals through bombs and rockets
against Kampuchedn guerillas and indiqenous H'nong tribesmen that verr
reslstlng Vietnam's attempts to dominate them 3

Villagers reported that an Where the

aircraft vould fly over them, dropping bombs or firing rockets.

weapons impacted there vould usually appear yellov colored clouds ?hat slovly dissipated. The villagers and their farm aniinal3 then immediately Many 2 : e : : ; t h c s c t:,.?:

experienced nausea, vomiting and profuse bleeding. surv!ved took months to recover 4 .

Laotian defectors reported that their Air Force was con8u1:ti::~ chemical attacks against local tribes vho vere attempting to resist efforts by the government to centralize control over them. One of t!ie
.'cC.>.';---

, .i

pilot, reported that he had seen rockets loaded on his aircraft vith modified, loose fitting varheads. He reported that his attacks resulted it!

red and yellow clouds over the impact area, and that the warheads d i d no: explode the same vay his normal varheads did5. The evidence provided to the State Department shoved a clea;, 2irect link to the Soviet ~ni'on. The Laotian pilot reported that Soviet technicians supervised the t:ansportation, storage aid !id:j oi:.
- E ;!.;:::iz?:

agents6 . More cnnclusive vas the type oE agent c o d .

Contami~.~:teZeaE : as

samples Erom one of the villages that h ~ d been attack?<, as v: e:

contdmindted vatri saa~plesErum the vcll tl ~nuthccsite jhovct that :he .f agent vas a synthetic derivative of a mycotoxin, a potent poisori pro2~ct.d by molds". This class of agent, while not unknown in the West, vas also
I t vas k-om,

not an agent vestern nations vorked vith or possessed.

15

hovever, that the Soviets vere quite familiar vith the toxins through the agricultural research they had been conducting since the 1930s . 8 The Soviet Union had a more open, direct role in the use of chemical veapons in Afghanistan. Afghani refugees streaming into Pakistan reported

attacks by Soviet helicopters and jets against villages and bands of Mujahadeen.

I From the symptoms reported by vitnesses and survivors, :

appeared the Soviets used a variety of agents ranginq from incapacitants to nerve agents to mycotoxins 9 . Unverified witness statements reported that the Soviets used a poison so toxic and fast acting that victims vere 'oun3 at thelr veapons, showing no signs thet they vrrc ew:l avarr they
-i..~.ti.

dyinglO. Why :he Soviets used chemicals vas a matter sf specuiakioh by :>c State Department. It vould appear that the Soviets used chemica:~ a i a forcin~t ? ? n

veapon of mass destruction to spread terror in the populat!on

to flee their homes and causing the Mujahadeen to lose their base of support. From eyevitness accounts by Afghan Army defectors, the Scv!eto took advantage of the attacks to develop their field data base on the
effects oE the agents. Soviets vearing full protective garments were

reported conducting field autopsies on dead villagers to determine the effects the agents had on thelr victlms
iL

In the recent Iran-Iraq war, the Vnltrd ~.:ttion: lias 3~i.:~ine!itt~:l: ~ t: Iraqi use of chemical agents against Iranian forces and Rhurdish vi!:asers
in border towns. Iraq, vhich is armed by the Soviets, appears t c h v c :!se.: both mustard and nerve agents against the Iranians and vil!agers, hundreds of casualties among the unprotected victi~s
1 :
iaasl~;

The knovleli9r that

Iraq had the capability to continue vith additional chemical attacks vith no fear of retallation may have prompted Iran to seek a cease fire car!i?r than expected 13 .

SECTION IV- THE NATO SCENARIO

"I we arc forced to operate encumbered by protective

systems while the enemy is alloved to operate unencumbered
in a clean environment, chemical veapons can offer him the
same high casualty rate, even if no one is killed."'

In the last section we saw hov the Soviet Union and lts cllent states were wllllnq to employ chemlcal agents against third world statzs wtc ha:: no retaliatory capability. The question that comes to mind is vhether t5.c

Soviet Union would employ chemical agents in a high intensity war again;: NATO forces.
Snvii.: This chapter vlll ansver that question by zeviswir,~

chemical history, discussing hov it views chemica? veapons vithin the overall scope of its military doctrine, and determining whether or not t!i+ Soviet Union would enjoy any advantages to employing chenicals fi:s?. Since 62% of all the gas casualties suffered in wdrld War I were
Russian
2

, the

Soviet Union well understands the devastating effect c h m i i a l The Soviet Union's cijmbat

agents can have on unprotected troops.

experience vith chemical veapons did not end vith the conclczion of 80:12 War I. In its ovn civil vat, the White Russians employed Eritisk
$5:

shells and the Red faction vas reputed to hdve ssed it: cv;-I c5esira: artillery shells'.

The Soviet Union signed the Geneva Convention banning first

3. 5

:,:
2: 1

chemical veapons in 1928, but reserved the right to Letaliate in : i n 2

vould not consider itself bound to the treaty should its enemy n o t . h a v ~ ratified the Convention 4 . Signing the treaty didn't m . : :: e ; : :i .t t ! , e
C;.v:e';
252

Union had renounced further research and development into t h e offeosiv? of chemica; veapuns, it simply meant that such efforts voc?d greater secrecy.
be

c l ~ L e 2i : ~ into a

The same year it signed the Convention, it enl?:?l

,dot!.

joint, highly secret collaboration vith the Cermdns Lo

with

mus:.ir:!

agent. Project Tomka, as it came to be called, was to zontiriue in

:cn~:e

area of the Soviet Union for a period of five years5

By the beginning of

World War 11, the Soviet Union had amassed a stockpile of chemical weapons but vas afraid to employ them initially against the invading Germans for fear of German retaliation 6
Later in the vat, the Soviet Union's . successes vith its rapid operatlonal form of varfare precluded the use of chemicals.
With the end of World War I1 and the beginnings oE the ColZ War, the Sovlet Union contlnued to build its stockpile of chenical
vzap:i:s.

: I the :

final veeks of the var, the Soviet aray captured large stockpiles oE Gerr;; chemlca: agents as vell as production factcries and procetiur?s producicg nerve agent.
53:

The plants and stockpiles taken Sack to the Soviet IJnion formed the backbone of the post var So.viet chemical proqram 7 . One

reason for the continued buildup vas its historical fascination vith the - .. potential effects of chemicals but another, more pragmatic, rezson vij that
the large stockpile was a cheap response to the US nuclear domination of
8
the 1950s . The Soviets appeared to have increased their icterest i r h chemlcal varfare in the late 1960s and early 1970s; that same per:;? time vhen the IJS unilaterally halted the11 chemical yrugram' . Current Sovlet doctrlne considers chemlcal weapon: a :
juet .austl~:i
* > c '9' I

of

form of conventional munltian and has thoroughly integratrZ the

chemicals into their overall military operations. Unlike t h e :;~:lt+d States, the Soviet Union's offensive delivery capability spectrum from tactical through operational level.
cove:^

t5t

Their indirect fire

delivery systems range from the short range mortars founl at bat:a:ior level to their long range Scud and Frog missiles that can fire from one nation to another. Their multiple launcher rocket systems scch
as

the OX:?

and EM27 have cbri~ilcalvarhrads allovlny thrti~ t o saturate a large arc; 18

q u i c k l y w i t h a l e t h a l d o s e of n o n p r r s i s t e n t a g e n t , an abi1it.y t h c U S c u r r e n t l y does n o t have

10

Because a l l of t h e i r i n d i r e c t f i r e system- hav?

t h e c a p a b i l i t y of f i r i n g chemical m u n i t i o n s i t v i l l be e x t r e m e l y d i f E i c s : t f o r NATO t o d e t e r m i n e v h i c h systems v i l l be d e d i c a t e d t o chemica? f i r e s . Compounding t h i s problem i s t h e S o v i e t Union's d o c t r i n e t h a t s o f u l l y i n t e g r a t e s chemical use t h a t 1 / 3 of t h e a r t i l l e r y s h e l l s c a r r i e d by a r t i l l e r y u n i t s a r e f i l l e d v i t h chemical a g e n t s

11

Every S o v i e t a r t i : l e r y

u n i t is a p o t e n t i a l chemical d e l i v e r y system becaose of i t s veapons' t e c h n i c a l c a p a b i l i t y and i t s b a s i c load m i x . The S o v i e t army is t h e w o r l d ' s b e s t equipped and trairiei: ch?:::i:.:t: fighting forceL'.

,,

A l l S o v i e t v e h i c l e s a r e equipped v i t h an ovF:pre::cr?

system t h a t p r o t e c t s t h e ' c r e v i n a chemical o r n u c l e a r contaminate2 environment. The S o v i e t army h a s t h e l a r g e s t chemical o r g a n i z a t i o n an2 i t - .. is f u l l y i n t e g r a t e d i n t o t h e r e g u l a r f o r c e s a s v e l l , beginning with t h e 13

chemical d e f e n s e company a t t h e r e g i m e n t a l l e v e l

The :rgiment,il

chemical d e f e n s e company's chemical r e c o n n a i s s a n c e p l a t o o n is equipged v i t b a s p e c i a l l y d e s i g n e d v e h i c l e t h a t a l l o w s t h e c r e v t o perform i t s duti.5 v i t h o u t l e a v i n g t h e v e h i c l e , a f e a t u r e t h e US army is p l a n n l n ~ jLu: :irlde? a s yet h a s not

14
.
of t h e i r chemica: trai:.iz,; ,~:;io?~

While v e l l equipped, i t is t h e :eve! enhances t h e i r chemicsl t h r e a t .

The S o v i e t Chemical Defensive Ac..i~?.t;;.;. a ?

S h i k h m g y t e a c h e s and d c v e l o p s chemical o f f e n s i v e w a r f a r e t e c t n i c j a ~ - ;s v e l l a s defensive warfare 15

S o v i e t u n i t s a r e knovn t o tzai:i v i t l i d i l u t d

l i v e chemical a g e n t s t o b u i l d u p t h e c o n f i d e n c e and ex?r?ri?nce l e . ~ e iof t h e i r troops. Some e l i t e u n i t s have remained f o r . s e v e r a 1 hours i n C o n t r a s t t h a t v i t h t h e United S t a t e s ' c u r r e n t l e v e l Currently the only troops training v i t h l i v e

contaminated a r e a s 1 6 .

of t r a i n i n g v i t h l i v e a g e n t s .

a g e n t s a r e t h e Chemical Branch o f f i c e r s and NCOs a t t e n d i n g b r a n c h s c h o o l s

a t F t . McClellan, Alabama.
artificial affair.

T h e i r e x p e r i e n c e is a h i g h l y s t r u c t u r e d ,

The s t u d e n t s e n t e r a b u i l d i n g v h e r e t h e i r p r o t e c : i , ~ e They t h e n e n t e r s n a l !

g e a r is t e s t e d s e v e r a l t i m e s t o i n s u r e t h e i r s a f e t y .

rooms under t h e s u p e r v i s i o n of i n s t r u c t o r s v h e r e t h e y d e c o n t a m i n a t e a ? i e c + o f equipment which h a s been c o n t a m i n a t e d v i t h a small amount of a g e n t .

A:

a l l t i m e s t h e s t u d e n t is a v a r e of t h e r e d u n d a n t s a f e t y measures p r o t e c t i n g hlm. Even s o , t h e e v e n t a p p e a r s t o be s t r e s s f u l 1 7 . The S o v i e t s have s e v e r a l a d v a n t a g e s i n h e r e n t i n t h e i r t r a i n i n g . One

1 s t h e f o r m a l schooling i n t h e offensive u s e of c h e m l c a ! ~ i n Z a n o t h e ~ :A t h e wide v a r i e t y of c h e m i c a l s t h e S o v i e t s s t o c k . Within t b e i r e s t i n d t u d The US, t h e

s t o c k p i l e of 5 0 , 0 0 0 t o n s a r e 1 7 d i f f e r e n t c h e m i c a l a g e n t s .

o n l y NATO n a t i o n v i t h a n y s o r t of c h e m i c a l s t o c k p i l e , works n:aiil?y w i t h tvii a g e n t s ; GB, a n o n p e r s i s t e n t ne:ve n e r v e .agent1'.

..

a g e n t and VX, a t h i c k e n e d , p e : n i s t e n t

Another ad"antage t h e S o v i e t s have is t h e i r actual combat They have f i e l d t e s t e d t h e i r d g e n t s and

t e s t e d chemical d o c t r i n e .

employment t e c h n i q u e s , and know what t o e x p e c t vhen t h e y e a p l o y them. Thus t h e S o v l e t army i s a v e l l equipper: and h i g h l y t r a i n e d c h e m i c a l f o r c e a n d , under t h e p r o p e r circumstances, v l l l
tiot

t e s l t a t e t o en>;,:);
T!w q u e s t i o n i c m ~ i n s

c h e m i c a l s if i t p e r c e i v e s an advantage t o t h e i r use.

v h e t h e r o r n o t t h e S o v i e t Union v o u l d c o n s i d e r employing c h e m i c d l s i n an a t t a c k a g a i n s t NATO f o r c e s . The f a c t is t h a t S o v i e t chrmic;: t r o o ~ st r a i l :

v i t h d i f f e r e n t a g c : ~ t s t h a n t h o s e employed by t h e i : y u t e : ~ t . i ~ e r ~ t . n i ~ : - , .V:,: l l e n d s c r e d e n c e t o t h c i d e a t h a t t h e y p l a n t o employ t h o s e c h e m i c a l s o f f e n s i v e l y and must be p r e p a r e d t o voqk v i t h them. Given t h a t t h e

S o v i e t s a r e b o t h t r a i n e d and p r e p a r e d t o employ c h e n i c a l s a s a nnrma!

product of thelr mllltary doctrlnc, there are several et:qent ! n i l i t a r y and political rea:ons

. .

for them t-o consider first use of chemical weapon:.

The first military reason involves the terrain the invading Soviet
forces must traverse. German tovns have grovn and expanded at scch a rste
that the once vide open spaces of the north German plain no lcnger exist. Soviet forces vould encounter at least three major urban areas evr:y
10

kilometers19. These urban centers are potential defensive strongpoints that vould greatly slov dovn the rapid tempo the Soviets deem necessa:y be successful in their attack. Soviet planners face a dilemma vhen they To bypass one urban cent?; vcclc?

: ;

consider hov to deal vith urban sprawl.

requirc traversiny another, and to neutralize one vould drain precious resources from the main effort. World War I 1 experience taught the Soviets that the combat pover required to reduce strongpoints rubbles tovns, increasing their defensive potential and destroyiny the infrast:uct~i:e the countries they vere planning to occupy 2 0
One solution is the massive use of chemical veapons. Ch~aicalv e a p n s
.f

have the positive characteristic of killing defenders while aininizin.; t!;~? rubbling of the orSan centers. The terrnristic effect of chemical ddvantaytous i f

casualties on the civilian population could be conside:el it serves to break the will of the defenders.

Mass casualties vi?l

undoubtedly help to overwhelm the NATO medical support structure, further degrading NATO's ability to effectively defend itself ? 1 . Soviet chemic:!

fires could isolate those urban areas they vish to bypass and permit concentration on those urban centers they fee! they must attack.
Thv,
~,3i!

then return to the bypassed urban centers at a later time vhen ths ee !c :t of the chemical fires has greatly veakened the defenders. The added effecL
. ~ fa standing inf:astructure

uridamagerl by conventional high exp:n;is;e

fires

will help the Soviets vith the post var reconstruction efforts in newly occupied territories 2 2 . Another incentive to Soviet first use of chemical veapons are the extraordinary NATO vulnerabilities to them. The largest NATO

reinforcements, and much of the eplacement equipment and sappli?s ccme fc :m the United States. Arriving soldiers must drav their prepositioned equipment and the large resupply items arriving by jhip have to at the ports thus presenting lucrative chemical targets.
bi

:~riluo~led

Chemical Eires

vill cause casualties and contaminate the equipment sites, ~ r e a t l yslo,~:ng dovn relnforclnq efforts. Ports present a hiqhr: v.i!ur
y target btc.?,i;~ .
.
,,.)

-,-

depecds on a large civilian labor pool to offload ships. This

lib:;;

force

is untrained and unprotected against cheffiica! fires. Long range chemica:

fires at the onset of the invasion would cause mass casualties among the
labor force and greatly degrade the NATO resupply effort
23

.
measure>,
:.A::,;+::.
.3

The NATO military forces themselves are highly susceptible to c.!:emica? flres. Whi!e most forces can respond vith adequate defens!ve

successful chemical defense is still very resource it~tensiveA;,~.: mllltary activity. The Combined Arms in a N~:c!?.i:/Ch?rlca!

E:~~~i:(~li:i~;;:t

(CANE) Phase I test conducted ln 1987 at F v r t Hood, ?,..>:as, !!lt.istr..~trd t ; , , ~ disruptive working i r ~.> chcmical enviro;~mcntwould he to a unlt. Significantly, it took small units tvice as long an? :rqol:ed twice as ,-.-u 6 . i. . -> Conman2

soldiers to accomplish the same task in a chemical environment.

and control vas greatly affected, vith radio transmissions doubling in

frequency and length in an attempt to overcome the effects of vozking in an
othervise successful mlssion oriented protective posture (H0PP)- .
' 4

The 1985 Krocsen study suggests that even if the front line hl!mhat units were not targeted,they would soon feel the detrlmcntal effects of the Soviet chemical fires in the rear areas. For example, an artillery unit,

itselE untouched by chemical fires, could face the dilemma of accepting ammunition which had been contaminated in the rear area.

If lt did not

accept the ammunltion, it vould soon run out of its basic lcad and t e combat ineffective. If it accepted the contaminated artillery shells, the

defensive measures it vould be required to take to protect itself wou?$ degrade it to the point that in a few days it would be combat ineffective through the exhaustion of vorklng in chemical protective Along vith the advantages of using chemical veapons, the pragmatic Soviets vill have to consider the additional risks involved as vell. Of primary concern vould be NATO's response to Soviet chemical fires. chemical retaliatory threat is extremely veak. VATO's

Only the UniteB States s n l

France have measurable stockpiles and France's stockpile is very small ' 5 . The US stockpile is old but is slovly being modernlzcd. has adequate means, the Soviets must still measure tkr effectively employ its chemical veapons. A greater fear the Soviets have is that NATO vill compensate For it; veak chemical retaliatory capability vith the threat of nuclear response. Since 1176, the Soviets have modified their conceptual use of chemical fires from a broad spectrum, high volume approach to a more Limited, selective use on hlgh value targets such as NATO command .and ,control centers, POMCUS sites and ports. The intent is to increase :he scr?rise
US

Assuming the US army'; a i i y b:! t,:.

and shock of the initial attack to preclude the political authorities :iom escalating to a nuclear response 27 .

The Soviet Union's concern for the political risks can best be vieved through an historical perspective. Actions in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan shov the Soviets willing to risk vorld censure to achieve internal objectives. Although there are certainly added political risks inherent in employing chemical veapons, they are insignificant compared to the risks of invading NATO in the first place28. Even the legal question

of violating the Geneva Convention signed in 1328 is moot. The Convention provides a loophole whereby a nation is not prohibited from first use of chemicals if its enemy or the enemy's allies are not signstoriez of t h e protocol. Several membezs of NATO as well as the Warsav Pact ha',/? aot
?O

slgned the protocol alloving both sides to engage in chemical use-.'. The only practical restraint to Soviet chemical use is deterrence.
Since the Soviets believe they can use chemicals vithout inviting a nuclear
response, chemical varfare hampers their efforts only vhere it slovs d u n
their operational tempo. If the Soviets are the only ones using chemical
veapons, they can selectively target those areas that wou?2 fcrc+ SAT0 to
operate in a chemically restricted defenve posture vhlle they vere fret t o move about unimpeded. The only vdy chemical warfare 4111 slav ,?>:,us ?!-I-
soviets 1s i f N A T ~ rzspi:lii<jsvltk rffective chz!rical fires units to operate in a degraded chemical Ccfenr.ivc pos:arr. States is the only NATO member vith the means to c : y ar fr>rciflgsoviet
The

I'nitw:

oct those chemica?

fires. The real Soviet concern is vhether the US Army is trained to

employ its limited chemical arsenal effectively.

SECTION V-HOW WELL TRAINED ARE QE?

In the previous section we saw that the Soviet Union had the capability
and demonstrated the villingness to employ chemical weapons should they
perceive an advantage to thelr use. When Soviet planners consider the

posslbllities of chemical retaliation and its detrlmental effect: on their

operations, only the United States Army currently has the realistic means
of providing that retaliation. This section details US doctrine and the
The planning and execution of chemical

:tj

offensive use of chemical weapons.

fires vill be analyzed, as will a doctrinally correct fire support .annex

a division operations order used at the Army's National Training Center t n illustrate how our doctrinal application reflects a lack of education art2
training.

US doctrine calls for the commander, operations officer and fire

support coordinator (FSCOORD) at every level from brigade to corps to be responsible for planning, integrating and executing chemical fires1 . Si:iii

the only means available to the US Army are the 155mm and 203sm artillery systems, resgonsibility for the actual employment of chemical munitions has been delegated to the field artillery. To them, "plarxiny fcr the
2-f

of

chemical veapons is done within the fire support system according to the
1

same principles and procedures used for other means of fire support"-. In
other words, chemical shells should be considered as just .lnotht?r big
bullet.
The commander gives his staff his guidance, detaillng the effects he vants chemical fires to achieve and what chemicals vill be incorporated into his scheme of maneuver. The operations officer insures the FSCOORD

understands the scheme of maneuver and incorporates fires to enhance t h e

25

unit's operations. The chemical officer's function is to assist and advise the FSCOORD in the preparation of those fires3

The chemical officer at Corps level prepares the corps chemical plan under the supervision of the corps FSCOORD. He considers the number and type of chemical munitions and delivery systems and allocates those weapons based on the corps commander's guidance. The division chemical officer works with the dlvision fire support element (FSE) to perform a similar, although more detailed plannlng function. The dlvlslon, reallstical!y, the lowest level that can provide detailed planning for chemical fires because it 1s the lowest level equlpped with a chemical planning stsff. Our doctrine, however, requires brigade staffs to plan and nominate chomical targets that will be incorporated into the division's artillery chemical flres plan
4

!s

Planners expecting a great deal of expert advlce on the employment nE chemical fires will be disappointed by the austere chemical staffs provided to tactical units. The corps chemical officer is most likely the ccrps chemical battalion commander. The corps Nuclear, Biological and Chemical INBC) center is manned by 5 offlcers and 8 enlisted soldiers who p r o v i d e 2 4 hour ztafflnq. Thls staff 1s respon~lble for collecting, collating, evaluatlng and dlsseminatlnq NBC reports and data wlkhln the corps .lrra, as well as asslstlnq the corps FSE wlth planning chemlcal flres sitcation does not improve at the division level
5

T5e

The heavy division has

a chemical staff of 13, with 8 dedicated to manning the NEC center with 2 4 hour staffing. Their main function is to coordinate the actions oE the
reconnaissance and decontamination platoons of the division chemical
company, as well as collating, collecting and disseminating NBC reports
thra~~qhouthe dlviuion. They are a s~mallenough staff that they are t
26

e a ~ l l yoverwhelmed with the added coordination involved w i t h i n t e g r a t i n g addltlonal assets that the corps may provide the dlvision. Doctrinally,

when the corps allocates additional units to the division it must also plan to send a Headquarters Detachment to augment the division chemical staff 6 . The chemical staffs at the brigade and battalion have purely defensive functions. The brigade chernlcal officer and NCO monitor the brigade's
chemical training in peacetime and assist and advise the commander
regarding placement of attached chemical decontamination units to support
the scheme of maneuver. The battalion's chemical staff consists of a

lieutenant and NCO at battalion headquarters, and a chemical speci.llist i n

each company to assist cummdnders with monitoring unit chemical defense
7
team and equipment proficiency Our doctrine expects battalion and

brigade commanders and staffs to be familiar vith the employment of chemicals and to be able to plan and nominate targets to division. Chemical officers at that level are not trained to advise their commanders on chemical veapon employment. Their technical advice deals vith the

characteristics of chemical agents and their effects on troops because that impacts on their defensive mission. The skills required to conduct a

chemical target value analysis that recommends vhich targets to hit vith what munitions from what delivery systems are extremely complex and require special schooling--schooling the chemical branch school is not t a ~ k e st w provide 8
. The highly complex chemical target value analysis process involves
making critical subjective value decisions. Some of the more obvious
factors to consider are meteorological data and the physical aspects of the
terrain at the target. Wind direction and speed impact on the dispersion

of the chemical, as does the time of day when the agent is employed

27

Vegetation and soil types determine how long an agent vill persist and how concentrated the vapor hazard vill be9 . The enemy situation has to be knovn, not only in terms of vhat he could be planning to do, but more specifically the size, shape and orientation of the enemy taryet, so as to maximize the effects of the chemical fires. On the friendly side, the planner must know vhat type and quantity of munition is available, vho has it, and vhat delivery means vill give the particular efect desired. The
planner has to consider vhat impact the chemical fires vill have on current
and planned operations as well as potential constraints on branches and
sequels. Flnally, the planner must determlne the relatlve vnrth of the
proposed target in terms of the posslble rlsk to frlendly troops, future
operations, and logistical effort required for the chemical fires, against
the expected damage to the enemy 10
Currently the only formal ~choollng . that provides such training to officers is the Nuclear, Chemical Target
Analysis Course, (NCTAC), taught to select officers at Fort Sill,
Oklahoma11
. Our doctrine expects our commanders, operations officers and fire support coordinator:: to be farolllar vlth the effects of chcntic.31 fires and their integration vlth maneuver. Their chemlcal ~taffsare tralned o s ! y t o

advise on defensive measures, so there surely must be some portion of an officer's formal schooling dedicated to employing chemical weapons. Unfortunately, that is not the case. The Command and General Staff Officers Course (CGSOC), the last opportunity for the army to offer its future brigade, division and corps staff officer with a common tactical base, has a required tactics course for resident students regardless of branch affiliation. The course, Combat Operations, requires the student to study 187 hours of integrated varflgbting technlquej at the corps
28
3rd
,: -

divlslon level

12

Only 6 hour: address che~nlcalwarfare, all devoted to

dlscusslon of the effects on frlendly opcratlons, and the dcfrnslvc actions to be taken, should the Soviets employ chemicals13. As it is a subject

matter to be vorked into the lesson, the actual amount of chemical varfare
incorporated into the course is left up to the instructor. Many groups do
not discuss it at all. Even the School of Advanced Mllltary Studles
tactical and

(SAMS), a school dedicated to the study of both the

operational level of var, does not incorporate chemical employment in its tactics instruction. In a recent exercise the students portrayed the staff of the hypothetical
X

Corps in a European scenario. The Fourth Army

G:o-2

operations order the staEf received omitted the chemical annex an:: the chemical fires portion of the fire support annex. Consequently, when the

board players representing the Soviet forces hit the corps area with chemical strikes, there was no vay the corps staff could plan retaliatory
measures. The subject of retaliatory fires vas discussed for a fev
moments, considered "too h a ~ dto do", and the matter vas dropped
14

Our doctrine calls for Army ofEicers to be proficient ,dith obemicdl

retaliatory fires, an acknovledged complex task, as a means of enhancing
our chemical deterrence. Yet, that is not vhat officers are being taught

and it is certainly not vhat they are practicing in the field. One merely
has to recall the number of times he has trained in the planning and
execution of chemical fires to appreciate how little training goes on in
this field. Even our institutional evaluation process for training
battalion and brigade staffs such as the National Training Center
disregards this area. In a system vhere those events that are evaluated

are the events that ve train on, the NTC only evaluates how vrll units
respond to chemical attacks, not how well they plan and execute them.

29

During a recent visit to the NTC, Major Charles Zimmerman, an

observer/controller for over 18 months, reported that he had yet to see
chemlcal fires included in any brigade operations order even though the
dlvlsion operatlons order given the brlgade staff for their planning
purposes lnstructs them to plan and nominate chemlcal targets15. The
division fire support annex detailing the requirements for the brigade's
chemical target nominations, vhile doctrinally correct, illuminates the
problem areas ve face due to our lack of training in this area.
The division operation order (OPORD) is for an attack in zone, vith the
evaluated brlgade recelvlnq prlorltles of flre. The divlslvn OPORD's
chemical appendix to the fire support annex follovs the doctrinal exanale
in FM 6-20 (The appendix has been reprinted as appendix A for this paper). Paragraph c.(l)(b) tells the division's brigades they may plan and nominate chemical targets. Those targets vould have to be approved by the division

commander, once he received expenditure authority from the corps commander. paragraphs. Crlterla for target selection 1s dellneated in later The division commander dictates vhat chemical agents may be

employed and that casualty effects vill be 301 (preferred), vith at least
15'1 casualtles as

a mlnlmum. The brlgade nust nnmlnatr chemlc.31 targets at

least 18 hours prior to desired time on target and the target description must include the radlus of the target 16

Although they are doctrinally correct, these requirements hamstring the brigade commander's freedom to employ chemical veapons. Unfortunately, it

is a doctrine which has not evolved very far from its World War I roots. If the division commander must approve all chemical artillery fires before they can be employed, hov responsive can they be? One of the many

advantaqes of artlllery I that it

rcspon.:,lvr to the cnmander'.? w e d s . : : 1

Attacks are fluid in nature, requiring responsive fires when iiecded, and
cannot await the tlme consuming approval process. Our current doctrine

says that the brigade's deep battle begins 12 hours out 17

Yet the . division expects the brigade commander in the attack to not only know where the chemical fires must be placed 18 hours from nov, he must also knov the dimensions of that target. Additionally, he is told that Rls chemical

fires must achieve a certain amount of casualties to be considered

successful. Commanders realize they can no longer expect fire support
systems to produce casualty rates on demand. Commanders expect their

artillery and air force assets to delay, disrupt and disorganize the
enemy. Destruction to any degree is an obvious benefit, but one that
Why, then, should the commander expect to be able to

cannot be decreed.

dictate casualty rates for his chemical fires if he doesn't expect it from
other fire support systems?
The casualty effect and size of the proposed target are requirements. based on tables the chemical fires planner used to achieve effects de:ired in World War I, but which are out of pldce on the modern battlefield. The

tables the chemical planner uses to determine the amount of chemical 3grnt to be delivered to the target are found in FM 3-10B. Those tables are predicated on the chemical agent and the dellvery system to be used. Cther factors the planner considers are the casualties to be produced by the chemical agent and the training status of the enemy. The plenner enters

the table by knoving the radius of the target, then includes all the above factors to determine hov many chemical rounds must be delivered in a given period of time to achieve the desired casualties18 .

Those tables are based on data gathered, for the most part, from World
War I vhen chemical barrages were planned as regularly as conventional artillery fires. In that static form of varfare, it vas important to achieve a desired casualty rate to allow friendly troops a better chance ts penetrate enemy defenses. The number of rounds required to achieve the

desired casualties was not a critical factor because the tactics of that period alloved for the tremendous buildup of artillery rounds to support the planned offensive. Chemical fires require tremendous numbers of

artillery shells to achieve significant number of enemy kills. An unclasslfied source calculated that to achleve 208-408 casualtles against a company-sized target, (the only modern unlt that vould fit vlthin a 500 meter radius area), would require 1080 155mm GB filled artillery shells delivered on the target area vithin 15 seconds19. not have seemed out of the ordinary in World War I. Such a requirement vould In the March 1913

German offensive, the Germans fired 20,000 rounds into one village alone vithid a 15 hour period20. today's lethal battlefield The US Army can't fulfill that mission in

According to the NTC's divlsion operations

order, the total divlsion allocation of GB (a nonperslstent ncrvc agent) is almost half of vhat vould br rrqulred to br flrcd on lust t h a t companysized target. More to the point, a division structured with an organic artillery brigade of three 155mm battalions and one 8" battalion is incapable of firing that many rounds that quickly, cven if it had the chemical rounds!21

Tralnlng at t h e NTC prepares units fur high intensity cc)iflbat, i-ct hov could that Instltutlon possibly produce a docunient so unreallatic: in its implementation? Has this point been raised before? The ansver may be that

ve are not trained to employ chemical weapons, and therefore have no vay of knowing if vhat our doctrine tells us is right or not

SECTION VI- THE CONCLUSION

"...The US chemical veapons policy is to deter, defend,
and retaliate. The order here is very significant. To be
effective and credible, all three elements must be in
balance, like the three legs of a stool. With the
retaliatory leg virtually nonexistent, the deterrence leg
is short."
1
HG John G. Appel
The problems associated vith our lack of training in the employment of chemical fires run far deeper than just the actual delivery of chemical munitions to the target. Lack of trainlng has also left us unprepared to employ chemical veapons in other vays as vell. One of the manuals issued CGSOC students lists 55 separate staff functions related to the employment of chemical fires2 . Among those tasks are the integration of chemical fires vith the scheme o f maneuver. Other tasks deal vith the supply, storage and transportation of chemical veapons. To avoid friendly casualties in the integration of chemical fires
vith maneuver, we have created a complex series of reports that inform
all units of enemy strikes and upcoming friendly chemical strikes.
The report process, hovever, doesn't allov for a means of confirrnlng
that Erlendly unlts have received the NBC 3 Strikevara.me:mgr because
it doesn't require a reply 3 . One reason it requires approval from higher levels to use chemical fires are the constraints they can place on the subsequent movement of adjacent friendly units. In our schooling, staffs are alloved to plan the use of artillery delivered scatterable mines vhose terrain limiting potential capability exceeds that of nonpersistent GB. Yet their employment is not constrained by
requiring permission to fire the misslon from higher commanders as is

the case vith chemical fires.

A host of problems arlse once approval has been glvrn by the

natlonal command authorlty to allocate chemlcal rounds to unlts, The

chemical artillery round may be just another bullet to those who fire
it, but it is a different matter to those who have to store and
deliver it. Field Manual 3-20, m h n l c a l Escort Ooerations, details a
litany of restrictive regulatlons requlred when chemical agents are
shipped. The regulations obviously make sense as they apply to

peacetime safety and environmental considerations, but the circular

makes no distinction between combat and peacetime conditions. Some of
the requirements would place too great an administrative burden to
make tactical sense. Among them are armed escorts, trained and
equipped to decontaminate whatever agents they are carrying. Escorts
must travel in vehicles with the cargo inspected and sealed, on routes
that have been requested and cleared ahead of time 4 . Delivering nerve

agents (the only agents ve employ) by air is even more restrictive. Should we have to follov these regulations under combat conditions, it would prevent using helicopters to deliver chemical rounds as we now use them for conventional artillery rounds. Storage of the chemical rounds poses another problem. Security

measures for storing chemical rounds in peacetime are far more

stringent than those required for conventional rounds. If those
procedures continue under combat conditions, special ammunition
storage points (ASP) will be required vith the additional staffing
that entails. Our doctrine called for specially trained chemical

units to store, transport and employ our chemical weapons in World War

11.

Under our current doctrine, conventional units assume this

additional duty and they have not trained for it.

Chemical weapons are just one of many tools in our tool box.
Just as ve vould fault a craftsman for not knowing how to use the
tools of his trade, we should fault military proEessionals vho are not
knowledgeable in the use of this tool. There are several actions the
Army can take to correct this deficiency.
The first step is to recognize that the spectre of chemical varfare is here to stay. The chemical threshold has been breached too many times in the recent past to serve as an effective barrier to future use. As a recent magazine article said, "the

International community will have to face up to the reallty that the

taboo on the use of chemlcal weapons has been weakened I not destroyed" 5 . Even if the Soviet Union should refraln from using chemlcal varfare in its future endeavors there are many Third World nations just nov waking up to its potential. CIA Director William H. Webster recently disclosed that Libya is building the largest chemicdl weapons plant the agency has ever seen, and that 20 other nations were developing chemical veapons
6

Once ve acknowledge that chemical

veapons are here to stay, ve must then recognize our responsibility to be proflclent in all aspects of thls form of warfare. Training I n the offensive use of chemlcal veapons should not undercut our nation's stated desire to banish future chemical varfare any more than improving our capability to fight in a uonventlonal manner undercuts
our nation's desire for future peace.
The second step is to integrate the full spectrum of chemical warfare into our formal education system. There 1s no reason why a chemlcal ofElcer should attend a field artillery school to ledrn to employ the veapons at vhlch he 1s supposed to be an expert. combat
36

arnls officers are required t-o h a w a working understanding of the

employment. of cornhat support asseta such as attack hellcoptrr~ and field artillery. Why allow them to defer to a "technical expert" on the fundamentals of employing chemical veapons to make up for their lack of knovledge? A11 officer advanced courses should lncoryoratc the employment of chemical veapons in thelr tactics instruction. Such instruction should be reinforced in the Command and General Staff Officers Course, thus insurlng that all officers asslgned to brigade, division and corps staffs have a working knovledge and appreciation for the offensive use of chemical weapons. Nev doctrinal concepts should be introduced to bring us closer to the realities of modern combat. The CANE report, mentioned earlier, shoved just hov having to vork in a chemical environment disrupts the command and control of tactical units and degrades their ability to perform their missions. Rather than overwhelm our current

capabilities to suit the requirements of an outdated chemical doctrine, ve can shape our doctrine to meet our capabilities. Instead

of firing massive numbers of chemical shells to achieve lethal total dose concentrations, we merely need to intersperse chemical shells vithln conventional artillery fires. The number of gas shells should be just enough to activate the enemy's chemical alarms, forcing his soldiers into their chemical protective gear, and thereby greatly degrading their ability to conduct var 7
Should the enemy choose not . to increase his defensive posture, he risks casualties above what would othervise be expected. This measured sprinkling of chemical rounds is within our capabilities to execute, yet the added

complexities it forces on the enemy greatly enhances the effects of

our conventional fires.
The only vay we will be able to execute this modified form of
chemical fires effectively is to require units to incorporate chemical
fires in thelr tactical training. Units at the NTC should be
evaluated on their ability to plan and deliver chemlcal fires as vell
as their abillty to defend against chemlcal attacks. The initlal
rotatlons to the NTC vere so evaluated before the process vas
administratively deleted by the control cell at the NTC as too hard to
control
8

Division CPXs should include the storing and transporting

of chemlcal munltlons to develop vorkable operatlnq procedures. Artillery units should be evaluated on their ability to plan, coordinate and deliver chemical fires.
A determination must be made vhether to dedicate one unit to f : ie all chemical rounds or unlts.

distribute

the chemical rounds to all Eiring

Consolldatlng chemical rounds in one unit obviously limits tbe

flexibility of artillery fires, but until binary rounds are all fielded, we still have to vork with old rounds that have a reputation 9 consolldatlon vould limit the for leaklng around the fuze vells

number of crews vorklnq vlth old shells who mlght have to operate in an increased MOPP status. One other advantage is that fever unlts vould then be involved vith picking up and transporting chemical rounds from their storage sites. Critics vho vould say that these measures unnecessarily complicate the "real" training that must occur, or that these ideas belong in the "too hard to do" drawer, must surely realize that, in combat, chemlcal

oyeratlons do not magically becnmr easier or wrr simple in their

38

interaction with conventional operations.

Only extensive, reallstlc

tralnlng will make these complex operatlons more effectlve.

The dilemma that accompanies the use of chemical veapons is its political ramifications. Considered a liability by many, the politlcal aspect of this subject can be used to our advantage against our greatest threat, the Soviet Unlon. The Soviets have always taken When the United States

a serious interest in our chemical program.

halted its chemical program, the Soviets responded by creatinq the most rapid expansion to date of their chemical varfare capability 10 . When the United States began to implement its chemical varfare modernization program to improve its offensive capability, the Soviets responded by pushing for a treaty banplng chemical veaponsll. The message is clear. A purely defensive policy is not as effective a deterrent as one that offers a credible retaliation capability. Merely stating that ve will retaliate does not give us the cdpability to do so. It is obvious that our lack of training further degrades By once again

the limited credibility of our retaliation policy.

schooling our officers in chemical weapons and training our units to employ those veapons properly, ve are sending a clear message to our enemies. we vould prefer not to use chemical veapons, bt:t s!l~u:d ve

have to respond, we can do so effectively. To those vho vould argue that our reneved emphasis on offensive
chemical employment sends our allies the wrong message, I vould
respond that it vas an allied officer who started me on this project.
Last year during a corps level exercise, a group of US officers sat at
a table vargaming the possible outcomes involved in their planned
course of action. At some point in our deliberations ve realized ve

39

had committed all of our assets but vould still be unable to delay or
disrupt an approaching Soviet force. An allied officer watching us
finally came over and suggested hitting that force with chemicals to
slow it down. In the scenario, the Soviet force had used chemicals

several days previously, so, politically it vas feasible. Whether or

not chemical use would have been effective is really not the point.
By the look on our faces, it vas painfully obvious that using chemical
weapons had never entered our minds. That an allied officer should
have to remind US officers about a capability for vhich they were once
respected world wldc should never happen again.

Appendix A:

ANNEX D (FIRE SUPPORT ) TO OPLAN 88-14

Notea Only that portlun of the annex deallng with chemical fires is
copied belov.
3. EXECUTION
a. b.
c.

(omitted)
(omitted)
Chemlcal Support:

(1) General:

(a) Priority of support to 3d Brigade initially.

(b) Toxic chemicals may be planned. Release for use vill
be transmitted per SOP for approval by division commander on release by
Corps commander.

3-3 FA 5-18 FA*

a u

83 41
8 3 41

When DS to 1st Brigade.

(3) Miscellaneous:
(a) Casualty Effects:
1. GB: Employ for immediate casualties.

2. VX:

Employ for delayed casualties and

contamination.

3. Fractional Casualties:
a Preferred fractional casualty achievement
is target destruction (30 percent casualties).
b Minimal acceptable fractional casu.ilty
achievement for target engagement is target neutralization (15 percent
qasualties).
(b) Nominations vill be made to Division G3 NLT 18 hours
prior to desired time on target.
A-1

( c ) A l l nomlnatlons v l l l include: 1. 2.
3.
4.

Type of t a r g e t . Slze of t a r g e t ( r a d i u s i n m e t e r s ) . Time on t a r g e t . Expected c a s u a l t i e s .

ENDNOTES
Section I
1 Field Manual (FM) 3-100, NBC Ooerations, Department of the Army,
(Washington D.C.: 19851, p. 5-3.
2 Hugh Stringer, peterrins Chemical Warfare: US Policv Decisions For The 1990s, (Washington D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey's, July 19871, p. 216. Hereafter listed as Stringer. 3 Ibid., p.30.

4 FH 3-20, Technical Escort Ooerations, Department of the Army,

(Washington D.C.: July 19811, p. 5.
5 FM 100-5, Ooeratlons, Department of the Army, (Washington D.C.:
19861, pp. 45-46.
6 FM 6-20, Fire s l ~ o r t Cn h p In Army, (Washington D.C.: 31 December 19841, p. 3-24. Department of the

7 Interview with LTC Larry S. Maupin, Chemical branch. LTC Maupin is a

tactics instructor for the Center for Army Tactics (CTAC), Command and
Geeneral Staff College, Ft. Leavenvorth, KS.

Section I1

1 Robert Harris h Jeremy Paxman, A Hiqher Form Of Killinq: The Secret Storv Of Chemical And Biolosical Warfare., (New York: Hall & Wong, 19R2), p. 107. Hereafter listed as Harris h Paxman, A Hiqher Form.
2 Ibid., p.53.

c e Office of the Chief, Chemical , 4 re Serv I Warfare Service, (Washington D.C.: July 19421, p. 116.
5

Harris h Paxman, A pp. 49-50. , Ibid., p.51. Ibid., p.114 Ibid., pp. 110-111.

6 7
8

9 Edward Fisher, "Why Weren't Chemical Agents Used In WW II?", Chemical Armv Review, June 1987, p.41.

10 H a r r i s & Paxman, t d l y h t ~ lFhcr~Ym., p p . 119-120.

1 Ibid., 1
pp. 116-117. 1 5 June

12 F 100-5, O ~ e r a t i o n s , The War Department, (Washington D.C.: M 19441, p. 1 8 .

1 3 Chemical Warfare R e f e r e n c e Data, Command And G e n e r a l S t a f f School, ( F o r t Leavenvorth, KS: 1 9 3 9 ) , pp 12-13. 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 m m i c a l Warfare S e r v i c e B u l l e t i n , A p r i l 1941, p. 38. Chemical Warfare S e r v i c e B u l l e t i n , October, 1942, p. 170. a e m i c a l Warfare R e f e r e n c e Data, pp. 18-21.
Chemical Warfare S e r v i c e B u l l e t i n , J a n u a r y , 1942, pp. 12-21

Harris

&

Paxman, A H i a h e r Form Of K i l l i n q , p. 127.

Chemical Warfare S e r v i c e B u l l e t i n , J u l y 1942, p. 116.

H a r r i s & Paxman, A p. 1 2 9 .
, I b i d . , p. 126.
Chemical Warfare S e r v i c e B u l l e t i n , A p r i l 1941, p. 57.
H a r r i s & Paxman, A Hiaher form, p. 1 2 1 .
Ibid., p. 135.

21
22 23 24

25 Major George W . S i e b e r t & Yeam H . Choi, "Chemical Weapons: D u l l Swords

I n US Armory", M i l i t a r y Reviev, March 1985, p . 26.
26 27 28

Harris

&

Paxman, A H i s h e r Form, p. 64.

Fisher, p. 4 1
H a r r i s & Paxman, A Hiqher Form, p. 135.

S e c t i o n I11

1 Alexander Haig, S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e , Chemical Warfare I n S o u t h e a s t Asia

And A f a h a n l s t a n R e ~ 0 r tTo C o n s r e s s , Department of S t a t e , (Washington
D.C.: 19821, p. 16.

2
3

H a r r i s 6 Paxman, A Hiaher Form, p . 234.

Haig, p. 6 .

4
5

I b i d . , pp. 20-21. Ibid.,

p. 1 8 .

6
7 8

Ibid., p . 13. Harris

h

Paxman, A H i s h e r Form, pp. 235-236.

I b i d . , p . 236. Haig, p. 6. I b i d . , p. 15. pp. 22-23.

9
10

1 Ibid., 1
12

J i l l Smolove, " R e t u r n Of The S i l e n t K i l l e r " , 46.

I b i d . , p. 46.

Time,

22 August 1988, p .

13

S e c t i o n IV

1 Dennis M i l l e r , "Chemical Warfare- US P o l i c y And C a p a b i l i t y " , S i x t e e n N a t i o n s , August 1985, p . 6 6 . M i l l e r v a s q u o t i n g t h e n A s s i s t a n t t o t h e S e c r e t a r y of Defense f o r c h e m i c a l m a t t e r s , Theodore S. Gold.

,
3

David S e g a l , "The S o v i e t U n i o n ' s Mighty Chemical Warfare Machine", August 1987, p . .27.
H a r r i s & Paxman,

H l s h e r form, p . 4 2 .

4 G e n e r a l F r e d e r i c k Kroesen, sis O f C k m i c a l Warfare o w r a t i o n s ,

( A l e x a n d r i a , V A : I n s t i t u t e f o r Defense A n a l y s e s , J a n u a r y 19851, p. 4 - 1 5 .

5 6

H a r r i s & Paxman, A ~ ~ q h Form, p . 47 e r I b i d . , p . 145.

7
S t u d e n t t e x t (ST) 3-1,,
8 Segal,

-1

.
e

G e n e r a l S t a f f C o l l e g e , ( F t . Leavenvorth, KS:

c oaos o mn And ~r t n, m ad l~ 19871, p . 1-37.

m,. p

27.

9 W a l t e r S t o e s s e l (Chairman), R ~ D O K f~ The Chemical Warfare Review

O 19851, p . 25. commission, (Washington D . C . :

10

Segal,

m,. p

29.

12 Ibid., p. 3. 13 FM 100-2-3, Sovlet Armv: Tronnc.. 0I4m. and Department of the Army, (Washington D.C.: 16 July 1984), p. 4-19.
!y 14 Segal, &! ,

p. 34.

15 Stoessel, w o r t Of The chemical Warfare Reviev commls&!n, p. 26. 16 Segal,

u, p.

34.

17 Captain Chris Parker, "Toxic Chemical Training", Armv Chemical Revlev, September 1987, p. 15.
18 Segal

m, p.

28.

19 George Schecter 6 Ammon Birenzvige, "Cities: Inviting Targets For Chemical Attack", Amy, December 1986, p. 42. 20 Ibid., p. 42. 21 Ibid., p. 42. 22 Ibid., p. 42. 23 Stringer, p. 53. 24 SH 3-800, Winnina In A Nuclear/Chemical Environment, US Army Chemical School, (Fort McClellan, AL: July 19871, p . 4-14. 25 General Frederick Kroesen, 'Chemical War-Deadly For Our Side?", National Guard, May 1985, p. 24.
26

Stringer, pp. 32-33.

27 Stoessel, Reoort Of The Chemical Warfare Review Commission, p. 28. 28 Ibid., p 43. 29 Kroesen, Pnalvsis Of Chemical Warfare Oaerations, p. 4-15. The 1925 Geneva protocol provides a legal loophole, allovinq a signatory such a s the Soviet Union to legally employ chemical weapons first against an adversary vho is not a signatory, or vhose allies haven't signed the protocol. NATO members who have not signed the protocol include Spain, Greece, Italy and Turkey. Warsav Pact members vho are not signatories Include East Germany, Poland, and Hungary.

Section V 1
2

EM 3-100, NBC O~erations, p. D-3. EM 6-20, Fire S u o ~ o r tIn Combined Ooerations, p. 3-24. Ibid., p. 3-31. Ibid., p . C-9.

3 4
5

FM 3-101, Chemical Staffs And Units, Department of the Army, (Washington D.C.: 22 April 19871, p . C-1-3.
Ibid., p. 2-2.
Ibid., p. C-4-5.
Intervlev vith LTC Maupin.

7
8

9 FM 3-10, Em~lovmentOf Chemical Asent~,Department of the Army,

(Washington D.C.: March 19661, p. 20.
10 Ibid., p 73.

11 Interviev vith LTC Maupin.

12 Command And General Staff Officers Course Cataloq AY 1988-1989.,

Command And General Staff College, (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: 19881, p. 59.
13 Interview vith LTC Maupin
14 Lesson 2-33, Corps Exercise, Course Tvo: Tactical Dvnamics, School OF
Advanced Milltary Studies, (Ft. Leavenvorth, KS: 20 October 19881.
15 OPORD 88-14, HQs, 52nd Mech Division, Ft. I K V ~ CA,

~, Observer/Controller dlvlslon, National Training Center, 181400 Aug 88,
p. 1)-2.
16 Annex D, fire Support, to OPORD 88-14.

18 Interviev vith LTC Maupin.

19 Stringer, p . 50. 20 Harris

&

Paxman, A Hiqher Form, p. 31.

21 Our heavy divisions have artillery brigades made up vith 3xl55mm Bns and one 8" battallon. At 24 tubes per battalion that is 96 tubes in the division capable of firing chemical shells. To Eire 1,080 shells vithin 15 seconds requires eac:h tube to flre over 11 shells at the r,?te of one per second. The rate of flre for each system 1s too slov for that. 47

1. MG John G. Appel, weal J o u u & , Spring 1986, p. 17.

2.

ST 3-1, Fundamentals Of NBC Ooerations, p. 1-21.

3. Interviev vlth LTC Maupin, CTAC, CGSC.

4. FM 3-20, l . & Escort Oocr?tlonJ, Department of the Army %, & d (Washington D. C.: July 19811, pp. 11-17.
5.

Smolove,

u,p.

47.

6. William H. Webster, "Libya Building Chemical veapons Plant", The Kansas City Timeg, 26 October, 1988, p. A-3.

7. From interviev vith LTC Maupin, who suggested this technique to me as

being far more efficient than attempting a total dose artillery barrage,
yet is as effective in terms of degrading the target unit's ability to
function.

8. Interviev with Captain Baltazar, survivability assessment point of

contact at the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALI. The-NTC stopped
allowing Blue (US) forces to employ chemical fires because it vas too
difficult to admlnistratively plot the dovn vlnd hazard areas and then
assess OPFOR casualties vithin those areas.
9. FC 3-20, Technical Escort Ooerations, Department of the Army,
(Washington D.C.: April 1987), p. 188.
10. Stoessel, R e ~ 0 r tOf The Chemical Warfare Reviev Commision, p. 25 11. Ibid., p. 77.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Books
Brovn, Frederick J. Chemical Warfare: Princeton Univ Press. 1968. Clarke, Robin. n e Silent Weaoons. A Studv in Restraint. Princeton, NJ:
1968.

New York, NY:

D. McKay Co.

Douglas, Joseph D., & Livingstone, Neil C. America the Vulnerable. "The Threat of Chemical and Bioloqical WarfartH. Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books. 1957 Haber, L. F. B e Poisonous Cloud. Oxford, England: Clarendon Press. 1988.

Harris, Robert & Paxman, Jeremy. A Hiqher Form of Killina: The Secret Storr g f Chemical and Bioloqical Warfare. New York, NY: Hall & Wong. 1982. Stringer, Hugh. Deterrlnu Chemlcal Warfare: I S Pollcv Ontlons for the 1990s. J Wash DC: Pergamon-Brassey's. July 1987. Vigor, P. H.. 1983. Soviet Blitzkriea Theorv. New York, NY: St. Martins Press.

GOVERNMENT/MILITARY PUBLICATIONS Bulletin, US Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency. Definition of Policy Of The -c ea il and Bioloqlcal Warfa=. Issue 11 9, October 1982 Chemical Warfare Reference Data. Fort Leavenvorth, KS: US Army Command
and General Staff School, 1939.
CDR. TEXCOM (Prov), Messaqe, Subject: Combined Arms in a Nuclear/Chemical . . on level) Test. Fort Hood, TX:
2015307ZApril 88.
Department of the Army, er a Servlre Bi~llrtln. 1911-45.
Washington D.C.: Office of the Chief. Chemical Warfare Servlce.
Department of the Army, command And General Staff Colleae Cataloq: AY 1988-89.
Fort Leavenvorth, KS: Command And General Staff College. 1988
Department of Defense. Soviet Militarv Pover: An Assessment of the Threat,
Washington D.C: US Printing Office. 1988.
Department of State, Chemical Warfare in SE Asia and Afqhanistan R e ~ o r tto
Conaress. Washington D.C.: US Government printing Office. 1982.

FC 3-20, Technical Escort Ooerations, Redstone Arsenal, Ala: Missile & Munitions Center & School. April 1987.

US Army

~ Washington D.C: I FM 3-9, M ilitarv Chemistrv and Chemical C headquarter^, Department of the Army, October 1175

3-10, w P t Of r h ~ Ig c.11 A4gnts. Wa~hlngtonD.C: Department of the Army, March 1966.

Headquarters,

3-100, NBC O~erations. Washington DC: Headquarters, Departmemt of the

Army, 1985.
3-101, Chemical StAnd Units. the Army, 22 April 1987.
Washington DC: Headquarters, Department

6-20, -art In Comblned Arms O ~ e r a t i o n ~ . Washlngton D.C:

Headquarters, Department of the Army, 31 December 1984.
6-20-30, Fire S u m o r t At Coros and Division. (coordinating draft). Sill, OK: US Army Field Artillery School, lMarch 1988.
100-5, Ooerations. Washington D.C: The War Department, 1944.
Fort

100-5, O~erations. Washington D.C: Headquarters, Department of the Army,

1986.
Manning, LTC Federick, An Evaluation of the Confidence Buildina Exercise
Identifvinq and Decontaminatina Nerve Asents. (Unpublished Abstract)
Walter Reed Medical Center: 31 December 1987.
PO14 (COMPS), Fundamentals of Nuclear And Chemical O~erations. Fort Leavenvorth, KS: US Army Command h General Staff College, 1987. SH3-800, Winnina In A Nuclear/Chemical Environment. US Army Chemical School, July 1987. Ft. McClellan, AL:

Student Text 3-1, Fundamentals of NBC O~erations. Fort Leavenvorth, KS: US Army Command d General Staff College, July 1987. ARTICLES, REPORTS, PUBLICATIONS AND OTHER SOURCES
Adams, Valerie. "Retaliatory Chemical Warfare Capability-Some Problems For
NATO". BUS1 For Defense Studies. December 1985. pp. 15-19.
"Chemical Warfare Development in the Third World". October 16, 1988, p A-5.
The Kansas Citv Times.

Fisher, Edvard A. Major, USA. "Why Weren't Chemical Agents Used In WW II?".
a Armv Chemical Reviev. June 198, pp 40-43.
L Foster, Richard B, Director. "Evaluation of Chemical Warfare Policy
Alternatives, 1980-1990". Arlington, VA: Stanford Research Institute,
Strategic Studies Center, February 1977.
Gold, Theodore. "US Chemical Warfare Policy And ProqranR, NATO's Sixteen
Nations. Feb-March 1983. pp. 66-70.
Kroesen, Frederick, General. Analysis Of Chemical Warfare O~erations.
Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, January 1985.

Kroesen, Frederick, General. "Chemical War-Deadly For Our Side". M, May 1985, pp. 22-26.

National

Levinson, Macha. "Chemical Deterrence-Will It Work?", International Defense Reviev. No 6, 1986. pp. 731-2. "Libya Building Chemical Weapons Plant". The Kansas Citv Times. 1988, p. A-3.
Maupin, Larry S. LTC, USA. Center for Army Tactics, Command College. Interview held in his office 7 October 1988. Miller, Dennis. "Chemical Warfare-US Policy And Capability". a x t e e n Nations, August 1985. pp. 66-68.
Parker, Chris. Captain. September 1987.

October 26,
General Staff

NATO's

"Toxic Chemical Training", Armv Chemical Review.

Rogers, Gen ~ernard. Interview. "Chemical Deterrence is Imperativew. onal Guard, March 1985, p. 21-13.
Segal, David. 'Soviet Union's Mighty Chemical Warfare Machine", August 1987. pp. 26-29.
Schecter, George & Birenzwige, Ammon. "Cities: Attack". m, December 1986, pp. 41-42.

m,

Inviting Targets For Chemical Military

Siebert, Major. "Chemical Weapons-Dull Swords In US Armoryn. Keviev, March 1985. pp. 23-29.
Smolowe, Jill. "Return of the Silent Killer", pp. 46-49.

m.

22 August 1988.
September 1986.

Spiers, E. "Chemical Warfare", BUS1 For D b s e studles, pp. 73-78.

Teller, Edward. "Defense: Retaliatlon or Protection?", ~ W % r ~ t e & J f & m L Science. August 1984. pp. 75-78.
Terrlll, Andrew ~ r . "Chemical weapons In The Gulf Reviev. Spring 1986. pp. 51-58.

war",

l l l n ? . t r ~ t r ~S t r a t i g l c d

Van Courtland-Moon, John Ellis. "Chemical Weapons and Deterrence: The WW I1

Experiencen, International Securitv. Spring 1984. pp. 33-35.
Wagner, R.L., and Gold, Theodore S. "Why We Can't Avoid Developing Chemical Weapons", Defense '82. July 1982, p . 4. Wilson, Penn. "Standardizing Chemical Units To Enhance Force Effectlvenss".
The Armv Chemical Journal. Winter 1986, pp. 40-43.

8903131-35-21

Apr 89

51