d

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U.S. ARMY TRAINING IN THE TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS: A FLAW IN OUR CHEMICAL DETERRENCE?

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A Monograph
by
Major Charles A. Peddy
Infantry

*

School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas First Term AY 88-89
Approved l o r Public Rclcase; Dlstributlon is Unllmiled

8403131

U Army T r a i n i n g I n The T a c t i c a l Zmploymen: O f Chemical Wea2ons: S A F l a v I n Our Chemical a e t e r r e n c e ?

Major C h a r l e s A . ??Cdy
Infantry

School of Advanced E i l i t a r y S t u d i e s U.S. Army Command and G e ~ e r a lS t a f f Col:s,;r
F o r t L e a v e n v c r t t , Kansas

9 December 1?38

Approved f o r p u b l i c r e l e a s e ;

distribution i s ui;:initd

School of Advanced Military Studies
Monograph Approval

Name of Student: Title of Monograph

Major Charles A. Peddy
US Army Training in the Use of Chemical Weapons
A Flaw in US Chemical Retaliatory Policy?

-

Monograph Director
Colonel Julialh MT'-Ympbell, M.S.
.;

. ,
Col'm61

L. D. Holder, MA

Director, School of Advanced Military Studies

Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.

Director, Graduate
Degree Programs

Accepted th

ABSTRACT
US Army Training In The Tactical Employment Of Chemical Weapons: In Our Chemical Deterrence?
By Major Charles A Peddy, USA, 51 pages.
Chemical veapons were introduced in World War I by the Germam 1i1 1916, durlng the battle of Ypres. The military's appreciation for the effectiveness of this veapon of mass destruction has continually conflicted vith society's horror of its cruel effects. As a compromise, many nations agreed not to employ them in future vars, vith the reservation that they vould retain a retaliatory capability that vould deter an adversary's impulse to introduce chemicals into the battle. While those measures served to prevent chemical use in World War 11,
events since then Eorce us to reevaluate our retaliatory capability and
its deterrence value. Increased use of chemical agents by the 5oviet
Union and its client states, and the development of chemical weapnn
programs in other third vorld nations, points to an ever increasing futore
risk that the US'S "retaliation in kind" policy vill be challenged.
Meanwhile the US Army has neglected the training of its officers and
units in the tactical employment of chemical veapons to the point that it
seriously undermines the credibility of the deterrence value of our
chemical veapons policy.
This paper concludes that the lack of training prevents the US Army from realizing that it is prepared to fight vith an obsolete chemical doctrine, and recommends actions that vill update its chemical varflghting capability and thereby enhance the deterrence effect of our chemical veapons policy. A F?av

TAELE OF CQSTENTS

SECTION I
SECTION I1
SECTION 111
SECTIO?I I V
SECTION V
SECTION VI
APPENDIX
ENDNOTES
BIBLIOGRAPHY

INTRODUCTION
WORLD WAR 11- AN HISTORICAL CASE
POST WORLi WAR I1
NATO SCENARIO
HOW WELL TRAINED ARE WE?
CONCLUSION

Modern chemical waxfare vas i n t r o d u c e d t o t k e 20th c e c t x y 5y :I:+ Germans i n 1916 a s t h e y a t t e m p t e d t o break t h e s t a t i c d e f e n s e s c: allies.e b a t t l e f i e l t a s long a s one s t i l l s e e s an a z v a n t a g e t o t b e i r u s ? ..INTRODUCTION 'Why have t h e C e r r a n ' s n o t used [ g a s ] ? They have o ~ t used i t because i t does not pay them. The a l l i e s acknowledged i t s e f f e c t i v e n e s s by r e t a l i a ' i 3 g :k:e :n By v a r ' s end. i t remains u n t i l i t i s no l o n g e r e f f e c t i v e . i n c l u d i n g t h e United S t a t e s an:! t!>e reservcd the r i g h t t o maintain s t o c k p i l e s 2s a d e t e r r e n c e a g a i n s t f i r s t use by o t h e r p a r t i e s .^? 1. L Nation: ha.v~. T h l s t h e y could have drenched v i t h g a s g r e a t l y t c t h e h i n d r a n c e of our t r o o p s .I .e o f f e n s i v e use of chemical veapons . The h o r r i b l e impact t h a t g a s w a r f a r e had made on t h e s o l d i e r s and populace l e d t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l e f f o r t s t o ban t o x i c chemical weapons. B u t t h e o n l y r e a s o n t h e y have n o t used i t a g a i n s t us is t h a t t h e y f e a r t h e r e t a l i a t i o n " 1 Winston C h u r c h i l l H i s t o r y has shovn t h a t when a nev veapon i s i n t r o d u c e d t o t h e battlefie:<. . I t s effectiveness .. Most n o t a b l e was t h e 1925 Geneva Convention 1imiteZ because S o v i e t Union. many n a t i o n s . kind. a l i s i d e s v e r e pushing t h e i r c h e m i c ~ ! :rdlis:ri?s t o d e v e l o p more l e t h a l chemical a g e n t s t h a t c o u l d be used b e f o r e being c u u n t e r e d by t h e t h e o t h e r s i d e . S i n c e t h e conver:ic!! v a s s i g n e d . That t h e y t h o u g h t a t o u t i t i z c e r t a i n and t h a t t h e y prepared a g a i n s t our use i s a l s o c e r t a i n .. The g r e a t e s t t e m p t a t i o n e v e r o f f e r e d t o them was t h e beaches of Normandy. almost e v e r y decade i n t h e 20th c e n t u r y has s e c s ::. n-ver been s u c c e s s f u l i n removing e f f e c t i v e weapons from .

.-I ~. ei. . vhen an F-4 aircraft carryin7 VI agent Xri'!?n:!y released part of its load outside t ! t e t . . . With antl-mllltary srnt!ment at its peak. This prompt?:: the reevaluate its policy. .In World War I1 all sides admitted to having prepared to employ chemical weapons but claimed their stockpiles were for retaliatory purposes only..am instead of following the unilateral effort by the Unites ftates to decrease the employment of chemicals in var. : . objective J ': L:. r i a . After WW 11. effectively crippling the United State's chrmlcal varfare program. sanctuaries... : :i Vietnam. the US maintainea a large chemical it3 stockpile but de-emphasized the use of chemicals as it shifted focus to the nuclear operations in future var. . with arms control. It dld use vhat it considered tvo form: of !ion toxic chemicals.?2: atialysls of captured Sovlet-made Egyptlan and Syr!ar. The prlmary was t o elielnatc the t h i r a : . growing against US use of chemical defoliant and riot contro! g : . The new chemical policy was stated in terms zeali!~.-. . . an incident prompted President Nixun to shut down all f:hi u:r chemical and biological testing. I .uipn!e:!t 5. an12 a $.C cV' . 1 1 I . Hls action vas triggered Ly t h e public outcry to a chemical accident in 1969 at the Oqden Provinc Grounds in Utah.:uf::i that the Soviets had vigorously improved their chemical po~?. over 5.. riot control agents to force guerillas out of bunker complexes and herbicide to defoliate the jungle to reto. During the Vietnam conflict the US did not use toxic chemical veapons but did continue research and development intu both chemical and blologlcal agents.? q!ierill. .?~. with the result that i t reenergized its chemical program. .

l that policy.. By 1920 t h e Army Chemical b r a n c h s c h o o l v z s Moreover.000. t h e a g i n g c h e m i c a l s t o c k p i l e i s s l o v l y b e i n g modernized v i t h s a f e r b:nary m u ~ l i t i o a v r e p l a c i n g o l d ~ l i c l l s011 a one f o r on? bas!. L . b r a n c h ' s s i z e had doubled from i t s 1 9 7 5 s t r e n g t h t o 4. t o terminate the c o n f l i c t a t the l o v e s t l e v e l of i n t e n s i t y p o s s i b i e . but t o achieve t h a t goal i t vas e s s e n t i a l f o r t h c US t o have a n effective c h c ~ r l c a ld e f e i i s i v e p o s t u r e arid a c.because Ecfend t h e m e l v e s i n a " d i r t y " e n v i r o m e n t . t h e United S t a t e . M . based on . X c C l e l l a n a f t e r b c l n g c l o s e d i n 1972. F 100-5 O v e r ~ i t i u i i c . t o enemy use of chemicals'' 5 Such ? r e p a r a t i o n s a c t a s a d e t o r r e n : The c o n s e n s u s a p p e a r s t o be t h a t a gdnZ . Thc objective o f u s i n g c h e m i c a l and n u c l e a r veaaons is t o convince t h e enemy t h a t i t s o b j e c t i v e s c a n n v t be a c > i c v d v i t h o a t u n a c c e p t a b l e l o s s e s ( d e t e r r e n c e ! . US c h e m i c a l use w i l l Se c c t a l i a t o r y o n l y ..rrJlLl? retaliatory capability. s t r e s s e s t h a t t h e offen::. reopened a t F t .? '4 p o l i c y of no f i r s t u s e . t h e Ey 1 / 8 5 .:y ".CCO.< f. If t h i s f a i l s .' - Ouz c u r r e n t n a t i o n a l c h e m i c a l p o l i c y emp!iasizes r e t a l i a t i h r . and do more t h a n :?im. EVeh : d a y . y e s e r v e s t h e z i y h t t o r e t a l i a t e i f enemies use c h e m i c a l veapons any u n i t must be p r e p a r e d t o c o ~ d u c : o f f e n s i v e chemical o p e r a t i o n s .. F i r s t and Eoremost. t h e c h e m i c a l S r s n c h had a n a c t i v e d u t y s t r e n g t h of 9.of c h e m l c a l weapon:. Our c u r r e n t k e y s t o n e manual. The N a t i o n a l Commanc? A u t h o r i t y must a 2 t h s : i z e i s r O F c h e m i c a l and n u c l e a r veapons. and on t e r z s a c c e p t a b l e t o t h e United S t a t e s and i t s a l l i e s . i' i1y siippu:l. d e t e r t h e u s e of n u c l e a r reapon. i n v o l v e t h e us? of ctiemical v ~ a p o n s .>r i t . and c h e m i c a l a g e n t s . S e v e r a l t i m e s i t mentions t h a t t h e b a t t l e f i e l d may iiriits must he p r e p a r e 6 ti.ive d e t e r r e n c e value only: c a y d b i l i t y sl!nuld be considc:ed A:. .

Lovevrz. the Sovlets might not consider first use. ! t ::s. controlling an3 coo:dinatin~ chemical veapons until allocation release has been act!-~iri:??. For our chemical offensive capability to have a credible deterrent value.:. : plan for their use and integrate them into their scheme of maneuver 7 . I 6 fir? ~ i t i ~ ? ~ c t ci~:::j:. that if there is no risk to using chemical varfare the Soviets will consider it..industria1 bas? in the CS l u . shells availaS1e. Su: detailed planning and coordination is done at division level-. :e +. s . If there is a perceived risk because of our retaliatory potential. many so old that thelr dellvery syntems oo lcnger ? . leaking munitions. -ever. ve must convince our adversaries that ve Rave t h e means. (FSCOORD).! fires :. and the villingness to use our chemical weapons. must be sufficiently knovledgeablr of chrmic. . The stockpile is filled vith aged. The only factor that degrades the credltlllty of our offri~s:vr ability is our training in the employment of chemic~: . atid to t ! x pessimistic Soviets the large chemical.. the training.'it. The US demonstrated its villingness to employ chsmica! wtapons in World War I and ve vere openly prepared to employ them in World War 11.deajons.. Brigade ancl battalio~~ Curnman?ers. ~ as a potential source of chemical munitions. .so that our enemies can conceive of us using chemica'.defensive posture is not deterrent enough. Our current manuals discuss the possibility of employinq chemical weapons . 1 The capability in the form of our chemical stockpile is admit:?dl\. :: .3i thousarld art1lle:y There . : cc~rpsare responsible for planning.::-. ves>ortif we felt it necessary.. weak.

Eire and maneuver vith concurrent chemical strikes. Finally. E:<a.' the only delivery systems ve now have are the 155mm and 8" artillery systems so ve are concerned vith our tactical expertise in the employment of these veapons. tactlcal matter.~c t h a t ve knov how to use our chemical veapons effectively our deterrec: vcluc vill suffer. A Europaan scenari.nples vi:l cite o: 7 hov the lack of credible chemical deterrence has led t h c Soviets their client states to use chemical veapona. trained and familiar 'With the use of chemical veapons enhanced that credibi!ity. Hovever. . shov vhy there is a real need for the US to 'ave retaliatory capability.ramlficatlons. If o t x enemirs do not Scl:e. an examination of c-:rent school curriculums and experiences at the Xationa? Training Ssnter (NTC) vill determine if our officers are being adequately traine. and that commanders and staffs.> u . ~ i a credible sanx::. the employment of chemical veapons 1s a Our tactlcal commanders are expected to lnteg~ate Additionally.. The following sections vill shov historically how a crediktir "retaliation only'' policy deterred the use of chemical veapons in battle.: : : employ chemical veapons. .

Beginning in 1939.Formed defeatists vhich one runs across now here nov there.rd the concept of employing chemical weapons important enough to divert preclous clvilian labor and other var resourcrs to its researc!~. only Germany had the advantjge of a nev class of chemical c:e :l? named Tabun 2 . J Japarl is ur~iqce u f all the Pvrld War i: belligrrt~iit:: :i: I I is documented evidence that she actually employed chemical weapons i c coxbat agairist an enemy force. 1 9 4 4 A World War 11 is significant because it serves as an example of a conflict that had the belligerents preparing and planning to us? an effective veapon. Both sides cor~sidci.!? !:.000 tons stored in bombs.000 tons of ncrve agcnt a year by 1943. While most nations had chemical stockpiles on the eve 3E World W: nr:. development.lot pl. but out of fear of retaliation.000 tons of nerve agent in artillery shells and another 10.f this potent poison and tva years later. The German mllitary clearly understood the value :. 3y ??44 Geraiar. let us do it one hundred per cent." 1 Winston Churchil? to his Chiefs of Staff. yet refraining from employing it. manufacture and storage. in 1340. This chapter vil: show that al! sides vere prepared to employ cheaicals vhen they considered it advantageous but held back.000 sfparate .Japanese cheilcal attacks a g a i n s t hot!! Ct!ii~??e ! i ! i l i t i r i 6 . i p.ot by that particular set of psaln singing uni.AN HISTORICAL CASE FOR A RETALIATORY POLICY ".ted over 1. In the meanwhile.it may be several weeks or even months before I shall ask you to drench Germany vith poison gas.XI. they built . and if ve do it. not for mara! reasons. the Chinese documer.!:: :i h: vas producing 3.. I want the matter studied in cold blood by sensible people and i.) had stockpiled 2..

svitched to the more effective method of s?rayi~. Z. cf . : * l its A : Force against the Ethiopians. t!.. instilling terror in the civllian populace and greatly reducing the rnilltary effectlvene~sof those targeted mllltary unlts.. If nothing else.is Almost 1/3 of the total Ethiopian casualties were attributed tc I t ? : i a ? chemical weapons 5 . ..?~. :r. but their combined industrial might alloved them to make up Eor quality vith a greater quantity of agents and a superior delivery meacs ic the form of the strategic bombe:... The unprotected and lightly c l ~ t h e d natives suffered tremendous casualties to include large numbers of women and children vho had travelled through previously contaminate2 are.::z. m x t a r d agent a day 6 . destrcction. it ic?i:ated :t.age-t I ? hlbs. i First using the .forces and civilian population centers 1 .t a potent capability to produce chemicals and a demonst:ate:! cse them.~ :o of r~tali3ti.1i-l The Allies themselves may have had less advancrd toxic chem:c. The nationallst government of cklna cont. On the eve of World lar I1 Sritizh intrl:igeLce believed that the Italians had the capability to produce u to 2' to-?. the unprotected natives from multiple aircraft so as to envelop a c o l u ~ no: natives in a fog of mustard mist. if only against a primitive enemy who had no ho. Agains: the unprotected Chinese the chemical agents became weapons of mas. .. ~il:in. When the Allied military leaderu contemplated potential cheaical use by the Axis powers they had to consider that Italy had been the last Western nation to employ chemicals in combat vhen it invaZed Ethiopia.? :talians in 1936.r or protection.lnually charged the JapaIWJc lnvaders vlth Go~ablng c:ltlc: aiid spraying Chinese troop formations vith mustard and phosgene.-+ls thi.I 1935 and 1936 Italy had shipped 700 tons of mustard agent t o b r -as--i.ily ::a? i : ?~t. Germany.

?.cl serving in both the A ~ m yand Aii Gorp:.... The Cheniical Warfare :ervice ..LL.: I. One example is the sad case o f t h r CSS John Harvey.c:. England's stockpile had increased from one day's supply to over 20.. .. spray units. and had a 4 month suyply u f sruund employell cheeica:~. 8 .?i~i. every theater of the war in Europe.:..OIICI so!dlers :la!. who vere intentionally left i i ~the dark regarding :he cause victims' suffering 10 . Italy.' '"I:. alone required 10. !il . ?!'he 5 3 1 1 ~ : ~ who escaped the ship by svimn~ing thuug!: t k cortaminatei: watc:. the United States had built 13 chemical mnufa?:uricg employing thousands of scarce civilian workers. following year as part of its Overlord preparation.000 workers. F. England's forces had managed to scrape together e n o u ~ hof . it spilled its secret cargo of mustard agent into the waters o f t!!r >a. nucilbered over :O. The Uhltcd States placed an effort in its chrmlcal prod~~ctlon comparable to its overall industrial var effort.000 tons by 1942 7 .. By 1943 the VS had month supply of air dellverable chemical v e a p a n ~ i n the f?r:ri c: >u-!-.t: !? By 1945. By the seconC veek cf June 1940.?c. Under Frime Minister Churchill's insistent prodding. docked at port in Bari. -.: . The exylaslons of the b ~ u ~ r ~ iship sent mustard agent i l a vapi)r for:!^ ng l throughout the t a v n causing bond:eds o f civill.islln!tle~. Those stockpiles follnved the advancing zrmies Ir.3 chemical stockpile to plan for the 12th Royal Air Force td use gas born55 and spray against the feared German amphibious assault force on ths beaches 8 .: . l-:e:.. burns from the blister agent a d hnl! to be treated by inexperienced o : : .England began the war with almost no chemical stockpile. Sunk during a German a i r :alC. Arkansas.~ a ' 2 .:. The plant a t Fine 91sf5...E. the Europeac TCcjter of Operations had stockpiled enough chemical munitions to last for over 1 : days of full scale use.! co..

i:s::. The 1933 Coctrice called for one of the four mortar platoons to be dedicated to chemical fires only.2" mortars. The battalion provide2 50th gas. Tc help him t ! . A theater of operations asset. By the late 1930s tbe Chemical Warfare Service was fully integrated at every command level. setween WW I and WW I1 the US Army's chemical doctrine and unit structure continued to evolve. - :u transportation assets dedicated to picking'-up t!~r chemical r o u G s delivering them to the mortar companies1 4 . and disbursing oE chemic.000 vorking in its rrsearcti and develupmcnt departwnt. a. ir~cendhriesaci? ii.~eret: chemical units at the ports and vere then stored in special chemic~l ammunition supply points. The chemical battalion had its ovn .:? . employment of his mortars.1 . integrate chemical fires vith the general scheme of maneuver.lc : 4. smoke.: munitions and protectiie gear. it vas n r a : om!y attach?? t s i division1'. responsible for drawing the chemical rounds vhen neede2. providing both the expertise and the means to transport. but by the beginning of the var the basic loads of all platoons ver? :!e iid vith smoke and HE'^. stock ant employ chemical agents.had over 1. . A t the heart o the service vas the chemical battalion vith i t .96 s:ga.000 tons11 . ey tFle . The battalion commarder vas the expert on the He vorked vith the division chemical offlc?: t c Ye . o Chemical Warfare Service had a complete supply infrastruzt~re vkcs? r315 Eunction vas the transporting.das . varehousing.: explosive (HE) fires depending on the situation. end of the var the uniteJ States had amssed a stockplle of aver 135. The chnical munitions vere ?ie!i.

: . . Chemicals vere not a popular weapon but their employment vas routinely considered in planning. .. The 2nd A:sy Arkansas. provided the tables that determined the nunber of :ourids needed based on veapons system selected.3:.. +el? i.eL: ':~13 . Thei: organization called for two specialized units.~sc!-1or:c6! agents and the techniques of their employmeat. the division con~manter could also rely on recent Command and General Staff School graduates f c r advice on the employment of chemical veapons. lntc vhlch alloved the student tu incorporate all forms of chcmicai fi:es the fleld order as operations orders vcre called then The Army took advintage of the 1a:ge 16 . Based on their experieace operating in the swampy terrain.we:s southern stater in 1941 to test its chemical doctzine. To that end the ~ c h o i l published tvo different reference manuals. It a aEter all.~ni~ei. and suggested the types 05 agents employ for maximum effects. :o It provided an example of the chemical . r v c i > l in sc.The Air Corps had its complement of chemical units as vell. and the Tactical Emoloment o f Chemical Aaents ftentatlve). These -8 textbooks helped the student plan his chemica? fires based on the situation. one that handled the chemical bombs and spray units and the other dedicated to the defensive decontamination mission 15 . for example. Along vith the chemical battalion commander. 2y the time the United States vent to var.mane:.2c: aqents against opposing unit command posts. its staffs and chemical units vere confident . encourayed the offensive use of siau:%[. 2nd Army developed aircraft sp:ayin~j techniques that vere effective against road bound units 17 . another tool in the military tool box and staff officers ve:e expected to be famlllar vlth the characteristics of the vario.

It i sisply a question of fashion chfjging as stc s does betveen long and short skirts for vomen. Even P:esi. all nations rattled their chemical sabers at each other.j t h e V-1 bombs against England.d using chemicals. both Japan and Italy had employed it The stated th. Although cloaked in the trappings of moral sanctity. : i hni:l veapons if sufficiently provoked. Churchill vanted to r e s p n d by ujing his - . they were ready to respond in kind That gas would be encountered on the World War 11 battlefield vas a foregone conclusion. After all. His military staff i'i3s11. On the other hand.le:i: Roosevelt. ." The Allies several times showed the vi1lingne:.. - - . large English bombe: fleet to "drench the cities of the Ruhr and many oiher cities in Germany in such a vay that most of the population woul2 be requiring constant ne2ical attention. as Xinston Churchill's remarks show. felt cijmpe:lt=d : u threaten Japan on 6 June 1'343 vith "retaliation in kind" if tht chemical attacks against the Chinese continued 19 . When the Germans beq.that should they encounter gas on the battlefield. .s to x e c c .it recently. Churchi?: ?ct:ic:y warned Germany that he would use bombers to drop chemical b m b s shocl' Ge:ma:. and everyone had uscd chemicalv in the prevIous war.y begin tising cliemicals on the eastern f:ont. vho 2ersonally aShu1rt. Now everybody toes it as a matter of course. in the last war the bombing of open cities vas regarded as forbidden. and. "20 .qn ::-unc?::..~Zcd his: . the morality of chemical use took a back s e a t :r military pragmatism and fear of retaliation: "It is absurd to consider morality on thls toplc [poison gas1 when everybody used it in the last war vithout a word of complaint from the moralists or the Church. difference nov vas that the Allies and Germany both publicly they would not employ chemicals first. that they would respond i r ~ retaliation only. On : I ! May 1941.

. The t h r e a t worked. t h e US was not l e g a l l y bound by t!~rp:~t:csl H of t h e Geneva Convention p r o h i b i t i n g f i r s t use of chemicals even t h o c ~ ts. d:awn m!lita:y ?4 . i t vould be i m p r a c t i c a l t o maintain the needed l e t h a ? . because Congress had never r a t i f i e d the Convention 2 2 .. Goeri:. too l a t e .1 varheads v i t h chemical warheads and cause even g r e a t e r problems Eor English c i t i e s 21 ..e was a s i ~ n a t o r yt o i t . A t the NueznSerg t r i a l s held a t t h e end of t h e var. vho i n i t i a l l y had been a g a i n i t .~s 2:. .I::'! employ gas on the Normandy beaches bec. began t o d i s c u s s i t more openly.~z k n he used t h e unfortunate episode of t h e USS John Harvey t o acknovlcd3e vkat u n t i l then had been kept s e c r e t : t h a t t h e a l l i e s were keeping stock?. His m i l i t a r y advi50r- .1+- of chemlcals i n a l l t h e a t e r s of t h e var and v e r e ever ready t o r e t a l i d i e with them should the Germans use them f i r s t 2 3 .ause they fezred the ? T : e c t ~ all:?:! chemical r e t a l i a t i o n would have on t h e i r mostly h6:se t r a n s p o r t a t i o n system ~.. As Germany began t a s u f f e r r e v e r s e s i n France d d on t h e east?::: ~ .mz.- f r o n t . . . t h a t t h e Germans had a s i z a b l e chemical s t o c k p i l e of t h e i r own.is By the11 i L vds Most of Germany's chemical a r s e n a l vas in t h e form of bombs and s h e no longer had t h e bombers t o d e l i v e r t h e bombs.. General Eisenhover s e n t a v e i l e d t h r e a t t o the Germar.by e x p l a i n i n g t h a t . s p e l l e d out. A t h e i r p u l e s of Land Warfare.~ a g a i n s t t h e landing f o r c e s on t h e beaches of Normandy. and t h a t t h e y vould probably r e t a l i a t e by r e p l a c i n g t h e V . . H i t l e r . F i e l d s The US m i l l t a r y made i t c l e a r t h a t t h e y v e r e l e g a l l y c o r r e c t i n employing a g e n t s vhen r e q u i r e d . The 2 ~ .g s t a t e d t h a t t!:c Ct. !. .. dose f o r a l l t h e i a r g e t s he vanted h i t . Manual F 27-10. d g r e a t e s t f e a r t h e a l l i e s had was t h a t t h e Germans vould use them'--'.thL-use of gas bekaose o: experience i n World War I .

$r:::L. the US actcally did cor.~! protective masks vere rushed forward. 33. recommended "soakingn the island of Iwo Jima vith chemicals prior to jil amphibious assault. scfferd digging out the tenacious defenders from their island caves led many to advocate the use of ga& to minimize IJS casualties. President Boosevrlt disapproved t 3 c r c c ~ n m e i . When these fell into German hands. approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and Adiniral Chester "imitz. one of Hltler': closest advlsor~.000 casualties taking the island 2 3 .vere also concerned by the Allies' incredible iblllty to retaliate. The U? v : kee2ing a close hol? on informa:lon on these chenica: icgredirn:~ A t :t vas to hide the development of the pesticide 3DT. vhlle accldental. As Albert Speer.agents. that cheaic.~: :es. the atomic bomb. not nerve aqent 2': . .recalled: "All sensible Army people turned gas varfarc down as being utterly insane." Other indicators.si2er usincj checical. in viev of America's superiority in the air. prompted the Germans to be?i+ve the US vas ready and villing to employ chemical veapons. When the invasion of Japan vas being planned. since. The tremendous casua?ti?s the US ha?.A t i x.? i : the US suffered over 20.:. desperate effort. it convinced the Germans that the US vas getting ready t o attack vitL chemicals Interestingly.3~1: :3 :!lei: LI the Japanese in the Pacific. During the Battle of the Bulge the US vas so sure that the Fernans were about to employ chemicals in a last ditch. chemical veapons had already bce: naCc obsolete by another weapon of mass destruction. it vould not be long before it vould bring do?? the most terrible catastrophe upon German cities. German intelligence cited the sudden and complete censure in print of previously mentione? a chemical compounds the Germans used to make nerve . The Lethhri+3e .

nose and mouth.!blt tnough that in :36?.111- POST WORLD WAR I1 CHEMICAL USE "Victims realize they had been exposed to chemical attack only vhen they become faint and dizzy. ~s In 1982. of chemical use in the area . Its interests in ndtn.. the remoteness of the areas in vhich the attacks took place and the transitory nature of the chemicals employed. Eyevitnesses reported the victims shoved symptu:X an2 and 323cc:3?d vlth exposure to mustard and nerve agents. The first documented instance of a Soviet client state involved in the employment of chemical veapons vas Egypt's support oE the Republican faction during the Yemeni civil var in the 1960s. The frequency 3' these attacks has increased over the last fev years.rc one nation used chemlcal agents aga:nst another. Subsequently. tAe nation attacked has had no cspabllity either to protect itsclf .ii tl.:t:c:. that the natlon using the chemical weapons has either been a client state of the Soviet Union or the Soviet Union itself. Secause of the nature of the events.. L :'t :i ttc adires:ed the 3. Two common factors in these events are." Mujahadern account of Soviet Chemical attack1 Since the end of World War I1 there have been several ocazisns . Death occurs vithin a short time.felt the ieports rrli. War coirespcndents Red Cross representatives reported that the Soviet armed-and Egyptian supported-faction had used chemical veapons against the roya:ists civilians. Prlme Minlster Harold wil:on.use 6: C o ~ ~ l n .g thc recent chemical attacks that had been previously reported in nrvspaper accounts. r . The Eritlsh governre:lt. Sword. it took several years before the State Department Eel: it had t > e .? :.dht. the State Department published a report dccumi:~tir. one.r kc ) retaliate vlth chemicals of its ovn.::a!:. they begin to vomit blood and bleed from the eyes.

storage aid !id:j oi:.. Contami~.i pilot. He reported that his attacks resulted it! red and yellow clouds over the impact area.rcquislte proof to charge Vletnam. The villagers and their farm aniinal3 then immediately Many 2 : e : : . One of t!ie . 2irect link to the Soviet ~ni'on. and that the warheads d i d no: explode the same vay his normal varheads did5. Laotian defectors reported that their Air Force was con8u1:ti::~ chemical attacks against local tribes vho vere attempting to resist efforts by the government to centralize control over them. Villagers reported that an Where the aircraft vould fly over them. loose fitting varheads. The evidence brought to the State Department shoved consicsively :a :t . Laos and the sovlet Union with the t~se of toxic chemicals lo violation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925. not an agent vestern nations vorked vith or possessed. .E . vas also I t vas k-om.f agent vas a synthetic derivative of a mycotoxin.'.?: experienced nausea. the Vietnamese used aircraft to deliver chemicals through bombs and rockets against Kampuchedn guerillas and indiqenous H'nong tribesmen that verr reslstlng Vietnam's attempts to dominate them 3 . The evidence provided to the State Department shoved a clea. vomiting and profuse bleeding.--- I . weapons impacted there vould usually appear yellov colored clouds ?hat slovly dissipated.>. a potent poisori pro2~ct. 15 . t h c s c t:. . dropping bombs or firing rockets.. as v: e: contdmindted vatri saa~plesErum the vcll tl ~nuthccsite jhovct that :he .!. This class of agent.d by molds". reported that he had seen rockets loaded on his aircraft vith modified. surv!ved took months to recover 4 .'cC.:::iz?: agents6 .~:teZeaE : as samples Erom one of the villages that h ~ d been attack?<. The Laotian pilot reported that Soviet technicians supervised the t:ansportation.. while not unknown in the West. More cnnclusive vas the type oE agent c o d .

ti.. . Iraq.hovever. the Scv!eto took advantage of the attacks to develop their field data base on the effects oE the agents. that the Soviets vere quite familiar vith the toxins through the agricultural research they had been conducting since the 1930s . It vould appear that the Soviets used chemica:~ a i a forcin~t ? ? n veapon of mass destruction to spread terror in the populat!on to flee their homes and causing the Mujahadeen to lose their base of support. hundreds of casualties among the unprotected victi~s 1 : iaasl~. In the recent Iran-Iraq war.:ttion: lias 3~i. Unverified witness statements reported that the Soviets used a poison so toxic and fast acting that victims vere 'oun3 at thelr veapons. vhich is armed by the Soviets. appears t c h v c :!se. direct role in the use of chemical veapons in Afghanistan. Afghani refugees streaming into Pakistan reported attacks by Soviet helicopters and jets against villages and bands of Mujahadeen. dyinglO. showing no signs thet they vrrc ew:l avarr they -i. .~. 8 The Soviet Union had a more open. the Vnltrd ~.:~ine!itt~:l: ~ t: Iraqi use of chemical agents against Iranian forces and Rhurdish vi!:asers in border towns. The knovleli9r that Iraq had the capability to continue vith additional chemical attacks vith no fear of retallation may have prompted Iran to seek a cease fire car!i?r than expected 13 . I From the symptoms reported by vitnesses and survivors. Soviets vearing full protective garments were reported conducting field autopsies on dead villagers to determine the effects the agents had on thelr victlms iL . Why :he Soviets used chemicals vas a matter sf specuiakioh by :>c State Department. : appeared the Soviets used a variety of agents ranginq from incapacitants to nerve agents to mycotoxins 9 . From eyevitness accounts by Afghan Army defectors.: both mustard and nerve agents against the Iranians and vil!agers.

ir:! agent.t t ! . and determining whether or not t!i+ Soviet Union would enjoy any advantages to employing chenicals fi:s?. discussing hov it views chemica? veapons vithin the overall scope of its military doctrine.THE NATO SCENARIO "I£ we arc forced to operate encumbered by protective systems while the enemy is alloved to operate unencumbered in a clean environment.SECTION IV.c Soviet Union would employ chemical agents in a high intensity war again. 5 :. as it came to be called. h a v ~ ratified the Convention 4 .. . Since 62% of all the gas casualties suffered in wdrld War I were Russian 2 . was to zontiriue in :cn~:e . Signing the treaty didn't m . the White Russians employed Eritisk $5: shells and the Red faction vas reputed to hdve ssed it: cv. The question that comes to mind is vhether t5. Snvii. e C. 252 Union had renounced further research and development into t h e offeosiv? of chemica.: NATO forces.dot!. it enl?:?l . : :: e .-I c5esira: artillery shells'. experience vith chemical veapons did not end vith the conclczion of 80:12 War I.v:e'. joint.: 2: 1 chemical veapons in 1928. highly secret collaboration vith the Cermdns Lo with mus:. veapuns. chemical veapons can offer him the same high casualty rate. but reserved the right to Letaliate in : i n 2 vould not consider itself bound to the treaty should its enemy n o t . even if no one is killed.: This chapter vlll ansver that question by zeviswir. The Soviet Union signed the Geneva Convention banning first 3."' In the last section we saw hov the Soviet Union and lts cllent states were wllllnq to employ chemlcal agents against third world statzs wtc ha:: no retaliatory capability.~ chemical history. the Soviet Union well understands the devastating effect c h m i i a l The Soviet Union's cijmbat agents can have on unprotected troops. Project Tomka. it simply meant that such efforts voc?d greater secrecy. In its ovn civil vat. : :i . be c l ~ L e 2i : ~ into a The same year it signed the Convention.

austl~:i * > c '9' I of form of conventional munltian and has thoroughly integratrZ the chemicals into their overall military operations.~:lt+d States. : I the : final veeks of the var. chemlca: agents as vell as production factcries and procetiur?s producicg nerve agent. One reason for the continued buildup vas its historical fascination vith the . the Soviet Union had amassed a stockpile of chemical weapons but vas afraid to employ them initially against the invading Germans for fear of German retaliation 6 Later in the vat.. the Soviet aray captured large stockpiles oE Gerr. the Soviet Union's . potential effects of chemicals but another. With the end of World War I1 and the beginnings oE the ColZ War. Current Sovlet doctrlne considers chemlcal weapon: a : juet . successes vith its rapid operatlonal form of varfare precluded the use of chemicals.? time vhen the IJS unilaterally halted the11 chemical yrugram' . Unlike t h e :. 53: The plants and stockpiles taken Sack to the Soviet IJnion formed the backbone of the post var So. the Soviet Union's offensive delivery capability spectrum from tactical through operational level. rezson vij that the large stockpile was a cheap response to the US nuclear domination of 8 the 1950s . By the beginning of World War 11. 18 .. The Soviets appeared to have increased their icterest i r h chemlcal varfare in the late 1960s and early 1970s..viet chemical proqram 7 . cove:^ t5t Their indirect fire delivery systems range from the short range mortars founl at bat:a:ior level to their long range Scud and Frog missiles that can fire from one nation to another. the Sovlet Union contlnued to build its stockpile of chenical vzap:i:s.area of the Soviet Union for a period of five years5 . that same per:. Their multiple launcher rocket systems scch as the OX:? and EM27 have cbri~ilcalvarhrads allovlny thrti~ t o saturate a large arc. more pragmatic.

beginning with t h e 13 chemical d e f e n s e company a t t h e r e g i m e n t a l l e v e l . of t r a i n i n g v i t h l i v e a g e n t s .s v e l l a s defensive warfare 15 . Compounding t h i s problem i s t h e S o v i e t Union's d o c t r i n e t h a t s o f u l l y i n t e g r a t e s chemical use t h a t 1 / 3 of t h e a r t i l l e r y s h e l l s c a r r i e d by a r t i l l e r y u n i t s a r e f i l l e d v i t h chemical a g e n t s 11 . The :rgiment. Because a l l of t h e i r i n d i r e c t f i r e system. i t is t h e :eve! enhances t h e i r chemicsl t h r e a t . ~ e iof t h e i r troops. an abi1it. a f e a t u r e t h e US army is p l a n n l n ~ jLu: :irlde? a s yet h a s not 14 .q u i c k l y w i t h a l e t h a l d o s e of n o n p r r s i s t e n t a g e n t .. The S o v i e t Chemical Defensive Ac.. a ? S h i k h m g y t e a c h e s and d c v e l o p s chemical o f f e n s i v e w a r f a r e t e c t n i c j a ~ .iz.io?~ While v e l l equipped. A l l S o v i e t v e h i c l e s a r e equipped v i t h an ovF:pre::cr? system t h a t p r o t e c t s t h e ' c r e v i n a chemical o r n u c l e a r contaminate2 environment.i~?.... is f u l l y i n t e g r a t e d i n t o t h e r e g u l a r f o r c e s a s v e l l .. Some e l i t e u n i t s have remained f o r . S o v i e t u n i t s a r e knovn t o tzai:i v i t l i d i l u t d l i v e chemical a g e n t s t o b u i l d u p t h e c o n f i d e n c e and ex?r?ri?nce l e . .t..y t h c U S c u r r e n t l y does n o t have 10 ...:t: fighting forceL'. .hav? t h e c a p a b i l i t y of f i r i n g chemical m u n i t i o n s i t v i l l be e x t r e m e l y d i f E i c s : t f o r NATO t o d e t e r m i n e v h i c h systems v i l l be d e d i c a t e d t o chemica? f i r e s . Every S o v i e t a r t i : l e r y u n i t is a p o t e n t i a l chemical d e l i v e r y system becaose of i t s veapons' t e c h n i c a l c a p a b i l i t y and i t s b a s i c load m i x . of t h e i r chemica: trai:..~:.il chemical d e f e n s e company's chemical r e c o n n a i s s a n c e p l a t o o n is equipged v i t b a s p e c i a l l y d e s i g n e d v e h i c l e t h a t a l l o w s t h e c r e v t o perform i t s duti. . The S o v i e t army h a s t h e l a r g e s t chemical o r g a n i z a t i o n an2 i t . s e v e r a 1 hours i n C o n t r a s t t h a t v i t h t h e United S t a t e s ' c u r r e n t l e v e l Currently the only troops training v i t h l i v e contaminated a r e a s 1 6 .5 v i t h o u t l e a v i n g t h e v e h i c l e . The S o v i e t army is t h e w o r l d ' s b e s t equipped and trairiei: ch?:::i:.

Given t h a t t h e S o v i e t s a r e b o t h t r a i n e d and p r e p a r e d t o employ c h e n i c a l s a s a nnrma! . i ~ e r ~ t . Within t b e i r e s t i n d t u d The US.. and know what t o e x p e c t vhen t h e y e a p l o y them. n i ~ : . employment t e c h n i q u e s .agent1'. One 1 s t h e f o r m a l schooling i n t h e offensive u s e of c h e m l c a ! ~ i n Z a n o t h e ~ :A t h e wide v a r i e t y of c h e m i c a l s t h e S o v i e t s s t o c k . The f a c t is t h a t S o v i e t chrmic. p e : n i s t e n t Another ad"antage t h e S o v i e t s have is t h e i r actual combat They have f i e l d t e s t e d t h e i r d g e n t s and t e s t e d chemical d o c t r i n e . v l l l tiot t e s l t a t e t o en>. Thus t h e S o v l e t army i s a v e l l equipper: and h i g h l y t r a i n e d c h e m i c a l f o r c e a n d . . T h e i r e x p e r i e n c e is a h i g h l y s t r u c t u r e d .. ~ e They t h e n e n t e r s n a l ! g e a r is t e s t e d s e v e r a l t i m e s t o i n s u r e t h e i r s a f e t y . rooms under t h e s u p e r v i s i o n of i n s t r u c t o r s v h e r e t h e y d e c o n t a m i n a t e a ? i e c + o f equipment which h a s been c o n t a m i n a t e d v i t h a small amount of a g e n t . a t h i c k e n e d . The S o v i e t s have s e v e r a l a d v a n t a g e s i n h e r e n t i n t h e i r t r a i n i n g ..V:.a g e n t s a r e t h e Chemical Branch o f f i c e r s and NCOs a t t e n d i n g b r a n c h s c h o o l s a t F t . under t h e p r o p e r circumstances. McClellan. a n o n p e r s i s t e n t ne:ve n e r v e .: t r o o ~ st r a i l : v i t h d i f f e r e n t a g c : ~ t s t h a n t h o s e employed by t h e i : y u t e : ~ t . A: a l l t i m e s t h e s t u d e n t is a v a r e of t h e r e d u n d a n t s a f e t y measures p r o t e c t i n g hlm. Alabama. a g e n t and VX. T!w q u e s t i o n i c m ~ i n s c h e m i c a l s if i t p e r c e i v e s an advantage t o t h e i r use. v h e t h e r o r n o t t h e S o v i e t Union v o u l d c o n s i d e r employing c h e m i c d l s i n an a t t a c k a g a i n s t NATO f o r c e s .: l l e n d s c r e d e n c e t o t h c i d e a t h a t t h e y p l a n t o employ t h o s e c h e m i c a l s o f f e n s i v e l y and must be p r e p a r e d t o voqk v i t h them. o n l y NATO n a t i o n v i t h a n y s o r t of c h e m i c a l s t o c k p i l e . 0 0 0 t o n s a r e 1 7 d i f f e r e n t c h e m i c a l a g e n t s . The s t u d e n t s e n t e r a b u i l d i n g v h e r e t h e i r p r o t e c : i . - . GB. Even s o . t h e e v e n t a p p e a r s t o be s t r e s s f u l 1 7 . artificial affair. t h e s t o c k p i l e of 5 0 .:). works n:aiil?y w i t h tvii a g e n t s .

requirc traversiny another. Mass casualties vi?l undoubtedly help to overwhelm the NATO medical support structure. These urban centers are potential defensive strongpoints that vould greatly slov dovn the rapid tempo the Soviets deem necessa:y be successful in their attack. . Ch~aicalv e a p n s . for them t-o consider first use of chemical weapon:. Thv. there are several et:qent ! n i l i t a r y and political rea:ons . World War I 1 experience taught the Soviets that the combat pover required to reduce strongpoints rubbles tovns. The first military reason involves the terrain the invading Soviet forces must traverse. ~ fa standing inf:astructure uridamagerl by conventional high exp:n.is. The terrnristic effect of chemical ddvantaytous i f casualties on the civilian population could be conside:el it serves to break the will of the defenders. consider hov to deal vith urban sprawl.~? rubbling of the orSan centers. and to neutralize one vould drain precious resources from the main effort. Soviet forces vould encounter at least three major urban areas evr:y 10 kilometers19. German tovns have grovn and expanded at scch a rste that the once vide open spaces of the north German plain no lcnger exist.f have the positive characteristic of killing defenders while aininizin.product of thelr mllltary doctrlnc. further degrading NATO's ability to effectively defend itself ? 1 . Soviet planners face a dilemma vhen they To bypass one urban cent?. ~. t!.. vcclc? : .3i! then return to the bypassed urban centers at a later time vhen ths ee !c :t of the chemical fires has greatly veakened the defenders.e fires . The added effecL . increasing their defensive potential and destroyiny the infrast:uct~i:e the countries they vere planning to occupy 2 0 One solution is the massive use of chemical veapons. Soviet chemic:! fires could isolate those urban areas they vish to bypass and permit concentration on those urban centers they fee! they must attack.

> chcmical enviro.-u 6 .~.>:as.i!ur y target btc.+::. .!:emica? flres.A::.i:/Ch?rlca! E:~~~i:(~li:i~.... Long range chemica: fires at the onset of the invasion would cause mass casualties among the labor force and greatly degrade the NATO resupply effort 23 ..istr. This lib:. ~ r e a t l yslo.i. Another incentive to Soviet first use of chemical veapons are the extraordinary NATO vulnerabilities to them..: mllltary activity. Arriving soldiers must drav their prepositioned equipment and the large resupply items arriving by jhip have to at the ports thus presenting lucrative chemical targets. .- depecds on a large civilian labor pool to offload ships.~ . ~ disruptive working i r ~.. force is untrained and unprotected against cheffiica! fires. ?. Significantly.~trd t . it took small units tvice as long an? :rqol:ed twice as . measure>. The largest NATO reinforcements. -> Conman2 soldiers to accomplish the same task in a chemical environment. vith radio transmissions doubling in frequency and length in an attempt to overcome the effects of vozking in an othervise successful mlssion oriented protective posture (H0PP).3 The NATO military forces themselves are highly susceptible to c.:t (CANE) Phase I test conducted ln 1987 at F v r t Hood.?.-. The Combined Arms in a N~:c!?.. . and much of the eplacement equipment and sappli?s ccme fc :m the United States. Whi!e most forces can respond vith adequate defens!ve successful chemical defense is still very resource it~tensiveA. i. bi :~riluo~led Chemical Eires vill cause casualties and contaminate the equipment sites. .~:ng dovn relnforclnq efforts. . Ports present a hiqhr: v. !!lt.will help the Soviets vith the post var reconstruction efforts in newly occupied territories 2 2 .... :.) -. ' 4 . and control vas greatly affected. .~mcntwould he to a unlt.

the pragmatic Soviets vill have to consider the additional risks involved as vell. it vould soon run out of its basic lcad and t e combat ineffective. If lt did not accept the ammunltion. VATO's Only the UniteB States s n l France have measurable stockpiles and France's stockpile is very small ' 5 . POMCUS sites and ports. a i i y b:! t. veak chemical retaliatory capability vith the threat of nuclear response. and shock of the initial attack to preclude the political authorities :iom escalating to a nuclear response 27 . selective use on hlgh value targets such as NATO command . the defensive measures it vould be required to take to protect itself wou?$ degrade it to the point that in a few days it would be combat ineffective through the exhaustion of vorklng in chemical protective Along vith the advantages of using chemical veapons. high volume approach to a more Limited. the Soviets must still measure tkr effectively employ its chemical veapons. If it accepted the contaminated artillery shells. an artillery unit.they would soon feel the detrlmcntal effects of the Soviet chemical fires in the rear areas. Since 1176.and . A greater fear the Soviets have is that NATO vill compensate For it. The intent is to increase :he scr?rise US Assuming the US army'. the Soviets have modified their conceptual use of chemical fires from a broad spectrum. . The US stockpile is old but is slovly being modernlzcd. chemical retaliatory threat is extremely veak.:.control centers. could face the dilemma of accepting ammunition which had been contaminated in the rear area. Of primary concern vould be NATO's response to Soviet chemical fires.The 1985 Krocsen study suggests that even if the front line hl!mhat units were not targeted. itselE untouched by chemical fires. For example. has adequate means.

they can selectively target those areas that wou?2 fcrc+ SAT0 to operate in a chemically restricted defenve posture vhlle they vere fret t o move about unimpeded.us ?!-I- soviets 1s i f N A T ~ rzspi:lii<jsvltk rffective chz!rical fires units to operate in a degraded chemical Ccfenr. States is the only NATO member vith the means to c : y ar fr>rciflgsoviet The I'nitw: oct those chemica? fires. Even the legal question of violating the Geneva Convention signed in 1328 is moot. If the Soviets are the only ones using chemical veapons. Several membezs of NATO as well as the Warsav Pact ha'. The only vdy chemical warfare 4111 slav . Czechoslovakia. and Afghanistan shov the Soviets willing to risk vorld censure to achieve internal objectives. The real Soviet concern is vhether the US Army is trained to employ its limited chemical arsenal effectively. .The Soviet Union's concern for the political risks can best be vieved through an historical perspective. Actions in Hungary.?>:. Since the Soviets believe they can use chemicals vithout inviting a nuclear response. The only practical restraint to Soviet chemical use is deterrence. The Convention provides a loophole whereby a nation is not prohibited from first use of chemicals if its enemy or the enemy's allies are not signstoriez of t h e protocol./? aot ?O slgned the protocol alloving both sides to engage in chemical use-.'. Although there are certainly added political risks inherent in employing chemical veapons. they are insignificant compared to the risks of invading NATO in the first place28.ivc pos:arr. chemical varfare hampers their efforts only vhere it slovs d u n their operational tempo.

resgonsibility for the actual employment of chemical munitions has been delegated to the field artillery. Si:iii the only means available to the US Army are the 155mm and 203sm artillery systems. When Soviet planners consider the posslbllities of chemical retaliation and its detrlmental effect: on their operations.annex a division operations order used at the Army's National Training Center t n illustrate how our doctrinal application reflects a lack of education art2 training. detaillng the effects he vants chemical fires to achieve and what chemicals vill be incorporated into his scheme of maneuver. chemical shells should be considered as just . US doctrine calls for the commander. "plarxiny fcr the 2-f of chemical veapons is done within the fire support system according to the 1 same principles and procedures used for other means of fire support"-. integrating and executing chemical fires1 . operations officer and fire support coordinator (FSCOORD) at every level from brigade to corps to be responsible for planning.lnotht?r big bullet. The operations officer insures the FSCOORD understands the scheme of maneuver and incorporates fires to enhance t h e 25 . In other words.SECTION V-HOW WELL TRAINED ARE QE? In the previous section we saw that the Soviet Union had the capability and demonstrated the villingness to employ chemical weapons should they perceive an advantage to thelr use. fires vill be analyzed. This section details US doctrine and the The planning and execution of chemical :tj offensive use of chemical weapons. To them. as will a doctrinally correct fire support . only the United States Army currently has the realistic means of providing that retaliation. The commander gives his staff his guidance.

T5e . however. as well as asslstlnq the corps FSE wlth planning chemlcal flres sitcation does not improve at the division level 5 . The division chemical officer works with the dlvision fire support element (FSE) to perform a similar. Planners expecting a great deal of expert advlce on the employment nE chemical fires will be disappointed by the austere chemical staffs provided to tactical units. Thls staff 1s respon~lble for collecting. reallstical!y. collecting and disseminating NBC reports thra~~qhouthe dlviuion. The dlvlslon. The chemical officer at Corps level prepares the corps chemical plan under the supervision of the corps FSCOORD. as well as collating. Our doctrine. Their main function is to coordinate the actions oE the reconnaissance and decontamination platoons of the division chemical company. requires brigade staffs to plan and nominate chomical targets that will be incorporated into the division's artillery chemical flres plan 4 !s .lrra. with 8 dedicated to manning the NEC center with 2 4 hour staffing. He considers the number and type of chemical munitions and delivery systems and allocates those weapons based on the corps commander's guidance. They are a s~mallenough staff that they are t 26 . the lowest level that can provide detailed planning for chemical fires because it 1s the lowest level equlpped with a chemical planning stsff. Biological and Chemical INBC) center is manned by 5 offlcers and 8 enlisted soldiers who p r o v i d e 2 4 hour ztafflnq. The corps Nuclear. although more detailed plannlng function. evaluatlng and dlsseminatlnq NBC reports and data wlkhln the corps . The heavy division has a chemical staff of 13. The corps chemical officer is most likely the ccrps chemical battalion commander. collating. The chemical officer's function is to assist and advise the FSCOORD in the preparation of those fires3 .unit's operations.

The chemical staffs at the brigade and battalion have purely defensive functions. Their technical advice deals vith the characteristics of chemical agents and their effects on troops because that impacts on their defensive mission. The highly complex chemical target value analysis process involves making critical subjective value decisions. Doctrinally. The battalion's chemical staff consists of a lieutenant and NCO at battalion headquarters. brigade commanders and staffs to be familiar vith the employment of chemicals and to be able to plan and nominate targets to division. Some of the more obvious factors to consider are meteorological data and the physical aspects of the terrain at the target. and a chemical speci.llist i n each company to assist cummdnders with monitoring unit chemical defense 7 team and equipment proficiency Our doctrine expects battalion and . The brigade chernlcal officer and NCO monitor the brigade's chemical training in peacetime and assist and advise the commander regarding placement of attached chemical decontamination units to support the scheme of maneuver. Wind direction and speed impact on the dispersion of the chemical. The skills required to conduct a chemical target value analysis that recommends vhich targets to hit vith what munitions from what delivery systems are extremely complex and require special schooling--schooling the chemical branch school is not t a ~ k e st w provide 8 .e a ~ l l yoverwhelmed with the added coordination involved w i t h i n t e g r a t i n g addltlonal assets that the corps may provide the dlvision. as does the time of day when the agent is employed 27 . Chemical officers at that level are not trained to advise their commanders on chemical veapon employment. when the corps allocates additional units to the division it must also plan to send a Headquarters Detachment to augment the division chemical staff 6 .

against the expected damage to the enemy 10 Currently the only formal ~choollng . shape and orientation of the enemy taryet. The Command and General Staff Officers Course (CGSOC). The planner has to consider vhat impact the chemical fires vill have on current and planned operations as well as potential constraints on branches and sequels. that is not the case.31 fires and their integration vlth maneuver. The enemy situation has to be knovn. Combat Operations. that provides such training to officers is the Nuclear. taught to select officers at Fort Sill. so there surely must be some portion of an officer's formal schooling dedicated to employing chemical weapons. Their chemlcal ~taffsare tralned o s ! y t o advise on defensive measures. requires the student to study 187 hours of integrated varflgbting technlquej at the corps 28 3rd . the last opportunity for the army to offer its future brigade. Flnally. and logistical effort required for the chemical fires. but more specifically the size. and vhat delivery means vill give the particular e£fect desired. not only in terms of vhat he could be planning to do. Chemical Target Analysis Course. On the friendly side. future operations. (NCTAC). operations officers and fire support coordinator:: to be farolllar vlth the effects of chcntic. Our doctrine expects our commanders. the planner must know vhat type and quantity of munition is available. The course. division and corps staff officer with a common tactical base. has a required tactics course for resident students regardless of branch affiliation. so as to maximize the effects of the chemical fires. vho has it. Unfortunately.Vegetation and soil types determine how long an agent vill persist and how concentrated the vapor hazard vill be9 . the planner must determlne the relatlve vnrth of the proposed target in terms of the posslble rlsk to frlendly troops. Oklahoma11 .: - .

In a recent exercise the students portrayed the staff of the hypothetical X Corps in a European scenario. and the matter vas dropped 14 . Many groups do not discuss it at all. and the dcfrnslvc actions to be taken. As it is a subject matter to be vorked into the lesson. Consequently.dith obemicdl retaliatory fires. Only 6 hour: address che~nlcalwarfare. The Fourth Army G:o-2 operations order the staEf received omitted the chemical annex an:: the chemical fires portion of the fire support annex. not how well they plan and execute them. Our doctrine calls for Army ofEicers to be proficient . the actual amount of chemical varfare incorporated into the course is left up to the instructor. does not incorporate chemical employment in its tactics instruction. Even the School of Advanced Mllltary Studles tactical and (SAMS). there was no vay the corps staff could plan retaliatory measures. The subject of retaliatory fires vas discussed for a fev moments. when the board players representing the Soviet forces hit the corps area with chemical strikes. the NTC only evaluates how vrll units respond to chemical attacks. as a means of enhancing our chemical deterrence. Even our institutional evaluation process for training battalion and brigade staffs such as the National Training Center disregards this area. Yet. an acknovledged complex task. 29 . all devoted to dlscusslon of the effects on frlendly opcratlons. considered "too h a ~ dto do". In a system vhere those events that are evaluated are the events that ve train on. One merely has to recall the number of times he has trained in the planning and execution of chemical fires to appreciate how little training goes on in this field.divlslon level 12 . that is not vhat officers are being taught and it is certainly not vhat they are practicing in the field. should the Soviets employ chemicals13. a school dedicated to the study of both the operational level of var.

vith at least 15'1 casualtles as a mlnlmum. these requirements hamstring the brigade commander's freedom to employ chemical veapons. If the division commander must approve all chemical artillery fires before they can be employed. The brlgade nust nnmlnatr chemlc. vhile doctrinally correct. : : 1 .During a recent visit to the NTC. paragraphs.? w e d s .:. The division fire support annex detailing the requirements for the brigade's chemical target nominations. Major Charles Zimmerman. Although they are doctrinally correct. hov responsive can they be? One of the many advantaqes of artlllery I that it rcspon. an observer/controller for over 18 months. The division operation order (OPORD) is for an attack in zone. once he received expenditure authority from the corps commander. Those targets vould have to be approved by the division commander. Unfortunately.(l)(b) tells the division's brigades they may plan and nominate chemical targets. reported that he had yet to see chemlcal fires included in any brigade operations order even though the dlvlsion operatlons order given the brlgade staff for their planning purposes lnstructs them to plan and nominate chemlcal targets15. Paragraph c.31 targets at least 18 hours prior to desired time on target and the target description must include the radlus of the target 16 . illuminates the problem areas ve face due to our lack of training in this area. it is a doctrine which has not evolved very far from its World War I roots. The divlslvn OPORD's chemical appendix to the fire support annex follovs the doctrinal exanale in FM 6-20 (The appendix has been reprinted as appendix A for this paper). Crlterla for target selection 1s dellneated in later The division commander dictates vhat chemical agents may be employed and that casualty effects vill be 301 (preferred). vith the evaluated brlgade recelvlnq prlorltles of flre.lvr to the cnmander'.

but which are out of pldce on the modern battlefield. then includes all the above factors to determine hov many chemical rounds must be delivered in a given period of time to achieve the desired casualties18 . division expects the brigade commander in the attack to not only know where the chemical fires must be placed 18 hours from nov. requiring responsive fires when iiecded. Commanders expect their artillery and air force assets to delay. should the commander expect to be able to cannot be decreed. he must also knov the dimensions of that target. and cannot await the tlme consuming approval process. based on tables the chemical fires planner used to achieve effects de:ired in World War I. then.Attacks are fluid in nature. The tables the chemical planner uses to determine the amount of chemical 3grnt to be delivered to the target are found in FM 3-10B. Commanders realize they can no longer expect fire support systems to produce casualty rates on demand. Cther factors the planner considers are the casualties to be produced by the chemical agent and the training status of the enemy. dictate casualty rates for his chemical fires if he doesn't expect it from other fire support systems? The casualty effect and size of the proposed target are requirements. The plenner enters the table by knoving the radius of the target. Our current doctrine says that the brigade's deep battle begins 12 hours out 17 Yet the . Destruction to any degree is an obvious benefit. disrupt and disorganize the enemy. he is told that Rls chemical fires must achieve a certain amount of casualties to be considered successful. Additionally. . but one that Why. Those tables are predicated on the chemical agent and the dellvery system to be used.

More to the point. According to the NTC's divlsion operations order. a division structured with an organic artillery brigade of three 155mm battalions and one 8" battalion is incapable of firing that many rounds that quickly. An unclasslfied source calculated that to achleve 208-408 casualtles against a company-sized target. the total divlsion allocation of GB (a nonperslstent ncrvc agent) is almost half of vhat vould br rrqulred to br flrcd on lust t h a t companysized target. today's lethal battlefield The US Army can't fulfill that mission in . not have seemed out of the ordinary in World War I. Chemical fires require tremendous numbers of artillery shells to achieve significant number of enemy kills. for the most part. In that static form of varfare.000 rounds into one village alone vithid a 15 hour period20.Those tables are based on data gathered. it vas important to achieve a desired casualty rate to allow friendly troops a better chance ts penetrate enemy defenses. (the only modern unlt that vould fit vlthin a 500 meter radius area). The number of rounds required to achieve the desired casualties was not a critical factor because the tactics of that period alloved for the tremendous buildup of artillery rounds to support the planned offensive. cven if it had the chemical rounds!21 . Such a requirement vould In the March 1913 German offensive. the Germans fired 20. from World War I vhen chemical barrages were planned as regularly as conventional artillery fires. would require 1080 155mm GB filled artillery shells delivered on the target area vithin 15 seconds19.

Tralnlng at t h e NTC prepares units fur high intensity cc)iflbat. i-ct hov could that Instltutlon possibly produce a docunient so unreallatic: in its implementation? Has this point been raised before? The ansver may be that ve are not trained to employ chemical weapons. and therefore have no vay of knowing if vhat our doctrine tells us is right or not .

" 1 HG John G.. ..The US chemical veapons policy is to deter. Other tasks deal vith the supply.THE CONCLUSION ".me:mgr because it doesn't require a reply 3 . Yet their employment is not constrained by requiring permission to fire the misslon from higher commanders as is the case vith chemical fires. doesn't allov for a means of confirrnlng that Erlendly unlts have received the NBC 3 Strikevara. The report process. and retaliate. the deterrence leg is short. The order here is very significant. To avoid friendly casualties in the integration of chemical fires vith maneuver. like the three legs of a stool. defend.SECTION VI. hovever. all three elements must be in balance. One reason it requires approval from higher levels to use chemical fires are the constraints they can place on the subsequent movement of adjacent friendly units. Appel The problems associated vith our lack of training in the employment of chemical fires run far deeper than just the actual delivery of chemical munitions to the target. Among those tasks are the integration of chemical fires vith the scheme o f maneuver. storage and transportation of chemical veapons. In our schooling. One of the manuals issued CGSOC students lists 55 separate staff functions related to the employment of chemical fires2 . With the retaliatory leg virtually nonexistent. Lack of trainlng has also left us unprepared to employ chemical veapons in other vays as vell. we have created a complex series of reports that inform all units of enemy strikes and upcoming friendly chemical strikes. To be effective and credible. staffs are alloved to plan the use of artillery delivered scatterable mines vhose terrain limiting potential capability exceeds that of nonpersistent GB.

The regulations obviously make sense as they apply to peacetime safety and environmental considerations. Security measures for storing chemical rounds in peacetime are far more stringent than those required for conventional rounds. Our doctrine called for specially trained chemical units to store. it would prevent using helicopters to deliver chemical rounds as we now use them for conventional artillery rounds. Escorts must travel in vehicles with the cargo inspected and sealed. Some of the requirements would place too great an administrative burden to make tactical sense. on routes that have been requested and cleared ahead of time 4 . transport and employ our chemical weapons in World War 11. details a litany of restrictive regulatlons requlred when chemical agents are shipped. . Among them are armed escorts. m h n l c a l Escort Ooerations. but the circular makes no distinction between combat and peacetime conditions. Should we have to follov these regulations under combat conditions. conventional units assume this additional duty and they have not trained for it. special ammunition storage points (ASP) will be required vith the additional staffing that entails. Storage of the chemical rounds poses another problem.A host of problems arlse once approval has been glvrn by the natlonal command authorlty to allocate chemlcal rounds to unlts. Field Manual 3-20. but it is a different matter to those who have to store and deliver it. Delivering nerve agents (the only agents ve employ) by air is even more restrictive. If those procedures continue under combat conditions. The chemical artillery round may be just another bullet to those who fire it. trained and equipped to decontaminate whatever agents they are carrying. Under our current doctrine.

There 1s no reason why a chemlcal ofElcer should attend a field artillery school to ledrn to employ the veapons at vhlch he 1s supposed to be an expert. Webster recently disclosed that Libya is building the largest chemicdl weapons plant the agency has ever seen. we should fault military proEessionals vho are not knowledgeable in the use of this tool. "the International community will have to face up to the reallty that the taboo on the use of chemlcal weapons has been weakened I £ not destroyed" 5 . ve must then recognize our responsibility to be proflclent in all aspects of thls form of warfare. combat 36 . Even if the Soviet Union should refraln from using chemlcal varfare in its future endeavors there are many Third World nations just nov waking up to its potential. Training I n the offensive use of chemlcal veapons should not undercut our nation's stated desire to banish future chemical varfare any more than improving our capability to fight in a uonventlonal manner undercuts our nation's desire for future peace. Once ve acknowledge that chemical veapons are here to stay. The chemical threshold has been breached too many times in the recent past to serve as an effective barrier to future use. There are several actions the Army can take to correct this deficiency.Chemical weapons are just one of many tools in our tool box. The first step is to recognize that the spectre of chemical varfare is here to stay. As a recent magazine article said. and that 20 other nations were developing chemical veapons 6 . CIA Director William H. The second step is to integrate the full spectrum of chemical warfare into our formal education system. Just as ve vould fault a craftsman for not knowing how to use the tools of his trade.

and thereby greatly degrading their ability to conduct var 7 Should the enemy choose not . This measured sprinkling of chemical rounds is within our capabilities to execute. shoved just hov having to vork in a chemical environment disrupts the command and control of tactical units and degrades their ability to perform their missions. The CANE report. thus insurlng that all officers asslgned to brigade. yet the added . to increase his defensive posture. of cornhat support asseta such as attack hellcoptrr~ and field artillery. division and corps staffs have a working knovledge and appreciation for the offensive use of chemical weapons. forcing his soldiers into their chemical protective gear. Why allow them to defer to a "technical expert" on the fundamentals of employing chemical veapons to make up for their lack of knovledge? A11 officer advanced courses should lncoryoratc the employment of chemical veapons in thelr tactics instruction. he risks casualties above what would othervise be expected. we merely need to intersperse chemical shells vithln conventional artillery fires. The number of gas shells should be just enough to activate the enemy's chemical alarms. Nev doctrinal concepts should be introduced to bring us closer to the realities of modern combat. Instead of firing massive numbers of chemical shells to achieve lethal total dose concentrations. Such instruction should be reinforced in the Command and General Staff Officers Course. ve can shape our doctrine to meet our capabilities. Rather than overwhelm our current capabilities to suit the requirements of an outdated chemical doctrine.arnls officers are required t-o h a w a working understanding of the employment. mentioned earlier.

coordinate and deliver chemical fires. One other advantage is that fever unlts vould then be involved vith picking up and transporting chemical rounds from their storage sites. A determination must be made vhether to dedicate one unit to f : ie all chemical rounds or unlts. The initlal rotatlons to the NTC vere so evaluated before the process vas administratively deleted by the control cell at the NTC as too hard to control 8 . or that these ideas belong in the "too hard to do" drawer. Artillery units should be evaluated on their ability to plan. Units at the NTC should be evaluated on their ability to plan and deliver chemlcal fires as vell as their abillty to defend against chemlcal attacks. distribute the chemical rounds to all Eiring Consolldatlng chemical rounds in one unit obviously limits tbe flexibility of artillery fires. in combat. but until binary rounds are all fielded.complexities it forces on the enemy greatly enhances the effects of our conventional fires. we still have to vork with old rounds that have a reputation 9 consolldatlon vould limit the for leaklng around the fuze vells . must surely realize that. The only vay we will be able to execute this modified form of chemical fires effectively is to require units to incorporate chemical fires in thelr tactical training. number of crews vorklnq vlth old shells who mlght have to operate in an increased MOPP status. Division CPXs should include the storing and transporting of chemlcal munltlons to develop vorkable operatlnq procedures. chemlcal oyeratlons do not magically becnmr easier or wrr simple in their 38 . Critics vho vould say that these measures unnecessarily complicate the "real" training that must occur.

interaction with conventional operations. When the United States began to implement its chemical varfare modernization program to improve its offensive capability. the politlcal aspect of this subject can be used to our advantage against our greatest threat. The message is clear. To those vho vould argue that our reneved emphasis on offensive chemical employment sends our allies the wrong message. At some point in our deliberations ve realized ve 39 . reallstlc tralnlng will make these complex operatlons more effectlve. bt:t s!l~u:d ve have to respond. Considered a liability by many. a group of US officers sat at a table vargaming the possible outcomes involved in their planned course of action. Merely stating that ve will retaliate does not give us the cdpability to do so. ve are sending a clear message to our enemies. I vould respond that it vas an allied officer who started me on this project. we can do so effectively. schooling our officers in chemical weapons and training our units to employ those veapons properly. the Soviet Unlon. Only extensive. we vould prefer not to use chemical veapons. the Soviets responded by pushing for a treaty banplng chemical veaponsll. The dilemma that accompanies the use of chemical veapons is its political ramifications. halted its chemical program. A purely defensive policy is not as effective a deterrent as one that offers a credible retaliation capability. Last year during a corps level exercise. The Soviets have always taken When the United States a serious interest in our chemical program. It is obvious that our lack of training further degrades By once again the limited credibility of our retaliation policy. the Soviets responded by creatinq the most rapid expansion to date of their chemical varfare capability 10 .

By the look on our faces.had committed all of our assets but vould still be unable to delay or disrupt an approaching Soviet force. An allied officer watching us finally came over and suggested hitting that force with chemicals to slow it down. . politically it vas feasible. That an allied officer should have to remind US officers about a capability for vhich they were once respected world wldc should never happen again. Whether or not chemical use would have been effective is really not the point. the Soviet force had used chemicals several days previously. In the scenario. so. it vas painfully obvious that using chemical weapons had never entered our minds.

Release for use vill be transmitted per SOP for approval by division commander on release by Corps commander. (b) Toxic chemicals may be planned. A-1 . 3-3 FA 5-18 FA* a u 83 41 8 3 41 * When DS to 1st Brigade. c. VX: Employ for delayed casualties and contamination.ilty achievement for target engagement is target neutralization (15 percent qasualties). EXECUTION a. Fractional Casualties: a Preferred fractional casualty achievement is target destruction (30 percent casualties). 3. (3) Miscellaneous: (a) Casualty Effects: 1. 2. 3.Appendix A: ANNEX D (FIRE SUPPORT ) TO OPLAN 88-14 Notea Only that portlun of the annex deallng with chemical fires is copied belov. GB: Employ for immediate casualties. b Minimal acceptable fractional casu. b. (b) Nominations vill be made to Division G3 NLT 18 hours prior to desired time on target. (omitted) (omitted) Chemlcal Support: (1) General: (a) Priority of support to 3d Brigade initially.

Expected c a s u a l t i e s . Time on t a r g e t . Type of t a r g e t . 4.( c ) A l l nomlnatlons v l l l include: 1. 3. . 2. Slze of t a r g e t ( r a d i u s i n m e t e r s ) .

: Pergamon-Brassey's.51. 5. 19R2). Ibid. 3 Ibid. Maupin. Ft. (New York: Hall & Wong. p. p. . (Washington D. 5-3. Chemical . Section I1 1 Robert Harris h Jeremy Paxman. "Why Weren't Chemical Agents Used In WW II?"... Department of the Army. 4 re Serv I Warfare Service. 45-46. Leavenvorth.C.C. 2 Hugh Stringer. Department of the 7 Interview with LTC Larry S. p. Command and Geeneral Staff College. 49-50. 5 Harris h Paxman. 2 Ibid. p. KS. A Hiqher Form Of Killinq: The Secret Storv Of Chemical And Biolosical Warfare. p..: July 19421. 216. LTC Maupin is a tactics instructor for the Center for Army Tactics (CTAC).C. Chemical branch.: 31 December 19841. July 19871. Hereafter listed as Stringer. June 1987. Fire s l ~ o r t Cn h p In Army. (Washington D. 5 FM 100-5.. Technical Escort Ooerations. p. (Washington D. 107. pp. p.41. 6 7 8 9 Edward Fisher. 6 FM 6-20.ENDNOTES Section I 1 Field Manual (FM) 3-100. c e Office of the Chief. Department of the Army.: July 19811. Ooeratlons. 3-24. Chemical Armv Review.C. p. (Washington D. peterrins Chemical Warfare: US Policv Decisions For The 1990s.C.30. NBC Ooerations. Ibid.C. p. A Hiqher Form.. pp. 116. (Washington D.. (Washington D.114 Ibid. 110-111.53. Hereafter listed as Harris h Paxman. . Department of the Army. 4 FH 3-20.: 19851. p. p. A pp.: 19861.

2 3 H a r r i s 6 Paxman.C. A p r i l 1941. March 1985. 1942.10 H a r r i s & Paxman. Chemical Warfare I n S o u t h e a s t Asia And A f a h a n l s t a n R e ~ 0 r tTo C o n s r e s s . A p r i l 1941. 1 Ibid. 38. "Chemical Weapons: D u l l Swords I n US Armory". . 64. p. 1 3 Chemical Warfare R e f e r e n c e Data. A Hiaher Form. p. S e c t i o n I11 1 Alexander Haig. ( F o r t Leavenvorth. 116.. J a n u a r y . p. O ~ e r a t i o n s . H a r r i s & Paxman. 6 . A p. S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e . p. p p . 1 pp. (Washington D. H a r r i s & Paxman.: 19821. 4 1 H a r r i s & Paxman. p.C. 1 2 9 . . J u l y 1942. 116-117. 234. Command And G e n e r a l S t a f f School. p. S i e b e r t & Yeam H . Fisher. Chemical Warfare S e r v i c e B u l l e t i n . Department of S t a t e . t d l y h t ~ lFhcr~Ym. 1942. The War Department. p. p .. A Hiqher Form. 1 2 1 . p. 135. October. 135. 26 27 28 Harris & Paxman. Choi. KS: 1 9 3 9 ) . 119-120. 1 8 . 126. pp 12-13. 18-21. pp. p. A H i s h e r Form. I b i d . A Hiaher form. 12-21 Harris & Paxman. (Washington D. pp. 26. M i l i t a r y Reviev. 170. p. Ibid. 57.. p. Chemical Warfare S e r v i c e B u l l e t i n . 1 5 June 12 F 100-5. .: M 19441. Chemical Warfare S e r v i c e B u l l e t i n . Haig. p. Chemical Warfare S e r v i c e B u l l e t i n . 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 m m i c a l Warfare S e r v i c e B u l l e t i n . 21 22 23 24 25 Major George W . a e m i c a l Warfare R e f e r e n c e Data. p. p . p. 16. 127. A H i a h e r Form Of K i l l i n q .

p . commission. 9 10 1 Ibid.4 5 I b i d . 5 6 H a r r i s & Paxman. . 3 2 David S e g a l . p. p. p 29.. -1 . 4 G e n e r a l F r e d e r i c k Kroesen. 22-23. 13. p . . I b i d . Gold... S i x t e e n N a t i o n s . : 10 Segal. Haig. 4 .27. I b i d . 6 7 8 Ibid. p . 22 August 1988. Ibid. J a n u a r y 19851... . 6. 13 S e c t i o n IV 1 Dennis M i l l e r . . p. Leavenvorth. "Chemical Warfare. e G e n e r a l S t a f f C o l l e g e . A ~ ~ q h Form. 47 e r I b i d . p . p . H a r r i s & Paxman. 46. . 6 6 .1 5 . M i l l e r v a s q u o t i n g t h e n A s s i s t a n t t o t h e S e c r e t a r y of Defense f o r c h e m i c a l m a t t e r s . 8 Segal. KS: c oaos o mn And ~r t n. August 1985. 20-21. p . pp. 1 8 . . Theodore S.US P o l i c y And C a p a b i l i t y " . m. p . m ad l~ 19871. pp.. Harris h Paxman. C . 4 2 . 145. sis O f C k m i c a l Warfare o w r a t i o n s . 25. . I b i d . A H l s h e r form. p. p. 15. p . V A : I n s t i t u t e f o r Defense A n a l y s e s . 235-236. "The S o v i e t U n i o n ' s Mighty Chemical Warfare Machine". 46. 236. 9 W a l t e r S t o e s s e l (Chairman). August 1987. p . p . (Washington D . ( F t . A H i s h e r Form. ( A l e x a n d r i a . " R e t u r n Of The S i l e n t K i l l e r " . m. Time. 1 12 J i l l Smolove. p 27. 7 S t u d e n t t e x t (ST) 3-1. pp. 1-37. . R ~ D O K f~ The Chemical Warfare Review O 19851.

24 SH 3-800. 'Chemical War-Deadly For Our Side?". Reoort Of The Chemical Warfare Review Commission. May 1985. Warsav Pact members vho are not signatories Include East Germany.. US Army Chemical School. 18 Segal m. p. 3. p. NATO members who have not signed the protocol include Spain. 42. Sovlet Armv: Tronnc. December 1986.. 20 Ibid. and Hungary. p. 34. 28. 42.. Greece. Pnalvsis Of Chemical Warfare Oaerations.C. 4-15. 22 Ibid. p . u. 16 Segal. 32-33. 15. The 1925 Geneva protocol provides a legal loophole. September 1987. 24. pp. Poland. 28. 29 Kroesen. p. or vhose allies haven't signed the protocol. 13 FM 100-2-3. National Guard. 26. 42. !y 14 Segal. 53. p. p. p. Italy and Turkey. Winnina In A Nuclear/Chemical Environment. 19 George Schecter 6 Ammon Birenzvige. Amy. p. "Toxic Chemical Training". (Fort McClellan. 21 Ibid. 25 General Frederick Kroesen.. w o r t Of The chemical Warfare Reviev commls&!n.. 27 Stoessel. p. p. &! . 23 Stringer. 4-19. "Cities: Inviting Targets For Chemical Attack". 34. (Washington D.. Armv Chemical Revlev. 42. 17 Captain Chris Parker. 26 Stringer. p. 15 Stoessel. 4-14. 28 Ibid.: 16 July 1984). p. and Department of the Army. allovinq a signatory such a s the Soviet Union to legally employ chemical weapons first against an adversary vho is not a signatory. p. p 43. 0I4m. AL: July 19871.12 Ibid. p. p. .

The rate of flre for each system 1s too slov for that. p . NBC O~erations. 52nd Mech Division. (Ft. p. School OF Advanced Milltary Studies. p. Corps Exercise. Ibid. Em~lovmentOf Chemical Asent~. Department of the Army. Ibid. to OPORD 88-14. p. fire Support..Department of the Army. 2-2. Intervlev vith LTC Maupin. Ft. Chemical Staffs And Units. KS: 20 October 19881. 19 Stringer. p . 3-31. 15 OPORD 88-14. 20. p. Leavenvorth. 50. To Eire 1. 59.Section V 1 2 EM 3-100. 31. p.: 22 April 19871. At 24 tubes per battalion that is 96 tubes in the division capable of firing chemical shells. Fire S u o ~ o r tIn Combined Ooerations. Ibid. ~. A Hiqher Form. 3-24. (Washington D.C. (Ft.. HQs. KS: 19881. p 73. 21 Our heavy divisions have artillery brigades made up vith 3xl55mm Bns and one 8" battallon. 11 Interviev vith LTC Maupin. Observer/Controller dlvlslon. 6 7 8 9 FM 3-10. C-1-3. I K V ~ CA..: March 19661. C-4-5. p. p.. 16 Annex D. Ibid. EM 6-20. 20 Harris & Paxman.080 shells vithin 15 seconds requires eac:h tube to flre over 11 shells at the r. Command And General Staff College.. National Training Center. Leavenworth. 47 . 18 Interviev vith LTC Maupin. Course Tvo: Tactical Dvnamics. p . C-9. (Washington D. 1)-2. p. 13 Interview vith LTC Maupin 14 Lesson 2-33. D-3. 181400 Aug 88..?te of one per second. 10 Ibid. p. 3 4 5 FM 3-101. 12 Command And General Staff Officers Course Cataloq AY 1988-1989.C.

C. p. 2. 6. & Escort Oocr?tlonJ. The Kansas City Timeg. 26 October. Webster. FM 3-20. u. Department of the Army. p. 4.: April 1987). Interviev with Captain Baltazar. C. Spring 1986. The-NTC stopped allowing Blue (US) forces to employ chemical fires because it vas too difficult to admlnistratively plot the dovn vlnd hazard areas and then assess OPFOR casualties vithin those areas. Fundamentals Of NBC Ooerations. "Libya Building Chemical veapons Plant". 17. 3. Appel. p. MG John G. 10. survivability assessment point of contact at the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALI. 188. 1988. & d (Washington D. Stoessel. 25 11. A-3. R e ~ 0 r tOf The Chemical Warfare Reviev Commision. 47. From interviev vith LTC Maupin. Interviev vlth LTC Maupin. 8. Ibid. 5. 7. pp.. Technical Escort Ooerations. p. William H. 77. CGSC. who suggested this technique to me as being far more efficient than attempting a total dose artillery barrage. FC 3-20. p. 9. weal J o u u & . . 11-17.1. ST 3-1. yet is as effective in terms of degrading the target unit's ability to function. CTAC. p.p. l . (Washington D. Department of the Army %.: July 19811. 1-21. Smolove.

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