Pakistan: The Role of Religion in Political Evolution B.M.

Chengappa, Senior Fellow

Abstract This article provides an insight into the demand of the Islamic fundamentalist p arties for an Islamic state today. The fundamentalists opposed the creation of P akistan because it contradicted orthodox Islamic thinking. However, after the fo rmation of Pakistan these groups who experienced a sense of alienation sought de sperately to establish an Islamic state. Pakistan was created as a Muslim state and therefore religion has a distinct rol e in its political evolution. This role can be categorised into two phases, name ly, the pre-partition and the post-partition periods. In the pre-partition phase Islam was used as an effective instrument of political mobilisation in order to achieve a Muslim state. However, once the political objective of nationhood was accomplished then there was a marked decline in the leadership's emphasis on th e role of religion. As a result, a conflict of ideology arose because the leader ship desired a secular state while the people yearned for a Muslim nation. Pakistan was formed on the basis of the two nation theory which lost its relevan ce on August 11, 1947, when the Quaid-I-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah made a public s tatement that religion was a private affair of the individual and highlighted th e equality of religions. The anti-Ahmadiya riots, the Objectives Resolution, the Basic Principles Committee Report and the 1962 Constitution only highlighted th e role of religion in the political evolution of Pakistan. Today the creation of Pakistan itself is seriously under question by a party whi ch considers itself the "creator of Pakistan" and therefore the role of religion in the country's political evolution gains both relevance and topicality. The I ndian Muslims, actually spearheaded the movement for nationhood, and helped to c reate Pakistan. Three decades later their progeny founded a political party name d the Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM) in the mid 1980s to ensure that they were n ot politically marginalised by the Punjabi establishment in Pakistan. The MQM leader Altaf Hussain, exiled in London, recently questioned the wisdom u nderlying the formation of the Muslim state by their fathers five decades ago.1 The Indian Muslims had demanded a political partition from British India to form a separate nation state on the basis of religion and the two nation theory whic h resulted in Pakistan. The MQM leader has even addressed a questionnaire to the Pakistani intelligentsia to elicit their views on the ideology of Pakistan. Altaf Hussain opines that the ideology of Pakistan has been abandoned long ago b y its rulers. He categorically rejects the existing federal structure wherein an all-powerful Centre controlled by the overbearing civil and military establishm ent makes the federating units dance to their tune. Hussain therefore wants a ne w constitution in accordance with the 1940 Lahore Resolution wherein Pakistan wa s to comprise "constituting independent states". The MQM leader wants the smalle r provinces of the country to be given their due rights. In this context, Hussai n has demanded a new constitution in order to ensure that the interests of the s maller provinces are protected from the Centre. The MQM leader in an interview t o the Pakistani news magazine The Herald said: If the smaller provinces and the ethno-linguistic minorities feel threatened by the majority rule as was the case before the partition of the subcontinent one would find it difficult to justify the two nation theory.2

The founding fathers of Pakistan proposed the political idea on the basis of the "two nation theory" as a homeland for South Asian Muslims. It suited them to do so initially in order to mobilise the Indian Muslim masses in the struggle towa rds nationhood. Yet the orthodox Muslim clergy opposed the idea of a separate st ate because they believed that religion was not the basis for nationhood and onl y common territory defines a nation. Whereas the Western-educated Muslim elite s tated that their common religion of Islam was adequate to form a nation. The fact that Pakistan became a reality despite resistance from fundamentalist e lements proved to be problematic for the latter. These fundamentalist clerics re presented religious parties and initially in the pre-partition period opposed th e concept of Muslim nationalism on the grounds that it contradicted orthodox Isl amic thinking. After the formation of Pakistan these fundamentalists suffered fr om a sense of marginalisation. In order to overcome this alienation they argued that since the state was achieved on the basis of Islam, the next political obje ctive was for the state to transform itself into an Islamic one.3 Thus Islam hel ped these religious parties which had no moorings in the new state to carve a ni che for themselves and advertise their nationalist credentials. The 'Father of Pakistan' Quaid-I-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah in his inaugural addre ss to the Pakistan Constituent Assembly on August 11, 1947 clearly stated that r eligion was a private affair of the individual and highlighted the equality of r eligions. To quote: "In course of time all these angularities of the majority and the minority commu nity will vanish You are free, you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other places of worship in the State of Pakistan. Y ou may belong to any religion or caste or creed that has nothing to do with the bu siness of the State We should keep that in front of us as our ideal and you will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would ce ase to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State. Obviously the strength of the obscurantists, of those who would perpetuate Muslims as Mus lims and Hindus as Hindus in the political sense as well was under-estimated bec ause in less than two years' time, on March 1949 the Objectives Resolution was m oved pledging the Constituent Assembly to the building up of an Islamic Constitu tion."4 In tune with this it may be recalled that in October 1999, General Pervez Mushar raf categorically stated that the Turkish leader Kemal Ataturk was his role mode l and his desire was for a similar political system in the country,5 soon after he took over the reins of government from the deposed Prime Minister Nawaz Shari f. Once again this only validates the thinking that the Muslim elite were keen o n having a secular state for themselves and to that extent far removed from orth odox pretensions. In Pakistan, Islam has always influenced various spheres of life: society, cultu re, economy, law and politics. For instance, the status of non-Muslims, adherenc e to a social code of conduct, interest free banking, forms of punishment, laws related to inheritance and divorce and the role of clergy illustrate this point. The paper therefore seeks to explain the role of religion in the context of the clash for power between the religio-political parties and the secular ones in t he country. Aim The paper aims to examine the confusion in the conception of Pakistan which was first envisaged as a Muslim state and subsequently created as a democratic natio n. The attempt to ride two horses pulling in opposite directions namely a religiou s state and a democratic state clearly underlined the contradiction in the constit

ution. This is because the concept of an Islamic state clashes with the idea of a democracy. It attempts to explain the role of religion in the pre-partition and post-partit ion periods. While a sense of Muslim communalism and Muslim nationalism characte rised the pre-partition period, the post-partition period started on a secular s tatement of the Quaid-I-Azam which amounted to be a contradiction of the two nat ion theory. Subsequently, Pakistan witnessed sectarianism in the form of anti-Ahmadiya riots and the beginning of a demand for an Islamic state in the country which manifes ted in the Objectives Resolution, the Basic Principles Committee Report and the 1962 Constitution. Thereafter, with the secession of East Pakistan the religio-p olitical parties sought to strengthen the ideological basis for Pakistan and inc orporated Islamic injunctions into the 1973 constitution. Finally the Zia regime officially pronounced a state policy which sponsored Islam. Muslim Communalism Wilfred Cantwell Smith describes Muslim communalism which evolved into the ideol ogy of Muslim nationalism. "Communalism in India may be defined as that ideology which has emphasised as th e social, political and economic unit the group of adherents of each religion, a nd has emphasised the distinction even the antagonism, between each group; the w ords "adherents" and "religion" being taken in the most nominal sense, Muslim co mmunalists, for instance, have been highly conscious of the Muslims within India as a supposedly single, cohesive community, to which they devote their loyalty pa ying little attention to whether the individuals included are religiously ardent , tepid, or cold; orthodox, liberal, or atheist; righteous or vicious; or whethe r they are landlord, prince or proletarian; also paying little attention to Musl ims outside India."6 The view that religion per se was not a consideration for the creation of Pakist an also needs elaboration. It is believed that a combination of political, socia l and economic issues in the 19th century led to the demand for a Muslim state t o be carved out from British India.7 The genesis of Muslim separatism can be tra ced to the need for social purity, the lack of job opportunities for Muslm youth , a comparatively weak entrepreneurial Muslim class, and the separate electorate s for Muslims and Hindus. The issue of social purity is based on religion and needs to be understood in th e context of the decline of Muslim power heralded by the ascendancy of the Briti sh Crown in India. Shah Waliullah and other Muslim revivalists in the subcontine nt attempted to preserve the distinct identity of the Muslim community through s trict adherence to pure Islam. These individuals felt that the Indian Muslims ha d become socially and culturally "polluted" owing to their close association wit h Hindus. They felt that the only solution was to avoid contact with other commu nities in the country. Therefore this thinking gradually gained ground among the Indian Muslim community and then transformed into the need to distance themselv es from the Hindus through the creation of a separate homeland and pursue their religion without extraneous influences. The Muslims as a community had not availed English education in the country owin g to their historical mind set of being erstwhile rulers of the land and notion that their knowledge of the Persian language was synonymous with the "French of the East". As a result, the Muslim youth were unable to get suitable jobs in the British Indian government unlike their Hindu counterparts. The Muslim community since generations had been a part of the ruling nobility an

d their subordinates lacked an orientation for business and commercial activitie s. This led to a situation where their entrepreneurial classes would have to com pete with the Hindu trader community which was financially stronger. The introdu ction of separate electorates and the reservation of legislative seats for Musli ms and Hindus was another political consideration which denied the Muslims the n ecessary level of representation. The British Indian government had two categori es of seats designated 'General' and 'Muslim' wherein the Muslims could vote onl y for members of their own community and the sheer numerical inferiority vis--vis the Hindus put them at a disadvantage. Muslim Nationalism Islam entered the subcontinent around 1,275 years ago with Arab traders settling down on the west coast at Calicut in 633 A..D. in the time of Umar. However, Mu slim military presence was established only in 712 A.D. during the Umayyad perio d. The modern period begins from the 1857 War of Indian Independence against the British Indian regime. The two Islamic highpoints in India are the Wahabi movem ent in the 19th century and the Pakistan movement in the 20th century. Muslim re ligious leaders realised that Islam could not survive without political power an d that Islam and Hinduism were antithetical so therefore only one of the religio ns could thrive at the expense of the other. The ulama were hostile to the British regime, as they viewed them as a non-Musli m occupation power. However, the Muslim elite led by Sir Syed Ahmed Khan (1817-1 898), who sought to reform his co-religionists, was a loyalist to the crown. Aft er the 1857 uprising the British placated the Muslim nobility because they neede d Muslim support to act as a counterpoise to the Indian National Congress which nurtured anti-British sentiments. The British regime therefore backed Sir Syed A hmed Khan against the Congress who discouraged Muslims to involve themselves in Congress activity thus giving rise to Muslim politics and Muslim nationalism in modern India. Sir Syed Ahmed Khan was the father of the Pakistan movement consid ering he had speculated on the political destiny of the Indian Muslims as early as 1888. Sir Syed stated: Is it possible that under these circumstances two nations the Mohammedan and Hindu c ould sit on the same throne and remain equal in power? Most certainly no. It is necessary that one of them should conquer the other and thrust it down. To hope that both could remain equal is to desire the impossible and the inconceivable.8 The British regime partitioned Bengal into a new province of Eastern Bengal in O ctober 1905. The Hindu leadership interpreted this as a British move to neutrali se the growing Indian nationalism. In turn they started a movement to annul this partition which culminated in the boycott of British goods. The Muslims realise d the advantages of an Eastern Bengal because they were in a majority of almost six million people. The next development was the Muslim leadership's demand for separate representation for the Muslims at all levels of government. The grand political finale was the formation of ecember 30, 1906 at Dacca which was the capital ite who feared Hindu domination in a democratic tablished the League. To that extent the Muslim ress claim to represent all Indians. The League present Muslim interests. the All India Muslim League on D of Eastern Bengal. The Muslim el system based on majority rule es League remained wary of the Cong projected itself as a body to re

The League's objectives were (a) to promote among the Muslims a sense of loyalty to the British government (b) to ensure that their political rights and interes ts were not violated (c) to develop a better understanding between the Muslims a nd other communities. Constitutional recognition accorded to the principle of se parate electorates in the Government of India Act of 1909 gave the League the st atus of an all-India party.

Eventually the partition of Bengal was annulled in 1911 and thereafter other pol itical developments impacted on the Muslim politics in the subcontinent. In the post-annulment period the new Muslim leadership was influenced by pan-Islamic te achings of Jamal al-Din Afghani and some Indian Muslim scholars. Around this tim e the Muslim states in the Middle East and North Africa witnessed a political de cline while the European powers gained against them. This chain of events also h elped to generate a spirit of brotherhood among the Indian Muslims and their coreligionists in those countries. The new clutch of Muslim newspapers reflected t his trend in the country. At this stage in the Muslim League there appeared a group of liberal minded Musl ims who were dissatisfied with the policy of "unconditional loyalism" and advoca ted a change which implied cooperation with the Congress to struggle together fo r constitutional reforms. These liberals were labelled the "progressives" and we re led by Mohammad Ali Jinnah who was till then an active Congress member. The o pponents of this policy were called the "Conservatives" headed by Sir Muhammad S hafi a loyalist Muslim from Punjab. The progressives prevailed and this resulted in the Congress-Muslim League Lucknow Pact of 1916. Congress leader GK Gokhale praised MA Jinnah who was hailed as the "ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity". The Lucknow Pact was to be the only agreement between the two parties in the constit utional history of India. The First World War had its own impact on the Muslim League when its more outspo ken leaders who favoured a pro-British policy on Turkey (which had joined the ce ntral powers) were incarcerated by the government. Thereafter in 1918 the ulama first made its appearance on the League platform which turned out to be short-li ved. At the end of the war the League leadership feared the disintegration of Tu rkey and started to work for the Khilafat in order to avoid hostile post-war con sequences for the Islamic Caliphate. The ulama organised themselves into a separ ate party the Jamat-al-Ulama-i-Hind and together with the Congress which was fig hting for home rule they generated an anti-British sentiment. This development helped foster Hindu-Muslim unity for two years. However, with t he abolition of the Khilafat by the Turkish National Assembly in 1924 the All In dia Khilafat Committee continued to function ineffectually till 1930. Thereafter the Hindus and Muslims were at loggerheads once again. The Muslim League which was inactive from 1920 came to life. Its President MA Jinnah stated that the par ty's revival aimed at bringing about Hindu-Muslim amity. The Muslims became susp icious of the Hindu demand for the reversal of the system of separate electorate s. Thereafter, the Hindu-Muslim animosity heightened and found expression in riots and communal killings from the late 1920s to the early 1930s. The Hindus started a movement called sangathan (binding together) to train their co-religionists i n martial arts for use in the communal riots. They also organised a programme of shudhi (purification) which was aimed to convert Muslims to Hinduism. As a resp onse the Muslims organised tanzeems (organisations) and tabligh (missionaries) t o counter the Hindu initiatives. These militant activities drew widespread invol vement from large sections of both communities. Initially Allama Dr Sir Mohammad Iqbal demanded a Muslim state in the 1930 annua l session of the Muslim League at Allahabad. And so the idea of a separate Musli m state is attributed to the poet-philosopher because he raised the issue in his presidential address of the League. He envisioned a single self-governing Musli m state within or without the British Empire in the Northwest by amalgamating th e Muslim majority provinces the Punjab, Sind, NWFP and Baluchistan. While the political proposition of Muslim statehood was not readily accepted in India, it fired the imagination of a small group of Muslim students at Cambridge

. In 1933 Chowdhary Rahmat Ali, a Punjabi student at Cambridge University, print ed a pamplet titled 'Now or Never' in which he claimed that the Hindus and the M uslims were two distinct nations with completely different social systems. There fore, the creation of a separate independent Muslim state was necessary. He stat ed that PAKISTAN stood for P-Punjab, A-Afghanistan (North West Frontier Province ), K-Kashmir and ISTAN-Sind and Baluchistan. While in Urdu PAK meant pure and IS TAN was land and collectively amounted to a 'Land of the Pure'. In October 1938 the Sind chapter of the League at a conference urged the council of All India Muslim League to review the demand "for political self-determinati on of the two nations Muslims and Hindu"; the issue of a future constitution to se cure "legitimate status" for the Muslims to attain "full independence". After si x months the working committee appointed a team to assess the various viewpoints on the subject. Finally a decision was taken at the Lahore session of the Leagu e on March 26, 1940 and the Lahore Resolution (later known as the Pakistan Resol ution) acknowledged Muslim acceptance of the constitutional plan. To quote: Resolved that it is the considered view of this session of the All India Muslim League that no constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptan ce to the Muslims unless it is designed on the following principle viz., that ge ographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so con stituted, with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary, that the area s in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority, as in the northwestern and eastern zones of India, should be grouped to constitute independent states in w hich the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign.9 The Muslim League successfully organised the Muslims into a political party thro ugh their demand for Pakistan which revived memories of past glories and promise d prospects of a great future. And the Quaid-I-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah created Pakistan with the termination of British rule in the Indian subcontinent. This w as possible because there was a clamour for Islamic government, Islamic state an d Islamic constitution among sections of the Indian Muslim community. The Problem of Ideology After Pakistan became a reality, the Muslim leadership who had their own values which were not in consonance with those of their brethren in the clergy, preferr ed to do away with the two nation theory. The Muslim elite cherished the concept of a secular state, but could not pursue their ideals since during the pre-part ition phase they had sold the line about the formation of a religious state to t he masses. Now that the desired political goal was achieved and the state in terms of terri tory and polity had taken shape the people yearned for their religious homeland. In fact they actually rejected the notion of a secular state and are supposed t o have given expression to such an intention on one occasion. As a result, the M uslim leadership had to unwillingly yield to the larger will of the people and p romote the concept of Pakistan as a religious state. Therefore the role of relig ion in nation building was integral to establish nationalism in Pakistan. To tha t extent there was an element of controversy over the very ideological basis of Pakistan prior to its creation. The controversy was therefore not so much betwee n Islam and Hinduism but that Muslims are a nation and deserve a homeland for th emselves. Some thinkers believe that the role of religion in the creation of Pakistan is l inked to the abolition of the Turkish caliphate in 1924 and the establishment of a secular national state. This development was a symbolic setback for the Sunni Muslims and resulted in a religious vacuum for them. Thus Sunni theoreticians a s an alternate to the defunct caliphate suggested the concept of an Islamic stat e in order to establish a linkage with Muslim history.

At this stage it would be necessary to make the distinction between an Islamic s tate and a Muslim state. Technically an Islamic state is based on the Shariat wh ereas a Muslim state refers to an independent Muslim majority rule. Today there are only Muslim states and arguably except for Iraq no Islamic states. The Islam ic state existed only when the Prophet Mohammed was alive and till the time of t he four righteous Caliphs. It would therefore not be incorrect to state that the concept of the Islamic state exists only in the Muslim psyche and not in realit y. Pakistan's conflict over ideology can be traced to the pre-independence period w hen several groups were involved in the struggle for independence. Those groups who did not succeed to political power continued their struggle, but with the fo cus shifting to the basis for a particular political and socio-economic order in the independent state. The lack of consensus over ideology of the state was fre quently accompanied by problems of regime legitimacy. Pakistan as a newly created nation had to formulate its own ideology which was d erived from the collective thoughts of various Muslim intellectuals in British I ndia since the 19th century which found expression during the pre-partition pron ouncements and commitments of the Muslim League. Sovereignty of the state vests with Allah rather than with the people. Minorities are not members of the Islami c brotherhood (Millat) and so cannot be entrusted with the power to propound and execute state policy at the highest level. The late Pakistani President Ayub Khan had observed: "Till the advent of Pakistan, none of us was in fact a Pakistani, for the simple reason that there was no territorial entity bearing that name So prior to 1947, our nationalism was based more on an idea than on any territorial definition. Ti ll then, ideologically we were Muslims; territorially we happened to be Indians; and parochially we were a conglomeration of at least eleven smaller states, pro vincial loyalties. But when Pakistan suddenly emerged as a reality, we who had g ot together from every nook and corner of the vast subcontinental India were fac ed with the task of transforming all our traditional territorial and parochial l oyalties into one great loyalty for the new state of Pakistan."10 The religio-political forces highlighted the concept of the "Ideology of Pakista n" when radical movements threatened the social order towards the end of the 196 0s. They said the ideology was derived from Islam and comprehensive which demand ed loyalty from all Muslims. Therefore to borrow from other ideologies amounts t o a lack of faith. In March 1970 General Yahya Khan in a legal framework order t o prescribe the basis for the country's first general elections stated that the constitution which elected the members of the National Assembly should ensure th at: "Islamic ideology which is the basis for the creation of Pakistan shall be prese rved "11 However, it was also mentioned that: "Adherence to fundamental principles of dem ocracy shall be ensured by providing direct and free periodic elections to the F ederal and Provincial legislatures on the basis of population and adult franchis e."12 The political leadership has invariably highlighted the Islamic character of Pak istan and simultaneously committed it to democracy in most pronouncements of an ideological nature. In the process neither an Islamic state in the real sense of the term nor a true democracy has taken shape in the country till now. Neverthe less, the military and civilian regimes have articulated both religious and demo cratic appeals to gain legitimacy. As a result, controversy characterises the na

ture and purpose of Pakistan which flows from the relationship between Islam and state. The reputed political scientist David Easton commenting on ideology, writes: "No system can endure, at least for very long, without the presence of some mode rate belief in its legitimacy Values consisting of articulated ethical interpretatio ns and principles that set forth the purposes, organisation and boundaries of po litical life, I shall describe by their usual name, ideologies."13 The Ahmadiya Issue Pakistan's first significant controversy involving both religion and politics rela tes to the Ahmadiya (also known as Quadianis) sect which first surfaced in the ear ly 1950s and thereafter in the mid 1970s. The Ahmadiyas follow the teachings of Hazrat Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1835-1908) of Quadian in Indian Punjab. They shifted from Indian Punjab following partition and set up their township and named it Ra bwah located near Chiniot in Pakistani Punjab. The problem arises because the orthodox Muslims believe that Mohammad was the la st Prophet while the Ahmadiyas disagree on this score. For the Muslims the Proph et was the last representative through whom God sent his message which would gov ern human behaviour for all time to come. However, this Islamic tenet was challe nged much to the displeasure of the orthodox Muslim clergy. At the turn of the 1 9th century Hazrat Mirza Ghulam Ahmad claimed to be a messiah or Mahdi who would follow whenever God so desired according to the teachings of the Holy Quran. He based his entire thinking purely on a verse in the Quran and his personal bel ief that he received revelations from the Almighty. As a result he conferred upo n himself the title of a 'prophet' and flagrantly violated the principle of the finality of prophethood. This gave him the opportunity to be the final authority on Islam. After Mirza Ghulam Ahmad died his successor was Mirza Mohammad Ahmad. While the ulama demanded that the Ahmadiyas be declared non-Muslims in 1953 the Pakistan government did not heed these demands. The Ahmadiya controversy which raged from 1948 to 1953 was the first sectarian conflict to take place in Pakist an. The Ahmadiya problem proved to be a serious issue in the national integration of Pakistan in the early years. The genesis of the problem was before partition wh en the Ahrars a Deobandi sect, launched the first agitation against the Ahmadiya s during the 1920s. The Ahrars at that point in time were aligned with the Congr ess and opposed to the Muslim League in a counter-movement called 'Naa Pakistan' . These Ahrar leaders were extremely orthodox to the extent that they even calle d the Quaid-I-Azam a 'Kafir-I-Azam'. They formed part of the anti-Pakistan movement in the initial phase of the strug gle for a separate and independent Muslim state. Thereafter in 1931 the Ahrars s plintered from the Congress and formed their own religious party the Majlis-I-Ah rar-I-Islam. The Ahrar leaders sent small groups of their followers to Quadian t o oppose the Ahmadiya sect and proclaimed them a non-Islamic community. As a res ult, the erstwhile British Indian government apprehended the potential for a bre akdown of law and order in the province and promptly banned the Majlis-I-Ahrar-I -Islam. Eventually with the reality of Pakistan taking shape they aligned themse lves with the Muslim League. The Ahrars as a sect began life in Pakistan with a tarnished political image con sidering they had initially opposed the movement for a separate religious state in pre-partition India. Given this background the Ahrars, who followed purist Is lam, found it necessary to establish their bonafides in the new Muslim state. Th us they did not hesitate to whip up the latent hostility towards the Ahmadiya se

ct. The Ahrars adopted a militant policy towards the Ahmadiyas in order to gain acceptance to the national mainstream in Pakistan. Their initiative against the Ahmadiyas was readily welcomed by Maulana Maudoodi and the Jamaat-I-Islami (JI) who had a commonality with the Ahrars. The Jamaat-I-Islami also opposed British India's partition and the creation of Pakistan. The JI therefore was keen to off set this anti-national image in the minds of the people. Towards this objective they advocated the need for an Islamic state which believed in the sovereignty o f Allah and conformity to the injunctions in the Holy Quran. Thus the Ahrars and the JI joined hands in their struggle for Pakistan to be an Islamic state. These two purist Islamic groups began pressuring Prime Minister L iaquat Ali Khan and his Muslim League government to ensure an Islamic government . The orthodox Muslim elements succeeded to the extent that the government passe d the 'Objectives Resolution' in 1949 to strengthen the ideology of Islam in Pak istan. The passage of the 'Objectives Resolution' gave the impression that Pakis tan would transform into an Islamic state and Muslims would be given a place of privilege. The 'Objectives Resolution' stated that: The Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in accordance with the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and Sunnah.14 After the Objectives Resolution was passed on March 7, 1949, the anti-Ahmadiya a gitation turned increasingly violent in West Punjab townships. Subsequently in J une 1952 the ulama instituted an anti-Ahmadiya committee. They demanded a social and commercial boycott of the Ahmadiya sect and labelled them non-Muslims. On t heir direction, shopkeepers had notices outside their premises stating 'Ahmadiya s are not entitled to purchase items'; also restaurants had separate utensils fo r Ahmadiyas. The political dimension to the problem was the relationship between the then Chi ef Minister of Punjab Mian Mumataz Daultana and the Bengali Prime Minister Khwaj a Nazimuddin. The relationship was guided purely by considerations of political self-interest to ensure survival in office. On January 21, 1953 the orthodox Mus lims gave an ultimatum to the Prime Minister to declare the Ahmadiyas a non-Musl im minority within a month. It also demanded the resignation of the Ahmadiya For eign Minister Mohammad Zafrullah Khan. The government response was to round up t he key leaders which triggered further communal disturbances in Punjab on Februa ry 27, 1953. On March 5, 1953, the government was left with no option but to dec lare martial law which resulted in the exit of the Chief Minister and the Prime Minister. Pakistan was able to suppress the sectarian strife after the imposition of marti al law which continued under President Ayub Khan initially and thereafter Presid ent Yahya Khan during the 1960s. These regimes concentrated on economic developm ent through agriculture and industry and the orthodox Muslim element was not rea lly allowed to voice their dissent. Thereafter Pakistan underwent a "second" par tition with the secession of East Pakistan which raked up the issue of ideology among the religio-political parties. The Objectives Resolution The Objectives Resolution was a framework to provide guidelines to the constitut ion-makers in their task. Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan commenting on the Reso lutions said: " before this House starts framing the future constitution of Pakistan, the member s should have some idea as to what sort of constitution and what type of constit

ution they want to frame."15 The Objectives Resolution was the first milestone in the constitutional history of Pakistan. It was the first attempt to define an Islamic state and therefore s ymbolised a triumph for the fundamentalist clerics in the country. The Constitue nt Assembly adopted the Objectives Resolution on March 12, 1949 and this gains i mportance because it indicated that the regime had in principle accepted the eve ntual aim of an Islamic state. The JI leader Abul Ala Maududi proved to be the f oremost ideologue who had applied himself to the conceptual framework of an Isla mic state. Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan stated that achievement of independence enabled the people to live in accordance with their ideals. A secular state would only b e contrary to their ideals and a negation of the demands that prompted the creat ion of Pakistan. Therefore those ideals pursued initially should now be the basi s for the new state. The investment of the power in the people thereby obviated the risks of a theocracy from assuming power. Moreover Islam itself does not bel ieve in a theocracy nor advocate it. The Resolutions started with an invocation that "sovereignty over the entire uni verse belongs to the God Almighty alone and the authority which He has delegated to the State of Pakistan 16 It further proclaimed that the state shall guide acco rding to Islamic principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and socia l justice. It declared that the state shall exercise its authority through the c hosen representatives of the people. The state was responsible to facilitate the Muslims to practice an Islamic mode of life as specified in the Quran and Sunna h. It also enjoined on the state to ensure adequate provision for the minorities to freely practice their religions. The Resolution stated that the individual w ould enjoy fundamental rights as "subject to law and morality." The Resolutions were aimed to keep the traditionalist and the modernist Islamic elements happy about the concept of an Islamic state and. Western-style democrac y respectively. In the process the traditionalists and the modernists interprete d the Resolutions in their own way. That essentially these interpretations tende d to be contradictory in nature only highlighted its dichotomous nature. Liaquat Ali opined that "democracy in the Islamic sense as distinct from that in the we stern and Soviet sense was more democratic than both."17 A few years later the a nti-Ahmadiya riots only validated the view about the contradictory nature of the Resolutions. Basic Principles Committee Report While the Objectives Resolution was the first exercise towards constitution maki ng the second step was clearly the Basic Principles Committee (BPC) report. The BPC was instituted on the day the Constituent Assembly adopted the Resolution Marc h 12, 1949. The Resolution aimed to identify the major guidelines for constituti on making and the BPC report attempted to implement these into an institutional form. The two exercises had one commonality in that they both were ambiguous in nature. The BPC report actually comprises three reports which were published at two year intervals. The first one, the Interim Report of 1950 and the second a regular rep ort of 1952 were not accepted by the Constituent Assembly. These reports were no t accepted because of problems which pertained to political and religious issues . The religious aspect related to the procedure to avoid repugnancy of the Holy Quran and the Sunnah in the Federal Legislature. The Constituent Assembly finall y accepted the third report on September 21, 1954. The BPC report advocated a parliamentary system modelled on the lines of the Gov ernment of India Act 1935. However, it was important to accommodate the interest

s of the fundamentalist factions. Towards this objective it provided for a Board of Ulema comprising five members to advise whether any Bill submitted before th e legislature was against the Islamic tenets. In the event the Board was unable to come to an unanimous decision the Head of State was to use his discretion to sign a Bill. The ulama were however discontented with an advisory role for the Board and inst ead they sought a Supreme Court for themselves to deliberate over the Islamic na ture of a Bill. In a sense they wanted their power to stretch beyond the recomme ndatory to that of enforceability. Whereas the modernists felt that the ulama ha d already been granted adequate importance and remained wary of a theocracy taki ng shape. The significance of the BPC report lay in the fact that it was able to deflect t he fundamentalists demand that the Shariat and not the parliament should be elev ated to the status of a sovereign body. While the ulama's role was advisory it w ould prove tricky for the politician to overrule their views on specific issues. The BPC report therefore proposed to form a parliamentary democracy in conjunct ion with a medieval theocracy. The BPC report recommended separate electorates and reservation of seats for the minorities. The Hindu members vehemently opposed the recommendations. Mr. Datta said the report should be scrapped and a fresh exercise should begin once again . Professor RK Chakravarthy said the report only betrayed Jinnah.18 The Ayub Khan Regime The second Constitution was promulgated on March 1, 1962 and enacted in exercise of the mandate given to Field Marshal Ayub Khan. The Constitution initially dec lared Pakistan a republic and the term 'Islamic' was dropped, but after protests in the first constitutional amendment in 1963 it re-named Pakistan as an Islami c Republic. Also the clause about all laws being brought in conformity with Isla m and no new law which was in contradiction to Islam remained in the new Constit ution. Pakistan was to have a presidential system of government since it corresp onded to the Islamic tradition of a strong executive. The 1962 Constitution emphasised the Islamic character and provided for an Advis ory Council of Islamic Ideology which was to be composed of 5-12 members appoint ed for three years by the President. The Council was to make recommendations to the government about the means to enable and encourage the Muslims of Pakistan t o order their lives in all respects in accordance with the principles and concep ts of Islam; advise the government organs on issues regarding laws. However, its advice was not binding on the government. The Constitution also directed the go vernment to set up a research institute for Islamic affairs with a view to recon struct Muslim society on a truly Islamic basis. Pakistan being an Islamic Republic in which Islam would dominate would be bound to impinge on the rights of the non-Muslims minorities. However, to balance thes e religious aspects of the Constitution, the fundamental rights, territorial and citizenship rights had a modern and secular character. The other highlight of a clash between religion and politics during the regime p ertains to the Fatima Jinnah case. In the January 1965 Presidential election cam paign the Combined Opposition Parties (COP) fielded Miss Fatima Jinnah as a cand idate against President Ayub Khan. The COP decision to support Ms Jinnah as a ca ndidate was a political decision and followed up thereafter with a theological r ationalisation. The controversy arose because orthodox Islam clearly states that a woman could not be voted a head of state. Yet the very same religio-political parties like the JI strongly supported the candidature of Miss Jinnah. Their co ntention was simply that while such a move was not in keeping with religion it w

ould be a far greater sin according to the Shariah to perpetuate an oppressive d ictatorship. To that extent, the 1965 elections proved to be a struggle between democracy and dictatorship rather than a clash between Islam and un-Islamic forc es. The Second Partition: Bangladesh 1971 The secession of East Pakistan from united Pakistan had a strong religious basis in the sense that it disproved the two nation theory based on religion. The rel igious currents underlying the secession therefore merit elaboration.19 The Beng ali Muslim demand for autonomy was perceived as anti-national purely because it amounted to an assertion of ethno-linguistic identity over the Islamic one. Cons idering the rationale for the creation of Pakistan was based on Muslim nationali sm such a separatist trend proved to be detrimental to ideological foundations o f the state. For the ulama therefore the demand for autonomy was viewed as an un Islamic act. It is necessary to understand the background to the perceptions of the ulama and their mind set on the matter. The ulama in this case specifically refers to the Jamaat-I-Islami which felt that Bengali Muslim nationalism was supported by thr ee distinct lobbies the communists, the Hindus and the political adventurers. The communist influence was there because of the paucity of Islamic literature in th e eastern province and was linked to the linguistic problem. The Pakistan govern ment had not declared Bengali as a national language and the bulk of the Islamic literature was available only in Urdu and not Bengali. Given that the average B engali had an antipathy towards Urdu the general level of literacy was not as hi gh as the mother-tongue. According to the JI line the Hindu influence on Bengali Muslim nationalism was p ossible because they dominated trade and industry in East Pakistan. The Hindu el ement only exploited the growing Bengali Muslim grievances, against their West P akistani brethren, and thereby intended to endear themselves to the national mai nstream. In the process they aimed to marginalise the Indian Muslim refugees in the country and further monopolise their control over the economy. Also the Hind u influence on the Bengali Muslim manifested at a cultural level; besides, it in fluenced their way of thinking due to a close association between the two commun ities over centuries. The unconscious assimilation was so subtle and gradual tha t it ceased to be an extraneous element in their lives. The JI referred to the political adventurers which implies the opposition party namely the Awami League. The JI and the Awami League had their own problems whic h are linked to the inability of the JI to successfully form a strong political party in the province. This stems from the thinking that the Bengali Muslim iden tified the JI with their West Pakistani rulers. Also the JI ideology did not app eal to the East Pakistani people owing to their greater democratic and political consciousness. The JI also intensified its campaign against the Awami League (AL) after the Pak istan Army action from March 1971 onwards. They stated that the AL's separatist struggle was part of an international conspiracy against Islam. To that extent t he JI attempted to project the impression that Pakistan and Islam were under a t hreat in order to rationalise the Pakistan Army atrocities in East Pakistan. Essen tially the JI propaganda for West Pakistani consumption was that the Army action was only against those Bengali Muslims under Hindu influence and hence their ac tions were justifiable in the interest of Islam and the integrity of Pakistan. The Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto Regime: 1974 The loss of Pakistan's eastern wing inspired the orthodox elements to renew thei r efforts and ensure that the ideological basis of Pakistan was secure. Moreover

ZA Bhutto embarked on Islamic socialism which attracted vehement criticism from the orthodox groups. In order to placate these orthodox clerics or fundamentali sts, Bhutto in the 1973 constitution declared Islam as the 'state religion' and clearly mentioned that 'only a Muslim was entitled to become the President of Pa kistan'. After the ulama succeeded in their objective to incorporate Islamic provisions i n the constitution their next move was to resume the anti-Ahmadiya campaign. Mau lana Maudoodi led the anti-Ahmadiya movement alongwith the Ahrar leader Agha Sho rish Kashmiri and together they accused Bhutto of nurturing sympathy towards the Ahmadiyas. Further they sought constitutional and legal measures against the Ah madiyas. In 1973 Sardar Qayuum Khan the President of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir a dopted legislative action in the provincial assembly to declare the Ahmadiyas no n-Muslims. The following year the OIC conference was held in Lahore and the repr esentatives of Saudi, Libya and Jordan acted as a pressure group against the Ahm adiyas. Later at a meeting in Jeddah in April 1974 the Ahmadiyas were proclaimed a 'non-Muslim minority' and the Pakistani delegation there were in agreement. In April 1974 the fundamentalists continued in their struggle against the Ahmadi yas and sought the resignation of Air Marshal Zafar Choudhary who was a nephew o f the former foreign minister Choudhry Zafarullah. He was replaced by Air Marsha l Zulfiquar Ali Khan who was a relative of former Chief of Army Staff General Ti kka Khan. Apart from these high profile changes in the military hierarchy the go vernment took stern action against other Ahmadiya officials. Bhutto on his part was keen to solve the issue constitutionally but the oppositi on staged a walkout in the National Assembly. On June 13, 1974 he stated in the house that: The issue is a religious one and its solution must not adversely affect the soli darity and sovereignty of the country. My government and the PPP are wedded to t he Islamic tenets and the ideology of Pakistan. Soon after the budget session, t he issue will be placed before the National Assembly.20 For Pakistan, the Ahmadiya problem had both internal and external dimensions whi ch left the government with no option but to bow to the wishes of the people. Fo r Bhutto, it meant that he measured up to his popular image of Quaid-I-Awam and had completed a mission that his predecessors had left incomplete. The Zia Regime: State Sponsored Islam The Zia regime is associated with state sponsored Islam which only led to a resu rgence of political Islam. He highlighted the need to establish an Islamic democ racy or Islamic Jamhooriyat which was similar to the concept of Nizam-I-Mustafa or 'Order of the Prophet.21 General Zia-ul Haq opined that foreign forms of gove rnment would be inimical to the Islamic ethos. To that extent, a poor country li ke Pakistan could ill afford the luxury of Western-style democracy in his view. The upshot of these Islamic initiatives was that the fundamentalist clergy or ul ama gained importance and sectarian schisms accentuated in the country. Zia used Islam as a tool to legitimise his unconstitutional military regime from July 1977 to August 1988. His sole intention of furthering the cause of Islam w as linked to his political compulsions for survival in office. Zia on assuming office after a coup d'etat in 1977 proclaimed that he would impr ove the country's polity, society and economy in accordance with the Quran and S unnah. During the transitional phase of martial law it suited him to implement some leg al measures in order to improve the law and order situation. These steps were ac

tually the barbaric penalties which Islamic law advocates and only proved useful for Zia to strengthen his grip on civil society so as to suppress dissent. Zia made a mockery of Islam and said that God had appointed him the ruler of Pak istan. In an Islamic political system sovereignty belongs to the Almighty Allah and that people only exercise delegated authority. And Islam directs its followe rs to obey the Almighty through his representatives. The issue of religion in politics had remained on the back-burner following Zulf iquar Ali Bhutto regime's declaration of the Ahmadiyas as a non-Muslim minority sect. The Zia government developed a close relationship with the fundamentalist Jamaat-I-Islami party which was at the forefront of the movement for an Islamic state. In March 1984 the chief martial law administrator General Zia conceived a '11 po int Islamic charter' which incorporates the primary requirements for an Islamic political order in the country. These include: 1) General elections would be based on the Islamic Shariah and held in Marc h 1985. 2) Sovereignty was in the Almighty Allah's hands.

3) The Head of State alongwith his elected representatives and administrati on would adhere to the Almighty's will as the Islamic principles. 4) Islam provides the guidelines for the state structure because it incorpo rates faith, economy and politics. The Ahmadiya Issue The Ahmadiya problem was further aggravated in the Zia regime owing to the state patronage of Islam. He endorsed the Nizam-I-Mustafa or rule of the Prophet in t he country. The military dictator's objective was purely to use religion to legi timise his regime which lacked electoral sanction. In the process the issue of r eligious tax payment for non-Muslims arose and by then the Ahmadiyas were techni cally classified as non-Muslims. To complicate the issue, fundamentalist element s were also adamant that the Ahmadiyas abstain from referring to their house of worship as mosques and their calls to prayer as azzan. The fundamentalists opine d that only Muslims were entitled to do so and those not accepting the supremacy of the Prophet were outside the Islamic realm. Their anti-Ahmadiya agenda culmi nated with a four-point plan:22 (a) immediate removal of Ahmadiyas from government appointments (b) incarceratio n of Mizra Tahir Ahmed the fourth Ahmadiya caliph (c) implementation of the Islami c order (d) identity cards and passports to specially include an indication of a n Ahmadiya citizen. The Zia regime agreed to these demands and accordingly promulgated an ordinance on April 26, 1984 prohibiting the Ahmadiya sect from calling themselves Muslims. The fundamentalists also demanded a social boycott of those people who continue d their relationships with the Ahmadiyas. While the fundamentalists were happy with the ordinance against the Ahmadiyas, t he more liberal elements expressed their unhappiness on the matter. The National Democratic Party, the Pakistan National Party and the Muslim League (Pir Pagara ) condemned the ordinance and exhorted the government to revoke the same. The li beral line was that the Ahmadiyas be treated as Pakistani citizens and on this b asis the state should protect their rights. In their enlightened opinion the ant i-Ahmadiya ordinance was violation of 'The Father of Pakistan' Quaid-I-Azam's st

atement about a secular state as enshrined in the 1940 Pakistan Resolution. Despite the constitutional steps against the Ahmadiyas, the fundamentalists did not cease to harass them. In September 1984, the more militant fundamentalist fa ctions organised themselves to disrupt Ahmadiya activities. In December 1984 the y disturbed the annual Ahmadiya congregation and made fresh demands against them . These included: (a) Rabwah city the Ahmadiya centre should be made an open city (b ) Rabwah to be re-named Saddique Akbar (c) The Jamaat-I-Islami to be declared a non-Muslim political party and its offices sealed.23 Conclusion The role of religion in the political evolution of Pakistan has to be divided in to the pre-partition and the post-partition periods. The political evolution sym bolised by Muslim communalism and Muslim nationalism in that order commenced in the pre-partition period which was based largely on religion. The role of religi on in the political evolution has therefore been far greater in the pre-partitio n period and thereafter tapered off in the post-partition period because the mov ement for Muslim nationhood was driven by secular Muslims. During the early 1940s the Muslim League was so preoccupied in its struggle for Pakistan that it did not focus on the type of nation state that would take shape . The League lacked a clear agenda after the accomplishment of its political obj ective. As a result, soon after the Muslim state was created a conflictual relat ionship arose between the traditionalists and the secularists on how Islamic the political structure should be. The Ahmadiya controversy has proved to be the most potent cocktail of religion a nd politics in Pakistan. It was the beginning of sectarianism which now poses a serious problem to political stability and national security. The other importan t fallout of the Ahmadiyas issue was that it resulted in the imposition of milit ary rule due to a breakdown of law and order for the first time in the country. The incident helped to convince the religio-political parties about their abilit y to dictate terms to an elected regime and also their clout to topple governmen ts. Apparently military rule in the infant phases of nationhood had its own impl ications on the polity and has proved disastrous in the long term. Pakistan has proved to be a 'schizophrenic' state owing to the dichotomous natur e of its Constitution which incorporates both Islamic ideology and parliamentary democracy. The Objectives Resolution and the Basic Principles Committee (BPC) r eport were aimed to mollify the fundamentalist clerics who asserted their opinio ns through 'street power'. To that extent the Resolutions and the BPC report wer e the beginning of the quest for an Islamic state in the country. The first deca de of independence therefore involved a national debate on how much Islam was ne cessary for the country. The BPC report was able to keep the fundamentalist cler ics and the Islamic liberals happy about the incorporation of Islam and democrac y. The report essentially ensured that the fundamentalists did not come to power . It is debatable when the Pakistani political leadership buried the two nation th eory. Whether it was Jinnah's controversial speech implying the state favours no religion and respects all, or the year that the government stopped any further immigration of Indian Muslims to Pakistan. However, the secession of East Pakist an in 1971 made it clear that religion alone was inadequate for Pakistan to pros per as a nation state. The Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto regime attempted to remain as secular as possible, but was compelled to declare the Ahmadiyas a non-Muslim minority because of domestic and foreign pressures. Thereafter the Zia regime which was synonymous with stat e patronage to Islam only heightened the role of religion in politics and thereb

y fuelled sectarianism further. The role of religion in political evolution also includes the Islamic concept of Jehad or holy war which has created controversy among nations of the secular wo rld. The interpretation of the doctrine of Jehad differs between the traditional ists and liberals. The doctrine is supposed to mean a permanent state of war bet ween the Islamic and non-Islamic world. However, this war does not amount to kil ling people but implies a sense of non-recognition of other nations or people. F or India this has a special relevance with Pakistan which has embarked on the pa th of political Islam.