Comparative Theory
Comparative Theory
1.1Introduction
Two of the basic questions that the theory of international trade has to
answer are what determines the pattern of trade and who gains from trade.
Economics does have answers to these questions ones that go back more
than 150 years - in the theories of comparative advantage and the gains
from trade. These theories, formulated around 1815, are usually connected
with the name of David Ricardo. The theory of comparative advantage
or, as it is sometimes called, the theory of comparative costs, is one of the
oldest, stillunchallenged theories of economics. Before exploring the basic
theory of comparative advantage and the gains from trade, which is
usually done geometrically, we shall take a brief look at its historical
background.
The economic doctrine that prevailed during the first two centuries of
the development of the modern nation-state - the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries -was mercantilism. Thedoctrine of mercantilism had
many modern features: it was highly nationalistic, viewing the well-being
of the home nation as of prime importance; it favoured the regulation and
planning of economic activity as an efficient means of fostering the goals of
the nation; and it generally viewed foreign trade with suspicion.
The most important way in which a nation could grow rich, according
to the doctrine of mercantilism, was by acquiring precious metals,
especially gold. Single individuals, however, were not to be trusted: they
might also like gold, but perhaps they liked other things even more. Left to
themselves, they might exchange gold for satin and linen, spices from
India, or sugar from Cuba, or indulge in whatever private pleasures they
3
4 Theories of Inter- and Intra-Industry Trade
preferred, to the detriment of the stock of precious metals stored in the
nation. To prevent such undertakings, the nation had to control foreign
trade. Exports were viewed favourably as long as they brought in gold, but
imports were viewed with apprehension, as depriving the country of its
true source of richness precious metals. Therefore, trade had to be
regulated and restricted, no specific virtuc being scen in having a large
volume of trade.
cconomics
It was against this background that English classical and David
developed, for mercantilism was the credo that Adam Smith
Ricardo rebelled against. English classical economics was an offspring of
liberalism and the Enlightenment - of a general philosophy that stressed
the importance of the individual and viewed the nation as nothing more
than the sum of its inhabitants.
the
For Smith, as for Ricardo, the supreme subject of economics was
consumer: man laboured and produced in order to consume. And anything
that could increase consumption, or, to use Ricardo's phrase, 'the sum of
enjoyments', ought to be viewed with favour.
have we made any explicit assumptions about the way in which the
markets, if any, operate within our two countries. Finally, we have
assumed that there is only one factor of production - labour - and that the
average product of labour is constant in both sectors in cach country.
In the simple two-country, two-good, onc-factor world we have been
considering, national currencies are in effect irrelevant, and as we shall see
later, all we need assume concerning wages is that so long as a country is
producing both goods then allworkers in both industries are paid the same
money wage. We may demonstrate the irrelevance of national currencies
and of the money wage rate under autarky, while providing onc possible
explanation of why trade in the directions suggested may occur, by
introducing them into the model. To simplify the presentation, we shall,
for the moment at least, also assume perfect competition in all markets.
Suppose that the wage rate in England under autarky is £1 per hour.
Given our assumptions, the cost of producing 1unit of cloth, and hence its
price, willthus be E100, while the cost and price of 1unit of wine will be
£120. Note that 1 unit of wine would then exchange for 1.2 units of cloth,
as in our original example. Suppose also that under autarky the wage rate
in Portugal is 2 escudos per hour, so that the cost and price of 1 unit of
wine is l60 escudos and of 1 unit of cloth is 180 escudos, so that again 1
unit of wine costs 0.89 units of cloth.
Consider now an individual in Portugal with l600 escudos and the
opportunity to export and import goods. He can use that money to
purchase 10 units of wine, which he can then export to England. There, he
can sell those 10 units of wine for £1200, and can then use that sum of
money to purchase 12 units of cloth at English prices. If he then imports
those 12 units of cloth to Portugal he can sellthem at Portuguese prices for
2160 escudos, making a profit of 560 escudos. This is of course an example
of arbitrage between two markets with different (relative) prices. Such
profits are of course an inducement to trade!
It should be obvious that doubling the wage rate in England would not
alter the essential details of this transaction; that we could equally well
have started by assuming an individual in England with money to invest in
such trade; and that we have no need to make any assumption about the
exchange rate between the two currencies. It should be equally obvious
that an individual exporting cloth from Portugal to England and wine from
England to Portugal must make a loss in money terms.
It is also apparent that this example raises other questions which we
must seek to answer. The additional demand for wine in Portugal arising
from its export will tend to increase its price in Portugal, with the same
happening for cloth in England, while the additional supply of cloth in
Portugal and of wine in England due to their import must reduce thelr
prices in those countries. However, as long as there is a difference in
Comparative Advantage and the Gains from Trade 9
relative prices between the two countries there must be opportunities for
individuals to gain by trading, so that the volume of trade will continue to
grow. Moreover, the price changes and the ensuing changes in the
profitability of producing the two goods must cause the expansion of the
export sector and the contraction of the import sector in both countries,
with labour having to move from the latter to the former. Will then the
new state of affairs lead to an equilibrium situation, and if so, what will be
the characteristics of that cquilibrium?
We may deduce that in an equilibrium we must have the same relative
pricés in both countries, as otherwise the volume of trade willchange, but
with our present assumptions we cannot determine what that equilibrium
price ratio will be. We know that in each country the import industry will
contract, but will it disappear so that the country specialises completely in
the production of its export good? In either event, what will be the volumes
of trade in cloth and wine? We know that labour must move from the
import-competing sector to the export sector, but what will happen to its
money wage or, more importantly, to its real wage? Finally, while we have
seen that some individuals may profit fromn arbitrage between the two
markets, does this mean that other individuals may lose, and if so, can we
say that the country is better off?
A wider set of questions concerns the extent to which our conclusion
that countries gain from free trade is dependent upon the particular
assumptions we have made. We shall extend this original classical model
to cases where there are two or more factors of production, and in
particular examples to cases where there are more than two countries and
more than two goods, and we shall consider what happens when markets
are not perfectly competitive. In order to do so we shall go deeper into the
questions of what determines which country has a comparative advantage
in a given good, and how we can judge whether a country does gain from
trade. In most cases we shall conclude that free trade is superior to
autarky.
For the moment we shall examine how the differences in opportunity
costs between the two countries, and the possibilities of gains from trade,
may be analysed geometrically using the concepts of the production
possibility curve and the community indifference map, without attempting
to tackle these wider questions.
AW
E'
-AC CLOTH
Figure 1.1 A concave production-possibility curve
Comparative Advantage and the Gains from Trade 11
WINE
>
C
E
B CLOTH
Figure 1.2 Long- and short-run production-possibility curves
12 Theories of Inter- and Intra-Industry Trade
WINE
P
Po
AW
P
Po
AC CLOTH
Figure 1.3 The role of shifting prices
Comparative Advantage and the Gains from Trade 13
If the relative price of wine increases to that shown by the slope of the
line PiP then the production mix must move to that shown by. point B.
Production of wine has increased and of cloth has decreased, with factors
moving from cloth to wine production, the marginal cost of wine
increasing, and the marginal cost of cloth decreasing.
WINE
lo
Pidlla
P2
Pa
CLOTH
and wine have been distributed in a particular way betwcen the two
individuals, giving individual 1 a utility level of u, say, and individual 2 a
utility level of uz.
wine available in the
Suppose now that we reduce the amount of
we choose these two
economy but increase the amount of cloth, and that
two individuals
changes so that, after making any exchanges they wish, the point be P2. We
this
are exactly as welloff as they were at point P, and let
between being at P, or
may assume that since each individual is indifferent
individuals is also
at P> then the community consisting of those two
indifferent between being at P, or P2. We may say that P, and P2 are points
Figure 1.4.
on the same community indifference curve, shown as lolo in wine and
amount of
But suppose now that we had taken the same total
cloth as those which gave us the efficient point P,, but gave initially more
individual 2.
wine and cloth to individual 1 and therefore less of both to
We have changed the distribution of income in favour of individual 1, and
even after the two individuals have exchanged until they reach an efficient
point it is unlikely that that point will yield the same levels of utility to
both individuals as they had in our first example. Individual 1 will have
more utility, say u (>ui) and individual 2 will have less, say u; (<u). In
generalwe cannot claim that the well-being of the community is the same
with this new distribution of income as it was with the initialdistribution.
Thus, point P, may be consistent with two different levels of well-being for
the community.a n
Moreover, with our second distribution of income, it is unlikely that the
reduction in the initial stock of wine in the economy assumed in obtaining
our move from P, to P, along curve lolo can be balanced exactly by the
same increase in the initial amount of cloth available. Suppose that more
cloth is needed to compensate for the loss in wine with our new income
distribution. The bundle of goods needed to give both individuals the same
level of utility as they enjoy at P, may now be that shown by point Ps. As,
with our new income distribution, both individuals have exactly the same
level of utility at P, and P3, these two points must lie on the same
community indifference curve, shown as IËlj.
We therefore have the problems that in general any point in our diagram
may show different levels of well-being (or welfare) for the community as a
whole, and that community indifference curves for different income
distributions may intersect one another. These problems can only be
resolved by making the assumption that we can judge a given reduction in
the utility of one individual to be exactly compensated for by
a given
increase in the utility of the other (employing a social welfare function).
The commonly made assumptions that all consumers have
the same
preferences and that these preferences obey the mathematical restriction
known as homotheticity are not sufficient in themselves to resolve the
Comparative Advantage and the Gains from Trade 15
WINE
CLOTH
Q CLOTH
WINE
CLOTH
WINE
Pa Pa
T2
CLOTH
Figure 1.9 shows the exports of cloth plotted against the importsof wine
at these two terms of trade. At the terms of trade shown by the line OT,,
the country exports OX; of cloth (equal to O,P, in Figure 1.8) and imports
trade
OM, of wine (equal to O,C, in Figure 1.8). At the higher terms of
shown by the line OT;, the country exports OX, of cloth (equal to O;Ps)
and imports OM, of wine (equal to O,C,). The set of all such points
defines the country's offer curve. The offer curve therefore shows how the
country's exports of cloth and imports of wine would change as the
price
ratio obtainable on the international market changes.
The form of the offer curve depends on the forms of the country's
production-possibility curve and community indifference curves. Note that
the offer curve drawn in Figure 1.9 starts off with a positive slope as we
move from the origin, but becomes negatively sloped if the world price
ratio increases sufficiently. Initially, as the country starts trading it is
prepared to offer more cloth in exchange for more wine as the relative
curve is
price of cloth increases. In such cases we would say that the offer
elastic.
As the volume of trade increases however the country may be prepared
to offer less cloth at the margin in exchange for wine imports. If trade
continues to increase then the country could become so unwilling to accept
any more wine imports that it reduces its cloth exports, even though the
then
terms of trade are becoming more favourable, and the offer curve
20 Theories of lnter- and Intra-Industry Trade
IOFMWIPONRTES
M3
EXPORTS OF CLOTH
referred to as being
becomes negatively sloped. The offer curve is usually
inelastic in such cases.
terms of trade
When we derived the offer curve, we argued as though the
then derived the shape of
were changing for some exogenous reason, and
be misunderstood.
the curve. This was a pedagogical device, and must not determined
The offer curve is a general equilibrium concept. The curve is
jointly by production and consumption conditions in the country have
concerned, and we cannot determine the terms of trade until we
the equivalent information for the other country concerned.
We can construct an offer curve for country B by analogous reasoning.
We would expect it to have the same general shape as the offer curve tor
country A, being positively sloped at low volumes of trade, bending away
from the exports axis as trade yolumes increase, and possibly becoming
negatively sloped at high terms of trade. We must remember of course that
for country B the export good will be wine.
With that in mind, we might expect the offer curve for country B to look
something like the curve OB in Figure 1.10. Curve OA is of course country
A'soffer curve. The offer curves of the two countries intersect at point E.
This point defines the free trade equilibrium for the two countries.
Country Awill export OC of cloth, which country Bis prepared to import
in exchange for exporting OW of wine to country A, precisely the amoun'
of wine that A wishes to import. The international terms of trade will o
given by the slope of the line OT.
Comparative Advantage and the Gains from Trade 21
WIINTRANDE
TRADE IN CLOTH
In Figure 1.10 the free trade equilibrium is where country A's offer curve
is inelastic but country B's offer curve is elastic. Suppose A were to become
more willing to trade at any given terms of trade, perhaps because her
production-possibility curve had moved out due an improvement in
technology. We would show this by moving A's offer curve outwards. A
would find it possible to increase both her exports and her imports,
although her terms of trade would deteriorate. If on the other hand B's
offer curve were to move outwards then not only would her terms of trade
become worse, she would also find that her increased exports of wine
would only exchange for a lower volume of cloth imports.
The position of a country facing an elastic offer curve from its trading
partner is therefore quite different in some respects to that of a country
facing an elastic offer curve when it comes to increasing exports. However,
in both the cases discussed an expansion of exports brought about a
worsening of the terms of trade.
There is however one particular case where this does not happen, and
that is where the country concerned is so small in terms of its partner's
market that it can increase its exports and imports without affecting the
prices at which it trades. The small country is said to face a perfectly elastic
offer curve, which must be a straight line through the origin. Such a
situation is shown in Figure 1.11. Whether country A's offer curve moves
those
In to or away from the origin, the terms of trade it faces will remain
given by the slope of OB. Of course, if B's offer curve changes then the
terms of trade facing A will change. If country A is small then it has to take
the international terms of trade as given.
22 Theories of Inter- and lntra-Industry Trade
WINE
TRADE
IN
B
W E
C TRADE IN CLOTH
ONotes
1 David Ricardo (1772-1823) accumulated a fortune during the Napoleonic wars
as a member of the London stock exchange. He then retired, turning to
theoretical economics, and in 1819 became a Member of Parliament. In 1817 he
published his main work, Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, which
contains the first rigorous exposition of the classical theory of value and
distribution; in Chapter 7, "On Foreign Trade', Ricardo expounds the theory
of comparative advantage.
2 Adam Smith (1723-90) was Professor of
Moral Philosophy at Glasgow
University. The first major figure of classical economics, he introduced the
theory of value and taught the blessings of
invisible hand'). His major work, The Wealth the of
unhampered market (the
1776. Nations, was published in
3 Robert Torrens (1780-1864), an
officer in the British Army during the
Napoleonic wars, later turned to economics and published a pamphlet in
Essay on the External Corn Trade,
which contains what seems to bel81,
carliest formulation of the theory of comparative the
significant contributions advantage. He also made
became a Member of to classical monetary theory and policy. In 1831 ne
4 For a Parliament.
justification of this statement in modern
and McFadden (1972), pp. analytical terms, see Grandmont
l09ff.