Amphibious operations are a key part of projecting military power from the sea onto land.

They involve
forces (like Marines or soldiers) landing on a shore, supported by naval ships.

These operations are divided into four main types, depending on the goal.

1. Amphibious Assault

🪖 Goal: Get onto enemy land and stay there.

 This is a full-scale attack on a hostile coast.

 The aim is to secure a beachhead, bring in more troops, and open a new front in a war.
 Think of D-Day in Normandy (1944) — a massive amphibious assault that turned the tide in WWII.

2. Amphibious Raid

⚔️Goal: Hit and run.

 The idea is to land temporarily, destroy or capture something (like supplies, people, or info), and then
withdraw as planned.
 It’s tactical or operational — not meant to hold territory.
 Example: British commando raids on Nazi-occupied Europe during WWII.

3. Amphibious Withdrawal

🚢 Goal: Pull out safely under pressure.

 This is about evacuating forces from land to sea, especially when under enemy threat.
 Doing it well builds confidence that troops won’t be abandoned.
 Gallipoli (1915–16): Even though the campaign failed, the evacuation was a success, showing how
lessons had been learned and operations could be reversed cleanly.
 Also: Withdrawals can be temporary — forces might land again somewhere else, using naval mobility.

4. Amphibious Feints and Demonstrations

🎭 Goal: Trick the enemy.

 These are deceptive landings or threats of landings.

 The real goal is to confuse the enemy, distract, or pin down their troops so they can’t reinforce other
areas.
 D-Day again had fake landings elsewhere to fool the Germans into thinking the real invasion would
come somewhere else.
Summary:

Type Goal Key Feature

Assault Capture and hold enemy shore Long-term presence
Raid Quick hit and withdrawal Temporary lodgement
Withdrawal Get forces off land safely Strategic flexibility
Feint/Demo Deceive enemy Psychological and tactical trick

What amphibious operations require

1. Maritime Superiority
2. Specialist skills and training
3. Joint operations
4. Surprise and Manoeuvre
5. Compensatory military-technological advantage

Maritime Superiority
To understand what amphibious operations require, particularly in terms of maritime
superiority, we can break down the passage into key concepts and supporting examples. Here's
a summarized explanation:

🔑 Core Requirement: Maritime Superiority

At a minimum, amphibious operations need what:

 Julian Corbett called “reasonable naval preponderance”.

 Furse termed “decided superiority” in the local maritime area.
🛡️Why Maritime Superiority Matters

Stephen Roskill emphasized that:

"An effective zone of maritime control in coastal and approach waters is an absolute
prerequisite for success."

This means:

 The navy must control the sea around the landing area to prevent enemy interference.
 The fleet must provide protection ("cover"):
o Full cover: When protecting the landing is the top priority.
o General cover: If protection is secondary to other naval objectives.

Two distinct naval roles are mentioned:

1. Covering Fleet – deals with major enemy threats; must be free for independent action.
2. Transport Squadron – protects against minor/local threats and ensures safe arrival of
forces.

⚓ Naval Responsibilities During Amphibious Operations

Once sea control is achieved, the navy must:

 Transport landing forces to the operation area.

 Provide close support during the landing.
 Sustain the forces ashore with supplies and reinforcements.
 Extract or reposition forces if needed.

🧭 Historical Example: Gallipoli (WWI)

 The navy’s withdrawal (due to Turkish and German threats) caused panic among troops
ashore.
 This illustrates the army’s complete dependence on the navy.
 Gallipoli remained an amphibious campaign throughout, requiring long-term naval
support.
 Final evacuation was highly successful—demonstrating naval importance again.

⚔️Historical Example: Normandy (WWII)

  The vast invasion fleet was vulnerable during its slow crossing.
 Hence, the Allies prioritized near-total sea control.
 Interestingly, weather caused more damage than German forces.
 A key insight: Maritime superiority includes logistics, i.e., having enough ships,
landing craft, and supply capability to land and support large forces.

🧠 Conclusion

Amphibious operations depend not just on fighting off enemy fleets, but also on:

 Maintaining control of sea lanes.

 Ensuring logistical capacity.
 Sustaining forces ashore over time.
 Being able to adapt (evacuate or reposition forces) if things go wrong.

In short, without firm control of the sea and adequate maritime resources, amphibious
operations are highly vulnerable and likely to fail.

Joint operations

1. Army–Navy Cooperation Is Crucial:

o Corbett emphasized that the army and navy must work as one, like “two lobes of
one brain”—each with its own duties but moving together in unity.
o Everyone involved in the operation, especially the leaders, must clearly
understand the common goal.

2. Gallipoli as a Warning Example:

o Though personal relationships between army and navy leaders were good, they
didn’t work closely together.
o Each side stayed in its own lane, avoiding interference, which hurt
communication and cooperation.
o There was confusion about the campaign’s purpose—was it mainly a naval
effort with army help, or a full amphibious operation?

3. Conflicting Priorities:
o The army wants maximum and constant support for troops.
 o The navy is often more focused on protecting its ships and defeating enemy fleets.
o At Gallipoli, the navy withdrew ships on 28 May to avoid risk, but to soldiers on
land, this felt like abandonment.
o Naval shells were designed for sea battles, not for hitting land targets like Turkish
bunkers, which limited their usefulness.

4. Normandy Was Better—but Still Had Issues:

o At Normandy, the army and navy worked together more effectively, though there
were still communication problems, especially with naval gunfire support for
troops.

5. Command Structure Problems:

o At Gallipoli, Britain kept separate army and navy command structures, which
Corbett supported.
o However, over time, the British realized that a single joint commander improves
coordination.
o After mistakes like Bluff Cove in the Falklands War (1982), the UK began
consistently using operational-level joint force commanders.
o Other countries also started doing the same.

Key Takeaways:

 Army and navy must coordinate closely and share the same objective in amphibious
operations.
 Lack of clarity in leadership, command structure, and mission purpose can seriously
damage a campaign.
 Modern military operations benefit from having a single joint commander to improve
cooperation and decision-making.

Operational manoeuvre from the sea

The Peninsula Campaign of 1862 during the US Civil War was an early example of the
military idea called "Operational Maneuver from the Sea" (OMFTS) – using naval power to
move troops directly to the battlefield instead of marching them over land.
  General McClellan wanted to avoid a head-on battle near Washington, so he used ships
to land his large army near Fort Monroe and move towards Richmond, the Southern
capital, with naval support from both sides (York and James rivers).
 The plan was bold, and the landing was successful at first, but progress slowed down
due to bad roads, weather, and McClellan’s overestimation of enemy strength.
 The North also faced a threat from the powerful Southern ironclad ship Merrimack,
which kept many Union ships occupied and limited support to the army.
 A Northern naval attack up the James River was stopped at Drewry’s Bluff, partly
because the navy didn’t have land support, and because their ships weren’t suitable for
river battles.

Lessons and Modern View:

Modern US military thinkers looked at this campaign and concluded that the idea of OMFTS
was good, but its execution failed due to several problems:

1. Lack of sea control: The Merrimack posed a big threat and tied down naval forces.
2. Loss of momentum: The army moved too slowly, missing chances to surprise the
enemy.
3. Inadequate technology: Ships like the Monitor couldn’t shoot high enough to hit
Confederate guns on cliffs.
4. Poor coordination: The navy and army didn’t work closely enough; for example, the
navy needed land support at Drewry’s Bluff.

In short, OMFTS was ahead of its time, but with better coordination, faster movement, and
improved technology, modern militaries believe such operations can succeed today – like they
did in the Inchon landings during the Korean War.

OMFTS: the strategic consequences

Key Points:
🔹 Peninsula Campaign (1862, US Civil War)

 Historian Callwell (though he didn’t use the term OMFTS) believed this campaign
showed how sea power influenced land warfare.
 Even though the Peninsula Campaign failed, the North's control of the sea allowed
them to move troops quickly by sea and stop General Lee’s invasion of Maryland.
 So, sea control helped avoid disaster, even when land plans failed.

🔹 Gulf War (1991)

 A modern example of OMFTS in action.

 Iraq used a traditional, static defense.
 The US-led Coalition used maneuver tactics.
 US Marines did an amphibious “feint” (a fake landing) that tricked Iraq into focusing on
the coast.
 Meanwhile, the real attack came from 200 miles west, catching Iraq by surprise.
 Coalition air superiority helped blind and paralyze the Iraqi forces.
 Result: Decisive victory using modern OMFTS principles.

🔹 Modern Requirements for OMFTS Success

To make OMFTS work today, a military force need:

1. Assault from far offshore (to stay hidden and surprise the enemy).
2. STOM (Ship-to-Objective Maneuver) to move fast and directly to the target.
3. Maritime firepower and sea-based supplies to support the operation.
4. Good intelligence and command systems for full battlefield awareness.
5. A reserve force at sea ready to respond flexibly.

Conclusion:

Even though McClellan didn’t use the term OMFTS, he would have understood the idea:
using sea power to move forces, support operations, and outflank the enemy.
The success of OMFTS depends on having advanced resources and technology, which the US
Navy and Marines have—but not all countries may. The impact also depends on how strong
the enemy is.

📝 Summary:
OMFTS allows fast, flexible, and powerful military actions from the sea. Its strategic value was
shown both in the Civil War and the Gulf War, proving that control of the sea can shape land
battles and even decide wars.

Indirect forward defence

This section continues the discussion on deterrence and invasion, focusing on the idea that
absolute command of the sea is rare, and in such uncertain situations, the stronger fleet must
act offensively to prevent or counter invasion threats.

🔑 Key Ideas in Simple Terms

🔹 Sea Command is Rarely Total

 The sea is often “uncommanded” — meaning neither side has full control.
 When that happens, the possibility of invasion increases, because the enemy might try
their luck under the cover of uncertainty.

🔹 Mahan's View: Offensive Is the Best Defense

 Naval theorist Alfred Thayer Mahan believed that:

"A navy should take offensive action, not sit back passively."

 Passive defense (just waiting and watching) is weak.

 Battleships are built to attack, not just to defend.

🔹 Types of Offensive Naval Actions

When the enemy is planning an amphibious invasion, offensive naval actions might include:

1. Intelligence Gathering
o Understand enemy positions, plans, and fleet movements.
2. Spoiling Attacks
o Strike first, as Drake did in 1587 at Cadiz against the Spanish Armada—attacking
before the invasion began.
3. Interception at Sea
 o Engage the enemy fleet while they are on the move, before they can land.

🔹 Enemy Invasion Tactics

If the sea is uncommanded, the invader has two main options:

 Option 1: Combine battle fleet and troop transports, and force their way through if
necessary.
 Option 2: Decoy the defender by sending the battle fleet elsewhere, then sneak the
transports across behind them.

In either case, the defender must use intelligence to figure out what's really happening.

🔹 Corbett’s View: Patience & Prioritizing Targets

 Julian Corbett, another naval theorist, emphasized:

o Better intelligence in modern times (especially with aircraft, radar, etc.) makes
interceptions more likely than in the age of sail.
o However, most invasions in the world wars still succeeded (e.g., Crete 1941,
Midway 1942).
o Airpower made the threat of interception so real that many invasions were never
attempted—deterrence by fear of interception.
 Corbett’s strategy when an invasion is underway:

Wait until the enemy is "hopelessly committed"—halfway through the landing—then

strike for maximum effect.

 Main Rule:

"Always target the transports, not the escorts."

These are the ships carrying the troops—sink them, and the invasion fails.

 This rule held true even in modern wars, such as the Falklands War (1982), where:
o Argentina’s air force failed to focus attacks on British troop transports—
either due to lack of awareness or strong British defenses.

✅ Summary:

When naval dominance is uncertain, taking the offensive is key. Waiting passively invites
attack. A fleet must use intelligence, aggression, and targeted strikes, especially against troop
transports, to prevent invasions. History shows that even with technological advances, many
invasions still succeeded—but often because they were not intercepted, not because
interception was impossible.

Direct Defence Offshore

This section explains how to defend the coast at sea, not just on land or far out at sea. It focuses on
the concept of direct offshore defence—the last naval barrier to stop or disrupt an enemy invasion
force close to the shoreline, using smaller, agile naval forces and coordination with land and air
units.

🔑 Key Concepts Explained Simply

🔹 Triple Naval Layer of Defence (Admiral Pellew’s Vision)

Admiral Pellew described a three-layered naval defense strategy to stop enemy invasions before they
reached the coast:

1. Fleet near enemy coast – offensive and far-reaching.

2. Heavy ships stationed mid-way – ready to respond quickly.
3. Small units close to shore – to destroy anything that breaks through.

This layered system aimed to catch raiders or invasion fleets at multiple points along their approach.

🔹 Flotilla Defence and the ‘Mosquito Fleet’ Idea

 Admiral Fisher (pre-WWI) promoted flotilla defence using:

o Small warships, submarines, mines, and aircraft.
 The Soviet New School (1930s) adopted this in full:
o Instead of big battleships, they used many small fast-attack units to create a “mosquito
fleet.”
o Focused on harassing, delaying, and damaging enemy forces the closer they got to the
shore.

✔️Key principle: Don't fight big fleet battles; instead, use asymmetric tactics and hit-and-run
operations near home waters.
🔹 Close Army-Navy Cooperation

 The navy’s role was not only to stop landings, but also to:
o Support land forces if the enemy got ashore.
o Disrupt enemy logistics and cut off reinforcements and supplies.

🔁 Historical Example:

 Korea, 1592: The Japanese landed, but the Korean navy cut their supply lines, forcing them
to evacuate.
 Chinese Navy (1950s): Emphasized a light, mobile, fast-response navy that could work with
the army and defend coastal zones rapidly.

🔹 Tactics Used in Offshore Defence (WWII and Beyond)

1. Coordinated Small Attacks:

o Submarines, fast attack craft, and combat swimmers (used by Germans off
Normandy in 1944).
2. Air Attacks on Invasion Fleets:
o Japanese kamikaze tactics during late WWII were effective.
o Modern precision missiles now make air and missile defence critical.
3. Minefields:
o Widely used to block access and delay landings.
o Examples:
 North Korea (1950): Wonsan harbor heavily mined.
 Iraq (1990–91): Used extensive sea mines.

🔹 Modern Implications

Today, defenders use technology and strategy to make every phase of an enemy’s operation difficult:

 Theater ballistic missiles can now target invasion forces before they land.
 There’s a growing focus on developing missile defense systems to counter this threat.

✅ Summary

 Direct offshore defence forms the final maritime barrier to protect a country from invasion.
 It relies on small, fast, and smart naval forces, minefields, and air support, not just big fleets.
 It also requires close coordination with land and air forces.
 While it can’t always stop an invasion, it can slow it, weaken it, and force it to fail before
gaining a foothold.
  In today’s warfare, technology and integrated defences make this offshore layer even more
vital.

Direct Defence Onshore

Direct defence onshore refers to the defence after enemy forces have landed or are close to landing
on the coast. It includes coastal fortifications, mobile land forces, and strategic reserve
deployment. The goal is to either prevent a beachhead from forming or contain and eliminate it
before it expands.

🔹 Key Points:

1. Army-Navy Debate (Britain, 19th Century):

o The army argued that naval defence was unreliable due to:
 Weather-related dangers.
 Accidents even during peace.
o General Wolseley (1896) emphasized the need for a strong army to defend the
homeland, not just rely on ships.
2. When Naval Power Is Not Enough:
o In some wars (e.g., France 1870–71, Russia in the Crimean War and Leningrad 1941–
43), navies were so limited that:
 Ships were disarmed to provide guns and crew for land defence.
 Naval contribution shifted from sea to supporting land fortifications.
3. Heavy Investment in Coastal Fortifications:
o Britain, even during Pax Britannica, built strong coastal defences.
o Countries without large navies rely more on shore defences, examples:
 USA (1815): Slow progress in building coastal forts even after the British burned
the White House.
 Australia (1857): Fort Denison built to protect Sydney from sea attacks.
 Nordic Countries: Used small ships, coastal guns, and full civilian mobilization.
Norway famously sank the Blücher cruiser in 1940 from a coastal fort.
 Modern examples: Argentine Exocet missile attack (1982) and Iraqi Silkworm
missile (1991).
4. Challenges of Defending the Shoreline:
o The invader has the advantage of choosing when and where to attack.
o The defender must:
 Spread forces along the coast, risking dilution.
 Hold reserves to counter major landings.
5. Historic Debates and Examples:
o Rommel vs. von Rundstedt (WWII):
 Disagreed on whether to defend at the beach or deeper inland.
 Airpower made it hard to move German reserves during D-Day.
o Salerno (1942): German counter-attacks nearly pushed the Allies back.
 oNormandy (1944): Panzer reserves were delayed; air attacks and French resistance
hindered them.
o Pacific Islands: Japan struggled to reinforce due to U.S. naval dominance. Adopted
beach defences, cave warfare, and counter-landings.
6. No One-Size-Fits-All Approach:
o Defence depends on geography, resources, enemy capability, and timing.
o History shows that most amphibious assaults succeed, and most defences fail unless
the invader is disrupted quickly.
7. Modern Threat – STOM (Ship-to-Objective Maneuver):
o Modern invaders may bypass the beach altogether using high-speed, long-range assault
methods.
o This makes it even harder for defenders to anticipate and respond effectively.

🔸 Conclusion:

Direct defence onshore is complex and risky. It must be flexible, multi-layered, and well-
coordinated. It involves:

 Prepared static defences (like fortifications).

 Mobile reserves ready to counter-attack.
 Awareness of the invader’s advantages, especially modern STOM tactics.

In short, a successful onshore defence demands anticipation, speed, and strategic balance between
holding the coast and retaining inland mobility.