SMI Professional Development Brief 1

PRIVATE MILITARY AND SECURITY COMPANIES

AND HUMANITARIAN ACTION

A publication of :

ABOUT THIS BRIEF

This Professional Development Brief is part of a series produced by the Security Management Initiative (SMI), which focuses on topics of central interest to the security and risk management community. The briefs follow a standardized outline offering practitioners an overview of key definitions and conceptual issues, the evolution of the topic, main debates and forward looking perspectives. They do not offer original research, but by providing a lay of the land, these documents aim to clarify and inform the security and risk management field.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The author of this brief, SMI Consultant Emily Speers Mears, extends special appreciation to James Cockayne of the International Peace Institute, Victoria DiDomenico of the Center on International Cooperation, Adele Harmer and Abby Stoddard of Humanitarian Outcomes, Colonel Christopher T. Mayer, US Army (Retired), and Jean S. Renouf of the London School of Economics (LSE) for their constructive comments in the development of this content. While they provided valuable feedback, the briefs content and any errors that remain are SMIs alone. In addition, the author is grateful to Maarten Merkelbach, Project Director of the Security Management Initiative, for his comments, and Suneeta Kaimal, HPCR International Project Manager, for her input, contributions and editorial assistance. The Security Management Initiative wishes to express its gratitude to the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs of Switzerland and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency for their financial support.

Private Military and Security Companies and Humanitarian Action SMI June 2009

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Private military and security companies (PMSCs) encounter humanitarian agencies and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in two ways: as providers of security services, and as fellow actors on the ground, operating in complex environments worldwide. The use of PMSCs by humanitarian actors has increased, particularly over the past five years. This brief begins by providing an overview of key definitions and highlighting evolutions within the field. It shows that there are three main reasons for the increase in the market for humanitarian security: in response to (perceived) humanitarian insecurity; as the natural outcome of a more general privatization of security; and as part of the wider professionalization of the humanitarian sector. It then fleshes out the key arguments for and against the use of PMSCs, along with some key questions about the wider implications of PMSC use. Advocates for this use argue that private security: works to protect staff and deter attackers; provides expert perspective in challenging security environments; contributes to improved security management; and accomplishes all of the above cost-effectively. The main arguments against the use of PMSCs are as follows: the current lack of effective regulation means that PMSCs are not held to account for illegal behavior, and there are no strong disincentives for such behavior; lack of accountability is compounded by the fact that humanitarian agencies are deeply unprofessional in the way they hire PMSCs; there is no coordination between humanitarian users; and this results in physical, financial and reputation risks. Finally, a survey of recommendations from research, policy and practice are provided to avoid or mitigate the risks described above. With respect to aid agencies internal policy, these recommendations cover the decision-making, tendering and hiring processes, broader policy recommendations and general interactions with PMSCs in the field. This final section also highlights how aid agencies might engage in emerging initiatives for PMSC regulation, and provides suggestions for further research.

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PRIVATE MILITARY AND SECURITY COMPANIES & HUMANITARIAN ACTION: INTRODUCTION Until recently, humanitarian actors engagement with private security has remained a grubby little secret1; few humanitarian actors have been willing to examine their own hiring practices, let alone air them in public. As a result, reporting on the humanitarian market for private security has been mostly speculative or limited in the depth of its analysis. The first study to provide an evidence base on the use of commercial security entities, by Stoddard, Harmer and DiDomenico, confirmed among other findings that the use of private security providers is increasingly common worldwide.2 vate military and security companies (PMSCs) encounter humanitarian agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in two ways: as providers of security services, from guarding to risk management consultancies, and as fellow actors on the ground, operating in complex environments worldwide. This brief begins by providing an overview of key definitions, highlighting evolutions within the field, and fleshing out key arguments for and against the use of PMSCs. It does not provide a history of PMSCs,3 but rather cuts straight to a review of the literature and practice relating to their specific interactions with humanitarian actors. It argues that the humanitarian sector has so far neglected to properly deal with the issues that these interactions raise. The brief concludes with a diversity of perspectives on the subject, including recommendations for next steps and ways forward. KEY DEFINITIONS Private military companies (PMCs) work in military and conflict settings to offer direct

tactical military assistance. The most significant characteristics distinguishing these firms from mercenaries are their corporate nature and the claim that they provide military skills to legitimate governments only.4 PMCs often describe themselves as private security companies, and they may indeed provide services that relate predominantly to security rather than military activities. Private security companies (PSCs) provide services to clients with the aim of ensuring their security. This term covers a vast range of companies globally, both international corporations such as G4S (formerly Group4/Securicor), and local set-ups, most of which operate predominantly in nonmilitary and non-conflict settings.5 PSCs and PMCs may often be interlinked through sub-contracting arrangements, joint ventures, movement of personnel, umbrella companies and subsidiary structures. The industrys sheer size6 and rapidly evolving nature, as companies diversify in order to increase or maintain their market share, compound the ambiguities in terminology. This has led most researchers to prefer the term private military and security companies (PMSCs). This is the term used by the Montreux Document, the clearest statement to date of the legal norms and business, administrative and regulatory practices that shape the relationships between states and PMSCs,7 and also used for the purposes of this brief. In the case of the interface between private security and humanitarian action, terminology is particularly difficult because humanitarian actors are exceedingly unlikely to engage the services of PMCs, strictly defined. Stoddard, Harmer and DiDomenico opted for the term private security providers (PSPs) to denote any entity, local or international, providing feebased security services to the humanitarian

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community.8 This term was deemed less inflammatory, and it is useful as it incorporates entities whose security services are tailored specifically for the humanitarian sector, such as not-for-profit humanitarian safety/security organizations. However, it also covers actors other than private security companies, such as nonstate armed groups and the police (although in some cases the line between these three categories may be fine). The services provided to humanitarian actors generally fall into two categories: knowledge-based services and physical services. International companies provide the bulk of knowledge-based services, which include security consultancies, training, risk management, and security intelligence and analysis. They often provide guarding services to other actors, including governments.9 Humanitarian actors are more likely to contract local companies to provide physical services, namely visible, everyday forms of commercial security such as site guarding and convoy protection, armed and unarmed guards, installation of physical deterrents such as fences, and alarm systems. Humanitarian action has different meanings for aid agencies and PMSCs. For aid agencies, and for this brief, the concept is largely defined by the core humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence.10 These principles are interpreted according to aid agencies unique identities, but usually translate into the delivery of aid based solely on need. PMSCs, on the other hand, often describe a wide range of activities, from peacekeeping to development, as humanitarian. EVOLUTION OF THE FIELD PMSCs have been present in humanitarian space since they first started to emerge as

significant actors providing services to governments and UN agencies in the complex emergencies of the early 1990s. The PMSC DynCorp provided international civilian police in Bosnia after the Balkans War;11 the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) hired foreign military advisors to secure the camps in Zaire following the Rwandan genocide;12 and PMSCs airlifted humanitarian staff out of conflict zones in Sierra Leone during the civil war there.13 Stoddard, Harmer and DiDomenico write that to date, it has been difficult to get an accurate picture of the extent to which [PSPs] are used in humanitarian operations, primarily because it is a topic that very few aid organizations want to discuss openly.14 This reticence on the part of both clients and companies makes it difficult to identify when ad hoc engagements become more formalized contracts between humanitarian actors and PMSCs, although it is likely that contracting for physical services arose first.15 The Good Practice Review 8 on security management, published in 2000, contained an annex on PSCs, including guidelines on how to select a company indicating that use was already established practice among some agencies.16 From the turn of the decade, a steady trickle of preliminary, predominantly speculative articles opened the debate on how PMSCs are used by humanitarian actors, and their (potential) impact.17 This literature usually summarized the reasons for PMSC use and the advantages and disadvantages of these interactions, while remaining light on empirical data. As a result, analysis remained limited. The increasing research attention was due in part to the proliferation of PMSCs during the Iraq bubble that accompanied the 2003 invasion. The knowledge that the bubble would eventually burst led many of these companies to seek new clients, and to market themselves more strategically to

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humanitarian actors, including by developing their soft knowledge-based portfolios. Industry representatives observed that PSCs are trying to open up business opportunities by moving into new fields such as state-building, supporting and providing humanitarian and disaster relief, and development tasks.18 However, this exploratory period of aggressive courtship has closed, in part due to the industry realization that humanitarian actors are not often the source of lucrative contracts.19 The basic conclusions drawn by early articles on PMSC use by humanitarian actors were largely corroborated by Stoddard, Harmer and DiDomenico in their publication of 2008. Their research covered UN agencies, the largest international NGOs, and a sample group of mid-level and smaller international NGOs; while hiring practices may vary across NGOs, the UN, and ICRC, this was not documented. The studys main findings are: there has been an increase in security contracting amongst humanitarian actors during the past five years, with the most important factor in the decision to hire a heightened sense of need; armed protection is still the exception to this increase; the private security industry is changing to diversify its services and explore new roles and clienteles; and there is a critical lack of policy and guidance on whether, when and how to contract and manage private security companies.20 KEY DEBATES Why do humanitarian actors use PMSCs? There are three main reasons for the increase in the market for humanitarian security: in response to (perceived) humanitarian insecurity; as the natural outcome of a more general privatization of security; and as part of the wider

professionalization of the humanitarian sector. Humanitarian insecurity is well recognized as the primary reason why humanitarian actors use PMSCs, although it is ultimately unclear whether this is a response to actual or perceived increases in insecurity. Whether real or perceived, insecurity not only drives humanitarian agencies to resort to physical protection and other visible security services;21 it may also prompt them to contract security consultancies and risk management, or other knowledge-based security services.22 Agencies do so both to address issues of organizational liability and out of a general sense of being illequipped to handle challenging and changing security environments.23 Humanitarian actors operate in contexts in which the state is either unwilling or unable to provide security to those within its borders.24 As a result, in some cases, the use of private security is mandated either by the state, the organization itself, or institutional donors. Unfortunately, [t]he demise of security as a public good25 means that security is increasingly only available to high bidders whether NGO, private business or government foreign services. Humanitarian actors are often an important source of income for local security providers. For example, the plethora of aid personnel flocking to the rescue of post-conflict Sierra Leone have provided a significant boost for the private security sector.26 The negative repercussions of the privatization of security are discussed below. The demand for PMSCs has also increased as the humanitarian sector has expanded and professionalized over the last two decades. Senior management has become more likely to invest in consultancy and other knowledge-based services, as they become aware of organizational liability for staff safety and security. The 2007 Corporate Manslaughter Act in the UK, and

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prominent court cases elsewhere27 have meant a higher premium is placed on discharging duty of care to staff and being able to demonstrate as much through improved security policies and management, security trainings and consultancies, and contracts involving visible security services in the field.28 This is reinforced in many cases by the need to contract in technical expertise organizations believe they lack.29 PMSCs have also played up to these concerns as well as to general concerns about humanitarian insecurity in their tenders and other marketing material.30 Should humanitarian actors use PMSCs? The benefits Underlying the why is a more fundamental question: should humanitarian actors use PMSCs? The general wariness with which humanitarian actors have approached this topic even as they start to hire PMSCs suggests a familiarity with the lengthier arguments against use,31 but an intractable pull of the arguments for, as bluntly concise as they may be. Advocates of PMSC use argue that, when well-managed and of a high quality, private security works. PMSCs can mitigate humanitarian insecurity; offer expert perspectives on challenging operational contexts; improve security management; and be cost-effective. Through both their physical and knowledge-based services PMSCs can ensure the safety of humanitarian workers, thereby facilitating their access to populations in need.32 The presence of guards may serve to protect staff and deter attackers, particularly in areas with high incidents of petty crime. Equally, delivering aid in high security situations such as Afghanistan and Pakistan could require the involvement of trained and experienced security personnel who can apply proven

protocols and resources, such as crisis response experts, as needed.33 In addition, Locally hired security guards are presumed to be knowledgeable about the players, politics and language of the area of operations,34 and international PMSCs can analyze rapidly changing environments from headquarters, and prescribe appropriate responses.35 Such expert perspectives may be particularly helpful in challenging security environments. PMSCs can also contribute to improved security management and understanding within organizations. As a former humanitarian worker turned employee for the PMSC ArmorGroup put it: commercial security companies are contracted to help humanitarian agencies become better prepared to protect their human resources, assets and operations in non-consensual or otherwise insecure environments.36 PMSC use can also have positive psychological effects on staff, who feel their concerns about security are being responsibly managed by someone with specific security expertise.37 Outsourcing security could also be costeffective. It provides an efficient service delivery model, as organizations do not have to retain full-time staff to monitor security. Security contracts might also help keep insurance costs down over the longterm, thereby ensuring that as much humanitarian funding as possible goes to beneficiaries. In terms of institutional survival, the use of PMSCs can help organizations to demonstrate they are discharging their duty of care to their employees, as PMSCs have been quick to note. For the same reason, it can make funding easier to obtain from some institutional donors. Finally, some have even argued that PMSCs could also contribute to security as a public good thereby effectively paying for themselves in monetary terms.38

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Should humanitarian actors use PMSCs? The risks The biggest argument against PMSC use relates to the current lack of quality control of PMSCs, which presents physical, financial and reputational risks. In this sense, there is no need to dispute the arguments for PMSC use it is simply that these depend on a hypothetical of high performance that cannot at present be ensured. However, PMSC use may also herald a decline in the quality of security management, and the privatization of security itself has a broader, negative impact. The global security industry is not well regulated, nationally or internationally.39 As a result, it is difficult to ensure that PMSCs are held to account for illegal behavior, or to be reassured that the standards in place whether industry codes of conduct or international legal norms are strict enough to provide strong disincentives for any such behavior. Of particular concern, given PMSCs unique relation to the use of force among private businesses, is the potential for private security contractors to commit human rights violations.40 Compounding this problem is the way in which aid agencies hire PMSCs, which is often deeply unprofessional and lacking in transparency. This observation has been a constant in articles on PMSC use. In 2002, Vaux et al. found that 20 agencies had no policies on usage, and in 2008 the picture was remarkably similar: policies and organizational guidance do not yet exist on how best to identify, vet, hire, oversee and manage the work of security contractors (local or international).41 Field hiring decisions often occur with very little oversight or guidance from organizations headquarters, or are simply made independently of headquarters, without headquarters knowledge.

Outsourcing in any context weakens lines of accountability, but these problems are more likely if contracts go to the lowest bidder, rather than those that demonstrate robust internal management systems, adherence to codes of conduct, or other forms of quality assurance. In these cases, organizational control over contractor behavior is greatly reduced. The problem of quality control is particularly acute given the current lack of information exchange between humanitarian actors on the performance of different PMSCs, and the lack of a collective position on PMSC standards. As Cockayne writes, Until users act collectively, this will be a sellers market.42 This problem carries interlinked risks for humanitarian users of PMSCs. Physically, private security personnel may commit human rights violations against local populations in the course of protecting NGO property, particularly if they are armed.43 PMSCs may also endanger humanitarian staff through other kinds of unprofessional and/or illegal behavior. Some PMSCs have been involved in arms and people trafficking, and prostitution.44 International PMSCs operating in Iraq and Afghanistan have been accused of contract violations and violations of labor law. There is a higher risk of PMSC staff carrying out their job ineffectively and unprofessionally when their own rights as employees are not being recognized. Stoddard, Harmer and DiDomenico reported humanitarian field staffs concerns about corruption and criminal behavior of local security contractors, particularly when guards are poorly paid.45 And local guarding PMSCs have been found to pay their employees peanuts.46 If publicly exposed, this behavior could have a severe impact on the hiring organizations reputation, particularly given the high moral expectations of the general public regarding humanitarian

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organizations activities. Furthermore, the diffuse and amorphous nature of the global security industry means that humanitarian agencies hiring a PMSC in one location may be unaware of the potentially damaging behavior of that PMSC and their personnel elsewhere until it is publicly exposed. This represents a financial risk for humanitarian clients as well, as they may be more likely to be held to account for PMSCs behavior, given the comparatively tighter scrutiny under which humanitarian organizations are placed by both institutional and individual donors. Security for whom? A further risk is that outsourcing security may diminish an organizations ability to manage its own security. Even if outsourcing security results in robust internal security management processes, the contracted PMSC may bring an approach to security with them that staff within the contracting organization feel is incompatible with a humanitarian point of view. For example, professional security is more likely to be technical rather than focused on acceptance, and therefore less likely to emphasize good relations with local communities. Indeed, at an operational level, using a PMSC to ensure the safe and efficient delivery of aid may compromise the impartiality, neutrality and independence of an organization, depending on how that company is itself perceived in the local context.47 If international PMSCs use their humanitarian contacts for intelligence gathering, this presents a risk to local perception of humanitarian operations particularly if the PMSCs other clients are not all humanitarian actors. Buchanan and Muggah argue that At the very least, the complexities and potential controversies of how private security can be locally-

interpreted is not being adequately considered by those agencies who often engage it.48 At a more fundamental level, humanitarian users of private security face the question of whether, by purchasing security, they contribute to its further privatization. The police and the army in Sierra Leone, for example, are seeing their roles weakened by local PMSCs.49 This may exacerbate social and economic stratification by creating sharply differentiated spaces of relative in/security.50 This stratification is evident between local and international staff, the latter being more likely to be the principals that security contractors are hired to protect or train. More broadly, purchasing security widens the gulf between protected humanitarian workers and unprotected beneficiaries. In certain contexts it may risk reproducing or influencing a local security dynamic, and legitimizing the use of force albeit unintentionally. Ultimately, there is a risk that the security measures being taken to safeguard staff members may negatively affect aid beneficiaries, and be in direct opposition to the humanitarian mantra of do no harm. This is particularly the case with respect to local PMSCs, which may be affiliated with local armed actors. Aid agencies may be increasingly likely to be held accountable for these broader impacts, as the norms relating to the corporate responsibility to respect human rights and business and human rights expand their focus. PMSC space encroachment on humanitarian

Even when they are not under contract to humanitarian agencies, PMSCs are still involved in activities they deem humanitarian. USAID and other agencies have contracted PMSCs to deliver humanitarian services, and some PMSCs

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have set up their own foundations to provide assistance to local populations, usually the distribution of goods.51 The chairman of the support services company RA International describes the companys projects training and employing local men and women in hospitals in cooperation with the Norwegian Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan as part of a humanitarian response.52 Such projects have blurred the lines between civil and military operations, and their blatant association of humanitarian action with Western foreign policy objectives has presented a significant challenge for humanitarian actors.53 The Taliban in Pakistan and Afghanistan have issued edicts against Western NGOs on the basis of the perception that they are part of an occupying force.54 International NGOs withdrew from Iraq due to the lack of security there, including a number of high profile incidents of humanitarian aid workers being targeted.55 PERSPECTIVES These debates have done little to prompt open discussion among humanitarian agencies about PMSCs, or even internal reviews of their own use. PMSCs have also toned down some of their earlier rhetoric about the natural synchronicity between humanitarians and PMSCs, suggesting that both sides would prefer to kick the issue under the carpet.56 This section provides recommendations for how to deal with the issue, in order to avoid or at least mitigate the risks described above. It covers internal policy, how humanitarian organizations might get involved in emerging initiatives for PMSC regulation, and finally offers suggestions for further research. Internal policy The haphazard way in which PMSCs are hired, and the lack of guidance on how this might be improved, represents a significant

gap in humanitarian agencies internal policies. While many agencies acknowledge that something should be done to improve hiring practices, and humanitarian field staff would support efforts to develop and share guidelines and good practice,57 none have so far been keen to advance the issue. In addressing the absence of guidelines and policy on PMSCs, researchers and practitioners have suggested that aid agencies or an NGO working group should consider the following:58 when making the decision to hire, consideration of potential scenarios and the legal, political, ethical and reputational implications; when tendering, how to assess PMSC suitability, including company history and affiliations, identity, staff selection, training, staff pay, understanding of the humanitarian ethos, and whether there are any conflicts of interest or associations with parties that might compromise the hiring organizations neutrality or jeopardize its relations with the local community; how to favor commercial security providers that are accountable to local communities or foreign regulators, and that foster public security; when hiring, the contractual clauses to include in such contracts, including rules of engagement if security personnel are armed, lines of responsibility and accountability, clearly allocated tasks or standard operating procedures (SOPs), functioning equipment; internal and external mechanisms for monitoring and reporting on providers performance; a collectively agreed code of conduct or other good practice standards, perhaps based on the Montreux Document, which offers best practices for states contracting PMSCs;

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in broader policy terms, how to coordinate with other aid agencies, including regarding payment policies and even potentially identifying lists of approved services and providers; how to encourage donors to take better account of security in their grant agreements, or even to develop and maintain registers of commercial security providers and their performance; and in general, how to interact with PMSCs in the field, including encouraging standardized identification for private security personnel.

in relation to their encounters with PMSCs in humanitarian space.61 Research Research into private security and humanitarian actors holds unplumbed depths. Researchers could look at the impact of the use of PMSCs on local populations, as well as beginning to trace the cumulative impact of their use.62 Given the issues of neutrality that accompany PMSC use, researchers could also consider how local populations perceive NGOs use of PMSCs. Since humanitarian non-profit security organizations might offer a preferred alternative to PMSCs, their role and effectiveness could be reviewed. Finally, researchers could spell out in greater detail the ethical and moral risks associated with their use, and the wider ramifications of the privatization of security for the humanitarian enterprise.63 The role of PMSCs in humanitarian relief and development is also being watched with some trepidation and could be more closely monitored.64 This ties into the larger debate about the transformation and the privatization of aid delivery as private entities begin to take on aid contracts. Several pertinent legal issues regarding PMSCs use by humanitarian organizations remain as well. Some of these are currently being investigated by the On the Edges of Conflict program, a joint project between the Liu Institute for Global Issues and the Canadian Red Cross.65 In sum, this brief has shown that the debate on PMSCs and humanitarian action has been well and truly opened. What remains is for humanitarian actors to ensure their own interests are represented within it.

Regulation As well as getting their own house in order, current developments in PMSC regulation suggest opportunities for humanitarian clients to influence its eventual shape and outcomes, in order to ensure their own interests as humanitarian clients are represented. The drive to regulate the private security industry internationally has gathered pace in recent years, particularly with the emergence of a number of cases of human rights violations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Swiss government is currently spearheading a widely-supported initiative to develop an international code of conduct for the industry and arrangements for its implementation and enforcement.59 The UN Working Group on Mercenaries is also currently developing proposals for an international convention.60 There is scope here for humanitarian actors to weigh in on applicable standards for the private security sector, both as clients and

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ENDNOTES
1

Michael Von Tangen Page, Private security should not be a grubby little secret Humanitarian Affairs Review (Autumn 2004), pp. 9-11. 2 Abby Stoddard, Adele Harmer and Victoria DiDomenico, The use of private security providers and services in humanitarian operations (Humanitarian Policy Group Report 27, London: Overseas Development Institute, 2008). 3 For such a history see Deborah Avant, The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security (Cambridge University Press, 2005), or Peter W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry (Cornell University Press, 2004). 4 For this claim, see Tim Spicer, An Unorthodox Soldier: Peace and War and the Sandline Affair (Edinburgh: Mainstream, 1999). 5 See Rita Abrahamsen and Michael Williams, Beyond the Privatized Military, in Security Privatization: Challenges and Opportunities, Human Security Bulletin (March 2008, vol. 6:3), p. 24. 6 Estimates of annual industry revenues settle around the $100 billion dollar mark but are rapidly outdated. See Abrahamsen and Williams, Beyond the Privatized and Singer, Corporate Warriors. 7 James Cockayne, Regulating Private Military and Security Companies: The Content, Negotiation, Weaknesses and Promise of the Montreux Document, Journal of Conflict & Security Law (2009, vol. 13:3, pp. 401-402. The Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies during Armed Conflict (2008) was signed by Afghanistan, Angola, Australia, Canada, China, France, Germany, Iraq, Poland, Russia, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, Ukraine, and the US. 8 Stoddard, Harmer and DiDomenico, The use of private security providers. 9 The PMSC Control Risks provides mobile security to the UK FCO in Iraq (20,831,233 from 1 July 2007 30 June 2008), but also has smaller contracts with humanitarian organizations for information provision and crisis management. The PMSC GardaWorld has similar arrangements with both the FCO in Iraq (5,427,186 from 1 July 2007 30 June 2008) and NGOs. See Hansard 5 May 2009 Col 43w. 10 As explained by the director of MSF USA, Nicolas de Torrente, The most important principles of humanitarian action are humanity, which posits the conviction that people have equal dignity by virtue of their membership in humanity, impartiality, which directs that assistance is provided based solely on need, without discrimination among recipients, neutrality, which stipulates that humanitarian organisations must refrain from taking part in hostilities or taking actions that advantage one side of the conflict over another, and independence, which is necessary to ensure that humanitarian action only serves the interests of war victims, and not political, religious, or other agendas. Nicolas de Torrente, Humanitarian Action Under Attack: Reflections on the Iraq War, Harvard Human Rights Journal 17 (Spring 2004), p. 28. 11 Deborah Avant, The Privatization of Security and Change in the Control of Force, International Studies Perspectives 5 (2004), 153-157. 12 James Cockayne, Commercial Security in Humanitarian and Post-Conflict Settings: An Exploratory Study (New York: International Peace Academy, 2006). 13 Emily Speers Mears, "A Place for Humanitarian Ideals? The use of private security companies by humanitarian NGOs" (unpublished MPhil thesis, University of Oxford, 2008). See also Christopher Spearin, A Private Security Panacea? A Response to Mean Times on Securing the Humanitarian Space (presentation at the Second Annual Graduate Student Seminar, Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development, 30 April 5 May, 2000), available at http://www.sandline.com/hotlinks/Chris_Spearinen.html#N_35_. 14 Stoddard, Harmer and DiDomenico, The use of private security providers, p. 1. 15 In 2002, Van Brabant noted a widespread refusal to square up to the subject, Koenraad Van Brabant, Humanitarian action and private security companies, Humanitarian Exchange Magazine 20, March 2002.

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16

Koenraad Van Brabant, Annex 5: Private Security Companies in Operational Security Management in Violent Environments (Humanitarian Practice Network: Good Practice Review 8, London: ODI, 2000), pp. 345-350. 17 See Damian Lilly, Tony Vaux, Chris Seiple, Greg Nakano and Koenraad Van Brabant, Humanitarian Action and Private Security Companies: Opening the Debate (London: International Alert, May 2002. 18 Andrew Bearpark and Sabrina Schulz, The future of the market, in Simon Chesterman and Chia Lehnhard (eds.) From Mercenaries to Markets, 241. This has of course not been the case so much for local PMSCs whose marketing methods are likely to be more direct and less part of a corporate package. 19 Stoddard, Harmer and DeDominico, The use of private security providers, p. 18. 20 Ibid.
See Cate Buchanan and Robert Muggah, No Relief: Surveying the Effects of Gun Violence on Humanitarian and Development Personnel (Geneva: Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue/Small Arms Survey, June 2005), p. 9.
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22

Since PMSCs have produced and disseminated copious material analysing insecurity to NGOs, often free of charge or at special humanitarian prices, it could be argued that they themselves are contributing to this sense of insecurity in order to profit from it. In Iraq, the PMSC Aegis distributed security analyses to NGOs free of charge; the PMSC Gardaworld does so in Afghanistan and Pakistan. See Neil MacKinnon, Keeping NGOs Safe and Sound: Harnessing the Power of Security Through Information, Journal of International Peace Operations 4:5, March-April 2009; Speers Mears, A Place for Humanitarian. 23 For an analysis of NGO responses to insecurity see Abby Stoddard and Adele Harmer, Little Room to Maneuver: The Challenges to Humanitarian Action in the New Global Security Environment, Journal of Human Development 7:1 (March 2006). 24 They have always done so, but their number and reach has increased dramatically over the last two decades, during which time perceptions of insecurity have become more common. Combined with the increase in expected accountability of humanitarian organizations for discharging their duty of care to staff, these factors have led to a perception of the need for private security services. And in some exceptional circumstances, such as Somalia, the state is essentially absent, forcing agencies to consider security provision in a more deliberate way than they otherwise would. Stoddard, Harmer and DiDomenico, The use of private security providers, p. 21.
Michael Bryans, Bruce D. Jones and Janice Gross Stein, Mean Times: Humanitarian Action in Complex Political Emergencies Stark Choices, Cruel Dilemmas. (Toronto: Program on Conflict Management and Negotiation, Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto, January 1999), p. 33.
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Rita Abrahamsen and Michael Williams, Country Report: Sierra Leone (University of Aberystwyth: Private Security Research Project, 2004), 9. 27 Notably, the court case between Mdecins sans Frontires (MSF) Switzerland and the Dutch government. The Head of Mission for the Swiss branch of MSF in Daghestan/Russian Federation was abducted in August 2002 and released in April 2004. The following year, the Dutch government sued MSF for repayment of the ransom (EUR one million). The Dutch claim was rejected by the Geneva Civil Appeals Court in 2007, and the Dutch government appealed. A final appeal decision was reached by the Swiss Federal Supreme Court on 10 July 2008, which ruled that MSF should repay half the ransom to the Dutch government. MSF, Appalling Ruling in Court Case Between Dutch Government and MSF, 14 July 2008, available at http://doctorswithoutborders.org/press/release.cfm?id=2856&cat=pressrelease&ref=related-sidebar. 28 See Pierre Gassmann, Rethinking Humanitarian Security, Humanitarian Exchange Magazine 20 (June 2005); Carolyn Klamp, Legal Liability in the Humanitarian Sector (presentation, RedR-IHE Senior Level Security Seminar, Arlington, VA, April 2007). See also forthcoming SMI report on the legal liability of international aid agencies. 29 Emily Speers Mears, A Place for Humanitarian. 30 See Neil MacKinnon, Keeping NGOs Safe and Sound: Harnessing the Power of Security Through Information, IPOA Journal, vol. 4 no. 5, March-April 2009. The author is the director of GardaWorlds Crisis Response & Risk Analysis Group.

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Stoddard, Harmer and DiDomenico found that their interviewees came up with more arguments against than for. 32 David Shearer, Outsourcing War, Foreign Policy 112, Autumn 1998, pp. 68-81. 33 MacKinnon, Keeping NGOs Safe, p. 32. 34 Benjamin Perrin, Not for the Faint-Hearted: Humanitarian Workers Face Threats and Risks in the Field Like Never Before, Journal of International Peace Operations, Sept-Oct 2008, p. 14. The author does acknowledge that locally hired security guards may also be associated with parties to the conflict. 35 Speers Mears, A Place for Humanitarian Ideals? 36 Vaux et al., Opening the debate, p. 15. 37 Thanks to Jean S. Renouf for this observation. 38 See Spearin, Private Security Panacea?. 39 For a discussion of the problems with existing regulation see James Cockayne et al., Beyond Market Forces: Regulating the Global Security Industry (International Peace Institute, forthcoming July 2009), 320 pp. 40 Shortly after the Blackwater killings of 17 Iraqi civilians in Nisoor Square in Iraq in September 2007, the PMSC Unity Resources Group shot and killed Iraqi two women and wounded another while protecting the convoy of a research organization funded by USAID. See Jan Weuts, Private Security Companies: Need for Advocacy, VOICE out loud 6 (December 2007), http://www.ngovoice.org/documents/voice_out_loud_6_BDEF_website.pdf. 41 Stoddard, Harmer and DiDomenico, The Use of Private p. 2. 42 Cockayne, Commercial Security, p. ii. 43 Although the definition of armed remains up for dispute one of Stoddard, Harmer and DiDomenicos interviewees noted that even a guard carrying no more than a stick could potentially kill someone. In The use of private security providers, p. 24. 44 See inter alia International Alert-Saferworld-SEESAC, SALW and Private Security Companies in South East Europe (London/Sarajevo, 2005). 45 Of course, the behavior of police and national security forces may not differ greatly. 46 Author correspondence with humanitarian field staff in Nigeria, October 2007. This sentiment was echoed by staff in Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe. Speers Mears, A Place for Humanitarian. 47 A journalists encounter with Delta Protection, a local guarding company used by humanitarian agencies in DRC, reads: A pickup truck marked Delta Protection zooms around a corner on a main avenue in the heart of the Congolese capital, with two uniformed men in the cab and another standing on the back, swinging a mounted heavy machine gun back and forth. They wear sunglasses, though it is night. Ernest Harsch, 2008, Congo-Kinshasa: Building a State for the People, Africa Renewal, 4 January 2008, http://allafrica.com/stories/200801040771.html. 48 Buchanan and Muggah, No Relief, p. 28. 49 Abrahamsen and Williams, Country Report: Sierra Leone. 50 Marc Von Boemcken, 2007, Liaisons Dangereuses: The Cooperation Between Private Security Companies and Humanitarian Agencies, in Thomas Jager and Gerhard Kummel, eds., Private Military and Security Companies: Chances, Problems, Pitfalls and Prospects, Vs Verlag Fur Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden, 2007, p. 270.
Noted by Stoddard, Harmer and DeDominico and Jean S. Renouf, Do Private Security Companies Have a Role in Ensuring the Security of Local Populations and Aid Workers? (lecture, 5 Autumn Humanitarian University, Groupe URD, Provence, September 2007).
51 th

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Soraya Narfeldt, Role of the private sector in humanitarian response, Forced Migration Review 29 (December 2007), p. 67. Also see inter alia Claude Berube, Uncharted Waters: A Role for the Private Sector in Providing Maritime Support for Humanitarian Assistance, Journal of International Peace Operations. 53 Donini, Minear and Walker write that the Iraq crisis represents a new level of intrusiveness into, and instrumentalisation of, the humanitarian enterprise, differing not only in degree but also in kind from its predecessors. In Antonio Donini, Larry Minear, and Peter Walker, The Future of Humanitarian Action:

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Mapping the Implications of Iraq and Other Recent Crises, Disasters 28:2 (2004), p. 192. See also Kenneth Anderson, Humanitarian Inviolability in Crisis: The Meaning of Impartiality and Neutrality for U.N. and NGO Agencies Following the 20032004 Afghanistan and Iraq Conflicts, Harvard Human Rights Journal 17:55 (2004); Lola Gostelow and Gerard McHugh, Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Humanitarian-Military Relations in Afghanistan (London: Save the Children 2004; among others. 54 Announcement Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, 16 April 2009; Paula Newton, Taliban threaten to kill aid workers as spies, CNN, 15 March 2009, available at http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/03/15/afghan.taliban.threat/index.html?eref=edition. 55 Sara Gaines, Lack of Security Forces Out Save the Children, The Guardian (1 March 2007). See Greg Hansen, Taking Sides or Saving Lives: Existential Choices for the Humanitarian Enterprise in Iraq, (Feinstein International Famine Center Briefing Paper, June 2007). 56 One author noted of a 2002 report on the topic observed that somehow it lost momentum. Personal correspondence, 3 January 2008. 57 Stoddard, Harmer and DiDomenico, The use of private security providers, p. 13. 58 These recommendations draw on Cockayne, Commercial Security; Jean S. Renouf, Using Private Security Companies Some Practical Recommendations (presentation to the European Interagency Security Forum, Oslo, 19 May 2009); and Stoddard, Harmer and DiDomenico, The use of private security providers. 59 http://www.eda.admin.ch/psc. See also Anne-Marie Buzatu, Safeguarding Security in Turbulent Times, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Special-Reports/Safeguarding-Security-in-TurbulentTimes/PMSCs/. The UK FCO proposes such an international regulatory framework, and a private security contractor reform bill currently before US Congress also calls for the establishment of an international framework. UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Consultation on Promoting High Standards of Conduct by Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) Internationally, 24 April 2009; and http://price.house.gov/apps/list/press/nc04_price/042909.shtml. 60 United Nations, UN Expert Group Considers New Legal Instruments for Regulation of Private Military and Security Companies, Press Release, 27 March 2009, http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/view01/FA7E102C7E4A32D3C1257586004D3EC9?opendo cument. 61 For the potential role of civil society and humanitarian clients of PMSCs in these processes see Cockayne et al., Beyond Market Forces. 62 Cockayne, Commercial Security. 63 Renouf. Do Private Security Companies Have a Role. 64 Stoddard, Harmer and DiDomenico, The use of private security providers. 65 http://www.edgesofconflict.com/#/private-security-companies/4532819930.

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KEY RESOURCES Buchanan, Cate and Robert Muggah. No Relief: Surveying the Effects of Gun Violence on Humanitarian and Development Personnel. Geneva: Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2005. The Canadian Consortium on Human Security (CCHS). Security Privatization: Challenges and Opportunities. Vancouver: CCHS, 2008. Cockayne, James. Commercial Security in Humanitarian and Post-Conflict Settings: An Exploratory Study. New York: International Peace Academy, 2006. Grofe, Jan. Human Rights and Private Military Companies: A Double-Edged Sword too Dangerous to Use? In Private Military and Security Companies: Chances, Problems, Pitfalls and Prospects, edited by Thomas Jager and Gerhard Kummel. Wiesbaden: Vs Verlag Fr Sozialwissenschaften, 2007. Hellinger, Daniel. Humanitarian Action, NGOs and the privatization of the military. Refugee Survey Quarterly 23:4 (2004): 192-220. Renouf, Jean S. Do Private Security Companies Have a Role in Ensuring the Security of Local Populations and Aid Workers? Paper presented at The security of humanitarian actors and the protection of civilian populations, the fifth session of the Autumns Humanitarian University, Groupe URD, Provence, September 2007. Accessed 17 June 2008 at: www.strategische-studien.com/uploads/media/JSRenouf__PSC_and_populations___and_aid_workers_physical_security.pdf Singer, Peter W. Humanitarian principles, private military agents: some implications of the privatized military industry for the humanitarian community. In Resetting the rules of engagement: Trends and issues in military-humanitarian relations, edited by Victoria Wheeler & Adele Harmer. London: Overseas Development Institute, 2006. Spearin, Christopher. Private Security Companies and Humanitarians: A Corporate Solution to Securing Humanitarian Spaces. International Peacekeeping 8:1 (Spring 2001): 20-43. Stoddard, Abby, Adele Harmer and Victoria DiDomenico. The use of private security providers and services in humanitarian operations. London: Overseas Development Institute, 2008. Swiss Initiative, in Cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross , on Private Military and Security Companies. The Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies during Armed Conflict. Montreux, 17 September 2008. Van Brabant, Koenraad. Operational Security Management in Violent Environments. London: Overseas Development Institute, 2000.

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Vaux, Tony, Chris Seiple, Greg Nakano and Koenraad Van Brabant. Humanitarian action and private security companies: Opening the debate. London: International Alert, 2001. Von Boemcken, Marc. Liaisons Dangereuses: The Cooperation Between Private Security Companies and Humanitarian Agencies. In Private Military and Security Companies: Chances, Problems, Pitfalls and Prospects, edited by Thomas Jager and Gerhard Kummel. Wiesbaden: Vs Verlag Fr Sozialwissenschaften, 2007. Von Tangen Page, Michael. Private security should not be a grubby little secret. Humanitarian Affairs Review (Autumn 2004): 9-11. Weuts, Jan. Private Security Companies: Need for Advocacy.Voice Out Loud 6 (December 2007): 12-13.

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