Presumptions in Statutory
Interpretation
• Meaning of Presumptions
• Presumption means assuming something true. Therefore, the expression
Presumptions in statutory Interpretation would mean that while
construing a statute or any provision thereof, the courts must deem
certain things true and correct. In other words, the courts must proceed
to interpret with the conception of correctness of certain things
• The Contrary should not be readily inferred or accepted
• These presumptions are desirable to be followed and therefore the court
must strive to apply them.
• However, they are not binding on the courts and therefore if it can be
established by a thorough reading of the entire statute and its objects that
there is a divergence from these standard presumptions the court may
conclude by departing from these presumptions as well.
Presumptions in Statutory Interpretation
1. In favour of the constitutionality of Enactment
• Every legislation enacted by Parliament or State Legislature carries with it a
presumption of constitutionality. This is founded on the premise that the
legislature, being a representative body of the people and accountable to
them is aware of their needs and acts in their best interest within the
confines of the Constitution
• The burden is upon him who attacks it to show that there has been a clear
transgression of constitutional principles.
• It is well settled that courts will be justified in giving a liberal interpretation
to the section in order to avoid constitutional invalidity
• Suresh Kumar Kaushal v. Naz Foundation: “ Another significant canon of
determination of constitutionality is that the Courts would be reluctant to declare a law
invalid or ultra vires on account of unconstitutionality. The Courts would accept an
interpretation, which would be in favour of constitutionality rather than the one which
would render the law unconstitutional. Declaring the law unconstitutional is one of the
last resorts taken by the Courts”
• Once the respondents prima facie convince the Court that the enactment
is unconstitutional then the burden shifts upon the State to satisfy that the
restrictions imposed on the fundamental rights satisfy the test of
reasonableness
• The courts should not put any unnatural or forced meaning on the words
used by the Legislature in the search for an interpretation which would
save the provision from being struck down
2. Statutes are presumed to be in conformity with International Law
• It is presumed that legislature does not enact anything contrary to
International Law or common Law.
• All general terms in a statute are to be interpreted in a way that they
confirm to international Law standards
• When two interpretations are possible the courts should lean in the
favour of that interpretation by which the statute comes into consonance
with the Principles of International law
• However merely on the grounds that a law is in contravention of
International Law, the court may not declare an act ultra vires
3. Presumption that the legislature does not commit mistakes or
make omissions
• Lord Halsbury observed, “But I do not think it competent for any court to proceed under
assumption that the legislature has made a mistake. Whatever the real fact may be, I think a court
of Law is bound to proceed on the assumption that the Legislature is an ideal person that does not
make mistakes
• Every word in the statute has been used mindfully, intentionally and
suitably
• Language employed by legislature is proper and does not suffer from
any mistake
• Court must read the language as it is and give the most plain meaning
• Court cant proceed on the assumption that the legislature does not
know what it is saying or that it has made a mistake
• Casus Omissus : only in severe cases of necessity , not ordinarily
Casus Omissus
• Casus Omissus, literally means case omitted.
• It is basically a situation not provided for by a statute or contract and therefore governed by precedents.
• When a statute or an instrument of writing undertakes to foresee and to provide for certain
contingencies, and through mistake, or some other cause, a case remains to be provided for, it is said to
be a casus omissus.
• It is a canon of construction, requiring the court to draw up principles of statutory construction, which
are then going to be followed by subsequent judges in their judicial decisions. Casus Omissus can be said
to be a gap in a statute.
• The classic rule is that courts will not fill the gaps in statutes – their function is declare or decide the
law. Presumption that the legislature does not commit mistakes or make omissions.
• Every word in the statute has been used mindfully, intentionally and suitably. Language employed by
legislature is proper and does not suffer from any mistake.
• Court must read the language as it is and give the plainest meaning. Court cannot proceed on the
assumption that the legislature does not know what it is saying or that it has made a mistake.
• casus omissus cannot be supplied by the Court except in the case of
clear necessity and when the reason for it is found in the four corners of
the statute itself but at the same time a casus omissus should not be
readily inferred and for that purpose all the parts of a statute or
section must be construed together (Ex Visceribus Actus)and every
clause of a section should be construed with reference to the context and
other clauses thereof so that the construction to be put on a particular
provision makes a consistent enactment of the whole statute.
4. Presumption that Legislature does not intend what is inconvenient
and unreasonable
• Intention of legislature is always fair and it does not do anything which is
unreasonable
• A construction by which inconvenience is caused should be avoided by
courts
• The SC quoted in D Saibaba v BCI, “The learned author states again, "In
selecting out of different interpretations 'the court will adopt that which is just,
reasonable and sensible rather than that which is none of those things' as it may be
presumed 'that the Legislature should have used the word in that interpretation which
least offends our sense of justice'.
5. Presumptions related to the Jurisdiction of the Courts
• Strong presumption against the ouster of jurisdictions of courts
• Unless the legislature has in express terms ousted the jurisdiction the
courts shall have the jurisdiction to try and determine the matter
• Ouster of jurisdiction to not be readily inferred or accepted the burden
of proof lies on party questioning it
Presumption in favour of Natural Justice
• The Court will avoid imputing to the legislature an intention to enact a provision which flouts
notions of justice and fairness
• It is presumed that PNJ are enshrined even if they are not expressly mentioned
• If the statute either specifically or by necessary implication excludes the application of PNJ
then the Court cannot ignore the mandate of the Legislature, however as much as possible it
will try to read the statute in entirety and try to ascertain the impact of such a provision
• Olga Tellis v BMC 1986 AIR 180 It must further be presumed that, while vesting in the
Commissioner the power to act without notice, the Legislature intended that the power should be
exercised sparingly and in cases of urgency which brook no delay. In all other cases, no departure from
the audi alteram partem rule ('Hear the other side') could be presumed to have been intended. Section 314 is so
designed as to exclude the principles of natural justice by way of exemption and not as a general rule. There are
situations which demand the exclusion of the rules of natural justice by reason of diverse factors like time, place
the apprehended danger and so on. The ordinary rule which regulates all procedure is that persons who are
likely to be affected by the proposed action must be afforded an opportunity of being heard as to why that action
should not be taken. The hearing may be given individually or collectively, depending upon the facts of each
situation. A departure from this fundamental rule of natural justice may be presumed to have
been intended by the Legislature only in circumstances which warrant it. Such circumstances
must be shown to exist, when so required, the burden being upon those who affirm their
existence.