Interpretation of Statutes

Basic Principles of Interpretation

• Intention of the Legislature
• Statute must be read as whole in its context
• Statute must be construed so as to make it
effective and workable
• If meaning is plain, effect must be given to it
irrespective of consequences
• Appraisal plain meaning
 Intention of Legislature

• The essence of law lies in the spirit, not in its

letter, for the letter is significant only as being
the external manifestation of the intention
that underlies it” - Salmond
• Statute is the edict of the legislature
The conventional way of interpreting the
statute is to seek the intention of the
legislature
 Contd..
• Courts cant interpret arbitrarily
• Duty of the court to act upon the true intention of
legislature both mens or sentia legis
• It is the short hand reference to meaning of words
as used by the legislature to be determined with the
guidance of accepted principles of interpretation
• If provision open for two meanings, the one which
represents the intention of legislature should be
taken
• It is true or legal meaning
 Contd..

• Task not easy because of various reasons

• First and foremost is the language
• Words are not scientific symbols
• Language is not complete medium of
communication
• Another difficulty the legislature may not
foresee any situations or circumstances that
may emerge
 contd
• Function of the court is only to expound the
law not to legislate
• Numerous rules of interpretation or
construction expressed differently by different
judges which lead to contradictory
propositions
• The problem of interpretation is problem of
meaning of words and their effectiveness to
communicating a particular thought or
expression
 contd

• Words are used to refer some object or

situation
• The object to assign a technical name referent
• Words and phrases are symbols that stimulate
mental references to referents. Each word may
stand for one or a number of objects
(Language and the Law by Glanvile Williams)
• Words are capable to refer to different
referents in different contexts in times
 Contd..
• Difficulty in borderline cases falling within or outside
the connotation of the word
• Language may be misunderstood in such cases
• The difference between interpretation of
communication and statute of law
• Statute cannot be explained by individual legislature
or even by a resolution as once enactment is done
the legislature become functus officio
• They can however amend or repeal any statute or
declare its meaning which can be done only through
the normal process of making the law
 Contd

• Example: word Building divergent decesions by the

courts ( Open Platform without a roof or wall
considered to be a building, but a brick kiln not a
building St v Venkat Rao Krishna Rao Gujar, Intl Airport
Employees Union v. Intl Airport Authority of India, State
v. SK Roy)
• Sometimes use of general words to cover different
situations arise problems
• Another example word repair doesn’t include cleaning
and oiling ( London & North Eastern Rly Co v. Berriman)
• Notional extension of the words accident arising out
of employment (Best Undertaking v. Agnes)
 Contd..

• whether a railway workman engaged in

cleaning and oiling a permanent way, is
repairing ..? Answer no by House of Lords
Berriman case
• Courts have to draw a line between the literal
and contextual meaning of the words.
• Modern day statute have a policy to curb
some public evil or mischief or effectuate
some public benefit.
• Sometimes the general words are so designed
to cover similar situations that arise in future
 contd

• However not possible to anticipate fully the

future changing situations..ex. Cyber Crimes
• The duty of the court only to expound not ot
legislate is a fundamental rule, therefore only
a marginal area to mould or creatively
interpret
• Ex..Telegraph Acts of 1863 & 1869 telegraph
cover the word telephone as telephone was
not invented when these acts were passed
 contd

• The intention of the legislature assimilates two

concepts
Concept of Meaning ( Literal)
Concept of Purpose & Object ( Purposive)
The process of construction combines both literal &
purposive approaches
Legislative intent to be determined taking the true or
legal meaning of the words in the light of purpose,
object, mischief which it intends to curb and provide
remedy and benefits which it accords.
 contd

• Acc to Black Stone the most fair & rational

method for interpreting a statute to explore the
intention of the legislature through the most
natural and probable signs which are “either
words, the subject matter, the effects and
consequence or the spirit and reason of the law”
• A bare mechanical interpretation of wordes will
devoid the concept of purpose
• Krishna Iyer J, “to be literal in meaning is to see
the skin and missing the soul”
 Contd..
• The law is a pragmatic instrument of social order and
an interpretative effort must be imbued with the
statutory purpose.
• A construction that would promote the purpose or
object of an Act, even if not expressed, is to be
preferred. “There is no possibility of mistaking
midnight for noon; but at what precise moment
twilight becomes darkness is hard to determine.” (Jane
Straford Boyse v. John T. Rassborough,.
• Thus, the courts, although conscious of such a dividing
line,, do not attempt to draw it for reasons of practical
impossibility; however, sometimes, attempts it after
laying down a working line; howsoever pragmatic, it
may or may not be.
 contd

• There is a marginal area in which the courts

mould or creatively interpret legislation and
thus finish or refine legislation which comes to
them in a state requiring varying degrees of
refinement.
• Since, interpretation always implies a degree
of discretion and choice, creativity, a degree
which is especially high in certain areas such
as constitutional adjudication.
 Contd..
• Textualism versus Purposivisim
• When Text is not clear Purpose should prevail
• The intention of legislature need to be looked
in in the light of purpose when the text gives
different meanings.
• Example Wife under section 125 Cr.P.C
2.Statute must be read as a whole in its Context
(“EX VISCERIBUS ACTUS”)
• This is the second important basic principle of
interpretation
• When question arises as the meaning of certain
provision, it must be read in its context (circumstances)
• It is legitimate to understand the provision in the light
of the context in which the statute is being applied
• Legislature has the habit of using same word or phrase
in different places in the same statute or other similar
statutes
 Contd..

• The context means

 the statute as whole,
 the previous state of law,
 other statutes in pari materia,
 the general scope of the statute and
 the mischief that it was intended to remedy
 Contd.
• A well established rule that the intention of the
statute must be found by reading the statute as a
whole.
• Viscount Simonds, “it is an elementary rule”
• Lord Somervell of Harrow, “compelling rule”
• BK Mukherjee J “settled rule”
• Lord Davey, every clause of the statute must be
construed with reference to context and other
clauses of the Act, so as to make a consistent
enactment of the whole statute or series of
statutes relating to the subject matter.
 contd

• Every clause needs to be construed with reference to

the context and other clauses of the Act, to make a
consistent enactment of the whole statute or series
of statutes relating to the subject-matter.
• Reference to the Context - means
 Always and not merely when ambiguity arises
 It is an elementary principle, that the words of a
statute should be construed in the context of the
scheme of the statute as a whole
 Controversial provision should be read in the context
of statute as a whole
• It is the most natural and genuine
exposition of a statute.
• To ascertain the meaning of a clause the
court must look at the whole statute, i.e
what it precedes, what it succeeds, and not
merely at the clause itself
• The conclusion that the language is plain or
ambiguous can be arived only by studying he
statute as a whole
 contd

• Sinha CJI, “the court must ascertain the

intention of the legislature by directing its
attention not merely to the clauses to be
construed but to the entire statute, it must
compare the clause with other parts of the
law, and the setting in which the clause to e
interpreted occurs”
• The rule is of general application as even the
plainest terms may be controlled by the
context
 contd
• It is conceivable as Lord Watson said, “that the
legislature while enacting one clause in plain terms,
might introduce into same statue or other
enactments which to some extent qualify or
neutralize its effect”
• i.e same word used in different sections of same
statute or even used at different palces in same
clause or section of a statute may bear different
meanings ( Ex: Civil services of a state not to include
HC or Subordinate Court Staff in Art 371-D though
same word includes them in Art 311 CJ AP v.
Dikshitulu)
 contd

• How far and to what extent each part of a

statute influences the other part would be
different in each case
• AG v HRH Prince Augustus, House of Lords
allowed Attorney General to refer to the
Preamble of the Statute. Lord Viscount
Simmonds, “ I conceive it as my right and duty
to examine every word in the statute in its
context, and I use context in widest sense..its
preamble…”
 contd
• Sir John Nichol, “the key to opening of every law is
the reason and spirit of the law- it is the animus
imponetus the intention of the legislature expressed
in the law itself taken as a whole.”
• Hence to arrive at the true meaning of any provision
or phrase, it should not viewed detached from the
context”
• High Court of Australia, the modern approach to
statutory interpretation insists, Context must be
considered at the first stage not at later stages when
ambiguity arises and in its widest sense.”
 Some case law

• OP Sigla v Union of India (1984, AIR SC 1595)

• Rule 7 of the Delhi Higher Judicial Service Rules, 1970 -
recruitment
by promotion and by direct recruitment.
• Proviso - Provided that not more than 1/3rd of the posts in the
service shall be held by direct recruits
• Ceiling or Quota?
Rule 8 - seniority of direct recruits vis-a-vis promotees shall
be determined in the order of rotation of vacancies based on the
quotas of vacancies reserved for both categories by rule 7
• Held - having regard to rule 8 the true intendment of the
proviso to rule 7 is that 1/3rd of the substantive posts must be
reserved for direct recruits.
 contd
• Attar Singh v Inderkumar (AIR 1967 SC 773)
• S. 13(a)(ii) of the Punjab Rent Restriction Act, 1949,
enables a landlord to obtain possession in the case of
rented land if-
• (a) he requires it for his own use;
• (b) he is not occupying in the urban area for the purpose
of his business any other such rented land; and
• (c) he has not vacated such rented land without
sufficient cause
• “for his own use” – ‘whatever is the nature of use’ or
‘his own business use?’
 Contd..
• SC held: “his own use meant his own business use”
• Observed: All the three clauses were to be read
together and clause (a) was restricted to business
use as were clauses (b) and (c). If this restricted
meaning were not given to the words "for his own
use" in clause (a) the later two clauses would
become inapplicable.
• D Sanjeevayya v Election Tribunal (AIR 1967 SC 1211)
Sec 150 of Representation of People Act, 1951 and
Part III of the Act should be read together
 Contd ..
• MCH v PN Murthy (AIR 1987 SC 92)
“buildings and lands vested in the Corporation” –
exempted from tax sec 202 – sec 204 tax shall be levied
from the occupier of he holds premises directly from the
crpn..- question allotters under Hire Purchase agreement
whether to pay or not ..held, property vested both in
title and possession alone exempted..both secs to be
read together
S Gopal Reddy v State of AP AIR 1996 SC 2184
Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 prohibits both actual
receiveing and demand for dowry..held, text and context
should be read together to find out the object of the Act
 contd

• Poaptlal Shah v State of Madras (AIR 1953 SC 274)

BK Mukherjee J, “It is a settled rule of construction that to
ascertain the legislative intent all the constituent parts
of a statute are to be taken together, each word phrase,
sentence is to be considered in the light of the object
and purpose of the Act”
SR Das J, “The meaning of words take colour from the
context in which they appear” “When context makes
the meaning clear it becomes unnecessary for and
select a particular meaning from the diverse meanings a
word is capable of according to lexicographers”
(Mangoo Singh v Election Tribunal AIR 1957 SC 871)
 Contd..

• The rule that the statute has to be read as a

whole in its context is of general application,
• The practical utility of the rule is more visible
in constriction of general words and in
resolving in consistencies by recourse to
harmonious construction
 3. Statute must be Construed to make it
Effective & Workable
• The Courts must strongly lean against a construction
which reduces the statue to a futility.
• A statute must be construed so as to make it
effective and workable.
• Ut res magis valeat quam pereat
• Presumption in favour of constitutionality of the
statute always to uphold the legislative competence
to enact laws
• No statute shall be declared as void for sheer
vagueness.
•Lord Denning “When a statute has some meaning even though
it is obscure, or several meanings, even though it is little to
choose between them, the courts have to
•say what meaning the statute is to bear, rather than rejecting it
as a nullity”

•The Courts there fore shall not reject the construction which
will defeat the plain intention of the legislature even though
there is inexactitude in the language used

•What ever the meaning the statute has, the same is to be

adapted rather than rejecting it

•Duty of the Court to make statute operative

 Contd .
• As far as possible all the words used in the statute must be
given meaning
• Not to be expected that the legislature used unnecessary
words
• It is sensible to presume that the same has not been said
earlier
• Viscount Simmons, “ if the choice is between two
interpretations, the narrower of which would fail to
achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation and avoid
the construction which render the statute to futility.
• The courts may complain that the enactment is mind twisting or
enigma, yet can’t concede that no meaning can be given to it.
 contd

• Holmes J, “ It is not adequate discharge of duty

for courts to say, we see what you are driving
at, but you have not said it, therefore shall go
on as before”
• Lord Dunedin, “ it is our duty to make what we
can of statutes knowing that they are meant to
be operative and not inept and nothing short of
impossibility should in my judgment to allow a
judge to declare a statute unworkable”
 contd
• CIT v Teja Singh AIR 1959 SC 352
Section 18-A(9) of IT Act, 1922 Notice under sec22(1) , 22(2)
ITO, Mangalore v Damodar Bhat (AIR 1969 SC 408)
The IT Act, 1961 section 297(2) (j) recovery of arrears assessed
under old Act can it be done in new Act
Corporation of Calcutta v Liberty Cinema AIR 1965 SC 1107
Fee should be treated as Tax so as to make the sec 548 workable and
effective
M Pentaih v Veermallappa Muddala AIR 1961 SC 1107
Hyderabad District Municipalities Act, 1956 – sec 320 – sec 16(1)
was held inapplicable to the first election but applicable to subsequent
elections
Udayan Chinubhai v RC Bali (AIR 1977 SC 2319)
Sec 12 of Limitation Act, “ time to compute the limitation shall not be
excluded in computing the period of limitation and not it shall not be
excluded in computing the time requisite for obtaining a copy
 4. If Meaning is Plain Effect Must be given to it
irrespective of Consequences
• This is the last of the Basic Principle
• When the words of a statute are clear, plain or
unambiguous, i.e., they are reasonably susceptible
to only one meaning, give effect to that meaning
irrespective of consequences
• Lord Viscount Simonds “…in construing enacted
words we are not concerned with the policy involved
or with the results, injurious or otherwise, which
may follow from giving effect to the language used”
Justice Gajendragadkar
“If the words used are capable of one construction only then
it would not be open to the courts to adopt any other
hypothetical construction on the ground that such
construction is more consistent with the alleged object and
policy of the Act”
SR Das J
“Hardship or inconvenience cannot alter the meaning of the
language employed by the legislature if that meaning is
clear on the face of the statute”
CJ Tindal, “ if the words are themselves precise and
unambiguous then no more necessary to expound them in
their natural and ordinary sense. They themselves declare
the intention of the legislature” ..
i.e when the words are plain &unambiguous and admits
only meaning no question of construction arises. For the
Act speaks for itself.
 Contd..
• Results of the construction will not be matter for the
court, even if it is strange, surprising, unreasonable,
unjust or oppressive
• CIT v Keshabchandra Mondal AIR 1950 SC 265
Returns of the Income to be signed an illiterate by the
pen of his son as bakalam
Pakala Narayanaswamy v Emperor AIR 1939 PC 47
sec 162 Cr.P.C “Any Person” includes who may
thereafter be an accused. “when the meaning of the
words is plain it is not the duty of the courts to busy
themselves with supposed intention” (Lord Atkin)
 Contd..

. Ramanjay Singh v Bajinath Singh AIR 1954 SC 752

123(7) RP Act, 1951- persons employed by the father and
paid by him, who assisted the son in his election - in
relation to the son are they mere volunteers or
employed?
Argued that its violative of spirit of election law to call them
volunteers?
SR Das J observed:
• "The spirit of the law may well be an elusive and unsafe
guide and the supposed spirit can certainly not be given
effect to in opposition to the plain language of the
sections of the Act”
 Contd..
• The rule applies to fiscal and penal statutes.
• If the person to be taxed comes within the letter of the law he
must be taxed..however hardship may appear to the judicial
minds
• MV Joshi v MU Shimpi AIR 1961 SC 1498
11, Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 – sale of
butter below prescribed standard was an offense - butter was
defined to mean 'the product prepared exclusively from milk
or cream’ – appellant was held guilty of selling butter below
standard.
Contended in appeal by the appellant that (i)the butter was
made from curd and not from milk, (ii)no foreign article was
added to make it adulterated, (iii)strict construction rule of
penal statute be applied, (iv) adopt the construction
favourable to the subject. Held: appellant was guilty
Justice Subbarao:
“But these rules do not in any way affect the fundamental
principle of interpretation, namely, that the primary test is—the
language employed in the Act and when the words are clear and
plain the court is bound to accept the expressed intention of the
legislature”
CSD Swamy v State ..AIR 1960, SC 7
Sec 5(3) Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 – rule of evidence –
presumption of guilt in certain cases..- departure from the
normal rule of criminal procedure -
Illachi Devi v Jain Society Protection of Orphans AIR 2003 SC
3397
Sec 233 and 236 Indian Succession Act, - prohibits grant of
probate or letters of Administration “to any association of
persons unless it is a company..” – Plain rule applied and held it
cannot be issued to the society registered under Societies
Registration Act
 Guiding Principles of Interpretation

• 1. Language of the Statute should be read as it is

• 2. The Rule of Literal Construction

• 3. Regard to Subject and Object of the Statute

• 4. Regard to the Consequences of Construction

 Language of the Statute should be read as it is

• Avoiding addition and Substitution of Words

• Casus Omissus
• Avoiding Rejection of Words
• Departure from the rule
- Additon of words when permissible
- Rejection of words when permissible
- Treating words or provisions as superfluous
Avoiding addition and substitution of words

• Intention of the Legislature primarily to be

gathered from the language used
• Attention to be given on what has been said
and what has not been said
• Any construction which requires for its
support addition or substitution or rejection of
words to be avoided
•
 contd

• Privy Council in Crawford v Spooner,” WE cannot

aid the Legislature’s Defective phrasing of an Act,
we cannot add or mend by construction make up
the deficiencies”
• Should not be done
• It is contrary to the rule to read words into the Act
unless it is absolutely necessary to do so
• It is wrong and dangerous to substitute the words
• The courts cannot reframe the Act for the very
reason that it has no powers to legislate
 Contd..
• British India Gen Insurance Co v Capt Itbar Singh
held, Sec 96(2) of MV Act 1939 is exhaustive by itself of
defenses open for an insurer the court refused to add the
word ‘also” after the words “ on any of the following words”
The court further held, “ the rule do not permit us to do so
unless the section as it stands is meaningless or doubtful
meaning”
Ramnarayan v State of Bombay ( AIR 1950 SC 459)
Held, Art 31-A(i)(a) of Constitution in holding that “exti
guishment or modification” of any right is a distinct conept
from the acquisition of any state or rights there in, rejected
the argument such ext. and mod. Should apply only in the
process of acquisition of the state
 Contd..

• KM Vishwanath Pilai v KM S Pillai (AIR1969 SC 493)

Sec. 42(1) MV Act 1939 which enacts that “No Owner
of transport vehicle shall use or permit the use of the
vehicle in any public place save in accordance with
the conditions of the permit granted or
countersigned”, court held no justification for reading
the words “to him” after the words “permit granted”
Said, the section did not make it necessary that the
owner of the vehicle himself should obtain permit ..
 Casus Omissus
• Term casus omissus means “cases of omission”
• Omission in a statute cannot be supplied by
construction.
• A matter which should have been provided but
actually has not been provided in a statute cannot be
supplied by the courts, as to do so will be legislation
and not construction.
• But there is no presumption that a casus
omissus exists and language permitting the court
should avoid creating a casus omissus where there is
none.
• Courts can interpret the law not legislate
(Hansraj Gupta v. DMET Co. Ltd. AIR 1933 P.C. 63)
 Contd..

• A casus omissus cannot be supplied by the court by

judicial interpretative process except in the case of
clear necessity and when reason for it is found in the
four corners of the statute itself.
• The language employed in the statute is the
determinative factor of the legislative intent. The first
and primary rule of the construction is that the
intention of the legislature must be found in the
words used by the legislature itself
• The question is not what may be supposed and has
been intended but what has been said
 contd

• Francis J. Mc. Coffery observes that it is a rule of statutory

construction that Casus Omissus which means that case
omitted from the language of a statute but within the
general scope of the statute and which appears to have
been omitted due to inadvertence or by overlook cannot
be supplied by the court.
• S.P. Gupta v. President of India AIR 1982 SC 149 the
Supreme Court held that when the language of a statute is
clear and unambiguous - no room for application of the
doctrine of Casus Omissus or for any external aid in such,
the words used by the statute speak for themselves and it
is not the function of the court to add words or expression
merely to suit what court thinks is the supposed intention
of the legislature.
 Contd..

• Raghunath Rai Bareja v. PNB (2007) 2 SCC 230 , SC

observed that even if there is defect or omission in
the words used by the Legislature, the Court cannot
correct or make up the deficiencies especially when
literal reading thereof produces an intelligible result
• Ramesh Mehta v. Sanwal Chand Siinghvi AIR 2004 SC
2258. The Supreme Court observed that although
court cannot supply to casus omissus, it is equally
clear that it should not interpret a statute so as
to create a casus omissus when there is really
none.
 contd

• Hiradevi v. Dist Board, Shahjahanpur AIR 1952 SC 362

Section 71 and Section 90 of the U.P. District Board Act,
1922 and the Amendment Act 1933 were in question.
Section 71 provided that a Board may dismiss its
Secretary by special resolution, which was amended in
1933 and made the dismissal to take effect after the
expiry of period of appeal or decision of appeal.
However, the corresponding Section 90 pending
enquiry or till sanction is obtained for dismissal in the
old Act which provided for suspension of the Secretary
pending enquiry was not amended. Therefore, Section
71 was amended but not Section 90.
 Contd..

• Justice Bhagwati in this case observed that, it was

unfortunate that when legislature came to amend
Section 71, it forgot to amend Section 90 in
conformity with amendment of Section 71. But
this lacuna cannot be supplied by any liberal
construction. No doubt, it is the duty of court to
try and harmonize the various provisions of an Act
passed by the Legislature. But, it is certainly not
the duty of the court to stretch the word used by
Legislature to fill in gaps or omissions in the
provisions of an Act.
 Contd..

• Gladstone v. Bower, - Agricultural Holdings Act, 1948,

section 23 applied tenancy for year to year – sec. 2
less than one year, sec 3 term for two years more..no
provision for 18 months, held court cant fill the gaps
• Basavantappa v. Gangadhar Narayana Dharwadkar
(1986) 4 SCC 273 P.K. Unni v. Nirmala Industries AIR
1990 SC 933 Dadi Jagannadam v. Jammulu Ramulu
AIR 2001 SC 2699 These cases relate to construction
of Rule 89 of Order 21 of CPC after the Amendment
of Article 127 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
 Contd..
• Rule 89 of Order 21 of CPC provides that if any person
claiming an interest in the property sold in execution of a
decree applies to have the execution sale aside and deposits
within 30 days from the date of sale, 5% of the sale money for
payment to the purchaser and the amount payable to the
decree holder, ‘the court shall make an order setting aside the
sale.’
• The period of limitation for applying under Rule 89 was also
30 days which was enlarged to 60 days by way of an
amendment in the Limitation Act.
• The Parliament however failed to make corresponding
amendment in the Rule 89 to enlarge the period for making
deposit
 Contd..

• The two judge bench in Dharwadkar held that

it is implied that the period in both the cases
is enlarged to 60 days
• Which was not accepted in Nirma Industries
Case
• Later in Ramulu’s case Nirma Case was
overruled and the Supreme Court held that
the court must try to harmonise the
conflicting provisions.
 contd
• Denning LJ, “When a defect appears a judge cannot simply
fold his hands and blame draftsman. He must set to work on
the constructive task of finding the intention of parliament
and then he must supplement the written words so as to
give force and life to the intention of the legislature”
• The intention of legislature can be better found by filling up
the gaps
• Criticism….
• Denning’s view was approved by SC in Bangalore Water
Supply v. Rajappa. While dealing with the definition of
‘Industry’ under ID Act, 1947, the definition was ambiguous
and so general some judicial heroics were required. CJ Beig
 contd

• Karnataka State v UOI AIR 1978 SC 68.

Sec. 35(2) FERA 1973, 104(2) Customs Act, 1962 – every
arrested person to be presented before a Magistrate within
24 hours – no provision empowering authorize magistrate
further detention. SC held, sec 167(2) of Cr.PC applies to FERA
and Customs Act, otherwise the provisions become useless.

• Boddu Narayanamma v Sri Venkateswara Aluminum Co

The AP Building (Lease Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1960
Buildings categories into residential and non
residential..what about the building which are given on
composite lease..held, has to be categorized according to the
nature accommodation and dominant purpose of the lease
• Omissions not to be considered as
defect which can be cured by supply of
words.
• Cannot be supplied except in the case
of clear necessity and when reason for it
is found in the four corners of the
statute itself.
 Avoiding the Rejection of Words
• Not permissible to add words or fill gap or lacuna, on
other hand effort should be made to give meaning
each and every word
• “It is not a sound construction to brush aside the
words” – J Patanjali Shashtri
• Incumbent on the part of the court to avoid a
construction which devoid of any meaning or
application
• Presumption that legislature inserted every provision
or word for a purpose and is not deemed to waste its
words
 contd

• Any construction which attributes redundancy

to the legislature will not be accepted except in
compelling situations
• Hill v Williams Hil (Park Lane) ltd.. Gaming Act,
1845..sec 18 ‘All the contracts or agreements by
way of gaming or wagering shall be null and
void and no suit shall be brought or maintained
for recovery any sum or thing which is alleged
to be won on ay wager’ question a separate
agreement to pay is enforceable..held, no
 Contd..

• State v Ali Gulshan..sec. 6(4) Bombay Land Requisition

Act, 1948 ‘requisition of land for the purpose of state or
any public purpose’ question any other public purpose
restricted to purpose of state..held no
• Balwant Kaur v Chararan Singh. Hindu Adoption and
Maintenance Act, 1956 – sec. 19 ‘maintenance to the
Hindu wife from the estate of her husband or her father
and mother’ held, section personal right against father
and mother ‘estate of’ before the words ‘her husband’
not to be read before the words ’her father and
mother’ otherwise section 22(2) becomes otiose.
 Exceptions – Departure from the Rule
• As already stated not permissible to read words into
the statute
• But in discharging its interpretative function the
court can correct obvious legislative errors & in
suitable cases will add, or omit or substitute the
words
• Three things the court must be sure :-
1. the intended purpose of the stature in wuestion
2. By inadvertence the P’ment failed to give effect
3. The error noticed
 Addition of words when permissible
• Words may be read into the Act to give effect to the
intention of the legislature which is apparent form the Act
• Where it appears the words have been accidentally
omitted or if the constriction adapted deprives the
existing provision all the meaning, it is permissible to add
words
• Departure from the rule is to avoid any statute becoming
meaningless.
• But before adding words it must be made sure that even
Legislature would have added the words had they noticed
the error
 Contd..

• Siraj ul Haq v Sunni Central Board of Wakf UP

sec. 5(2), ‘Mutawalli of a wakf or any person
interested in a Wakf’….held, any person
should be understood as, “any person
interested in what is held to be a wakf
Gajendragadkar J, “ where literal meaning of the
words used in the statute defeat the main
object by making it meaningless or ineffective,
it is legitimate to adopt liberal construction to
give meaning to all the statutes
 Contd..

• State Bank of Travancore v Mohammad

Sec. 4(1) of Kerala Agriculturists Debt Relief Act, 1970
“any debt due before the commencement of this Act to any
Banking Company..”..the SC construed them as, “any debt
due at and before the commencement of this Act”
Chandrachud CJ, “..that is the only rational manner by which
we can give meaning and content to it to further the
object of the Act”
Union Bank v Seppo Rally
Sec. 17 C P Act 1986 – State Commission – Territorial
Jurisdiction, held, as per sec. 11 Jurisdiction of Dist.
Forum
 Rejection of words when permissible
• Words introduced due to inadvertence or unskilfulness
of the legislature can be rejected to make the statute
effective and workable.
• Since the courts not to reduce the statute to a futility, it
is permissible to reject the surplus words
• Salmon v Duncombe,
“Any natural born subject of Great Britain and Ireland
resident within this district may exercise all the rights of
disposal property by will ‘as if such natural born subject
resided in England….intention was clear but due to last
nine words, the provision is meaningless, held, that the
last nine words be rejected
 Treating the words as superfluous
• Legislature sometimes use superfluous words –
tautological expression due to ignorance of law
or sometimes as a matter of abundant caution –
not uncommon..
• To find special exemptions which are already
covered under general exemptions
• A provision which owes its origin to a confusion
of ideas or misunderstanding of law or abundant
caution the court considers them as superfluous
 2. The Rule of Literal Construction
Natural & Grammatical Meaning
• By the literal rule, words in a statute must be
given their plain, ordinary or literal meaning.
• The objective of the court is to discover the
intention of Parliament as expressed in the
words used. 
• This approach will be used even if it produces
absurdity or hardship, in which case the remedy
is for Parliament to pass an amending statute.
 Contd..

• One of the leading statements of the literal rule was

made by Tindal CJ in the Sussex Peerage Case (1844)
11 Cl&Fin 85 “… the only rule for the construction of
Acts of Parliament is, that they should be construed
according to the intent of the Parliament which
passed the Act. If the words of the statute are in
themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more
can be necessary than to expound those words in
their natural and ordinary sense. The words
themselves alone do, in such case, best declare the
intention of the lawgiver.”
 Lord Esof in
R v Judge of the City [1892] 1 QB 273 said:
•“If the words of an Act are clear then you must follow
them even though they lead to a manifest absurdity.
The court has nothing to do with the question whether
the legislature has committed an absurdity.
Facts
• In the case Mr C, the Claimant, was injured in a car.
• The Defendant’s insurance only covered him under the
Road Traffic Act 1988 for the use of his car ‘on any highway
and any other road to which the public has access’. Issue
• The question for the court to determine, therefore, was
whether the multi-storey car park was a road?
Held
•The HL held that the car park was not a road
because a road provides for cars to move along
it to a destination.
•Therefore, the insurance company was not
liable to pay out on the driver’s policy because
the claimant had not been injured due to the
use of the car on a “road”.
Inland Revenue Commissioners v Hinchy (1960)
Tax penalty case
 Issue
•Concerned the construction of s.25 (3) of the Income
Tax Act 1952
•The Act stated that anyone convicted should be subject
to a fixed penalty and triple the tax which he ought to
have been charged under the Act
•The Court had to decide whether the amount should
be based on the whole amount that was liable under the
statute or just the unpaid amount
•The Court decided that on the literal rule he was liable
to pay the whole amount, even though this was a harsh
decision
 Whiteley v Chappell (1868) LR 4 QB 147
aka Dead person case
• Facts:
• Defendant was arrested for impersonating a dead
person in order to cast an extra vote Provision:
• A statute aimed at preventing election rigging
made it an offence to impersonate “…any person
entitled to vote” at an election. Issue:
• Was he guilty or not guilty of casting an extra vote?
• Held, He was found not guilty as dead people are
clearly not entitled to vote!
London and North Eastern Railway v Berriman [1946]
AC 278
• Facts
• A railway worker was knocked down & killed by a train
while oiling parts of the line. His wife was claimed
compensation for his death. Provision
• The relevant statute said that compensation was available
for workers who were ‘..killed whilst repairing the line…’
Issue
• Whether the widow is entitled for the compensation.
• The court held that in the ordinary sense of the word,
‘repairing’ did not include oiling as this was merely
maintenance
 Maqbool Hussain v. St of Bom.(AIR 1953 SC325)
aka Gold Confiscated case

• Facts: A person was tried and penalised under Sea

Customs Authority Act, 1878 for smuggling Gold.
• He was later tried under FERA in the Court
• Question can he be tried again for same offence and
violation of Art 20(2) of Constitution
• Held, Sea Customs is not a court and therefore can
be tried again by FERA
Motipur Zamindary Company Pvt. Ltd. V. St of Bihar
(AIR 1962 SC 660)
Facts • Green vegetable are exempted of the sales tax
within Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947 Issue
• Whether sugarcane fall within the term green
vegetable?
Held: • That sugar cane was not a green vegetable and
was not exempted under the notification.
• The word "vegetables" in taxing statutes was to be
understood as in common parlance i.e. denoting class
of vegetables which were grown in a kitchen garden or
in a farm and were used for the table.
• The dictionaries defined sugar cane as a "grass."
Ramavtar Budhaiprasad v. Assistant Sales Tax Officer.
The Supreme court was faced with a question with the
meaning of “vegetable”, as it had occurred in the C.P &
Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947
whether the word vegetables included betel leaves or
not.

The Supreme Court held that “being a word of everyday

use it must be construed in its popular sense”.62 It was
therefore held that betel leaves were excluded from its
purview.
 The Literal Rule, also known as the Plain-Meaning rule,
is a type of statutory construction, which dictates that
statutes are to be interpreted using the ordinary
meaning of the language of the statute unless a statute
explicitly defines some of its terms otherwise.
In other words, the law is to be read word for word and
should not divert from its true meaning.
The Literal Rule means that the words need to be
interpreted in the strict ordinary meaning and the
scope of words should not be considered more than its
ordinary meaning. The words are to be understood in
their ordinary and natural meaning unless the object of
the statute suggests otherwise
The words of a statute are first understood in their natural,
ordinary or popular sense and phrases and sentences are
construed according to their grammatical meaning, unless
that leads to some absurdity or unless there is something in
the context, or in the object of the statute to suggest the
contrary.
"The true way", according to Lord Brougham is, "to take
the words as the Legislature have given them, and to take
the meaning which the words given naturally imply, unless
where the construction of those words is, either by the
preamble or by the context of the words in question,
controlled or altered
 Contd..

• Lord Atkinson: In the construction of statutes, their

words must be interpreted in their ordinary grammatical
sense unless there be something in the context, or in the
object of the statute in which they occur or in the
circumstances in which they are used, to show that they
were used in a special sense different from their ordinary
grammatical sense.
• Basis of this principle, the words has to be interpreted
according to the rules of grammar to ascertain the
intention of the legislature
• Safe rule – if language is plain effect to be given
irrespective of the consequences.
 Contd..

• Souhthendran v Immiration Appeal Tribunal - section

14(1) of the Immigration Act, 1971, which provides
that "a person who has a limited leave under this
Act to enter or remain in the United Kingdom may
appeal to an adjudicator against any variation of the
leave or against any refusal to vary it".
"a person who has a limited leave" were construed
not to include a person "who has had" such limited
leave and it was held that the section applied only to
a person who at the time he lodged his appeal was
lawfully in the United Kingdom that is in whose case
leave had not expired at the time of lodgment of
appeal.
 Contd..

• SC dealing with Order 21 Rule 16 of CPC held actual transfer

of decree means assignment in writing after decree is passed
• SR Das J, referring to the rule under discussion said: The
cardinal rule of construction of statutes is to read the statutes
literally, that is, by giving to the words their ordinary, natural
and grammatical meaning. If, however, such a reading leads to
absurdity and the words are susceptible of another meaning,
the Court may adopt the same. But if no such alternative
construction is possible, the court must adopt the ordinary
rule of literal interpretation. In the present case the literal
construction leads to no apparent absurdity and therefore,
there can be no compelling reason for departing from that
golden rule of construction
 Contd..

• SA Venkatram v State – held Sec 6 of Prevention of

Corruption Act, 1947, that sanction is not necessary
for taking cognizance of the offences referred to in
that section if the accused has ceased to be a public
servant on the date when the court is called upon to
take cognizance of the offences. The court rejected
the construction that the words "who is employed—
and is not removable" as they occur in clauses (a)
and (b) of section (1) mean "who was employed—
and was not removable",
To avoid ambiguity, legislatures often include "definitions"
sections within a statute, which explicitly define the most
important terms used in that statute.
The plain meaning rule attempts to guide courts faced with
litigation that turns on the meaning of a term not defined by the
statute, or on that of a word found within a definition itself.
When it is said that words are to be understood first in their
natural ordinary and popular sense, means that words must be
ascribed their natural, ordinary or popular meaning which they
have in relation to the subject matter with reference to which
and the context in which they have been used in the Statute.
In the statement of the rule, the epithets ‘natural, “ordinary”,
“literal”, “grammatical” and “popular” are employed almost
interchangeably to convey the same idea. The word ‘primary’ is
used to convey the same idea
 contd

• The natural or ordinary meaning of the word should be

understood in its context as sometimes the words may have a
secondary meaning ( different meanings)
• Ex: Coal..SC held under Sales Tax Act, include charcoal not just
coal derived from mineral, but under Colliery Control Order
coal is confined only to mineral
• Popular meaning to be derived according to how the people
deal with the subject understood them
• Same applied in determining Paddy & Rice and Textiles to
cover cotton woolen clothes.
• FRO v Kushboo Enterprises – held, ‘wood oil’ from forest
produce not to include Sandalwood oil.
 Contd..

• Exact Meaning preferred to Loose meaning

presumption that words are used exactly not
loosely.
word ’contiguous’ interpreted to its exact
meaning as ‘touching’ not as ‘neighboring’ the
loose meaning.
similarly PC held ‘adjoining’ as conterminous’
but not as near
 Contd..
• Technical Words in technical sense
Special Meaning in trade, business :
Natural & ordinary meaning of the words to be understood in
a legislation relating to a particular trade, business, profession
etc..
• Such a special meaning is called the technical meaning to
distinguish it from the more common meaning that the word
may have
• As pointed by Lord Esher MR: If the Act is one passed with
reference to a particular trade, business or transaction and
words are used which everybody conversant with that trade,
business or transaction knows and understands to have a
particular meaning in it, then the words are to be construed
as having that particular meaning
The power, therefore, given to a Surveyor under section 65 of the
English Highways Act, 1835 to "lop" trees growing near a highway
was construed as conferring the power to cut off the branches but
not to "top", i.e., to cut off the top of the tree.

Legal Words in Legal Sense

On the same principle when words acquire a technical meaning

because of their consistent use by the Legislature in a particular
sense or because of their authoritative construction by superior
courts, they are understood in similar context in subsequent
legislation
 3. Regard to Subject & Object – Mischief Rule
• Where there is a doubt about the meaning of the words, they
should be best understood in by harmonizing the subject &
object of the Act
• Hand J, “The courts have declined to be bound by the letter,
when it frustrates the patent purpose of the statute.”
• Courts should adopt an object-oriented approach to avoid the
legislative futility within the permissible interpretative limits
• However, such approach shall not extend to cause violence to
the plain language used inn the statute
• UP Bhoodan Yagna Samithi v Braj Kishore
Up BhoodanYagna Act, 1953 – held, sec 14 ‘landless persons’ – to
mean landless labors – not landless businessmen – object of the
Act was considered
 Contd.
• Workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate v Mgt
ID Act, 1947 – sec 2(k) ‘Industrial Dispute’ many dispute
between employers & employees or between employees and
workmen or between workmen and workmen ..in connection
with any employment or non employment or terms of
employment or conditions of labour of any person – held, ‘any
person’ – dispute must be real and capable of giving necessary
relief and as the person regarding whom the dispute raised to
have a substantial interest.
• Santa Singh v State – SC held, sec. 235(2) CrPC, 1973, hearing
of accused on the question of sentence and pass according to
law as mandatory to bring in conformity with the modern
trends of penology
 Contd..
• Narendra Madivalappa v Manikrao Patil
sec 23 Representation of the People Act, 1951 – inclusion of names
in the electoral roll till the last date of nomination – last date was
interpreted as last hour of nomination on the last date as per sec
33(1) which provides that the nominations can be filed between 11
am to 3 pm.
Bipin Chandra Patel v State – sec 40(1) Gujarath Municipality Act
empowers the authorized to suspend the president or vice president
if they have been detained in a prison during a trial – held, the
section empowers to suspend even if the detention is made during
the investigation of the case not only when detained after the charge
is framed. Keeping the object of the statute to keep the shady
characters away from the administration
When two interpretations possible o the one which supresses the
mischief and advances the remedy to be taken
 Contd..

• Same expressions in two different statutes in

similar context may have different meanings
having regard to the object of the enactment
Example: VC Shukla v State – Interlocutory Order
Sec 397 CrPC & sec 11 Special Courts Act
• Summary: the meaning of the words not to be
taken ordinarily in abstract – regard to be to
be given to its setting, subject and object of
the Act
 3A - Mischief Rule of Interpretation
• The Mischief Rule means judges can apply in
statutory interpretation in order to discover
Parliament’s intention. 
• This rule has often been used to resolve ambiguities
in cases in which the literal rule cannot be applied.
• This rule is so called as ‘mischief rule’ because it
envisages that construction, by which the mischief is
suppressed
• Lord Simonds concedes that the mischief is part of the
context and that he says that other sections of the
statute, the preamble, the existing state of the law and
other statutes in pari materia may be used to throw
light on that mischief. 
 Mischief Rule contd..

• The mischief rule is applied to find out

what Parliament MEANT.
• It looks for the wrong: the 'mischief' which
the statute is trying to correct
• The rule is based on the Heydon’s Case [1584]
– VERY OLD!
• Also called as Hedon’s Rule
• The rule applies to all the statutes be
beneficial, restrictive, enlarging, penal..etc..
 The rule also known as Purposive Construction.
The rule enables consideration of four things
• What was the common law before the passing
of the Act?
• What was the mischief and defect for which
the common law did not provide?
• What remedy the Parliament had resolved and
appointed to cure the “disease of the
Commonwealth”.
• The true reasons for the remedy.
 Contd..
• The rule directs the court to adopt such construction
which shall suppress the mischief and advances the
remedy.
• This rule requires the court to look to what the law was
before the statute was passed in order to discover what
gap or mischief the statute was intended to cover.
• This rule gives the court justification for going behind
the actual wording of the statute in order to consider
the problem that the particular statute was aimed at
remedying
• it is limited to using previous common law to determine
what mischief the Act in question was designed to
remedy.
 Contd..
• The rule in Heydon’s case followed in England
• Earl of Halsbury, - “it is not only legitimate but highly
convenient to refer both former &later Acts to
ascertain evils which the former Act given rise & later
Act provides remedy”.
• Statutes to be given purposive construction, i.e. to
identify the mischief and suitable construction that
remedies.
• The purposes of the Act and the mischief rule are,
therefore, closely connected, and it is very genuine
to look at the long title, scope and object of the Act
 Case laws – Mischief Rule

• Smith v Huges – Street Offences Act, 1959

sec 1(1) – soliciting the customers by prostitutes in a
street is offence – question soliciting from balconies be
considered as in a street – held, yes – the object of the
Act to keep the streets clean and peaceful for
commuters
RMDC v Union of India the definition of ‘prize
competition’ under s 2(d) of the Prize competition act
1955, was held to be inclusive of only those instances
in which no substantive skill is involved.
Thus, those prize competitions in which some skill was
required were exempt from the definition of ‘prize
competition’ under s 2(d) of the Act.
The Supreme Court has applied the Heydon’s Rule in
order to suppress the mischief was intended to be
remedied, as against the literal rule which could have
covered prize competitions where no substantial
degree of skill was required for success.
 Corkery v Carpenter 1951 aka Drunk n Ride case 
• Law: S.12 of the Licensing Act 1872 made it an
offence to be drunk in charge of a carriage on the
highway.
• Facts: The defendant was riding his bicycle whilst
under the influence of alcohol. Apply the mischief
rule – what do you think is the mischief? And is the
person guilty?
• Held: The court applied the mischief rule holding that
a riding a bicycle is a carriage. This was within the
mischief of the Act as the defendant represented a
danger to himself and other road users.
 Contd..

• Bengal Immunity Co’ case – SC applying the rule held,

Art 286 as one to cure the mischief of multiple
taxation and to preserve the free flow of the inter
state trade in Union of India without any provincial
barrier.
• Alamgir v State – sec. 498 IPC - Whoever takes or
entices away any woman who is and whom he knows
or has reason to believe to be the wife of any other
man, from that man, ….- question – if taking away
with the consent of the woman offence – applying
the rule the SC held, against the consent of the
husband as offence.
 Contd..

CIT v. Smt. Sodra Devi, - Section 16(3) of the Indian

Income-tax Act, - question- whether the word
'individual ' in s. 16(3) of the 'Indian Income-tax Act,
1922, as amended by Act IV of 1937, includes a female
and whether the income of minor sons from a
partnership, to the benefits of which they were
admitted, was liable to be included in computing the
total income of the mother who was a member of the
partnership.
held, The word 'individual' occurring in s. 16(3) of the
Indian Income-tax Act, as amended by Act IV Of 1937,
means only a male and does not include a female.
 Contd..

• The rule attains importance in construing the

statutes like Prevention of Food Adulteration
Act, 1947, Dowry Prohibition Act, 1986 etc..
• However, the rule is applicable only when the
words are ambiguous and are reasonably
capable of more than one meaning.
• Whether the language is ambiguous or not,
be understood by looking at the context of the
Act
 4 Regard to Consequences – Golden Rule
• If the language is capable of bearing more than one
construction, regard must be given to the consequences
• Construction that gives undesired results, which he
statute doesn’t intend, to be rejected
• Hardship, Inconvenience, Injustice, Absurdity &
Anomaly to be avoided.
• This is called Golden Rule of interpretation, a
modification of literal rule of interpretations
• Rule no application if the words are susceptible to only
one meaning
 Golden Rule of Interpretation

• Hardship, Inconvenience, Injustice, Absurdity

& Anomaly to be avoided.
• Courts to adopt that interpretation,
reasonable and sensible.
• Presumption that legislature not used the
word which offends the sense of justice
 Contd..

• If the plain meaning of the word – is ambiguous,

vague or misleading or – if a strict literal
interpretation would result in absurd results
• then the court may deviate from the literal meaning
to avoid such an absurdity.
• This is also known as the Golden Rule of
interpretation.
• It is the modification of the literal rule of
interpretation -  tries to avoid anomalous and absurd
consequences from arising from
literal interpretation.In view of the same, the
grammatical meaning of such words is usually
modified.
 contd

•  Lord Wensleydale in Grey v Pearson (1857)

Propounded this rule –

• “… the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words

is to be adhered to, unless that would lead to some
absurdity, or some repugnance or inconsistency with
the rest of the instrument, in which case the
grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be
modified, so as to avoid that absurdity and
inconsistency, but no farther.”
 Contd..

• It is the modification of the literal rule of

interpretation.
• The literal rule emphasizes on the literal meaning
of legal words or words used in the legal context
which may often lead to ambiguity and absurdity.
• Justice Parke “It is a very useful rule in the construction of
a statute to adhere to the ordinary meaning of the words
used, and to the grammatical construction, unless that is at
variance with the intention of the legislature to be collected
from the statute itself, or leads to any manifest absurdity or
repugnance, in which case the language may be varied or
modified so as to avoid such inconvenience but no further.”
 LITERAL GOLDEN RULE
Three Fundamental Rules
• Firstly, the literal rule that, if the meaning of
the section is plain, it is to be applied whatever
the result.
• Secondly, “golden rule” that the words should
be given their ordinary sense unless that would
lead to some absurdity or inconsistency with
the rest of the instrument;
• Thirdly, the general policy of the enactment
and the evil at which it was directed.
 Contd..

• For the application of the literal rule, a clear and

unequivocal meaning is essential.
•  Jugal Kishore Saraf v. Raw Cotton Co. Ltd.[the
SC held, that the cardinal rule of construction of statutes
is to read the statutes literally, that is by giving to the
words their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning.
If, however, such a reading leads to absurdity and the
words are susceptible of another meaning, the court may
adopt the same. But when no such alternative
construction is possible, the court must adopt the
ordinary rule of literal interpretation.
cont
• Under the literal interpretation of this sign,
people must never use the lifts, in case
there is a fire.

• However, this would be an absurd result,

as the intention of the person who made
the sign is obviously to prevent people
from using the lifts only if there is currently
a fire nearby.
 Contd..

• Applying the golden rule, the court held that

requirement of the section had not been
followed by the driver as he had not stopped
for a reasonable period requiring interested
persons to make necessary inquires from him
about the accident.
• The rule suggests that the consequences &
effects of an in interpretation deserves a lot
more importance since they are clues to the
true meaning of the legislature
 Contd..

• UP Bhoodan Yagna Samithi v Braj Kishore

Up BhoodanYagna Act, 1953 – held, sec 14 ‘landless
persons’ – to mean landless labors – not landless
businessmen – object of the Act was considered.
• Thirath Singh v Bachitar Singh – sec 99 RP Act,
1951 – Election Tribunal authorized to name all
the persons guilty of election corrupt practices
provided notice is given to such persons and
examined – question, notice to be given to
parties of the petition too- held, no - - grounds of
reasonableness and justification
 Contd..

• Ramji Missar v. State of Bihar[x 

- Sec 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958,
the SC held, crucial date on which the age of the
offender had to be determined is not the date of
offence, but the date on which the sentence is
pronounced by the trial court. An accused who
on the date of offence was below 21 years of
age but on the date on which the judgment
pronounced, if he was above 21 years, he is not
entitled to the benefit of the statute.
Advantages
• This rule prevents absurd results in some cases
containing situations that are completely
unimagined by the law makers.
• It focuses on imparting justice instead of blindly
enforcing the law.
Disadvantages
• The golden rule provides no clear means to test the
existence or extent of an absurdity. It seems to
depend on the result of each individual case.
• This rule tends to let the judiciary overpower the
legislature by applying its own standards of what is
absurd and what it not.
 Harmonious Construction
Avoiding Inconsistency & Repugnancy

• Statute must be read as a whole, i.e one

provision should be construed to other
provision in the same Act to make it consistent
• This will avoid the inconsistency & repugnancy
either with a section or with other parts of the
Statute.
• Court tom avoid the Head on Clash between
two sections of same Act & to harmonize
whenever such conflict appears
 Contd..

• This is known as Harmonious Construction

• Harmonious construction is a principle of
statutory interpretation, which holds that
when two provisions of a legal text seem to
conflict, they should be interpreted so that
each has a separate effect and neither is
redundant or nullified.
• No assumption that legislature gave from one
hand and taken away by other
 Contd..
• The provision of one section cannot be used to defeat
the provision contained in another unless the court,
despite all its effort, is unable to find a way to reconcile
their differences,
(CIT v Hindustan Bulk Carriers (2003)

• Courts must also keep in mind that interpretation that

reduces one provision to a useless number or dead is
not harmonious construction.

• To harmonize is not to destroy any statutory provision

or to render it fruitless.
 contd

• When it is impossible to completely reconcile the

differences in contradictory provisions, the courts
must interpret them in such as way so that effect is
given to both the provisions as much as possible.
• The rule applies to sub sections within the provisions
– try to harmonize or give effect to both
• It runs on the premise that Parliament did not make
the provisions in a an enactment to defeat each
other or to make one of them ineffective by giving
only effect to the other/s.
 Contd..

• The familiar approach in resolving the conflict – to

find out which of the provision is more general &
which one more specific

• Then to construe the general one to exclude the

specific one

• The question whether general or specific can be

determined with reference to area and extent of
application
 Contd..

• Principle explained – Generalia Specialibus non

derogant, Generalia Specialibus derogant
• If a special provision is made on a certain matter, it is
excluded from general provision
• This principle used to resolve conflict between the
provision and the rule in the Act
• When it is impossible to completely reconcile the
differences in contradictory provisions, the courts
must interpret them in such as way so that effect is
given to both the provisions as much as possible.
 Contd..

• Venkaramana Devru v State – Conflict between Art

26(b) Indian Constitution Right to manage religious
affairs – Art 25 – Right to worship – sec 3 Madras
Temple Entry Authorisation Act, 1949 – entitling
Harijans to enter temple, held, Right to manage
religious affairs is subject to Right to worship
• MSM Sharma v Krishna Singh (Search Light Case)
Held, Art 19(1) – freedom of speech and expression
subject to Art 194(3) Parliamentary Privileges
• Kehavananda Bharathi Case held, Art 368 power to
amend the constitution is subject to the rule basic
structure cannot be affected
 contd

• KM Nanavathi v State – Art 161 Governor Power to

pardon not available during SLP under Art 142
• Sirsilk Ltd. v. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh – held, sec 17 –
Publication of Award under ID Act, 1947 is
mandatory even if the parties entered into a
separate agreement subsequently under sec 18.
• D Sanjeeviah v Election Tribunal held, Power of EC to
hold Bye Election under sec 150 should be read witrh
sections 84 & 98(c)
 Contd..
When reconciliation is not possible
• It is a general rule that when reconciliation is not possible
the later provision shall prevail.
• Eastbourne corporation v. Fortes Ltd(1959)
“If two section of an Act of Parliament are in truth
irreconcilable, then prima facie the later will be preferred.”
• However, a better approach has been devised where
hierarchy of provisions is to set.
• Institute of Patent Agents v. Lockwood(1894)
In case of irreconcilable provisions, “you have to determine
which is leading provision, and which is subordinate
provision and which must give way to other.”