Latour Promises of Constructivism Latour wishes to defend constructivism on the ground that it may be the only defense against

fundamentalism, defined as a tendency to deny the constructed and mediated character of the entities whose public existence has to be discussed. (28) Whats wrong with constructivism? Everything Latour surveys everything that is currently wrong with constructivism, and then subsequently assesses what can be salvaged. An implausible role for the social One view of constructivismwhat Latour calls social constructivismholds that the authority of science is entirely a function of the social ties and power relations within the societies in which it exists. Critique: The facts discovered by social scientists have even less authority than the natural scientific facts that they study. Latour notes that he and the leading science studies scholars dont hold this view. Instead they try to show how science and technology were providing some of the ingredients necessary to account for the very making and stability of society. However, Latour and company were also not trying to give nature or reality an undue explanatory role. He suggests that we get rid of the word social altogether when talking about constructivism. Miscasting creators as well as creatures Unfortunately, even with the social label cast off, construction is still a vexing word. Whos building? What are the raw materials? Whats the product? However, constructivism really tries to blur all of these elements: engineers are deeply intertwined with their materials (Latour calls both actants) such that both are shaped by each other. Furthermore, the materials involved in construction are quite different n the context of science studies. On other views of science, matter plays three potential roles: (1) It places constraints on everything, (causally) determining scientific choices (realism). (2) It is entirely subject to human interests and cognition (social construction). (3) It is largely determined by human interests and cognition, but can place modest constraints (e.g., empiricism). An Impossible sentence: the more constructed, the more real Constructivist explanations of reality

When asked, Why do certain claims get taken as facts rather than as mere opinions offered by scientists? Latourian constructivists should reply, Because believing these claims works well. Realist explanations of success In contrast, typical realist explanations attempt the exact opposite line of explanation, answering the question Why do certain claims work well? with the answer, Because they are facts. Latour cites four reasons to favor the constructivist line of explanation over the realist line: 1) Etymologically, the word fact derives from the latin factum meaning making doing or action. In English, the words fact and feat are both derived from factum. In French, fait means both doing and fact. a. Objection: This is irrelevant. If fact were derived from the Latin word for fish, does that mean that fisherman should offer a rival philosophy of science to realism? 2) The realist explanation appears to render scientists actions completely irrelevant to the establishment of a fact. a. Objection 1: Many good explanations screen off potential explanatory factors that seemed initially promising. i. Ex. Prior to relativity theory, ether was seen as an important explanatory factor which played a prominent role in Maxwells Equations. Similarly, what ether is to relativity, scientists actions are to truth. b. Objection 2: There are realist explanations of scientists actions. We can make sense of scientists actions in terms of their trying to get the facts straight, to obtain the truth, and to avoid error. 3) If the realist explanation were correct, then scientists should not ask for any grant money, since their work is irrelevant and perhaps detrimental to a search for the truth. a. Objection: This rests on a mischaracterization (due largely to Latours accounting metaphor) of scientific realism. The issue is simply that scientists actions are not by themselves sufficient to explain why a claim is true 4) The realist explanation eliminates the difference between good and bad science. a. Objection: The realist will just say that good science gets us closer to the truth and bad science doesnt. General comment: In general, Latour doesnt fairly characterize the scientific realists argument. One realist strategy would be to explain the empirical and practical success of certain theories in terms of their truth, and to explain scientists actions in terms of their desire to seek truth and avoid error. Good and bad science would then track largely with true and false science (or at least, science that is reliable in getting at the truth and science that less reliable). As a result, his objections have little force.

However, Latour does do a nice job of spelling out his own constructivist approach, in which the reason that certain claims are taken as facts is spelled out in terms of how those claims are put to work in scientific practice. He also does a nice job of highlighting the major problem: while we have no problem talking of buildings being constructed, it would be a mistake to carry the analogy between buildings and scientific facts too far, since the latter are supposed to exist prior to any act of construction. Ex. The theory of gravity was constructed by Newton, but the existence of gravity was discovered by Newton, precisely because the latter isnt like a building; theres no human action that brought gravity into existence. Latour dismisses the typical postmodern reply (what he often calls critical sociology) to this kind of worry: facts are both constructed and real. He cites three reasons for this: (1) It requires a very implausible notion of construction. (2) It requires a very implausible notion of how constructers and their materials (actants) interact. (3) It requires a very implausible notion of reality. A scale to qualify the right amount of constructivism In this section, Latour challenges several of Hackings points: 1. Grades of commitment Recall that Hacking, in Chapter 1 of The Social Construction of What? (SCW), set up four grades of commitment for stating that X is socially constucted: (0) X is taken for granted. (1) X is not inevitable. (2) X is bad. (3) X should be overthrown. If these grades of commitment are to have mileage in the science wars, then the positions opposed to constructivism must also be fairly represented. Latour offers a fifth grade of commitment to which all constructivisms are opposed: (-1) X is the way it is, i.e., X is a permanent fixture of nature. (37) In contrast, all naturalists are committed to -1. Notes: (A) In typical philosophical jargon, if you are naturalist about X then you believe that X can (and should) be articulated entirely in the language of science (this typically includes everything from physics to psychology). (B) Realists would also be committed to -1. (C) Not all who are opposed to -1 are constructivists (e.g., deconstructionists) 2. Political versus conceptual differences In Chapter 3 of SCW, Hacking offers three sticking points between constructionists and scientists: (1) contingency versus inevitability of scientific research programs, (2) nominalism versus inherent-structurism, and (3) internal versus external explanations of

stability. This strongly suggests that the differences between constructivists and their critics are mostly intellectual. However, Latour suggests that the differences are fundamentally political. He characterizes this in terms of competing guarantees. First guarantee: once there, and no matter how it came about, discussion about X should stop for good. Typically, if we take X as true, then we are entitled to use it as a basis for inference and action. If, on the other hand, Xs truth is constantly being questioned, then X loses its inferential and practical value. Constructivists typically challenge this guarantee; naturalists need it because (a) X may be something that is required to make sense of other parts of nature, and (b) if Xs naturalness is being questioned then it does not fit into a naturalist framework/worldview. Second guarantee: in spite of the indisputability insured by the First Guarantee, a revision process should be maintained, an appeal of some sort, to make sure that new claimants which the former established order had not taken into accountwill be able to have their voices heard. Social constructivists think that X should be constantly reassessed; as a result, they take naturalists to be dogmatic conversation-stoppers. Thus, if we wanted to, we can see Latour as posing Sticking Point #4: Settled versus ongoing discussion. (Latour seems to think of his guarantees as an alternative to Hackings sticking points, but this doesnt seem necessary). Fifth guarantee: institutions assuring due process should be able to specify the quality of the good common world they have to monitor. The quest of the common world cannot even begin to be raised when an opposition is drawn between an unconstructed world already there, already unified, devoid of values, on the one hand, and a constructed motley of conflicting social or subjective value claims on the other. (40) This is a lot of jargon, but it seems to me that Latours main point is that there cannot be a strong distinction between epistemological questions and moral questions, i.e., there is not strong fact/value dichotomy. 3. From contingency versus necessity to progressivism versus unity Third guarantee: the common world is to be composed progressively; it is not already there once and for all. On Hackings view constructionists claim that our current research programs are contingent: a different kind of physics that was equally successful could have emerged. Their critics deny this, claiming that our current theories are inevitable. Latour thinks this misrepresents constructivism. Science studies chief aim is demonstrating the impossibility of absorbing the worldin the singularin one single chunk. (39) Progressive constructionists hold that a single world is a goal that has not yet been achieved, and may never be achieved. As a result, a

risky process is needed to compose the disparate parts (which are?). Traditional naturalists hold that a single world is already there. Objection: Its not clear how Latour thinks Hacking misrepresents constructivism on this point; if any attempt to unify the world could fail, then that attempt, e.g., science, is contingent. Otherwise, Latour is claiming that constructivists are rather boring fallibilists, i.e., that science could get things wrong. However, its hard to see how this weaker claim licenses constructivism rather than common sense. 3. From realism versus nominalism to human versus non-human Fourth guarantee: humans and non-humans are engaged in a history that should render their separation impossible. In SCW, Hacking claims that constructionists are typically nominalists, meaning that they think the concepts that scientists use to make sense of the world are largely manmade (linguistic) conventions, whereas their critics think that these concepts refer to the inherent structure of the world. Latour thinks that sets up a schism between words and objects that constructivists typically reject. Rather, words and worlds mark possible and not very interesting extremities, end points of a complex set of practices, mediations, instruments, forms of life, engagements, involvements through which new associations are generated. (39) He goes on to claim that science studies guarantee is not to finally obtain a clear separation between words and worlds, nature and culture, facts and representation, but just the opposite: to ensure that there is no such separation. (40) Objection: Latour is conflating two issues: (a) Do concepts in science refer to the inherent structure of the world? (b) How do concepts relate to the objects to which they refer? Latour seems to think that answering No to (a) means that you have to set up a sharp dualism (between concepts/words and the world) that makes answering (b) especially nasty, but this doesnt follow. The Upshot of the Five Guarantees Here is an attempt at interpreting Latours five guarantees into plainer prose: 1) If everyone regards something as a fact, then it should not be questioned, and should be used as an assumption to guide inference and action. 2) All facts can be questioned and are revisable in principle. 3) Unifying the world (both scientifically and politically) is an ongoing project rather than an uncontroversial assumption. 4) There is no strong distinction between the world and the words/concepts we use to refer to it, or more generally, between us and the other objects in the world. 5) There is no strong distinction between facts and values. Latour thinks that this new framework is useful for making sense of all of the positions in the science wars. Constructivists seek to find positions that satisfy (1)-(5); naturalists privilege (1) (some facts should not be questioned so that they can serve as the basis of

inference and action) while downplaying the rest; while deconstructionists emphasize the guarantees (2) and (5) (all ideas are revisable and questionable; no big difference between facts and values) while downplaying the rest. Further remarks: As we saw, theres really no reason for Latour to reject Hackings sticking points and opt for (3) and (4) instead. Item (5) is typically also endorsed by naturalists, since values arent always seen as part of the natural world. Finally items (1) and (2) are compatible with a fairly commonsensical version of fallibilism, typically embodied in the idea We can criticize all of our ideas, just not all at once, which most naturalists and many deconstructionists accept. So is there anything special about constructivism? If only constructivism and deconstruction could part company Constructivists and deconstructionists are often lumped together, primarily because as soon as someone claims that X is constructed, it is implied that X can be deconstructed (Latour cites an analogous relationship between prey and predator). Latour first notes the similarities between the constructivism and deconstruction: (1) All access to objectivity, truth, morality, divinities, or beauty is indirect and mediated. Latour then notes a key difference: (1) Deconstruction adopts a skeptical/critical position towards any claims about objectivity, truth, morality, etc. In contrast, constructivism attempts to articulate and state what these elevator words can look like in the face of being only indirectly accessed. Thus, constructivism is the only viable middle path between relatively nihilistic and skeptical deconstruction and dogmatic fundamentalism.