Br. J . Psychol. (1978).

69, 1-8 Printed in Great Britain I

The progress of psychology

Koch has argued that psychology is an imitation science, because it has failed to build an edifice of positive
knowledge; and that it cannot logically do any better in the future.
The paper rejects this sceptical argument. The sceptics appear to be victims of the accumulation-cum-
building picture of scientific progress, and prisoners of the mistaken presupposition that progress in science
consists in either the achievement of a paradigm, or the subsequent development of one. The paper points to
weaknesses in the thesis that it is not logically possible for psychology to do any better in the future and
achieve a paradigmatic advance.
But though the sceptics’ case against psychology is a bad one, their case against a traditional view about
the nature of psychology is sound; and this suggests that we should think in a different way about the
subject. I

I
Koch (1974) has argued that psychology is an ‘imitation science’. By this statement he appears
to mean that what psychologists have produced is a subject which ‘imitates ’, in its methods and
results, a genuine science (such as physics or chemistry); but which is really so dissimilar from
the genuine sciences that it fails to be a science at all, and, therefore, merits the description
‘imitation science ’.
Koch summarizes his reasons for this argument in the following way:

The idea that psychology -like the natural sciences on which it is modelled - is a cumulative or progressive
discipline is hardly borne out by its history. Indeed, there could be a way of writing the history of modern
psychology which would have to acknowledge that most of the well verified and solid ‘advances’ of any
generality are registered by clusters of findings that help reveal the utter inadequacy of long-flourishing
analytical frameworks or so-called ‘theories ’. The hard knowledge that accrues in one generation typically
disenfranchises the theoretical fictions of the last - and any new theoretical framework it is believed to
suggest, or support, typically survives only until the next. If psychology be science, it is ‘science’of a
strange kind. Its larger generalizations are not specified and refined over time and effort; they are merely
replaced. Throughout its history as ‘science’, the hard knowledge which it has deposited has usually been
negative knowledge!

This is an argument from the history of the subject. Psychology has failed to produce the
steady accumulation of knowledge that characterizes progress in the natural sciences. No doubt,
psychologists have discovered a great many particular hard bricks. But they have not been able
to use these bricks to build an edifice of hard knowledge. In so far as there has been a growth or
accumulation of knowledge, this has been negative in character. Psychologists have discovered
what is not the case; they have failed to discover what really is the truth about human nature and
its functioning.
But Koch goes further than this. It is not just that psychologists have failed to produce an
edifice of hard knowledge in the past. They will not do any better in the future. They will not do
so because they cannot; and they cannot because the methods of natural science they use and
espouse cannot logically be extended to deal with psychological phenomena.
Well, why not? Koch distinguishes between two types of ‘subfields of psychology’. On the
one hand, there is ‘sensory psychology’ and ‘biological psychology’. On the other hand, there
are subfields such as ‘perception, cognition, motivation and learning, social psychology,
psychopathology and personology ’. The former (i.e. sensory and biological psychology), he says,
‘might just as well (and perhaps more fruitfully) be regarded as parts of a biological science ’.
The latter type, he says, are ‘close to the heart of psychological studies’; and it is with these that
I PSY 69
2 B. A. Farrell
he is really concerned. He maintains that scientific methods cannot logically be extended to
these fields because

in all these areas such concepts as ‘law ’, ‘experiment’, ‘measurement’, ‘variable’, ‘control ’, ‘theory ’, do
not behave sufficiently like their homonyms in the established sciences to justify the extension to them of the
term ‘science’.To persist in the use of this highly charged metaphor is to shackle these fields of study with
exceedingly unrealistic expectations concerning generality limits of the anticipated findings, predictive
specificity

and so on. In other words, Koch is claiming that the subject matter of study in these areas of
psychology is so different from the subject matter in the natural sciences that it is useless to try
to apply scientific methods to them. If we do, and we speak of ‘psychological experiment ’,
‘variables’, and the rest, we are just deluding ourselves. These words and expressions have no
genuine application in the psychological field. If we go on using them, the effect is to produce
‘spurious knowledge ’ and an ‘imitation science ’.
Now these two arguments - from history and from the logic of the subject matter of
psychology - appear to represent the gist of Koch’s criticism of contemporary psychology. In
presenting this criticism Koch does not stand alone. He is only one of several students of the
subject who, in recent years, have presented a sceptical view of the status and prospects of the
subject - of the discipline that is taught in British and American universities. I have chosen to
concentrate on Koch’s criticisms, because he is perhaps the most vociferous and well known of
the sceptics. Obviously, if his sceptical arguments are correct, if psychology really is an
imitation science and bound to remain one, then the stand taken by psychology departments
throughout this country and the USA collapses at once; and they will all be obliged to undertake
a major task of rethinking and reorganization.

I1
How sound is this criticism of contemporary psychology? I begin with the argument from
history. Has the history of psychology been a disaster - a negative achievement - from which no
edifice of knowledge has emerged, and therefore, a history in which no progress has been
attained?
Let us examine this argument by looking, very briefly, at a piece of psychological history
which Koch accepts as illustrating splendidly the truth of his negative thesis about the history of
the whole subject. Let us look at the history of the work on learning and learning theory. AS his
thesis is itself a historical one, we must cease being psychologists and must put on the spectacles
of the historian. Accordingly, we have to ask at this point, pace Collingwood, ‘what was the
question that psychologists of learning were asking themselves at the beginning of the period -
say, at the time of Watson and just after World War I?’ (Watson 1914, 1924).
We have to remember that psychologists were then coming to feel the impact of two critical
developments in related fields. In biology the work of Darwin, and his successors, drew
attention to the instinctive equipment of animals and their comparative powers. In physiology,
everyone was still assimilating the work of Sherrington and others, and the concept of the reflex.
The latter was taken to provide the key to the working of the nervous system; and this was
regarded as a throughput system, which enabled the organism to make an adaptive response,
under the influence of its innate equipment and its past experience in the world. So the general
question psychologists of learning asked was this: how does the experience of the organism
enable it to use its innate equipment to acquire a repertoire of adaptive responses? As we all
know, in trying to answer this question, students of learning were naturally and reasonably
affected by the original work of Pavlov - theoretically and methodologically. Consequently, the
whole S-R programme was itself a natural and appropriate response to the problems posed for
learning psychologists at this time.
They then began to uncover more and more of the complexities of acquired adaptive
 The progress of psychology 3
behaviour; and this whole field was explored objectively and fairly carefully in a way that it had
not been explored before. As a result, we came to appreciate all sorts of things we did not know
before; and the texts of learning over this period reveal fairly clearly what these things were.
However, this work had barely got under way when two discoveries were made about brain
functioning, which altered the whole background that had generated the work on learning in the
first place. (1) By the use of experimental methods, Lashley took the first steps to show that the
brain and cortex could not be regarded as a system built like a telephone exchange. (2) Adrian
and Matthews confirmed the Berger rhythm, thereby suggesting that the brain was a centre of
spontaneous activity of its own. These developments in physiological psychology fed into the
already changing emphasis among psychologists of learning. The latter had been moving from an
exclusive concern with the environmental input to an emphasis on the internal states of the
organism. This happened largely through the influence of Tolman and Clark Hull. As a result,
psychologists came to develop structural-cum-functionalaccounts of how organisms work. In the
years after World War 11, we came to appreciate both the strength and the limits of this way of
proceeding at this time. It became clear, also, that the earlier workers had missed phenomena
such as reversal learning; that it was very difficult to decide between one and two process
learning theories; that the role of selective attention was difficult to pin down; and that, generally
speaking, the subtleties of organismic reactivity were very much greater than had been supposed
during the decades of grand theory building in learning.
Now, with this crude historical reminder behind me, let us return to the sceptics’ criticism of
psychology. Is it adequate to describe all this work on learning as a history of disastrous
retreat? - as a negative achievement? I believe that the judgement of the historian of science will
be: certainly not. This work on learning represents a very considerable positive achievement. In
it psychologists have opened up and carefully explored an area that is essential for the
understanding of how organisms function, whether animal or human. This work shows us that
they are very much wiser men today than they were in Watson’s time. If some of them are
landed on Mars with the first astronauts, they will be able to study the strange species of man
they find there with a subtlety and sophistication that they would not have possessed in 1914 or
1920. For they are in possession today of concepts and skills that they did not have 50 years ago.
In this sense, they are standing on the shoulders of their predecessors. This means that in some
sense there has been a significant development of knowledge in this field - which represents an
achievement by psychologists that it is just silly to denigrate.
I happen to have picked on work in learning as an example. But I think I could have picked
on other examples of psychological work, which would reveal the same sort of picture as learning
does. Indeed, the quickest way to see the limitations of the sceptics’ negative thesis about
progress in psychology is to keep our historical spectacles firmly on our noses, and then simply
to compare and contrast the textbooks of psychology of (say) 50 or 40 years ago with those in
current use.
111
Can the sceptics reply to this argument? Yes, I think they may be tempted to reply that, if all
psychology can show for itself is progress of the sort I have sketched, then its showing is very
poor indeed. For where is the body of established and accepted theory we expect from science?
Where are the universal and lawful generalizations that we expect a genuine science to produce?
It is obviously very difficult to find any such established theory (or theories) in psychology; and
equally difficult to find many, or any, invulnerable lawlike generalizations. Psychology has
manifestly failed to produce an’edifice of scientific knowledge. Therefore, it remains true to say
that it has failed to achieve the progress characteristic of science.
Is this so? It is evident that this argument presupposes that all progress in science is of one
sort. Progress only occurs if the hard bricks collected are put together into a building, or edifice,
of knowledge. Is this presupposition correct? In my view, and I think in the view of most
4 B. A. Farrell
historians and philosophers of science, the answer is: emphatically no; the
accumulation-cum-building picture of scientific progress is quite inadequate. It is easy to expose
its inadequacy. All we need do is to remind ourselves of some examples which are quite
manifestly examples of scientific progress, but which the accumulation-cum-buildingpicture
cannot accommodate.
In 1839 a young naturalist published his notes of a journey round the world - a rambling
series of unrelated, particular jottings and queries about what he had observed - animals, terrain,
climate, and so on and so forth. At the time this report merely added to the naturalists’ stockpile
of particular facts. At that time, and on the building view, this report could not be said to
constitute a step in the progress of science. Yet we would all agree today that this report by
Charles Darwin (1839), in The Voyage of the Beagle, represented a critical step in the advance of
contemporary biology (see also Darwin, 1859). Consider, next, the history of our understanding
of mental disorder. When Pine1 and others began the humane treatment of the insane, they also
set in train an attempt by the medical world to bring some sort of order into the phenomena
presented by the behaviour disorders. But to do this is to reject the pre-existing belief that to be
mad was to be possessed, and to adopt, instead, the assumption that the phenomena were
natural ones, and therefore ones falling within the scope of scientific inquiry. This was a great,
indeed the very first, step forward in the scientific study of this field. But it is an example of
scientific progress that the building model cannot cover. What is more, during the 19th and early
20th centuries, the medical world succeeded to a large extent in ordering the phenomena in this
field by means of the post-Kraepelinianclassification with which we are all familiar. But, on the
building view, it is doubtful whether we can say that this classificatory achievement represents
any scientific progress at all (Kraepelin, 1905-6). Likewise for any other classificatory scheme -
for example, in zoology itself. And all this is just absurd. As a last example, recall the state
of chemistry between, say, 1700 and 1770. At that time, we would have been right to describe
chemistry as a jungle of confusion with no discernible thread of progress in it, a splendid
example, in fact, of what Koch should describe as an imitation science. Yet, with our present
hindsight, we can see very well, and in detail, how this work prepared the way in an
indispensable fashion for the break-through by Lavoisier (1789), and the founding of modern
chemistry.
I hope these few examples are sufficient to show that the sceptics’ view of scientific
progress will not do. Even if we allow that it fits certain cases of progress, it cannot be
generalized to cover all of them. The obvious reason for this is that science is a very large and
rambling mansion. What goes on in one room is often very different from what goes on in
another; progress in one room, therefore, may take a very different form from progress in
another.
But this is only part of the story. I suspect that Koch, and other sceptics, have also been
misled by another and still deeper presupposition that they have unwittingly adopted. This
presupposition is not an easy one to state shortly. I will state it with the aid of Kuhn’s
distinction (1%2) between paradigmatic and preparadigmatic science. However, what I propose
to say here is not logically tied to Kuhn’s distinction, and can be restated without using it. I
resort to Kuhn’s distinction and language simply because it is well known and convenient for my
restricted purposes.
The sceptics are presupposing that all progress in science consists either in the achievement of
a paradigm; or in the results of post-paradigmaticinquiry. That is to say, progress in science is
to be found either in the achievement of, for example, Newton in the Principia or in the Opticks;
or in the subsequent development of these paradigms. In these achievements and their
developments we have edifices of knowledge. As the sceptics are controlled by this
presupposition, they will naturally take it for granted that progress in science is all of one type,
namely that which puts bricks together to make an edifice of knowledge, or which goes on
adding bricks to extend the edifice. Because psychology has not done this, it has failed to
 The progress of psychology 5

progress and this shows us that it is a bogus or imitation science. I hope I am right in saying
that, at this point, we need hardly do more than dig out this presupposition and expose it to the
light, in order for us to realize that it simply will not do. For it obviously carries with it the
consequence that there is no such thing as progress during the preparadigmatic stage of a
science. It means that we cannot say, for example, that chemistry progressed between 1700 and
1770. This is just absurd. So the sceptics’ general view of progress in science is very misleading
and quite inadequate.
IV
I come now to the second part of the discussion. Koch’s criticism of psychology as an imitation
science only becomes interesting when he goes on to argue (in effect) that psychology never will
achieve a paradigm, and hence never will develop in the way that the natural sciences have
done. He presents this case in the second argument I mentioned at the beginning, namely that
the subject matter of psychology is such that the concepts of experiment and variable, and the
like, and scientific method in general are not applicable to this subject matter.
Now, in the paper from which I have quoted, Koch does not tell us at all clearly just what the
precise reasons are, on which he relies to support this argument of inapplicability. I confess I
find the same lack of clarity when I consult some of his other writings on the subject (e.g. Koch,
1959, 1W). This is a pity, because there are reasons available, which lend considerable weight
to his argument. Let me look briefly at what is, I think, the strongest of these supporting
reasons, and one which, I think, Koch himself would be ready to endorse.
If we are to achieve a paradigm in any field, then, presumably, we will have to arrive at some
generalizations about the field that we will agree are true. But (roughly put) a generalization
connects some property A with some other property B in a certain domain. Therefore, to be able
to state a true generalization connecting A and B, we must be able to ignore all other properties
that may also be exhibited by the particulars of the domain involved. That is to say, we must be
able to abstract A and B from the other properties of the domain, and still go on to assert a true
generalization connecting them. If abstraction is not possible in a field, then it follows that
scientific method - with its concepts of experiment and variable, etc. - are not applicable to this
field, and Koch’s second argument is true of it.
Well, is the abstraction of properties possible in psychology or not? There is a logical, or a
priori, case for non-abstractability in psychology. It would be widely accepted that ‘the heart of
the subject’ (in Koch’s phrase) is concerned with functions such as perception, attention,
memory, learning, intelligence, motivation and so forth. Now, for me to assert ‘Johnny is still
learning the rules of castling in chess’ is also to assert that, when playing chess, Johnny will
sometimes remember how to move and sometimes not. For me to assert that ‘Smith saw X ’is
(in certain key contexts) also to assert that ‘Smith attended to something or other at the time’.
In short, the concepts involved in our mental functions are logically connected, and (it could be
maintained) connected intimately and on an extensive scale. From this it follows that abstraction
is not possible. It will not be possible for me to produce a true generalization about one of them
without also necessarily having to produce true generalizations about an indefinite number of
other functions at the same time. Therefore, experiment and scientific method in general are not
applicable to mental functions.
I think this a pfiori argument for non-abstractability is a weak one. (a) Even if these concepts
are logically connected in an intimate and extensive way, it does not follow from this fact that
no abstraction is posiible at all. What does follow is that abstraction is a difficult exercise. I
think psychologists accept this conclusion. They recognize that theirs is a difficult subject. (6)
The critical question is this: will the abstraction (which it is possible for a psychologist to carry
out) necessarily be insufficient, or not enough, to permit psychology to make preparadigmatic
progress up to the stage where a paradigm can be achieved? The a priori argument fails to show
that this is the case. In other words, it fails to show that the difficulties of abstraction are such
6 B. A. Farrell
that psychologists will necessarily not be able to make the preparadigmatic progress sufficient for
them to achieve a paradigmatic transformation of their subject. (c) In any case, it could be said,
the Q pn'ori argument from non-abstractability holds for the concepts of ordinary discourse.
What it shows, therefore, is that these concepts do not help particularly towards the scientific
understanding of how men and animals function. What the a priori argument draws attention to
is the need to replace ordinary concepts by other, technical ones which do not produce these
difficulties.
So much, then, for the a pion' argument. There is also, however, an a posteriori, or empirical,
argument for non-abstractability in psychology. This appeals to the history of the subject, and
stresses the notorious fact that psychologists have not unearthed many satisfactory or
invulnerable law-like generalizations. The argument can be boiled down into a crude syllogism.
If psychological properties are (generally) abstractable, then many satisfactory generalizations
will have been found by psychologists.
Many such generalizations have not been found by psychologists.
Therefore, psychological properties are not (generally) abstractable.
Obviously, the weight of this argument depends on the strength of the major premise. Have
we good reason to believe it? Have we, in other words, good reason to believe that abstractability
is a suflcient condition for the discovery of satisfactory generalizations in psychology? Clearly
not. Abstractability is not sufficient by itself; other conditions are manifestly also required before
psychologists can arrive at satisfactory generalizations. The two most obvious ones are: (1) an
adequate background of knowledge, and therefore of concepts, in the field and in other related
ones; (2) techniques of investigation strong enough to do the job. It is plausible to argue that it is
the absence of these two conditions during the history of modern psychology that is largely
responsible for the history and state of the subject, not the (alleged) non-abstractability of
psychological properties.
If I had the space, I would like to make all this clearer by examining some examples from the
history of science. It will have to suffice for me to refer to one I have mentioned before, namely
chemistry. Suppose we take ourselves back to 1700 (say), and look at the state of the subject at
that time. We can then construct, I think, a splendid argument to the effect that chemistry is an
imitation science, in which experiment is impossible, and which will never achieve a paradigm.
With the hindsight of the 20th century, we can appreciate clearly that, and why, this sceptical
argument is quite wrong of chemistry in 1700. Such an appreciation is sobering. For it makes U S
realize that the sceptics' case today against psychology, however beguiling, may be quite wrong
also. [For an introduction to the state of chemistry at the time, see Toulmin & Goodfield (1962).
This reference is sufficient to suggest how a good sceptical case against chemistry could have
been constructed at that time.]
Indeed, when one takes an overall view - through a historian's spectacles - of the history of
the sciences, the conditions that favour and hinder progress, and so on, one comes away (I
think) with a relatively optimistic picture of the prospects of psychology. The development and
progress that the subject has achieved to date - such as that shown, for example, by the
psychology of learning I considered earlier - is quite characteristic of the preparadigmatic stage of
science. There is nothing in the history of science in general, and in that of psychology in
particular, to show, or even suggest, that psychology will not reach the paradigmatic stage in time.
v
The next question is an obvious one. If the sceptics' case is mistaken and it is possible for
psychology to achieve a paradigm, how are we to achieve it and what form (or forms) will it
take? It should be evident from what I have said already that we cannot infer from our present
knowledge and from the present state of psychology what form a paradigm will take in it. It
should also be evident that there are no methodological rules available for achieving a paradigm.
If psychologist X urges us to adopt a certain method, he cannot prove that this method will get us
 The progress of psychology 7
there. At most he can offer us a bet or hunch - with supporting reasons -that a certain research
strategy will pay us the best dividends. When a Skinnerian, for example, urges his experimental
analysis of behaviour upon us, some psychologists may object on the ground that this strategy is
very superficial and limited, and that we obviously need to know about the internal conditions and
cognitive functioning of the organism. But the Skinnerian may be right. Let us remember, after
all, that the first and great paradigm in biology was achieved by Charles Darwin without a
knowledge of Mendelian regularities or the mechanisms of heredity - and solely on the basis of
the macrophenomena of species’ differences and survivals and the like. It is logically possible
that a 20th century Darwin in psychology will emerge to achieve a paradigmatic synthesis of the
behavioural discoveries of Skinner and others. When, in contrast, a psychologist urges us to
rely on what he may claim has been underused in recent decades, namely the power of the
human organism to report what he is thinking, feeling, etc., others may object to this policy.
They may object on the grounds that human introspection and reports have a very limited
reliability and use. Still, this psychologist may be right, in spite of these objections.
My own hunch is very different, but quite orthodox and quite unexciting. I think that a
paradigm will be achieved when we come to understand how the nervous system works. I think
that perhaps the first paradigm may be achieved when we come to understand how it subserves
some type of animal learning - say, Pavlovian conditioning or some simple visual discrimination
learning (for example, of brightness). I would back this hunch by an argument from analogy. In
the last 250 years of science, we have ordered the varied panorama of nature in a way that
represents a remarkable achievement by the human mind. We have done this by postulating and
finding minute entities in relations, which are responsible for the panorama. In the course of the
last 120 years or so, physiologists have also succeeded, in this same way, in ordering many
aspects of the functioning of organisms. A good, and very promising, beginning has been made
on the nervous system itself. Hence there are good reasons to believe that the corpuscularian
tradition will also be found to apply to the nervous systems of organisms, and the panorama of
activity that these systems subserve. If this really turns out to be the case, then the
psychological phenomena that organisms present will also be shown to have an order that is the
manifestation of the operation of minute entities in relations. And the route to the first, and
immediately succeeding, paradigms in psychology will take the form indicated by the
corpuscularian tradition of science.
I am aware that, in recent years, some psychologists have raised sceptical doubts about this
paradigmatic route for psychology. Thus, it has been argued that it is utterly impractical, because
we will not be able to obtain sufficient control over the internal states, or conditions, of an
organism to find out what the minute entities are, and how they subserve the activity of the
organism. Let me, as an outsider, respectfully advise the sceptics not to take this stand. The
history of the last 30 or 40 years points very firmly in the opposite direction. Techniques of
electron microscopy, of single unit analysis, and in the biochemical study of impulse
transmission all suggest that we have at last got down to the level of minuteness required. These
techniques cast very serious doubts on the thesis that the internal states of organisms are beyond
the bounds of practical inquiry. However, it has also been argued that, if the study of internal
states does turn out to be practical and successful, the result will be the death of psychology and
its replacement by neurophysiology. I think this argument is quite fallacious, and its fallacies
have been sufficiently exposed in recent years. For one thing, we cannot logically even discover
how the minute entities of the nervous system are connected with mental functions without the
use of psychological concepts and methods of inquiry (Fodor, 1968).

VI
From all this it is evident that I think the case of the sceptics is a bad one. It is simply not true
that psychology is an ‘imitation’ science; this description is quite misplaced. What the critics are
8 B. A. Farrell
really trying to tell us, I think, is that the traditional picture of the nature of psychology just will
not do. In other words it is quite wrong to think of contemporary psychology as being like
physics, or any other post-paradigmatic natural science. Here the sceptics are right; this
traditional picture of psychology has indeed broken down. But it is quite unwarranted to
conclude from this that psychology itself has broken down, and that psychologists are doomed
for ever to walk the dark and dreary nights of preparadigmatic science. This conclusion simply
does not follow.
Accordingly, I suggest that we take a different view of the subject. I suggest we look upon it
as a scientific inquiry, which is still in its exploratory stages. Because of this, it uses theory and
experiment as exploratory tools - charting the phenomena of animal and human activity. The
progress it achieves, therefore, is characteristically preparadigmatic. On the other hand, there is
some reason to believe that we are en route to the achievement of a paradigm in the subject -
something that we may achieve in this coming century when, for example, we do begin to
understand how the brain works. In the meantime, allow me, as a philosopher, to say to
psychologists: Be of good cheer! do not allow yourselves to be overcome by depression and
hypochondria about your own work and subject. Of course, if you do find yourself running out
of ideas, and, in consequence, that you can no longer stand the heat of psychological inquiry, all
you have to do is to remember President Truman’s advice: ‘Get out of the kitchen’. But, please,
do not then react to the whole subject in a way that gives the impression you are a psychologist
manquk, rationalizing your disillusion by. depreciating the subject and the work of fellow
psychologists. If, on the other hand, you decide to remain inside the psychological kitchen, then
obviously what the subject (like any other science) will require from you is not philosophical
scepticism about it, but persistence, patience and originality inside it. Act, therefore, so as to
foster these virtues. In particular, try to maintain your own creative impulses. Then you may
succeed collectively in achieving the progress in psychology that will make otiose all papers like
this one, which I have just presented to you.
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Received 1 August 1976; revised version received 14 September 1976

This paper closely follows one read at the Annual Conference of the British Psychological Society, York,
April 1976.
Requests for reprints should be addressed to B. A. Farrell, Department of Experimental Psychology,
University of Oxford, South Parks Road, Oxford OX1 3UD.