Study Group 13 China by 2060

Economic reforms have transformed Chinas economy. According to estimates by Keidel, China will have a GDP almost 2.5 times greater than the U.S. by 2060, and will have a per capita GDP very close to U.S. levels (163). He also contends that economic growth in China will gradually create more liberal political and market-oriented economic institution and these will converge with U.S. institutions by 2060 (159). Keidels projections are unrealistic. Economic growth is not a sufficient condition for democratization, and even if China makes gradual reforms to include participatory elements, it is unlikely to have institutions similar to the U.S. Furthermore, China faces major challenges which are likely to inhibit its potential growth, preventing any convergence in economic institutions. In 2060, Chinas economic and political institutions will not converge with those of the U.S.; however this will not threaten Sino-American relations. China must overcome major challenges in order to sustain its economic growth which will prevent Chinas economic institutions from converging with U.S. institutions. Keidel posits that economic institutional development depends upon a nations level of economic development, best measured by percapita GDP (159). As states become more developed, the basis of their economies shifts from agriculture to industry and then to services (Naughton 149-150). In 2009, 39.5 percent of Chinas labor force was employed in agriculture, compared to 0.7% for the United States (CIA). Although much of this labor will shift towards the industry and service sectors as China continues to grow, Chinas need to sustain a population four times greater than the U.S. will force many workers to remain in agriculture. China also lost 6.6 percent of its arable land from 1996-2006 due to increased construction, desertification, and pollution (Liu). If the government cannot reduce these losses, more labor intensive forms of agriculture may be needed in the future. Technology will increase farmers productivity, but this will not allow China to shift fully into a service-oriented economy. The need to feed Chinas population will inhibit China from continuing its transition away from agriculture into more productive industrial and service sectors. By 2060, Chinas political institutions will continue to differ substantially from U.S. institutions. As seen with many countries, economic growth is not a sufficient cause for democratization. Singapore provides an excellent example. Singapores 2009 per capita GDP (ppp) was $3,900 higher than that of the

U.S., indicating a higher level of development (CIA). However, despite a democratic shell, Singapore is an authoritarian state. Polity IV rankings, which rank the degree of authoritarianism in a states political institutions, indicate that there is been no change in the relative degree of democracy in Singapore since 1963 despite great economic growth: the ruling Peoples Action Party has used its dominance in government to solidify its control, even though elections are regularly held and contested (Marshall and Jaggers1-2). Similarly China experienced tremendous economic growth for the past 30 years, but has made no democratic reforms. The CCP will not willingly hand over its monopoly on political power in the future. The CCP has become more meritocratic and less ideological, but these reforms occurred within the framework of continued CCP dominance (Naughton and Yang 124). Although China may incorporate elements of popular participation in the future, the CCP is likely to continue to use the state apparatus to maintain its control, whether through repression or cooptation (Pei 40). If popular opposition to the CCP grows large enough to overthrow the government, the subsequent political chaos will stifle economic growth, and democracy may still not emerge. China faces economic hurdles which will prevent economic institutional convergence with the U.S. Political convergence is unlikely because economic growth does not always cause democratization and the CCP will be hesitant to relinquish its power. Despite these differences, Sino-American relations will remain stable. The increasing level of economic integration between China and the U.S. creates incentives for both sides to cooperate, and failure to cooperate would reduce both states economic growth. Exponential technological advancement in industry will prevent Sino-American rivalry from escalating due to competition for scarce energy resources: according to Kurzweil, solar energy will meet all energy needs within 20 years (215). Even if this is only true for the U.S., U.S. energy self-sufficiency would prevent competition for energy resources with China. There will likely continue to be major differences between China and the U.S., but these differences will not hurt U.S.-China relations.
Central Intelligence Agency. The World Factbook. 2009. {https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/index.html}

Liu, Yingling. Shrinking Arable Lands Jeopardizing Chinas Food Security. Worldwatch Institute. April 18, 2006. {http://www.worldwatch.org/node/3912}

Pei, Minxin. The Dark Side of Chinas Rise. Foreign Policy. Mar.-Apr. 2006.

Marshall, Monty & Jaggers, Keith (Principle Investigators). Polity IV Country Report 2008: Singapore. {http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/Singapore2008.pdf}