This action might not be possible to undo. Are you sure you want to continue?
Consider your entire organization
When considering security, the best way to avoid obvious breaches of security is to capture the big picture of your installation. Practically, this means that you should work from the outside in, ie. consider security of the building and area, then the actual offices, followed by the network infrastructure, and end with hosts themselves. It's a bit pointless to spend a lot of time securing hosts if anyone can walk into the server room and walk out with a host under each arm. Those things do happen. This is all the more important since most of computer crime is perpetrated by insiders, for obvious ease of action and lack of interest to hackers about the average corporate data. Because it is more exciting to most system administrators, computer books usually concentrate on securing hosts, but sound computer security doesn't deal with just individual computers. You must consider your entire organization.
Prepare for disaster
Generally speaking, check for any single point of failures in your environment, and provide backup solutions. Perform dry runs regularly to make sure everyone knows what to do in case of a breakdown. Post-incident plans must be updated whenever any change is made to your site, and as much as possible, everyone, especially MIS personnel, must be capable of performing the procedures. Plans should also include procedures to solve day-to-day MIS activities, like installing a new host, welcoming a new employee, etc. Also, whenever possible, use fail-safe tools, ie. should the device fail, they should refuse access instead of letting people in. A firewall is not the magic bullet to securing a site. Generally speaking, try to place as many barriers as possible between valued asset and a potential adversary, without this security being too invasive to employees. Remember that an effective security policy requires that every single employee abide by it, and not just the rank-and-files. The more prepared you are to handle break-ins and disasters, the better for the image of the company and the MIS team. In addition, your company may be held responsible legally if your network was used by hackers to launch attacks on other sites. You might want to hire an outside company to test your security at random times.
A usage policy is an important user-oriented document, not just to cover your ass in case someone in your organization steals information that is off-limit for them, but also because it forces you to think about how your organization works from an MIS point of view.
A security policy is more MIS-oriented than the user policy, and its goal is to offer a big picture view of security of your organization.
Keep in touch with local police authorities about robberies in your area, as thieves are likely to keep using a tactic if it proved successful in a location (eg. burglars pretending to be couriers and stealing unattended portable PCs.) Update this list accordingly, and warn users about those new risks. Also, check with authorities what the regulations are about setting up an alarm system at your site, and whether it can be set up to call up the police automatically when the alarm goes off.
Doors and windows
All entrances must be equipped with secure locking devices that cannot be circumvented (key locks, dead bolts, cipher locks, etc.), and hinge pings that are spotwelded or otherwise protected Doors must be constructed of sturdy material (steel, solid core wood), must not exceed the number for safe and efficient operation, and must always be secured when not in active use All ventilators or other possible means of entrance must be covered with steel bars or wire mesh grill All windows must be securely fastened from the inside. Windows accessible from the ground or located on roofs must come with window/glass tamper or breakage protection features, and be protected by steel bars or grill Check that blinds and shades are available to hide valued items from the outside
Locks and keys
Set up security patrols at random hours during the day, and end-of-workday security checks Check with local police authorities if day- and night-time patrols are scheduled in the neighborhood Access control cards must be clearly different for company personnel and visitors Provide escort for visitors If multiple corporate sites, inter-connect security systems to increase monitoring of sites located in different time zones, and to make travel easier by providing only one electronic badge to each employee Only MIS personnel should have access to the server room Grant users access with the least amount of privilege required to accomplish their job, using user profiles to manage accounts more securily Check the log files created by the application running the electronic locks Set up a procedure to monitor use of all locks and keys. Update when necessary Keep tracks of keys issued, with their number and identification, for both master keys and duplicate keys Keep records of use and turn-in of keys, and check locks quarterly Change locks immediately upon loss or theft of keys If used, master keys must be devoid of marking identifying them as such Only issue keys to authorized employees. Other must use an electronic badge. Keys not in use must be secured in a locked, fireproof safe that is secured to prevent removal
When making duplicates of master keys, mark them "Do Not Duplicate" and obliterate manufacturer's serial numbers Any visitor, either a corporate employee from another site or an outside guest, must warn MIS of his/her visit as early as possible, so as to provide adequate security (ie. some guest might need to be allowed in areas that are off-limit to standard guests.) Employees from other sites and guests must provide the following information: Name, Location, Visit Start and End Dates, Arrival Time, Access Needs Greater than Week Day (7 AM - 7 PM), Buildings to be Visited (if known), Employee e-mail address, Name of manager, Point of Contact at local site MIS must be informed of loss of access control card ASAP so as to disable access and provide a new, safe badge Guests must return their visitor access control card upon leaving the premises MIS must conduct periodical security inspections, and report any problem so as to implement corrective action
Set up either television recording, burglar alarm, or intrusion alarm systems linked to off-site security team. Test them regularly Make sure the television system can record a minimum of four days Check that the alarm systems are backed up automatically, and have an alternate or independent source of power available to cut in and operate automatically
Provide adequate protective lighting for all areas Mark emergency routes clearly Write procedures for emergency evacuations (fire, bomb threats, etc.), and exercise plans regularly Train users in fire fighting Provide response to medical emergency (phone numbers to local medical facilities; first aid supplies) Provide electronic-friendly sprinklers in or over the data center/server rooms No possible leaks over computers, especially server room (water pipes, sprinklers, AC units) Alarm systems must be tamper- , and weather resistant Provide security personnel trained in physical security Set up procedure to respond to alarms, including night-time and week-ends The monitoring system must provide sufficient information to investigate any breakin, and remedy Check that fake floors and ceilings cannot be used for break-ins Check that fire extinguishers and other fire fighting equipment are in sufficient number, that they match the type of fire they would be used to put off, and that they're properly secured on walls (no extinguisher lying around)
Install air conditioning to keep hosts (and users :-) cool, at least in the server room Have someone come in at least once a year to maintain AC units
Set up thermometers linked to monitoring software to check the temperature in the server room, and have it page/call or send e-mail if temperature rises In a large site, use a naming convention for rooms (eg. country names, etc.) and a cabling management software to make sure everyone understands which room and which plugs you mean Use asset management software to assure strict accountability of all company assets In highly-sensitive locations, make sure guests are either restricted to safe areas, escorted at all times, and that their bags are checked when they depart (Welcome to Intel :-) Consider printing sensitive information on easily identifiable paper (eg. yellow, orange, or red paper, depending on its importance), and forbid employees to go offsite with top sensitive documents Guests must sign a log when they visit, and register their laptop computers and camera (manufacturer and serial #.) Make sure there's always personnel available to watch entrances, and that they can call security and send an immediate message to everyone in the building should someone try to walk into the office unauthorized (especially important during lunchhour and late at night) Make sure video cameras connected to VCRs are pointing at all exits to help police authorities investigate break-ins
Monitor your WAN links through MRTG, and your LAN through netstat -i (watch for the collision/outpackets, outerrs/outpackets, and inerrs/inpackets ratio) Use proxy servers to control use of bandwidth and to hide information about your private network Set up an alternate, anonymous connection to the Net to let users find information for yet-unannounced products, as the competition could use this information to tell what your company is working on Run monitoring software like Linux-based Netwatch to keep a eye on the use of network bandwitdth, especially on what servers on the Internet users are connecting. Install an intrusion detection server on all servers, both in the DMZ and in the internal network, and do not ignore traffic coming from your internal network. Consider putting a sensor both on your public routers and firewalls so as to be warned of any suspicious traffic (Unix) Do not run NIS if you can avoid it, or consider NIS+. Consider centralized authentication systems like Kerberos, or Samba Have agents run on all servers, so as to keep an eye on log files, disk space, etc. They could consist in Perl or Python scripts, as those have been ported to different environments and offer a rich amount of modules that avoid your reinventing the wheel If you discover that some hosts have been hacked, and you'd like to get in contact with people on remote sites (eg. a host from which the hacker seems to have connected, or MIS personnel at other corporate sites, etc.) to try to catch him redhanded, either use the phone, set up a brand new mail server, or use encrypted e-mails through PGP/GnuPG, as the hacker may have set up tools to snoop on your network, and be warned of your plans.
monitors. Watch out for magnets (heated car seats. Set up some hosts loaded with anti-virus software and that can be easily removed from the network to test software downloaded from the Net. IPSec/CIPE. update it every time you change the configuration of a host. etc. Could be used to set up a host to sniff passwords. Encourage users to p Encrypt all network traffic. leave them in a magnetic media-friendly safe at a nearby bank. make sure those sites also keep an eye on security. Either take them home every night. unprotected by firewalls. L2TP/PPTP/PoPToP. As the Melissa and ILOVEYOU viruses have shown. as you'll need them after a fire or flood. or foreign sites on the Internet. VPN. consider setting up a SAN instead LAN Check if you really need walk-up network connections. Abacus/Port Sentry) Backup/restore Keep a current backup of all data files that your company cannot afford losing after a computer goes south Keep an ad hoc step-by-step restore procedure current. PGP/GnuPG. or the mail server just crashed). security is only as strong as its weakest link. washing machines. a suspicious individual is in the building. or physical break-in. Test it regularly. and stop using tapes that show too many access errors As backup jobs use a lot of bandwidth. Unplug any unused . or. should be scheduled at night to make the most of the corporate link to the Net. Remind users that downloading binaries is either forbidden by corporate policy. In case your site is ruined by a fire. S/MIME. Some PBXs lets you use the loudspeaker of digital phones as a PA system.) and safes that are not meant to protect magnetic media If resorting to a courier solution. and perform regular restores on bare-metal systems at a remote site to prepare to see your location ruined by a fire or flood Do not keep the latest backup tapes in the location. either provide a fully-equiped temporary location. no rogue. on other corporate sites connected through WAN. or have a courier pick them up at night. WinPopup or ICQ) to reduce work disruption while allowing for broadcasts when needed (ie. APOP. a flood. as breaches of security there could easily end up jeopardizing your own site Remember that any unsecure host on your network can be used to launch an attack on other resources. Add an IDB (ISDN Dial Backup) unit to your routers that goes up should your permanent connection go down. etc. Used a dynamic firewall (eg. or check how long it would take to be provided with new or temporary equipment by a commercial supplier or other corporate sites If your site is connected to remote sites through alternative links besides the Internet. if possible. whether they are located on your LAN. Make sure you can decrypt tapes on a bare-metal system after your site has been damaged Perform frequent restores of a few files to check that the backups actually work Remember to clean drive heads regularly. This can be done at different network levels (magic words are SSL/SSLey. SSH. If not. consider encrypting data. STelnet. especially the one flowing on public LANs.) Run a live messaging application on all hosts (eg. unused network plug. proxy servers. S-HTTP/HTTPS.
Consider using a Radius or Tacac authentication server to centralize the task of authentication users. Assign a MAC address to each port (ie. and only open those you really need and understand. or even biometric devices .att. so present less risk of breaking down. your network can be endangered by UDP or ICMP packets. one-time passwords (PAP/CHAP.to hub-mode).). and PAM.x) Set up routers and firewalls to log infos to the same central host running syslogd that other hosts are using Do not just rely on ACLs on routers. They have fewer moving parts (cooling fans are just about the only mechanical part). NDS. take a look at Samba. Kerberos. Ban any packet coming from the Internet whose source address pertains to the private ranges (10. crashing when receiving severely mangled packets) Check out reverse path filtering to prevent IP spoofing Set up hubs to forbid hub-mode on ports (ie. NIS. S/Key. consider limiting it to a restricted local LAN connected to the rest of the network through a firewall + bastion host to limit access only to limited services. and circuit-level firewalls (eg. network connection on the patch panel. time-limited tickets (Kerberos). stateful firewall instead.168. etc. keep an up-to-date list of unused network plugs. application-level (proxy servers). 172-16/31. especially for UDP-based applications (Three basic types of firewalls: network-level (screening routers). If you do need such access. and are less likely to run other software besides the firewall part. hence less security risk. 192. A context-based firewall is much more secure.ca. and set up DHCP server to not give out IP addresses to unauthorized hosts. and have a monitoring program warn you immediately when a connection goes up Check out authentication systems like challenge/response. digital certificates. hardware tokens. 174. Cisco PIX) ) As IPChains is not stateful. ie.x. aim at using SSO (Single Sign-On) architecture to reduce the number of login/passwords used. Start by closing all services.net) All incoming connections from on-the-road employees through the Internet must use SSH and related tools to ensure encryption Check ACLs on routers and firewalls. Use SNMP-capable switches to monitor network use Use bandwidth control tools like Packeteer to prevent denial of service by programs gone haywire Prefer stand-alone firewalls like Cisco PIX over PCs.Firewalls . letting a host listen to all traffic by setting up the port it's connected to from switch. Generally speaking. smart cards. Besides Radius and Tacac.los-angeles-63-64rs. Consider buying a stand-alone.dial-access.x. LDAP. smart card or finger-print based systems Routers . filtering routers. if only one host is connected to a given port) Assign descriptive host names in the DNS to make logs more meaningful (eg. If possible. Especially remember to disable telnet access from the Net.Switches Run Antisniff to try to see if a host is sniffing the network Run tools like Nessus to check what your firewall and routers can withstand (eg.
and force a disconnect after the thirdto slow down automated password attacks. transparent proxying and Fast NAT.html . the password. and Sygate's Personal Firewall. etc. test it regularly from the Internet: o HackerWacker o Shields-UP! http://grc. run separate dial-in and dial-out modem spools Disable the use of the escape sequence +++ to switch to command mode. and make sure modems cannot be reprogrammed remotely. if available RAS Add authentication for dial-out users. Evaluate different methods to hide your private network: masquerading. You'd be surprised at the number of spyware applications sending out information to the Net without telling you. packet filtering. Do not allow dial-out from an unauthenticated dial-in call If possible.com/default. Hosts Install a firewall on all hosts. automated connection on all the phone lines available at your site to check for rogue modems installed by users without noticing MIS) Set a short delay after the first and second failed logins... unbeknownst to MIS. modems inside PBX to allow for remote administration. and that the server forces logout from all active sessions Check that no useless RAS access is available (users setting up a modem on their computer. Zone Labs' ZoneAlarm. Fight IP spoofing coming from your by not letting out any packet whose source address does not belong to your network PBX If your PBX can be configured remotely through a modem. were incorrect.htm o WinNuke Test Page http://www. including client hosts: Free solutions for Windows are Tiny Software's Tiny Personal Firewall. change default password/code Check daily logs if available. especially regarding outgoing calls (hackers using corporate phone system as relay) Set up security codes on all voice mailboxes.com/resources/winnuke. Don't tell the user whether the username. use Permanent Virtual Circuits or Closed User Groups whenever possible. or both. modems still connected to the POTS that everyone forgot about. Once the firewall is set up on your network. to force users to use proxying With switched technologies.) All RAS access must require login/password. and call-back if available Log Caller ID information if available Maintain an up-to-date register of all your modem lines and conduct regular site checks for unauthorized modems (eg.jtan. Implement both proxies or packet filters. Modems should be reset to a standard configuration after each call Check that calls terminate cleanly.
Germany http://www.securityspace.netscreen.exchangeantivirus.net/tools/security/scan. use the noatime attribute in /etc/fstab.sdesign.sicher-surfen.itsec.de/cgibin/index.Ingenieurbuero Holger Heimann.de. use the LIBSAFE set of libraries to protect binaries) Limit what kernel options can be changed while the server is up (eg.pl o Adiscon QuickCheck for Clients.html o Hochschule Rapperswil.net. Set up hosts to limit use of resources (eg.webtrends.sygatetech. Swizerland.com http://www. /etc/limits.hsr. etc.dslreports. Germany http://www.mycio.ita.com http://www.) o o o .html o Online Trojan Port Scanner (Lockdown?) http://onlinescanner.html o Secure Design http://www.net/ o Personal Security Scanner .de/SecurityCheck/default.html o myCIO.com/pub/scan/ o Whitehats Free DDOS Testing Service http://dev.pl o The Apostols http://apostols. On Unix.html o QuickInspector for the Web by Shavlik Technologies http://security. games.com/secureme_go Protect against buffer overflows (StackGuard.html o ibh .com/ E-SOFT/SecuritySpace.com/smysecure/index.smartbotpro. patch the Linux kernel.com/scan/ddos/ddos.net/ o Quick-Test by sicher-surfen. so as to reduce the need for sending queries to a remote DNS. and allow for backup in case of short interruptions Mount as many partitions in read-only as possible.com/securitytest/index.sybergen. im Auftrag des Datenschutzbeauftragten des Kantons Zuerich http://www.com/content/security/cybercop.shavlik.anti-trojan.heise. especially on your MTA.com/ o Browser-Check bei heise online (Germany) http://www.net/camera/ o Security Space https://secure1.conf) Keep compilers and packagers on a removable device to make it difficult for someone to compile and/or install packages (Unix) Consider using xinetd to replace inetd + TCPWrapper (Unix) Remove all unneeded aliases in /etc/aliases (eg.asp o Virtual Suicide http://suicide.securityspace.com/ o Sybergen Online-Security-Check http://www.de/vulchk.de/ct/browsercheck/ o DLS Reports http://www.com/~kalish/ o Security-Port-Scanvon by NetScreen Technologies http://www2.netfarmers. Secure-Me/DSLreports http://www.-) http://server142.sandboxsecurity.ch/cgibin/datenschutz/DSZ_test_start. only root should be able to run echo "1" > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward) Require a password when booting in single-user mode Disable or restrict email relaying on your MTAs Run a cache DNS.htm o Sandbox Security Test Suite http://www.net/ Sygate http://scan. Germany http://www.com/smysecure/index.mycgiserver.asp o Anti-Trojan. Germany http://www.whitehats.com/SecurityTest/ o WebTrends http://www.org/tools.secure-me.com/products/prescan1.asp o Remote Security Tester by Ken Kalish http://www.
.deny feature. ICQ) and e-mail Set up hosts to log users out or lock their screen after X minutes of no activity. Use safe names for hosts. or avoid messing with them in the first place Take advantage of the extended attributes offered by the ext2fs to forbid changed to configuration files (eg. ttyp1.bash_profile configuration file.rhosts /root/. No rogue hosts: Decommission any host that is no longer being used Do NOT connect a new host to the network until it has been thoroughly secured. etc. although tools like nmap can determine the platform you are running in different ways Take advantage of TCP Wrapper's /etc/hosts.rhosts. the DMZ in front of a firewall). " line in /etc/inittab (Unix) Chmod 0700 /etc/rc. if available on your system. SUID/SGID in Unix). /etc/pam. ttyp2. for added security Do not run unneeded binaries that run as administrator (eg. especially system configuration files Implement the undelete or chattr feature. and even then.equiv files to avoid hackers from creating them (use touch followed by chmod 0) When creating a new user account. or by changing the leading letter from S to s. chattr +i /etc/inetd. sudo). names should not give away information on their platform or OS version. and have an e-mail sent to MIS so that you know who your reckless users are Disable command-line history log by adding HISTFILESIZE=0 in your local .) and NOT through the pseudo-terminals over the network (eg. tty2. and limit this function for console connections (Unix) Disable host reboot through CTRL-ALT-DEL by commenting out the "ca::ctrlaltdel:/sbin/shutdown. ~/. and change the group ownership to su accordingly (eg. to make it easier for users to recover files deleted by mistake. and su to root. as this switch is logged.netrc /etc/hosts.d.d/rcX. and have your monitoring tool check for such files every night Check for all world-writable/everyone files and directories. It's much safer that users who telnet into a host first log on as a regular user. Add legalese to /etc/issue to warn users. consider using tools that let you perform only limited tasks as administrator (eg.deny.d/* to keep users from checking out boot-time scripts Any failed attempt to connect should trigger an instant message (eg.).forward. etc. Use /etc/securetty to make sure that root can only log on through the console (eg. create locked ~/.. Remove all unneeded user and group accounts On your mailer. especially if that host is connected to the public part of your network (ie. eg. It doesn't take long for hackers to locate such unsecure hosts.d/su) Create locked /root/. etc.conf) Only use an administrator account when absolutely needed. thus granting a regular user admin rights . and hide which OS and version number is running. Start by denying all access in hosts.allow . Disable services started up at boot-time by either deleting the symlink in /etc/rc. Use the wheel group to specify who is allowed to su to root. and only allow specific access in hosts. disable the use of EXPN and VRFY commands Considering disabling remote reboot/shutdown.allow and hosts. tty1. Make sure this tool does not run applications with shell escape.d/init.
/dev/*) Keep /tmp in its own partition Authentication . and prohibit users from running applications from there Set limits to how much RAM and processes are available to average users When installing a new closed-source software program. the other to receive mail Hard disk Use file quotas in user home directories Check that the default file permissions are safe (eg.) Files exported through either NFS or Samba should be read-only as often as possible.) When running as root. consider using two hosts. Otherwise. get the habit of always using absolute pathnames to executables (eg. either remove identd. etc. Users might want to affix a tamper-proof picture of themselves on their laptop computer to reduce risk of theft In case you either lose the administrator password or it was changed by hackers. no ". check the nifty utilities from Winternals. under Linux. thus preventing the host to reboot automatically after power resumes. umask of 022. /usr/bin/su instead of simply su) New files should be created with safe. no boot from floppy drive. secure cases to unable access to jumper to reset passord. Boot loaders like LILO can also be set to prompt users for a password before booting an OS. run a tool that monitors sockets to check whether it's trying to upload information to the Internet. etc. For NT. learn how to boot as administrator to reset the password (eg. Check that your PATH is secure. tamper-proof cable to secure host physically to server room. to enhance performance and security (so a rogue program or hacker filling up a hard disk and crashing this host) To install and upgrade programs. etc. consider removing sensitive tools that could be taken advantage of by hackers (compilers.". and 077 for root) If available. take advantage of package managers like RPM to make it easier to know what packages are installed. and which version Once the host has all the packages you need.) On Unix hosts. set up program so run in chroot() to enhance security OS-permitting. booting with linux single in LILO. be prepared to drive to the office in the middle of the night if power goes off at this inconvenient time. or check its configuration so that it does not return important information to remote sites Mail server: For added security. no writable directories to avoid running bogus binaries upload by hackers. especially root's (ie. one to send mail. no root access. check whether the UPS application can send the password over a wire.) When setting a password in the BIOS and using auto-shutdown UPS units (with autoreboot set in the BIOS when power returns). build a host with different partitions on different hard disks. default rights (eg. consider 077 for system configuration files) Check that access to devices is secure (eg. umask of 027 under Unix. unbeknownst to you Restrict physical access (BIOS password.
the activities of authorized users may also be monitored and recorded. and change the default to their own. put users in a group instead All accounts should have a password If using NIS. secure. Individuals using this system without authority or in excess of their authority are subject to having all their activities on this system monitored and recorded or examined by any authorized person. to make logging easier. do not use the same password for all newly-created accounts). All users should use a personal account. or do not get back to you. if applicable. check for all unused accounts. Remove guest accounts. Sample seen on rootprompt: This computer system is for authorized users only. including law enforcement. do not use group accounts. Display login banner with some legalese to warn hackers that those are not public resources. After a waiting period. Any material so recorded may be disclosed as appropriate. as system personnel deem appropriate. and contact their owner to check if they still need it. NT: Do not set up unneeded trust relationships with other domains Remove all login information (eg. In the course of monitoring individuals improperly using the system or in the course of system maintenance. without choosing one that they used in the past (Linux and NT. Utmp is not fool-proof: it will not be updated if a user's shell crashes (hence the user will appear to be still logged on). while authentication means checking that the user is indeed who he means he is (ie. and use MD5 hashes instead of the crypt() function Consider password/account blocking after a predefined number of failed attempts to authenticate Do not create "Joe accounts". On *nix systems. leaving your Unix system wide-open Authorization Authorization deals with controlling access to resources. use a difficult. If they don't. When creating new user accounts. ie. and is a plain-text file. for one. a connection to the SMTP port of a mail server should not tell you which MTA is running and its version) Run password cracking software regularly to check that users do not choose unsafe passwords. use shadow passwords instead of relying on /etc/password. Take advantage of password aging to force users to change their password regularly. make sure you do not delete the leading + sign in /etc/password. test accounts whose password is easy to crack. and unique password as default to make them safe (ie. Make sure this banner does not give out any information on the host platform and version #. enter a password to prove this) Check if your system supports the use of ACLs such as SubDomain instead of the basic Unix owner-group-world system of authorization . disable their account. and implement password aging to force them to change their password regularly Change all default passwords on applications you install. offer this feature) Each month. safe password (see appendix for how to choose a safe password) Disable all unused accounts. Remind employees to never write down their password. remove those of employees who have definitely left. ie. Anyone using this system consents to these terms.
hence the need for a lot of monitoring tools Choose the "that which is not explicitly permitted is denied" philosophy. tools that either do not require authentication to access resources.conf Check for process table attack and related types of denial of service attacks Take a look at Bastille Linux or Debian. Check for unowned files regularly Use sudo or equivalent to allow restricted use of root access. rsh. suspicious browsing. Even safer is sending logs to a printer directly attached to each host to avoid sniffing. ie. do not simply disable them by removing entries in start-up scripts and inet. attempts to write to system.conf. denial of service.) and fingerd. Another server in the private part. Maintain a skeptical attitude to determine if a service is truly needed or just a user's whim. or that give out information on your hosts and network . NT : Control Panel | Services). to host private. Disable any unneeded services running hosts (Unix: /etc/inettab. In log files. data modification or deletion. as they are more secure distributions Unless absolutely necessary. and check that passwords are not actually logged for anyone to read To avoid log files from using too much disk space. anomalies. Generally speaking. and furnished with enough paper. Uninstall any service/software that you do not need. Remember to use a shredder before throwing out useless logs. especially from anonymous/guest accounts. /etc/inetd. and work from there. Make sure passwords are not logged Check history log Monitor connections and log files Consider logging to different files.accounting discrepancies. and what the legal restrictions are about logging user personal information Services Keep two web servers: One in the public part of the LAN to contain files meant for the outside world. or rotation followed by periodic moving of old log files to permanent storage like CD-Rs in case you need to investigate a break-in in the future. inability of a user to log in due to modifications of his/her account. poor system performance. etc. on a central host: one for critical information to be sent to you by e-mail and/or printed. preferably one that doesn't use a data buffer. new user accounts or high activity on a previously low usage account. pay special attention to any attempt to achieve a different security level by any user or process. Do the same for FTP and e-mail Run host monitoring tools like WhatsUp to check services running on remote hosts. consider either compression. especially if one of your hosts turns out to have been used by hackers as relay to launch attacks on other sites Check with lawyers how much data must be logged by auditing software. etc. changes in file lengths or dates (use Tripwire). unexplained. do not run the r-services (rlogin. new files with novel or strange file names. corporate resources (Search engines on the web can list all files on a weakly protected public web server). Access should be limited to what a user could need to be doing on a host but not more Logging Things to watch for: system crashes and reboots. suspicious probes. the other to the regular log file. should know before users if something is wrong on the network.
DDoS. If this translates into too many servers. Monitor use of hard disk space to watch for warez Try to protect from human error. active desynchronization.forward files in case a hacker tried to reroute e-mail Use secure terminals (/etc/securetty) to force admins to first log in with their personal account and su to root To share directories and files from an Unix host. A free solution for Windows hosts is AVG.) Have users turn their monitor off to save power when leaving the office. SYN flooding (solutions are Random Early Drop.) with a step-by-step procedure on replacing them Use BIOS system monitoring feature (temperature in case. Security is only as strong as the weakest link in the chain.255 with source address is a local address) Run anti-virus software on all hosts. As a better solution. Cops. the main UPS sends an SNMP trap that can trigger all other hosts to shutdown. eg. SACK (Selective Acknowledgement). Trinux. with automatic updates for a local. TCP ACK storms. power supplies.) All access to resources should be authorized Scan for . Ideally. central host to avoid every user downloading the same update from the Net. web server). to minimize down time Run scanners like Satan. Do not rely on a trusted-hosts architecture (/etc/hosts. Check that the BIOS of each host handles automatic reboot when power resumes. etc. either stand-alone hosts. to check for open ports and other possible insecurities Famous attacks: TCP/IP sequence-number prediction. create an empty . etc. passive attacks. and document this as part of the security policy If possible. Do the same thing for .equiv. This helps to isolate intruders and limit potential harm. high-availability systems (RAID 5 with hot-pluggable hard disks. monitors. fans. TCP session hijacking. RAM. and set the sticky bit of user home directories to 1 to forbid users from deleting this file. and delete them. install important services on secure hosts. etc. TCP spoofing. motherboards. each service should be running on a different machine whose only duty is to provide a specific service. stealth scanning (through the FIN packet). a misconfigured host offering temporary degraded service Use UPS on all hosts that require them. equiped with auto-shutdown and reboot. and making sure that all hosts are regularly updated. sniffing.) Have spare hosts and spare parts ready (hard disks.rhosts files in user home directories regularly. and trivial services on trivial hosts. Provide backup hosts for major applications (e-mail. Beowulf Linux. and SYN Cookies). services should be placed on hosts according to their security level (ie. Nessus. early desynchronization. and to back up their files at night . hard disk status. IP-directed broadcast (pinq x. considering using Samba instead of NFS for ease of deployment and increased security Consider installing a bastion host to be the point of access of all connections to the Internet (the router should only allow outgoing connections originating from that host) Take a look at outgoing filters to control which sites users can access on the Internet.) Provide guest FTP access instead of anonymous access. but leave their host running to minimize wear due to frequent power-offs.rhosts file owned by root and read-only to forbid users from creating one of their own. Use a spare hard disk as home to FTP users to prevent hackers from crashing the host by uploading huge files. Telnet session.
Have it look up addresses from DNS and assign static addresses to known hosts. unsecure hosts themselves Users/MIS Personnel Instruct marketing and sales people to check with MIS before publishing any information on company resources. The goal should be to reduce synchronous calls to emergencies that require an immediate response from MIS. Monitor use of DHCP leases. Either keep those for possible use later. and run dnswalk to check for errors Keep that all software up to date. New or temporary hosts could use anonymous addresses from a DHCP pool DNS: Do not run dynamic DNS until a secure version is available. so as to have the exact same setup Before applying an update. Use toll-free phone numbers instead of actual. The best way is to stop the host to be updated. the more time you have to take care of tasks that only you can do as administrator. or groupware servers). or destroy them. clone its hard disk.) The more users can do themselves. Remember to run eg. CDs can still contain confidential data. and perform upgrade tests on the copy. groupware. through a filesystem that supports automatic file encryption. Run Tripwire or equivalent to monitor changes to system files. do not allow anonymous hosts from getting an IP address. along with phone and fax numbers). help desk application. or through applications that do this automatically (Lotus Notes.) This is especially important for theft-prone portables If confidentiality is not an issue but integrity is.) DHCP: If applicable. Provide classes for all new employees on software used internally . etc. Provide easy-to-use procedure to set up new hosts from secure images to avoid having users install new. Check that DST works and has no impact on applications (source control. Use secure time server to keep all hosts in sync (especially important for timedependent applications like build machines. tapes. source control applications. through initial training and online knowledge databases (groupware. do not reveal the name of MIS personnel. Norton utilities to make sure a hard disk really is blank and its contents unreadable. When you want to check your machine. use MD5 or PGP to check that no hacker has tampered with it. take it off the network and boot off a fresh kernel (usually a read-only boot floppy is good for this) and then run Tripwire to check your files. teach users how to sign files through PGP/GnuPG Add corporate banner to all e-mails Do not just throw away outdated or broken equipments. internal numbers. Test upgrade on a test host to check that no application is broken in the process. Hard disks. floppies. either manually through PGP/GnuPG. as this can be used by hackers to learn about your network Information given in your NIC record for the domains you own: Make them as generic and minimal as possible (eg. Educate users as much as possible. Never install binaries for which you don't have the source code and didn't check that they come from a reliable source Data Consider encrypting data files. Check for suspicious changes made to zone files.
and Out-Processing . This is especially important when posting to newsgroups or inquiring about competitors Watch out for hackers resorting to social engineering to find information (pretending to be with MIS and calling someone in the company to have them change their password. Dejanews. Make sure all MIS personnel is able to take over someone else's job at short notice.Employee In. transformers. fax machines. etc. tips. access control card to the premises if applicable. etc. checking trivial web sites or newsgroups. Use shredders for sensitive data Provide a computer use policy so that users know what they can and cannot do with their computer (eg. check how safe the political and economic situation is. so as to provide history to users and MIS. and that you have all the required equipment (PC Card and cable. so you know how to reach them at any time Check purchase requests from employees for any unsafe choices Tell users not to share accounts. or on-site if visitors are around. etc. organize a balanced work schedule (eg. Check that they do not re-use an older password Before leaving for any trip. etc. Remind MIS personnel to take advantage of groupware application to document procedures.) Remind users not to write down their password.). printers.) Do not leave sensitive documentation on desks.and off-line list of MIS employees. All interventions should be logged in the help desk application.) When traveling in groups. adding support for virtual domains in sendmail. as they're easy to remember and much more secure than regular passwords. Require users to change their password regularly. and ask for a personal account if they need one Check with management if users should be allowed to post to newsgroups from their corporate account If MIS personnel need to ask technical questions to newsgroups that could be used by hackers to break into their site. posting corporate information in newsgroups. installing softwares downloaded from the Net or found in magazines. masquerading. and feedback to management on MIS activity and the type of problems that occur most often As answering synchronous calls is stressful and boring. use a private ISP account for this to hide the origin of the article (eg. and works on system-oriented tasks the rest of the time) Reduce inter-dependencies and specialization to a minimum. etc. or in trash cans.) Check that acronym-based passphrases are used instead of passwords (eg. Check password aging. Have them use passphrases instead. or downloading offensive JPGs. contacts. Walls have ears Check appendices in this document on steps for hiring and firing personnel Appendix A . employees should not all fly on the same plane When off-site. such and such employee answers calls only at certain hours or certains days. w45hatgtg "where 45 have all the good times gone" instead of an actual word. pay attention not to give out confidential information on either the company or its computer infrastucture. which makes it all the easier for hackers to crack passwords. etc.) Consider setting up a bogus domain name to hide connections from your site (eg. Keep on. along with heads of departments. and keeps MIS personnel from working on longer-term projects. online dictionaries abound on the Internet. phone adapters.
Employee In-Processing 1.Add account to list. Take picture. cable modem. phone directory. Remove user from all mailing lists and backup jobs 3. Disable all accounts (including RAS) immediately before employee is leaving or is told of his dismissal (disgruntled employees and the like are the most common problem of internal threats). Hand out documentation on resources available onsite (Phone-HOWTO. should not be allowed in in the premises without an escort Appendix B .46. a router. personal or ex-customers). a bridge. xDSL. Different standards of routing protocols TCP/IP : What form does an IP address take . Lotus Notes. in case the employee can be expected to return in a short while. etc. and remember to delete them after a given period of time in case the employee is not to return 2. and Caller ID 8. Tell user to change passwords immediately. Update caller ID and SPID in PBX 5.MIS Personnel Hiring Test WAN Difference between a repeater. What are class and classless IP addresses . NT computer.0/24. Disabling is better than deleting. provide access control card Employee Out-Processing 1. as employee could continue receiving individual corporate e-mails after leaving the company 7. Check with manager or co-workers whether some files should be backed up from employee's workstations. Do NOT forward e-mails to a new address. etc. update mug-sheet and organization chart. FTP. Add phone # to online phone list 4. E-mail: Set up automated answer for incoming mails.). and communicate login/password. FDDI. backup. Create various accounts (NT user. NIS. VPN. What is sub-netting Your ISP grants your site class C IP network address 207. How is an address bound to a NIC . NFS. Add IP address in DHCP and DNS 3. Make sure security knows that this employee is no longer with the company. change them 5. What are private IP addresses . except corporate and known mailing lists (eg. explaining that the employee has left and can be reached at such and such phone # or e-mail address 6. SMB/CIFS RAS . If admin passwords were known by employee. X25. ISDN. Unix e-mail. and burn CDs or save to tapes before reconditioning hosts 4. Remove employee picture from mug-sheet. and choose solid passwords per instructions in user guide 2.) 6.130. Frame-relay. Remove hosts from backup selection list 9. unless OKed by management. and. How would you use it to set up 2 networks of your own ? Differences between TCP/IP and Netbeui Explain what the following terms mean: ATM.
either random. RAID1. Things to watch for before connecting a new device onto a SCSI bus How many primary partitions does a hard-disk support ? How many cylinders should a hard-disk contain to avoir problems when booting an OS from one of the partitions ? What does MBR stand for. ZModem. each with its rough storage capacity What's the difference between an incremental and differential backup job ? What's the difference between RAID 0. V42bis. V34. X2/K56Flex/V90. BBS. SLIP/PPP. and type of connectors . call-back. How many devices can be connected onto a single SCSI bus . Explain what the following terms mean: RS-232. Example of some basic modem AT commands ? LAN Difference between a hub and a switch ? Maximum number of 10BT hubs that can be linked together using regular plugs ? Name different LAN architectures available Name of the different layers that constitute the OSI/ISO and TCP/IP models Difference between TCP and UDP ? Some well-known port numbers ? What settings does a TCP/IP host need to connect to a LAN ? Name major NOS Different ways to protect a LAN from outside hacking ? Wiring How many wires are required for 10BT wiring ? For 100BTX ? For 100BT4 ? What do UTP and STP stand for ? When is it necessary to use either one ? What are straight-through and cross-over cables ? PBX How many wires are required to plug an analog phone into a PBX ? An ISDN phone ? What's SPID (French : SDA) ? Approximate voltage level of a RING signal ? Backup Name different mass-storage devices currently in use. and what is it for ? What frequency should you choose so that the picture displayed by a monitor doesn't flicker ? . V42. and RAID 5 ? Hardware Name different manufacturers of microprocessors Different models of the Intel family Different types of RAM How many devices can be connected onto an IDE bus ? SCSI : Speeds. BBS.or sequentialaccess. black-listing. Kermit.
OCX? Name different file systems available on Microsoft platforms What is the difference between FAT and FAT32 ? Name major DBMS vendors Unix/Linux Name the two original Unix branches Name the major current flavors of Unix Name the current. netstat. What is the CPU/bus ratio ? Software Name some major OS's What do the following terms mean : SNMP.d over RC scripts ? How do you set things up. X. OLE. and when should you use them ? What is Samba ? Can it be used as a DC ? On a DNS server. VBX. main Linux distributions What is POSIX ? What is the point of building a new kernel ? What are modules. DCOM. BootP. netwatch. ping. how do you set an alias for a host ? How does a DHCP server work ? What are Telnet. What are hard links. FTP. ActiveX. nslookup. DNS. LDAP ? What is the difference between POP and IMAP ? What is Lotus Notes ? What is currently its strong point as compared to Microsoft Exchange ? What is ASCII ? Unicode ? What is a DLL ? What does client/server mean ? Alternative ? What do the following terms mean : DDE. Kerberos ? What are run-levels ? When should you use inet. IMAP. and only access a Linux server for e-mail ? What is a shadow password ? What do SUID/SGID mean.500. Corba ? What do the following terms mean : Java. and symbolic links ? How does an X server work ? NT What are the different release numbers of NT ? What is the difference between a workgroup and an NT domain ? What is a DC ? What is Active Directory? What are the benefits to move to AD? . DHCP. and when should you use them ? How do you add a new user account into a Linux server ? How to you set a new password for it ? What should you change to unable users to login. so that a user is presented with a GUI to log in on a Linux server ? What is an i-node ? Name different file systems supported by Linux. sniffing. tripwire. POP. COM. INND. NIS/NIS+. tcpdump.
and ask applicant about their use Appendix C . transportation means. jdoe@yaPLEASEREMOVETHISTOMAILMEhoo. Be suspicious of any phone call asking for confidential information (your password. Python. name resolution. HOSTS . broadcasts. either use the legitimate corporate connection. If you need to connect to a remote site. DOS batch files. DNS. and commute time If possible perform assessment test: Fill a box with different hardware (NIC. and do not post your address in any web page accessible from the Internet (eg. Contact MIS if your mailbox is filled with it. etc. eg. PearlPerl. Disguise your e-mail address. information on corporate infrastructure. etc.) Do not answer any SPAM e-mails. Use one-time passwords or tunneling to encrypt all data flow between corporate servers and your modem-equipped host .User Policy Read the corporate computer use policy If you receive an e-mail or an instant message asking you to update the password of any of your accounts (NT. Do not use your actual e-mail address when posting to newsgroups or mailing lists. e-mail.com Do not install a modem to your host. WINS. master browser ? What is an SID ? What happens if you clone the partition of an NT host currently connected to the network. Office macros) English Aural comprehension: TOEFL tape riting proficiency: TOEFL MCQs Reading comprehension: TOEFL MCQs Miscellaneous Check applicant's location.). C/C++. can be tapped.). do not answer and ask IT to investigate Contact MIS in case of any malicious and threatening telephone calls. including wireless. your home page). What do the following terms mean : NetBios. video adapters. LMHOSTS. Visual Test. or check with MIS if the remote site requires setting up an ad hoc connection Remember that telephone lines. and restore this image onto a new PC ? How can you upgrade a stand-alone NT host into a DC ? Is FAT32 supported by NT 4 ? What's an ERD ? What is a trust relationship ? What is an NT service ? Where are user or application parameters saved in Windows 9x and NT ? Development (Proficiency in VB. as this can be used by spammers to confirm that an e-mail address is valid. etc. Spammers can easily build themselves mailing lists by scanning such material.
etc. encrypt all sensitive files (e-mails. w45hatgtg "where 45 have all the good times gone" instead of an actual word. This channel also reduces synchronous interruptions to a minimum. data can still be read on a reformated hard drive. etc. Use a paper shredder before throwing out confidential data Do not run any software received through the mail or the Internet (e-mail attachments. and bring it to MIS instead. with the right tools. etc. and review the process continuously and make improvements each time a weakness is found. phone adapters. Walls have ears Do not leave confidential information lying on your desk. employees should not all fly on the same plane Generally speaking. When off-site. Your e-mail and any file on your computer can also be monitored. set up a password in the BIOS. etc. implement measures which will protect your assets in a cost-effective manner. Before leaving for any trip. unauthorized programs being run. etc. using your hosts as stepping stone to launch attacks to other sites. and that you have all the required equipment (PC Card and cable.) When traveling in groups. transformers. contact MIS whenever you detect a situation that you consider is or could be a security or safety incident Appendix D . put your portable in a safe). and history of past incidents. online dictionaries abound on the Internet. always secure it with a lock and cable when working in an office. or waiting for you through the metal detector. identification of the incident. disruption of service.). use acronym-based passphrases (eg.). etc. and is responsible for prohibiting use of to newsgroups and web sites that are not work-related. in each area. leaving it at your feet in an airport. notification.) Do NOT write down passwords. make the most of the corporate groupware or help desk application before calling up MIS. Do not throw away computer equipment. or fax or copy machines. or on-site if visitors are around. corporate reputation.). pay attention not to give out confidential information on either the company or its computer infrastucture. check how safe the political and economic situation is. as they may still contain sensitive data (for instance. never leave a portable computer unattended (eg. access control card to the remote presmises if applicable.) Watch out for hackers resorting to social engineering to find information (pretending to be with MIS and calling someone in the company to have them change their password. Those contain answers to Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs). and call MIS/security ASAP. Challenge any stranger not wearing an access control card. handling. at your hotel. As explained in RFC 2196. identify what you are trying to protect (files. make sure the portable comes up with a visible tamper-proof corporate sticker to discourage theft MIS monitors network use. . determine how likely the threats are. web sites) While on the road. use the site PA system if available If available.) Passwords: Instead of regular words. If no one is available.Security Policy The security policy to handle incidents should have the following sections: Goals and objectives. post-mortem to improve security in the future. which makes it all the easier for hackers to crack passwords. determine what you are trying to protect it from (files being accessed or deleted or replaced.
nontechnical employees are those most likely to not upgrade to the latest anti-virus and launch any application or click on any e-mail attachement. and you'll get monkeys. and data integrity. list who will provide and administer it. Therefore. Security is a state of mind. if using an RSAtype of encryption.com/15tape. Threats include unauthorized access to resources and/or information. very likely to be neglected.com/ http://www. the cost of protecting assets should be less than the cost of their loss. new breaches of security are found every single day. make sure you keep safe copies of your private key on a separate media) Temp stuff http://www.Choosing a backup software Use encryption. or the wages of your staff. and denial of service. availability.com/cgi-bin/printer. especially if using a courier company to store tapes off-site Make sure you can restore encrypted tapes on a bare-metal host (eg. keep in mind that. but also very boring. Needless to say. Perl. automate as many tasks as you can. No security. whether it's the amount of work to re-create them (lost files). if only because new software and upgrades often means new security flaws. Python. can be achieved without dedicating significant resources. so remember to check security-related mailing lists and web sites on a daily basis. Applications (and their corresponding bugs and breaches of security) are updated constantly. confidential information passed on to the competition. authorization. confidentiality. To make matters worse. especially as technical and involved as handling day-to-day management of a computer infrastructure. this document gives a list of general hints.dantz.) Also. and hire MIS employees with such coding skills. For each service that will be provided. there is no way that anybody will be able to provide you with any acceptable level of security. Performing such daily routine tasks is not only time-consuming. and who will be allowed to access them. as the Bugtraq mailing list shows. Do not assume that because your whole site is secure today. take into account the knowledge required to use computers securely.pctechguide.pl?issue=200101&article=tape_drive . as e-mail-based virus are all it takes to bring down an entire organisation. and hence. or the impact of the image or future of the company (break-ins. but if you don't take measures to provide these necessary resources. hardware. In order to keep it as universal as possible and avoid having to update it too often.htm Tape Drive Roundup .Which Tape Drive Is Best for Your Linux System? http://www. and shell scripts are your friends. Appendix E .The basic goals of security are authentication.linux-mag. Pay peanuts. Finally. that it will remain so tomorrow. That money can be spent on software. Hence the need to keep abreast through mailing lists and web sites. and does not deal with particular versions of softwares you might be running.
wraps the tape around a rotating drum that contains the heads. models (IDE. linear-scan drives have been winning the race with proven market success. . That is. using a series of tensioners. while the latter promises increased reliability. The stationary heads of the linear tape technology are what theoretically give linear-tape drives superior reliability. Concerns about the tape stretching or snapping due to drum rotation speeds upward of 7. $150-600) DI30 (IDE) is Certified for Linux! ADR50 is Certified for Linux! ZIP QIC 120M floppy drive CD-R/CD-RW Server DAT 4mm (DDS) DAT 8mm (AIT) Jaz VXA DLT Exabyte Mammoth-2 Tandberg LTO Optical Magneto optical DVD Drive price. Linear scan writes data from front to back in a serpentine method.2GB tapes Travan TR4 (4-8GB $200-500). when the head reaches the end of the tape. USB). 25-50GB. standard recording format (can be accessed using non-proprietary software) The Emerging Tape Backup Market http://www. Appendix F .com/shared/printArticle?article=nc/1114/1114ws3 full.networkcomputing.000 rpm and high tension conditions have been quelled by the success and reliability of solutions such as the Sony AIT-2 drive. $250-600) Mgf = Seagate TapeStor OnStream (15-30GB. Aided by DLT. int SCSI. Linux. Helical scan writes data diagonally across the entire tape-simultaneously using multiple heads. it drops down a row and switches direction.html&pub=nwc Tape technology is broken into two major categories: helical tape and linear tape. The main difference between the two is that a helical-scan drive pulls the tape out of the cartridge and. TR5 (10-20GB. Linear scan uses stationary heads and a less complex tapethreading method.Workstation CastleWood ORB Int IDE $150 Int SCSI $160 Ext SCSI $180 USB $200 2.Unix Security Checklist (from Practical Unix & Internet Security) Preface Reread your manuals and vendor documentation. ext SCSI. The other difference is the way data is written to the tape. The former touts higher density and performance. tape price.
Develop a positive security policy. Don't have different. Don't use your password on other computer systems under different administrative control. tokens. Pick passwords that are not so difficult to remember that you have to write them down. Write a letter to your vendors indicating your interest and concem about (insufficient) sottware quality and security features. Post a reminder above your computer or desk: "Security is not 'Me versus the Users' but 'All of Us versus Them. Become familiar with your users' expectations and experience with UNIX. Consider automatic generation or screening of passwords. or any part of your computer. nonobvious passwords. in fact. keyboard." Work to educate your users on good security practice. Be sure that every user's account has a password. Schedule time to read them when they arrive. by trying to log in on another terminal. Do not attach your password to your terminal. a password. What do you need to protect? What are you protecting against? Understand priorities. don't forget it! After you change your password. Circulate it to all users. Don't use your password as the password to another application such as a Multi-User Dungeon (MUD) game. less secure rules for top-evel management. Chapter 1: Introduction Order other appropriate references on security and computer crime. again. budget. Ensure that everything to be protected has an "owner. Get management involved. don't make it obvious that what you have written is. Set priorities for security and use. Pick strong. After you change your password. and resources available. . Ensure that all users know about good password management practices. Ensure that authority is matched with responsibility. Chapter 3: Users and Passwords Be sure that every person who uses your computer has his or her own account. or by using the telnet localbost command. Consider use of one-time passwords.' " Chapter 2: Policies and Guidelines Assess your environment. or smart cards. Perform a risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis. Never record passwords online or send them to another user via electronic mail. test it with the su command. If you must write down your password. Do not write your account name or the name of the computer on the same piece of paper. Mark your calendar for 6-12 months in the future to reread your manuals.
consider superencrypting with Triple-DES. Choose encryption keys as you would a password. and the Superuser Ensure that no two regular users are assigned or share the same account. Scan for device files on your system. Use the compress command (or similar compression system) on files before encrypting them. Groups.avoid obvious or easily guessed words or patterns.g. Think of how to protect especially sensitive files in the event that the root account is compromised. Remember. the same UID. or other appropriate log files on a regular basis for bad su attempts. Never use a login password as an encryption key. Set your umask to an appropriate value (e. Check their ownership and permissions to ensure that they are reasonable. /var/adm/sulog. Chapter 6 Cryptography Learn about the restrictions your government places on the use. or restrict the ability to su to user root su to the user's ID when investigating problem reports rather than exploring as user root. If you use the Data Encryption Standard (DES) algorithm for encryption. Never use rot13 as an encryption method to protect data. If your system has "universes" or Context Dependent Files (CDFs). Scan the files /var/adm/message.Chapter 4: Users. Never write SUID/SGID shell scripts. and chgrp operations on files clear the SUID/SGID bits on your system. other than UUCP users. Disable SUID on disk partition mounts (local and remote) unless necessary. Get in the habit of checking files based on this information. Avoid use of the root account for routine activities that can be done under a plain user ID. do not depend on ACLs to protect files on NFS partitions. Consider contacting your legislators with your opinions on these laws. especially if they negatively impact your ability to protect your systems. chown. 027 or 077). . This protection includes use of removable media and encryption. export. Obtain and install a message digest program (such as MD5). Never give any users. Determine if write. Restrict access to the su command.. chmod. If your system has ACLs. especially if it is more than 1024 bytes in length. Don't depend on the crypt command to protect anything particularly sensitive. be sure that all your administrative actions actually scan all the files and directories on your system.. learn how to use them. Think about how you can assign group IDs to promote appropriate sharing and protection without sharing accounts. Learn how to use message digests. Periodically scan your system for SUID/SGID files. Chapter 5: The UNIX Filesystem Learn about the useful options to your version of the Is command. however . and sale of cryptography.
Chapter 7: Backups Make regular backups. If your budget and needs are appropriate. log in to your own account and use su. use the rsh restricted shell. disable accounts like uucp and daemon so that people cannot use them to log into your system. Make periodic paper copies of important files. Do not store your backups in the same room as your computer system: consider offsite backup storage. Try to completely rebuild your system from a set of backup tapes to be certain that your backup procedures are complete. or store it online. Be certain that everything on your system is on your backups. Make periodic archive backups of your entire system and keep them forever. Use PGP to encrypt files and sensitive email. Ensure that access to your backup tapes during transport and storage is limited to authorized and trusted individuals. Consider obtaining a copy of the PGP software and making it available to your users. and to create and check digital signatures on important files. /etc/rc. Do not set up a single account that is shared by a group of people. investigate doing backups across a network link to a "hot spare" site. Protect your encryption key as you would your password .don't write it down. Make at least every other backup onto a different tape to guard against media failure. and /etc/fstab). Encrypt your backups. /etc/passwd. . Avoid proprietary encryption methods whose strengths are not known. Protect your encryption programs against tampering. put it in a shell file. Use the group ID mechanism instead. Think about creating restricted filesystem accounts for special-purpose commands or users. system. Do not set up accounts that run single commands. Make paper copies of critical files for comparison or rebuilding your system (e. Chapter 8: Defending Your Accounts Make sure that every account has a password. If you need to set up an account that can run only a few commands.g. Do not create "default" or "guest" accounts for visitors. Remember to update your backup regimen whenever you update your system or change its configuration.. because the tapes will eventually fail. consider remounting the filesystems as read-only during backups to prevent changes to file access times. Make sure to change the password of every "default" account that came with your UNIX. but escrow the keys in case you lose them. When using software that accesses files directly rather than through the raw devices. Do not reuse a backup tape too many times. Keep your backups under lock and key. Try to restore a few files from your backup tapes on a regular basis. If possible. Instead of logging into the root account.
If you are using a central mail server or firewall. as these people can use the su command to become the superuser (if applicable). enable it. If your computer supports password aging. you may wish to export these filesystems read-only. and permissions of every program on your system. you may wish to slighdy alter the algorithm used by crypt 0 to encrypt your password. Chapter 9. on their directories. Double check the protection attributes on system command and data files. and on all ancestor directories. mount disks read-only if they contain system software. Disable dormant accounts on your computer. consider the benefits of accountname aliasing. If you don't have them. If your system does not have a shadow password file. Monitor the format and contents of the /etc/passwd file. modems. Disable the accounts of people on extended vacations. You may wish to include cryptographic checksums in the lists. consider asking your vendor when they will be supported in your version of UNIX. For example. use them. contact the vendor and request that such support be added. Otherwise. If possible. if present in your software. If possible. Write a daily check script to check for unauthorized changes to files and system directories. so that they cannot be modified by NFS clients. If your system allows the use of a longer password than the standard crypt() uses. or public terminals as "secure" in the /etc/default/loging or /etc/ttys files. Keep copies of this checklist on removable media and use them to determine if any of your system files or programs have been modified. Make a checkdist listing the size. you can increase the number of encryption rounds from 25 to 200. Consider using the Distributed Computing Environment (DCE) or Kerberos for any local network of single-user workstations. Establish a system by which accounts are always created with a fixed expiration date and must be renewed to be kept active. make sure that the file /etc/passwd cannot be read anonymously over the network via UUCP or TFTP. if your vendor software allows it. Consider cracking your own passwords periodically. Be careful who you put in the wheel group. especially on accounts that may be used across a network link. set your systems to require the root password when rebooting in singleuser mode. to help prevent users from picking bad passwords. enable it.. If your system supports the TCB/trusted path mechanism. . set a lifetime between one and six months. Put time/tty restrictions on login to accounts as appropriate. Enable password constraints. but don't place much faith in results that show no passwords cracked. If you export filesystems containing system programs. Tell your users to use longer passwords. Do not declare network connections. If your software does not support a shadow password file. Consider using some form of one-time password or token-based authentication. modiflcation time. enable it. Integrity Management If your system supports immutable files. If you have shadow password capability. consider adding password screening or coaching software to assist your users in picking good passwords. If you have source code for your operating system.
install it. Have your users check the last login time each time they log in to make sure that nobody else is using their accounts. xferlog. Turn on whatever accounting mechanism you may have that logs command usage. This review should include (if they exist on your system) loginlog. Scan your system for any user home directories or dot files that are world writ-able or group writable. . Make sure that your utmp file is not world writable. Determine if there is an intrusion-detection and/or audit-reduction tool available to use with your C2 logs. Never install binaries obtained from untrustworthy sources (like the Usenet). This approach will ensure that you see all exceptional condition messages. Consider installing a simple cron task to save copies of the lastlog file to track logins.g. sulog. Use this program on a regular basis. Consider installing something to check message digests of files (e. Chapter 10: Auditing and Logging Consider installing a dedicated PC or other non-UNIX machine as a network log host. configure it so that all auth messages are logged to a special file. Run last periodically to see who has been using the system. If you process your logs in an automated fashion.. Consider making all files on NFS-exported disks owned by user root. When installing new software. you can use comparison checking to detect unauthorized modifications. craft your filters so that they exclude the things you don't want rather than pass only what you do want. Tripwire). Be certain that the program and all its data files are stored on read-only media or protected with encryption (or both). Evaluate whether C2 logging on your system is practical and appropriate. and others. Make sure that your log files are on your daily backups before they get reset. Review your specialized log files on a regular basis. also have these messages logged to a special hardcopy printer and to another computer on your network. If you can. If you have backups of critical directories. Don't leave any bin or library directories writable by untrustworthy accounts. Run integrity checks on your system on a regular basis (see Chapter 9). Consider adding an automatic log monitor such as Swatch. Set permissions on commands to prevent unauthorized alteration. Be careful to protect your backup copies and comparison programs from potential attackers. If you have syslog. install it first on a noncritical system on which you can test it and observe any misbehavior or bugs. aculog. Be aware that log file entries may be forged and misleading in the event of a carefully crafted attack. Don't include nonstandard directories in your execution path. Make an offline list of every SUID and SGID file on your system. Keep a paper log on a per-site and per-machine basis. Chapter 11: Protecting Against Programmed Threats Be extremely careful about installing new software. Consider runting rdist from a protected system on a regular basis to report changes. If so.
Never have writ-able directories in your search path. Never have ". get in the habit of typing full pathnames for commands. call a FIRST response team or the vendor to confirm the instance before spreading any alarm. Keep your backups offsite. Don't use the vi or ex editors in a directory without first checking for a Trojan . Disable terminal answer-back. install alarm sensors both above and below the floor. . Verify that any files run from the cron command files cannot be altered or replaced by unauthorized users. Make sure that personnel know how to use all fire protection and suppression equipment. Have water sensors installed above and below raised floors in your computer room.forward files. environment.g. if possible. Periodically review configuration files for server programs (e. Train your users and operators about what to do when an alarm sounds. Make sure that the placement and nature of fire-suppression systems will not endanger personnel or equipment more than is necessary.exrc file. Chapter 12: Physical Security Develop a physical security plan that includes a description of your assets. Have heat and smoke alarms in your computer room. Determine who might have physical access to any of your resources under any circumstances. including editor start-up files.) Check the security of your at program. Disable the automatic command execution feature in GNU Emacs. Never write or use SUID or SGID shell scripts unless you are a hoary UNIX wizard. and drinking in your computer room or near computer equipment. etc. or structural failure." (the current directory) in your search path. eating. put sensors above the ceiling. If you have a raised floor. Periodically review mailer alias files for unauthorized changes. Review the use of these commands (and the shell) in all scripts executed by cron. threats. Install and regularly clean air filters in your computer room.. Watch for unauthorized modification to initialization files in any user or system account. Check the behavior of your xargs and find commands. perimeter. Make sure that the devices used for backups are not world readable. . If you suspect a network-based worm attack or a virus in widely circulated software. Make sure that any shared libraries are properly protected and that protections cannot be overridden. Periodically review all system start-up and configuration files for additions and changes. Place your computer systems where they will be protected in the event of earthquake.conf. explosion. If you have a dropped ceiling. When running as the superuser. and defenses. Check the placement and recharge status of fire extinguishers on a regular basis. too. inetd. and disable the program if necessary. Strictly prohibit smoking.
responsibility or stress on a frequent or regular basis. Encrypt sensitive data held on your systems. Try to resolve potential problems before they become real problems. Have temperature and humidity controls in your computer room.g. Make sure that staff have adequate time and resources to pursue continuing education opportunities. Do so with the permission of the applicants. Have disaster-recovery and business-continuation plans in place. Check peripheral devices for local onboard storage that can lead to disclosure of information. users should be required to take holiday and vacation leave regularly. Consider setting autologout on user accounts. Chapter 13: Personnel Security Conduct background checks of individuals being considered for sensitive positions. Use bulk erasers. and for personnel taking on new assignments. if appropriate. and bolts to keep computer equipment from being carried away. or incinerators. Make sure that users in sensitive positions are not overloaded with work. . Examine them periodically. terminators. Have antistatic measures in place. Institute an ongoing user security-awareness program. Physically protect your backups and test them periodically. Protect power switches and fuses. shredders. Sanitize media (e. tie-downs. Never use programmable function keys on a terminal for login or password information. consider using a polygraph examination of the candidate. even if compensated for the overload. Beware of insects trying to "bug" your computers. Provide comprehensive and appropriate training for all new personnel.. Store computer equipment and magnetic media away from building structural steel members that might conduct electricity after a lightning strike. Use locks. Consider installing an uninterruptible power supply. Have alarms associated with the systems to indicate if values get out of range. Install filtered power and/or surge protectors for all your computer equip ment. Have regular performance reviews and monitoring. and if it is legally allowable. If the position is extremely sensitive. Lock and physically isolate your computers from public access. Consider encrypting all of your backups and offline storage. In particular. Have applicants and contractors in sensitive positions obtain bonding. Consider putting motion alarms or other protections in place to protect valuable equipment when personnel are not present. Avoid having glass walls or large windows in your computer room. Have recorders to monitor these values over time. and connectors from tampering. Protect all your network cables. Provide refresher training on a regular basis. tapes and disks) and printouts before disposal. Consider using fiber optic cable for networks.
Check permissions on all associated devices and configuration files. Consider use of encrypting modems with fixed keys to guard against unauthorized use or eavesdropping. When any user leaves the organization. Consider getting CALLER*ID/ANI to trace incoming calls automatically. Monitor users in sensitive positions (without intruding on their privacy) for signs of excess stress or personal problems.sys or /usr/lib/uucp/Systems is mode 400. Disable third-party billing to your modem lines. Audit access to equipment and critical data. Do not export UUCP files or commands on a writable NFS partition. UUCP Be sure that every UUCP login has a unique password. Make sure that /usr/lib/uucp/L. Consider using separate callout telephone lines with no dial-in capability for callback schemes. If there are daily. Apply policies of least privilege and separation of duties where applicable. make sure that they are run with the UUCP UID but that they are owned by root. Set up a different UUCP login for every computer you cornmunicate with via UUCP. Do not install call forwarding on any of your incoming lines. Make sure that no user becomes irreplaceable. Limit UUCP access to the smallest set of directories necessary. Only allow execution of commands by UUCP that are absolutely necessary. Make sure that the ruusend command is not in your L. Consider making some or all of your UUCP connections use callback to initiate a connection. Chapter 15. make sure that access is properly ter minated and duties transferred. Make sure that the tip or cu programs automatically exit if the user gets logged out of the remote machine or if the telephone call is interrupted. Make sure that the files in the /usr/lib/uucp directories can't be read or written remotely or locally with the UUCP system. readable only by the UUCP user. Make sure that mail to the UUCP users gets sent to the system administrator. Consider getting leased lines and/or callback modems. Log the numbers that call your system. Make sure that incoming modems automatically hang up on an incoming call if the caller logs out or if the caller's login process gets killed. or monthly administrative scripts run by cron to clean up the UUCP system. Chapter 14: Thlephone Security Make sure that incoming modems automatically log out the user if the telephone call gets interrupted. Physically protect the modems and phone lines. Make sure that there is no way for the local user to reprogram the modem. Make sure that no UUCP login has /usr/spooI/uucp/uucppublic for its home directory.cmds file (Version 2 UUCP). Make sure that outgoing modems hang up on the outgoing call if the tip or cu program is exited. . weekly.
The file should also contain the name of any other account that does not belonged to an actual human being. consider installing the tcpwrapper program to better regulate and log access to your servers. Make sure that all directory permissions and ownership on your ftp account are set correctly. don't have a copy of your real /etc/passwd as an ~ftp/etc/passwd. contact your vendor and ask when equivalent functionality will be provided as a standard feature in the vendors' systems. Do not depend on IP addresses or DNS information for authentication. If you support anonymous FTP. TCP/IP Networks Consider lowAevel encryption mechanisms in enterprise networks. Frequenfly scan the files in. Disable or delete any uucpd daemon if you aren't using it. your ftp account. Remove all of the UUCP software and libraries if you aren't going to use them. and bin. If your software allows. uucp. Be sure that the UUCP control files are protected and cannot be read or modified using the UUCP program. Chapter 17: TCP/IP Services Routinely examine your inetd configuration file. Only give UUCP access to the directories to which it needs access. Disable any unneeded network services. or to "tunnel" through external networks. Examine carefully any other alias that delivers to a program or file. If the machine has an active FTP service. Then. Make sure that your sendmail program will not deliver mail directly to a file Make sure that your sendmail program does not have a wizard's password set in the configuration file Limit the number of "trusted users" in your sendmail. If your standard software does not offer this level of control. Delete the "decode" alias in your aliases file. . wiz. Make sure that /etc/ftpusers contains at least the account names root. configure any "incoming" directories so that files dropped off cannot then be uploaded without operator intervention. Chapter 16. Test your mailer to make sure that it will not deliver a file or execute a command that is encapsulated in an address. Disable UUCP over IP unless you need UUCP. ensure that all UUCP users are listed in the /etc/ftpusers file.cf file Make sure that your version of the sendmail program does not support the debug. Consider disabling any services that provide nonessential information to outsiders that might enable them to gather information about your systems. or kill commands. You may wish to limit UUCP to the directory /usr/spool/uucppublic. Limit the commands which can be executed from offsite to those that are absolutely necessary. Make sure that your version of the ftpd program is up to date. and usage of. Do not depend on header information in news articles or email as they can be forged.
Set up your logindevperm or fbtab files to restrict permissions on frame buffers and devices. and that. bind) with all patches applied. Make sure that all files used by the nameserver software are properly protected against tampering. Disable or replace the finger service with something that provides less information. Scan your network connections regularly with netstat. Consider running the authd daemon for all machines in the local net. Disable rexec service unless needed. Disable zone transfers in your DNS.rhosts files). and perhaps against reading by unauthorized users.g. (But beware that most implementations of trusted commands don't understand IP addresses in .g. if enabled. Kerberos. with all published patches in place Make sure that the aliases file cannot be altered by unauthorized individuals. in . Routinely scan your system for suspicious.rhosts. If you have a plus sign (+) in your /etc/hosts. Tell your users about the information that the finger program makes available on the network Make sure that your finger program is more recent than November 5.rhosts files are protected to mode 600. remove it. Make sure that all existing .g. Secure RPC.) Make sure that TFTP access. Consider not allowing users to have . Do not place usemames in your /etc/hosts. Make your list of trusted hosts as small as possible. Make sure that you are running the latest version of the nameserver software (e.equiv file. Block incoming RIP packets. If your X11 Server blocks on null connections. Block NTP connections from outside your organization. 1988. Configure your NNTP or INND server to restrict who can post articles or transfer Usenet news. Consider disabling SMTP commands such as VRFY and EXPN with settings in your sendmail configuration. Disable UUCP over IP unless needed.rhosts files on your system. use static routes where possible and practical. Consider replacing sendmail with smap. configure your system to use APOP or Kerberos for authentication. if possible. get an updated version. Make sure that your version of the sendmail program is up to date. Have an alias for every non-user account so that mail to any valid address gets delivered to a person and not to an unmodified mailbox. in such cases. or other servers. is limited to a single directory containing boot files. IRCs. If you are using POP or IMAP. Be very cautious about installing MUDs.equiv file.rhosts files. Restrict access to your printing software via the /etc/hosts. Make sure that you have the most recent version of the software. doing this might introduce a vulnerability.. Scan your network with tools such as SATAN and ISS to determine if you have uncorrected vulnerabilities . if this is possible on your system. Disable the rexd RPC service. . Use IP addresses instead of domain names in places where the practice makes sense (e. "magic cookies") instead of using xhost..before an attacker does the same.lpd file. Enable the best X11 authentication possible in your configuration (e. Block SNMP connections from outside your organization. or another more tractable network agent.
Limit or prohibit server-side includes. Put keylogout in your logout file if you are running secure RPC. Chapter 18: WWW Security Consider running any www server from a Macintosh platform instead of from a UNIX platform.. including login. or to only follow links that are owned by the same user that owns the destination of the link. (See the specific programming recommendations in the chapter. personal information). If you are transferring sensitive information over the WWW connection (e. Prevent general access to the server log files. Configure your server to only allow CGI scripts from a particular directory under your control. If your version of portmapper has a "securenets" feature. Set the server to not follow symbolic links. Chapter 19: RPC. Become familiar with all the configuration options for the particular server you use. Do not mix WWW and FTP servers on the same machine in the same filesystem hierarchy. enable encryption. Disable automatic directory listings. NIS+. Make sure that your version of ypbind only listens on privileged ports. Make sure that there is an asterisk (*) in the password field of any line beginning with a plus sign (+) in both the passwd and group files of any NIS client. Re-evaluate why you are connected to the network at all. and Kerberos Enable Kerberos or Secure RPC if possible. Consider making your www server chroot into a protected directory. Be aware of the potential risks posed by dependence on a limited number of thirdparty providers. If you are using Kerberos. Make sure that your version of portmapper does not do proxy forwarding. Monitor the logs and usage of your WWW service. configure the program so that it restricts which machines can send requests to your portmapper. Do not run your server as user root. Use NIS+ in preference to MS. contact your vendor and ask when it will be supported. . if possible. and set its options appropriately (and conservatively). and disconnect machines that do not really need to be connected.g. NIS. Use netgroups to restrict access to services. If this feature is not present. Make sure that there is no line beginning with a plus sign (+) in the passwd or group files on any NIS server.) Consider using taintperl as the implementation language. Chapter 20: NFS Program your firewall and routers to block NFS packets. understand its limitations. Have it set to run as a nobody user unique to the WWW service. Be extremely cautions about writing and installing CGI scripts or programs.
and think about doing without. Consider buying a commercially provided and configured firewall. Set the kemel portmon variable to ignore NFS requests from unprivileged ports. if possible. At the very least. use the secure option for NFS mounts. Use the most complete firewall you can afford and one that makes sense in your environment. Use NFS version 3. Make sure that firewall machines have the highest level of logging.or group-writable directories. Mount partitions nosuid unless SUID access is absolutely necessary. if available. Do not export user home directories in a writable mode. When possible. Chapter 21: Firewalls Keep in mind that firewalls should be used in addition to other security measure and not in place of them. using the access= or ro= options. if available. Have a central mail machine with MX aliasing and name rewriting. Mount partitions nodev. Don't configure any machine to trust machines outside the local subnet. Make sure that user accounts have different passwords for machines on different subnets. Keep in mind that firewalls can sometirnes fail. Consider setting a policy of default deny for your firewall. Use the netgroups mechanism to restrict the export of (and thus the ability to remotely mount) filesystems to a small set of local machines. Export filesystems to a small set of hosts. (See the discussion in the chapter. Monitor activity on the firewall regularly. Monitor who is mounting your NFS partitions (but realize that you may not have a complete picture because of the stateless nature of NFS). Configure firewall machines without user accounts and program development utilities. Each subnet should have its own NIS server and netgroups domain.) . Use fsirand on all partitions that are exported. independent subnets. Don't mount NFS directories across subnet boundaries. Give serious thought to whether or not you really want all your systems to be connected to the rest of the world. Do not export filesystems to yourself! Do not use the root= option when exporting filesystems unless absolutely necessary. in TCP mode. Set root ownership on files and directories mounted remotely. rather than creating your own. Never export a mounted partition on your system to an untrusted machine if the partition has any world. replicating disk on local machines may be a safer approach. put a screening router in place. and Usenet on closely guarded bastion hosts. Reconsider why you want to use NFS. Configure your firewall/bastion hosts to remove all unnecessary services and utilities. Plan accordingly: periodically test your firewall and have defense in depth for that eventuality. Break your network up into small. Plan on centralizing services such as DNS. even if a firewall is interposed. For instance. email. Consider intemal firewalls as well as extemal firewalls. Rerun the program periodically.
be certain that you restore the system to a known. Install a firewall to prevent network problems. Configure appropriate process and user limits on your system. Specifically. Chapter 24: Discovering a Break-in Plan ahead: have response plans designed and rehearsed. enable them. Observe the 14 general rules presented in the chapter when writing any program that will be SUID or SGID. Chapter 25: Denial of Service Attacks and Solutions If user quotas are available on your system. Run hardcopies of files showing changes and tracing activity. Initial and time-stamp these copies. Don't test new software while running as root. Consider installing the ident/authd service on your system to help track network access. Consider writing your own wrapper programs to provide extra control or logging for your local system.there is too much detail to list here.Chapter 22: Wrappers and Proxies Consider installing the smap proxy in place of the sendmail program to receive mail over the network. Carefully examine the system after a break-in. Carefully check backups and logs to determine if this is a single occurrence or is related to a set of incidents. consider making a dump of the system to backup media before correcting anything. Consider installing the tcpwrapper program to restrict and log access to local network services. Think about using chroot for privileged programs. If a break-in occurs. etc. w. Avoid storing or transmitting passwords in clear text in any application. Chapter 23: Writing Secure SUID and Network Programs Convey to your vendors your concem about sofiware quality in their products. See the chapter text for specific . Note and timestamp everything you discover and do. . vmstat. Observe the 24 general rules presented in the chapter when writing any software. remember that the results retumed by this service are not completely trustworthy. don't panic! Start a diary and/or script file as soon as you discover or suspect a break-in. If a break-in occurs. However. Be very cautious about generating and using "random" numbers. and especially when writing software that needs extra privileges or trust. Run machine status-checking programs regularly to watch for unusual activity: ps. Observe the 17 general rules presented in the chapter when writing any network server programs. good state.
Determine if your insurance covers business interruption during an investigation. printouts. IP addresses. Keep available an up4o-date paper list of low-level network addresses (e. Educate your users on polite methods of sharing system resources. and other information upon user departure. Also determine if you will be required to institute criminal or civil action to recover on your insurance. Make sure that you have appropriate swap space configured. Configure disk partitions to have sufficient inodes and storage. if possible. setting the nice to a positive value. and sound files. If called upon to help in an investigation. if you need it. Do not be unduly hesitant about reporting a computer crime and involving lawenforcement personnel. Replace any "welcome" messages with warnings against unauthorized use. Define. Have a spare network connection available. Keep written records of your actions when investigating an incident. Recommend a disinterested third party to act as an expert. Make sure that users understand copyright and license restrictions on commercial software. Expand your professional training and contacts by attending security training sessions or conferences. images.. Develop contacts with your local law-enforcement personnel. printouts. Run long-running tasks in the background. Have all users provide a signature noting their understanding of and agreement to such a statement. pornographic material. . Formally register copyrights on your locally developed code and databases. Put explicit copyright and/or proprietary property notices in code start-up screens and source code. Consider investing in a network monitor appropriate for your network. and machine names. Time-stamp and initial media. and other materials as you proceed. etc. Ethernet addresses). Restrict or prohibit access to material that could lead to legal difficulties. Develop contingency plans and response plans in advance of difficulties. Make your users aware of the dangers of electronic harassment or defamation.g. trade secrets. request a signed statement by a judge requesting (or directing) your "expert" assistance. Keep your backups separate from your machine. Consider joining security-related organizations. Law Consult with your legal counsel to determine legal options and liability in the event of a security incident. in writing. Prohibit or restrict access to Usenet from organizational machines. Chapter 26: Computer Security and US. Consider coupling this to provision of personal accounts with an independent service provider. This includes copyrighted material. Ensure good physical security for all network cables and connectors. Consult with your insurance carrier to determine if your insurance covers loss from break-ins. Restrict access to cryptographic software from the network. levels of user access and responsibility. Monitor disk usage and encourage users to archive and delete old files. Make certain that your legal counsel is consulted before you provide locally developed software to others outside your organization. Be aware of other liability concerns. Include an explicit statement about the return of manuals.
world-writable files + dir. identd to get infos on a running process. netcat. Develop a healthy sense of paranoia. tx alarm if nic set to promiscuous. remove all unneeded sws. dll's. rogue phone plugs. Monitor newsgroups. icmpquery & icmpush. and fixig security bugs in a timely fashion. Understand the commands that are available to manipulate processes on your system. seifried. > zone. Appendix C: UNIX Processes Understand how processes work on your system. UNIX.org/lasg. Appendix F: Organizations Learn more about security. Explore other resources concerning security. Understand why SUID/SGID files have those permissions.g RFC 1244 Policy for handling incidents: Overview (goal and objectives in handling the incident) Evalution (how serious is it?) Notification (who should be notified) . The copies will make you intelligent. Trust us on this. Under construction nslookup (ls -d acme. close tcp 53 on firewall. and add to your knowledge and experience. Make your vendor aware of your concerns about security. core dump.Chapter 27: "Who Do You Trust? Read the chapter. Protest when vendors attempt to sell you products advertised with "hacker challenges" instead of more reliable proof of good design and testing. attractive. Appendix B: Important Files Become familiar with the important files on your system. spread dial-in phone #s. and other resources that will help you stay current on threats and countermeasures. don't run progs as root. Buy another 1000 copies of this book for all your friends and acquaintances. Explore professional opportunities that enable you to network with other professionals.com. mailing lists.net. Appendix G: Table of IP Services Read the table and add your own site notes indicating the services you do and do not wish to support. fping gping. traceroute -S -p53 x. host -lvt any acme. adequate testing. net view /domain: mydomain.txt). and incredibly popular. strobe & udp-scan. and the Internet. modems. vrfy/expn mysmtp.
On the local machine domain sockets are used. No system account needs to use them. Even better. if you just know how. Of the remaining 12. since it is very different from the way lpd works. Ditto of xdm's UDP port. All remaining twelve programs had one thing in common: normally they would only be started by humans. Anything that does interaction with the outside world should either be very trivial. I therefore put them all into a directory that only those accounts that correspond to real users can access. among other things.uiuc. Programs like sudo provide other ways to control who may use what program. X's TCP port can be banished. Preferably it should be all of them. try to explain how it works. If an attacker breaks into a system account he cannot reach any suid root program.edu/pdq So I have my standards. but it's got the funniest web site of the lot. http and FTP software. As before.tam.a number of special group IDs controls who may access these. very well audited. dns. Many classic programs cannot be set up this way and should not be exposed to the public Internet. that's what documentation is for. The usual way it to create a special group for each class of suid programs you can identify and make each user a member of the groups needed. It's not particularly sophisticated. I've decided to switch to a little known print system called PDQ. http://feynman. or be sufficiently sandboxed that possible damage is limited. I won't go into detail on installing it. and of course Qmail One gruesome night of crawling through man pages. For six of the twelve I added extra requirements . 7 had a legitimate reason to be suid root (like su) while the other 5 needed to be suid root for practical reasons but there really should be a better way of doing this. . Suid programs can be made only accessible to those who need to use them. newsgroups. Examples are ping and Xwrapper. I will however. deeply hidden scripts and obscure configuration files reveals that in fact the only one not using port 6000 is the local user. Response Legal/investigative Documentation logs (records to keep from before/during/after the incident) Temp stuff djbDNS instead of BIND Use tcpserver to replace inetd netstat -an --inet netstat -nl --inet # netstat -ln dnscache There's replacements for.
Security Tools Nessus NetCat TCPDump Snort Saint Ethereal Whisker Internet Security Scanner PortSentry Sniff TripWire Cybercop Scanner HPing 2 Security Auditor's Research Assistant (SARA) Sniff It SATAN IP Filter IP Tables Firewalk Strobe L0pht Crack John The Ripper Hunt OpenSSH TCP Wrappers nTop ping/traceroute/telnet NetBIOS Auditing Tool Scanlogd Sam Spade NFR logcheck Perl Ngrep (Network monitoring with ngrep) Cheops Vetescan Retina Crack/Libcrack Cerberus Internet Scanner Swatch Nemesis LSOF Lids IPTraf IPLog FragRouter Queso Top .
Lcrzoex mscan and sscan from Jsbach ADMhack Osiris host integrity monitoring Samhain integrity monitoring Automate Linux Configuration with cfengine By Carla Schroder Nagios ("Nagios is an open source host.0 by Thomas Stocking) Secure remote file management with sshfs by StoneLion . service and network monitoring program". Nagios 2.