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Consider your entire organization
When considering security, the best way to avoid obvious breaches of security is to capture the big picture of your installation. Practically, this means that you should work from the outside in, ie. consider security of the building and area, then the actual offices, followed by the network infrastructure, and end with hosts themselves. It's a bit pointless to spend a lot of time securing hosts if anyone can walk into the server room and walk out with a host under each arm. Those things do happen. This is all the more important since most of computer crime is perpetrated by insiders, for obvious ease of action and lack of interest to hackers about the average corporate data. Because it is more exciting to most system administrators, computer books usually concentrate on securing hosts, but sound computer security doesn't deal with just individual computers. You must consider your entire organization.
Prepare for disaster
Generally speaking, check for any single point of failures in your environment, and provide backup solutions. Perform dry runs regularly to make sure everyone knows what to do in case of a breakdown. Post-incident plans must be updated whenever any change is made to your site, and as much as possible, everyone, especially MIS personnel, must be capable of performing the procedures. Plans should also include procedures to solve day-to-day MIS activities, like installing a new host, welcoming a new employee, etc. Also, whenever possible, use fail-safe tools, ie. should the device fail, they should refuse access instead of letting people in. A firewall is not the magic bullet to securing a site. Generally speaking, try to place as many barriers as possible between valued asset and a potential adversary, without this security being too invasive to employees. Remember that an effective security policy requires that every single employee abide by it, and not just the rank-and-files. The more prepared you are to handle break-ins and disasters, the better for the image of the company and the MIS team. In addition, your company may be held responsible legally if your network was used by hackers to launch attacks on other sites. You might want to hire an outside company to test your security at random times.
A usage policy is an important user-oriented document, not just to cover your ass in case someone in your organization steals information that is off-limit for them, but also because it forces you to think about how your organization works from an MIS point of view.
A security policy is more MIS-oriented than the user policy, and its goal is to offer a big picture view of security of your organization.
Keep in touch with local police authorities about robberies in your area, as thieves are likely to keep using a tactic if it proved successful in a location (eg. burglars pretending to be couriers and stealing unattended portable PCs.) Update this list accordingly, and warn users about those new risks. Also, check with authorities what the regulations are about setting up an alarm system at your site, and whether it can be set up to call up the police automatically when the alarm goes off.
Doors and windows
All entrances must be equipped with secure locking devices that cannot be circumvented (key locks, dead bolts, cipher locks, etc.), and hinge pings that are spotwelded or otherwise protected Doors must be constructed of sturdy material (steel, solid core wood), must not exceed the number for safe and efficient operation, and must always be secured when not in active use All ventilators or other possible means of entrance must be covered with steel bars or wire mesh grill All windows must be securely fastened from the inside. Windows accessible from the ground or located on roofs must come with window/glass tamper or breakage protection features, and be protected by steel bars or grill Check that blinds and shades are available to hide valued items from the outside
Locks and keys
Set up security patrols at random hours during the day, and end-of-workday security checks Check with local police authorities if day- and night-time patrols are scheduled in the neighborhood Access control cards must be clearly different for company personnel and visitors Provide escort for visitors If multiple corporate sites, inter-connect security systems to increase monitoring of sites located in different time zones, and to make travel easier by providing only one electronic badge to each employee Only MIS personnel should have access to the server room Grant users access with the least amount of privilege required to accomplish their job, using user profiles to manage accounts more securily Check the log files created by the application running the electronic locks Set up a procedure to monitor use of all locks and keys. Update when necessary Keep tracks of keys issued, with their number and identification, for both master keys and duplicate keys Keep records of use and turn-in of keys, and check locks quarterly Change locks immediately upon loss or theft of keys If used, master keys must be devoid of marking identifying them as such Only issue keys to authorized employees. Other must use an electronic badge. Keys not in use must be secured in a locked, fireproof safe that is secured to prevent removal
When making duplicates of master keys, mark them "Do Not Duplicate" and obliterate manufacturer's serial numbers Any visitor, either a corporate employee from another site or an outside guest, must warn MIS of his/her visit as early as possible, so as to provide adequate security (ie. some guest might need to be allowed in areas that are off-limit to standard guests.) Employees from other sites and guests must provide the following information: Name, Location, Visit Start and End Dates, Arrival Time, Access Needs Greater than Week Day (7 AM - 7 PM), Buildings to be Visited (if known), Employee e-mail address, Name of manager, Point of Contact at local site MIS must be informed of loss of access control card ASAP so as to disable access and provide a new, safe badge Guests must return their visitor access control card upon leaving the premises MIS must conduct periodical security inspections, and report any problem so as to implement corrective action
Set up either television recording, burglar alarm, or intrusion alarm systems linked to off-site security team. Test them regularly Make sure the television system can record a minimum of four days Check that the alarm systems are backed up automatically, and have an alternate or independent source of power available to cut in and operate automatically
Provide adequate protective lighting for all areas Mark emergency routes clearly Write procedures for emergency evacuations (fire, bomb threats, etc.), and exercise plans regularly Train users in fire fighting Provide response to medical emergency (phone numbers to local medical facilities; first aid supplies) Provide electronic-friendly sprinklers in or over the data center/server rooms No possible leaks over computers, especially server room (water pipes, sprinklers, AC units) Alarm systems must be tamper- , and weather resistant Provide security personnel trained in physical security Set up procedure to respond to alarms, including night-time and week-ends The monitoring system must provide sufficient information to investigate any breakin, and remedy Check that fake floors and ceilings cannot be used for break-ins Check that fire extinguishers and other fire fighting equipment are in sufficient number, that they match the type of fire they would be used to put off, and that they're properly secured on walls (no extinguisher lying around)
Install air conditioning to keep hosts (and users :-) cool, at least in the server room Have someone come in at least once a year to maintain AC units
Set up thermometers linked to monitoring software to check the temperature in the server room, and have it page/call or send e-mail if temperature rises In a large site, use a naming convention for rooms (eg. country names, etc.) and a cabling management software to make sure everyone understands which room and which plugs you mean Use asset management software to assure strict accountability of all company assets In highly-sensitive locations, make sure guests are either restricted to safe areas, escorted at all times, and that their bags are checked when they depart (Welcome to Intel :-) Consider printing sensitive information on easily identifiable paper (eg. yellow, orange, or red paper, depending on its importance), and forbid employees to go offsite with top sensitive documents Guests must sign a log when they visit, and register their laptop computers and camera (manufacturer and serial #.) Make sure there's always personnel available to watch entrances, and that they can call security and send an immediate message to everyone in the building should someone try to walk into the office unauthorized (especially important during lunchhour and late at night) Make sure video cameras connected to VCRs are pointing at all exits to help police authorities investigate break-ins
Monitor your WAN links through MRTG, and your LAN through netstat -i (watch for the collision/outpackets, outerrs/outpackets, and inerrs/inpackets ratio) Use proxy servers to control use of bandwidth and to hide information about your private network Set up an alternate, anonymous connection to the Net to let users find information for yet-unannounced products, as the competition could use this information to tell what your company is working on Run monitoring software like Linux-based Netwatch to keep a eye on the use of network bandwitdth, especially on what servers on the Internet users are connecting. Install an intrusion detection server on all servers, both in the DMZ and in the internal network, and do not ignore traffic coming from your internal network. Consider putting a sensor both on your public routers and firewalls so as to be warned of any suspicious traffic (Unix) Do not run NIS if you can avoid it, or consider NIS+. Consider centralized authentication systems like Kerberos, or Samba Have agents run on all servers, so as to keep an eye on log files, disk space, etc. They could consist in Perl or Python scripts, as those have been ported to different environments and offer a rich amount of modules that avoid your reinventing the wheel If you discover that some hosts have been hacked, and you'd like to get in contact with people on remote sites (eg. a host from which the hacker seems to have connected, or MIS personnel at other corporate sites, etc.) to try to catch him redhanded, either use the phone, set up a brand new mail server, or use encrypted e-mails through PGP/GnuPG, as the hacker may have set up tools to snoop on your network, and be warned of your plans.
or the mail server just crashed). SSH. consider encrypting data. or foreign sites on the Internet. S-HTTP/HTTPS. as breaches of security there could easily end up jeopardizing your own site Remember that any unsecure host on your network can be used to launch an attack on other resources.) and safes that are not meant to protect magnetic media If resorting to a courier solution. a suspicious individual is in the building. Remind users that downloading binaries is either forbidden by corporate policy. and stop using tapes that show too many access errors As backup jobs use a lot of bandwidth. This can be done at different network levels (magic words are SSL/SSLey. or check how long it would take to be provided with new or temporary equipment by a commercial supplier or other corporate sites If your site is connected to remote sites through alternative links besides the Internet. As the Melissa and ILOVEYOU viruses have shown. on other corporate sites connected through WAN. Add an IDB (ISDN Dial Backup) unit to your routers that goes up should your permanent connection go down. etc. especially the one flowing on public LANs. Abacus/Port Sentry) Backup/restore Keep a current backup of all data files that your company cannot afford losing after a computer goes south Keep an ad hoc step-by-step restore procedure current. If not. monitors.) Run a live messaging application on all hosts (eg. should be scheduled at night to make the most of the corporate link to the Net. whether they are located on your LAN. L2TP/PPTP/PoPToP. and perform regular restores on bare-metal systems at a remote site to prepare to see your location ruined by a fire or flood Do not keep the latest backup tapes in the location. unprotected by firewalls. Unplug any unused . Could be used to set up a host to sniff passwords. In case your site is ruined by a fire. APOP. Used a dynamic firewall (eg. a flood. if possible. STelnet. washing machines. IPSec/CIPE. as you'll need them after a fire or flood. etc. Watch out for magnets (heated car seats. or. Some PBXs lets you use the loudspeaker of digital phones as a PA system. proxy servers. S/MIME. Set up some hosts loaded with anti-virus software and that can be easily removed from the network to test software downloaded from the Net. VPN. PGP/GnuPG. consider setting up a SAN instead LAN Check if you really need walk-up network connections. unused network plug. WinPopup or ICQ) to reduce work disruption while allowing for broadcasts when needed (ie. leave them in a magnetic media-friendly safe at a nearby bank. or physical break-in. either provide a fully-equiped temporary location. Test it regularly. no rogue. Encourage users to p Encrypt all network traffic. Either take them home every night. security is only as strong as its weakest link. update it every time you change the configuration of a host. make sure those sites also keep an eye on security. Make sure you can decrypt tapes on a bare-metal system after your site has been damaged Perform frequent restores of a few files to check that the backups actually work Remember to clean drive heads regularly. or have a courier pick them up at night.
net) All incoming connections from on-the-road employees through the Internet must use SSH and related tools to ensure encryption Check ACLs on routers and firewalls. your network can be endangered by UDP or ICMP packets.att. smart cards.x. ie.x. If possible. so present less risk of breaking down. 192. 174.los-angeles-63-64rs. and set up DHCP server to not give out IP addresses to unauthorized hosts. and are less likely to run other software besides the firewall part. digital certificates. A context-based firewall is much more secure. network connection on the patch panel. if only one host is connected to a given port) Assign descriptive host names in the DNS to make logs more meaningful (eg. especially for UDP-based applications (Three basic types of firewalls: network-level (screening routers). stateful firewall instead. and only open those you really need and understand. Start by closing all services. filtering routers. one-time passwords (PAP/CHAP. hence less security risk. Use SNMP-capable switches to monitor network use Use bandwidth control tools like Packeteer to prevent denial of service by programs gone haywire Prefer stand-alone firewalls like Cisco PIX over PCs. NDS. smart card or finger-print based systems Routers . application-level (proxy servers). or even biometric devices .x) Set up routers and firewalls to log infos to the same central host running syslogd that other hosts are using Do not just rely on ACLs on routers. Cisco PIX) ) As IPChains is not stateful. Consider using a Radius or Tacac authentication server to centralize the task of authentication users.dial-access.168.Switches Run Antisniff to try to see if a host is sniffing the network Run tools like Nessus to check what your firewall and routers can withstand (eg. and circuit-level firewalls (eg. consider limiting it to a restricted local LAN connected to the rest of the network through a firewall + bastion host to limit access only to limited services. If you do need such access. S/Key. They have fewer moving parts (cooling fans are just about the only mechanical part). Especially remember to disable telnet access from the Net. and PAM. time-limited tickets (Kerberos).). LDAP. crashing when receiving severely mangled packets) Check out reverse path filtering to prevent IP spoofing Set up hubs to forbid hub-mode on ports (ie. aim at using SSO (Single Sign-On) architecture to reduce the number of login/passwords used. keep an up-to-date list of unused network plugs. etc.Firewalls . and have a monitoring program warn you immediately when a connection goes up Check out authentication systems like challenge/response. hardware tokens. Generally speaking. Ban any packet coming from the Internet whose source address pertains to the private ranges (10. Besides Radius and Tacac. Kerberos.to hub-mode). Consider buying a stand-alone. Assign a MAC address to each port (ie. take a look at Samba. letting a host listen to all traffic by setting up the port it's connected to from switch.ca. 172-16/31. NIS.
if available RAS Add authentication for dial-out users. and Sygate's Personal Firewall. Zone Labs' ZoneAlarm. or both. Hosts Install a firewall on all hosts. and force a disconnect after the thirdto slow down automated password attacks..htm o WinNuke Test Page http://www. etc.com/resources/winnuke. Do not allow dial-out from an unauthenticated dial-in call If possible.) All RAS access must require login/password. including client hosts: Free solutions for Windows are Tiny Software's Tiny Personal Firewall. modems still connected to the POTS that everyone forgot about. and make sure modems cannot be reprogrammed remotely. Implement both proxies or packet filters. Evaluate different methods to hide your private network: masquerading. Once the firewall is set up on your network. Don't tell the user whether the username. use Permanent Virtual Circuits or Closed User Groups whenever possible.jtan. change default password/code Check daily logs if available.html . Modems should be reset to a standard configuration after each call Check that calls terminate cleanly. unbeknownst to MIS. packet filtering.com/default. transparent proxying and Fast NAT. Fight IP spoofing coming from your by not letting out any packet whose source address does not belong to your network PBX If your PBX can be configured remotely through a modem. modems inside PBX to allow for remote administration. You'd be surprised at the number of spyware applications sending out information to the Net without telling you.. automated connection on all the phone lines available at your site to check for rogue modems installed by users without noticing MIS) Set a short delay after the first and second failed logins. and call-back if available Log Caller ID information if available Maintain an up-to-date register of all your modem lines and conduct regular site checks for unauthorized modems (eg. run separate dial-in and dial-out modem spools Disable the use of the escape sequence +++ to switch to command mode. especially regarding outgoing calls (hackers using corporate phone system as relay) Set up security codes on all voice mailboxes. and that the server forces logout from all active sessions Check that no useless RAS access is available (users setting up a modem on their computer. the password. to force users to use proxying With switched technologies. test it regularly from the Internet: o HackerWacker o Shields-UP! http://grc. were incorrect.
Set up hosts to limit use of resources (eg.webtrends. im Auftrag des Datenschutzbeauftragten des Kantons Zuerich http://www.dslreports. Germany http://www.com/~kalish/ o Security-Port-Scanvon by NetScreen Technologies http://www2.securityspace.net/ o Personal Security Scanner .org/tools.com/content/security/cybercop.netfarmers.net/ Sygate http://scan. only root should be able to run echo "1" > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward) Require a password when booting in single-user mode Disable or restrict email relaying on your MTAs Run a cache DNS.com/ E-SOFT/SecuritySpace. so as to reduce the need for sending queries to a remote DNS.com/ o Browser-Check bei heise online (Germany) http://www.sygatetech.pl o Adiscon QuickCheck for Clients.com http://www.asp o Remote Security Tester by Ken Kalish http://www.html o myCIO.de/cgibin/index. Germany http://www.net/ o Quick-Test by sicher-surfen. Secure-Me/DSLreports http://www.com/smysecure/index.smartbotpro.html o QuickInspector for the Web by Shavlik Technologies http://security.de/SecurityCheck/default.conf) Keep compilers and packagers on a removable device to make it difficult for someone to compile and/or install packages (Unix) Consider using xinetd to replace inetd + TCPWrapper (Unix) Remove all unneeded aliases in /etc/aliases (eg.securityspace.com/smysecure/index.html o ibh . etc.sandboxsecurity. especially on your MTA.exchangeantivirus. and allow for backup in case of short interruptions Mount as many partitions in read-only as possible.html o Secure Design http://www.secure-me.htm o Sandbox Security Test Suite http://www.Ingenieurbuero Holger Heimann.com/SecurityTest/ o WebTrends http://www. games.com/scan/ddos/ddos.html o Online Trojan Port Scanner (Lockdown?) http://onlinescanner.heise.-) http://server142.com/securitytest/index. use the LIBSAFE set of libraries to protect binaries) Limit what kernel options can be changed while the server is up (eg.anti-trojan.net.shavlik.asp o Anti-Trojan.ita.whitehats.net/camera/ o Security Space https://secure1.com/pub/scan/ o Whitehats Free DDOS Testing Service http://dev. Germany http://www.de/ct/browsercheck/ o DLS Reports http://www.de.net/tools/security/scan.sdesign.netscreen.ch/cgibin/datenschutz/DSZ_test_start. use the noatime attribute in /etc/fstab.sybergen.com/products/prescan1. /etc/limits. Germany http://www. On Unix.) o o o .mycio. patch the Linux kernel.sicher-surfen.mycgiserver. Swizerland.com/ o Sybergen Online-Security-Check http://www.com/secureme_go Protect against buffer overflows (StackGuard.itsec.com http://www.de/vulchk.pl o The Apostols http://apostols.asp o Virtual Suicide http://suicide.hsr.html o Hochschule Rapperswil.
/etc/pam. " line in /etc/inittab (Unix) Chmod 0700 /etc/rc. to make it easier for users to recover files deleted by mistake.) and NOT through the pseudo-terminals over the network (eg. ~/. It's much safer that users who telnet into a host first log on as a regular user. eg.allow and hosts. although tools like nmap can determine the platform you are running in different ways Take advantage of TCP Wrapper's /etc/hosts. chattr +i /etc/inetd. and su to root. ttyp2. etc. ttyp1.. or avoid messing with them in the first place Take advantage of the extended attributes offered by the ext2fs to forbid changed to configuration files (eg.rhosts /root/. Use /etc/securetty to make sure that root can only log on through the console (eg. disable the use of EXPN and VRFY commands Considering disabling remote reboot/shutdown. names should not give away information on their platform or OS version. No rogue hosts: Decommission any host that is no longer being used Do NOT connect a new host to the network until it has been thoroughly secured. Start by denying all access in hosts. and hide which OS and version number is running. and change the group ownership to su accordingly (eg. tty1.deny. as this switch is logged.forward. for added security Do not run unneeded binaries that run as administrator (eg.netrc /etc/hosts. Disable services started up at boot-time by either deleting the symlink in /etc/rc. Make sure this tool does not run applications with shell escape. and have your monitoring tool check for such files every night Check for all world-writable/everyone files and directories.d/su) Create locked /root/.conf) Only use an administrator account when absolutely needed.bash_profile configuration file. and only allow specific access in hosts. Remove all unneeded user and group accounts On your mailer.allow .d. create locked ~/. It doesn't take long for hackers to locate such unsecure hosts. and have an e-mail sent to MIS so that you know who your reckless users are Disable command-line history log by adding HISTFILESIZE=0 in your local .. the DMZ in front of a firewall). etc. etc. or by changing the leading letter from S to s. Add legalese to /etc/issue to warn users.deny feature. thus granting a regular user admin rights . tty2. especially system configuration files Implement the undelete or chattr feature. Use safe names for hosts.d/* to keep users from checking out boot-time scripts Any failed attempt to connect should trigger an instant message (eg. if available on your system. ICQ) and e-mail Set up hosts to log users out or lock their screen after X minutes of no activity.d/init. and even then. and limit this function for console connections (Unix) Disable host reboot through CTRL-ALT-DEL by commenting out the "ca::ctrlaltdel:/sbin/shutdown. consider using tools that let you perform only limited tasks as administrator (eg. sudo). SUID/SGID in Unix).equiv files to avoid hackers from creating them (use touch followed by chmod 0) When creating a new user account.rhosts. especially if that host is connected to the public part of your network (ie. Use the wheel group to specify who is allowed to su to root.d/rcX.).
no boot from floppy drive. and which version Once the host has all the packages you need. default rights (eg. no writable directories to avoid running bogus binaries upload by hackers. or check its configuration so that it does not return important information to remote sites Mail server: For added security.) On Unix hosts. /dev/*) Keep /tmp in its own partition Authentication .". check whether the UPS application can send the password over a wire.) Files exported through either NFS or Samba should be read-only as often as possible. set up program so run in chroot() to enhance security OS-permitting. be prepared to drive to the office in the middle of the night if power goes off at this inconvenient time. especially root's (ie. check the nifty utilities from Winternals. tamper-proof cable to secure host physically to server room. etc. booting with linux single in LILO. etc. and prohibit users from running applications from there Set limits to how much RAM and processes are available to average users When installing a new closed-source software program. /usr/bin/su instead of simply su) New files should be created with safe. no ". learn how to boot as administrator to reset the password (eg. get the habit of always using absolute pathnames to executables (eg. consider removing sensitive tools that could be taken advantage of by hackers (compilers. etc. no root access. thus preventing the host to reboot automatically after power resumes. consider using two hosts. either remove identd. Otherwise. Users might want to affix a tamper-proof picture of themselves on their laptop computer to reduce risk of theft In case you either lose the administrator password or it was changed by hackers. umask of 027 under Unix. umask of 022. build a host with different partitions on different hard disks. consider 077 for system configuration files) Check that access to devices is secure (eg. take advantage of package managers like RPM to make it easier to know what packages are installed. under Linux. one to send mail. run a tool that monitors sockets to check whether it's trying to upload information to the Internet. to enhance performance and security (so a rogue program or hacker filling up a hard disk and crashing this host) To install and upgrade programs.) When setting a password in the BIOS and using auto-shutdown UPS units (with autoreboot set in the BIOS when power returns). Check that your PATH is secure. unbeknownst to you Restrict physical access (BIOS password. Boot loaders like LILO can also be set to prompt users for a password before booting an OS. secure cases to unable access to jumper to reset passord.) When running as root. the other to receive mail Hard disk Use file quotas in user home directories Check that the default file permissions are safe (eg. and 077 for root) If available. For NT.
Display login banner with some legalese to warn hackers that those are not public resources. and contact their owner to check if they still need it. Anyone using this system consents to these terms. remove those of employees who have definitely left. disable their account. Sample seen on rootprompt: This computer system is for authorized users only. without choosing one that they used in the past (Linux and NT. do not use the same password for all newly-created accounts). test accounts whose password is easy to crack. If they don't. the activities of authorized users may also be monitored and recorded. When creating new user accounts. while authentication means checking that the user is indeed who he means he is (ie. secure. Make sure this banner does not give out any information on the host platform and version #. and unique password as default to make them safe (ie. ie. enter a password to prove this) Check if your system supports the use of ACLs such as SubDomain instead of the basic Unix owner-group-world system of authorization . After a waiting period. a connection to the SMTP port of a mail server should not tell you which MTA is running and its version) Run password cracking software regularly to check that users do not choose unsafe passwords. Individuals using this system without authority or in excess of their authority are subject to having all their activities on this system monitored and recorded or examined by any authorized person. Utmp is not fool-proof: it will not be updated if a user's shell crashes (hence the user will appear to be still logged on). and is a plain-text file. leaving your Unix system wide-open Authorization Authorization deals with controlling access to resources. make sure you do not delete the leading + sign in /etc/password. In the course of monitoring individuals improperly using the system or in the course of system maintenance. safe password (see appendix for how to choose a safe password) Disable all unused accounts. Any material so recorded may be disclosed as appropriate. and change the default to their own. and implement password aging to force them to change their password regularly Change all default passwords on applications you install. All users should use a personal account. offer this feature) Each month. to make logging easier. use a difficult. ie. or do not get back to you. as system personnel deem appropriate. do not use group accounts. for one. Take advantage of password aging to force users to change their password regularly. Remind employees to never write down their password. and use MD5 hashes instead of the crypt() function Consider password/account blocking after a predefined number of failed attempts to authenticate Do not create "Joe accounts". On *nix systems. if applicable. put users in a group instead All accounts should have a password If using NIS. NT: Do not set up unneeded trust relationships with other domains Remove all login information (eg. including law enforcement. Remove guest accounts. check for all unused accounts. use shadow passwords instead of relying on /etc/password.
pay special attention to any attempt to achieve a different security level by any user or process. and what the legal restrictions are about logging user personal information Services Keep two web servers: One in the public part of the LAN to contain files meant for the outside world. NT : Control Panel | Services). or rotation followed by periodic moving of old log files to permanent storage like CD-Rs in case you need to investigate a break-in in the future. hence the need for a lot of monitoring tools Choose the "that which is not explicitly permitted is denied" philosophy. /etc/inetd. changes in file lengths or dates (use Tripwire). suspicious probes. on a central host: one for critical information to be sent to you by e-mail and/or printed. new files with novel or strange file names. poor system performance. Maintain a skeptical attitude to determine if a service is truly needed or just a user's whim. Access should be limited to what a user could need to be doing on a host but not more Logging Things to watch for: system crashes and reboots. consider either compression. Disable any unneeded services running hosts (Unix: /etc/inettab. do not run the r-services (rlogin.accounting discrepancies.conf Check for process table attack and related types of denial of service attacks Take a look at Bastille Linux or Debian. or that give out information on your hosts and network . Check for unowned files regularly Use sudo or equivalent to allow restricted use of root access. Make sure passwords are not logged Check history log Monitor connections and log files Consider logging to different files. denial of service. attempts to write to system. and work from there. etc. Even safer is sending logs to a printer directly attached to each host to avoid sniffing. to host private. In log files. do not simply disable them by removing entries in start-up scripts and inet.conf. and furnished with enough paper. the other to the regular log file. rsh. new user accounts or high activity on a previously low usage account. data modification or deletion. unexplained. ie.) and fingerd. Uninstall any service/software that you do not need. tools that either do not require authentication to access resources. inability of a user to log in due to modifications of his/her account. suspicious browsing. Generally speaking. and check that passwords are not actually logged for anyone to read To avoid log files from using too much disk space. Another server in the private part. Do the same for FTP and e-mail Run host monitoring tools like WhatsUp to check services running on remote hosts. anomalies. preferably one that doesn't use a data buffer. should know before users if something is wrong on the network. etc. especially from anonymous/guest accounts. Remember to use a shredder before throwing out useless logs. especially if one of your hosts turns out to have been used by hackers as relay to launch attacks on other sites Check with lawyers how much data must be logged by auditing software. corporate resources (Search engines on the web can list all files on a weakly protected public web server). as they are more secure distributions Unless absolutely necessary.
Check that the BIOS of each host handles automatic reboot when power resumes. Telnet session. Security is only as strong as the weakest link in the chain.) Provide guest FTP access instead of anonymous access. DDoS. monitors. central host to avoid every user downloading the same update from the Net. each service should be running on a different machine whose only duty is to provide a specific service.) All access to resources should be authorized Scan for . and SYN Cookies). Beowulf Linux.equiv. etc. sniffing. active desynchronization. TCP spoofing. Monitor use of hard disk space to watch for warez Try to protect from human error. considering using Samba instead of NFS for ease of deployment and increased security Consider installing a bastion host to be the point of access of all connections to the Internet (the router should only allow outgoing connections originating from that host) Take a look at outgoing filters to control which sites users can access on the Internet.rhosts files in user home directories regularly. This helps to isolate intruders and limit potential harm. If this translates into too many servers. motherboards. As a better solution. TCP ACK storms. and document this as part of the security policy If possible. SYN flooding (solutions are Random Early Drop. web server).) Have spare hosts and spare parts ready (hard disks. hard disk status. and set the sticky bit of user home directories to 1 to forbid users from deleting this file. passive attacks. to check for open ports and other possible insecurities Famous attacks: TCP/IP sequence-number prediction. create an empty . IP-directed broadcast (pinq x. stealth scanning (through the FIN packet). and making sure that all hosts are regularly updated. install important services on secure hosts. TCP session hijacking.rhosts file owned by root and read-only to forbid users from creating one of their own. Provide backup hosts for major applications (e-mail. etc. A free solution for Windows hosts is AVG. Use a spare hard disk as home to FTP users to prevent hackers from crashing the host by uploading huge files. Ideally. early desynchronization. and delete them. SACK (Selective Acknowledgement). the main UPS sends an SNMP trap that can trigger all other hosts to shutdown. Trinux. services should be placed on hosts according to their security level (ie. high-availability systems (RAID 5 with hot-pluggable hard disks. Do not rely on a trusted-hosts architecture (/etc/hosts.forward files in case a hacker tried to reroute e-mail Use secure terminals (/etc/securetty) to force admins to first log in with their personal account and su to root To share directories and files from an Unix host. with automatic updates for a local. fans. a misconfigured host offering temporary degraded service Use UPS on all hosts that require them.255 with source address is a local address) Run anti-virus software on all hosts. etc. RAM. equiped with auto-shutdown and reboot. Nessus. Do the same thing for . but leave their host running to minimize wear due to frequent power-offs. and to back up their files at night .) Have users turn their monitor off to save power when leaving the office.) with a step-by-step procedure on replacing them Use BIOS system monitoring feature (temperature in case. eg. either stand-alone hosts. power supplies. Cops. and trivial services on trivial hosts. to minimize down time Run scanners like Satan.
do not allow anonymous hosts from getting an IP address. Norton utilities to make sure a hard disk really is blank and its contents unreadable. etc. Provide easy-to-use procedure to set up new hosts from secure images to avoid having users install new. When you want to check your machine. New or temporary hosts could use anonymous addresses from a DHCP pool DNS: Do not run dynamic DNS until a secure version is available. the more time you have to take care of tasks that only you can do as administrator. Educate users as much as possible. through a filesystem that supports automatic file encryption. Monitor use of DHCP leases. floppies. or destroy them. so as to have the exact same setup Before applying an update. Check for suspicious changes made to zone files. and run dnswalk to check for errors Keep that all software up to date. help desk application. teach users how to sign files through PGP/GnuPG Add corporate banner to all e-mails Do not just throw away outdated or broken equipments. The goal should be to reduce synchronous calls to emergencies that require an immediate response from MIS. internal numbers. clone its hard disk. take it off the network and boot off a fresh kernel (usually a read-only boot floppy is good for this) and then run Tripwire to check your files. Provide classes for all new employees on software used internally . The best way is to stop the host to be updated. CDs can still contain confidential data. Either keep those for possible use later. Use secure time server to keep all hosts in sync (especially important for timedependent applications like build machines. either manually through PGP/GnuPG. do not reveal the name of MIS personnel.) The more users can do themselves. tapes. as this can be used by hackers to learn about your network Information given in your NIC record for the domains you own: Make them as generic and minimal as possible (eg. source control applications. along with phone and fax numbers). Never install binaries for which you don't have the source code and didn't check that they come from a reliable source Data Consider encrypting data files. or groupware servers). Check that DST works and has no impact on applications (source control. Test upgrade on a test host to check that no application is broken in the process. Hard disks. groupware. Use toll-free phone numbers instead of actual.) DHCP: If applicable. through initial training and online knowledge databases (groupware. Run Tripwire or equivalent to monitor changes to system files. use MD5 or PGP to check that no hacker has tampered with it. Remember to run eg. Have it look up addresses from DNS and assign static addresses to known hosts.) This is especially important for theft-prone portables If confidentiality is not an issue but integrity is. unsecure hosts themselves Users/MIS Personnel Instruct marketing and sales people to check with MIS before publishing any information on company resources. and perform upgrade tests on the copy. or through applications that do this automatically (Lotus Notes.
along with heads of departments. Check password aging. check how safe the political and economic situation is. Keep on. Remind MIS personnel to take advantage of groupware application to document procedures. printers. or downloading offensive JPGs. access control card to the premises if applicable. contacts.and Out-Processing .). and works on system-oriented tasks the rest of the time) Reduce inter-dependencies and specialization to a minimum. adding support for virtual domains in sendmail.Employee In. organize a balanced work schedule (eg. online dictionaries abound on the Internet. Require users to change their password regularly. Check that they do not re-use an older password Before leaving for any trip. which makes it all the easier for hackers to crack passwords.) Remind users not to write down their password. masquerading. phone adapters. Use shredders for sensitive data Provide a computer use policy so that users know what they can and cannot do with their computer (eg. posting corporate information in newsgroups.) When traveling in groups. etc. and keeps MIS personnel from working on longer-term projects. Have them use passphrases instead. etc. etc. etc. or on-site if visitors are around. etc. fax machines. so you know how to reach them at any time Check purchase requests from employees for any unsafe choices Tell users not to share accounts. pay attention not to give out confidential information on either the company or its computer infrastucture. and feedback to management on MIS activity and the type of problems that occur most often As answering synchronous calls is stressful and boring. checking trivial web sites or newsgroups.and off-line list of MIS employees.) Consider setting up a bogus domain name to hide connections from your site (eg. All interventions should be logged in the help desk application. and ask for a personal account if they need one Check with management if users should be allowed to post to newsgroups from their corporate account If MIS personnel need to ask technical questions to newsgroups that could be used by hackers to break into their site. use a private ISP account for this to hide the origin of the article (eg. employees should not all fly on the same plane When off-site. This is especially important when posting to newsgroups or inquiring about competitors Watch out for hackers resorting to social engineering to find information (pretending to be with MIS and calling someone in the company to have them change their password. so as to provide history to users and MIS.) Check that acronym-based passphrases are used instead of passwords (eg. and that you have all the required equipment (PC Card and cable. or in trash cans. transformers. etc. tips. w45hatgtg "where 45 have all the good times gone" instead of an actual word. Walls have ears Check appendices in this document on steps for hiring and firing personnel Appendix A . such and such employee answers calls only at certain hours or certains days. Make sure all MIS personnel is able to take over someone else's job at short notice. installing softwares downloaded from the Net or found in magazines.) Do not leave sensitive documentation on desks. Dejanews. as they're easy to remember and much more secure than regular passwords.
Add account to list. E-mail: Set up automated answer for incoming mails. How is an address bound to a NIC . Different standards of routing protocols TCP/IP : What form does an IP address take . FDDI. and communicate login/password.130. provide access control card Employee Out-Processing 1. Remove user from all mailing lists and backup jobs 3. Tell user to change passwords immediately. backup. Update caller ID and SPID in PBX 5. and burn CDs or save to tapes before reconditioning hosts 4.Employee In-Processing 1.MIS Personnel Hiring Test WAN Difference between a repeater. NT computer. explaining that the employee has left and can be reached at such and such phone # or e-mail address 6. Check with manager or co-workers whether some files should be backed up from employee's workstations.0/24. What are class and classless IP addresses . Remove employee picture from mug-sheet. in case the employee can be expected to return in a short while. should not be allowed in in the premises without an escort Appendix B . How would you use it to set up 2 networks of your own ? Differences between TCP/IP and Netbeui Explain what the following terms mean: ATM. Create various accounts (NT user. phone directory. What are private IP addresses . a router. Hand out documentation on resources available onsite (Phone-HOWTO. Make sure security knows that this employee is no longer with the company. etc. VPN. xDSL. and Caller ID 8.). and choose solid passwords per instructions in user guide 2.) 6. change them 5. SMB/CIFS RAS . Unix e-mail. as employee could continue receiving individual corporate e-mails after leaving the company 7. update mug-sheet and organization chart. X25. Do NOT forward e-mails to a new address. Add phone # to online phone list 4. NFS. a bridge. cable modem. unless OKed by management.46. etc. Disabling is better than deleting. Add IP address in DHCP and DNS 3. NIS. ISDN. personal or ex-customers). Lotus Notes. Take picture. Remove hosts from backup selection list 9. If admin passwords were known by employee. What is sub-netting Your ISP grants your site class C IP network address 207. and. except corporate and known mailing lists (eg. Disable all accounts (including RAS) immediately before employee is leaving or is told of his dismissal (disgruntled employees and the like are the most common problem of internal threats). Frame-relay. FTP. and remember to delete them after a given period of time in case the employee is not to return 2.
either random. V42bis. Example of some basic modem AT commands ? LAN Difference between a hub and a switch ? Maximum number of 10BT hubs that can be linked together using regular plugs ? Name different LAN architectures available Name of the different layers that constitute the OSI/ISO and TCP/IP models Difference between TCP and UDP ? Some well-known port numbers ? What settings does a TCP/IP host need to connect to a LAN ? Name major NOS Different ways to protect a LAN from outside hacking ? Wiring How many wires are required for 10BT wiring ? For 100BTX ? For 100BT4 ? What do UTP and STP stand for ? When is it necessary to use either one ? What are straight-through and cross-over cables ? PBX How many wires are required to plug an analog phone into a PBX ? An ISDN phone ? What's SPID (French : SDA) ? Approximate voltage level of a RING signal ? Backup Name different mass-storage devices currently in use. Explain what the following terms mean: RS-232. BBS. V34. and RAID 5 ? Hardware Name different manufacturers of microprocessors Different models of the Intel family Different types of RAM How many devices can be connected onto an IDE bus ? SCSI : Speeds.or sequentialaccess. RAID1. BBS. and type of connectors . and what is it for ? What frequency should you choose so that the picture displayed by a monitor doesn't flicker ? . ZModem. SLIP/PPP. How many devices can be connected onto a single SCSI bus . V42. X2/K56Flex/V90. black-listing. Things to watch for before connecting a new device onto a SCSI bus How many primary partitions does a hard-disk support ? How many cylinders should a hard-disk contain to avoir problems when booting an OS from one of the partitions ? What does MBR stand for. each with its rough storage capacity What's the difference between an incremental and differential backup job ? What's the difference between RAID 0. Kermit. call-back.
LDAP ? What is the difference between POP and IMAP ? What is Lotus Notes ? What is currently its strong point as compared to Microsoft Exchange ? What is ASCII ? Unicode ? What is a DLL ? What does client/server mean ? Alternative ? What do the following terms mean : DDE. COM. BootP. tripwire. IMAP. VBX.500. ping. DNS. OLE. Corba ? What do the following terms mean : Java. Kerberos ? What are run-levels ? When should you use inet. and when should you use them ? How do you add a new user account into a Linux server ? How to you set a new password for it ? What should you change to unable users to login. POP. ActiveX. tcpdump. What is the CPU/bus ratio ? Software Name some major OS's What do the following terms mean : SNMP. netstat. sniffing. and when should you use them ? What is Samba ? Can it be used as a DC ? On a DNS server. INND. NIS/NIS+. how do you set an alias for a host ? How does a DHCP server work ? What are Telnet. and symbolic links ? How does an X server work ? NT What are the different release numbers of NT ? What is the difference between a workgroup and an NT domain ? What is a DC ? What is Active Directory? What are the benefits to move to AD? . and only access a Linux server for e-mail ? What is a shadow password ? What do SUID/SGID mean. main Linux distributions What is POSIX ? What is the point of building a new kernel ? What are modules. What are hard links. X. FTP. so that a user is presented with a GUI to log in on a Linux server ? What is an i-node ? Name different file systems supported by Linux.d over RC scripts ? How do you set things up. DCOM. nslookup. netwatch. OCX? Name different file systems available on Microsoft platforms What is the difference between FAT and FAT32 ? Name major DBMS vendors Unix/Linux Name the two original Unix branches Name the major current flavors of Unix Name the current. DHCP.
name resolution. and restore this image onto a new PC ? How can you upgrade a stand-alone NT host into a DC ? Is FAT32 supported by NT 4 ? What's an ERD ? What is a trust relationship ? What is an NT service ? Where are user or application parameters saved in Windows 9x and NT ? Development (Proficiency in VB. jdoe@yaPLEASEREMOVETHISTOMAILMEhoo. Do not use your actual e-mail address when posting to newsgroups or mailing lists. etc. etc. If you need to connect to a remote site. do not answer and ask IT to investigate Contact MIS in case of any malicious and threatening telephone calls.com Do not install a modem to your host. and ask applicant about their use Appendix C . information on corporate infrastructure. Python.). Office macros) English Aural comprehension: TOEFL tape riting proficiency: TOEFL MCQs Reading comprehension: TOEFL MCQs Miscellaneous Check applicant's location. broadcasts. and commute time If possible perform assessment test: Fill a box with different hardware (NIC. Disguise your e-mail address. What do the following terms mean : NetBios. DOS batch files. etc. LMHOSTS. PearlPerl. transportation means. including wireless. e-mail. either use the legitimate corporate connection. eg. your home page). and do not post your address in any web page accessible from the Internet (eg. Spammers can easily build themselves mailing lists by scanning such material. Contact MIS if your mailbox is filled with it.). Visual Test. HOSTS . can be tapped.) Do not answer any SPAM e-mails. master browser ? What is an SID ? What happens if you clone the partition of an NT host currently connected to the network. C/C++.User Policy Read the corporate computer use policy If you receive an e-mail or an instant message asking you to update the password of any of your accounts (NT. Use one-time passwords or tunneling to encrypt all data flow between corporate servers and your modem-equipped host . as this can be used by spammers to confirm that an e-mail address is valid. WINS. DNS. or check with MIS if the remote site requires setting up an ad hoc connection Remember that telephone lines. video adapters. Be suspicious of any phone call asking for confidential information (your password.
determine what you are trying to protect it from (files being accessed or deleted or replaced. as they may still contain sensitive data (for instance.) Passwords: Instead of regular words.Security Policy The security policy to handle incidents should have the following sections: Goals and objectives. and review the process continuously and make improvements each time a weakness is found.). w45hatgtg "where 45 have all the good times gone" instead of an actual word. etc. at your hotel. with the right tools. identify what you are trying to protect (files.). Challenge any stranger not wearing an access control card. Before leaving for any trip. set up a password in the BIOS. online dictionaries abound on the Internet. use the site PA system if available If available. contact MIS whenever you detect a situation that you consider is or could be a security or safety incident Appendix D .). etc. etc. encrypt all sensitive files (e-mails. and is responsible for prohibiting use of to newsgroups and web sites that are not work-related. unauthorized programs being run. web sites) While on the road. phone adapters. As explained in RFC 2196. etc. implement measures which will protect your assets in a cost-effective manner. using your hosts as stepping stone to launch attacks to other sites. employees should not all fly on the same plane Generally speaking. and history of past incidents. post-mortem to improve security in the future. identification of the incident. When off-site. always secure it with a lock and cable when working in an office. leaving it at your feet in an airport. make sure the portable comes up with a visible tamper-proof corporate sticker to discourage theft MIS monitors network use.) Do NOT write down passwords. and that you have all the required equipment (PC Card and cable. and call MIS/security ASAP. determine how likely the threats are. disruption of service. Your e-mail and any file on your computer can also be monitored. or waiting for you through the metal detector. This channel also reduces synchronous interruptions to a minimum. etc. etc. check how safe the political and economic situation is. transformers. use acronym-based passphrases (eg. pay attention not to give out confidential information on either the company or its computer infrastucture. notification. or fax or copy machines. put your portable in a safe).) When traveling in groups. . If no one is available. in each area. Do not throw away computer equipment. access control card to the remote presmises if applicable.) Watch out for hackers resorting to social engineering to find information (pretending to be with MIS and calling someone in the company to have them change their password. Use a paper shredder before throwing out confidential data Do not run any software received through the mail or the Internet (e-mail attachments. Those contain answers to Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs). corporate reputation. or on-site if visitors are around. which makes it all the easier for hackers to crack passwords. data can still be read on a reformated hard drive. make the most of the corporate groupware or help desk application before calling up MIS. Walls have ears Do not leave confidential information lying on your desk. and bring it to MIS instead. handling. never leave a portable computer unattended (eg.
that it will remain so tomorrow. No security.Choosing a backup software Use encryption. can be achieved without dedicating significant resources. and does not deal with particular versions of softwares you might be running. Do not assume that because your whole site is secure today. and shell scripts are your friends. new breaches of security are found every single day.The basic goals of security are authentication. and you'll get monkeys. Finally. and who will be allowed to access them. In order to keep it as universal as possible and avoid having to update it too often.htm Tape Drive Roundup . and hence. Pay peanuts. For each service that will be provided. make sure you keep safe copies of your private key on a separate media) Temp stuff http://www. as the Bugtraq mailing list shows. very likely to be neglected. hardware. keep in mind that. Perl. To make matters worse. confidential information passed on to the competition.com/cgi-bin/printer. or the impact of the image or future of the company (break-ins. especially as technical and involved as handling day-to-day management of a computer infrastructure.linux-mag.dantz. and hire MIS employees with such coding skills. and denial of service. as e-mail-based virus are all it takes to bring down an entire organisation. nontechnical employees are those most likely to not upgrade to the latest anti-virus and launch any application or click on any e-mail attachement. and data integrity. whether it's the amount of work to re-create them (lost files). That money can be spent on software. availability. authorization. there is no way that anybody will be able to provide you with any acceptable level of security. take into account the knowledge required to use computers securely. but also very boring.com/15tape. if only because new software and upgrades often means new security flaws. Hence the need to keep abreast through mailing lists and web sites. or the wages of your staff. the cost of protecting assets should be less than the cost of their loss. especially if using a courier company to store tapes off-site Make sure you can restore encrypted tapes on a bare-metal host (eg. but if you don't take measures to provide these necessary resources. Applications (and their corresponding bugs and breaches of security) are updated constantly.pl?issue=200101&article=tape_drive . Performing such daily routine tasks is not only time-consuming. Appendix E . Threats include unauthorized access to resources and/or information. list who will provide and administer it. confidentiality. this document gives a list of general hints. Therefore.Which Tape Drive Is Best for Your Linux System? http://www. automate as many tasks as you can.com/ http://www.pctechguide.) Also. if using an RSAtype of encryption. so remember to check security-related mailing lists and web sites on a daily basis. Security is a state of mind. Needless to say. Python.
Aided by DLT. 25-50GB. when the head reaches the end of the tape.000 rpm and high tension conditions have been quelled by the success and reliability of solutions such as the Sony AIT-2 drive. That is. while the latter promises increased reliability. Linux. ext SCSI. using a series of tensioners. tape price.com/shared/printArticle?article=nc/1114/1114ws3 full. it drops down a row and switches direction. The main difference between the two is that a helical-scan drive pulls the tape out of the cartridge and.Workstation CastleWood ORB Int IDE $150 Int SCSI $160 Ext SCSI $180 USB $200 2. $150-600) DI30 (IDE) is Certified for Linux! ADR50 is Certified for Linux! ZIP QIC 120M floppy drive CD-R/CD-RW Server DAT 4mm (DDS) DAT 8mm (AIT) Jaz VXA DLT Exabyte Mammoth-2 Tandberg LTO Optical Magneto optical DVD Drive price. The former touts higher density and performance. Concerns about the tape stretching or snapping due to drum rotation speeds upward of 7. . The other difference is the way data is written to the tape. The stationary heads of the linear tape technology are what theoretically give linear-tape drives superior reliability.networkcomputing.html&pub=nwc Tape technology is broken into two major categories: helical tape and linear tape. standard recording format (can be accessed using non-proprietary software) The Emerging Tape Backup Market http://www. linear-scan drives have been winning the race with proven market success. wraps the tape around a rotating drum that contains the heads. Appendix F . Linear scan uses stationary heads and a less complex tapethreading method. $250-600) Mgf = Seagate TapeStor OnStream (15-30GB.Unix Security Checklist (from Practical Unix & Internet Security) Preface Reread your manuals and vendor documentation. TR5 (10-20GB. Helical scan writes data diagonally across the entire tape-simultaneously using multiple heads. int SCSI. USB). Linear scan writes data from front to back in a serpentine method.2GB tapes Travan TR4 (4-8GB $200-500). models (IDE.
' " Chapter 2: Policies and Guidelines Assess your environment. Ensure that all users know about good password management practices. or any part of your computer. Don't use your password as the password to another application such as a Multi-User Dungeon (MUD) game. again. Don't have different. . Do not write your account name or the name of the computer on the same piece of paper. Get management involved. Don't use your password on other computer systems under different administrative control. Pick passwords that are not so difficult to remember that you have to write them down. Perform a risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis. Ensure that authority is matched with responsibility. After you change your password. Do not attach your password to your terminal. nonobvious passwords. and resources available. Consider automatic generation or screening of passwords. If you must write down your password. or by using the telnet localbost command. Consider use of one-time passwords. Chapter 3: Users and Passwords Be sure that every person who uses your computer has his or her own account. less secure rules for top-evel management. Ensure that everything to be protected has an "owner. Set priorities for security and use. Never record passwords online or send them to another user via electronic mail. budget. Write a letter to your vendors indicating your interest and concem about (insufficient) sottware quality and security features. keyboard. Become familiar with your users' expectations and experience with UNIX. Mark your calendar for 6-12 months in the future to reread your manuals. Circulate it to all users. Schedule time to read them when they arrive. Pick strong." Work to educate your users on good security practice. don't make it obvious that what you have written is. or smart cards. Chapter 1: Introduction Order other appropriate references on security and computer crime. test it with the su command. in fact. don't forget it! After you change your password. Develop a positive security policy. What do you need to protect? What are you protecting against? Understand priorities. tokens. Be sure that every user's account has a password. Post a reminder above your computer or desk: "Security is not 'Me versus the Users' but 'All of Us versus Them. by trying to log in on another terminal. a password.
Use the compress command (or similar compression system) on files before encrypting them. Learn how to use message digests. Never use a login password as an encryption key. Choose encryption keys as you would a password. Think of how to protect especially sensitive files in the event that the root account is compromised. This protection includes use of removable media and encryption. 027 or 077). Never write SUID/SGID shell scripts. Groups. be sure that all your administrative actions actually scan all the files and directories on your system. and the Superuser Ensure that no two regular users are assigned or share the same account. Chapter 5: The UNIX Filesystem Learn about the useful options to your version of the Is command. or other appropriate log files on a regular basis for bad su attempts.Chapter 4: Users. Remember. learn how to use them. Consider contacting your legislators with your opinions on these laws. Avoid use of the root account for routine activities that can be done under a plain user ID.. /var/adm/sulog. Scan the files /var/adm/message. Obtain and install a message digest program (such as MD5). especially if they negatively impact your ability to protect your systems. the same UID. Determine if write. Periodically scan your system for SUID/SGID files. Never use rot13 as an encryption method to protect data. Set your umask to an appropriate value (e.. especially if it is more than 1024 bytes in length. and sale of cryptography. chmod. Restrict access to the su command. Disable SUID on disk partition mounts (local and remote) unless necessary. Never give any users. do not depend on ACLs to protect files on NFS partitions. however . If your system has "universes" or Context Dependent Files (CDFs). chown. If your system has ACLs. Scan for device files on your system. . consider superencrypting with Triple-DES. If you use the Data Encryption Standard (DES) algorithm for encryption. Chapter 6 Cryptography Learn about the restrictions your government places on the use. Think about how you can assign group IDs to promote appropriate sharing and protection without sharing accounts. Don't depend on the crypt command to protect anything particularly sensitive. Get in the habit of checking files based on this information.g. and chgrp operations on files clear the SUID/SGID bits on your system. or restrict the ability to su to user root su to the user's ID when investigating problem reports rather than exploring as user root.avoid obvious or easily guessed words or patterns. export. other than UUCP users. Check their ownership and permissions to ensure that they are reasonable.
Make at least every other backup onto a different tape to guard against media failure. Be certain that everything on your system is on your backups. Do not set up accounts that run single commands. and /etc/fstab). Try to restore a few files from your backup tapes on a regular basis.. Chapter 7: Backups Make regular backups. If you need to set up an account that can run only a few commands. Encrypt your backups.don't write it down. Ensure that access to your backup tapes during transport and storage is limited to authorized and trusted individuals. Do not set up a single account that is shared by a group of people. /etc/rc. Instead of logging into the root account. but escrow the keys in case you lose them. Remember to update your backup regimen whenever you update your system or change its configuration. system. . investigate doing backups across a network link to a "hot spare" site. because the tapes will eventually fail. log in to your own account and use su. Make periodic paper copies of important files. Do not reuse a backup tape too many times. Avoid proprietary encryption methods whose strengths are not known. put it in a shell file. When using software that accesses files directly rather than through the raw devices. Keep your backups under lock and key. Think about creating restricted filesystem accounts for special-purpose commands or users. /etc/passwd. Make sure to change the password of every "default" account that came with your UNIX. Try to completely rebuild your system from a set of backup tapes to be certain that your backup procedures are complete. Use the group ID mechanism instead. Protect your encryption key as you would your password . Consider obtaining a copy of the PGP software and making it available to your users. If your budget and needs are appropriate. Chapter 8: Defending Your Accounts Make sure that every account has a password. Use PGP to encrypt files and sensitive email.g. Do not create "default" or "guest" accounts for visitors. or store it online. Make paper copies of critical files for comparison or rebuilding your system (e. If possible. consider remounting the filesystems as read-only during backups to prevent changes to file access times. Make periodic archive backups of your entire system and keep them forever. Protect your encryption programs against tampering. and to create and check digital signatures on important files. use the rsh restricted shell. disable accounts like uucp and daemon so that people cannot use them to log into your system. Do not store your backups in the same room as your computer system: consider offsite backup storage.
If you export filesystems containing system programs. use them. if your vendor software allows it. you may wish to slighdy alter the algorithm used by crypt 0 to encrypt your password. modiflcation time. If your software does not support a shadow password file. Write a daily check script to check for unauthorized changes to files and system directories. Tell your users to use longer passwords. If your system does not have a shadow password file. Double check the protection attributes on system command and data files. you may wish to export these filesystems read-only. Put time/tty restrictions on login to accounts as appropriate. Otherwise. enable it. set your systems to require the root password when rebooting in singleuser mode. consider adding password screening or coaching software to assist your users in picking good passwords. as these people can use the su command to become the superuser (if applicable). Chapter 9. If your computer supports password aging. make sure that the file /etc/passwd cannot be read anonymously over the network via UUCP or TFTP. especially on accounts that may be used across a network link. enable it. If you have shadow password capability. . you can increase the number of encryption rounds from 25 to 200. consider asking your vendor when they will be supported in your version of UNIX. Make a checkdist listing the size. Consider cracking your own passwords periodically. If you are using a central mail server or firewall. Disable the accounts of people on extended vacations. contact the vendor and request that such support be added. but don't place much faith in results that show no passwords cracked. and on all ancestor directories. enable it. if present in your software. Disable dormant accounts on your computer. If possible. Consider using some form of one-time password or token-based authentication. consider the benefits of accountname aliasing. Monitor the format and contents of the /etc/passwd file. If your system supports the TCB/trusted path mechanism. mount disks read-only if they contain system software. to help prevent users from picking bad passwords. so that they cannot be modified by NFS clients. If possible. Do not declare network connections. If your system allows the use of a longer password than the standard crypt() uses. Establish a system by which accounts are always created with a fixed expiration date and must be renewed to be kept active. Enable password constraints. set a lifetime between one and six months.. If you have source code for your operating system. Consider using the Distributed Computing Environment (DCE) or Kerberos for any local network of single-user workstations. Keep copies of this checklist on removable media and use them to determine if any of your system files or programs have been modified. modems. Be careful who you put in the wheel group. and permissions of every program on your system. For example. on their directories. If you don't have them. Integrity Management If your system supports immutable files. or public terminals as "secure" in the /etc/default/loging or /etc/ttys files. You may wish to include cryptographic checksums in the lists.
Use this program on a regular basis. If you have backups of critical directories. If so. Set permissions on commands to prevent unauthorized alteration. Tripwire). craft your filters so that they exclude the things you don't want rather than pass only what you do want. Consider making all files on NFS-exported disks owned by user root. Chapter 11: Protecting Against Programmed Threats Be extremely careful about installing new software. Determine if there is an intrusion-detection and/or audit-reduction tool available to use with your C2 logs. Don't leave any bin or library directories writable by untrustworthy accounts. . This approach will ensure that you see all exceptional condition messages. Be aware that log file entries may be forged and misleading in the event of a carefully crafted attack. also have these messages logged to a special hardcopy printer and to another computer on your network. When installing new software. This review should include (if they exist on your system) loginlog. Be certain that the program and all its data files are stored on read-only media or protected with encryption (or both). Make sure that your log files are on your daily backups before they get reset. If you process your logs in an automated fashion. Make sure that your utmp file is not world writable. and others. Consider installing a simple cron task to save copies of the lastlog file to track logins. configure it so that all auth messages are logged to a special file. Review your specialized log files on a regular basis. Consider adding an automatic log monitor such as Swatch. Chapter 10: Auditing and Logging Consider installing a dedicated PC or other non-UNIX machine as a network log host. install it first on a noncritical system on which you can test it and observe any misbehavior or bugs. Evaluate whether C2 logging on your system is practical and appropriate. aculog. Never install binaries obtained from untrustworthy sources (like the Usenet). Turn on whatever accounting mechanism you may have that logs command usage. If you have syslog. Scan your system for any user home directories or dot files that are world writ-able or group writable. Consider runting rdist from a protected system on a regular basis to report changes.g. Make an offline list of every SUID and SGID file on your system. xferlog. install it. Be careful to protect your backup copies and comparison programs from potential attackers. Keep a paper log on a per-site and per-machine basis. you can use comparison checking to detect unauthorized modifications. Run last periodically to see who has been using the system. Run integrity checks on your system on a regular basis (see Chapter 9). Consider installing something to check message digests of files (e. sulog. If you can. Don't include nonstandard directories in your execution path. Have your users check the last login time each time they log in to make sure that nobody else is using their accounts..
Never have ". Watch for unauthorized modification to initialization files in any user or system account.exrc file. Never write or use SUID or SGID shell scripts unless you are a hoary UNIX wizard. .forward files. including editor start-up files. Place your computer systems where they will be protected in the event of earthquake. put sensors above the ceiling. Disable terminal answer-back. Periodically review configuration files for server programs (e. When running as the superuser. Periodically review mailer alias files for unauthorized changes. or structural failure. and drinking in your computer room or near computer equipment. Make sure that personnel know how to use all fire protection and suppression equipment. explosion. Have heat and smoke alarms in your computer room. Verify that any files run from the cron command files cannot be altered or replaced by unauthorized users. inetd. if possible. Keep your backups offsite. environment. too. Have water sensors installed above and below raised floors in your computer room.. etc. Periodically review all system start-up and configuration files for additions and changes. Don't use the vi or ex editors in a directory without first checking for a Trojan . If you have a raised floor. Make sure that any shared libraries are properly protected and that protections cannot be overridden. and disable the program if necessary. .) Check the security of your at program. Chapter 12: Physical Security Develop a physical security plan that includes a description of your assets. Determine who might have physical access to any of your resources under any circumstances. Install and regularly clean air filters in your computer room. call a FIRST response team or the vendor to confirm the instance before spreading any alarm. Make sure that the placement and nature of fire-suppression systems will not endanger personnel or equipment more than is necessary. Strictly prohibit smoking. install alarm sensors both above and below the floor." (the current directory) in your search path. perimeter. eating. If you have a dropped ceiling. If you suspect a network-based worm attack or a virus in widely circulated software. Review the use of these commands (and the shell) in all scripts executed by cron. get in the habit of typing full pathnames for commands. Train your users and operators about what to do when an alarm sounds.g.conf. and defenses. Check the placement and recharge status of fire extinguishers on a regular basis. Make sure that the devices used for backups are not world readable. Never have writ-able directories in your search path. Disable the automatic command execution feature in GNU Emacs. threats. Check the behavior of your xargs and find commands.
Provide comprehensive and appropriate training for all new personnel. If the position is extremely sensitive. Install filtered power and/or surge protectors for all your computer equip ment. Institute an ongoing user security-awareness program. Consider setting autologout on user accounts. and bolts to keep computer equipment from being carried away. and if it is legally allowable. Chapter 13: Personnel Security Conduct background checks of individuals being considered for sensitive positions. shredders. Never use programmable function keys on a terminal for login or password information. consider using a polygraph examination of the candidate. users should be required to take holiday and vacation leave regularly. Have disaster-recovery and business-continuation plans in place. Provide refresher training on a regular basis. Have temperature and humidity controls in your computer room. Check peripheral devices for local onboard storage that can lead to disclosure of information. Use bulk erasers. Have antistatic measures in place. Make sure that users in sensitive positions are not overloaded with work. Try to resolve potential problems before they become real problems. responsibility or stress on a frequent or regular basis. Examine them periodically. Protect all your network cables. and for personnel taking on new assignments. Consider installing an uninterruptible power supply. Consider encrypting all of your backups and offline storage. Avoid having glass walls or large windows in your computer room. In particular. Have applicants and contractors in sensitive positions obtain bonding. Physically protect your backups and test them periodically.. Do so with the permission of the applicants. or incinerators. Have recorders to monitor these values over time. Consider using fiber optic cable for networks. Lock and physically isolate your computers from public access. Protect power switches and fuses. and connectors from tampering. tie-downs. Beware of insects trying to "bug" your computers. even if compensated for the overload. . Make sure that staff have adequate time and resources to pursue continuing education opportunities. Have alarms associated with the systems to indicate if values get out of range. if appropriate.g. Sanitize media (e. Use locks. Encrypt sensitive data held on your systems. terminators. Store computer equipment and magnetic media away from building structural steel members that might conduct electricity after a lightning strike. tapes and disks) and printouts before disposal. Consider putting motion alarms or other protections in place to protect valuable equipment when personnel are not present. Have regular performance reviews and monitoring.
make sure that they are run with the UUCP UID but that they are owned by root. Make sure that no UUCP login has /usr/spooI/uucp/uucppublic for its home directory. make sure that access is properly ter minated and duties transferred. Consider using separate callout telephone lines with no dial-in capability for callback schemes. Consider use of encrypting modems with fixed keys to guard against unauthorized use or eavesdropping. If there are daily. readable only by the UUCP user. Do not install call forwarding on any of your incoming lines. UUCP Be sure that every UUCP login has a unique password. weekly. Monitor users in sensitive positions (without intruding on their privacy) for signs of excess stress or personal problems. Check permissions on all associated devices and configuration files. Log the numbers that call your system. Make sure that the ruusend command is not in your L. Make sure that incoming modems automatically hang up on an incoming call if the caller logs out or if the caller's login process gets killed. Make sure that /usr/lib/uucp/L. Set up a different UUCP login for every computer you cornmunicate with via UUCP. Only allow execution of commands by UUCP that are absolutely necessary. . Do not export UUCP files or commands on a writable NFS partition. Audit access to equipment and critical data. Make sure that the tip or cu programs automatically exit if the user gets logged out of the remote machine or if the telephone call is interrupted. Make sure that the files in the /usr/lib/uucp directories can't be read or written remotely or locally with the UUCP system. Make sure that outgoing modems hang up on the outgoing call if the tip or cu program is exited. Limit UUCP access to the smallest set of directories necessary. Apply policies of least privilege and separation of duties where applicable. Chapter 14: Thlephone Security Make sure that incoming modems automatically log out the user if the telephone call gets interrupted. Make sure that mail to the UUCP users gets sent to the system administrator. Physically protect the modems and phone lines. Consider making some or all of your UUCP connections use callback to initiate a connection. Consider getting CALLER*ID/ANI to trace incoming calls automatically. When any user leaves the organization. Consider getting leased lines and/or callback modems. Make sure that there is no way for the local user to reprogram the modem.cmds file (Version 2 UUCP). Disable third-party billing to your modem lines. Make sure that no user becomes irreplaceable. Chapter 15.sys or /usr/lib/uucp/Systems is mode 400. or monthly administrative scripts run by cron to clean up the UUCP system.
and usage of. consider installing the tcpwrapper program to better regulate and log access to your servers. uucp. Make sure that your version of the ftpd program is up to date. Do not depend on header information in news articles or email as they can be forged. Then. Disable UUCP over IP unless you need UUCP. Test your mailer to make sure that it will not deliver a file or execute a command that is encapsulated in an address. contact your vendor and ask when equivalent functionality will be provided as a standard feature in the vendors' systems. Disable or delete any uucpd daemon if you aren't using it. Do not depend on IP addresses or DNS information for authentication. don't have a copy of your real /etc/passwd as an ~ftp/etc/passwd. ensure that all UUCP users are listed in the /etc/ftpusers file. If your standard software does not offer this level of control. and bin. If the machine has an active FTP service. Make sure that all directory permissions and ownership on your ftp account are set correctly. Delete the "decode" alias in your aliases file. Examine carefully any other alias that delivers to a program or file. If your software allows. or to "tunnel" through external networks. TCP/IP Networks Consider lowAevel encryption mechanisms in enterprise networks. Make sure that your sendmail program will not deliver mail directly to a file Make sure that your sendmail program does not have a wizard's password set in the configuration file Limit the number of "trusted users" in your sendmail. Disable any unneeded network services. configure any "incoming" directories so that files dropped off cannot then be uploaded without operator intervention. Be sure that the UUCP control files are protected and cannot be read or modified using the UUCP program. The file should also contain the name of any other account that does not belonged to an actual human being. Consider disabling any services that provide nonessential information to outsiders that might enable them to gather information about your systems. your ftp account. Limit the commands which can be executed from offsite to those that are absolutely necessary. Chapter 16. You may wish to limit UUCP to the directory /usr/spool/uucppublic. or kill commands. Frequenfly scan the files in. Make sure that /etc/ftpusers contains at least the account names root. Only give UUCP access to the directories to which it needs access. If you support anonymous FTP. wiz. Remove all of the UUCP software and libraries if you aren't going to use them. Chapter 17: TCP/IP Services Routinely examine your inetd configuration file. .cf file Make sure that your version of the sendmail program does not support the debug.
Restrict access to your printing software via the /etc/hosts. Have an alias for every non-user account so that mail to any valid address gets delivered to a person and not to an unmodified mailbox. Consider not allowing users to have . use static routes where possible and practical. Be very cautious about installing MUDs. if possible. Disable or replace the finger service with something that provides less information. remove it. in . Make sure that all existing . Block SNMP connections from outside your organization. Tell your users about the information that the finger program makes available on the network Make sure that your finger program is more recent than November 5. Block NTP connections from outside your organization. Enable the best X11 authentication possible in your configuration (e..g.before an attacker does the same. If you have a plus sign (+) in your /etc/hosts. Block incoming RIP packets. Make sure that you have the most recent version of the software. Consider replacing sendmail with smap. If your X11 Server blocks on null connections. Set up your logindevperm or fbtab files to restrict permissions on frame buffers and devices. Disable zone transfers in your DNS.. doing this might introduce a vulnerability. or other servers.g.equiv file. Consider disabling SMTP commands such as VRFY and EXPN with settings in your sendmail configuration.rhosts files on your system. in such cases. 1988.) Make sure that TFTP access. Make sure that you are running the latest version of the nameserver software (e. Do not place usemames in your /etc/hosts. Secure RPC. bind) with all patches applied. Scan your network connections regularly with netstat.g. Use IP addresses instead of domain names in places where the practice makes sense (e. Make sure that all files used by the nameserver software are properly protected against tampering. Make sure that your version of the sendmail program is up to date. get an updated version. if this is possible on your system. or another more tractable network agent. and that. if enabled. and perhaps against reading by unauthorized users. Kerberos. . Configure your NNTP or INND server to restrict who can post articles or transfer Usenet news.rhosts files are protected to mode 600. Disable the rexd RPC service. If you are using POP or IMAP. with all published patches in place Make sure that the aliases file cannot be altered by unauthorized individuals. Routinely scan your system for suspicious.rhosts files).rhosts. Disable rexec service unless needed. Scan your network with tools such as SATAN and ISS to determine if you have uncorrected vulnerabilities . Consider running the authd daemon for all machines in the local net. "magic cookies") instead of using xhost. Make your list of trusted hosts as small as possible. is limited to a single directory containing boot files. (But beware that most implementations of trusted commands don't understand IP addresses in . configure your system to use APOP or Kerberos for authentication. IRCs.equiv file.lpd file. Disable UUCP over IP unless needed.rhosts files.
Configure your server to only allow CGI scripts from a particular directory under your control. Be aware of the potential risks posed by dependence on a limited number of thirdparty providers. Chapter 18: WWW Security Consider running any www server from a Macintosh platform instead of from a UNIX platform. or to only follow links that are owned by the same user that owns the destination of the link. If this feature is not present. Make sure that your version of ypbind only listens on privileged ports. understand its limitations. personal information). Make sure that there is no line beginning with a plus sign (+) in the passwd or group files on any NIS server. Use netgroups to restrict access to services. NIS+. Make sure that your version of portmapper does not do proxy forwarding.. and disconnect machines that do not really need to be connected. Become familiar with all the configuration options for the particular server you use. and set its options appropriately (and conservatively). configure the program so that it restricts which machines can send requests to your portmapper. Have it set to run as a nobody user unique to the WWW service. Prevent general access to the server log files. Put keylogout in your logout file if you are running secure RPC. enable encryption. Chapter 20: NFS Program your firewall and routers to block NFS packets. contact your vendor and ask when it will be supported. Consider making your www server chroot into a protected directory. and Kerberos Enable Kerberos or Secure RPC if possible. If you are transferring sensitive information over the WWW connection (e. Be extremely cautions about writing and installing CGI scripts or programs. including login. Disable automatic directory listings.g. Re-evaluate why you are connected to the network at all. Chapter 19: RPC. Monitor the logs and usage of your WWW service. (See the specific programming recommendations in the chapter. Set the server to not follow symbolic links. If your version of portmapper has a "securenets" feature.) Consider using taintperl as the implementation language. Do not mix WWW and FTP servers on the same machine in the same filesystem hierarchy. Use NIS+ in preference to MS. if possible. If you are using Kerberos. Do not run your server as user root. Limit or prohibit server-side includes. NIS. Make sure that there is an asterisk (*) in the password field of any line beginning with a plus sign (+) in both the passwd and group files of any NIS client. .
Chapter 21: Firewalls Keep in mind that firewalls should be used in addition to other security measure and not in place of them. Don't mount NFS directories across subnet boundaries. Never export a mounted partition on your system to an untrusted machine if the partition has any world. At the very least. Plan accordingly: periodically test your firewall and have defense in depth for that eventuality. (See the discussion in the chapter. Break your network up into small. Consider buying a commercially provided and configured firewall. use the secure option for NFS mounts. even if a firewall is interposed. Don't configure any machine to trust machines outside the local subnet. Configure your firewall/bastion hosts to remove all unnecessary services and utilities. Use NFS version 3. For instance. Mount partitions nodev. When possible. if available. if available. replicating disk on local machines may be a safer approach. Give serious thought to whether or not you really want all your systems to be connected to the rest of the world. put a screening router in place. Do not export filesystems to yourself! Do not use the root= option when exporting filesystems unless absolutely necessary. Monitor activity on the firewall regularly. Each subnet should have its own NIS server and netgroups domain. Monitor who is mounting your NFS partitions (but realize that you may not have a complete picture because of the stateless nature of NFS). Make sure that firewall machines have the highest level of logging.) . Mount partitions nosuid unless SUID access is absolutely necessary. if possible. independent subnets. Use fsirand on all partitions that are exported. and Usenet on closely guarded bastion hosts. and think about doing without. Reconsider why you want to use NFS. Use the netgroups mechanism to restrict the export of (and thus the ability to remotely mount) filesystems to a small set of local machines. Set root ownership on files and directories mounted remotely. Configure firewall machines without user accounts and program development utilities. in TCP mode. Do not export user home directories in a writable mode. Set the kemel portmon variable to ignore NFS requests from unprivileged ports. Make sure that user accounts have different passwords for machines on different subnets. using the access= or ro= options. Have a central mail machine with MX aliasing and name rewriting. rather than creating your own. Rerun the program periodically. Consider intemal firewalls as well as extemal firewalls. Keep in mind that firewalls can sometirnes fail.or group-writable directories. Export filesystems to a small set of hosts. Plan on centralizing services such as DNS. Use the most complete firewall you can afford and one that makes sense in your environment. Consider setting a policy of default deny for your firewall. email.
remember that the results retumed by this service are not completely trustworthy. Consider writing your own wrapper programs to provide extra control or logging for your local system. Carefully check backups and logs to determine if this is a single occurrence or is related to a set of incidents. and especially when writing software that needs extra privileges or trust. Consider installing the tcpwrapper program to restrict and log access to local network services. See the chapter text for specific . vmstat. don't panic! Start a diary and/or script file as soon as you discover or suspect a break-in. Don't test new software while running as root. Run hardcopies of files showing changes and tracing activity. Chapter 23: Writing Secure SUID and Network Programs Convey to your vendors your concem about sofiware quality in their products. etc. . Think about using chroot for privileged programs. Chapter 25: Denial of Service Attacks and Solutions If user quotas are available on your system. enable them. If a break-in occurs. Avoid storing or transmitting passwords in clear text in any application. Install a firewall to prevent network problems. Specifically. Run machine status-checking programs regularly to watch for unusual activity: ps. Be very cautious about generating and using "random" numbers. Configure appropriate process and user limits on your system. Consider installing the ident/authd service on your system to help track network access. Observe the 17 general rules presented in the chapter when writing any network server programs.Chapter 22: Wrappers and Proxies Consider installing the smap proxy in place of the sendmail program to receive mail over the network. Observe the 24 general rules presented in the chapter when writing any software. Initial and time-stamp these copies. consider making a dump of the system to backup media before correcting anything. Chapter 24: Discovering a Break-in Plan ahead: have response plans designed and rehearsed. Observe the 14 general rules presented in the chapter when writing any program that will be SUID or SGID. Note and timestamp everything you discover and do. be certain that you restore the system to a known.there is too much detail to list here. w. good state. Carefully examine the system after a break-in. If a break-in occurs. However.
Recommend a disinterested third party to act as an expert. etc. Put explicit copyright and/or proprietary property notices in code start-up screens and source code. Be aware of other liability concerns. Keep written records of your actions when investigating an incident. Monitor disk usage and encourage users to archive and delete old files. Make your users aware of the dangers of electronic harassment or defamation.. Also determine if you will be required to institute criminal or civil action to recover on your insurance. if possible. and sound files. Educate your users on polite methods of sharing system resources. Consult with your insurance carrier to determine if your insurance covers loss from break-ins. . Define. Consider investing in a network monitor appropriate for your network. Restrict access to cryptographic software from the network. Make sure that users understand copyright and license restrictions on commercial software. Restrict or prohibit access to material that could lead to legal difficulties. if you need it. trade secrets. Keep available an up4o-date paper list of low-level network addresses (e. pornographic material. Do not be unduly hesitant about reporting a computer crime and involving lawenforcement personnel. Keep your backups separate from your machine. Formally register copyrights on your locally developed code and databases. This includes copyrighted material. and other materials as you proceed. Consider joining security-related organizations. Time-stamp and initial media. Law Consult with your legal counsel to determine legal options and liability in the event of a security incident. in writing. request a signed statement by a judge requesting (or directing) your "expert" assistance. Chapter 26: Computer Security and US. Have a spare network connection available. Make certain that your legal counsel is consulted before you provide locally developed software to others outside your organization. printouts. Develop contingency plans and response plans in advance of difficulties. Make sure that you have appropriate swap space configured. Consider coupling this to provision of personal accounts with an independent service provider. Determine if your insurance covers business interruption during an investigation. Configure disk partitions to have sufficient inodes and storage. If called upon to help in an investigation. Include an explicit statement about the return of manuals. Run long-running tasks in the background. printouts. and other information upon user departure. Ethernet addresses). Develop contacts with your local law-enforcement personnel. Ensure good physical security for all network cables and connectors. Replace any "welcome" messages with warnings against unauthorized use. Have all users provide a signature noting their understanding of and agreement to such a statement. Prohibit or restrict access to Usenet from organizational machines. levels of user access and responsibility.g. setting the nice to a positive value. IP addresses. and machine names. images. Expand your professional training and contacts by attending security training sessions or conferences.
Chapter 27: "Who Do You Trust? Read the chapter.txt). net view /domain: mydomain. and add to your knowledge and experience. Explore professional opportunities that enable you to network with other professionals. remove all unneeded sws. vrfy/expn mysmtp. Make your vendor aware of your concerns about security.g RFC 1244 Policy for handling incidents: Overview (goal and objectives in handling the incident) Evalution (how serious is it?) Notification (who should be notified) . and the Internet. Buy another 1000 copies of this book for all your friends and acquaintances. attractive. Trust us on this. and fixig security bugs in a timely fashion. core dump. and incredibly popular. identd to get infos on a running process. close tcp 53 on firewall.net. world-writable files + dir. icmpquery & icmpush. Protest when vendors attempt to sell you products advertised with "hacker challenges" instead of more reliable proof of good design and testing. adequate testing. Develop a healthy sense of paranoia. and other resources that will help you stay current on threats and countermeasures. Under construction nslookup (ls -d acme. Appendix F: Organizations Learn more about security. Monitor newsgroups. Appendix C: UNIX Processes Understand how processes work on your system. > zone. host -lvt any acme. Understand why SUID/SGID files have those permissions.org/lasg. fping gping. traceroute -S -p53 x. don't run progs as root. The copies will make you intelligent. seifried. dll's. Appendix G: Table of IP Services Read the table and add your own site notes indicating the services you do and do not wish to support. modems. netcat. rogue phone plugs. strobe & udp-scan. tx alarm if nic set to promiscuous. Appendix B: Important Files Become familiar with the important files on your system. Explore other resources concerning security. mailing lists. Understand the commands that are available to manipulate processes on your system. UNIX.com. spread dial-in phone #s.
If an attacker breaks into a system account he cannot reach any suid root program. Suid programs can be made only accessible to those who need to use them.edu/pdq So I have my standards. I will however. The usual way it to create a special group for each class of suid programs you can identify and make each user a member of the groups needed. As before. http and FTP software. Response Legal/investigative Documentation logs (records to keep from before/during/after the incident) Temp stuff djbDNS instead of BIND Use tcpserver to replace inetd netstat -an --inet netstat -nl --inet # netstat -ln dnscache There's replacements for. On the local machine domain sockets are used. I've decided to switch to a little known print system called PDQ. if you just know how. Anything that does interaction with the outside world should either be very trivial. Preferably it should be all of them. and of course Qmail One gruesome night of crawling through man pages. It's not particularly sophisticated. 7 had a legitimate reason to be suid root (like su) while the other 5 needed to be suid root for practical reasons but there really should be a better way of doing this. X's TCP port can be banished.a number of special group IDs controls who may access these. Of the remaining 12. I won't go into detail on installing it. Examples are ping and Xwrapper.uiuc. among other things. http://feynman. Programs like sudo provide other ways to control who may use what program. No system account needs to use them. Many classic programs cannot be set up this way and should not be exposed to the public Internet. . Even better. Ditto of xdm's UDP port. since it is very different from the way lpd works. newsgroups. For six of the twelve I added extra requirements . but it's got the funniest web site of the lot. or be sufficiently sandboxed that possible damage is limited. dns. All remaining twelve programs had one thing in common: normally they would only be started by humans. very well audited. deeply hidden scripts and obscure configuration files reveals that in fact the only one not using port 6000 is the local user. I therefore put them all into a directory that only those accounts that correspond to real users can access. try to explain how it works. that's what documentation is for.tam.
Security Tools Nessus NetCat TCPDump Snort Saint Ethereal Whisker Internet Security Scanner PortSentry Sniff TripWire Cybercop Scanner HPing 2 Security Auditor's Research Assistant (SARA) Sniff It SATAN IP Filter IP Tables Firewalk Strobe L0pht Crack John The Ripper Hunt OpenSSH TCP Wrappers nTop ping/traceroute/telnet NetBIOS Auditing Tool Scanlogd Sam Spade NFR logcheck Perl Ngrep (Network monitoring with ngrep) Cheops Vetescan Retina Crack/Libcrack Cerberus Internet Scanner Swatch Nemesis LSOF Lids IPTraf IPLog FragRouter Queso Top .
Nagios 2.0 by Thomas Stocking) Secure remote file management with sshfs by StoneLion . service and network monitoring program". Lcrzoex mscan and sscan from Jsbach ADMhack Osiris host integrity monitoring Samhain integrity monitoring Automate Linux Configuration with cfengine By Carla Schroder Nagios ("Nagios is an open source host.