MIS Security Check-list

Consider your entire organization
When considering security, the best way to avoid obvious breaches of security is to capture the big picture of your installation. Practically, this means that you should work from the outside in, ie. consider security of the building and area, then the actual offices, followed by the network infrastructure, and end with hosts themselves. It's a bit pointless to spend a lot of time securing hosts if anyone can walk into the server room and walk out with a host under each arm. Those things do happen. This is all the more important since most of computer crime is perpetrated by insiders, for obvious ease of action and lack of interest to hackers about the average corporate data. Because it is more exciting to most system administrators, computer books usually concentrate on securing hosts, but sound computer security doesn't deal with just individual computers. You must consider your entire organization.

Prepare for disaster
Generally speaking, check for any single point of failures in your environment, and provide backup solutions. Perform dry runs regularly to make sure everyone knows what to do in case of a breakdown. Post-incident plans must be updated whenever any change is made to your site, and as much as possible, everyone, especially MIS personnel, must be capable of performing the procedures. Plans should also include procedures to solve day-to-day MIS activities, like installing a new host, welcoming a new employee, etc. Also, whenever possible, use fail-safe tools, ie. should the device fail, they should refuse access instead of letting people in. A firewall is not the magic bullet to securing a site. Generally speaking, try to place as many barriers as possible between valued asset and a potential adversary, without this security being too invasive to employees. Remember that an effective security policy requires that every single employee abide by it, and not just the rank-and-files. The more prepared you are to handle break-ins and disasters, the better for the image of the company and the MIS team. In addition, your company may be held responsible legally if your network was used by hackers to launch attacks on other sites. You might want to hire an outside company to test your security at random times.

Usage policy
A usage policy is an important user-oriented document, not just to cover your ass in case someone in your organization steals information that is off-limit for them, but also because it forces you to think about how your organization works from an MIS point of view.

Security policy
A security policy is more MIS-oriented than the user policy, and its goal is to offer a big picture view of security of your organization.

Keep in touch with local police authorities about robberies in your area, as thieves are likely to keep using a tactic if it proved successful in a location (eg. burglars pretending to be couriers and stealing unattended portable PCs.) Update this list accordingly, and warn users about those new risks. Also, check with authorities what the regulations are about setting up an alarm system at your site, and whether it can be set up to call up the police automatically when the alarm goes off.

Doors and windows

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All entrances must be equipped with secure locking devices that cannot be circumvented (key locks, dead bolts, cipher locks, etc.), and hinge pings that are spotwelded or otherwise protected Doors must be constructed of sturdy material (steel, solid core wood), must not exceed the number for safe and efficient operation, and must always be secured when not in active use All ventilators or other possible means of entrance must be covered with steel bars or wire mesh grill All windows must be securely fastened from the inside. Windows accessible from the ground or located on roofs must come with window/glass tamper or breakage protection features, and be protected by steel bars or grill Check that blinds and shades are available to hide valued items from the outside

Locks and keys
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Set up security patrols at random hours during the day, and end-of-workday security checks Check with local police authorities if day- and night-time patrols are scheduled in the neighborhood Access control cards must be clearly different for company personnel and visitors Provide escort for visitors If multiple corporate sites, inter-connect security systems to increase monitoring of sites located in different time zones, and to make travel easier by providing only one electronic badge to each employee Only MIS personnel should have access to the server room Grant users access with the least amount of privilege required to accomplish their job, using user profiles to manage accounts more securily Check the log files created by the application running the electronic locks Set up a procedure to monitor use of all locks and keys. Update when necessary Keep tracks of keys issued, with their number and identification, for both master keys and duplicate keys Keep records of use and turn-in of keys, and check locks quarterly Change locks immediately upon loss or theft of keys If used, master keys must be devoid of marking identifying them as such Only issue keys to authorized employees. Other must use an electronic badge. Keys not in use must be secured in a locked, fireproof safe that is secured to prevent removal

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When making duplicates of master keys, mark them "Do Not Duplicate" and obliterate manufacturer's serial numbers Any visitor, either a corporate employee from another site or an outside guest, must warn MIS of his/her visit as early as possible, so as to provide adequate security (ie. some guest might need to be allowed in areas that are off-limit to standard guests.) Employees from other sites and guests must provide the following information: Name, Location, Visit Start and End Dates, Arrival Time, Access Needs Greater than Week Day (7 AM - 7 PM), Buildings to be Visited (if known), Employee e-mail address, Name of manager, Point of Contact at local site MIS must be informed of loss of access control card ASAP so as to disable access and provide a new, safe badge Guests must return their visitor access control card upon leaving the premises MIS must conduct periodical security inspections, and report any problem so as to implement corrective action

Alarm System
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Set up either television recording, burglar alarm, or intrusion alarm systems linked to off-site security team. Test them regularly Make sure the television system can record a minimum of four days Check that the alarm systems are backed up automatically, and have an alternate or independent source of power available to cut in and operate automatically

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Provide adequate protective lighting for all areas Mark emergency routes clearly Write procedures for emergency evacuations (fire, bomb threats, etc.), and exercise plans regularly Train users in fire fighting Provide response to medical emergency (phone numbers to local medical facilities; first aid supplies) Provide electronic-friendly sprinklers in or over the data center/server rooms No possible leaks over computers, especially server room (water pipes, sprinklers, AC units) Alarm systems must be tamper- , and weather resistant Provide security personnel trained in physical security Set up procedure to respond to alarms, including night-time and week-ends The monitoring system must provide sufficient information to investigate any breakin, and remedy Check that fake floors and ceilings cannot be used for break-ins Check that fire extinguishers and other fire fighting equipment are in sufficient number, that they match the type of fire they would be used to put off, and that they're properly secured on walls (no extinguisher lying around)

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Install air conditioning to keep hosts (and users :-) cool, at least in the server room Have someone come in at least once a year to maintain AC units

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Set up thermometers linked to monitoring software to check the temperature in the server room, and have it page/call or send e-mail if temperature rises In a large site, use a naming convention for rooms (eg. country names, etc.) and a cabling management software to make sure everyone understands which room and which plugs you mean Use asset management software to assure strict accountability of all company assets In highly-sensitive locations, make sure guests are either restricted to safe areas, escorted at all times, and that their bags are checked when they depart (Welcome to Intel :-) Consider printing sensitive information on easily identifiable paper (eg. yellow, orange, or red paper, depending on its importance), and forbid employees to go offsite with top sensitive documents Guests must sign a log when they visit, and register their laptop computers and camera (manufacturer and serial #.) Make sure there's always personnel available to watch entrances, and that they can call security and send an immediate message to everyone in the building should someone try to walk into the office unauthorized (especially important during lunchhour and late at night) Make sure video cameras connected to VCRs are pointing at all exits to help police authorities investigate break-ins

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Monitor your WAN links through MRTG, and your LAN through netstat -i (watch for the collision/outpackets, outerrs/outpackets, and inerrs/inpackets ratio) Use proxy servers to control use of bandwidth and to hide information about your private network Set up an alternate, anonymous connection to the Net to let users find information for yet-unannounced products, as the competition could use this information to tell what your company is working on Run monitoring software like Linux-based Netwatch to keep a eye on the use of network bandwitdth, especially on what servers on the Internet users are connecting. Install an intrusion detection server on all servers, both in the DMZ and in the internal network, and do not ignore traffic coming from your internal network. Consider putting a sensor both on your public routers and firewalls so as to be warned of any suspicious traffic (Unix) Do not run NIS if you can avoid it, or consider NIS+. Consider centralized authentication systems like Kerberos, or Samba Have agents run on all servers, so as to keep an eye on log files, disk space, etc. They could consist in Perl or Python scripts, as those have been ported to different environments and offer a rich amount of modules that avoid your reinventing the wheel If you discover that some hosts have been hacked, and you'd like to get in contact with people on remote sites (eg. a host from which the hacker seems to have connected, or MIS personnel at other corporate sites, etc.) to try to catch him redhanded, either use the phone, set up a brand new mail server, or use encrypted e-mails through PGP/GnuPG, as the hacker may have set up tools to snoop on your network, and be warned of your plans.

unused network plug. or check how long it would take to be provided with new or temporary equipment by a commercial supplier or other corporate sites If your site is connected to remote sites through alternative links besides the Internet. especially the one flowing on public LANs. Test it regularly. if possible. whether they are located on your LAN. monitors. This can be done at different network levels (magic words are SSL/SSLey. APOP. as breaches of security there could easily end up jeopardizing your own site Remember that any unsecure host on your network can be used to launch an attack on other resources. consider encrypting data. WinPopup or ICQ) to reduce work disruption while allowing for broadcasts when needed (ie. Either take them home every night. should be scheduled at night to make the most of the corporate link to the Net. In case your site is ruined by a fire. L2TP/PPTP/PoPToP. SSH. If not. and perform regular restores on bare-metal systems at a remote site to prepare to see your location ruined by a fire or flood Do not keep the latest backup tapes in the location. Used a dynamic firewall (eg. washing machines. S-HTTP/HTTPS. a flood. on other corporate sites connected through WAN. or. Unplug any unused . IPSec/CIPE. Add an IDB (ISDN Dial Backup) unit to your routers that goes up should your permanent connection go down. leave them in a magnetic media-friendly safe at a nearby bank. STelnet. etc.) Run a live messaging application on all hosts (eg. or the mail server just crashed). a suspicious individual is in the building. Set up some hosts loaded with anti-virus software and that can be easily removed from the network to test software downloaded from the Net. As the Melissa and ILOVEYOU viruses have shown. Watch out for magnets (heated car seats. VPN. as you'll need them after a fire or flood. or foreign sites on the Internet. proxy servers. update it every time you change the configuration of a host. Abacus/Port Sentry) Backup/restore        Keep a current backup of all data files that your company cannot afford losing after a computer goes south Keep an ad hoc step-by-step restore procedure current.         Remind users that downloading binaries is either forbidden by corporate policy. Encourage users to p Encrypt all network traffic. security is only as strong as its weakest link. make sure those sites also keep an eye on security. PGP/GnuPG. consider setting up a SAN instead LAN  Check if you really need walk-up network connections.) and safes that are not meant to protect magnetic media If resorting to a courier solution. Some PBXs lets you use the loudspeaker of digital phones as a PA system. and stop using tapes that show too many access errors As backup jobs use a lot of bandwidth. no rogue. or have a courier pick them up at night. Could be used to set up a host to sniff passwords. unprotected by firewalls. Make sure you can decrypt tapes on a bare-metal system after your site has been damaged Perform frequent restores of a few files to check that the backups actually work Remember to clean drive heads regularly. or physical break-in. etc. S/MIME. either provide a fully-equiped temporary location.

If you do need such access. Generally speaking. and PAM. if only one host is connected to a given port) Assign descriptive host names in the DNS to make logs more meaningful (eg. aim at using SSO (Single Sign-On) architecture to reduce the number of login/passwords used. etc.los-angeles-63-64rs. and set up DHCP server to not give out IP addresses to unauthorized hosts. Start by closing all services.ca. stateful firewall instead. S/Key. Assign a MAC address to each port (ie. your network can be endangered by UDP or ICMP packets. crashing when receiving severely mangled packets) Check out reverse path filtering to prevent IP spoofing Set up hubs to forbid hub-mode on ports (ie. hence less security risk. letting a host listen to all traffic by setting up the port it's connected to from switch.Firewalls . and are less likely to run other software besides the firewall part. Use SNMP-capable switches to monitor network use Use bandwidth control tools like Packeteer to prevent denial of service by programs gone haywire Prefer stand-alone firewalls like Cisco PIX over PCs.x) Set up routers and firewalls to log infos to the same central host running syslogd that other hosts are using Do not just rely on ACLs on routers. keep an up-to-date list of unused network plugs. Kerberos. filtering routers. and circuit-level firewalls (eg. Consider buying a stand-alone. If possible.net) All incoming connections from on-the-road employees through the Internet must use SSH and related tools to ensure encryption Check ACLs on routers and firewalls.dial-access. especially for UDP-based applications (Three basic types of firewalls: network-level (screening routers).x. ie. Cisco PIX) ) As IPChains is not stateful.att. one-time passwords (PAP/CHAP. smart cards. Besides Radius and Tacac.Switches                Run Antisniff to try to see if a host is sniffing the network Run tools like Nessus to check what your firewall and routers can withstand (eg. network connection on the patch panel.x. smart card or finger-print based systems Routers . digital certificates.168. NIS.to hub-mode). NDS. They have fewer moving parts (cooling fans are just about the only mechanical part). Consider using a Radius or Tacac authentication server to centralize the task of authentication users. time-limited tickets (Kerberos). take a look at Samba.). consider limiting it to a restricted local LAN connected to the rest of the network through a firewall + bastion host to limit access only to limited services. 192. and have a monitoring program warn you immediately when a connection goes up Check out authentication systems like challenge/response. 172-16/31. and only open those you really need and understand. 174. A context-based firewall is much more secure. LDAP. or even biometric devices . application-level (proxy servers). Ban any packet coming from the Internet whose source address pertains to the private ranges (10. Especially remember to disable telnet access from the Net. hardware tokens. so present less risk of breaking down.

.com/default. You'd be surprised at the number of spyware applications sending out information to the Net without telling you. etc. unbeknownst to MIS. run separate dial-in and dial-out modem spools Disable the use of the escape sequence +++ to switch to command mode. modems inside PBX to allow for remote administration.html . change default password/code Check daily logs if available. and call-back if available Log Caller ID information if available Maintain an up-to-date register of all your modem lines and conduct regular site checks for unauthorized modems (eg. the password.   Evaluate different methods to hide your private network: masquerading. Hosts   Install a firewall on all hosts. packet filtering.) All RAS access must require login/password.jtan.. were incorrect. transparent proxying and Fast NAT. and Sygate's Personal Firewall. Fight IP spoofing coming from your by not letting out any packet whose source address does not belong to your network PBX    If your PBX can be configured remotely through a modem.com/resources/winnuke. Zone Labs' ZoneAlarm. use Permanent Virtual Circuits or Closed User Groups whenever possible. modems still connected to the POTS that everyone forgot about. and force a disconnect after the thirdto slow down automated password attacks. and that the server forces logout from all active sessions Check that no useless RAS access is available (users setting up a modem on their computer. including client hosts: Free solutions for Windows are Tiny Software's Tiny Personal Firewall. Implement both proxies or packet filters. if available RAS          Add authentication for dial-out users.htm o WinNuke Test Page http://www. or both. Once the firewall is set up on your network. Do not allow dial-out from an unauthenticated dial-in call If possible. and make sure modems cannot be reprogrammed remotely. Don't tell the user whether the username. to force users to use proxying With switched technologies. Modems should be reset to a standard configuration after each call Check that calls terminate cleanly. test it regularly from the Internet: o HackerWacker o Shields-UP! http://grc. especially regarding outgoing calls (hackers using corporate phone system as relay) Set up security codes on all voice mailboxes. automated connection on all the phone lines available at your site to check for rogue modems installed by users without noticing MIS) Set a short delay after the first and second failed logins.

Germany http://www.heise.com/SecurityTest/ o WebTrends http://www.com/pub/scan/ o Whitehats Free DDOS Testing Service http://dev.pl o Adiscon QuickCheck for Clients. Germany http://www.com/ o Browser-Check bei heise online (Germany) http://www.net/ Sygate http://scan.net/camera/ o Security Space https://secure1.net.net/tools/security/scan.          Secure-Me/DSLreports http://www.asp o Virtual Suicide http://suicide.html o QuickInspector for the Web by Shavlik Technologies http://security.org/tools.secure-me.mycgiserver. games.com/smysecure/index.netfarmers.whitehats.asp o Remote Security Tester by Ken Kalish http://www.com/securitytest/index. especially on your MTA.com http://www.com/ E-SOFT/SecuritySpace. Swizerland.com/products/prescan1.netscreen. On Unix.itsec. so as to reduce the need for sending queries to a remote DNS.html o Secure Design http://www.de/cgibin/index.smartbotpro.html o ibh .com/content/security/cybercop.securityspace. Set up hosts to limit use of resources (eg. Germany http://www.dslreports.anti-trojan.de. use the LIBSAFE set of libraries to protect binaries) Limit what kernel options can be changed while the server is up (eg.conf) Keep compilers and packagers on a removable device to make it difficult for someone to compile and/or install packages (Unix) Consider using xinetd to replace inetd + TCPWrapper (Unix) Remove all unneeded aliases in /etc/aliases (eg.sandboxsecurity.html o myCIO.com/smysecure/index.-) http://server142.Ingenieurbuero Holger Heimann.sygatetech.html o Hochschule Rapperswil. Germany http://www.securityspace.com http://www.com/secureme_go Protect against buffer overflows (StackGuard.pl o The Apostols http://apostols.net/ o Quick-Test by sicher-surfen.sicher-surfen.exchangeantivirus.com/scan/ddos/ddos. use the noatime attribute in /etc/fstab.net/ o Personal Security Scanner . patch the Linux kernel. and allow for backup in case of short interruptions Mount as many partitions in read-only as possible.com/~kalish/ o Security-Port-Scanvon by NetScreen Technologies http://www2.html o Online Trojan Port Scanner (Lockdown?) http://onlinescanner.hsr. /etc/limits.ch/cgibin/datenschutz/DSZ_test_start.com/ o Sybergen Online-Security-Check http://www.) o o o .de/SecurityCheck/default.de/ct/browsercheck/ o DLS Reports http://www.htm o Sandbox Security Test Suite http://www.sybergen. im Auftrag des Datenschutzbeauftragten des Kantons Zuerich http://www.shavlik.asp o Anti-Trojan.ita.de/vulchk.sdesign. only root should be able to run echo "1" > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward) Require a password when booting in single-user mode Disable or restrict email relaying on your MTAs Run a cache DNS.webtrends. etc.mycio.

It doesn't take long for hackers to locate such unsecure hosts. and have an e-mail sent to MIS so that you know who your reckless users are Disable command-line history log by adding HISTFILESIZE=0 in your local . No rogue hosts: Decommission any host that is no longer being used Do NOT connect a new host to the network until it has been thoroughly secured.d/* to keep users from checking out boot-time scripts Any failed attempt to connect should trigger an instant message (eg..rhosts /root/. or by changing the leading letter from S to s. and su to root. as this switch is logged. eg. disable the use of EXPN and VRFY commands Considering disabling remote reboot/shutdown. tty2. Add legalese to /etc/issue to warn users. and limit this function for console connections (Unix) Disable host reboot through CTRL-ALT-DEL by commenting out the "ca::ctrlaltdel:/sbin/shutdown. ~/.netrc /etc/hosts..d/su) Create locked /root/.conf) Only use an administrator account when absolutely needed.allow and hosts. and hide which OS and version number is running.d. Use the wheel group to specify who is allowed to su to root. ttyp1. especially system configuration files Implement the undelete or chattr feature. " line in /etc/inittab (Unix) Chmod 0700 /etc/rc. Start by denying all access in hosts.d/init. Make sure this tool does not run applications with shell escape. tty1.bash_profile configuration file. etc. Use /etc/securetty to make sure that root can only log on through the console (eg. Use safe names for hosts. and even then.) and NOT through the pseudo-terminals over the network (eg. sudo). ttyp2. especially if that host is connected to the public part of your network (ie. etc. consider using tools that let you perform only limited tasks as administrator (eg. SUID/SGID in Unix).equiv files to avoid hackers from creating them (use touch followed by chmod 0) When creating a new user account. although tools like nmap can determine the platform you are running in different ways Take advantage of TCP Wrapper's /etc/hosts.rhosts. to make it easier for users to recover files deleted by mistake. chattr +i /etc/inetd. create locked ~/.deny. names should not give away information on their platform or OS version. or avoid messing with them in the first place Take advantage of the extended attributes offered by the ext2fs to forbid changed to configuration files (eg.d/rcX. for added security Do not run unneeded binaries that run as administrator (eg. thus granting a regular user admin rights .allow . Disable services started up at boot-time by either deleting the symlink in /etc/rc. and change the group ownership to su accordingly (eg.forward.). the DMZ in front of a firewall).                       Remove all unneeded user and group accounts On your mailer. and have your monitoring tool check for such files every night Check for all world-writable/everyone files and directories. and only allow specific access in hosts. etc. It's much safer that users who telnet into a host first log on as a regular user. ICQ) and e-mail Set up hosts to log users out or lock their screen after X minutes of no activity. /etc/pam. if available on your system.deny feature.

the other to receive mail Hard disk     Use file quotas in user home directories Check that the default file permissions are safe (eg. and which version Once the host has all the packages you need. Users might want to affix a tamper-proof picture of themselves on their laptop computer to reduce risk of theft In case you either lose the administrator password or it was changed by hackers. etc. no root access. /dev/*) Keep /tmp in its own partition Authentication . build a host with different partitions on different hard disks. tamper-proof cable to secure host physically to server room. set up program so run in chroot() to enhance security OS-permitting. no boot from floppy drive. under Linux. be prepared to drive to the office in the middle of the night if power goes off at this inconvenient time. get the habit of always using absolute pathnames to executables (eg. For NT. check whether the UPS application can send the password over a wire. unbeknownst to you Restrict physical access (BIOS password. check the nifty utilities from Winternals. especially root's (ie. secure cases to unable access to jumper to reset passord. or check its configuration so that it does not return important information to remote sites Mail server: For added security. and prohibit users from running applications from there Set limits to how much RAM and processes are available to average users When installing a new closed-source software program. take advantage of package managers like RPM to make it easier to know what packages are installed. one to send mail. umask of 027 under Unix. consider using two hosts. default rights (eg. either remove identd.) Files exported through either NFS or Samba should be read-only as often as possible. etc. and 077 for root) If available.                 Check that your PATH is secure. consider 077 for system configuration files) Check that access to devices is secure (eg. no writable directories to avoid running bogus binaries upload by hackers. /usr/bin/su instead of simply su) New files should be created with safe.". to enhance performance and security (so a rogue program or hacker filling up a hard disk and crashing this host) To install and upgrade programs. learn how to boot as administrator to reset the password (eg. consider removing sensitive tools that could be taken advantage of by hackers (compilers. no ".) When running as root. thus preventing the host to reboot automatically after power resumes.) When setting a password in the BIOS and using auto-shutdown UPS units (with autoreboot set in the BIOS when power returns). umask of 022. etc. Otherwise. run a tool that monitors sockets to check whether it's trying to upload information to the Internet. Boot loaders like LILO can also be set to prompt users for a password before booting an OS.) On Unix hosts. booting with linux single in LILO.

safe password (see appendix for how to choose a safe password) Disable all unused accounts. secure. a connection to the SMTP port of a mail server should not tell you which MTA is running and its version) Run password cracking software regularly to check that users do not choose unsafe passwords. and change the default to their own. for one. and implement password aging to force them to change their password regularly Change all default passwords on applications you install. Display login banner with some legalese to warn hackers that those are not public resources. test accounts whose password is easy to crack. check for all unused accounts. or do not get back to you. do not use group accounts. Any material so recorded may be disclosed as appropriate. if applicable. without choosing one that they used in the past (Linux and NT. enter a password to prove this)  Check if your system supports the use of ACLs such as SubDomain instead of the basic Unix owner-group-world system of authorization . Take advantage of password aging to force users to change their password regularly. ie. Make sure this banner does not give out any information on the host platform and version #. ie. make sure you do not delete the leading + sign in /etc/password. If they don't. use a difficult. Remind employees to never write down their password. Anyone using this system consents to these terms. All users should use a personal account. Sample seen on rootprompt: This computer system is for authorized users only. In the course of monitoring individuals improperly using the system or in the course of system maintenance. while authentication means checking that the user is indeed who he means he is (ie. do not use the same password for all newly-created accounts). the activities of authorized users may also be monitored and recorded. offer this feature) Each month. After a waiting period. and use MD5 hashes instead of the crypt() function Consider password/account blocking after a predefined number of failed attempts to authenticate Do not create "Joe accounts". put users in a group instead All accounts should have a password If using NIS. and contact their owner to check if they still need it. and unique password as default to make them safe (ie. as system personnel deem appropriate. When creating new user accounts. disable their account. leaving your Unix system wide-open              Authorization Authorization deals with controlling access to resources. including law enforcement. On *nix systems. to make logging easier. use shadow passwords instead of relying on /etc/password. and is a plain-text file. NT: Do not set up unneeded trust relationships with other domains Remove all login information (eg. Individuals using this system without authority or in excess of their authority are subject to having all their activities on this system monitored and recorded or examined by any authorized person. Utmp is not fool-proof: it will not be updated if a user's shell crashes (hence the user will appear to be still logged on). Remove guest accounts. remove those of employees who have definitely left.

Access should be limited to what a user could need to be doing on a host but not more Logging         Things to watch for: system crashes and reboots. data modification or deletion. Disable any unneeded services running hosts (Unix: /etc/inettab. suspicious probes. rsh. consider either compression. anomalies. and what the legal restrictions are about logging user personal information Services        Keep two web servers: One in the public part of the LAN to contain files meant for the outside world. changes in file lengths or dates (use Tripwire). unexplained. and furnished with enough paper. Uninstall any service/software that you do not need. and work from there. In log files. Generally speaking.conf. especially from anonymous/guest accounts. do not run the r-services (rlogin. ie. or that give out information on your hosts and network . preferably one that doesn't use a data buffer. /etc/inetd. Even safer is sending logs to a printer directly attached to each host to avoid sniffing.conf Check for process table attack and related types of denial of service attacks Take a look at Bastille Linux or Debian. poor system performance. Remember to use a shredder before throwing out useless logs. and check that passwords are not actually logged for anyone to read To avoid log files from using too much disk space. inability of a user to log in due to modifications of his/her account. etc. Make sure passwords are not logged Check history log Monitor connections and log files Consider logging to different files. do not simply disable them by removing entries in start-up scripts and inet. Another server in the private part. or rotation followed by periodic moving of old log files to permanent storage like CD-Rs in case you need to investigate a break-in in the future. tools that either do not require authentication to access resources. should know before users if something is wrong on the network. the other to the regular log file.) and fingerd. attempts to write to system. as they are more secure distributions Unless absolutely necessary. new files with novel or strange file names. especially if one of your hosts turns out to have been used by hackers as relay to launch attacks on other sites Check with lawyers how much data must be logged by auditing software. to host private. corporate resources (Search engines on the web can list all files on a weakly protected public web server). on a central host: one for critical information to be sent to you by e-mail and/or printed.  Check for unowned files regularly Use sudo or equivalent to allow restricted use of root access. NT : Control Panel | Services). Maintain a skeptical attitude to determine if a service is truly needed or just a user's whim.accounting discrepancies. Do the same for FTP and e-mail Run host monitoring tools like WhatsUp to check services running on remote hosts. etc. suspicious browsing. denial of service. pay special attention to any attempt to achieve a different security level by any user or process. hence the need for a lot of monitoring tools Choose the "that which is not explicitly permitted is denied" philosophy. new user accounts or high activity on a previously low usage account.

Cops. This helps to isolate intruders and limit potential harm. and making sure that all hosts are regularly updated. motherboards.                 Do not rely on a trusted-hosts architecture (/etc/hosts. either stand-alone hosts. RAM. central host to avoid every user downloading the same update from the Net. high-availability systems (RAID 5 with hot-pluggable hard disks. equiped with auto-shutdown and reboot. services should be placed on hosts according to their security level (ie. Beowulf Linux. considering using Samba instead of NFS for ease of deployment and increased security Consider installing a bastion host to be the point of access of all connections to the Internet (the router should only allow outgoing connections originating from that host) Take a look at outgoing filters to control which sites users can access on the Internet. power supplies.forward files in case a hacker tried to reroute e-mail Use secure terminals (/etc/securetty) to force admins to first log in with their personal account and su to root To share directories and files from an Unix host.) Provide guest FTP access instead of anonymous access. passive attacks. DDoS. TCP spoofing. etc. A free solution for Windows hosts is AVG. SACK (Selective Acknowledgement). the main UPS sends an SNMP trap that can trigger all other hosts to shutdown.255 with source address is a local address) Run anti-virus software on all hosts. create an empty . stealth scanning (through the FIN packet). active desynchronization. Do the same thing for . web server). install important services on secure hosts. but leave their host running to minimize wear due to frequent power-offs. hard disk status. fans.) Have users turn their monitor off to save power when leaving the office. Security is only as strong as the weakest link in the chain. early desynchronization.rhosts files in user home directories regularly. TCP session hijacking. with automatic updates for a local. Check that the BIOS of each host handles automatic reboot when power resumes. Nessus. If this translates into too many servers. and delete them. to minimize down time Run scanners like Satan. and trivial services on trivial hosts.rhosts file owned by root and read-only to forbid users from creating one of their own. Ideally.equiv. As a better solution. Telnet session. eg.) All access to resources should be authorized Scan for . IP-directed broadcast (pinq x. Monitor use of hard disk space to watch for warez Try to protect from human error. etc. TCP ACK storms.) Have spare hosts and spare parts ready (hard disks. Trinux. SYN flooding (solutions are Random Early Drop. etc. each service should be running on a different machine whose only duty is to provide a specific service. to check for open ports and other possible insecurities Famous attacks: TCP/IP sequence-number prediction. sniffing.) with a step-by-step procedure on replacing them Use BIOS system monitoring feature (temperature in case. Use a spare hard disk as home to FTP users to prevent hackers from crashing the host by uploading huge files. and to back up their files at night . and document this as part of the security policy If possible. Provide backup hosts for major applications (e-mail. a misconfigured host offering temporary degraded service Use UPS on all hosts that require them. and SYN Cookies). monitors. and set the sticky bit of user home directories to 1 to forbid users from deleting this file.

or groupware servers). etc. Norton utilities to make sure a hard disk really is blank and its contents unreadable. Hard disks. do not reveal the name of MIS personnel. Check that DST works and has no impact on applications (source control. source control applications. so as to have the exact same setup Before applying an update. do not allow anonymous hosts from getting an IP address. Have it look up addresses from DNS and assign static addresses to known hosts. Educate users as much as possible.     Use secure time server to keep all hosts in sync (especially important for timedependent applications like build machines. use MD5 or PGP to check that no hacker has tampered with it. Run Tripwire or equivalent to monitor changes to system files. clone its hard disk. The best way is to stop the host to be updated. tapes. floppies. teach users how to sign files through PGP/GnuPG Add corporate banner to all e-mails Do not just throw away outdated or broken equipments. groupware. The goal should be to reduce synchronous calls to emergencies that require an immediate response from MIS. Provide classes for all new employees on software used internally . CDs can still contain confidential data. or destroy them. through a filesystem that supports automatic file encryption. Never install binaries for which you don't have the source code and didn't check that they come from a reliable source Data       Consider encrypting data files. When you want to check your machine. the more time you have to take care of tasks that only you can do as administrator. as this can be used by hackers to learn about your network Information given in your NIC record for the domains you own: Make them as generic and minimal as possible (eg. and run dnswalk to check for errors Keep that all software up to date. New or temporary hosts could use anonymous addresses from a DHCP pool DNS: Do not run dynamic DNS until a secure version is available. either manually through PGP/GnuPG. Test upgrade on a test host to check that no application is broken in the process. and perform upgrade tests on the copy. Check for suspicious changes made to zone files. internal numbers.) DHCP: If applicable. Either keep those for possible use later.) This is especially important for theft-prone portables If confidentiality is not an issue but integrity is. Remember to run eg. unsecure hosts themselves Users/MIS Personnel    Instruct marketing and sales people to check with MIS before publishing any information on company resources. Monitor use of DHCP leases. take it off the network and boot off a fresh kernel (usually a read-only boot floppy is good for this) and then run Tripwire to check your files. Provide easy-to-use procedure to set up new hosts from secure images to avoid having users install new.) The more users can do themselves. help desk application. through initial training and online knowledge databases (groupware. along with phone and fax numbers). or through applications that do this automatically (Lotus Notes. Use toll-free phone numbers instead of actual.

Check that they do not re-use an older password Before leaving for any trip.) Remind users not to write down their password.) Do not leave sensitive documentation on desks. and keeps MIS personnel from working on longer-term projects. etc. or downloading offensive JPGs. etc.) Consider setting up a bogus domain name to hide connections from your site (eg. phone adapters. installing softwares downloaded from the Net or found in magazines. so as to provide history to users and MIS. pay attention not to give out confidential information on either the company or its computer infrastucture. as they're easy to remember and much more secure than regular passwords. Dejanews. Require users to change their password regularly. Use shredders for sensitive data Provide a computer use policy so that users know what they can and cannot do with their computer (eg. This is especially important when posting to newsgroups or inquiring about competitors Watch out for hackers resorting to social engineering to find information (pretending to be with MIS and calling someone in the company to have them change their password. and feedback to management on MIS activity and the type of problems that occur most often As answering synchronous calls is stressful and boring. etc. etc. such and such employee answers calls only at certain hours or certains days.and Out-Processing . organize a balanced work schedule (eg. so you know how to reach them at any time Check purchase requests from employees for any unsafe choices Tell users not to share accounts. masquerading. Check password aging. adding support for virtual domains in sendmail. Remind MIS personnel to take advantage of groupware application to document procedures. printers. access control card to the premises if applicable.) Check that acronym-based passphrases are used instead of passwords (eg. Keep on. or in trash cans. checking trivial web sites or newsgroups. contacts.) When traveling in groups. and ask for a personal account if they need one Check with management if users should be allowed to post to newsgroups from their corporate account If MIS personnel need to ask technical questions to newsgroups that could be used by hackers to break into their site. employees should not all fly on the same plane When off-site. fax machines. or on-site if visitors are around. which makes it all the easier for hackers to crack passwords. check how safe the political and economic situation is.). Make sure all MIS personnel is able to take over someone else's job at short notice.                   All interventions should be logged in the help desk application. tips. etc. use a private ISP account for this to hide the origin of the article (eg.Employee In. transformers. Walls have ears Check appendices in this document on steps for hiring and firing personnel Appendix A . online dictionaries abound on the Internet. w45hatgtg "where 45 have all the good times gone" instead of an actual word. and that you have all the required equipment (PC Card and cable.and off-line list of MIS employees. posting corporate information in newsgroups. and works on system-oriented tasks the rest of the time) Reduce inter-dependencies and specialization to a minimum. etc. along with heads of departments. Have them use passphrases instead.

Remove hosts from backup selection list 9.). Do NOT forward e-mails to a new address. What are private IP addresses . in case the employee can be expected to return in a short while. and communicate login/password. Remove user from all mailing lists and backup jobs 3. ISDN. Add phone # to online phone list 4. Unix e-mail. Update caller ID and SPID in PBX 5. E-mail: Set up automated answer for incoming mails. NIS. Check with manager or co-workers whether some files should be backed up from employee's workstations. explaining that the employee has left and can be reached at such and such phone # or e-mail address 6. update mug-sheet and organization chart. xDSL. and choose solid passwords per instructions in user guide 2. and. Add IP address in DHCP and DNS 3. Lotus Notes. and burn CDs or save to tapes before reconditioning hosts 4. Create various accounts (NT user. a bridge. How would you use it to set up 2 networks of your own ? Differences between TCP/IP and Netbeui Explain what the following terms mean: ATM. phone directory. VPN. Tell user to change passwords immediately.) 6. X25. Frame-relay. Disabling is better than deleting. personal or ex-customers). cable modem. should not be allowed in in the premises without an escort Appendix B . provide access control card Employee Out-Processing 1.46. FTP. change them 5. a router.Employee In-Processing 1. How is an address bound to a NIC . Disable all accounts (including RAS) immediately before employee is leaving or is told of his dismissal (disgruntled employees and the like are the most common problem of internal threats). NFS. Take picture. as employee could continue receiving individual corporate e-mails after leaving the company 7. and remember to delete them after a given period of time in case the employee is not to return 2. What are class and classless IP addresses . Remove employee picture from mug-sheet. Make sure security knows that this employee is no longer with the company. If admin passwords were known by employee. Different standards of routing protocols TCP/IP : What form does an IP address take . backup. etc. Hand out documentation on resources available onsite (Phone-HOWTO. What is sub-netting Your ISP grants your site class C IP network address 207. and Caller ID 8.MIS Personnel Hiring Test WAN       Difference between a repeater. NT computer.Add account to list. unless OKed by management.130.0/24. etc. FDDI. except corporate and known mailing lists (eg. SMB/CIFS RAS .

Kermit. call-back. and RAID 5 ? Hardware         Name different manufacturers of microprocessors Different models of the Intel family Different types of RAM How many devices can be connected onto an IDE bus ? SCSI : Speeds. RAID1. ZModem. X2/K56Flex/V90. and what is it for ? What frequency should you choose so that the picture displayed by a monitor doesn't flicker ? . black-listing. SLIP/PPP.  Explain what the following terms mean: RS-232. V42bis. Example of some basic modem AT commands ? LAN          Difference between a hub and a switch ? Maximum number of 10BT hubs that can be linked together using regular plugs ? Name different LAN architectures available Name of the different layers that constitute the OSI/ISO and TCP/IP models Difference between TCP and UDP ? Some well-known port numbers ? What settings does a TCP/IP host need to connect to a LAN ? Name major NOS Different ways to protect a LAN from outside hacking ? Wiring    How many wires are required for 10BT wiring ? For 100BTX ? For 100BT4 ? What do UTP and STP stand for ? When is it necessary to use either one ? What are straight-through and cross-over cables ? PBX    How many wires are required to plug an analog phone into a PBX ? An ISDN phone ? What's SPID (French : SDA) ? Approximate voltage level of a RING signal ? Backup    Name different mass-storage devices currently in use.or sequentialaccess. Things to watch for before connecting a new device onto a SCSI bus How many primary partitions does a hard-disk support ? How many cylinders should a hard-disk contain to avoir problems when booting an OS from one of the partitions ? What does MBR stand for. BBS. V42. and type of connectors . either random. BBS. V34. How many devices can be connected onto a single SCSI bus . each with its rough storage capacity What's the difference between an incremental and differential backup job ? What's the difference between RAID 0.

so that a user is presented with a GUI to log in on a Linux server ? What is an i-node ? Name different file systems supported by Linux. and when should you use them ? How do you add a new user account into a Linux server ? How to you set a new password for it ? What should you change to unable users to login. DHCP. X. and only access a Linux server for e-mail ? What is a shadow password ? What do SUID/SGID mean. VBX. Corba ? What do the following terms mean : Java. LDAP ? What is the difference between POP and IMAP ? What is Lotus Notes ? What is currently its strong point as compared to Microsoft Exchange ? What is ASCII ? Unicode ? What is a DLL ? What does client/server mean ? Alternative ? What do the following terms mean : DDE.500. tcpdump. netstat. COM.d over RC scripts ? How do you set things up. ping. What are hard links. OLE. What is the CPU/bus ratio ? Software             Name some major OS's What do the following terms mean : SNMP. POP. main Linux distributions What is POSIX ? What is the point of building a new kernel ? What are modules. INND. sniffing. Kerberos ? What are run-levels ? When should you use inet. how do you set an alias for a host ? How does a DHCP server work ? What are Telnet. tripwire. and symbolic links ? How does an X server work ? NT    What are the different release numbers of NT ? What is the difference between a workgroup and an NT domain ? What is a DC ? What is Active Directory? What are the benefits to move to AD? . FTP. NIS/NIS+. IMAP. OCX? Name different file systems available on Microsoft platforms What is the difference between FAT and FAT32 ? Name major DBMS vendors Unix/Linux                   Name the two original Unix branches Name the major current flavors of Unix Name the current. and when should you use them ? What is Samba ? Can it be used as a DC ? On a DNS server. BootP. nslookup. netwatch. ActiveX. DNS. DCOM.

can be tapped. Be suspicious of any phone call asking for confidential information (your password. and ask applicant about their use Appendix C . e-mail. do not answer and ask IT to investigate Contact MIS in case of any malicious and threatening telephone calls.). and commute time If possible perform assessment test: Fill a box with different hardware (NIC.). C/C++. or check with MIS if the remote site requires setting up an ad hoc connection Remember that telephone lines.        What do the following terms mean : NetBios. Spammers can easily build themselves mailing lists by scanning such material. your home page). as this can be used by spammers to confirm that an e-mail address is valid. DNS. including wireless. broadcasts. transportation means. PearlPerl. If you need to connect to a remote site. video adapters. and do not post your address in any web page accessible from the Internet (eg. and restore this image onto a new PC ? How can you upgrade a stand-alone NT host into a DC ? Is FAT32 supported by NT 4 ? What's an ERD ? What is a trust relationship ? What is an NT service ? Where are user or application parameters saved in Windows 9x and NT ? Development (Proficiency in VB. Contact MIS if your mailbox is filled with it.User Policy        Read the corporate computer use policy If you receive an e-mail or an instant message asking you to update the password of any of your accounts (NT. Disguise your e-mail address. name resolution. Office macros) English    Aural comprehension: TOEFL tape riting proficiency: TOEFL MCQs Reading comprehension: TOEFL MCQs Miscellaneous Check applicant's location. DOS batch files. Use one-time passwords or tunneling to encrypt all data flow between corporate servers and your modem-equipped host .com Do not install a modem to your host. LMHOSTS. etc. WINS. either use the legitimate corporate connection. etc. Visual Test. Python. HOSTS . master browser ? What is an SID ? What happens if you clone the partition of an NT host currently connected to the network. eg. information on corporate infrastructure. Do not use your actual e-mail address when posting to newsgroups or mailing lists. etc. jdoe@yaPLEASEREMOVETHISTOMAILMEhoo.) Do not answer any SPAM e-mails.

etc. determine how likely the threats are. check how safe the political and economic situation is. etc.) Do NOT write down passwords. or fax or copy machines. and history of past incidents. never leave a portable computer unattended (eg. Your e-mail and any file on your computer can also be monitored. handling. set up a password in the BIOS. at your hotel. . use the site PA system if available If available. put your portable in a safe). or on-site if visitors are around. As explained in RFC 2196.Security Policy The security policy to handle incidents should have the following sections: Goals and objectives.). access control card to the remote presmises if applicable. identify what you are trying to protect (files. always secure it with a lock and cable when working in an office. etc. and that you have all the required equipment (PC Card and cable. etc. in each area. and review the process continuously and make improvements each time a weakness is found. contact MIS whenever you detect a situation that you consider is or could be a security or safety incident Appendix D . and is responsible for prohibiting use of to newsgroups and web sites that are not work-related.). Use a paper shredder before throwing out confidential data Do not run any software received through the mail or the Internet (e-mail attachments. with the right tools. Those contain answers to Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs). transformers. pay attention not to give out confidential information on either the company or its computer infrastucture. w45hatgtg "where 45 have all the good times gone" instead of an actual word. disruption of service. etc. post-mortem to improve security in the future. etc. and call MIS/security ASAP. employees should not all fly on the same plane Generally speaking.) Passwords: Instead of regular words. web sites) While on the road. data can still be read on a reformated hard drive.) Watch out for hackers resorting to social engineering to find information (pretending to be with MIS and calling someone in the company to have them change their password. as they may still contain sensitive data (for instance. identification of the incident. make sure the portable comes up with a visible tamper-proof corporate sticker to discourage theft MIS monitors network use. encrypt all sensitive files (e-mails. unauthorized programs being run. leaving it at your feet in an airport.) When traveling in groups. use acronym-based passphrases (eg. using your hosts as stepping stone to launch attacks to other sites. phone adapters. If no one is available.). Walls have ears Do not leave confidential information lying on your desk. online dictionaries abound on the Internet. or waiting for you through the metal detector. which makes it all the easier for hackers to crack passwords. implement measures which will protect your assets in a cost-effective manner. determine what you are trying to protect it from (files being accessed or deleted or replaced.              When off-site. Do not throw away computer equipment. Challenge any stranger not wearing an access control card. This channel also reduces synchronous interruptions to a minimum. corporate reputation. notification. and bring it to MIS instead. make the most of the corporate groupware or help desk application before calling up MIS. Before leaving for any trip.

Security is a state of mind. Perl. if only because new software and upgrades often means new security flaws. especially if using a courier company to store tapes off-site Make sure you can restore encrypted tapes on a bare-metal host (eg. and data integrity. nontechnical employees are those most likely to not upgrade to the latest anti-virus and launch any application or click on any e-mail attachement. whether it's the amount of work to re-create them (lost files). and shell scripts are your friends.com/cgi-bin/printer. automate as many tasks as you can.pctechguide. Performing such daily routine tasks is not only time-consuming. and who will be allowed to access them. make sure you keep safe copies of your private key on a separate media) Temp stuff http://www. especially as technical and involved as handling day-to-day management of a computer infrastructure. That money can be spent on software. Finally.htm Tape Drive Roundup . Therefore. Threats include unauthorized access to resources and/or information. or the impact of the image or future of the company (break-ins. confidentiality. and denial of service. very likely to be neglected. confidential information passed on to the competition. hardware.The basic goals of security are authentication. Do not assume that because your whole site is secure today. Appendix E . take into account the knowledge required to use computers securely. authorization. availability. For each service that will be provided. keep in mind that. list who will provide and administer it. but also very boring.) Also. Needless to say. new breaches of security are found every single day. so remember to check security-related mailing lists and web sites on a daily basis. In order to keep it as universal as possible and avoid having to update it too often.com/ http://www. and hire MIS employees with such coding skills.com/15tape. Pay peanuts.Which Tape Drive Is Best for Your Linux System? http://www. and does not deal with particular versions of softwares you might be running. and hence.dantz. or the wages of your staff. the cost of protecting assets should be less than the cost of their loss. No security. but if you don't take measures to provide these necessary resources. as the Bugtraq mailing list shows. this document gives a list of general hints. can be achieved without dedicating significant resources. there is no way that anybody will be able to provide you with any acceptable level of security.linux-mag. To make matters worse. Hence the need to keep abreast through mailing lists and web sites. and you'll get monkeys. that it will remain so tomorrow.pl?issue=200101&article=tape_drive . as e-mail-based virus are all it takes to bring down an entire organisation. if using an RSAtype of encryption.Choosing a backup software   Use encryption. Applications (and their corresponding bugs and breaches of security) are updated constantly. Python.

$250-600) Mgf = Seagate TapeStor OnStream (15-30GB. Concerns about the tape stretching or snapping due to drum rotation speeds upward of 7. it drops down a row and switches direction. .networkcomputing. int SCSI.html&pub=nwc Tape technology is broken into two major categories: helical tape and linear tape. Linear scan writes data from front to back in a serpentine method. Linear scan uses stationary heads and a less complex tapethreading method. using a series of tensioners. ext SCSI. linear-scan drives have been winning the race with proven market success. tape price. when the head reaches the end of the tape.Unix Security Checklist (from Practical Unix & Internet Security) Preface  Reread your manuals and vendor documentation. TR5 (10-20GB. That is. wraps the tape around a rotating drum that contains the heads.000 rpm and high tension conditions have been quelled by the success and reliability of solutions such as the Sony AIT-2 drive.com/shared/printArticle?article=nc/1114/1114ws3 full. Linux. The stationary heads of the linear tape technology are what theoretically give linear-tape drives superior reliability. USB).Workstation CastleWood ORB Int IDE $150 Int SCSI $160 Ext SCSI $180 USB $200 2. while the latter promises increased reliability. The former touts higher density and performance.2GB tapes Travan TR4 (4-8GB $200-500). Helical scan writes data diagonally across the entire tape-simultaneously using multiple heads. $150-600) DI30 (IDE) is Certified for Linux! ADR50 is Certified for Linux! ZIP QIC 120M floppy drive CD-R/CD-RW Server DAT 4mm (DDS) DAT 8mm (AIT) Jaz VXA DLT Exabyte Mammoth-2 Tandberg LTO Optical Magneto optical DVD Drive price. standard recording format (can be accessed using non-proprietary software) The Emerging Tape Backup Market http://www. 25-50GB. Appendix F . Aided by DLT. The main difference between the two is that a helical-scan drive pulls the tape out of the cartridge and. The other difference is the way data is written to the tape. models (IDE.

by trying to log in on another terminal. Circulate it to all users. What do you need to protect? What are you protecting against? Understand priorities. Be sure that every user's account has a password. Schedule time to read them when they arrive. Don't have different. or by using the telnet localbost command. Chapter 1: Introduction     Order other appropriate references on security and computer crime. or any part of your computer. again. Become familiar with your users' expectations and experience with UNIX. budget. Ensure that all users know about good password management practices. tokens. or smart cards. Consider automatic generation or screening of passwords. test it with the su command. Develop a positive security policy. don't forget it! After you change your password. Post a reminder above your computer or desk: "Security is not 'Me versus the Users' but 'All of Us versus Them. Get management involved. Chapter 3: Users and Passwords              Be sure that every person who uses your computer has his or her own account. Ensure that authority is matched with responsibility. Do not attach your password to your terminal. Don't use your password on other computer systems under different administrative control. Do not write your account name or the name of the computer on the same piece of paper. Consider use of one-time passwords. Ensure that everything to be protected has an "owner. nonobvious passwords. Never record passwords online or send them to another user via electronic mail. After you change your password. Write a letter to your vendors indicating your interest and concem about (insufficient) sottware quality and security features. . Perform a risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis. keyboard. don't make it obvious that what you have written is. Set priorities for security and use. Pick passwords that are not so difficult to remember that you have to write them down. Don't use your password as the password to another application such as a Multi-User Dungeon (MUD) game. and resources available." Work to educate your users on good security practice. Pick strong. a password.' " Chapter 2: Policies and Guidelines           Assess your environment. If you must write down your password. less secure rules for top-evel management. in fact. Mark your calendar for 6-12 months in the future to reread your manuals.

If you use the Data Encryption Standard (DES) algorithm for encryption. Never give any users. 027 or 077). . Obtain and install a message digest program (such as MD5). and the Superuser         Ensure that no two regular users are assigned or share the same account. Never use rot13 as an encryption method to protect data. /var/adm/sulog. Consider contacting your legislators with your opinions on these laws. Disable SUID on disk partition mounts (local and remote) unless necessary. Use the compress command (or similar compression system) on files before encrypting them. Never use a login password as an encryption key. however .. Choose encryption keys as you would a password. export. or restrict the ability to su to user root su to the user's ID when investigating problem reports rather than exploring as user root.avoid obvious or easily guessed words or patterns. Set your umask to an appropriate value (e.Chapter 4: Users.. Think about how you can assign group IDs to promote appropriate sharing and protection without sharing accounts. Avoid use of the root account for routine activities that can be done under a plain user ID. This protection includes use of removable media and encryption. Determine if write. Never write SUID/SGID shell scripts. If your system has "universes" or Context Dependent Files (CDFs). learn how to use them. be sure that all your administrative actions actually scan all the files and directories on your system. Don't depend on the crypt command to protect anything particularly sensitive. and chgrp operations on files clear the SUID/SGID bits on your system. especially if they negatively impact your ability to protect your systems. and sale of cryptography. Chapter 5: The UNIX Filesystem          Learn about the useful options to your version of the Is command. chmod. Check their ownership and permissions to ensure that they are reasonable. or other appropriate log files on a regular basis for bad su attempts. consider superencrypting with Triple-DES. the same UID. Remember. do not depend on ACLs to protect files on NFS partitions. chown. Groups. other than UUCP users. Scan for device files on your system. Chapter 6 Cryptography        Learn about the restrictions your government places on the use. Periodically scan your system for SUID/SGID files.g. Think of how to protect especially sensitive files in the event that the root account is compromised. Learn how to use message digests. Get in the habit of checking files based on this information. Restrict access to the su command. Scan the files /var/adm/message. especially if it is more than 1024 bytes in length. If your system has ACLs.

Instead of logging into the root account. Do not store your backups in the same room as your computer system: consider offsite backup storage. investigate doing backups across a network link to a "hot spare" site.g. Do not set up a single account that is shared by a group of people. Be certain that everything on your system is on your backups. Use PGP to encrypt files and sensitive email. Avoid proprietary encryption methods whose strengths are not known. Make at least every other backup onto a different tape to guard against media failure. When using software that accesses files directly rather than through the raw devices. Encrypt your backups. /etc/rc.. log in to your own account and use su. Ensure that access to your backup tapes during transport and storage is limited to authorized and trusted individuals. put it in a shell file. Chapter 8: Defending Your Accounts         Make sure that every account has a password. If you need to set up an account that can run only a few commands. or store it online. Remember to update your backup regimen whenever you update your system or change its configuration. Make periodic archive backups of your entire system and keep them forever. Do not set up accounts that run single commands. Try to restore a few files from your backup tapes on a regular basis. Do not create "default" or "guest" accounts for visitors. /etc/passwd. . Keep your backups under lock and key.    Protect your encryption key as you would your password . Consider obtaining a copy of the PGP software and making it available to your users. Try to completely rebuild your system from a set of backup tapes to be certain that your backup procedures are complete. If possible. and /etc/fstab). Make paper copies of critical files for comparison or rebuilding your system (e. Make sure to change the password of every "default" account that came with your UNIX. Use the group ID mechanism instead. but escrow the keys in case you lose them. Do not reuse a backup tape too many times.don't write it down. If your budget and needs are appropriate. use the rsh restricted shell. consider remounting the filesystems as read-only during backups to prevent changes to file access times. disable accounts like uucp and daemon so that people cannot use them to log into your system. Think about creating restricted filesystem accounts for special-purpose commands or users. Protect your encryption programs against tampering. system. Make periodic paper copies of important files. and to create and check digital signatures on important files. Chapter 7: Backups                 Make regular backups. because the tapes will eventually fail.

you may wish to slighdy alter the algorithm used by crypt 0 to encrypt your password. consider adding password screening or coaching software to assist your users in picking good passwords. consider asking your vendor when they will be supported in your version of UNIX. If you are using a central mail server or firewall. Double check the protection attributes on system command and data files. you may wish to export these filesystems read-only. Chapter 9. especially on accounts that may be used across a network link. so that they cannot be modified by NFS clients. Consider cracking your own passwords periodically. or public terminals as "secure" in the /etc/default/loging or /etc/ttys files. Put time/tty restrictions on login to accounts as appropriate. enable it. For example. Tell your users to use longer passwords. Do not declare network connections. enable it. If your system supports the TCB/trusted path mechanism. If you export filesystems containing system programs. and on all ancestor directories. If you don't have them. Disable the accounts of people on extended vacations. you can increase the number of encryption rounds from 25 to 200. Be careful who you put in the wheel group. and permissions of every program on your system. but don't place much faith in results that show no passwords cracked. If your software does not support a shadow password file. if your vendor software allows it. Keep copies of this checklist on removable media and use them to determine if any of your system files or programs have been modified. Establish a system by which accounts are always created with a fixed expiration date and must be renewed to be kept active. to help prevent users from picking bad passwords. If you have source code for your operating system. consider the benefits of accountname aliasing. modems. If you have shadow password capability. Otherwise. on their directories. . You may wish to include cryptographic checksums in the lists. Make a checkdist listing the size. as these people can use the su command to become the superuser (if applicable). modiflcation time. use them. Disable dormant accounts on your computer.                   Monitor the format and contents of the /etc/passwd file. If your computer supports password aging. Write a daily check script to check for unauthorized changes to files and system directories.. If possible. Enable password constraints. set a lifetime between one and six months. mount disks read-only if they contain system software. Integrity Management        If your system supports immutable files. set your systems to require the root password when rebooting in singleuser mode. If your system allows the use of a longer password than the standard crypt() uses. Consider using the Distributed Computing Environment (DCE) or Kerberos for any local network of single-user workstations. contact the vendor and request that such support be added. If your system does not have a shadow password file. make sure that the file /etc/passwd cannot be read anonymously over the network via UUCP or TFTP. If possible. if present in your software. Consider using some form of one-time password or token-based authentication. enable it.

. and others. you can use comparison checking to detect unauthorized modifications. Be careful to protect your backup copies and comparison programs from potential attackers. Evaluate whether C2 logging on your system is practical and appropriate. Chapter 10: Auditing and Logging                Consider installing a dedicated PC or other non-UNIX machine as a network log host. Don't include nonstandard directories in your execution path. Keep a paper log on a per-site and per-machine basis. . Be aware that log file entries may be forged and misleading in the event of a carefully crafted attack. Run last periodically to see who has been using the system. If you process your logs in an automated fashion. aculog. This approach will ensure that you see all exceptional condition messages. This review should include (if they exist on your system) loginlog. Set permissions on commands to prevent unauthorized alteration. Run integrity checks on your system on a regular basis (see Chapter 9). Tripwire). If you can. also have these messages logged to a special hardcopy printer and to another computer on your network. Consider runting rdist from a protected system on a regular basis to report changes. Have your users check the last login time each time they log in to make sure that nobody else is using their accounts. Make sure that your utmp file is not world writable. Consider adding an automatic log monitor such as Swatch. xferlog. install it.g. Use this program on a regular basis. Turn on whatever accounting mechanism you may have that logs command usage. If you have syslog.     Consider making all files on NFS-exported disks owned by user root. sulog. Make an offline list of every SUID and SGID file on your system. Determine if there is an intrusion-detection and/or audit-reduction tool available to use with your C2 logs. Be certain that the program and all its data files are stored on read-only media or protected with encryption (or both). install it first on a noncritical system on which you can test it and observe any misbehavior or bugs. If you have backups of critical directories. When installing new software. configure it so that all auth messages are logged to a special file. Consider installing something to check message digests of files (e. craft your filters so that they exclude the things you don't want rather than pass only what you do want. Scan your system for any user home directories or dot files that are world writ-able or group writable. Chapter 11: Protecting Against Programmed Threats        Be extremely careful about installing new software. Review your specialized log files on a regular basis. Make sure that your log files are on your daily backups before they get reset. Don't leave any bin or library directories writable by untrustworthy accounts. If so. Never install binaries obtained from untrustworthy sources (like the Usenet). Consider installing a simple cron task to save copies of the lastlog file to track logins.

Place your computer systems where they will be protected in the event of earthquake. install alarm sensors both above and below the floor. Have heat and smoke alarms in your computer room. Disable terminal answer-back. and drinking in your computer room or near computer equipment. call a FIRST response team or the vendor to confirm the instance before spreading any alarm. including editor start-up files. Review the use of these commands (and the shell) in all scripts executed by cron. Periodically review all system start-up and configuration files for additions and changes. and disable the program if necessary. Make sure that the placement and nature of fire-suppression systems will not endanger personnel or equipment more than is necessary. Determine who might have physical access to any of your resources under any circumstances. Strictly prohibit smoking. eating. . environment. Chapter 12: Physical Security             Develop a physical security plan that includes a description of your assets. too. Make sure that personnel know how to use all fire protection and suppression equipment. Never write or use SUID or SGID shell scripts unless you are a hoary UNIX wizard. Never have writ-able directories in your search path. inetd. Watch for unauthorized modification to initialization files in any user or system account. Install and regularly clean air filters in your computer room. or structural failure. and defenses. if possible. etc. If you have a raised floor. If you have a dropped ceiling.exrc file. Periodically review configuration files for server programs (e. Check the behavior of your xargs and find commands. Never have ". perimeter. get in the habit of typing full pathnames for commands. Periodically review mailer alias files for unauthorized changes. Make sure that the devices used for backups are not world readable. Make sure that any shared libraries are properly protected and that protections cannot be overridden. .forward files." (the current directory) in your search path. Have water sensors installed above and below raised floors in your computer room.. Check the placement and recharge status of fire extinguishers on a regular basis.               If you suspect a network-based worm attack or a virus in widely circulated software. Train your users and operators about what to do when an alarm sounds. threats. Keep your backups offsite. Verify that any files run from the cron command files cannot be altered or replaced by unauthorized users. explosion.g. put sensors above the ceiling. Disable the automatic command execution feature in GNU Emacs. When running as the superuser.conf. Don't use the vi or ex editors in a directory without first checking for a Trojan .) Check the security of your at program.

Protect power switches and fuses. Consider encrypting all of your backups and offline storage. Consider setting autologout on user accounts. users should be required to take holiday and vacation leave regularly. Have recorders to monitor these values over time. If the position is extremely sensitive. Check peripheral devices for local onboard storage that can lead to disclosure of information. Use locks.                    Have temperature and humidity controls in your computer room. Physically protect your backups and test them periodically. Never use programmable function keys on a terminal for login or password information. Consider using fiber optic cable for networks. Have regular performance reviews and monitoring. Consider putting motion alarms or other protections in place to protect valuable equipment when personnel are not present. tie-downs. Consider installing an uninterruptible power supply. if appropriate. Sanitize media (e. Provide comprehensive and appropriate training for all new personnel.. Have antistatic measures in place. Store computer equipment and magnetic media away from building structural steel members that might conduct electricity after a lightning strike. terminators. Chapter 13: Personnel Security          Conduct background checks of individuals being considered for sensitive positions. responsibility or stress on a frequent or regular basis. Have applicants and contractors in sensitive positions obtain bonding. Encrypt sensitive data held on your systems. tapes and disks) and printouts before disposal. consider using a polygraph examination of the candidate. and bolts to keep computer equipment from being carried away. Use bulk erasers. Try to resolve potential problems before they become real problems. . Beware of insects trying to "bug" your computers. Do so with the permission of the applicants. Make sure that staff have adequate time and resources to pursue continuing education opportunities. and if it is legally allowable. Install filtered power and/or surge protectors for all your computer equip ment. Make sure that users in sensitive positions are not overloaded with work. Lock and physically isolate your computers from public access.g. Have disaster-recovery and business-continuation plans in place. shredders. and for personnel taking on new assignments. Have alarms associated with the systems to indicate if values get out of range. Provide refresher training on a regular basis. or incinerators. even if compensated for the overload. Avoid having glass walls or large windows in your computer room. and connectors from tampering. Institute an ongoing user security-awareness program. Protect all your network cables. In particular. Examine them periodically.

Make sure that no user becomes irreplaceable. Make sure that the tip or cu programs automatically exit if the user gets logged out of the remote machine or if the telephone call is interrupted. Make sure that outgoing modems hang up on the outgoing call if the tip or cu program is exited. Consider using separate callout telephone lines with no dial-in capability for callback schemes. Limit UUCP access to the smallest set of directories necessary. . Check permissions on all associated devices and configuration files. Chapter 15. Make sure that there is no way for the local user to reprogram the modem. Physically protect the modems and phone lines. Consider making some or all of your UUCP connections use callback to initiate a connection. Set up a different UUCP login for every computer you cornmunicate with via UUCP. Log the numbers that call your system. Apply policies of least privilege and separation of duties where applicable.sys or /usr/lib/uucp/Systems is mode 400. Make sure that /usr/lib/uucp/L. Chapter 14: Thlephone Security              Make sure that incoming modems automatically log out the user if the telephone call gets interrupted. When any user leaves the organization. Make sure that no UUCP login has /usr/spooI/uucp/uucppublic for its home directory. Only allow execution of commands by UUCP that are absolutely necessary. Make sure that the ruusend command is not in your L. If there are daily. readable only by the UUCP user. Make sure that incoming modems automatically hang up on an incoming call if the caller logs out or if the caller's login process gets killed.     Monitor users in sensitive positions (without intruding on their privacy) for signs of excess stress or personal problems. or monthly administrative scripts run by cron to clean up the UUCP system. Consider getting leased lines and/or callback modems. Make sure that mail to the UUCP users gets sent to the system administrator. Do not install call forwarding on any of your incoming lines. Do not export UUCP files or commands on a writable NFS partition.cmds file (Version 2 UUCP). Consider getting CALLER*ID/ANI to trace incoming calls automatically. UUCP             Be sure that every UUCP login has a unique password. make sure that access is properly ter minated and duties transferred. make sure that they are run with the UUCP UID but that they are owned by root. weekly. Audit access to equipment and critical data. Disable third-party billing to your modem lines. Consider use of encrypting modems with fixed keys to guard against unauthorized use or eavesdropping. Make sure that the files in the /usr/lib/uucp directories can't be read or written remotely or locally with the UUCP system.

contact your vendor and ask when equivalent functionality will be provided as a standard feature in the vendors' systems. Only give UUCP access to the directories to which it needs access. your ftp account. The file should also contain the name of any other account that does not belonged to an actual human being. or kill commands. Frequenfly scan the files in. Make sure that all directory permissions and ownership on your ftp account are set correctly. and bin. Disable any unneeded network services. Make sure that /etc/ftpusers contains at least the account names root. don't have a copy of your real /etc/passwd as an ~ftp/etc/passwd. If your software allows. You may wish to limit UUCP to the directory /usr/spool/uucppublic. wiz. Examine carefully any other alias that delivers to a program or file. uucp. . If you support anonymous FTP. Disable or delete any uucpd daemon if you aren't using it. Do not depend on header information in news articles or email as they can be forged. Chapter 16.        Test your mailer to make sure that it will not deliver a file or execute a command that is encapsulated in an address. Chapter 17: TCP/IP Services                Routinely examine your inetd configuration file. TCP/IP Networks    Consider lowAevel encryption mechanisms in enterprise networks. Make sure that your sendmail program will not deliver mail directly to a file Make sure that your sendmail program does not have a wizard's password set in the configuration file Limit the number of "trusted users" in your sendmail. If the machine has an active FTP service. or to "tunnel" through external networks. consider installing the tcpwrapper program to better regulate and log access to your servers. configure any "incoming" directories so that files dropped off cannot then be uploaded without operator intervention. Disable UUCP over IP unless you need UUCP. and usage of. Make sure that your version of the ftpd program is up to date. ensure that all UUCP users are listed in the /etc/ftpusers file. Remove all of the UUCP software and libraries if you aren't going to use them. Consider disabling any services that provide nonessential information to outsiders that might enable them to gather information about your systems.cf file Make sure that your version of the sendmail program does not support the debug. If your standard software does not offer this level of control. Do not depend on IP addresses or DNS information for authentication. Be sure that the UUCP control files are protected and cannot be read or modified using the UUCP program. Limit the commands which can be executed from offsite to those that are absolutely necessary. Delete the "decode" alias in your aliases file. Then.

Do not place usemames in your /etc/hosts. Configure your NNTP or INND server to restrict who can post articles or transfer Usenet news. use static routes where possible and practical. Scan your network with tools such as SATAN and ISS to determine if you have uncorrected vulnerabilities .before an attacker does the same. if enabled.g. 1988. Disable UUCP over IP unless needed. (But beware that most implementations of trusted commands don't understand IP addresses in . Consider replacing sendmail with smap. Consider disabling SMTP commands such as VRFY and EXPN with settings in your sendmail configuration. doing this might introduce a vulnerability.rhosts files on your system. Restrict access to your printing software via the /etc/hosts. IRCs. Make sure that all existing . in such cases. Make sure that you are running the latest version of the nameserver software (e. Scan your network connections regularly with netstat. if this is possible on your system.g. is limited to a single directory containing boot files.. Routinely scan your system for suspicious.rhosts files are protected to mode 600. Kerberos. If your X11 Server blocks on null connections. Tell your users about the information that the finger program makes available on the network Make sure that your finger program is more recent than November 5. or other servers.equiv file. If you have a plus sign (+) in your /etc/hosts. bind) with all patches applied.                                  Make sure that your version of the sendmail program is up to date. "magic cookies") instead of using xhost. Use IP addresses instead of domain names in places where the practice makes sense (e. Make sure that you have the most recent version of the software.rhosts files).) Make sure that TFTP access. Secure RPC. Make your list of trusted hosts as small as possible. Block SNMP connections from outside your organization.g. Disable the rexd RPC service. if possible. Block NTP connections from outside your organization. Consider not allowing users to have . Disable zone transfers in your DNS.rhosts files. in . Consider running the authd daemon for all machines in the local net.. Make sure that all files used by the nameserver software are properly protected against tampering. and that. Disable rexec service unless needed. Set up your logindevperm or fbtab files to restrict permissions on frame buffers and devices. Block incoming RIP packets. . configure your system to use APOP or Kerberos for authentication. Enable the best X11 authentication possible in your configuration (e. Have an alias for every non-user account so that mail to any valid address gets delivered to a person and not to an unmodified mailbox.rhosts. or another more tractable network agent. get an updated version. Disable or replace the finger service with something that provides less information. If you are using POP or IMAP.equiv file. and perhaps against reading by unauthorized users. remove it.lpd file. with all published patches in place Make sure that the aliases file cannot be altered by unauthorized individuals. Be very cautious about installing MUDs.

(See the specific programming recommendations in the chapter. Re-evaluate why you are connected to the network at all. or to only follow links that are owned by the same user that owns the destination of the link. Set the server to not follow symbolic links. Chapter 19: RPC. Consider making your www server chroot into a protected directory. Prevent general access to the server log files. Do not run your server as user root. NIS+. and set its options appropriately (and conservatively). If your version of portmapper has a "securenets" feature.g. Put keylogout in your logout file if you are running secure RPC. including login. Be extremely cautions about writing and installing CGI scripts or programs. Make sure that there is an asterisk (*) in the password field of any line beginning with a plus sign (+) in both the passwd and group files of any NIS client. Have it set to run as a nobody user unique to the WWW service. and Kerberos           Enable Kerberos or Secure RPC if possible. Make sure that there is no line beginning with a plus sign (+) in the passwd or group files on any NIS server. If you are using Kerberos.) Consider using taintperl as the implementation language. Make sure that your version of portmapper does not do proxy forwarding. Configure your server to only allow CGI scripts from a particular directory under your control. If this feature is not present. configure the program so that it restricts which machines can send requests to your portmapper. Be aware of the potential risks posed by dependence on a limited number of thirdparty providers. Use netgroups to restrict access to services. enable encryption. Chapter 20: NFS  Program your firewall and routers to block NFS packets. Make sure that your version of ypbind only listens on privileged ports. Chapter 18: WWW Security               Consider running any www server from a Macintosh platform instead of from a UNIX platform. If you are transferring sensitive information over the WWW connection (e. Use NIS+ in preference to MS. personal information). and disconnect machines that do not really need to be connected. Do not mix WWW and FTP servers on the same machine in the same filesystem hierarchy. Limit or prohibit server-side includes. if possible.. Become familiar with all the configuration options for the particular server you use. . understand its limitations. NIS. Monitor the logs and usage of your WWW service. Disable automatic directory listings. contact your vendor and ask when it will be supported.

Never export a mounted partition on your system to an untrusted machine if the partition has any world. Don't configure any machine to trust machines outside the local subnet. Break your network up into small. rather than creating your own. Set root ownership on files and directories mounted remotely. independent subnets.               Use NFS version 3. and Usenet on closely guarded bastion hosts. replicating disk on local machines may be a safer approach. if possible. Configure your firewall/bastion hosts to remove all unnecessary services and utilities. Keep in mind that firewalls can sometirnes fail. At the very least.or group-writable directories. Reconsider why you want to use NFS. Make sure that firewall machines have the highest level of logging. email. in TCP mode. Give serious thought to whether or not you really want all your systems to be connected to the rest of the world. using the access= or ro= options. Set the kemel portmon variable to ignore NFS requests from unprivileged ports. Plan accordingly: periodically test your firewall and have defense in depth for that eventuality. put a screening router in place.) . Chapter 21: Firewalls                  Keep in mind that firewalls should be used in addition to other security measure and not in place of them. Configure firewall machines without user accounts and program development utilities. When possible. Use fsirand on all partitions that are exported. For instance. Consider buying a commercially provided and configured firewall. even if a firewall is interposed. Have a central mail machine with MX aliasing and name rewriting. Mount partitions nosuid unless SUID access is absolutely necessary. Do not export user home directories in a writable mode. Monitor activity on the firewall regularly. Export filesystems to a small set of hosts. Do not export filesystems to yourself! Do not use the root= option when exporting filesystems unless absolutely necessary. Monitor who is mounting your NFS partitions (but realize that you may not have a complete picture because of the stateless nature of NFS). Consider setting a policy of default deny for your firewall. and think about doing without. use the secure option for NFS mounts. if available. Don't mount NFS directories across subnet boundaries. Each subnet should have its own NIS server and netgroups domain. Use the netgroups mechanism to restrict the export of (and thus the ability to remotely mount) filesystems to a small set of local machines. if available. Mount partitions nodev. Plan on centralizing services such as DNS. Consider intemal firewalls as well as extemal firewalls. Rerun the program periodically. Use the most complete firewall you can afford and one that makes sense in your environment. (See the discussion in the chapter. Make sure that user accounts have different passwords for machines on different subnets.

Run hardcopies of files showing changes and tracing activity. good state. Consider installing the ident/authd service on your system to help track network access. Consider writing your own wrapper programs to provide extra control or logging for your local system. Chapter 24: Discovering a Break-in         Plan ahead: have response plans designed and rehearsed. w. Chapter 23: Writing Secure SUID and Network Programs        Convey to your vendors your concem about sofiware quality in their products. Initial and time-stamp these copies. etc. However. Consider installing the tcpwrapper program to restrict and log access to local network services.Chapter 22: Wrappers and Proxies     Consider installing the smap proxy in place of the sendmail program to receive mail over the network. vmstat. . Observe the 17 general rules presented in the chapter when writing any network server programs. be certain that you restore the system to a known. Carefully examine the system after a break-in. If a break-in occurs. If a break-in occurs. See the chapter text for specific . Observe the 14 general rules presented in the chapter when writing any program that will be SUID or SGID. Chapter 25: Denial of Service Attacks and Solutions     If user quotas are available on your system. consider making a dump of the system to backup media before correcting anything. and especially when writing software that needs extra privileges or trust. Don't test new software while running as root. Carefully check backups and logs to determine if this is a single occurrence or is related to a set of incidents.there is too much detail to list here. Install a firewall to prevent network problems. Think about using chroot for privileged programs. Be very cautious about generating and using "random" numbers. Run machine status-checking programs regularly to watch for unusual activity: ps. Observe the 24 general rules presented in the chapter when writing any software. don't panic! Start a diary and/or script file as soon as you discover or suspect a break-in. Avoid storing or transmitting passwords in clear text in any application. Specifically. Configure appropriate process and user limits on your system. remember that the results retumed by this service are not completely trustworthy. enable them. Note and timestamp everything you discover and do.

pornographic material. Do not be unduly hesitant about reporting a computer crime and involving lawenforcement personnel. Time-stamp and initial media. setting the nice to a positive value. Put explicit copyright and/or proprietary property notices in code start-up screens and source code. trade secrets. Recommend a disinterested third party to act as an expert. printouts. Keep available an up4o-date paper list of low-level network addresses (e. if you need it.        Educate your users on polite methods of sharing system resources. and other information upon user departure. Develop contacts with your local law-enforcement personnel. Consider coupling this to provision of personal accounts with an independent service provider. Include an explicit statement about the return of manuals. Ethernet addresses). Make sure that users understand copyright and license restrictions on commercial software. and machine names. This includes copyrighted material. images. Have all users provide a signature noting their understanding of and agreement to such a statement. Expand your professional training and contacts by attending security training sessions or conferences. Consult with your insurance carrier to determine if your insurance covers loss from break-ins. Have a spare network connection available. printouts. Keep your backups separate from your machine. Determine if your insurance covers business interruption during an investigation. levels of user access and responsibility. Make sure that you have appropriate swap space configured. etc. .. Ensure good physical security for all network cables and connectors. Develop contingency plans and response plans in advance of difficulties. Restrict or prohibit access to material that could lead to legal difficulties. Replace any "welcome" messages with warnings against unauthorized use. Define. in writing. and other materials as you proceed. Make certain that your legal counsel is consulted before you provide locally developed software to others outside your organization.g. Restrict access to cryptographic software from the network. Run long-running tasks in the background. Consider joining security-related organizations. Be aware of other liability concerns. IP addresses. Also determine if you will be required to institute criminal or civil action to recover on your insurance. Formally register copyrights on your locally developed code and databases. Law                    Consult with your legal counsel to determine legal options and liability in the event of a security incident. Consider investing in a network monitor appropriate for your network. Configure disk partitions to have sufficient inodes and storage. Make your users aware of the dangers of electronic harassment or defamation. Monitor disk usage and encourage users to archive and delete old files. if possible. Chapter 26: Computer Security and US. request a signed statement by a judge requesting (or directing) your "expert" assistance. Prohibit or restrict access to Usenet from organizational machines. Keep written records of your actions when investigating an incident. If called upon to help in an investigation. and sound files.

Monitor newsgroups. spread dial-in phone #s. modems.g RFC 1244 Policy for handling incidents:    Overview (goal and objectives in handling the incident) Evalution (how serious is it?) Notification (who should be notified) . and fixig security bugs in a timely fashion. Protest when vendors attempt to sell you products advertised with "hacker challenges" instead of more reliable proof of good design and testing. identd to get infos on a running process. UNIX. world-writable files + dir. and add to your knowledge and experience. tx alarm if nic set to promiscuous. Under construction nslookup (ls -d acme. vrfy/expn mysmtp. and incredibly popular. Appendix G: Table of IP Services Read the table and add your own site notes indicating the services you do and do not wish to support. fping gping.Chapter 27: "Who Do You Trust?     Read the chapter. net view /domain: mydomain. > zone. seifried. Buy another 1000 copies of this book for all your friends and acquaintances. core dump. Explore professional opportunities that enable you to network with other professionals. close tcp 53 on firewall. and the Internet. Understand the commands that are available to manipulate processes on your system. traceroute -S -p53 x.com. mailing lists. strobe & udp-scan. attractive. Appendix B: Important Files   Become familiar with the important files on your system. icmpquery & icmpush. adequate testing. The copies will make you intelligent.txt). and other resources that will help you stay current on threats and countermeasures. host -lvt any acme. don't run progs as root. Appendix F: Organizations     Learn more about security. Explore other resources concerning security. remove all unneeded sws. Trust us on this.net. Develop a healthy sense of paranoia. dll's. netcat. Understand why SUID/SGID files have those permissions.org/lasg. rogue phone plugs. Appendix C: UNIX Processes   Understand how processes work on your system. Make your vendor aware of your concerns about security.

Ditto of xdm's UDP port.uiuc. For six of the twelve I added extra requirements . All remaining twelve programs had one thing in common: normally they would only be started by humans. Examples are ping and Xwrapper. and of course Qmail One gruesome night of crawling through man pages.edu/pdq So I have my standards. or be sufficiently sandboxed that possible damage is limited. since it is very different from the way lpd works. http://feynman. Preferably it should be all of them. The usual way it to create a special group for each class of suid programs you can identify and make each user a member of the groups needed. newsgroups. If an attacker breaks into a system account he cannot reach any suid root program. As before. Of the remaining 12. I won't go into detail on installing it. if you just know how. Programs like sudo provide other ways to control who may use what program. It's not particularly sophisticated. X's TCP port can be banished. I've decided to switch to a little known print system called PDQ. No system account needs to use them. http and FTP software. Suid programs can be made only accessible to those who need to use them. among other things. but it's got the funniest web site of the lot. On the local machine domain sockets are used. I will however. deeply hidden scripts and obscure configuration files reveals that in fact the only one not using port 6000 is the local user. Even better. . I therefore put them all into a directory that only those accounts that correspond to real users can access. Anything that does interaction with the outside world should either be very trivial. Many classic programs cannot be set up this way and should not be exposed to the public Internet. dns. that's what documentation is for. try to explain how it works.tam. 7 had a legitimate reason to be suid root (like su) while the other 5 needed to be suid root for practical reasons but there really should be a better way of doing this.   Response Legal/investigative Documentation logs (records to keep from before/during/after the incident) Temp stuff djbDNS instead of BIND Use tcpserver to replace inetd netstat -an --inet netstat -nl --inet # netstat -ln dnscache There's replacements for. very well audited.a number of special group IDs controls who may access these.

Security Tools                                                 Nessus NetCat TCPDump Snort Saint Ethereal Whisker Internet Security Scanner PortSentry Sniff TripWire Cybercop Scanner HPing 2 Security Auditor's Research Assistant (SARA) Sniff It SATAN IP Filter IP Tables Firewalk Strobe L0pht Crack John The Ripper Hunt OpenSSH TCP Wrappers nTop ping/traceroute/telnet NetBIOS Auditing Tool Scanlogd Sam Spade NFR logcheck Perl Ngrep (Network monitoring with ngrep) Cheops Vetescan Retina Crack/Libcrack Cerberus Internet Scanner Swatch Nemesis LSOF Lids IPTraf IPLog FragRouter Queso Top .

Nagios 2. service and network monitoring program".0 by Thomas Stocking) Secure remote file management with sshfs by StoneLion .        Lcrzoex mscan and sscan from Jsbach ADMhack Osiris host integrity monitoring Samhain integrity monitoring Automate Linux Configuration with cfengine By Carla Schroder Nagios ("Nagios is an open source host.