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Consider your entire organization
When considering security, the best way to avoid obvious breaches of security is to capture the big picture of your installation. Practically, this means that you should work from the outside in, ie. consider security of the building and area, then the actual offices, followed by the network infrastructure, and end with hosts themselves. It's a bit pointless to spend a lot of time securing hosts if anyone can walk into the server room and walk out with a host under each arm. Those things do happen. This is all the more important since most of computer crime is perpetrated by insiders, for obvious ease of action and lack of interest to hackers about the average corporate data. Because it is more exciting to most system administrators, computer books usually concentrate on securing hosts, but sound computer security doesn't deal with just individual computers. You must consider your entire organization.
Prepare for disaster
Generally speaking, check for any single point of failures in your environment, and provide backup solutions. Perform dry runs regularly to make sure everyone knows what to do in case of a breakdown. Post-incident plans must be updated whenever any change is made to your site, and as much as possible, everyone, especially MIS personnel, must be capable of performing the procedures. Plans should also include procedures to solve day-to-day MIS activities, like installing a new host, welcoming a new employee, etc. Also, whenever possible, use fail-safe tools, ie. should the device fail, they should refuse access instead of letting people in. A firewall is not the magic bullet to securing a site. Generally speaking, try to place as many barriers as possible between valued asset and a potential adversary, without this security being too invasive to employees. Remember that an effective security policy requires that every single employee abide by it, and not just the rank-and-files. The more prepared you are to handle break-ins and disasters, the better for the image of the company and the MIS team. In addition, your company may be held responsible legally if your network was used by hackers to launch attacks on other sites. You might want to hire an outside company to test your security at random times.
A usage policy is an important user-oriented document, not just to cover your ass in case someone in your organization steals information that is off-limit for them, but also because it forces you to think about how your organization works from an MIS point of view.
A security policy is more MIS-oriented than the user policy, and its goal is to offer a big picture view of security of your organization.
Keep in touch with local police authorities about robberies in your area, as thieves are likely to keep using a tactic if it proved successful in a location (eg. burglars pretending to be couriers and stealing unattended portable PCs.) Update this list accordingly, and warn users about those new risks. Also, check with authorities what the regulations are about setting up an alarm system at your site, and whether it can be set up to call up the police automatically when the alarm goes off.
Doors and windows
All entrances must be equipped with secure locking devices that cannot be circumvented (key locks, dead bolts, cipher locks, etc.), and hinge pings that are spotwelded or otherwise protected Doors must be constructed of sturdy material (steel, solid core wood), must not exceed the number for safe and efficient operation, and must always be secured when not in active use All ventilators or other possible means of entrance must be covered with steel bars or wire mesh grill All windows must be securely fastened from the inside. Windows accessible from the ground or located on roofs must come with window/glass tamper or breakage protection features, and be protected by steel bars or grill Check that blinds and shades are available to hide valued items from the outside
Locks and keys
Set up security patrols at random hours during the day, and end-of-workday security checks Check with local police authorities if day- and night-time patrols are scheduled in the neighborhood Access control cards must be clearly different for company personnel and visitors Provide escort for visitors If multiple corporate sites, inter-connect security systems to increase monitoring of sites located in different time zones, and to make travel easier by providing only one electronic badge to each employee Only MIS personnel should have access to the server room Grant users access with the least amount of privilege required to accomplish their job, using user profiles to manage accounts more securily Check the log files created by the application running the electronic locks Set up a procedure to monitor use of all locks and keys. Update when necessary Keep tracks of keys issued, with their number and identification, for both master keys and duplicate keys Keep records of use and turn-in of keys, and check locks quarterly Change locks immediately upon loss or theft of keys If used, master keys must be devoid of marking identifying them as such Only issue keys to authorized employees. Other must use an electronic badge. Keys not in use must be secured in a locked, fireproof safe that is secured to prevent removal
When making duplicates of master keys, mark them "Do Not Duplicate" and obliterate manufacturer's serial numbers Any visitor, either a corporate employee from another site or an outside guest, must warn MIS of his/her visit as early as possible, so as to provide adequate security (ie. some guest might need to be allowed in areas that are off-limit to standard guests.) Employees from other sites and guests must provide the following information: Name, Location, Visit Start and End Dates, Arrival Time, Access Needs Greater than Week Day (7 AM - 7 PM), Buildings to be Visited (if known), Employee e-mail address, Name of manager, Point of Contact at local site MIS must be informed of loss of access control card ASAP so as to disable access and provide a new, safe badge Guests must return their visitor access control card upon leaving the premises MIS must conduct periodical security inspections, and report any problem so as to implement corrective action
Set up either television recording, burglar alarm, or intrusion alarm systems linked to off-site security team. Test them regularly Make sure the television system can record a minimum of four days Check that the alarm systems are backed up automatically, and have an alternate or independent source of power available to cut in and operate automatically
Provide adequate protective lighting for all areas Mark emergency routes clearly Write procedures for emergency evacuations (fire, bomb threats, etc.), and exercise plans regularly Train users in fire fighting Provide response to medical emergency (phone numbers to local medical facilities; first aid supplies) Provide electronic-friendly sprinklers in or over the data center/server rooms No possible leaks over computers, especially server room (water pipes, sprinklers, AC units) Alarm systems must be tamper- , and weather resistant Provide security personnel trained in physical security Set up procedure to respond to alarms, including night-time and week-ends The monitoring system must provide sufficient information to investigate any breakin, and remedy Check that fake floors and ceilings cannot be used for break-ins Check that fire extinguishers and other fire fighting equipment are in sufficient number, that they match the type of fire they would be used to put off, and that they're properly secured on walls (no extinguisher lying around)
Install air conditioning to keep hosts (and users :-) cool, at least in the server room Have someone come in at least once a year to maintain AC units
Set up thermometers linked to monitoring software to check the temperature in the server room, and have it page/call or send e-mail if temperature rises In a large site, use a naming convention for rooms (eg. country names, etc.) and a cabling management software to make sure everyone understands which room and which plugs you mean Use asset management software to assure strict accountability of all company assets In highly-sensitive locations, make sure guests are either restricted to safe areas, escorted at all times, and that their bags are checked when they depart (Welcome to Intel :-) Consider printing sensitive information on easily identifiable paper (eg. yellow, orange, or red paper, depending on its importance), and forbid employees to go offsite with top sensitive documents Guests must sign a log when they visit, and register their laptop computers and camera (manufacturer and serial #.) Make sure there's always personnel available to watch entrances, and that they can call security and send an immediate message to everyone in the building should someone try to walk into the office unauthorized (especially important during lunchhour and late at night) Make sure video cameras connected to VCRs are pointing at all exits to help police authorities investigate break-ins
Monitor your WAN links through MRTG, and your LAN through netstat -i (watch for the collision/outpackets, outerrs/outpackets, and inerrs/inpackets ratio) Use proxy servers to control use of bandwidth and to hide information about your private network Set up an alternate, anonymous connection to the Net to let users find information for yet-unannounced products, as the competition could use this information to tell what your company is working on Run monitoring software like Linux-based Netwatch to keep a eye on the use of network bandwitdth, especially on what servers on the Internet users are connecting. Install an intrusion detection server on all servers, both in the DMZ and in the internal network, and do not ignore traffic coming from your internal network. Consider putting a sensor both on your public routers and firewalls so as to be warned of any suspicious traffic (Unix) Do not run NIS if you can avoid it, or consider NIS+. Consider centralized authentication systems like Kerberos, or Samba Have agents run on all servers, so as to keep an eye on log files, disk space, etc. They could consist in Perl or Python scripts, as those have been ported to different environments and offer a rich amount of modules that avoid your reinventing the wheel If you discover that some hosts have been hacked, and you'd like to get in contact with people on remote sites (eg. a host from which the hacker seems to have connected, or MIS personnel at other corporate sites, etc.) to try to catch him redhanded, either use the phone, set up a brand new mail server, or use encrypted e-mails through PGP/GnuPG, as the hacker may have set up tools to snoop on your network, and be warned of your plans.
Used a dynamic firewall (eg. L2TP/PPTP/PoPToP. consider encrypting data. As the Melissa and ILOVEYOU viruses have shown. make sure those sites also keep an eye on security. monitors.) Run a live messaging application on all hosts (eg. APOP. Make sure you can decrypt tapes on a bare-metal system after your site has been damaged Perform frequent restores of a few files to check that the backups actually work Remember to clean drive heads regularly. unused network plug. etc. unprotected by firewalls. Could be used to set up a host to sniff passwords. This can be done at different network levels (magic words are SSL/SSLey. especially the one flowing on public LANs. should be scheduled at night to make the most of the corporate link to the Net. consider setting up a SAN instead LAN Check if you really need walk-up network connections. S-HTTP/HTTPS. IPSec/CIPE. or check how long it would take to be provided with new or temporary equipment by a commercial supplier or other corporate sites If your site is connected to remote sites through alternative links besides the Internet. proxy servers. as breaches of security there could easily end up jeopardizing your own site Remember that any unsecure host on your network can be used to launch an attack on other resources. In case your site is ruined by a fire. Watch out for magnets (heated car seats. or foreign sites on the Internet. or the mail server just crashed). or. Either take them home every night. a flood. SSH. VPN. S/MIME. Test it regularly. Set up some hosts loaded with anti-virus software and that can be easily removed from the network to test software downloaded from the Net. Some PBXs lets you use the loudspeaker of digital phones as a PA system. no rogue. and perform regular restores on bare-metal systems at a remote site to prepare to see your location ruined by a fire or flood Do not keep the latest backup tapes in the location. update it every time you change the configuration of a host.) and safes that are not meant to protect magnetic media If resorting to a courier solution. Encourage users to p Encrypt all network traffic. as you'll need them after a fire or flood. PGP/GnuPG. Add an IDB (ISDN Dial Backup) unit to your routers that goes up should your permanent connection go down. etc. a suspicious individual is in the building. WinPopup or ICQ) to reduce work disruption while allowing for broadcasts when needed (ie. if possible. leave them in a magnetic media-friendly safe at a nearby bank. security is only as strong as its weakest link. or have a courier pick them up at night. STelnet. and stop using tapes that show too many access errors As backup jobs use a lot of bandwidth. whether they are located on your LAN. or physical break-in. If not. Unplug any unused . washing machines. on other corporate sites connected through WAN. either provide a fully-equiped temporary location. Remind users that downloading binaries is either forbidden by corporate policy. Abacus/Port Sentry) Backup/restore Keep a current backup of all data files that your company cannot afford losing after a computer goes south Keep an ad hoc step-by-step restore procedure current.
application-level (proxy servers). especially for UDP-based applications (Three basic types of firewalls: network-level (screening routers). if only one host is connected to a given port) Assign descriptive host names in the DNS to make logs more meaningful (eg.x) Set up routers and firewalls to log infos to the same central host running syslogd that other hosts are using Do not just rely on ACLs on routers. consider limiting it to a restricted local LAN connected to the rest of the network through a firewall + bastion host to limit access only to limited services. and circuit-level firewalls (eg. keep an up-to-date list of unused network plugs. Ban any packet coming from the Internet whose source address pertains to the private ranges (10. aim at using SSO (Single Sign-On) architecture to reduce the number of login/passwords used. and have a monitoring program warn you immediately when a connection goes up Check out authentication systems like challenge/response. 192.net) All incoming connections from on-the-road employees through the Internet must use SSH and related tools to ensure encryption Check ACLs on routers and firewalls.ca. Start by closing all services. LDAP. and only open those you really need and understand. so present less risk of breaking down. ie. Besides Radius and Tacac. your network can be endangered by UDP or ICMP packets.Firewalls .Switches Run Antisniff to try to see if a host is sniffing the network Run tools like Nessus to check what your firewall and routers can withstand (eg. etc.). time-limited tickets (Kerberos). A context-based firewall is much more secure. filtering routers.los-angeles-63-64rs.168. They have fewer moving parts (cooling fans are just about the only mechanical part). Kerberos. and are less likely to run other software besides the firewall part. 174. If you do need such access. Generally speaking.att. stateful firewall instead. hence less security risk. smart cards. letting a host listen to all traffic by setting up the port it's connected to from switch. one-time passwords (PAP/CHAP.x. Consider buying a stand-alone. or even biometric devices . digital certificates.dial-access. NDS. If possible. crashing when receiving severely mangled packets) Check out reverse path filtering to prevent IP spoofing Set up hubs to forbid hub-mode on ports (ie.to hub-mode). hardware tokens. Use SNMP-capable switches to monitor network use Use bandwidth control tools like Packeteer to prevent denial of service by programs gone haywire Prefer stand-alone firewalls like Cisco PIX over PCs. S/Key. take a look at Samba. and set up DHCP server to not give out IP addresses to unauthorized hosts. Assign a MAC address to each port (ie. 172-16/31. NIS. smart card or finger-print based systems Routers . and PAM. Cisco PIX) ) As IPChains is not stateful. network connection on the patch panel. Consider using a Radius or Tacac authentication server to centralize the task of authentication users.x. Especially remember to disable telnet access from the Net.
html .com/resources/winnuke.) All RAS access must require login/password. were incorrect. modems still connected to the POTS that everyone forgot about. and call-back if available Log Caller ID information if available Maintain an up-to-date register of all your modem lines and conduct regular site checks for unauthorized modems (eg. change default password/code Check daily logs if available. test it regularly from the Internet: o HackerWacker o Shields-UP! http://grc. Modems should be reset to a standard configuration after each call Check that calls terminate cleanly. modems inside PBX to allow for remote administration. and make sure modems cannot be reprogrammed remotely. if available RAS Add authentication for dial-out users. Hosts Install a firewall on all hosts. Implement both proxies or packet filters.jtan. the password. etc. packet filtering. or both. and that the server forces logout from all active sessions Check that no useless RAS access is available (users setting up a modem on their computer. Once the firewall is set up on your network.com/default. and Sygate's Personal Firewall. Don't tell the user whether the username. and force a disconnect after the thirdto slow down automated password attacks.. Fight IP spoofing coming from your by not letting out any packet whose source address does not belong to your network PBX If your PBX can be configured remotely through a modem. Do not allow dial-out from an unauthenticated dial-in call If possible. Zone Labs' ZoneAlarm. Evaluate different methods to hide your private network: masquerading. run separate dial-in and dial-out modem spools Disable the use of the escape sequence +++ to switch to command mode. You'd be surprised at the number of spyware applications sending out information to the Net without telling you. transparent proxying and Fast NAT.. automated connection on all the phone lines available at your site to check for rogue modems installed by users without noticing MIS) Set a short delay after the first and second failed logins. to force users to use proxying With switched technologies. including client hosts: Free solutions for Windows are Tiny Software's Tiny Personal Firewall. unbeknownst to MIS. use Permanent Virtual Circuits or Closed User Groups whenever possible.htm o WinNuke Test Page http://www. especially regarding outgoing calls (hackers using corporate phone system as relay) Set up security codes on all voice mailboxes.
Secure-Me/DSLreports http://www.heise.com/ o Browser-Check bei heise online (Germany) http://www.com/pub/scan/ o Whitehats Free DDOS Testing Service http://dev. games.net/ Sygate http://scan.com/~kalish/ o Security-Port-Scanvon by NetScreen Technologies http://www2.com http://www.exchangeantivirus.asp o Remote Security Tester by Ken Kalish http://www.html o Secure Design http://www.de/SecurityCheck/default.netscreen.secure-me.pl o Adiscon QuickCheck for Clients.dslreports.netfarmers.de/ct/browsercheck/ o DLS Reports http://www.ita.net.com/ E-SOFT/SecuritySpace.html o QuickInspector for the Web by Shavlik Technologies http://security. especially on your MTA.com/smysecure/index. Germany http://www.shavlik.org/tools.mycio.webtrends.ch/cgibin/datenschutz/DSZ_test_start.sdesign. im Auftrag des Datenschutzbeauftragten des Kantons Zuerich http://www.hsr.com http://www.smartbotpro.de/vulchk. Set up hosts to limit use of resources (eg. Swizerland.html o ibh . only root should be able to run echo "1" > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward) Require a password when booting in single-user mode Disable or restrict email relaying on your MTAs Run a cache DNS.sandboxsecurity.com/SecurityTest/ o WebTrends http://www. Germany http://www.html o Online Trojan Port Scanner (Lockdown?) http://onlinescanner.sygatetech.htm o Sandbox Security Test Suite http://www.com/products/prescan1. use the LIBSAFE set of libraries to protect binaries) Limit what kernel options can be changed while the server is up (eg.itsec.pl o The Apostols http://apostols. use the noatime attribute in /etc/fstab.de/cgibin/index.com/secureme_go Protect against buffer overflows (StackGuard.whitehats.com/smysecure/index.asp o Virtual Suicide http://suicide.com/scan/ddos/ddos.Ingenieurbuero Holger Heimann.com/content/security/cybercop.net/tools/security/scan.conf) Keep compilers and packagers on a removable device to make it difficult for someone to compile and/or install packages (Unix) Consider using xinetd to replace inetd + TCPWrapper (Unix) Remove all unneeded aliases in /etc/aliases (eg. etc.com/ o Sybergen Online-Security-Check http://www.com/securitytest/index. patch the Linux kernel. On Unix.anti-trojan. Germany http://www. so as to reduce the need for sending queries to a remote DNS.securityspace.) o o o .asp o Anti-Trojan.sybergen. /etc/limits.html o myCIO.-) http://server142. Germany http://www.net/ o Personal Security Scanner .net/ o Quick-Test by sicher-surfen. and allow for backup in case of short interruptions Mount as many partitions in read-only as possible.securityspace.sicher-surfen.mycgiserver.de.html o Hochschule Rapperswil.net/camera/ o Security Space https://secure1.
and hide which OS and version number is running. ICQ) and e-mail Set up hosts to log users out or lock their screen after X minutes of no activity. etc. and limit this function for console connections (Unix) Disable host reboot through CTRL-ALT-DEL by commenting out the "ca::ctrlaltdel:/sbin/shutdown. disable the use of EXPN and VRFY commands Considering disabling remote reboot/shutdown. if available on your system. or by changing the leading letter from S to s. the DMZ in front of a firewall). Remove all unneeded user and group accounts On your mailer. It doesn't take long for hackers to locate such unsecure hosts. etc. SUID/SGID in Unix). especially system configuration files Implement the undelete or chattr feature. Add legalese to /etc/issue to warn users.d.rhosts.equiv files to avoid hackers from creating them (use touch followed by chmod 0) When creating a new user account. ttyp2.deny. although tools like nmap can determine the platform you are running in different ways Take advantage of TCP Wrapper's /etc/hosts. Use /etc/securetty to make sure that root can only log on through the console (eg.allow and hosts.. and have your monitoring tool check for such files every night Check for all world-writable/everyone files and directories. /etc/pam. or avoid messing with them in the first place Take advantage of the extended attributes offered by the ext2fs to forbid changed to configuration files (eg. to make it easier for users to recover files deleted by mistake. sudo).d/* to keep users from checking out boot-time scripts Any failed attempt to connect should trigger an instant message (eg.allow . ttyp1. and only allow specific access in hosts. eg. Use safe names for hosts. ~/. etc.. consider using tools that let you perform only limited tasks as administrator (eg. for added security Do not run unneeded binaries that run as administrator (eg. " line in /etc/inittab (Unix) Chmod 0700 /etc/rc. and even then. No rogue hosts: Decommission any host that is no longer being used Do NOT connect a new host to the network until it has been thoroughly secured. and su to root. names should not give away information on their platform or OS version.) and NOT through the pseudo-terminals over the network (eg. and have an e-mail sent to MIS so that you know who your reckless users are Disable command-line history log by adding HISTFILESIZE=0 in your local . It's much safer that users who telnet into a host first log on as a regular user. Start by denying all access in hosts. thus granting a regular user admin rights . create locked ~/. Make sure this tool does not run applications with shell escape. as this switch is logged.conf) Only use an administrator account when absolutely needed. tty2.forward. Disable services started up at boot-time by either deleting the symlink in /etc/rc. and change the group ownership to su accordingly (eg.d/su) Create locked /root/. chattr +i /etc/inetd.rhosts /root/. Use the wheel group to specify who is allowed to su to root.d/init.deny feature. tty1.d/rcX.).netrc /etc/hosts.bash_profile configuration file. especially if that host is connected to the public part of your network (ie.
secure cases to unable access to jumper to reset passord. and 077 for root) If available. /dev/*) Keep /tmp in its own partition Authentication . Otherwise.) When running as root. get the habit of always using absolute pathnames to executables (eg.". no writable directories to avoid running bogus binaries upload by hackers. /usr/bin/su instead of simply su) New files should be created with safe. one to send mail. no boot from floppy drive. For NT. consider using two hosts.) When setting a password in the BIOS and using auto-shutdown UPS units (with autoreboot set in the BIOS when power returns). check the nifty utilities from Winternals. unbeknownst to you Restrict physical access (BIOS password. Users might want to affix a tamper-proof picture of themselves on their laptop computer to reduce risk of theft In case you either lose the administrator password or it was changed by hackers. set up program so run in chroot() to enhance security OS-permitting. Boot loaders like LILO can also be set to prompt users for a password before booting an OS. build a host with different partitions on different hard disks. take advantage of package managers like RPM to make it easier to know what packages are installed.) Files exported through either NFS or Samba should be read-only as often as possible. no ". consider removing sensitive tools that could be taken advantage of by hackers (compilers. and which version Once the host has all the packages you need. consider 077 for system configuration files) Check that access to devices is secure (eg. learn how to boot as administrator to reset the password (eg. especially root's (ie. booting with linux single in LILO. umask of 022. thus preventing the host to reboot automatically after power resumes. run a tool that monitors sockets to check whether it's trying to upload information to the Internet. be prepared to drive to the office in the middle of the night if power goes off at this inconvenient time. check whether the UPS application can send the password over a wire. etc. no root access. under Linux. the other to receive mail Hard disk Use file quotas in user home directories Check that the default file permissions are safe (eg. or check its configuration so that it does not return important information to remote sites Mail server: For added security. Check that your PATH is secure. to enhance performance and security (so a rogue program or hacker filling up a hard disk and crashing this host) To install and upgrade programs. umask of 027 under Unix. tamper-proof cable to secure host physically to server room. default rights (eg.) On Unix hosts. either remove identd. etc. etc. and prohibit users from running applications from there Set limits to how much RAM and processes are available to average users When installing a new closed-source software program.
put users in a group instead All accounts should have a password If using NIS. leaving your Unix system wide-open Authorization Authorization deals with controlling access to resources. Utmp is not fool-proof: it will not be updated if a user's shell crashes (hence the user will appear to be still logged on). ie. test accounts whose password is easy to crack. remove those of employees who have definitely left. After a waiting period. or do not get back to you. use a difficult. disable their account. make sure you do not delete the leading + sign in /etc/password. and use MD5 hashes instead of the crypt() function Consider password/account blocking after a predefined number of failed attempts to authenticate Do not create "Joe accounts". On *nix systems. When creating new user accounts. without choosing one that they used in the past (Linux and NT. safe password (see appendix for how to choose a safe password) Disable all unused accounts. Take advantage of password aging to force users to change their password regularly. If they don't. and implement password aging to force them to change their password regularly Change all default passwords on applications you install. and unique password as default to make them safe (ie. and change the default to their own. for one. and contact their owner to check if they still need it. Any material so recorded may be disclosed as appropriate. a connection to the SMTP port of a mail server should not tell you which MTA is running and its version) Run password cracking software regularly to check that users do not choose unsafe passwords. NT: Do not set up unneeded trust relationships with other domains Remove all login information (eg. Remove guest accounts. do not use group accounts. enter a password to prove this) Check if your system supports the use of ACLs such as SubDomain instead of the basic Unix owner-group-world system of authorization . Individuals using this system without authority or in excess of their authority are subject to having all their activities on this system monitored and recorded or examined by any authorized person. if applicable. use shadow passwords instead of relying on /etc/password. as system personnel deem appropriate. check for all unused accounts. Sample seen on rootprompt: This computer system is for authorized users only. All users should use a personal account. the activities of authorized users may also be monitored and recorded. Remind employees to never write down their password. do not use the same password for all newly-created accounts). ie. offer this feature) Each month. Anyone using this system consents to these terms. including law enforcement. secure. Display login banner with some legalese to warn hackers that those are not public resources. Make sure this banner does not give out any information on the host platform and version #. In the course of monitoring individuals improperly using the system or in the course of system maintenance. and is a plain-text file. to make logging easier. while authentication means checking that the user is indeed who he means he is (ie.
/etc/inetd. rsh. Access should be limited to what a user could need to be doing on a host but not more Logging Things to watch for: system crashes and reboots. especially from anonymous/guest accounts. Remember to use a shredder before throwing out useless logs. suspicious browsing. etc.) and fingerd. pay special attention to any attempt to achieve a different security level by any user or process. do not simply disable them by removing entries in start-up scripts and inet. especially if one of your hosts turns out to have been used by hackers as relay to launch attacks on other sites Check with lawyers how much data must be logged by auditing software. consider either compression. and work from there. Another server in the private part. unexplained. etc. or rotation followed by periodic moving of old log files to permanent storage like CD-Rs in case you need to investigate a break-in in the future. poor system performance. suspicious probes. attempts to write to system. Generally speaking. Make sure passwords are not logged Check history log Monitor connections and log files Consider logging to different files. do not run the r-services (rlogin. changes in file lengths or dates (use Tripwire). preferably one that doesn't use a data buffer. tools that either do not require authentication to access resources. Maintain a skeptical attitude to determine if a service is truly needed or just a user's whim. ie. and check that passwords are not actually logged for anyone to read To avoid log files from using too much disk space. hence the need for a lot of monitoring tools Choose the "that which is not explicitly permitted is denied" philosophy. NT : Control Panel | Services). anomalies. Do the same for FTP and e-mail Run host monitoring tools like WhatsUp to check services running on remote hosts. or that give out information on your hosts and network . Check for unowned files regularly Use sudo or equivalent to allow restricted use of root access. Uninstall any service/software that you do not need. new user accounts or high activity on a previously low usage account. and what the legal restrictions are about logging user personal information Services Keep two web servers: One in the public part of the LAN to contain files meant for the outside world. data modification or deletion. Even safer is sending logs to a printer directly attached to each host to avoid sniffing. corporate resources (Search engines on the web can list all files on a weakly protected public web server). In log files.accounting discrepancies. on a central host: one for critical information to be sent to you by e-mail and/or printed. as they are more secure distributions Unless absolutely necessary. Disable any unneeded services running hosts (Unix: /etc/inettab.conf. to host private. new files with novel or strange file names.conf Check for process table attack and related types of denial of service attacks Take a look at Bastille Linux or Debian. and furnished with enough paper. denial of service. should know before users if something is wrong on the network. the other to the regular log file. inability of a user to log in due to modifications of his/her account.
motherboards. active desynchronization. A free solution for Windows hosts is AVG.forward files in case a hacker tried to reroute e-mail Use secure terminals (/etc/securetty) to force admins to first log in with their personal account and su to root To share directories and files from an Unix host. with automatic updates for a local. Nessus. either stand-alone hosts. Use a spare hard disk as home to FTP users to prevent hackers from crashing the host by uploading huge files. TCP spoofing. This helps to isolate intruders and limit potential harm. stealth scanning (through the FIN packet). Do the same thing for . and delete them.255 with source address is a local address) Run anti-virus software on all hosts. Ideally. considering using Samba instead of NFS for ease of deployment and increased security Consider installing a bastion host to be the point of access of all connections to the Internet (the router should only allow outgoing connections originating from that host) Take a look at outgoing filters to control which sites users can access on the Internet. hard disk status. web server). equiped with auto-shutdown and reboot.rhosts file owned by root and read-only to forbid users from creating one of their own. TCP session hijacking. DDoS. Monitor use of hard disk space to watch for warez Try to protect from human error. IP-directed broadcast (pinq x. but leave their host running to minimize wear due to frequent power-offs. SYN flooding (solutions are Random Early Drop. sniffing. Do not rely on a trusted-hosts architecture (/etc/hosts. Telnet session. install important services on secure hosts.) Have users turn their monitor off to save power when leaving the office.) Have spare hosts and spare parts ready (hard disks. and to back up their files at night . etc. and trivial services on trivial hosts. SACK (Selective Acknowledgement). Provide backup hosts for major applications (e-mail. and document this as part of the security policy If possible. Cops. each service should be running on a different machine whose only duty is to provide a specific service. create an empty . high-availability systems (RAID 5 with hot-pluggable hard disks. and set the sticky bit of user home directories to 1 to forbid users from deleting this file. RAM.) with a step-by-step procedure on replacing them Use BIOS system monitoring feature (temperature in case.) Provide guest FTP access instead of anonymous access. and making sure that all hosts are regularly updated. services should be placed on hosts according to their security level (ie. fans. the main UPS sends an SNMP trap that can trigger all other hosts to shutdown.rhosts files in user home directories regularly. eg. Trinux. central host to avoid every user downloading the same update from the Net. passive attacks. As a better solution. Beowulf Linux. early desynchronization. If this translates into too many servers. Check that the BIOS of each host handles automatic reboot when power resumes. a misconfigured host offering temporary degraded service Use UPS on all hosts that require them. to check for open ports and other possible insecurities Famous attacks: TCP/IP sequence-number prediction. TCP ACK storms.) All access to resources should be authorized Scan for . etc. power supplies. to minimize down time Run scanners like Satan. and SYN Cookies). etc. Security is only as strong as the weakest link in the chain. monitors.equiv.
New or temporary hosts could use anonymous addresses from a DHCP pool DNS: Do not run dynamic DNS until a secure version is available. source control applications. Provide easy-to-use procedure to set up new hosts from secure images to avoid having users install new. take it off the network and boot off a fresh kernel (usually a read-only boot floppy is good for this) and then run Tripwire to check your files. Never install binaries for which you don't have the source code and didn't check that they come from a reliable source Data Consider encrypting data files. or groupware servers). as this can be used by hackers to learn about your network Information given in your NIC record for the domains you own: Make them as generic and minimal as possible (eg.) The more users can do themselves. When you want to check your machine. through a filesystem that supports automatic file encryption. so as to have the exact same setup Before applying an update. or destroy them. unsecure hosts themselves Users/MIS Personnel Instruct marketing and sales people to check with MIS before publishing any information on company resources. Provide classes for all new employees on software used internally .) DHCP: If applicable. etc. do not allow anonymous hosts from getting an IP address. The best way is to stop the host to be updated. Run Tripwire or equivalent to monitor changes to system files. clone its hard disk. either manually through PGP/GnuPG. tapes. Test upgrade on a test host to check that no application is broken in the process. through initial training and online knowledge databases (groupware. groupware. Norton utilities to make sure a hard disk really is blank and its contents unreadable. Remember to run eg. The goal should be to reduce synchronous calls to emergencies that require an immediate response from MIS. do not reveal the name of MIS personnel. floppies. help desk application. Use secure time server to keep all hosts in sync (especially important for timedependent applications like build machines. Check that DST works and has no impact on applications (source control. Have it look up addresses from DNS and assign static addresses to known hosts. teach users how to sign files through PGP/GnuPG Add corporate banner to all e-mails Do not just throw away outdated or broken equipments. Hard disks. CDs can still contain confidential data. and run dnswalk to check for errors Keep that all software up to date. use MD5 or PGP to check that no hacker has tampered with it. and perform upgrade tests on the copy. Educate users as much as possible. or through applications that do this automatically (Lotus Notes. Either keep those for possible use later. Use toll-free phone numbers instead of actual. Check for suspicious changes made to zone files.) This is especially important for theft-prone portables If confidentiality is not an issue but integrity is. internal numbers. Monitor use of DHCP leases. the more time you have to take care of tasks that only you can do as administrator. along with phone and fax numbers).
posting corporate information in newsgroups. check how safe the political and economic situation is. etc. Check password aging. transformers. along with heads of departments. organize a balanced work schedule (eg.) Remind users not to write down their password. Check that they do not re-use an older password Before leaving for any trip. Make sure all MIS personnel is able to take over someone else's job at short notice. Keep on. Have them use passphrases instead. such and such employee answers calls only at certain hours or certains days. checking trivial web sites or newsgroups.Employee In. etc. This is especially important when posting to newsgroups or inquiring about competitors Watch out for hackers resorting to social engineering to find information (pretending to be with MIS and calling someone in the company to have them change their password. which makes it all the easier for hackers to crack passwords.and Out-Processing . pay attention not to give out confidential information on either the company or its computer infrastucture. and keeps MIS personnel from working on longer-term projects. etc. tips. adding support for virtual domains in sendmail.) Consider setting up a bogus domain name to hide connections from your site (eg. etc. and works on system-oriented tasks the rest of the time) Reduce inter-dependencies and specialization to a minimum.). use a private ISP account for this to hide the origin of the article (eg. etc. or in trash cans. Remind MIS personnel to take advantage of groupware application to document procedures. so you know how to reach them at any time Check purchase requests from employees for any unsafe choices Tell users not to share accounts. Dejanews. masquerading. fax machines. All interventions should be logged in the help desk application.) When traveling in groups. or downloading offensive JPGs. Require users to change their password regularly. installing softwares downloaded from the Net or found in magazines.and off-line list of MIS employees.) Do not leave sensitive documentation on desks. and ask for a personal account if they need one Check with management if users should be allowed to post to newsgroups from their corporate account If MIS personnel need to ask technical questions to newsgroups that could be used by hackers to break into their site. online dictionaries abound on the Internet. printers. access control card to the premises if applicable. employees should not all fly on the same plane When off-site. and that you have all the required equipment (PC Card and cable. and feedback to management on MIS activity and the type of problems that occur most often As answering synchronous calls is stressful and boring.) Check that acronym-based passphrases are used instead of passwords (eg. phone adapters. w45hatgtg "where 45 have all the good times gone" instead of an actual word. or on-site if visitors are around. etc. contacts. Walls have ears Check appendices in this document on steps for hiring and firing personnel Appendix A . as they're easy to remember and much more secure than regular passwords. so as to provide history to users and MIS. Use shredders for sensitive data Provide a computer use policy so that users know what they can and cannot do with their computer (eg.
Disabling is better than deleting. backup. If admin passwords were known by employee. etc. Check with manager or co-workers whether some files should be backed up from employee's workstations. Tell user to change passwords immediately. update mug-sheet and organization chart. How is an address bound to a NIC . xDSL. as employee could continue receiving individual corporate e-mails after leaving the company 7. etc.46. VPN. Remove user from all mailing lists and backup jobs 3.) 6. and Caller ID 8. SMB/CIFS RAS . Lotus Notes.Add account to list. X25. FDDI. Add IP address in DHCP and DNS 3. phone directory.). NT computer. provide access control card Employee Out-Processing 1. FTP. Add phone # to online phone list 4. Make sure security knows that this employee is no longer with the company. Unix e-mail. a bridge. change them 5. personal or ex-customers). Update caller ID and SPID in PBX 5.MIS Personnel Hiring Test WAN Difference between a repeater. Remove hosts from backup selection list 9. explaining that the employee has left and can be reached at such and such phone # or e-mail address 6. should not be allowed in in the premises without an escort Appendix B . Hand out documentation on resources available onsite (Phone-HOWTO. and communicate login/password. a router. in case the employee can be expected to return in a short while. What is sub-netting Your ISP grants your site class C IP network address 207. Disable all accounts (including RAS) immediately before employee is leaving or is told of his dismissal (disgruntled employees and the like are the most common problem of internal threats). and choose solid passwords per instructions in user guide 2. E-mail: Set up automated answer for incoming mails. and burn CDs or save to tapes before reconditioning hosts 4. Create various accounts (NT user. Do NOT forward e-mails to a new address.130. How would you use it to set up 2 networks of your own ? Differences between TCP/IP and Netbeui Explain what the following terms mean: ATM. and remember to delete them after a given period of time in case the employee is not to return 2. Remove employee picture from mug-sheet. What are private IP addresses . except corporate and known mailing lists (eg. Frame-relay. ISDN. cable modem.0/24. Take picture. unless OKed by management. What are class and classless IP addresses . and. NFS.Employee In-Processing 1. NIS. Different standards of routing protocols TCP/IP : What form does an IP address take .
and RAID 5 ? Hardware Name different manufacturers of microprocessors Different models of the Intel family Different types of RAM How many devices can be connected onto an IDE bus ? SCSI : Speeds. SLIP/PPP. V42bis. Things to watch for before connecting a new device onto a SCSI bus How many primary partitions does a hard-disk support ? How many cylinders should a hard-disk contain to avoir problems when booting an OS from one of the partitions ? What does MBR stand for. How many devices can be connected onto a single SCSI bus . Kermit. V42. ZModem. and what is it for ? What frequency should you choose so that the picture displayed by a monitor doesn't flicker ? . black-listing. each with its rough storage capacity What's the difference between an incremental and differential backup job ? What's the difference between RAID 0. BBS. BBS. Explain what the following terms mean: RS-232. either random. V34. RAID1.or sequentialaccess. call-back. and type of connectors . X2/K56Flex/V90. Example of some basic modem AT commands ? LAN Difference between a hub and a switch ? Maximum number of 10BT hubs that can be linked together using regular plugs ? Name different LAN architectures available Name of the different layers that constitute the OSI/ISO and TCP/IP models Difference between TCP and UDP ? Some well-known port numbers ? What settings does a TCP/IP host need to connect to a LAN ? Name major NOS Different ways to protect a LAN from outside hacking ? Wiring How many wires are required for 10BT wiring ? For 100BTX ? For 100BT4 ? What do UTP and STP stand for ? When is it necessary to use either one ? What are straight-through and cross-over cables ? PBX How many wires are required to plug an analog phone into a PBX ? An ISDN phone ? What's SPID (French : SDA) ? Approximate voltage level of a RING signal ? Backup Name different mass-storage devices currently in use.
What is the CPU/bus ratio ? Software Name some major OS's What do the following terms mean : SNMP. POP. COM. FTP.500. netwatch. OCX? Name different file systems available on Microsoft platforms What is the difference between FAT and FAT32 ? Name major DBMS vendors Unix/Linux Name the two original Unix branches Name the major current flavors of Unix Name the current. LDAP ? What is the difference between POP and IMAP ? What is Lotus Notes ? What is currently its strong point as compared to Microsoft Exchange ? What is ASCII ? Unicode ? What is a DLL ? What does client/server mean ? Alternative ? What do the following terms mean : DDE. DHCP. and only access a Linux server for e-mail ? What is a shadow password ? What do SUID/SGID mean. X. BootP. main Linux distributions What is POSIX ? What is the point of building a new kernel ? What are modules. and when should you use them ? How do you add a new user account into a Linux server ? How to you set a new password for it ? What should you change to unable users to login. and symbolic links ? How does an X server work ? NT What are the different release numbers of NT ? What is the difference between a workgroup and an NT domain ? What is a DC ? What is Active Directory? What are the benefits to move to AD? . Kerberos ? What are run-levels ? When should you use inet. and when should you use them ? What is Samba ? Can it be used as a DC ? On a DNS server. ping. tripwire.d over RC scripts ? How do you set things up. DNS. tcpdump. IMAP. ActiveX. how do you set an alias for a host ? How does a DHCP server work ? What are Telnet. so that a user is presented with a GUI to log in on a Linux server ? What is an i-node ? Name different file systems supported by Linux. netstat. Corba ? What do the following terms mean : Java. INND. DCOM. NIS/NIS+. nslookup. sniffing. OLE. VBX. What are hard links.
either use the legitimate corporate connection. broadcasts. Office macros) English Aural comprehension: TOEFL tape riting proficiency: TOEFL MCQs Reading comprehension: TOEFL MCQs Miscellaneous Check applicant's location. etc. If you need to connect to a remote site. transportation means. jdoe@yaPLEASEREMOVETHISTOMAILMEhoo. name resolution. What do the following terms mean : NetBios. HOSTS . etc. and ask applicant about their use Appendix C . Use one-time passwords or tunneling to encrypt all data flow between corporate servers and your modem-equipped host . Do not use your actual e-mail address when posting to newsgroups or mailing lists. e-mail.).com Do not install a modem to your host.User Policy Read the corporate computer use policy If you receive an e-mail or an instant message asking you to update the password of any of your accounts (NT. and commute time If possible perform assessment test: Fill a box with different hardware (NIC. DOS batch files.) Do not answer any SPAM e-mails. C/C++. master browser ? What is an SID ? What happens if you clone the partition of an NT host currently connected to the network. your home page). and do not post your address in any web page accessible from the Internet (eg. LMHOSTS. as this can be used by spammers to confirm that an e-mail address is valid. and restore this image onto a new PC ? How can you upgrade a stand-alone NT host into a DC ? Is FAT32 supported by NT 4 ? What's an ERD ? What is a trust relationship ? What is an NT service ? Where are user or application parameters saved in Windows 9x and NT ? Development (Proficiency in VB. can be tapped. Contact MIS if your mailbox is filled with it. WINS. DNS. Disguise your e-mail address. eg. do not answer and ask IT to investigate Contact MIS in case of any malicious and threatening telephone calls. information on corporate infrastructure. Visual Test.). Python. including wireless. Spammers can easily build themselves mailing lists by scanning such material. or check with MIS if the remote site requires setting up an ad hoc connection Remember that telephone lines. PearlPerl. etc. video adapters. Be suspicious of any phone call asking for confidential information (your password.
using your hosts as stepping stone to launch attacks to other sites. Use a paper shredder before throwing out confidential data Do not run any software received through the mail or the Internet (e-mail attachments. If no one is available.) Watch out for hackers resorting to social engineering to find information (pretending to be with MIS and calling someone in the company to have them change their password. When off-site. leaving it at your feet in an airport. Do not throw away computer equipment. put your portable in a safe). As explained in RFC 2196.).) When traveling in groups.). This channel also reduces synchronous interruptions to a minimum. data can still be read on a reformated hard drive. determine what you are trying to protect it from (files being accessed or deleted or replaced. Before leaving for any trip. employees should not all fly on the same plane Generally speaking. unauthorized programs being run. w45hatgtg "where 45 have all the good times gone" instead of an actual word. and that you have all the required equipment (PC Card and cable. make sure the portable comes up with a visible tamper-proof corporate sticker to discourage theft MIS monitors network use. etc. etc. transformers. identification of the incident. etc. which makes it all the easier for hackers to crack passwords.) Do NOT write down passwords. Challenge any stranger not wearing an access control card. and bring it to MIS instead. etc. Those contain answers to Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs). etc. implement measures which will protect your assets in a cost-effective manner. . web sites) While on the road. contact MIS whenever you detect a situation that you consider is or could be a security or safety incident Appendix D . Walls have ears Do not leave confidential information lying on your desk. use acronym-based passphrases (eg.Security Policy The security policy to handle incidents should have the following sections: Goals and objectives. corporate reputation. determine how likely the threats are. in each area.) Passwords: Instead of regular words. make the most of the corporate groupware or help desk application before calling up MIS. or fax or copy machines. at your hotel. always secure it with a lock and cable when working in an office. handling. online dictionaries abound on the Internet. notification. Your e-mail and any file on your computer can also be monitored. access control card to the remote presmises if applicable. and is responsible for prohibiting use of to newsgroups and web sites that are not work-related. post-mortem to improve security in the future. never leave a portable computer unattended (eg. disruption of service. and review the process continuously and make improvements each time a weakness is found. and history of past incidents. set up a password in the BIOS. pay attention not to give out confidential information on either the company or its computer infrastucture. check how safe the political and economic situation is.). and call MIS/security ASAP. use the site PA system if available If available. encrypt all sensitive files (e-mails. identify what you are trying to protect (files. or on-site if visitors are around. as they may still contain sensitive data (for instance. phone adapters. with the right tools. or waiting for you through the metal detector. etc.
as the Bugtraq mailing list shows. make sure you keep safe copies of your private key on a separate media) Temp stuff http://www. there is no way that anybody will be able to provide you with any acceptable level of security. or the impact of the image or future of the company (break-ins. Appendix E . and hence. whether it's the amount of work to re-create them (lost files). especially if using a courier company to store tapes off-site Make sure you can restore encrypted tapes on a bare-metal host (eg. but also very boring. and who will be allowed to access them.The basic goals of security are authentication. Security is a state of mind. if only because new software and upgrades often means new security flaws.linux-mag. nontechnical employees are those most likely to not upgrade to the latest anti-virus and launch any application or click on any e-mail attachement. Threats include unauthorized access to resources and/or information.com/cgi-bin/printer. hardware. and data integrity. automate as many tasks as you can. Do not assume that because your whole site is secure today. especially as technical and involved as handling day-to-day management of a computer infrastructure.com/ http://www. that it will remain so tomorrow.pl?issue=200101&article=tape_drive . this document gives a list of general hints. keep in mind that. and you'll get monkeys. For each service that will be provided. Finally. and denial of service. and hire MIS employees with such coding skills. That money can be spent on software. so remember to check security-related mailing lists and web sites on a daily basis. No security. Hence the need to keep abreast through mailing lists and web sites.htm Tape Drive Roundup . new breaches of security are found every single day. confidential information passed on to the competition. or the wages of your staff. Therefore. and does not deal with particular versions of softwares you might be running.) Also.Choosing a backup software Use encryption. and shell scripts are your friends. authorization. Performing such daily routine tasks is not only time-consuming. can be achieved without dedicating significant resources. Perl.Which Tape Drive Is Best for Your Linux System? http://www.com/15tape. Pay peanuts. To make matters worse. list who will provide and administer it.dantz. as e-mail-based virus are all it takes to bring down an entire organisation. Needless to say. if using an RSAtype of encryption.pctechguide. the cost of protecting assets should be less than the cost of their loss. but if you don't take measures to provide these necessary resources. availability. In order to keep it as universal as possible and avoid having to update it too often. very likely to be neglected. take into account the knowledge required to use computers securely. Applications (and their corresponding bugs and breaches of security) are updated constantly. Python. confidentiality.
wraps the tape around a rotating drum that contains the heads. Linear scan writes data from front to back in a serpentine method. $150-600) DI30 (IDE) is Certified for Linux! ADR50 is Certified for Linux! ZIP QIC 120M floppy drive CD-R/CD-RW Server DAT 4mm (DDS) DAT 8mm (AIT) Jaz VXA DLT Exabyte Mammoth-2 Tandberg LTO Optical Magneto optical DVD Drive price. . USB). 25-50GB. standard recording format (can be accessed using non-proprietary software) The Emerging Tape Backup Market http://www. while the latter promises increased reliability. when the head reaches the end of the tape. $250-600) Mgf = Seagate TapeStor OnStream (15-30GB. using a series of tensioners. The stationary heads of the linear tape technology are what theoretically give linear-tape drives superior reliability.networkcomputing. Aided by DLT. Linux.html&pub=nwc Tape technology is broken into two major categories: helical tape and linear tape. int SCSI. Linear scan uses stationary heads and a less complex tapethreading method. it drops down a row and switches direction. linear-scan drives have been winning the race with proven market success. models (IDE.Unix Security Checklist (from Practical Unix & Internet Security) Preface Reread your manuals and vendor documentation. That is.000 rpm and high tension conditions have been quelled by the success and reliability of solutions such as the Sony AIT-2 drive.2GB tapes Travan TR4 (4-8GB $200-500). Helical scan writes data diagonally across the entire tape-simultaneously using multiple heads. Appendix F . TR5 (10-20GB. The main difference between the two is that a helical-scan drive pulls the tape out of the cartridge and. The former touts higher density and performance. Concerns about the tape stretching or snapping due to drum rotation speeds upward of 7.Workstation CastleWood ORB Int IDE $150 Int SCSI $160 Ext SCSI $180 USB $200 2.com/shared/printArticle?article=nc/1114/1114ws3 full. ext SCSI. tape price. The other difference is the way data is written to the tape.
tokens. Do not write your account name or the name of the computer on the same piece of paper. Post a reminder above your computer or desk: "Security is not 'Me versus the Users' but 'All of Us versus Them. Get management involved. If you must write down your password. What do you need to protect? What are you protecting against? Understand priorities. or any part of your computer. Schedule time to read them when they arrive. Never record passwords online or send them to another user via electronic mail. Ensure that everything to be protected has an "owner. Be sure that every user's account has a password. less secure rules for top-evel management. Set priorities for security and use. or by using the telnet localbost command. by trying to log in on another terminal. nonobvious passwords. Don't use your password on other computer systems under different administrative control. Don't use your password as the password to another application such as a Multi-User Dungeon (MUD) game. or smart cards. again. Mark your calendar for 6-12 months in the future to reread your manuals. Pick strong. test it with the su command. Consider automatic generation or screening of passwords. After you change your password. Consider use of one-time passwords. Pick passwords that are not so difficult to remember that you have to write them down. Write a letter to your vendors indicating your interest and concem about (insufficient) sottware quality and security features. Become familiar with your users' expectations and experience with UNIX.' " Chapter 2: Policies and Guidelines Assess your environment. keyboard. Ensure that all users know about good password management practices." Work to educate your users on good security practice. a password. Do not attach your password to your terminal. Circulate it to all users. and resources available. budget. Develop a positive security policy. Perform a risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis. Chapter 1: Introduction Order other appropriate references on security and computer crime. in fact. Don't have different. Ensure that authority is matched with responsibility. Chapter 3: Users and Passwords Be sure that every person who uses your computer has his or her own account. don't make it obvious that what you have written is. . don't forget it! After you change your password.
If you use the Data Encryption Standard (DES) algorithm for encryption. the same UID. export. Determine if write. If your system has "universes" or Context Dependent Files (CDFs). If your system has ACLs. Learn how to use message digests. however . chmod. and sale of cryptography.g. and chgrp operations on files clear the SUID/SGID bits on your system. 027 or 077). and the Superuser Ensure that no two regular users are assigned or share the same account. Groups.. Scan the files /var/adm/message. especially if they negatively impact your ability to protect your systems. Consider contacting your legislators with your opinions on these laws. be sure that all your administrative actions actually scan all the files and directories on your system. or restrict the ability to su to user root su to the user's ID when investigating problem reports rather than exploring as user root. Think about how you can assign group IDs to promote appropriate sharing and protection without sharing accounts. especially if it is more than 1024 bytes in length. Restrict access to the su command. Never write SUID/SGID shell scripts. other than UUCP users. Avoid use of the root account for routine activities that can be done under a plain user ID. consider superencrypting with Triple-DES. Chapter 6 Cryptography Learn about the restrictions your government places on the use.Chapter 4: Users.avoid obvious or easily guessed words or patterns. Chapter 5: The UNIX Filesystem Learn about the useful options to your version of the Is command. Get in the habit of checking files based on this information. Never use a login password as an encryption key.. /var/adm/sulog. or other appropriate log files on a regular basis for bad su attempts. learn how to use them. Disable SUID on disk partition mounts (local and remote) unless necessary. . Scan for device files on your system. do not depend on ACLs to protect files on NFS partitions. Set your umask to an appropriate value (e. Obtain and install a message digest program (such as MD5). Never give any users. Remember. Choose encryption keys as you would a password. Don't depend on the crypt command to protect anything particularly sensitive. Periodically scan your system for SUID/SGID files. Think of how to protect especially sensitive files in the event that the root account is compromised. Use the compress command (or similar compression system) on files before encrypting them. Never use rot13 as an encryption method to protect data. Check their ownership and permissions to ensure that they are reasonable. This protection includes use of removable media and encryption. chown.
Make paper copies of critical files for comparison or rebuilding your system (e. Consider obtaining a copy of the PGP software and making it available to your users. Make sure to change the password of every "default" account that came with your UNIX. Try to completely rebuild your system from a set of backup tapes to be certain that your backup procedures are complete. Do not set up accounts that run single commands. Do not set up a single account that is shared by a group of people. log in to your own account and use su. disable accounts like uucp and daemon so that people cannot use them to log into your system. . Do not create "default" or "guest" accounts for visitors. Keep your backups under lock and key. Use PGP to encrypt files and sensitive email.don't write it down. Encrypt your backups. Protect your encryption key as you would your password . Be certain that everything on your system is on your backups. because the tapes will eventually fail. Try to restore a few files from your backup tapes on a regular basis. Think about creating restricted filesystem accounts for special-purpose commands or users. Make periodic archive backups of your entire system and keep them forever. Chapter 8: Defending Your Accounts Make sure that every account has a password. and /etc/fstab). or store it online. consider remounting the filesystems as read-only during backups to prevent changes to file access times. If you need to set up an account that can run only a few commands. Remember to update your backup regimen whenever you update your system or change its configuration. Chapter 7: Backups Make regular backups. but escrow the keys in case you lose them. system.. Instead of logging into the root account. Ensure that access to your backup tapes during transport and storage is limited to authorized and trusted individuals. Avoid proprietary encryption methods whose strengths are not known. Make at least every other backup onto a different tape to guard against media failure. investigate doing backups across a network link to a "hot spare" site. /etc/rc. Make periodic paper copies of important files.g. /etc/passwd. Protect your encryption programs against tampering. When using software that accesses files directly rather than through the raw devices. and to create and check digital signatures on important files. Do not reuse a backup tape too many times. Use the group ID mechanism instead. If possible. If your budget and needs are appropriate. Do not store your backups in the same room as your computer system: consider offsite backup storage. use the rsh restricted shell. put it in a shell file.
If your software does not support a shadow password file. enable it. . Do not declare network connections. Make a checkdist listing the size. mount disks read-only if they contain system software. on their directories. you may wish to slighdy alter the algorithm used by crypt 0 to encrypt your password. Monitor the format and contents of the /etc/passwd file. Keep copies of this checklist on removable media and use them to determine if any of your system files or programs have been modified. If you don't have them. If your system supports the TCB/trusted path mechanism. Otherwise. Disable dormant accounts on your computer.. Put time/tty restrictions on login to accounts as appropriate. consider asking your vendor when they will be supported in your version of UNIX. set your systems to require the root password when rebooting in singleuser mode. to help prevent users from picking bad passwords. make sure that the file /etc/passwd cannot be read anonymously over the network via UUCP or TFTP. Integrity Management If your system supports immutable files. Consider using the Distributed Computing Environment (DCE) or Kerberos for any local network of single-user workstations. if your vendor software allows it. consider the benefits of accountname aliasing. especially on accounts that may be used across a network link. or public terminals as "secure" in the /etc/default/loging or /etc/ttys files. If your system does not have a shadow password file. If you have shadow password capability. Consider cracking your own passwords periodically. Be careful who you put in the wheel group. so that they cannot be modified by NFS clients. Enable password constraints. modiflcation time. set a lifetime between one and six months. Tell your users to use longer passwords. as these people can use the su command to become the superuser (if applicable). and permissions of every program on your system. you may wish to export these filesystems read-only. modems. If you have source code for your operating system. For example. consider adding password screening or coaching software to assist your users in picking good passwords. If you are using a central mail server or firewall. but don't place much faith in results that show no passwords cracked. Disable the accounts of people on extended vacations. If possible. use them. Chapter 9. You may wish to include cryptographic checksums in the lists. If you export filesystems containing system programs. Write a daily check script to check for unauthorized changes to files and system directories. Double check the protection attributes on system command and data files. If possible. Establish a system by which accounts are always created with a fixed expiration date and must be renewed to be kept active. you can increase the number of encryption rounds from 25 to 200. enable it. If your computer supports password aging. if present in your software. Consider using some form of one-time password or token-based authentication. enable it. and on all ancestor directories. contact the vendor and request that such support be added. If your system allows the use of a longer password than the standard crypt() uses.
Be careful to protect your backup copies and comparison programs from potential attackers. install it. Consider runting rdist from a protected system on a regular basis to report changes. Don't leave any bin or library directories writable by untrustworthy accounts. Evaluate whether C2 logging on your system is practical and appropriate. . Run integrity checks on your system on a regular basis (see Chapter 9). Chapter 11: Protecting Against Programmed Threats Be extremely careful about installing new software. you can use comparison checking to detect unauthorized modifications. Have your users check the last login time each time they log in to make sure that nobody else is using their accounts. Set permissions on commands to prevent unauthorized alteration. Be aware that log file entries may be forged and misleading in the event of a carefully crafted attack. craft your filters so that they exclude the things you don't want rather than pass only what you do want. Tripwire). sulog. and others. If you can. Keep a paper log on a per-site and per-machine basis. xferlog. also have these messages logged to a special hardcopy printer and to another computer on your network. Review your specialized log files on a regular basis. Scan your system for any user home directories or dot files that are world writ-able or group writable. Don't include nonstandard directories in your execution path. Determine if there is an intrusion-detection and/or audit-reduction tool available to use with your C2 logs.g. When installing new software. Consider making all files on NFS-exported disks owned by user root. If you have backups of critical directories. Make sure that your log files are on your daily backups before they get reset. Consider installing a simple cron task to save copies of the lastlog file to track logins. Be certain that the program and all its data files are stored on read-only media or protected with encryption (or both). If you have syslog. Never install binaries obtained from untrustworthy sources (like the Usenet). Chapter 10: Auditing and Logging Consider installing a dedicated PC or other non-UNIX machine as a network log host. Use this program on a regular basis. If so. Make an offline list of every SUID and SGID file on your system. Turn on whatever accounting mechanism you may have that logs command usage. Make sure that your utmp file is not world writable. If you process your logs in an automated fashion. aculog.. This approach will ensure that you see all exceptional condition messages. Consider adding an automatic log monitor such as Swatch. This review should include (if they exist on your system) loginlog. install it first on a noncritical system on which you can test it and observe any misbehavior or bugs. Run last periodically to see who has been using the system. Consider installing something to check message digests of files (e. configure it so that all auth messages are logged to a special file.
Place your computer systems where they will be protected in the event of earthquake. Check the placement and recharge status of fire extinguishers on a regular basis. Don't use the vi or ex editors in a directory without first checking for a Trojan . Disable terminal answer-back. . Chapter 12: Physical Security Develop a physical security plan that includes a description of your assets. . and drinking in your computer room or near computer equipment. Watch for unauthorized modification to initialization files in any user or system account. If you suspect a network-based worm attack or a virus in widely circulated software.forward files. If you have a dropped ceiling." (the current directory) in your search path. Keep your backups offsite.exrc file. and defenses. Have heat and smoke alarms in your computer room. Periodically review mailer alias files for unauthorized changes. Periodically review all system start-up and configuration files for additions and changes. explosion. Train your users and operators about what to do when an alarm sounds.. Check the behavior of your xargs and find commands. or structural failure.) Check the security of your at program.g. Make sure that personnel know how to use all fire protection and suppression equipment. Make sure that any shared libraries are properly protected and that protections cannot be overridden. Never have writ-able directories in your search path. Review the use of these commands (and the shell) in all scripts executed by cron. Never write or use SUID or SGID shell scripts unless you are a hoary UNIX wizard. put sensors above the ceiling. install alarm sensors both above and below the floor. etc. call a FIRST response team or the vendor to confirm the instance before spreading any alarm. Verify that any files run from the cron command files cannot be altered or replaced by unauthorized users. If you have a raised floor. including editor start-up files. Periodically review configuration files for server programs (e. too. environment. and disable the program if necessary. threats. Have water sensors installed above and below raised floors in your computer room. inetd. Strictly prohibit smoking. Never have ". Make sure that the placement and nature of fire-suppression systems will not endanger personnel or equipment more than is necessary. Make sure that the devices used for backups are not world readable. Disable the automatic command execution feature in GNU Emacs. if possible. Install and regularly clean air filters in your computer room. Determine who might have physical access to any of your resources under any circumstances. perimeter. When running as the superuser. get in the habit of typing full pathnames for commands. eating.conf.
Make sure that staff have adequate time and resources to pursue continuing education opportunities. Have alarms associated with the systems to indicate if values get out of range. Have recorders to monitor these values over time. Provide refresher training on a regular basis. and connectors from tampering. Use bulk erasers. Encrypt sensitive data held on your systems. Do so with the permission of the applicants. Have temperature and humidity controls in your computer room. Have disaster-recovery and business-continuation plans in place. Avoid having glass walls or large windows in your computer room.. consider using a polygraph examination of the candidate. shredders. Use locks. Consider using fiber optic cable for networks. Physically protect your backups and test them periodically. users should be required to take holiday and vacation leave regularly. Have applicants and contractors in sensitive positions obtain bonding. Make sure that users in sensitive positions are not overloaded with work. Have antistatic measures in place. if appropriate. tapes and disks) and printouts before disposal. Protect all your network cables. Consider encrypting all of your backups and offline storage. or incinerators. Protect power switches and fuses. Beware of insects trying to "bug" your computers. Check peripheral devices for local onboard storage that can lead to disclosure of information. . responsibility or stress on a frequent or regular basis. and if it is legally allowable. Never use programmable function keys on a terminal for login or password information. Consider installing an uninterruptible power supply. Have regular performance reviews and monitoring. Chapter 13: Personnel Security Conduct background checks of individuals being considered for sensitive positions. Provide comprehensive and appropriate training for all new personnel. Institute an ongoing user security-awareness program. Sanitize media (e.g. Consider putting motion alarms or other protections in place to protect valuable equipment when personnel are not present. Consider setting autologout on user accounts. In particular. Install filtered power and/or surge protectors for all your computer equip ment. If the position is extremely sensitive. even if compensated for the overload. Store computer equipment and magnetic media away from building structural steel members that might conduct electricity after a lightning strike. Examine them periodically. Try to resolve potential problems before they become real problems. Lock and physically isolate your computers from public access. terminators. tie-downs. and bolts to keep computer equipment from being carried away. and for personnel taking on new assignments.
. Chapter 15. Do not install call forwarding on any of your incoming lines.cmds file (Version 2 UUCP). readable only by the UUCP user. Consider using separate callout telephone lines with no dial-in capability for callback schemes. Check permissions on all associated devices and configuration files. weekly. Make sure that the ruusend command is not in your L. Make sure that /usr/lib/uucp/L.sys or /usr/lib/uucp/Systems is mode 400. Chapter 14: Thlephone Security Make sure that incoming modems automatically log out the user if the telephone call gets interrupted. Disable third-party billing to your modem lines. Only allow execution of commands by UUCP that are absolutely necessary. When any user leaves the organization. Make sure that incoming modems automatically hang up on an incoming call if the caller logs out or if the caller's login process gets killed. Apply policies of least privilege and separation of duties where applicable. Audit access to equipment and critical data. Make sure that the tip or cu programs automatically exit if the user gets logged out of the remote machine or if the telephone call is interrupted. Make sure that the files in the /usr/lib/uucp directories can't be read or written remotely or locally with the UUCP system. Consider making some or all of your UUCP connections use callback to initiate a connection. Make sure that there is no way for the local user to reprogram the modem. Consider use of encrypting modems with fixed keys to guard against unauthorized use or eavesdropping. If there are daily. make sure that access is properly ter minated and duties transferred. Make sure that no UUCP login has /usr/spooI/uucp/uucppublic for its home directory. Consider getting CALLER*ID/ANI to trace incoming calls automatically. UUCP Be sure that every UUCP login has a unique password. Set up a different UUCP login for every computer you cornmunicate with via UUCP. Physically protect the modems and phone lines. Log the numbers that call your system. Monitor users in sensitive positions (without intruding on their privacy) for signs of excess stress or personal problems. make sure that they are run with the UUCP UID but that they are owned by root. or monthly administrative scripts run by cron to clean up the UUCP system. Make sure that outgoing modems hang up on the outgoing call if the tip or cu program is exited. Limit UUCP access to the smallest set of directories necessary. Consider getting leased lines and/or callback modems. Do not export UUCP files or commands on a writable NFS partition. Make sure that no user becomes irreplaceable. Make sure that mail to the UUCP users gets sent to the system administrator.
or kill commands. Do not depend on IP addresses or DNS information for authentication.cf file Make sure that your version of the sendmail program does not support the debug. . If you support anonymous FTP. Make sure that all directory permissions and ownership on your ftp account are set correctly. You may wish to limit UUCP to the directory /usr/spool/uucppublic. Make sure that your sendmail program will not deliver mail directly to a file Make sure that your sendmail program does not have a wizard's password set in the configuration file Limit the number of "trusted users" in your sendmail. contact your vendor and ask when equivalent functionality will be provided as a standard feature in the vendors' systems. Remove all of the UUCP software and libraries if you aren't going to use them. If the machine has an active FTP service. Make sure that your version of the ftpd program is up to date. configure any "incoming" directories so that files dropped off cannot then be uploaded without operator intervention. If your software allows. Frequenfly scan the files in. Delete the "decode" alias in your aliases file. and usage of. don't have a copy of your real /etc/passwd as an ~ftp/etc/passwd. Test your mailer to make sure that it will not deliver a file or execute a command that is encapsulated in an address. Chapter 16. Then. Limit the commands which can be executed from offsite to those that are absolutely necessary. Examine carefully any other alias that delivers to a program or file. The file should also contain the name of any other account that does not belonged to an actual human being. If your standard software does not offer this level of control. Be sure that the UUCP control files are protected and cannot be read or modified using the UUCP program. Only give UUCP access to the directories to which it needs access. Chapter 17: TCP/IP Services Routinely examine your inetd configuration file. Consider disabling any services that provide nonessential information to outsiders that might enable them to gather information about your systems. Disable UUCP over IP unless you need UUCP. and bin. uucp. Disable any unneeded network services. or to "tunnel" through external networks. consider installing the tcpwrapper program to better regulate and log access to your servers. Do not depend on header information in news articles or email as they can be forged. ensure that all UUCP users are listed in the /etc/ftpusers file. Make sure that /etc/ftpusers contains at least the account names root. wiz. your ftp account. TCP/IP Networks Consider lowAevel encryption mechanisms in enterprise networks. Disable or delete any uucpd daemon if you aren't using it.
use static routes where possible and practical. doing this might introduce a vulnerability. in such cases. Disable UUCP over IP unless needed.g.. "magic cookies") instead of using xhost.. Block NTP connections from outside your organization. Make your list of trusted hosts as small as possible.) Make sure that TFTP access. with all published patches in place Make sure that the aliases file cannot be altered by unauthorized individuals. bind) with all patches applied. configure your system to use APOP or Kerberos for authentication.rhosts files).equiv file. Routinely scan your system for suspicious. in . Block incoming RIP packets. Make sure that you are running the latest version of the nameserver software (e.rhosts files on your system. or other servers. Set up your logindevperm or fbtab files to restrict permissions on frame buffers and devices. Do not place usemames in your /etc/hosts. Disable rexec service unless needed. 1988.equiv file. Have an alias for every non-user account so that mail to any valid address gets delivered to a person and not to an unmodified mailbox. Enable the best X11 authentication possible in your configuration (e. remove it. get an updated version. Kerberos. Consider disabling SMTP commands such as VRFY and EXPN with settings in your sendmail configuration. Consider running the authd daemon for all machines in the local net. Make sure that your version of the sendmail program is up to date.lpd file. Block SNMP connections from outside your organization. is limited to a single directory containing boot files. Tell your users about the information that the finger program makes available on the network Make sure that your finger program is more recent than November 5. Make sure that all existing . Disable the rexd RPC service.rhosts files. Scan your network with tools such as SATAN and ISS to determine if you have uncorrected vulnerabilities . Configure your NNTP or INND server to restrict who can post articles or transfer Usenet news.g. IRCs. . if this is possible on your system. if possible. Disable or replace the finger service with something that provides less information. Disable zone transfers in your DNS. if enabled.rhosts files are protected to mode 600. and perhaps against reading by unauthorized users. Be very cautious about installing MUDs. Secure RPC. Use IP addresses instead of domain names in places where the practice makes sense (e. Make sure that all files used by the nameserver software are properly protected against tampering. If you have a plus sign (+) in your /etc/hosts. and that. Make sure that you have the most recent version of the software.before an attacker does the same. If your X11 Server blocks on null connections. (But beware that most implementations of trusted commands don't understand IP addresses in . Consider replacing sendmail with smap. Restrict access to your printing software via the /etc/hosts. Consider not allowing users to have .g. or another more tractable network agent. Scan your network connections regularly with netstat.rhosts. If you are using POP or IMAP.
personal information). Use NIS+ in preference to MS. enable encryption. Make sure that there is no line beginning with a plus sign (+) in the passwd or group files on any NIS server.g. contact your vendor and ask when it will be supported. Disable automatic directory listings. understand its limitations. (See the specific programming recommendations in the chapter. Prevent general access to the server log files. Configure your server to only allow CGI scripts from a particular directory under your control. and set its options appropriately (and conservatively). Do not run your server as user root. If you are using Kerberos.) Consider using taintperl as the implementation language. and Kerberos Enable Kerberos or Secure RPC if possible. Be extremely cautions about writing and installing CGI scripts or programs. Make sure that your version of ypbind only listens on privileged ports. including login. NIS. If you are transferring sensitive information over the WWW connection (e. Chapter 19: RPC. Use netgroups to restrict access to services.. If your version of portmapper has a "securenets" feature. Set the server to not follow symbolic links. and disconnect machines that do not really need to be connected. Have it set to run as a nobody user unique to the WWW service. If this feature is not present. Chapter 18: WWW Security Consider running any www server from a Macintosh platform instead of from a UNIX platform. or to only follow links that are owned by the same user that owns the destination of the link. configure the program so that it restricts which machines can send requests to your portmapper. Make sure that your version of portmapper does not do proxy forwarding. Chapter 20: NFS Program your firewall and routers to block NFS packets. Make sure that there is an asterisk (*) in the password field of any line beginning with a plus sign (+) in both the passwd and group files of any NIS client. if possible. Be aware of the potential risks posed by dependence on a limited number of thirdparty providers. Limit or prohibit server-side includes. Become familiar with all the configuration options for the particular server you use. Do not mix WWW and FTP servers on the same machine in the same filesystem hierarchy. . Re-evaluate why you are connected to the network at all. Consider making your www server chroot into a protected directory. Put keylogout in your logout file if you are running secure RPC. NIS+. Monitor the logs and usage of your WWW service.
Don't mount NFS directories across subnet boundaries. Use NFS version 3. Monitor activity on the firewall regularly. Chapter 21: Firewalls Keep in mind that firewalls should be used in addition to other security measure and not in place of them. Use the most complete firewall you can afford and one that makes sense in your environment. and Usenet on closely guarded bastion hosts. Give serious thought to whether or not you really want all your systems to be connected to the rest of the world. At the very least. use the secure option for NFS mounts. Plan accordingly: periodically test your firewall and have defense in depth for that eventuality. Break your network up into small. Make sure that firewall machines have the highest level of logging. Make sure that user accounts have different passwords for machines on different subnets. Export filesystems to a small set of hosts. if available. Keep in mind that firewalls can sometirnes fail.) . email. When possible. rather than creating your own. Consider intemal firewalls as well as extemal firewalls. (See the discussion in the chapter. Configure your firewall/bastion hosts to remove all unnecessary services and utilities. Consider setting a policy of default deny for your firewall. Use fsirand on all partitions that are exported. replicating disk on local machines may be a safer approach.or group-writable directories. Set root ownership on files and directories mounted remotely. Monitor who is mounting your NFS partitions (but realize that you may not have a complete picture because of the stateless nature of NFS). Mount partitions nodev. independent subnets. Consider buying a commercially provided and configured firewall. Reconsider why you want to use NFS. even if a firewall is interposed. and think about doing without. if possible. Do not export filesystems to yourself! Do not use the root= option when exporting filesystems unless absolutely necessary. in TCP mode. Use the netgroups mechanism to restrict the export of (and thus the ability to remotely mount) filesystems to a small set of local machines. Never export a mounted partition on your system to an untrusted machine if the partition has any world. Don't configure any machine to trust machines outside the local subnet. Set the kemel portmon variable to ignore NFS requests from unprivileged ports. Rerun the program periodically. Mount partitions nosuid unless SUID access is absolutely necessary. Plan on centralizing services such as DNS. put a screening router in place. if available. Each subnet should have its own NIS server and netgroups domain. Configure firewall machines without user accounts and program development utilities. Have a central mail machine with MX aliasing and name rewriting. using the access= or ro= options. Do not export user home directories in a writable mode. For instance.
Avoid storing or transmitting passwords in clear text in any application. Note and timestamp everything you discover and do. Chapter 24: Discovering a Break-in Plan ahead: have response plans designed and rehearsed. Run machine status-checking programs regularly to watch for unusual activity: ps. be certain that you restore the system to a known. Consider installing the tcpwrapper program to restrict and log access to local network services. Chapter 25: Denial of Service Attacks and Solutions If user quotas are available on your system. Be very cautious about generating and using "random" numbers. However. enable them. Run hardcopies of files showing changes and tracing activity. Consider writing your own wrapper programs to provide extra control or logging for your local system. Think about using chroot for privileged programs. don't panic! Start a diary and/or script file as soon as you discover or suspect a break-in. If a break-in occurs.there is too much detail to list here. Consider installing the ident/authd service on your system to help track network access. Install a firewall to prevent network problems. Initial and time-stamp these copies. Carefully examine the system after a break-in. . vmstat. Specifically. Observe the 14 general rules presented in the chapter when writing any program that will be SUID or SGID. Chapter 23: Writing Secure SUID and Network Programs Convey to your vendors your concem about sofiware quality in their products. good state. remember that the results retumed by this service are not completely trustworthy. Observe the 17 general rules presented in the chapter when writing any network server programs. If a break-in occurs. Observe the 24 general rules presented in the chapter when writing any software. Don't test new software while running as root. w. See the chapter text for specific . etc. Configure appropriate process and user limits on your system. and especially when writing software that needs extra privileges or trust.Chapter 22: Wrappers and Proxies Consider installing the smap proxy in place of the sendmail program to receive mail over the network. consider making a dump of the system to backup media before correcting anything. Carefully check backups and logs to determine if this is a single occurrence or is related to a set of incidents.
levels of user access and responsibility. Consult with your insurance carrier to determine if your insurance covers loss from break-ins. Develop contingency plans and response plans in advance of difficulties. Law Consult with your legal counsel to determine legal options and liability in the event of a security incident. Expand your professional training and contacts by attending security training sessions or conferences. Develop contacts with your local law-enforcement personnel.g. Make sure that users understand copyright and license restrictions on commercial software. pornographic material. printouts. Monitor disk usage and encourage users to archive and delete old files. and sound files. This includes copyrighted material. Chapter 26: Computer Security and US. Keep your backups separate from your machine. Formally register copyrights on your locally developed code and databases. etc. Include an explicit statement about the return of manuals. trade secrets. Also determine if you will be required to institute criminal or civil action to recover on your insurance. and machine names. Do not be unduly hesitant about reporting a computer crime and involving lawenforcement personnel. Keep written records of your actions when investigating an incident. Prohibit or restrict access to Usenet from organizational machines. Have a spare network connection available. Make sure that you have appropriate swap space configured. and other information upon user departure. Make your users aware of the dangers of electronic harassment or defamation. Ensure good physical security for all network cables and connectors. Make certain that your legal counsel is consulted before you provide locally developed software to others outside your organization. Define. in writing. and other materials as you proceed. Put explicit copyright and/or proprietary property notices in code start-up screens and source code.. Be aware of other liability concerns. If called upon to help in an investigation. . images. Configure disk partitions to have sufficient inodes and storage. if possible. Keep available an up4o-date paper list of low-level network addresses (e. if you need it. Run long-running tasks in the background. Have all users provide a signature noting their understanding of and agreement to such a statement. printouts. Restrict or prohibit access to material that could lead to legal difficulties. Recommend a disinterested third party to act as an expert. setting the nice to a positive value. Replace any "welcome" messages with warnings against unauthorized use. Consider investing in a network monitor appropriate for your network. Consider coupling this to provision of personal accounts with an independent service provider. request a signed statement by a judge requesting (or directing) your "expert" assistance. IP addresses. Ethernet addresses). Educate your users on polite methods of sharing system resources. Determine if your insurance covers business interruption during an investigation. Consider joining security-related organizations. Restrict access to cryptographic software from the network. Time-stamp and initial media.
Understand the commands that are available to manipulate processes on your system. and incredibly popular. attractive. Explore professional opportunities that enable you to network with other professionals. and fixig security bugs in a timely fashion. Buy another 1000 copies of this book for all your friends and acquaintances. icmpquery & icmpush. identd to get infos on a running process. dll's. seifried. Under construction nslookup (ls -d acme.com. don't run progs as root. modems. and add to your knowledge and experience. Explore other resources concerning security. Protest when vendors attempt to sell you products advertised with "hacker challenges" instead of more reliable proof of good design and testing. Trust us on this. fping gping. Appendix B: Important Files Become familiar with the important files on your system. rogue phone plugs. traceroute -S -p53 x. net view /domain: mydomain. Appendix F: Organizations Learn more about security.net. Appendix G: Table of IP Services Read the table and add your own site notes indicating the services you do and do not wish to support. The copies will make you intelligent. and the Internet. Monitor newsgroups. Appendix C: UNIX Processes Understand how processes work on your system. core dump. Develop a healthy sense of paranoia. and other resources that will help you stay current on threats and countermeasures.Chapter 27: "Who Do You Trust? Read the chapter. close tcp 53 on firewall. spread dial-in phone #s.org/lasg.g RFC 1244 Policy for handling incidents: Overview (goal and objectives in handling the incident) Evalution (how serious is it?) Notification (who should be notified) . remove all unneeded sws.txt). world-writable files + dir. strobe & udp-scan. vrfy/expn mysmtp. netcat. UNIX. mailing lists. > zone. tx alarm if nic set to promiscuous. adequate testing. host -lvt any acme. Understand why SUID/SGID files have those permissions. Make your vendor aware of your concerns about security.
since it is very different from the way lpd works. I will however. Suid programs can be made only accessible to those who need to use them. if you just know how. On the local machine domain sockets are used. http://feynman. If an attacker breaks into a system account he cannot reach any suid root program. and of course Qmail One gruesome night of crawling through man pages. Examples are ping and Xwrapper. 7 had a legitimate reason to be suid root (like su) while the other 5 needed to be suid root for practical reasons but there really should be a better way of doing this. dns. deeply hidden scripts and obscure configuration files reveals that in fact the only one not using port 6000 is the local user. I've decided to switch to a little known print system called PDQ.tam. As before. For six of the twelve I added extra requirements . Even better. . Ditto of xdm's UDP port. Programs like sudo provide other ways to control who may use what program. but it's got the funniest web site of the lot. Many classic programs cannot be set up this way and should not be exposed to the public Internet. All remaining twelve programs had one thing in common: normally they would only be started by humans. The usual way it to create a special group for each class of suid programs you can identify and make each user a member of the groups needed. try to explain how it works. I won't go into detail on installing it. among other things. newsgroups. http and FTP software. X's TCP port can be banished. very well audited. No system account needs to use them. It's not particularly sophisticated. I therefore put them all into a directory that only those accounts that correspond to real users can access. Preferably it should be all of them. Anything that does interaction with the outside world should either be very trivial.uiuc. Of the remaining 12. that's what documentation is for.edu/pdq So I have my standards.a number of special group IDs controls who may access these. or be sufficiently sandboxed that possible damage is limited. Response Legal/investigative Documentation logs (records to keep from before/during/after the incident) Temp stuff djbDNS instead of BIND Use tcpserver to replace inetd netstat -an --inet netstat -nl --inet # netstat -ln dnscache There's replacements for.
Security Tools Nessus NetCat TCPDump Snort Saint Ethereal Whisker Internet Security Scanner PortSentry Sniff TripWire Cybercop Scanner HPing 2 Security Auditor's Research Assistant (SARA) Sniff It SATAN IP Filter IP Tables Firewalk Strobe L0pht Crack John The Ripper Hunt OpenSSH TCP Wrappers nTop ping/traceroute/telnet NetBIOS Auditing Tool Scanlogd Sam Spade NFR logcheck Perl Ngrep (Network monitoring with ngrep) Cheops Vetescan Retina Crack/Libcrack Cerberus Internet Scanner Swatch Nemesis LSOF Lids IPTraf IPLog FragRouter Queso Top .
Lcrzoex mscan and sscan from Jsbach ADMhack Osiris host integrity monitoring Samhain integrity monitoring Automate Linux Configuration with cfengine By Carla Schroder Nagios ("Nagios is an open source host.0 by Thomas Stocking) Secure remote file management with sshfs by StoneLion . Nagios 2. service and network monitoring program".