I shall say more later about this second kind of Egoism, this antialtruistic Egoism, this Egoism as a doctrine

of means. What I am now concerned with is thatutterlydistinctkindofEgoism,whichholdsthateachmanoughtrationally to hold: My own greatest happiness is the only good thing there is; my actions canonlybegoodasmeans,insofarastheyhelptowinmethis.Thisisadoctrine whichisnotmuchheldbywritersnowadays.Itisadoctrinethatwaslargely heldbyEnglishHedonistsinthe17thand18thcenturies:itis,forexample,atthe bottomofHobbesEthics.ButeventheEnglishschoolappeartohavemadeone step forward in the present century: they are most of them nowadays Utilitarians. They do recognise that if my own happiness is good, it would be strangethatotherpeopleshappinessshouldnotbegoodtoo.(591) In order fully to expose the absurdity of this kind of Egoism, it is necessary to examinecertainconfusionsuponwhichitsplausibilitydepends.(592) Thechiefoftheseistheconfusioninvolvedintheconceptionofmyowngood asdistinguishedfromthegoodofothers.Thisisaconceptionwhichwealluse every day; it is one of the first to which the plain man is apt to appeal in discussing any question of Ethics: and Egoism is commonly advocated chiefly because its meaning is not clearly perceived. It is plain, indeed, that the name Egoism more properly applies to the theory that my own good is the sole good,thanthatmyownpleasureisso.AmanmayquitewellbeanEgoist,evenif hebenotaHedonist.Theconceptionwhichis,perhaps,mostcloselyassociated with Egoism is that denoted by the words my own interest. The Egoist is the manwhoholdsthatatendencytopromotehisowninterestisthesolepossible, and sufficient, justification of all his actions. But this conception of my own interestplainlyincludes,ingeneral,verymuchmorethanmyownpleasure.It is,indeed,onlybecauseandinsofarasmyowninteresthasbeenthoughtto consist solely in my own pleasure, that Egoists have been led to hold that my ownpleasureisthesolegood.Theircourseofreasoningisasfollows:Theonly thing I ought to secure is my own interest; but myown interest consists in my greatestpossiblepleasure;andthereforetheonlythingIoughttopursueismy own pleasure. That it is very natural, on reflection, thus to identify my own pleasurewithmyowninterest;andthatithasgenerallybeendonebymodern moralists,maybeadmitted.ButwhenProf.Sidgwickpointsthisout(III.xiv.5, Div.III.),heshouldhavealsopointedoutthatthisidentificationhasbynomeans beenmadeinordinarythought.Whentheplainmansaysmyowninterest,he doesnotmeanmyownpleasurehedoesnotcommonlyevenincludethis he means my own advancement, my own reputation, the getting of a better income etc., etc. That Prof. Sidgwick should not have noticed this, and that he should give the reason he gives for the fact that the ancient moralists did not identifymyowninterestwithmyownpleasure,seemstobeduetohishaving failedtonoticethatveryconfusionintheconceptionofmyowngoodwhichI amnowtopointout.Thatconfusionhas,perhaps,beenmoreclearlyperceived by Plato than by any other moralist, and to point it out suffices to refute Prof. SidgwicksownviewthatEgoismisrational.(593) What,then,ismeantbymyowngood?Inwhatsensecanathingbegoodfor me?Itisobvious,ifwereflect,thattheonlythingwhichcanbelongtome,which

canbemine,issomethingwhichisgood,andnotthefactthatitisgood.When, therefore,ItalkofanythingIgetasmyowngood,Imustmeaneitherthatthe thingIgetisgood,orthatmypossessingitisgood.Inbothcasesitisonlythe thingorthepossessionofitwhichismine,andnotthegoodnessofthatthingor that possession. There is no longer any meaning in attaching the my to our predicate, and saying: The possession of this by me is my good. Even if we interpretthisbyMypossessionofthisiswhatIthinkgood,thesamestillholds: forwhatIthinkisthatmypossessionofitisgoodsimply;and,ifIthinkrightly, thenthetruthisthatmypossessionofitisgoodsimplynot,inanysense,my good;and,ifIthinkwrongly,itisnotgoodatall.Inshort,whenItalkofathingas my own good all that I can mean is that something which will be exclusively mine, as my own pleasure is mine (whatever be the various senses of this relation denoted by possession), is also good absolutely; or rather that my possession of it is good absolutely. The good of it can in no possible sense be private or belong to me; any more than a thing can exist privately or for one persononly.TheonlyreasonIcanhaveforaimingatmyowngood,isthatitis good absolutely that what I so call should belong to megood absolutely that I should have something, which, if I have it, others cannot have. But if it is good absolutelythatIshouldhaveit,theneveryoneelsehasasmuchreasonforaiming at my having it, as I have myself. If, therefore, it is true of any single mans interestorhappinessthatitoughttobehissoleultimateend,thiscanonly mean that that mans interest or happiness is the sole good, the Universal Good, and the only thing that anybody ought to aim at. What Egoism holds, therefore, is that each mans happiness is the sole goodthat a number of different things are each of them the only good thing there isan absolute contradiction!Nomorecompleteandthoroughrefutationofanytheorycouldbe desired.(594) 60. Yet Prof. Sidgwick holds that Egoism is rational; and it will be useful briefly to considerthereasonswhichhegivesforthisabsurdconclusion.TheEgoist,he says (last Chap 1), may avoid the proof of Utilitarianism by declining to affirm, either implicitly or explicitly, that his own greatest happiness is not merelytheultimaterationalendforhimself,butapartofUniversalGood.And inthepassagetowhichhehererefersus,ashavingthereseenthis,hesays:It cannotbeprovedthatthedifferencebetweenhisownhappinessandanothers happiness is not for him allimportant (IV. ii. 1). What does Prof. Sidgwick meanbythesephrasestheultimaterationalendforhimself,andforhimall important?Hedoesnotattempttodefinethem;anditislargelytheuseofsuch undefinedphraseswhichcausesabsurditiestobecommittedinphilosophy(60 1) Isthereanysenseinwhichathingcanbeanultimaterationalendforoneperson andnotforanother?Byultimatemustbemeantatleastthattheendisgoodin itselfgoodinourundefinablesense;andbyrational,atleast,thatitistruly good.Thatathingshouldbeanultimaterationalendmeans,then,thatitistruly goodinitself;andthatitistrulygoodinitselfmeansthatitisapartofUniversal Good. Can we assign any meaning to that qualification for himself, which will make it cease to be a part of Universal Good? The thing is impossible: for the

Egoistshappinessmusteitherbegoodinitself,andsoapartofUniversalGood, orelseitcannotbegoodinitselfatall:thereisnoescapingthisdilemma.Andifit is not good at all, what reason can he have for aiming at it? how can it be a rational end for him? That qualification for himself has no meaning unless it implies not for others; and if it implies not for others, then it cannot be a rational end for him, since it cannot be truly good in itself: the phrase an ultimate rational end for himself is a contradiction in terms. By saying that a thingisanendforoneparticularperson,orgoodforhim,canonlybemeantone offourthings.Either(1)itmaybemeantthattheendinquestionissomething whichwillbelongexclusivelytohim;butinthatcase,ifitistoberationalforhim to aim at it, that he should exclusively possess it must be a part of Universal Good.Or(2)itmaybemeantthatitistheonlythingatwhichheoughttoaim; but this can only be, because, by so doing, he will do the most he can towards realisingUniversalGood:andthis,inourcase,willonlygiveEgoismasadoctrine ofmeans.Or(3)itmaybemeantthatthethingiswhathedesiresorthinksgood; and then, if he thinks wrongly, it is not a rational end at all, and, if he thinks rightly,itisapartofUniversalGood.Or(4)itmaybemeantthatitispeculiarly appropriatethatathingwhichwillbelongexclusivelytohimshouldalsobyhim beapprovedoraimedat;but,inthiscase,boththatitshouldbelongtohimand thatheshouldaimatitmustbepartsofUniversalGood:bysayingthatacertain relationbetweentwothingsisfittingorappropriate,wecanonlymeanthatthe existenceofthatrelationisabsolutelygoodinitself(unlessitbesoasameans, which gives case (2)). By no possible meaning, then, that can be given to the phrase that his own happiness is the ultimate rational end for himself can the Egoistescapetheimplicationthathisownhappinessisabsolutelygood;andby sayingthatitistheultimaterationalend,hemustmeanthatitistheonlygood thingthewholeofUniversalGood:and,ifhefurthermaintains,thateachmans happiness is the ultimate rational end for him, we have the fundamental contradictionofEgoismthatanimmensenumberofdifferentthingsare,each ofthem,thesolegood.Anditiseasytoseethatthesameconsiderationsapply totheprhasethatthedifferencebetweenhisownhappinessandanothersisfor himallimportant.Thiscanonlymeaneither(1)thathisownhappinessisthe onlyendwhichwillaffecthim,or(2)thattheonlyimportantthingforhim(asa means)istolooktohisownhappiness,or(3)thatitisonlyhisownhappiness whichhecaresabout,or(4)thatitisgoodthateachmanshappinessshouldbe theonlyconcernofthatman.Andnoneofthesepropositions,trueastheymay be,havethesmallesttendencytoshewthatifhisownhappinessisdesirableat all,itisnotapartofUniversalGood.Eitherhisownhappinessisagoodthingor itisnot;and,inwhateversenseitmaybeallimportantforhim,itmustbetrue that, if it is not good, he is not justified in pursuing it, and that, if it is good, everyoneelsehasanequalreasontopursueit,sofarastheyareableandsofar asitdoesnotexcludetheirattainmentofothermorevaluablepartsofUniversal Good.Inshortitisplainthattheadditionofforhimformetosuchwordsas ultimaterationalend,good,importantcanintroducenothingbutconfusion. The only possible reason that can justify any action is that by it the greatest possible amount of what is good absolutely should be realised. And if anyone saysthattheattainmentofhisownhappinessjustifieshisactions,hemustmean thatthisisthegreatestpossibleamountofUniversalGoodwhichhecanrealise. Andthisagaincanonlybetrueeitherbecausehehasnopowertorealisemore,

inwhichcaseheonlyholdsEgoismasadoctrineofmeans;orelsebecausehis ownhappinessisthegreatestamountofUniversalGoodwhichcanberealisedat all, in which case we have Egoism proper, and the flagrant contradiction that everypersonshappinessissinglythegreatestamountofUniversalGoodwhich canberealisedatall.(602) 61. It should be observed that, since this is so, the relation of Rational Egoism to Rational Benevolence, which Prof. Sidgwick regards as the profoundest problemofEthics(III.xiii.5,n.1),appearsinquiteadifferentlighttothatin which he presents it. Even if a man, he says, admits the selfevidence of the principleofRationalBenevolence,hemaystillholdthathisownhappinessisan end which it is irrational for him to sacrifice to any other; and that therefore a harmony between the maxim of Prudence and the maxim of Rational Benevolence must be somehow demonstrated, if morality is to be made completelyrational.ThislatterviewisthatwhichImyselfhold(lastChap.1). Prof. Sidgwick then goes on to shew that the inseparable connection between UtilitarianDutyandthegreatesthappinessoftheindividualwhoconformstoit cannot be satisfactorily demonstrated on empirical grounds (Ib. 4). And the finalparagraphofhisbooktellsusthat,sincethereconciliationofdutyandself interest is to be regarded as a hypothesis logically necessary to avoid a fundamentalcontradictioninonechiefdepartmentofourthought,itremainsto ask how far this necessity constitutes a sufficient reason for accepting this hypothesis (Ib. 5). To assume the existence of such a Being, as God, by the consensus of theologians, is conceived to be would, he has already argued, ensure the required reconciliation; since the Divine Sanctions of such a God would,ofcourse,sufficetomakeitalwayseveryonesinteresttopromotethe universalhappinesstothebestofhisknowledge(Ib.5).(611) NowwhatisthisreconciliationofdutyandselfinterestwhichDivineSanctions could ensure? It would consist in the mere fact that the same conduct which producedthegreatestpossiblehappinessofthegreatestnumberwouldalways also produce the greatest possible happiness of the agent. If this were the case (and our empirical knowledge shews that it is not the case in this world), morality would, Prof. Sidgwick thinks, be completely rational; we should avoid an ultimate and fundamental contradiction in our apparent intuitions of whatisReasonableinconduct.Thatistosay,weshouldavoidthenecessityof thinkingthatitisasmanifestanobligationtosecureourowngreatestHappiness (maximofPrudence),astosecurethegreatestHappinessonthewhole(maxim of Benevolence). But it is perfectly obvious we should not. Prof. Sidgwick here commitsthecharacteristicfallacyofEmpiricismthefallacyofthinkingthatan alterationinfactscouldmakeacontradictionceasetobeacontradiction.Thata single mans happiness should be the sole good, and that also everybodys happinessshouldbethesolegood,isacontradictionwhichcannotbesolvedby the assumption that the same conduct will secure both: it would be equally contradictory,howevercertainwewerethatthatassumptionwasjustified.Prof. Sidgwick strains at a gnat and swallows a camel. He thinks the Divine Omnipotence must be called into play to secure that what gives other people pleasure should also give it to himthat only so can Ethics be made rational;

whileheoverlooksthefactthateventhisexerciseofDivineOmnipotencewould leave in Ethics a contradiction, in comparison with which his difficulty is a triflea contradiction, which would reduce all Ethics to mere nonsense, and before which the Divine Omnipotence must be powerless to all eternity. That each mans happiness should be the sole good, which we have seen to be the principleofEgoism,isinitselfacontradiction;andthatitshouldalsobetruethat the Happiness of all is the sole good, which is the principle of Universalistic Hedonism, would introduce another contradiction. And that these propositions should all be true might well be called the profoundest problem in Ethics: it wouldbeaproblemnecessarilyinsoluble.Buttheycannotallbetrue,andthere is no reason, but confusion, for the supposition that they are. Prof. Sidgwick confuses this contradiction with the mere fact (in which there is no contradiction) that our own greatest happiness and that of all do not seem alwaysattainablebythesamemeans.Thisfact,ifHappinesswerethesolegood, would indeed be of some importance; and, on any view, similar facts are of importance.Buttheyarenothingbutinstancesoftheoneimportantfactthatin this world the quantity of good which is attainable is ridiculously small compared to that which is imaginable. That I cannot get the most possible pleasureformyself,ifIproducethemostpossiblepleasureonthewhole,isno more the profoundest problem of Ethics, than that in any case I cannot get as muchpleasurealtogetheraswouldbedesirable.Itonlystatesthat,ifwegetas muchgoodaspossibleinoneplace,wemaygetlessonthewhole,becausethe quantityofattainablegoodislimited.TosaythatIhavetochoosebetweenmy owngoodandthatofallisafalseantithesis:theonlyrationalquestionishowto choosebetweenmyownandthatofothers,andtheprincipleonwhichthismust beansweredisexactlythesameasthatonwhichImustchoosewhethertogive pleasuretothisotherpersonortothat.(612) 61,n.1:Theitalicsaremine. 62. It is plain, then, that the doctrine of Egoism is selfcontradictory; and that one reasonwhythisisnotperceivedisaconfusionwithregardtothemeaningofthe phrase my own good. And it may be observed that this confusion and the neglect of this contradiction are necessarily involved in the transition from NaturalisticHedonism,asordinarilyheld,toUtilitarianism.Mill,forinstance,as wesaw,declares:Eachperson,sofarashebelievesittobeattainable,desires his own happiness (p. 53). And he offers this as a reason why the general happiness is desirable. We have seen that to regard it as such, involves, in the firstplace,thenaturalisticfallacy.Butmoreover,evenifthatfallacywerenota fallacy, it could only be a reason for Egoism and not for Utilitarianism. Mills argument is as follows: a man desires his own happiness; therefore his own happiness is desirable. Further: A man desires nothing but his own happiness; thereforehisownhappinessisalonedesirable.Wehavenexttoremember,that everybody, according to Mill, so desires his own happiness: and then it will follow that everybodys happiness is alone desirable. And this is simply a contradictioninterms.Justconsiderwhatitmeans.Eachmanshappinessisthe only thing desirable: several different things are each of them the only thing desirable.ThisisthefundamentalcontradictionofEgoism.Inordertothinkthat

what his arguments tend to prove is not Egoism but Utilitarianism, Mill must think that he can infer from the proposition Each mans happiness is his own good,thepropositionThehappinessofallisthegoodofall;whereasinfact,if weunderstandwhathisowngoodmeans,itisplainthatthelattercanonlybe inferredfromThehappinessofallisthegoodofeach.NaturalisticHedonism, then,logicallyleadsonlytoEgoism.Ofcourse,aNaturalistmightholdthatwhat we aimed at was simply pleasure not our own pleasure; and that, always assuming the naturalistic fallacy, would give an unobjectionable ground for Utilitarianism. But more commonly he will hold that it is his own pleasure he desires,oratleastwillconfusethiswiththeother;andthenhemustlogicallybe ledtoadoptEgoismandnotUtilitarianism.(621) 63. The second cause I have to give why Egoism should be thought reasonable, is simply its confusion with that other kind of EgoismEgoism as a doctrine of means. This second Egoism has a right to say: You ought to pursue your own happiness,sometimesatallevents;itmayevensay:Always.Andwhenwefindit saying this we are apt to forget its proviso: But only as a means to something else.Thefactisweareinanimperfectstate;wecannotgettheidealallatonce. Andhenceitisoftenourboundenduty,weoftenabsolutelyought,todothings whicharegoodonlyorchieflyasmeans:wehavetodothebestwecan,whatis absolutely right, but not what is absolutely good. Of this I shall say more hereafter.IonlymentionitherebecauseIthinkitismuchmoreplausibletosay thatweoughttopursueourownpleasureasameansthanasanend,andthat this doctrine, through confusion, lends some of its plausibility to the utterly distinct doctrine of Egoism proper: My own greatest pleasure is the only good thing.(631) 64. SomuchforEgoism.OfUtilitarianismnotmuchneedbesaid;buttwopointsmay seemdeservingofnotice.(641) Thefirstisthatthisname,likethatofEgoism,doesnotnaturallysuggestthatall ouractionsaretobejudgedaccordingtothedegreeinwhichtheyareameansto pleasure.Itsnaturalmeaningisthatthestandardofrightandwronginconduct isitstendencytopromotetheinterestofeverybody.Andbyinterestiscommonly meantavarietyofdifferentgoods,classedtogetheronlybecausetheyarewhata man commonly desires for himself, so far as his desires have not that psychological quality which is meant by moral. The useful thus means, and was in ancient Ethics systematically used to mean, what is a means to the attainment of goods other than moral goods. It is quite an unjustifiable assumptionthatthesegoodsareonlygoodasmeanstopleasureorthattheyare commonlysoregarded.ThechiefreasonforadoptingthenameUtilitarianism was,indeed,merelytoemphasizethefactthatrightandwrongconductmustbe judgedbyitsresultsasameans,inoppositiontothestrictlyIntuitionisticview thatcertainwaysofactingwererightandotherswrong,whatevertheirresults mightbe.Inthusinsistingthatwhatisrightmustmeanwhatproducesthebest possibleresultsUtilitarianismisfullyjustified.Butwiththiscorrectcontention therehasbeenhistorically,andverynaturally,associatedadoubleerror.(1)The

best possible results were assumed to consist only in a limited class of goods, roughlycoincidingwiththosewhichwerepopularlydistinguishedastheresults ofmerelyusefulorinterestedactions;andtheseagainwerehastilyassumed to be good only as means to pleasure. (2) The Utilitarians tend to regard everythingasameremeans,neglectingthefactthatsomethingswhicharegood as means are also good as ends. Thus, for instance, assuming pleasure to be a good,thereisalsoatendencytovaluepresentpleasureonlyasameanstofuture pleasure, and not, as is strictly necessary if pleasure is good as an end, also to weigh it against possible future pleasures. Much utilitarian argument involves thelogicalabsurditythatwhatishereandnow,neverhasanyvalueinitself,but isonlytobejudgedbyitsconsequences;whichagain,ofcourse,whentheyare realised,wouldhavenovalueinthemselves,butwouldbemeremeanstoastill furtherfuture,andsoonadinfinitum.(642) ThesecondpointdeservingnoticewithregardtoUtilitarianismisthat,whenthe name is used for a form of Hedonism, it does not commonly, even in its description of its end, accurately distinguish between means and end. Its best known formula is that the result by which actions are to be judged is the greatesthappinessforthegreatestnumber.Butitisplainthat,ifpleasureisthe solegood,providedthequantitybeequallygreat,anequallydesirableresultwill have been obtained whether it be enjoyed by many or by few, or even if it be enjoyedbynobody.Itisplainthat,ifweoughttoaimatthegreatesthappinessof the greatest number, this can only, on the hedonistic principle, be because the existenceofpleasureinagreatnumberofpersonsseemstobethebestmeans available for attaining the existence of the greatest quantity of pleasure. This may actually be the case; but it is fair to suspect that Utilitarians have been influenced, in their adoption of the hedonistic principle, by this failure to distinguish clearly between pleasure or consciousness of pleasure and its possessionbyaperson.Itisfareasiertoregardthepossessionofpleasurebya numberofpersonsasthesolegood,thansotoregardthemereexistenceofan equally great quantity of pleasure. If, indeed, we were to take the Utilitarian principlestrictly,andtoassumethemtomeanthatthepossessionofpleasureby manypersonswasgoodinitself,theprincipleisnothedonistic:itincludesasa necessarypartoftheultimateend,theexistenceofanumberofpersons,andthis willincludeverymuchmorethanmerepleasure.(643) Utilitarianism,however,ascommonlyheld,mustbeunderstoodtomaintainthat either mere consciousness of pleasure, or consciousness of pleasure together with the minimum adjunct which may be meant by the existence of such consciousnessinatleastoneperson,isthesolegood.Thisisitssignificanceasan ethical doctrine; and as such it has already been refuted in my refutation of Hedonism.Themostthatcanbesaidforitisthatitdoesnotseriouslymisleadin itspracticalconclusions,onthegroundthat,asanempiricalfact,themethodof acting which brings most good on the whole does also bring most pleasure. Utilitariansdoindeedgenerallydevotemostoftheirargumentstoshewingthat thecourseofactionwhichwillbringmostpleasureisingeneralsuchascommon sense would approve. We have seen that Prof. Sidgwick appeals to this fact as tendingtoshewthatpleasureisthesolegood;andwehavealsoseenthatitdoes not tend to shew this. We have seen how very flimsy the other arguments

advancedforthispropositionare;andthat,ifitbefairlyconsideredbyitself,it appears to be quite ridiculous. And, moreover, that the actions which produce most good on the whole do also produce most pleasure is extremely doubtful. Theargumentstendingtoshewitareallmoreorlessvitiatedbytheassumption thatwhatappeartobenecessaryconditionsfortheattainmentofmostpleasure in the near future, will always continue so to be. And, even with this vicious assumption,theyonlysucceedinmakingoutahighlyproblematicalcase.How, therefore, this fact is to be explained, if it be a fact, need not concern us. It is sufficient to have shewn that many complex states of mind are much more valuablethanthepleasuretheycontain.Ifthisbeso,noformofHedonismcanbe true.And,sincethepracticalguidanceaffordedbypleasureasacriterionissmall in proportion as the calculation attempts to be accurate, we can well afford to await further investigation, before adopting a guide, whose utility is very doubtfulandwhosetrustworthinesswehavegravereasontosuspect.(644) 65. ThemostimportantpointswhichIhaveendeavouredtoestablishinthischapter are as follows. (1) Hedonism must be strictly defined as the doctrine that Pleasure is the only thing which is good in itself: this view seems to owe its prevalencemainlytothenaturalisticfallacy,andMillsargumentsmaybetaken as a type of those which are fallacious in this respect; Sidgwick alone has defended it without committing this fallacy, and its final refutation must thereforepointouttheerrorsinhisarguments(3638).(2)MillsUtilitarianism is criticised; it being shewn (a) that he commits the naturalistic fallacy in identifyingdesirablewithdesired;(b)thatpleasureisnottheonlyobjectof desire.ThecommonargumentsforHedonismseemtorestonthosetwoerrors (3944).(3)HedonismisconsideredasanIntuition,anditispointedout(a) thatMillsallowancethatsomepleasuresareinferiorinqualitytoothersimplies boththatitisanIntuitionandthatitisafalseone(4648);(b)thatSidgwick fails to distinguish pleasure from consciousness of pleasure, and that it is absurdtoregardtheformeratallevents,asthesolegood(4952);(c)thatit seems equally absurd to regard consciousness of pleasure as the sole good, since, if it were so, a world in which nothing else existed might be absolutely perfect:Sidgwickfailstoputtohimselfthisquestion,whichistheonlyclearand decisive one (5357). (4) What are commonly considered to be the two main types of Hedonism, namely, Egoism and Utilitarianism, are not only different from, but strictly contradictory of, one another; since the former asserts My owngreatestpleasureisthesolegood,thelatterThegreatestpleasureofallis the sole good. Egoism seems to owe its plausibility partly to the failure to observethiscontradictionafailurewhichisexemplifiedbySidgwick;partlyto aconfusionofEgoismasadoctrineofend,withthesameasadoctrineofmeans. If Hedonism is true, Egoism cannot be so; still less can it be so, if Hedonism is false.TheendofUtilitarianism,ontheotherhand,would,ifHedonismweretrue, be,notindeedthebestconceivable,butthebestpossibleforustopromote;butit isrefutedbytherefutationofHedonism(5864)