Society for French Historical Studies

The Functioning of Ambassadors under Louis XIV Author(s): William J. Roosen Reviewed work(s): Source: French Historical Studies, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Spring, 1970), pp. 311-332 Published by: Duke University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/286062 . Accessed: 22/05/2012 09:44
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The Functioning of Ambassadors under Louis XIV

William J. Roosen
In the centuries since states and princes began sending representatives to one another, the kinds of activities in which diplomats engaged have varied according to time and place. Some diplomats were little more than postmen who took a message and were expected to return with an answer. Others in effect controlled the government to which they were accredited. Yet, despite the many studies which have been made of early modern diplomacy, relatively little is known about the working methods, duties, and responsibilities of diplomats examined from the perspective of the diplomats themselves.l Furthermore, those scholars who have taken up the topic have too often been content to assume that the generalizations given in contemporary theoretical manuals on diplomacy described actual behavior rather than just ideal or desirable situations.2 Others have examined diplomatic institutions in the way which Philippe Sagnac called "sec et froid, souvent inintelligible." Officers such as "the secretary of state for foreign affairs" or "the ambassador" are pictured as having certain powers and duties without recognition of personal differences of the officeholders which frequently changed the characteristics of the office.3 Thus our underMr. Roosen is assistant professor of history at Northern Arizona University. The preparation of this article was aided by a grant from the Institutional Studies and Research Committee of Northern Arizona University. When XVIIe siecle devoted an entire issue to problems of foreign policy during the reign of Louis XIV, the editors were unable to obtain an article on these subjects. Victor-Lucien Tapie, "Quelques aspects g6n6raux de la politique dtrangere de Louis XIV," XVIIe siecle, XLVI-XLVII (1960), 3-4. 2 Among recent authors who have done this are Harold Nicolson and Adrien de Lens. Nicolson, The Evolution of Diplomatic Method (London, 1954), bases his discussion of the "French method" on Francois de Callieres, De la maniere de negocier avec les souverains. The only source used by Lens, "Ambassades et ambassadeurs d'autrefois," Revue d'histoire diplomatique, LXVI (1951), 170-86, is Abraham van Wicquefort, L'Ambassadeur et ses fonctions. 3 "De la methode dans 1'etude des institutions de l'Ancien Regime," Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine, VI (1904-05), 18. Orest Ranum criticized this type of

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standing of how diplomats actually functioned has been limited because specific individual cases have not been examined before generalizations were made. To counteract these misunderstandings it is desirable to examine as many individual diplomats as possible while at the same time limiting the study to reasonable proportions. For this purpose an examination of the ambassadors of Louis XIV is particularly appropriate. The approximately seventy men who served as permanent ambassadors for Louis during his personal rule from 1661 to 1715 provide a workable sample. Furthermore, while there is disagreement over whether or not the diplomatic methods used during the Sun King's reign were novel, most scholars agree that the duties and responsibilities which Louis' representatives had either were or would soon become characteristic of other European diplomats as
well.4

During the Middle Ages ambassadors were thought to be servants of the whole "Christian Republic" rather than of their prince alone. Thus their most important responsibility was to preserve peace and good relations between Christian rulers. Many seventeenth-century theoreticians still gave lip service to this ideal, saying that an ambassador's principal aim was to maintain good relations between his master and the prince to whom he was accredited.5 However, as a researcher reads further in these seventeenth-century books, he discovers that their tenor was quite different from the Middle Ages. True, the theoreticians said that an ambassadorshould try to keep things running smoothly; but the reason they thought the diplomat should do this was to increase his ability to carry out his own master's policies and defend his interests. In other words, the theoreticians believed an ambassador owed his primary allegiance not to any universal Christian republic or to "peace" but to the prince he represented. The practice under Louis XIV correlated exactly with this theory. Both the
institutional history in "Richelieu, The Power to Govern," unpublished paper read at the Eighth Annual Conference of the Society for French Historical Studies, Michigan State University, 1962, 7 numb. leaves. Even Camille-Georges Picavet, La Diplomatie frangaise au temps de Louis XIV (Paris, 1930) has been criticized by Gaston Zeller for lacking a firm base in the lives and actions of specific French diplomats. Zeller, "Politique exterieure et diplomatie sous Louis XIV (a propos d'un livre recent)," Revue d'histoire moderne, VI (1931), 139. 4 See Corneliu S. Blaga, L'&volution de la diplomatie (Paris, 1938-), I, 57; Nicolson, Evolution of Diplomatic Method, pp. 68-72, and Gaston Zeller, "French Diplomacy and Foreign Policy in Their European Setting," New Cambridge Modern History (1957-), V, 198. 5 Callieres, De la maniere de negocier avec les souverains (Paris, 1716), p. 8, and Wicquefort, L'Ambassadeur et ses fonctions (The Hague, 1681), II, 9-10.

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French king and his ambassadors took it for granted that their first and only duty was to His Majesty's service. There is another connotation to the term duty, however-the types of tasks which an ambassador performed in his daily work of advancing the king's interests. It is these matters which will be examined in this article. A favorite topic of theoreticians was the question of which ambassadorial duty was most important for the prince's service, but there was little agreement in their answers. An anonymous author of the early seventeenth century argued that the ambassador should have two major purposes-to present the will of his master which "is the end and the cause of his legation" and to show his master's good will towards the host.6 Wicquefort and Callieres classify the delivering of letters, observing the court, or protecting his master's subjects as an ambassador's central task.7 However, the task of negotiating with a foreign government far more deserves such classification. An ambassador might be involved with arranging a formal diplomatic agreement, or he could work on problems which did not require specific written agreements such as Charles Colbert de Croissy's lengthy discussions with the Duke of York about salutes between French and English ships at sea.8 But it is neither possible nor desirable to examine specific negotiations here. Here the question is how the negotiations were carried out from the perspective of the ambassadors themselves. There are several aspects to this problem: What role did the ambassadors have in forming policy? How much authority did they have over when and with whom to negotiate? And, finally, what happened if they acted without instructions or against them? What role did French ambassadors have in forming policy during the reign of Louis XIV? Callieres states unequivocally that both in theory and practice the diplomats were the servants and not the authors of policy.9 This is not exact, however. At times the king asked for his ambassadors' opinions on important policy questions. For instance, in 1682 when Jean-Antoine d'Avaux was at The Hague, Louis inquired whether it would be advisable to threaten the States-General
6 Eugene Griselle, ed., "Un Manuel du parfait diplomate au dix-septieme siecle," Revue d'histoire diplomatique, XXIX (1915), 775-79. 7 Wicquefort, Ambassadeur et ses fonctions, II, 9-10, and Callieres, Maniere de negocier, p. 387. 8 Pierre ClEment, ed., Lettres, instructions et memoires de Colbert (Paris, 1861-73), III, Pt. 1, passim, hereafter cited as LIM Colbert. 9Maniere de negocier, passirn.

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with confiscation of their vessels in French ports if they carried out their intention of aiding the Spanish.l0 Fifteen years later when he was at Stockholm, d'Avaux was asked what he thought should be included in a proposed treaty between France and Sweden since the king felt that d'Avaux had an understanding both of his intentions and of what the Swedes would want." In addition, diplomats who felt that they were respected by the king sometimes dared to volunteer their opinions on policy matters. The word "dared" is used advisedly because they knew that Louis XIV guarded his prerogatives jealously and seldom appreciated unsolicited advice.12 Thus, every suggestion was accompanied by the ambassador's assurances that he was always ready to submit to the king's judgment. Occasionally the French monarch deigned to explain his reasons for not following an unrequested suggestion on policy. In the fall of 1665 Louis XIV told Godefroy d'Estrades that he would not declare publicly his intention to help the Dutch in their war against England, as the ambassador suggested, because he did not want to be left fighting the English alone if the Dutch dropped out as they had done in the 1640's.13However, the king usually ignored such advice. The diplomats in turn often stopped making suggestions. Of necessity the ambassadors had much more authority in determining when and how they would negotiate. Because of the distances involved, the inevitable delays in communications, and the changing political situations in the foreign land, the ambassador himself had to make such decisions. Furthermore, the very organization of the host government often determined the people with whom the ambassador had to communicate. Still, the French government frequently advised its ambassadors about which individuals at the foreign court were to be particularly courted or avoided because of a previously exhibited
10 March 19, 1682, [Edme Mallet, ed.], Ndgociations de Monsieur le comte d'Avaux en Hollande, depuis 1679 . . . jusqu'en 1688 (Paris, 1754), I, 107. D'Avaux recommended against such a declaration because the Prince of Orange would gain an advantage from it. llNov. 28, 1697, J. A. Wijnne, ed., Negociations de Monsieur le comte d'Avaux, ambassadeur extraordinaire a la cour de Suede, pendant les annees 1693, 1697, 1698, Werken van het Historisch Genootschap, new ser., nos. 33-36 (Utrecht, 1882), III, Pt. 2, 97. 12 It is curious that Louis XIV was not more receptive to such advice from his ambassadors. John B. Wolf, Louis XIV (New York, 1968), passim, has shown that the king sought the advice of experts on military, financial, and other public affairs. 13 Recueil des instructions donnees aux ambassadeurs et ministres de France depuis les Traitds de Westphalie jusqu'i la Rdvolution frangaise, Vol. XXI: A. Geffroy, ed., Hollande (Paris, 1885), 203, n.1. Hereafter the series Recueil des instructions . . will be cited as RI and the name of the country.

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friendliness or antipathy towards France. Antoine-Charles de Grammont, for example, was chided for trying to reduce the influence of the Queen of Spain over Philip V. Louis XIV warned that the Spanish king would weaken and tell her of Grammont's attempts. This would then cause him great difficulties because "the queen will always be the mistress of his [Philip V's] spirit." Instead the ambassador was directed to work through the queen and thereby take advantage of her power rather than try to destroy it.14 Simon Arnauld de Pomponne was told that the Grand Chancellor of Sweden had always been friendly toward France and therefore should be sounded out soon after Pomponne presented his credentials.15In an unusual display of confidence in an ambassador's judgment d'Avaux was given three different "powers" to use as he saw fit to end the struggle with Spain in 1684.16 Usually, however, the ambassadors of Louis XIV were more limited in their choice of methods, and, of course, their results had to be ratified by the French king. Louis XIV's ambassadors were understandably hesitant to act without or against their instructions. Occasionally, however, circumstances which did not leave sufficient time to ask for directions forced them to make decisions on the spot. At such times they did what they thought was best and depended on a thorough explanation in their reports to justify their actions. For example, in June 1684 although Jean-Antoine d'Avaux had received explicit and repeated instructions to deliver a memoir to some members of Amsterdam's government telling how Louis would treat the town of Luxembourg after its capture, the diplomat held back because he believed it would be better to wait until after the French actually took the town. The king commented on this only by noting that he assumed the memoir had been delivered as soon as news of the capture was received.17 In general, however, Louisquatorzien ambassadors were not known for their independence of action. In the seventeenth century the most time-consuming duty of an ambassador was the gathering and sending of information.l8 There
14 Louis XIV to Grammont, Jan. 6, 1705. "Lettres particulieres," in Oeuvres de Louis XIV (Paris, 1806), VI, 178. 15 Instruction de Pomponne, June 8, 1671, RI, Suede, p. 105. 16 Mallet, ed. Negociations d'Avaux en Hollande, III, 15. 7 Ibid, 62-67. 18 Donald E. Queller, The Office of Ambassador in the Middle Ages (Princeton, 1967), p. 88, shows that the acquisition and transmission of information became the

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were no journalists and few travelers capable of informing the French government about the countries with which they were dealing. Thus, Louis XIV and his ministers depended heavily upon diplomatic reports when making decisions and forming policies. Three major aspects of the topic merit consideration: the kinds of information sent home, the methods the ambassador used to acquire information, and characteristics and regulations of correspondence. The large quantity and variety of information which was sent to the king cannot be overemphasized. Ambassadors were told not to be afraid of writing too much or of digressing from the topic at hand because "nothing happens in the world which does not come under
the cognizance of ... a good ambassador."19 Louis XIV's envoys took

this order seriously. Since political information was most important, diplomatic dispatches contained news about possible treaties and alliances of the host government, its internal problems, and the other types of political information for which ambassadors have been responsible ever since. In other words, seventeenth-century French ambassadors differed little from their predecessors and successors insofar as their responsibility for political information was concerned. However, the Louisquatorzien emphasis on personal information about local rulers was different from the practice of later centuries. In the late seventeenth century a government needed to know about the personality and physical characteristics of foreign rulers, since these factors often played an important part in diplomacy. The best example is Charles II of Spain. Since he did not and could not have a direct heir, information about his health or his predisposition toward the French or Austrian claimants for his throne was of critical importance. Furthermore, an ambassador to Spain could not afford to ignore gossip concerning the Spanish monarch's sterility. Fran;ois de Rebenac reported that a magical spell was preventing the Spanish rulers from conceiving a child and that the king wore rough shirts which a Dominican monk said would take away the charm.20Even information on a prince's minor illness was considered worthy of mention because it could lead to his death and a change in rulers.
resident ambassadors' primary function in the late Middle Ages. Picavet has a chapter in Diplomatie franfaise entitled, "Les Moyens d'information et d'action de la diplomatie franSaise," but his emphasis is on the money spent and on French propaganda abroad. Picavet adds that this field of research is immense and has barely been touched (p. 180). 19 Louis XIV to Cominges, Feb. 22, 1663, Jean-Jules Jusserand, A French Ambassador at the Court of Charles the Second (New York, 1892), pp. 198-99. 20 R6benac to Louis XIV, Dec. 23, 1688, A[rsene] Legrelle, La Mission de M. de Rebenac a Madrid . . . (1688-1689) (Paris, 1894), pp. 52-53.

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Louis XIV was also interested in news of a personal nature which had little political value. In fact some of the things his ambassadors wrote him can only be classed as tidbits of court gossip. While Gaston de Cominges was in London in the early 1660's, he frequently sent Louis the most pungent news of the daily court life.21 When Charles XII of Sweden smashed the grandmaster's windows, broke the chairs which were used during sermons at the palace, and destroyed a peasant's boat, d'Avaux dutifully reported the "events."22 Ambassadors were particularly careful to send detailed accounts of the events surrounding the death of a king, queen, or other important person. Such memorabilia as the last words spoken, whether death came easily or not, who was present, how soon and in what manner the successor was proclaimed, and exact details of the autopsy and funeral were included in the dispatches. In fact, ambassadors took Louis XIV's directive that all events were worthy of an ambassador's concern more seriously for matters concerning personal affairs of the local princes than for almost any other type of information. The value of any military information which the ambassadors could send is obvious. Since ambassadors were forced to leave when war broke out, they could seldom acquire military information during hostilities, but there were exceptions. An ambassador to a neutral state could discover important data about neighboring states at war with France, or he could warn of the neutral country's plans to assist France's foes. Usually, however, most important military information was acquired during peacetime. This took two major forms: first, information about foreign methods of organization and regulations which could be adapted for use in France and, second, information which would be of value to French commanders if hostilities arose later. The former type is well illustrated by a letter Jean-Baptiste Colbert (who in addition to his other positions was secretary of state for the navy) sent to his brother Colbert de Croissy, the French ambassador in London: "I will be very happy to see the memoir that
you are writing about the English navy ... in order that we can

profit from their great experience in this type of war. If it is possible, I will be especially happy to learn how they determine the number of men for the crews. If you could get the plans for the battles they have had at sea, you would please me greatly by sending them to me; but
21 RI, Angleterre, I, 329. 22D'Avaux to Louis XIV, May 21, 1698, Wijnne, Suede, III, Pt. 1, 257. ed., Ndgociations d'Avaux de

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I know that this is a delicate matter."23Colbert made the same request of Pomponne in the Netherlands.24The second type of information is shown by Paul de Barillon's efforts in 1685 to discover exact information about the number and destination of James II's troops and ships.25 Ambassadors were concerned with other types of information as well. One could describe at length their addiction to miscellaneous matters from famines to calendar changes. However, it is not pertinent to list all such items; the variety of subjects with which Louis' ambassadors were concerned has been well established. Instead, it is appropriate to probe beneath the surface and study the means whereby ambassadors acquired the information which they forwarded to their monarch. The conventional way for ambassadors to become informed is by interviews with appropriate officials in the host government. Since this is true of all resident diplomats, little need be said specifically about seventeenth-century French ambassadors. In general, they had no more official difficulties than ambassadors from other countries. However, an equally if not more important source of information was social intercourse with local officials and other knowledgeable individuals. The importance of social contact was shown particularly well by a contemporary Englishman who described French ambassadors:
A French minister . . . has not been six weeks at a Court, without

having, by a thousand little attentions, insinuated himself into some degree of favour with the Prince, his wife, his mistress, his favourite and his minister. He has established himself upon a familiar and domestic footing in a dozen of the best houses of the place where he has accustomedthe people to be not only easy, but unguarded before him; he makes himself at home there, and they think him so. By these means he knows the interior of those Courts, and can almost write prophecies to his own [court], from the knowledge he has of the characters,the humours, the abilities, or the weaknessesof the actors.26 Not all French ambassadors were this effective, of course, but many were, especially those who had participated in the court life at Versailles.
24 Dec. 19, 1669, Cldment, LIM Colbert, III, Pt. 1, 204.

23 March 20, 1669, Clement, LIM Colbert, III, Pt. 1, 110.

25 Louis XIV to Barillon, Aug. 1685, Charles James Fox, ed., "Correspondence between Louis XIV and M. Barillon on English Affairs, from December 1684, to December 1685," in his A History of the Early Part of the Reign of James the Second (Philadelphia, 1808), p. clii. 26J. Bradshaw, ed., Chesterfield, Letters: Letters of Philip Dormer Stanhope, Earl of Chesterfield (1892), I, 422-23, as quoted by D. B. Horn in The British Diplomatic Service, 1689-1789 (Oxford, 1961), pp. 182-83.

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Merely being attentive and insinuating, however, was not sufficient to enable ambassadors to discover everything they wished to know. In diplomatic circles information was almost like an item of trade. In order to learn facts they had to give information to others. Sometimes they would just pass on material they had learned on the spot, but news from France was more valuable. Henri de Ruvigny explained the situation perfectly when he wrote Pomponne from England: "I beg you, Monsieur, to arrange for me to receive .. . some news about events and affairs which can be passed around. This is necessary so that people do not think that I am being crafty and so that I can do my part at court by furnishing some news for the trade here. You know that in [diplomacy] as in other ordinary transactions it is necessary to give in order to receive."27 Thus a factor in understanding how the ambassadors acquired the information they wanted is a knowledge of how well they were kept informed about events in France. An ambassador's problems were greatly eased when the king took a personal interest in keeping his minister informed. A prime example of this was Pomponne's period of service in the Netherlands in 1671 while Louis XIV was preparing for the Dutch War.28 An ambassador could also be quite certain of receiving all the news he needed from France if he had a friend or relative who was an important official in the French government. Colbert de Croissy, whose brother was Jean-Baptiste Colbert, and Isaac de Feuquieres, who was related to Pomponne, seldom lacked adequate news from France. Their correspondence about personal affairs and gossip as well as official business was quite sufficient. Ambassadors whose positions did not interest Louis XIV personally or who did not know a minister well had more problems, but this seems to have been rare. While obtaining information officially or by social contacts with government officials was both acceptable and desirable in the seventeenth century, another method was equally accepted in practice even if not openly admitted. Espionage continued to flourish, and ambassadors were thought to be "honorable spies."29 Louis XIV was not only aware of this activity, he required it. Several methods of espionage were used. The first and perhaps the easiest was to secure information in return for monetary gifts or other
27

Arnauld de Pomponne, 1669-1671 (The Hague, 1957), p. 161. 29 Voltaire, Le Siecle de Louis XIV (Paris, 1847), pp. 5-6; Callibres, Maniere de negocier, p. 46.

28 Herbert H. Rowen, The Ambassador Prepares for War: The Dutch Embassy of

March 12, 1674, RI, Angleterre, II, 156.

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presents to appropriate officials and courtiers. Today this would be classed as bribery, but, since in the seventeenth practice century "presents were constantly on the move, between monarchs, ministers, ambassadors, members of public assemblies, etc.,... it was no easy matter to discern where courtesy stopped and corruption began."30 The ambassadors themselves were quite aware when bribery was taking place, however, especially when the diplomat was trying to prod an official into taking action which Louis XIV desired. Feuquieres could hardly have called it anything else when he reported that he had offered the Grand Chancellor of Sweden 100,000 ecus but that the Chancellor wanted 250,000 before promising that Sweden would declare war on Brandenburg.31 Because of the illicit nature of transactions involving possible bribery, evidence is insufficient to determine whether French bribes were as effective as they were reputed to be. However, the indications are that their effectiveness has been overrated. A good example of giving too much credit to it is the claim that d'Estrades was able to purchase Dunkirk from Charles II simply because he "bribed the Duchess of York, who was the daughter of the influential Chancellor Clarendon, with 'clock dials set with diamonds and other precious stones . . .' "32 There are several reasons why the stress placed on the role of bribery in Louis XIV's diplomacy is excessive. First, the generosity of the Sun King has been exaggerated. Despite his apparent riches Louis was frequently short of cash and was unwilling to be too free with it abroad. Second, diplomats and ministers, of other countries were eager to attribute the failure of their plans to French money rather than to more complicated factors. Third, foreign statesmen were often willing to take money for doing what they would have done anyway. And, fourth, while bribery might have determined a foreign statesman's actions on minor points, it usually failed to influence issues which involved fundamental interests.33 As a method of discovering secret information, however, bribery was much more effective throughout Louis XIV's reign. In 1663 Estrades gave a gratification to a M. de Guent, a deputy to the States
Jusserand, "The School for Ambassadors," American Historical Re30Jean-Jules view, XXVII (1922), 445. 31 Feuqui&res to Louis XIV, Sept. 19, 1674, Auguste Alphonse ftienne-Gallois, ed., Lettres inedites des Feuquieres, tirdes des papiers de famille de Madame la duchesse Decazes (Paris, 1845), III, 43. 32 James Westfall Thompson and Saul Kussiel Padover, Secret Diplomacy: A Record of Espionage and Double-Dealing: 1500-1815 (London, 1937), p. 90. 33 George Pages, Contributions a l'histoire de la politique franraise en Allemagne sous Louis XIV (Paris, 1905), p. 66; Rowen, Ambassador Prepares for War, p. 25.

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General, in return for his devotion to Louis XIV and his assistance in the affair of the Knights of Malta.34 Feuqui~res drew information from and gave presents to at least five counselors and other high officials of the Swedish king in the 1670's.35 And in 1713 Pierre Antoine de Chasteauneuf was told that Louis XIV would "recompense" Dutchmen in the war or the peace parties or both when it would help the ambassador to "penetrate their intrigues and learn about their intended projects."36 But, although bribery was more effective for gaining information than for producing action, it was far from foolproof. Barillon made more use of payments than any of his predecessors,37 but he did not discover William of Orange's plans to invade England. It is possible, however, that lack of funds prevented the ambassadors of Louis XIV from getting as much information from bribery as might have been discovered if money had been more plentiful. Francois de Callieres suggested that an ambassador should be ready to spend large amounts for buying great secrets, and he should even be prepared to do it at his own expense when the money supplied by his master was insufficient.38 Since Louisquatorzien diplomats were constantly short of funds, this suggestion was utterly impractical. In addition to giving "presents" as a method of getting information Louis' diplomats often created their own intelligence service. Their spies may have been members of the ambassador's own entourage like the man d'Avaux sent "to the Prince of Nassau ostensibly to congratulate him on his marriage but, in fact, to discover the state of affairs in Friesland."39 Or a resident French subject could be persuaded to pass on information. Few diplomats were as fortunate as Henri de Ruvigny, whose English relatives gave him information about parliamentary sessions.40 More often it was necessary to recruit agents from the local populace.41 But despite the importance of spying and bribery in the life of Louis XIV's diplomats espionage did not have the all-important character which some scholars have given
34 Estrades to Louis XIV, Feb. 22, 1663, G. Groen van Prinsterer, ed., Archives ou correspondance inedite de la maison d'Orange-Nassau, 2d ser. (Utrecht, 1857), V, 234. 35Feuquieres to Pomponne, March 16, 1675, ttienne-Gallois, ed., Feuquieres, III, 210-13. 36 Instruction de Chasteauneuf, RI, Hollande, XXII, 353. 37 RI, Angleterre, II, 251. 38Maniere de negocier, p. 47. 39 Sept. 21, 1684, Mallet, ed., Negociations d'Avaux en Hollande, IV, 48. 40 RI, Angeterre, II, 159; 41 An account of how this was done is given by d'Avaux Jan. 2, 1697, in Wijnne, ed., Negociations d'Avaux de Suede, II, 7,

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it.42 Traditional and open methods of gaining information were equally if not more important, and occasionally information was found in such "modern" sources as newspapers and journals. After the ambassador had gathered his information or performed any of his other duties, he had to notify the French government. But the diplomat then faced a problem: to what individual or individuals should he address his correspondence? In other words, to whom were the ambassadors responsible? At first glance the problem seems almost nonexistent. The ambassadors did not represent the nation or the government but were the personal spokesmen of the king. Louis XIV made certain that this was fully understood by his frequent use of the terms mon service, mon alliance, and the like. Thus it would seem obvious that the ambassadors should write to Louis XIV himself. However, the king could not and did not handle all the correspondence with his diplomatic representatives. Mere volume prohibited that. During the reign several attempts were made to require the ambassadors to address all their corespondence to the king rather than to the foreign secretary.43 The diplomats' acquiescence in these attempts was always short-lived. They quickly began to write statements like the following to the secretary of state for foreign affairs: "I am well aware that you do not want me to write to you about any matter. Nevertheless, I believe that it is more appropriate to inform you of many of the little things rather than to fill the letters to the king
with them."44

These "supplementary" letters to the minister sometimes gave more details on something mentioned to the king, but usually they were concerned with financial problems, requests for discretion when certain parts of the letters were read to the king, and so on. Upon occasion Louis had these private letters read or shown to him while the more friendly, unofficial letters which the secretary of state for foreign affairs often sent the ambassadors along with the king's official dispatch were prepared under the direction of Louis and with his knowledge.45 Thus the problem of whether an ambassador should di42 Thompson, Secret Diplomacy, p. 6. 43 Jean de Boislisle, ed., Mdmoriaux du conseil de 1661 (Paris, 1905), I, Pt. 2, 276, shows one attempt. There is a good brief discussion of the steps Louis XIV took in 1661 to ensure his control of the diplomatic correspondence in Paul Sonnino, Louis XIY's View of the Papacy (1661-1667) (Berkeley, 1966), pp. 4-6. 44 D'Avaux to Colbert de Croissy, probably April 15, 1693, Wijnne, ed., Ndgociations d'Avaux de Suede, I, 141. 45 RI, Angleterre, I, 259.

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rect his correspondence to the king or to the secretary of state for foreign affairs was not grave because they both read most such mail. But great difficulties arose over whether or not ambassadors should correspond with other officials in the French government. Some scholars have argued that the lack of distinction between the areas of responsibility of Louis XIV's ministers meant that any one of them could concern himself with any affair, either domestic or foreign. Ambassadors therefore wrote to one or another according to the nature of the affair in question.46 In practice matters were not so informal. The specialization of the foreign secretariat was already sufficiently advanced so that the foreign secretaries resisted attempts by other officials to expand their area of authority by communicating personally with the ambassadors. This was particularly true of Pomponne who protested against interference in his functions by Michel Louvois, minister of war, and Jean-Baptiste Colbert. Despite denials of such intentions by both these men47 their words are belied by their well-known attempts to expand their influence. At times the ministerial struggles became so intense that Louis XIV officially promulgated rules limiting what types of correspondence could be carried on by specific ministers. In 1667, for instance, the king resolved that Colbert would control everything which concerned the navy and commerce. After Colbert had prepared letters and orders for the ambassadors, he was to give them to Hugues de Lionne, minister for foreign affairs, who would actually send them.48In 1698 a much longer reglement established essentially the same procedures.49The mere existence, however, of these repetitive orders indicates that they were disregarded often enough to continue to cause problems between ministers. These conflicts were awkward because one secretary would order the diplomat to write to him about specific matters and then another would specifically countermand the orders. The men had to decide which order to obey without making an enemy of an important official.50
46 Claude Badalo-Dulong, Trente ans de diplomatie frangaise en Allemagne; Louis XIV et l'electeur de Mayence (1648-1678) (Paris, 1956), p. 224. 47 Colbert to Colbert de Croissy, Aug. 19, 1673, Clement, LIM Colbert, VI, 314-15, and [Louis de Rouvroy] de Saint-Simon, Memoires de Saint-Simon, ed. A. de Boislisle (new ed.; Paris, 1879), VI, 338-39. 48 Clement, LIM Colbert, III, Pt. 1, 92. 49 D[idier] Neuville, ed., Atat sommaire des Archives de la Marine antdrieures a la Revolution (Paris, 1898), pp. 244-45. 50 An excellent discussion of the intervention of Louvois and Chamillart in foreign affairs may be found in Picavet, Diplomatie frangaise, pp. 42-47.

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A much easier problem was deciding how often to send dispatches. Louis Rousseau de Chamoy argued that a diplomat should write his master as often as possible.51 And this was the practice. French ambassadors were expected to write often and regularly even if they had nothing special to report.52 This meant that the envoy sent one or two letters a week to the king and received dispatches from the French government almost as often. There were political reasons for such frequent correspondence. If an ambassador were thought to have the confidence of his king, he could perform his duties better; his receiving frequent dispatches showed that he held this confidence. On the other hand, adjusting the frequency could aid negotiation when a slowdown was desirable. Camille de Tallard wrote from England in 1698 that he would not write so soon and that Louis should not reply too quickly. But, Tallard warned, William III "is very quick-sighted, has good judgment, and will soon perceive that we are trifling with him if we protract matters too much."53 For the most part, however, the frequency with which dispatches were exchanged was governed by practical needs such as sending information and requesting and sending instructions, rather than by ulterior motives.

The letters which the diplomats sent to France were usually very long. Georges Pages described the practice accurately: "Diplomatsof the 17th century at least-did not try to be concise. ... One of

their most useful qualities was the art of speaking without saying anything; thus, as a matter of habit, they wrote the way they spoke. A letter of ten or twelve long pages can almost always be summarized in a few lines."54 At least some of the ambassadors were aware of this tendency, and they apologized for being so verbose. But they continued to write letters of fifteen, twenty, or more pages. In fact, the day the mail was to leave was often so taken up with letter-writing that other official business had to be postponed. In addition to corresponding with the government in France, en51 L[ouis] Delavaud, ed., L'Idee du parfait ambassadeur (Paris, 1912), p. 37. 52 Instruction de Guiscard, April 18, 1699, RI, Suede, p. 203. D'Avaux's habit of always writing something whether it was necessary or not is illustrated by his letter to Louis XIV of March 13, 1697, which starts: "Thus there is nothing which happened here this week which is important enough to be told to Your Majesty." D'Avaux goes on to write two and a half pages about this "nothing." Wijnne, ed., Ndgociations d'Avaux de Suede, II, 55. 53 July 8, 1698, Paul Grimblot, ed., Letters of William III. and Louis XIV. and of Their Ministers (London, 1848), II, 54. 54 "L'Histoire diplomatique du regne de Louis XIV, sources et etat des travaux," Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine, VII (1905-06), 674.

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voys were also expected to communicate regularly with their colleagues abroad. Many instructions contained statements similar to that for Hugues de Terlon in 1664; he was told to undertake "a punctual exchange of letters with all the other ambassadors and ministers who serve the king abroad, who will have the same orders from His Majesty to inform him [Terlon] as he does them about everything which they hear which is of importance for the good of his [the king's] service ...."55 While the theory of using such communications to keep ambassadors abreast of relevant information was sound, it did not always work in practice. French residents abroad often failed to write to their colleagues and when they did, often produced letters of no particular value, containing too much advice, too many prophecies, and not very many facts. In the twentieth century a diplomat can commit few sins worse than interfering with the internal affairs of the country in which he resides. Some modern scholars have argued that such interference was equally frowned upon in the seventeenth century and even that "Louis XIV refused to interfere in the internal organization of foreign states."56 In practice, however, French ambassadors were expected

to try to influence the course of purely internal affairs. This policy was carried out most effectively in Spain after Philip V, Louis XIV's grandson, had been put on the throne of the Catholic Kings. For the first half decade of the 1700's the conflict of Cesar and Jean d'Estrees and Grammont with Madame des Ursins weakened the influence of the ambassadors on the Spanish government.57 With the appointment of Michel Jean d'Amelot in 1705, however, the French ambassador gained direct control of the affairs of the Spanish government. He wrote to Louis: "The king and queen speak to me about everything, even about the favors which the king must distribute. Every day this prince sends me the memoirs and consultes concerning war and finances. After I have examined them with Orry [Philip's minister of finances], I take him the replies and orders which we have drawn up. Ordinarily he approves them and then gives them to the Marquis de
Mejorada to have them carried out."58 Amelot also attended the meet55 RI, Suede, p. 51. 56 Picavet, Diplomatie franraise, p. 157. 57Saint-Simon, Memoires, XII, 59-60, 433, and M. A. Geffroy, ed., Lettres inedites de la Princesse des Ursins (Paris, 1859), p. 464. 58 June 22, 1705, Alfred Baudrillart, Philippe V et la cour de France (Paris, 1890), I, 230.

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ings of the despacho, the king of Spain's council of ministers; he helped choose the ministers by sending recommendations to Louis XIV, who then had his grandson, Philip V, select them.59 After 1709 Louis XIV was forced by the military situation of the War of Spanish Succession to abandon Spain and separate the two monarchies. But, although Amelot departed and his successors were not actually members of the Spanish governing council, they still played a strong role in internal Spanish affairs. While the rest of Louis' ambassadors did not have as much power as Amelot, they still became involved in local affairs in several ways. D'Avaux, for example, took an active part in the political life of the Dutch Republic by aiding the party which opposed the Prince of Orange.60 Rebenac had been told exactly how to create a party of Spaniards who would declare in favor of the Dauphin if Charles II died.61 French envoys also interfered by trying to influence the choice of individuals for official positions in the host government. D'Avaux reported to Louis in 1698 that he was doing the best he could to stop the Swedish chancellor, Axel Oxenstierna, a Francophobe, from filling a vacant clerkship with one of his own men.62 Interference might also have involved simply making difficulties for the host government. Barillon wrote to Louis XIV: "Your majesty hath commanded me to do everything that is possible to raise troubles to the King of England. ...."3 Finally, ambassadorial attempts to influence internal affairs involved what the modern world considers perfectly acceptable diplomatic activities, like trying to influence policies concerning France. According to a famous student of bassadors had by the early 1600's begun their master's subjects was an insult to to protect their fellow-countrymen."64 By Renaissance diplomacy, am"to behave as if an injury to his crown, and to intervene the early 1700's theoreticians

59 De Girardot, ed., Correspondance de Louis XIV avec M. Amelot, son ambassadeur en Espagne, 1705-1709 (Paris, 1864), I, passim. 60 Instruction d'Avaux, Sept. 5, 1678, RI, Hollande, XXI, 399. 61 Legrelle, Mission de Rebenac a Madrid, p. 20. 62 Feb. 19, 1698, Wijnne, ed., Ndgociations d'Avaux de Suede, III, Pt. 1, 95. 63 Oct. 24, 1678, John Dalrymple, ed., and [trans.], Memoirs of Great Britain and Ireland (new ed.; London, 1790), I, 252. 64 Garrett Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy (Boston, 1955), p. 251. All Picavet (Diplomatie francaise, p. 112) says on this subject is that the task was very important and that the ambassadors were the born protectors of all Frenchmen abroad, particularly in defending their commercial interests.

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like Antoine Pecquet accepted the practice and argued: "In general a public minister must protect all the subjects of his master when they merit it by their conduct. Those who are in a foreign country are under the tacit protection of the envoy from their nation without the necessity of being personally attached to him. ... However, the envoy himself has no right of constraint or coercion on his fellowcountrymen."65 In practice, however, the ambassadors' rights and responsibilities were not so clearly delineated. Louis XIV's representatives were expected to help Frenchmen engaged in commerce. This aid took two major forms: helping captains of French ships and helping resident French merchants. In both cases the envoy was concerned with the difficulties of French subjects with local officials rather than with their problems with other merchants. Since the small French merchant marine seldom engaged in international trade outside the Mediterranean, French ships were rare in the sea lanes of northern Europe,66 but French vessels had particular problems in the Netherlands, and ambassadors like d'Estrades and Pomponne were frequently asked to help when the Dutch confiscated or otherwise mistreated French ships.67As for resident French merchants, diplomats frequently tried to get them better terms for trading. Jean-Baptiste Colbert was concerned that Frenchmen in foreign countries be treated as well and have the same rights as other foreigners, particularly the English and the Dutch. Ambassadors were also expected to use their official position to protect the treaty rights of French merchants.68 Ambassadors also had responsibilities for Frenchmen which were unrelated to commerce. They could be called on for help when a French subject was unable to support himself. For instance, when Isaac de Feuquieres was in Sweden he gave money to "French deserters and others."69 The diplomats protested on behalf of Frenchmen who were mistreated. After 108 French workers were tortured and robbed while returning to France from Spain, Andr6 de La
1789," Journal of Modern History, XXVI (1954), 207. 67 Colbert to Pomponne, March 21, 1669, Clement, LIM Colbert, II, 461-64; Instruction d'Estrades, 1662, RI, Hollande, XXI, 241-42; Godefroi Louis d'Estrades, Lettres, memoires et negociations de Monsieur le comte d'Estrades, [ed. Prosper Marchand] (new ed.; London [actually The Hague], 1743), III, 57-58; Picavet, Diplomatie franraise, p. 291. 68 G. B. Depping, ed., Correspondance administrative sous le rdgne de Louis XIV (Paris, 1950-55), III, passim (hereafter cited as Depping, CARL); Economic instruction for Pierre de Villars, May 15, 1679, Clement, LIM Colbert, II, 700. 69 Feuquieres to Pomponne, Dec. 5, 1676, Etienne-Gallois, ed., FeuquiAres, IV, 88.

66Paul Walden Bamford, "French Shipping in Northern European Trade, 1660-

65 Discours sur l'art de negocier (Paris, 1737), pp. 127-29.

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Vauguyon demanded and received ample reparation for the crime.70 Envoys also became involved when French subjects and even former French subjects died abroad. They sent wills back to France and occasionally took control of the decedent's property. These responsibilities involved "services" which benefited the subjects themselves, a point of interest because the French diplomats' responsibility for French subjects abroad usually involved activities which were in the interest of the king, not the individual. Despite Pecquet's argument that the "envoy himself has no right of constraint or coercion on his fellow-countrymen," both the French government and ambassadors acted as if the envoys did have such rights. This responsibility was exercised in several ways. If a subject did something which seemed contrary to the interests of the French crown, attempts were made to persuade him to return home. Such was the case in 1671 when the ambassador to Portugal requested a master clothmaker to give up his newly established factory and return to France.7 On occasion an ambassador acted even more strongly and directly ordered rather than persuaded expatriate Frenchmen to return to France. Of course, since an ambassador had no legal right to enforce such an order in a foreign land, he was usually backed up by the French government's threat to harm their families. Frenchmen living in the Ottoman Empire without Louis XIV's permission were given this warning in 1711.72 If the French subject were accused of some crime, the ambassador could attempt to have the local government arrest the individual and return him to France, a primitive form of extradition. If all these methods failed, French ambassadors might even try kidnapping.73 They would do almost anything to exercise the right of coercion they believed they had over their fellow subjects if it were in the king's interest. Surprisingly, Louis XIV's diplomats also had certain responsibilities for individuals who were not French, particularly for religious reasons. First, Louisquatorzien ambassadors gave aid to Catholics in Protestant countries who were neither French nor nationals of the host country. For instance, d'Estrades was emphatically instructed in 1661 to "care for the secular priests, the Jesuits, the Benedictine fa70 A.-F. Aude, Vie publique et privee d'Andre de Bethoulat, comte de La Vauguyon, ambassadeur de France (1630-1693) (Paris, 1921), p. 213. 71 June 12, 1671. Clement, LIM Colbert, II, 621, n.l. 72 Louis de Pontchartrain to Pierre Puchot Des Alleurs, Jan. 14, 1711, Depping, CARL, IV, 785-86. 73 [Louis Francois] Sourches [supposed author], Memoires du marquis de Sourches sur le regne de Louis XIV, ed. Gabriel-Jules Cosnac et. al. (Paris, 1882), I, 59-60.

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thers and all other religieux who had been sent by their superiors for the propagation of the faith and to minister to the Catholics in England."74 Second, they were expected to intervene with the local government on behalf of native Catholics, but this procedure was de-emphasized in the later years of Louis XIV's reign because the French monarch did not wish to provide any opportunities for Protestant princes to make demands on him in favor of the Religion pretendue Reformee in France.75 Throughout the reign, however, French ambassadors maintained the traditional diplomatic right to have a chapel for their own benefit. They also allowed local Catholics to attend, arguing that if the host government wished to prevent their attendance, it was up to the government and not the ambassador to enforce the decision. The major religious duty concerned French Protestants. During the earlier years of Louis' reign the diplomats discovered and notified the French government of any relations or correspondence between Protestant churches abroad and those in France "so that His Majesty could take whatever action was necessary."76 After the revocation of the Edict of Nantes the diplomats' problems increased drastically. As much as a third of their correspondence was about problems arising from the revocation: examples of the stories about the persecution of the Huguenots, evaluations of how much the French political position was hurt by the persecution, and appeals that foreigners residing in France not be forced to convert to Catholicism or that they be allowed to leave France. Also common were descriptions of the losses to French industry resulting from the flight of Protestant businessmen taking their families, wealth, skills, and even their workers with them.77 Furthermore, the ambassadors were ordered to convert and send back to France any of the Huguenots who had already arrived in a foreign land. Needless to say, the diplomats did not succeed in this any better than the king had in France. They were also to watch over fugitives who had succeeded in escaping from France and help any who desired to return. Within ten years, however, Louis XIV had given up his hopes of persuading fugitive Huguenots to return to France, and he ordered his envoys not to have any contact with them. When a Frenchman who wished to abjure his heresy and return
74 Instruction d'Estrades, May 23, 1661, RI, Angleterre, I, 278-79. 75 Instruction de Tallard, March 2, 1698, RI, Angleterre, III, 31-32; Instruction de Guiscard, 1699, RI, Suede, p. 203. 76 Instruction de Colbert [de Croissy], [Aug. 2, 1668]. RI, Angleterre, II, 81. 77 See, for example, Mallet, ed., Negociations d'Avaux en Hollande, V, passim.

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appeared voluntarily, however, the- diplomats were still to help him do so although they were to ascertain his sincerity first.78 Few things are as curious to twentieth-century men as the emphasis placed on the ceremonial aspects of diplomacy during the ancien regime. According to popular opinion, no period or ruler was more concerned with such matters than the late seventeenth century and Louis XIV. However, simply dismissing the topic with a casual remark that "for the time ceremonial and its attendant problems had their raison d'etre and their significance" does the king and his diplomats an injustice.7 We must attempt to understand their reason and significance. First, ceremonial had a definite practical purpose: it symbolized the relations between two princes. Any modification of ceremonial either indicated or was thought to indicate a change in their relationship. A ceremonial innovation which did less honor to the French ambassador than before was thought to mean either that the foreign prince was less friendly with Louis XIV or that, in the prince's opinion, France was no longer as powerful and important as before. The opposite was true of any change in ceremony which did the ambassador more honor than had been accorded his predecessors. A common misconception is the belief that ceremony was a matter of constant concern to Louis XIV and his diplomats and that they failed to recognize that ceremony was not the substance of diplomacy. Actually the discussions and problems about ceremonial matters which arose and have been described so often did "not refer to friendly but to formal visits where the minister is acting as an ambassador and not as an individual."80 Furthermore, the diplomats themselves recognized a certain amount of silliness in arguing about ceremonial when other matters were more important. After describing the negotiation about whether Madame Pierre de Villars would be given a straight-backed chair or a chair with arms for her public reception at Turin, Ambassador Villars ended his letter to Pomponne by saying: "And there, Monsieur, are our important affairs during this time while all of Europe is at warl"81The sarcasm could scarcely be heavier.
78 Instruction de Tallard, 1698, RI, Angleterre, III, 31-32; Instruction de Bonrepaus, Jan. 13, 1698, RI, Hollande, XXII, 21. 79 Picavet, Diplomatie fran9aise, p. 98. 80 H. J. Chaytor, ed., and trans., Embajada Espanola, An Anonymous Contemporary Spanish Guide to Diplomatic Procedure in the Last Quarter of the Seventeenth Century, Spanish and English texts, Camden Miscellany (London, 1926), XIV, 9. 81 Sept. 23, 1676, Pierre Villars, Mdmoires de la cour d'Espagne de 1679 a 1681, ed. A. Morel-Fatio (Paris, 1893), pp. xxxij-xxxiij.

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The attitude of Louis XIV was similar, at least as he grew older. Henri Brocher has shown that concern for the rules of rank and etiquette at Versailles weakened as Louis aged and that court life became less and less formal.82 A similar development occurred in the king's attitude towards diplomatic ceremonial. Whereas in 1663 he could refer to the problem of whether or not ambassadors should take part in the entry of other ambassadors as a "weighty matter," in 1693 he saw no sense in an ambassador's making himself disagreeable over ceremonial matters like a change in the place where he met the master of ceremonies.83 Louis still wished all the honors shown his ambassadors to be continued, but in practice he accepted changes when necessary, especially if they could be called "temporary." What ceremonial matters were considered significant? The most important was the question of precedence. In the opinion of contemporaries nothing showed the relative importance of states more clearly than the order in which their ambassadors were placed in a procession, which ceded "le pas" to another, how close they were to the place of honor at banquets, and the like. The seventeenth century's most famous controversy over precedence was the Estrades-Watteville affair, which took place in London in 1661.84 Some scholars have since argued that this affair showed Louis XIV's extreme concern with matters of ceremony since he was willing to go to war over such a "trifling matter." They miss the point of his action. Louis, a young and vigorous king who was fully in control of his kingdom, wished his preeminent place in Europe publicly acknowledged because it gave him definite advantages in negotiations and general political position. Of course, the public apology of Philip IV's ambassador was probably personally gratifying to Louis the man as well as to Louis the king. That Louis XIV was not as concerned with the ceremonial details of precedence per se as has been claimed is further shown by the fact that, although other problems of precedence arose, he never again seriously threatened war because of them. Wicquefort made the obvious but sometimes forgotten point that
82 Le Rang et l'dtiquette sous l'Ancien Regime a la cour de Louis XIV (Paris, 1934), pp. 94-97. 83Jusserand, French Ambassador at the Court of Charles the Second, pp. 70-71, 199200; Louis XIV to d'Avaux, April 23, 1693, Wijnne, ed., Negociations d'Avaux de Suede, I, 114. 84 Most of the relevant documents about this incident can be found in "Le Conflit A good brief discussion is given in Ernest Satow, A Guide to Diplomatic Practice, ed. Nevile Bland (4th ed.; New York, 1957), p. 28. A combination of narrative and documents appears in RI, Angleterre, I, 286-303.

Estrades-Wattevilleet la pr6s6ancede la France," Boislisle, ed., Memoriaux, III, 140-76.

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a diplomat cannot and should not always behave formally. Although they are the greatest actors in the world because they are playing a r61e, they must sometimes step out of the r61e.85 So, too, the representatives of Louis XIV had duties outside their official capacity. For instance, they frequently performed miscellaneous errands which their geographical location enabled them to do. Antoine Courtin was asked to establish a large shipyard in Sweden and have up to six vessels built for France.86 Terlon sent swans from Denmark to be used in the ponds and canals of French royal houses.87 Barillon and others bought books, engravings, medals, and manuscripts for Louis XIV and JeanBaptiste Colbert.88 Other duties, such as giving letters of recommendation to prospective soldiers or examining new inventions which foreigners wished to sell to the king of France, were a very minor part of an ambassador's existence. In view of the variety and time-consuming nature of the various functions which Louisquatorzien diplomats had, it is astonishing that their duties were carried out as well as they ordinarily were. This is especially true since, unlike modern ambassadors with their large staffs, Louis' ambassadors usually had no formal assistants except a secretary. They were helped by the existence of traditional procedures for handling many of their problems which could be followed again when necessary. This was possible because, although the names and places changed, the problems were similar throughout the period of Louis XIV's personal rule. It hardly seems possible that these fiftyfive years could have passed without some major functional changes in diplomatic practice taking place, but such was the case.89 The unchanging aspects of the diplomatic functions were much more significant than the sometimes obvious, but still superficial, developments. From the perspective of the ambassadors most French diplomatic procedures used in 1715 were substantially the same as those used in the 1660's.
85 Ambassadeur et ses fonctions, II, 3-5. 86 Colbert to Courtin, Jan. 2, 1666, Clement, LIM Colbert, III, Pt. 1, p. 33. 87 Colbert to Terlon, Sept. 16, 1672, Clement, LIM Colbert, V, 334-35. 88 Colbert to Barillon, July 23, 1682, Depping, CARL, IV, 598; RI, Suede, pp. xxvixxvii. 89 Such scholars as Camille-G. Picavet, Louis Andre, and Cornelieu S. Blaga argue that the monarchy and its diplomatic organization constantly progressed during the period. Picavet, Diplomatie franfaise, p. 119; Andre, Louis XIV et 'Europe (Paris, 1950), p. 25; Blaga, ESvolution de la diplomatie, I, 30.