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The argumentis based on the assumptionthat crucial in understanding the "bargainers need to reach some settlementbut. macro-oriented studies which focus on the objective conditions of regime and transformation studies that concentrateon political strategiesand choices.4 More recently. Karl and Schmitter suggest that the "mode of transition from autocratic rule is a principal determinantof whether democracy will emerge.Political Transition Processes in Central and Eastern Europe Helga A.3 In the wake of these extraordinary events much scholarly attention initially focused on the various causes of regime change in the former Soviet bloc. this article approachesthe study of transitionsby deemphasizingthe role of modes of transitionand instead emphasizing the changingmodes of conflict resolutionin the transitionprocess from authoritarian regimes to polyarchies. and from below (replacement/breakdown/rupture).. wish to settle on terms favorableto themselves. independentof the mode of transition. They caution. by peaceful evolution. transitionswhere regime and opposition (transplacement/extrication) Dahl has play a roughly equal role in system transformation . large number of the stable-high-consensuspolyarchies argued that a "disproportionately seem to have come about . that the experiences in central and eastern Europe might suggest different findings with regardto the utility of modes of transitionsand emphasize that the differentclassifications are ideal types. the consequences of regime change5 and the comparability of regime transitionsin eastern Europe to other regions of the world have been given greater attention.7 This article falls into the second category. however.. studies on regime transitionscan be loosely grouped into two categories. Using the example of central and eastern Europe. at the same time."9 In a similarvein.2 domino-effect fall of Communist political regimes in the central and eastern European countriesand the Soviet Union in 1989 and 1991. Welsh What has been termedthe "thirdwave"' of democratization culminatedin the unexpected. Other studies placed major emphasis on the prerequisites of democratization:socioeconomic development and the roles of civil society and political culture. one can transitions differentiatebetween transitionsfrom above (transformation/transaction/reform).the concept of bargainingis transitionprocesses. One of the underlyingassumptionsof much of the literatureon transitionshas been that the mode with which new regimes are createdhas importantimplicationsfor the stabilityof the newly emerging polyarchies.6 As Przeworskipoints out."'9 They argue that the most successful transitions are implementedby pact or imposition in which the incumbentrulers remain at least partly in control of political development and contrast them to transitionby reform or revolution."I Jointdecision makingcan take a varietyof forms across national 379 . Modes of transitionare usually distinguishedaccordingto the process throughwhich incumbentsare replacedby opposition forces.I argue that. Roughly.
The beginning is markedby the dissolutionof the authoritarian regime. the end by the establishment of a new form of government that gains legitimacy through democratic elections.'5 380 . The emphasis on different negotiationpatternsalso contributesto a better understanding of the transitionprocess. "democracy cannot be dictated: it emerges from bargaining. but. the successful transitionprocess toward democratic political rule involves three stages. but of operationalization the differentcategories is difficult. His preparatory phase featuresthe polarizationof the main political actors. liberalization of the authoritarianregime is accompaniedby declines in the use of commandand imposition as the prevailingmodes of conflict resolution. the demarcation of stages within the transition process is not new. however. consolidationof the transitionis distinguishedby the increasing dominance of competition and cooperation as the prevailing means of conflict resolution.'3 It is reasonable to assert that transitionshave beginnings and that they must have ends. First. In this approach. bargainingand compromiseemerge as the key of features in decision making. Second.The final phase of a transition is the period to during which politicians and the electorateare "habituated" the new political rules. and the election of a new governmentis not the end of the transitionperiod. Regime change. First. for example. However. It allows us to distinguishbetween differentstages in the transition process without having to rely solely on particularevents such as founding elections. at regional and local levels-and in decision-makingprocedures. I propose that different stages in the transitionprocess are defined by different modes of conflict resolution. Emphasis on the date of the first democratic election after a period of authoritarianrule oversimplifies the transformationof political systems and reduces it to the act of voting and to the transferof power at the central level. The third section analyzes similarities and differences in transitionsby outlining negotiationpatternsin the countriesof centraland eastern Europe. Finally. involves changes at many other levels of the political system-for example. distinguished three phases in the transitionprocess. which often is identified with first signs of mass mobilization. followed by a decision phase in which some crucial elements of democratic procedure are institutionalized. the dissolution of an authoritarian regime often starts well before signs of dissatisfactionmanifestthemselves publicly. The second section proposes a frameworkfor analyzing regime transformations looking at changing by modes of conflict resolution. as Przeworski puts it.'" The absence or failure of bargainingefforts may impede progresstowardthe emergence and consolidationof polyarchicpolitical systems. but their fluidity makes clear demarcation difficult. I conclude by suggestingthat the transitionprocess has entereda new stage once bargainingis replacedby competitionas the prevailing mode of conflict resolution. Rustow. as the transitionproceedsto extricationfrom the old regime and institutionalization a new political system.'4 Of course. I summarize some of the major characteristicsof transitionperiods.ComparativePolitics July 1994 settings. Transitions Problems of Definition The interval between an authoritarianpolitical regime and a democraticone is commonly referredto as the transitionperiod.
In other words. Once initial euphoria has leading subsided. democratization--that is. and economic changes have been postponedor blocked. Characteristics of the Transition While there are individual. that institutionalizesuncertainty. Whereas liberalizationis a controlled opening of the political space. 381 . Typically. institutionalarrangements regardingthe future distribution of power and the requirementsfor "founding elections" command immediate action. Some of the major issues in the process of transitionare addressedin Table 1.Helga A. there might be considerablediscrepanciesbetween the original intent and the final political outcome of mass action. and players involved in transitions. The goal of transforming political order is centralto most definitions of revolutions. and war involving different ethnic groups. transitionperiods are characterizedby great uncertaintywith regardto both the process and the results. During a transitionno one knows who will win or lose in both the distributionof political and economic power and personal well-being. it becomes clear that the prospects for achieving and sustaining polyarchy are different among countries in the region. national variations with regard to the speed. After long periods duringwhich majorpolitical."7Thus.'6 Just as it is difficult to outline the exact time framefor periods of transition.it is difficult to describe differentmodes of transition. processes the to the achievement of these goals vary considerably.however. From the very beginning it is imperative to institutionalize change since dissatisfactionand nostalgiafor certainaspects of the old regime may slow down the process of reform and enhance political polarization. First.'8 In centraland easternEurope. previous authoritarianstructures are altered during a transition period by the rapidlyexpandingrange of political actors and the need for political communicationamong them. even if there are agreementson the goals of economic and political transformation.19 may Third. Welsh The most common distinction is made between liberalization and democratization. extrication from the authoritarian regime and constitution of a democratic one-is a process that subjects different intereststo competition. stalemates in decision making. this impatiencebecame evident in the pressure to schedule "founding"elections at times when most opposition forces hardly had time to organize and overcome the Communist Party's monopoly of access to and distributionof information.Indeed. Disturbing signs of governmental instability. methods. transitionperiods are characterizedby the need to address certain crucial issues under ratherurgent time constraints. there is consensus on some goals but discord on methods and procedures. social. they have a number of featuresin common. the confusion about how one should label the different transitionmodes in eastern Europe is great and contributessignificantly to the general problem of concept misformation in political science.For example. as in the former Yugoslavia. the collapse of authoritarian rule result in a variety of outcomes. The confusion relates in particularto the use of the term revolution in describing the developments in central and the easternEurope. transitionperiods are times of accelerated change. reinforce the notion that the process and the outcome of transitionsfrom differentforms of authoritarianism not linearand are are often marredby insecurityand uncertainty. In addition. Second. the emergence of violent protests. a growing impatienceof the populationarises which intensifies the apparentneed for change.
22 In centraland easternEurope.g.g. as Burton.one could argue the same for externallyimposed transitions. politicalparties. Independentof whether regime change has been initiatedfrom above by political elites or from below by the masses. transitions involve bargaining. Gunther.. broad anticommunistsentimentunited the opposition.2' Mass mobilization is short-lived. managementtraining) Economic: * * * * * In 1989.23 Last but not least. restrictions on political activities for nonsanctioned political groups and organizations ceased to exist and resulted in the resurrection of civil society... In addition. the gap between the political elite and the masses reinforceddisillusionmentand distance between the rulers and the ruled.g. the extent of structural integrationat the level of communicationand influence and value consensus regardingthe mode of political conduct are crucially importantonce the transition has ended and the process of consolidationbegins. not by the public. transitions are elite-centered. on the other hand. privatization.These assumptions 382 . a highly diversified political landscape emerged..g. For example.20 Fourth. and Higley have pointed out. demobilizationand retreatto the privatespherefollow. with its long history of intellectualdissidents and politicians. in "the second phase of the redemocratizationprocess elite bargaining and accords become the key.interest groups) constitutionwriting prosecutionand purgeof communistpartyofficialsand members of securityapparatus restitutionof past injustices reformof media sector stabilization macroeconomic (e. Whereas popular mobilization often creates the conditions for the extricationfrom authoritarian regimes.. price liberalization. trade liberalization) structural reform(e.g.. currencyconvertibility) reform(e. it is often assumed that revolutionary transitions lack the element of negotiation. the terms of transitions are settled by emerging elites. The institutionalization political parties and movements was a dialectical process: on the one of hand.ComparativePolitics July 1994 in MainIssuesof Conflict Processes Central Eastern and Table 1 Transition Resolution Europe: Political: * * * * * * * * reformof electoralsystem issuesof reformof structureof government(including decentralization) selection of new politicalelite and developmentof institutionsof interest articulation interest aggregation(e.g. reformof monetaryand fiscal policies) price reform(e. reformof legaland banking systems) institutional educationalreform(e."24 This sequence seems to hold trueeven in cases where negotiationhas been previously neglected.
negotiations aimed at reaching compromises at the greatest advantage to each participatingparty. Welsh apply only if one limits the concept of negotiationto "old" versus "new" political forces. One specific featureof the transitionsin centraland easternEuropewas the emergence of round tables in which representativesof the old Communistpolitical system discussed the terms of transitionwith representativesof the opposition. In centraland easternEurope. it is born out of necessity. which are seen as important preconditionsof the voluntarydistributionand regularizedtransferof power. or exclusion and the mutual denial of legitimacy.25 Recent transitionperiods suggest that the end of extricationand the institutionalization of polyarchyare delimitedby the dramaticdecline of commandand impositionand the increase in bargaining and compromise. and the numberof actors as well as the issues under discussion is limited. even in the past they have been recognized as increasingly political systems. Bargaining in Central and Eastern Europe Bargaining. lies at the heart of pluralistpolitics. members of political and social organizationswho were closely aligned with the ruling CommunistParty participatedin the negotiations.conflict resolution.Helga A. In East Germany and Poland the mediating role of the 383 . but groundedin a political climate that nurtures mutual trust and cooperation. diverse.26 Similarly. While bargainingin authoritarian regimes is state-initiatedand state-controlled and aims at the protectionand consolidationof power. force. Although these modes are clearly present in all political systems. in pluralist political systems competition is moderated by cooperation which promotespersistentbargainingand compromise. broad-based (maximum-winning) coalition governments. corporatist strategies importantfeatures in authoritarian involving coalitions of special interestgroups within the state where access to participation is state-controlledare a common feature of left. their relative significance varies considerably. Bargainingand compromiseare not entirely absent in authoritarianregimes.and right-wing authoritarian regimes. Alternately. the stage of "bargainingand compromise"was characterized by three particularfeatures: the so-called round table. accompaniedby cooperation. the introductionof democracy is as much a matter of procedureas it is a matterof substance. bargainingin pluralistpolitical systems is competitive. This article addressesone particularissue of transition. and competition and cooperation. bargainingand compromise. For example. can take a variety of forms (includingad hoc meetings) but more often takes place in an institutionalizedsetting. we distinguish among three major means of conflict resolution: command and imposition.periodsof transitionare characterized a numberof specific featureswhich by aim at both change and consolidation. In contrast. and "conglomerate"parties. In summary. negotiationsmay take a variety of forms dependingon the political environment. In authoritarian political systems conflict resolution is based largely upon methods of command and imposition that take the form of rule by decree. In some countries. These features help us understandthe complexities and challenges of transitionbut are also instructivein understandingthe characterof the process. Transitions and Conflict Resolution Generally. bargainingin times of transitionis aimed at the peaceful passage of power. competition. However.
the particular political environments. Czechoslovakia. Because it was commonly understoodthat central and eastern Europe had to undergo dual transitionsthat encompassed political and economic institutions. and conflict is never absent. However.The mandate of the round table representativeswas self-imposed and exclusive.in Hungarya numberof independentobservers. workers' militia) had to be made. there was a high level of mutual dependence on the bargainingrelationship. and the perception of bargainingpower shifted from the incumbents to the 384 . the time frames duringwhich roundtables were active." Power-sharing emerged because the Communists were no longer able to govern without the active participationand supportof oppositionalforces. and one of their trademarkswas the exclusion of public discourse. the negotiationprocess runs throughstages. and the inability of the Communists to continue their rule independentof other political forces had to be furtherexposed.28In the context of the literatureon negotiation. and the resulting bargaining strengths of the parties varied to a fair degree. In Poland. In all cases. urgentand drasticeconomic reforms could no longer be postponed. in East Germany. and to initiatethe process of democratization. changes in the constitution (for example. and thus isolatedfrom the public at large.ComparativePolitics July 1994 churches was evident in their continuousrole in the round table negotiations. this type of bargainingis generally describedas integrative:there are two majorparties and several issues to be negotiated.29 Round table negotiations combined public with secret negotiations. and Bulgaria large segments of the public had become highly politicized and demanded major political and economic reforms.attemptsto reconcile the past division between "us" and "them. Finally. loss of authority by the incumbent political parties continued during the negotiations. with the exception of Solidarityin Poland. The opposition saw the roundtable arrangements a way to control the as incumbentgovernment.27 the dismantlingof the forces the and of domestic suppression (state security. For a variety of reasons.ratherelitist. the opposition in Hungary and in Bulgaria (until December 1990) rejected formal power-sharing the arrangements: sense of defeat of the Communistswas less acute in these two countries. also attendedsome of the round table negotiations. Bargaining schemes differed with regardto tactics and the perceived power of the negotiating partner. deletion of the provisions that guaranteed leading role of the CommunistParty). both items were discussed. With the exception of Hungary and Bulgaria. and its legitimacy was indeterminate since it was not based on elections. These negotiations opened up channels of political participation for the hitherto excluded opposition groups and allowed outgoing administrationsto "save face. Although the methods and goals of power-sharingwere similar across national settings. Decisions regarding dates and terms of democratic elections. in the end the results of the round table discussions were confined largely to the political realm. round tables led to or were responsiblefor the choice of transitionalgovernments. Generally. the opposition had always been fragmented." and their aim was to make compromises acceptable to both sides.round table negotiations were entered into out of political and economic necessity. one overriding feature of round table negotiations involved power-sharing. The main goal of the round tables was similar in all countries:to set the terms for the creation of a reformed or new political system. the parties' interests are not clearly defined at the beginning of the negotiations. to raise the visibility of opposition forces since. including churchpersonalities.
In central and eastern Europe. and East Germany. 1989-12 Mar. the "CentralRound Table" met sixteen times from the beginning of December 1989 to the middle of March 1990. 1989-31 Jan. 1989 26 Nov. roughly four forms of negotiation emerged.Helga A. In addition. Finally. however. twelve subcommittees. 1990-14 May1990 27 Jan. The ongoing reassessment of bargaining strength had important implications for the roles of opposition groups which evolved throughoutthe period of negotiations. While the political forces in Poland agreed to a gradual opening based on power-sharing. if not defeat. of the power of the CommunistParty. 1990 7 Dec.000 documented meetings or talks over a period of three months./8Apr. The most common form of negotiationevolved from the concept of controland resultedin power-sharing. the so-called round table negotiations encompassed only two sessions (see Table 2). 1990 8/9 June 1990 18 Mar. negotiations started with the initial intent of controlling the Communist Party."32 In Romania.1990 22 Jan. as well as a steering committee and numerous smaller ad hoc committees. In contrastto the first setting.and the numberof meetings--were also evident. In this form of transition. 1990-1 Feb. fifty main delegates and more than 500 experts came together in two main committees.30 During this time. 1990 Date of National Elections 4/8 June 1989 25 Mar.evolved into power-sharing. altogether 276 members and advisers took part in the activities of the "Central Round Table. Negotiations startedbecause of the sharedperceptionbetween regime and opposition that the severity of the political and economic crises demandedjoint approachesto problem solving. Welsh opposition forces.In this arrangement. In Hungary.1990 10/17 June 1990 20 May 1990 385 . negotiationstook place in Romaniawith the intentof replacingthe old system but without substantial power-sharing among the new political elite. Czechoslovakia. They emphasize different aspects of the process but are not mutually exclusive. the range of participants.31 In East Germany. there were sixteen working committees. 1989-5 Apr. the Hungarian oppositionopted insteadfor an immediatetransitionto democracywithoutformal power-sharing arrangements.and resultedin a substantialdecline. and two supplementarycommittees and negotiated in roughly 1. substantial differences in institutional settings-the length of negotiations. mass mobilizationplayed a crucialrole in the willingness of the rulingelites to enternegotiationswith oppositionforces. 1989 13 June 1989-18 Sept.which was adopted in Bulgaria. The limited role of bargainingand compromise is yet another indicator that tAe transition to polyarchy was severely hamperedin the Romaniancase. Round TableNegotiations National and in Table2 Central Elections Central Eastern and Europe Country Poland Hungary CSSR GDR Bulgaria Romania Duration of Round-TableNegotiations 6 Feb. competitive strategies almost immediatelyfollowed the opening of the political space.
" that is. the lower house of the parliament. By late July. the experience of negotiation was not new to the political actors in Poland.a contingency for which it was unprepared. . The resulting compromiseinitially clearly favored the Communistpartyand its coalition partners: they were guaranteeda majorityin the Sejm. we won the elections.In addition.ComparativePolitics July 1994 Negotiation as Reform In many ways Poland set the stage since it was the first countryin central and eastern Europe that engaged in round table negotiations. .the experience of 1981 was not to be repeatedin 1989.it also became 386 .The round table agreementpreservedimportantelements of political power for former Communists and. it was understoodthat the opposition would not impede the election of General Jaruzelskias presidentand that mattersof defense and internalorder would remain in the hands of the Communists.they were able to agree on a common strategyand were helped by a falteringCommunistpartythathad split into two rival wings. by a stroke of bad luck.33 However. However.At one point Lech Walqsa confirmed that his intentions had been quite different:"I wanted to stop at the conquestsof the roundtable. Negotiation and Competition In Hungary. In March 1989. following a by-election which returnedthe first oppositionMP to Parliament. Solidaritywas forced to take over governmentalresponsibility. "Their original idea was to make economic discussion a condition for political concessions."34 After the electoraldefeat of the Polish United Workers'Party. make a pause and occupy ourselves with the economy and the society. The goal of the OppositionRoundTable was to create the conditions for a peaceful transition to democracy. they rejected the power-sharing formulaemployed in Poland. ultimately became an obstacle toward faster consolidation of democraticrule. but the Communist party leadership insisted on giving economic issues equal standing in the negotiations. Members of the Polish United Workers' Partyas well as of Solidarityhad the experiences of 1981 to draw from. But.people questionedthe need to adhere to an arrangementthat was made under different domestic and international circumstances. in the eyes of many. In addition. convincing at least the more reform-mindedmembers of the HungarianSocialist Workers' Party (HSWP) that the strategy of "divide and conquer" towardthe opposition had failed. even this aspect of policymakinghas been drawninto question not only by subsequentgovernmentsbut also by scholars. nine majoroppositiongroupsformedthe so-called Opposition Round Table. the major opposition forces advocated the concept of "one-step transition to democracy. the diffusion effects of these developmentson other countries in the region can hardly be overstated. the roundtable agreementmade possible the peaceful transitionto a pluralist political system at a time when power-sharingin Communist political systems was a novelty. In addition.36 Nevertheless.37Although the opposition forces were fragmented. the demoralizingblow to the Communistsin the June and July 1989 elections to the upper house of parliament seriously undermined the results of the round table negotiations. The fact that the negotiationsin 1980-81 failed and led to the introductionof martial law weighed heavily on the negotiating partners.35The power-sharingarrangement advance and did facilitate the introduction one of the more progressive "shock therapies"in the transition of from a centralized to a market-oriented economy. .
In East Germany and Czechoslovakia. The political initiative moved from the old to the new political forces: indeed. Although to differing degrees. The Communistsreacted. but the independent opposition was relatively weak. the threator use of strikes and walk-outs and the refusal to enter into a new round of talks unless certain issues were resolved became standard negotiation tactics and continued to underminethe strength of the Bulgarian Communist Partyfrom the initial phase of transitionuntil the June 1990 elections. a governmentwas created in which the then-renamedBulgarianSocialist Party held eight positions.39 Although bargainingand compromise did not extend to institutionalizedpower-sharing arrangements. Finally the stalematewas brokenwhen the opposition forces within the Union of DemocraticForces agreedto enter into a power-sharing government. the inequality between the two negotiating based on necessity which precludedgenuine power-sharing."38 contrastto Poland. later expanding into shaping policy decisions. in response to the turmoilin their countries. while four went to unaffiliatedexperts. The National Round Table set the terms of the transition (which included the specifics of the upcoming elections and consensus regardingmajorlegislative proposals)40and united the opposition.the opposition forces refused to enter any transitorygovernmentalpower arrangements. there were many futile efforts to form a coalition between the Bulgarian Communist Party and the Union of DemocraticForces. the Communist political leadership started the process of liberalization only after the pressure of popular mobilization left no alternative. opposition groups gradually eroded the bases for Communist party participation and entered coalition governments of "national unity" and "national responsibility" in which Communists and noncommunistsshared power until elections in spring 1990. 1990. the Union of Democratic Forces three. lacked organization. and the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union two. Oppositiongroups saw their roles initially in terms of vetoing Communistpolicy initiatives. and needed to gain independence and visibility.Helga A. Czechoslovakia. even if only for a few months.4' Even after the June 1990 elections. and only on March 12. Negotiation: From Control to Power-Sharing In Bulgaria.On December 29.they were the prevailing decision-making mode for the duration of the National Round Table. which resulted in a small margin of victory for the Communists. 1990 was a formalagreementregardingthe role of the round table concluded. and Czechoslovakia. during which settlementsof far-reachingpolitical significance were achieved. Welsh clear thatboth the policy of concessions and the plan of makingdemocracya gift from above In were of limited potential. opposition forces in all three countries were still in their infancy and needed the support of round table negotiations to gain status and public visibility. As in Hungary. only the of threatof a general strike at the nationallevel led to the inauguration roundtable talks in January1990. partnersled to an arrangement More than in other countries. the German Democratic Republic. and East Germany. in the case of Czechoslovakia a reversal in power positions occurred even before the scheduling of democraticelections. For example. The resultingtransitionalgovernmentin Bulgariawas exclusively a caretakergovernment without the participationof the opposition forces. 387 . ratherthan acted. Bulgaria's Communist Party met emerging opposition from a united front. and the initiative for the institutionalizationof round tables came from the political opposition.
by the anticipatedstrengthof the Communistparty and the emerging opposition political forces.and the dialogue between newly emerging political forces was never officially termed a round table (althoughthe term was widely used in the media). There were no negotiationsbetween old and new political forces. the Civic Forum and Public against Violence did the same in Czechoslovakia.44 Whetherto unite or to run on separatetickets was conditioned. a number of powerful political alliances emerged in central and eastern Europein 1990.45Although the origins of Solidarity differ from those of the opposition forces in other central and easternEuropeancountries. The old RomanianCommunistParty died with Ceausescu. at least not in the usual juxtaposition of Communist Party versus opposition. members of the emerging opposition rejected any kind of overt ideology and often even the very concept of party-building. In East Germany. the leaders of the NationalSalvationFrontsaw themselves as executive organsof the revolution who enjoyed considerablepolitical backing.that is. and although members of the opposition were included in the Council of the National Salvation Front (NSF) and later in the Provisional Council of National Unity. However. These terms were used to describe political organizationswhich combined a variety of different political groups and political parties in a loose movement without a structuredprogram or institutionalized structure. Wherethe Communistpartywas perceivedas united and strongand the opposition as weak.ComparativePolitics July 1994 Negotiation by Dictate Negotiation in Romania did not follow any of these patterns. Where the Communistparty split into two or more rival political parties. the sense of unity of the oppositionalforces initiallyprevailedin Poland as well. On the one hand. The othernewly emerging political forces were fragmentedand were never able to gain an equal footing in the negotiations. oppositional unity was essential. or movement parties. conglomerate parties. in terms of political spectrumand membershipstrength. As a result. the clear majorityof NSF members precluded any meaningful bargaining. of A first offer to the opposition to participate in the government came in April 1991. As Weiss and Heinrich point out.42 In the May 1990 elections the National Salvation Frontemerged as the clear winner and was able to form a governmentwithoutparticipation the highly diverse opposition forces.among otherthings. The pent-up desire for political participation resulted in an unprecedented proliferationof political partiesand movements. the resultingcoalition governmentwas aptly termeda pseudo-coalition. as in Poland and Hungary. ratherdiverse elements of the opposition in Bulgaria. The Union of DemocraticForces combined majorbut.43 The Development of the Political Party System Another feature in power-sharing arrangementsinvolved creation of so-called umbrella organizations. on they created new organizationswhich-just as the despised Communist parties-tried to appeal to all sectors of the population. efforts to unite major opposition groups failed largely 388 . Mushroomingnumbersof political groups and parties were counterbalancedby the antiideological and anticommuniststance of the opposition movement. "all political interestswere submergedin the name of the higher interest"of opposing the Communistparty. the other hand.the need to ban together diminished.the major opposition forces refused to join the governmentby Petre Roman because it did not entail any guaranteesof power-sharing.
As Batt points out. In particular. a number of electoral alliances. the anticommunistumbrella was enough to continue electoral alliances into governmentalalliances. party identification. the opposition remained divided and confident of its victory over an increasingly weak Communist party that had split into two majorfactions. A coalition between the two largestparties. in turn. and 389 . and institutionalized structure became major obstacles to efficient decision making."46 However. Slogans had to be replaced by substantivepolitical programsand transformedinto policy actions. and competition was limited almost were initially exclusively to former Communists. accordingto the roundtable agreements. party programs. power-sharingarrangements the oppositional Union of Democratic Forces. These of problemsare particularly importantsince the structures governmentin centraland eastern Europe are based on the model of western European parliamentarysystems which rely heavily on partyidentificationand partydiscipline. Power-sharinggovernments still prevailed. In Czechoslovakia and East Germany the broad-basedpower-sharinggovernments of the first transition period led to maximum-winningcoalitions. New elections were set for September 1993. Effective policymakingis possible only with the supportof a majorityin parliament.47In particular. broad consensus was needed. Political groups and organizationsfelt the pressureto develop their own political profiles and their independent organizationaland membershipbases. the governmentstruggledrepeatedlyto form viable coalition cabinets:a coalition of seven parties was able to maintaina stable majorityin the Sejm. aimed at combining different political groups under one umbrella. However. Welsh because of the early entry of West Germanpartiesinto the electoral campaign. "theircreationwas largely the productof elite initiatives. with the HungarianDemocratic Forum as its core. In view of the enormous tasks ahead. was declined by the former. By 1991 transitions entered a new stage in most countries. As early as 1988. 1990. and a coalition governmentwas rejectedby not formed until the end of November 1990.the Free Democrats. Still. agreed to a revision of some laws which. the Civic Forum. the refusalof the Social DemocraticPartyto join an opposition alliance forestalleda similar arrangementin East Germany. Conflicting interests startedto surface.this pact involved the choice of a memberof the Alliance of Free Democratsas president. from July 1992 to May 1993.48 However. Lack of party tradition. ratherthan the mass pressurethat was so importantin the original formationof Solidarity. One major exception to this form of power-sharingis Hungary. had previously requireda two-thirdsmajority. In Hungary. the opposition enjoyed relatively more freedom of organizationbut was limited to the urban middle class. the two major political parties concluded a pact in which major elements of the distributionof power were negotiated. the Polish parliament. problemsinherentin the lack of an establishedparty system have subsequently taken their toll. In the months following the 1991 elections. the DemocraticForumand the Alliance of Free Democrats. In Poland the power-sharingarrangement between former members of the Polish United Workers' Party and Solidarity gradually disintegrated up to the elections of October 1991. and the Public against Violence. even after the elections in 1990. the incumbent caretakergovernment was replaced by a coalition of three parties.Helga A. the element of compromisecame to the fore once more: on April 29. in particularthe victorious Alliance for Germany. Initially. In Bulgaria.
including its chairman. and Poland. However. one of Romania's 140-odd registeredparties. the proliferation of parties did not necessarily coincide with party identification. The division of the Public against Violence into two parties led to the collapse of the republicangovernmentin Slovakia.2 percentof the nationalvote. a key variable in democraticconsolidation.49 governmentseems to have been able to finish its originalterm of four Only the Hungarian years. However. Hardly a day passes without a split in. more than 100 political partiesexisted. lack of cooperation in the coalition governmentdominated by the HungarianDemocratic Forum (HDF) has led to the walk-out of ten of the members of the Independent Smallholders'Party. In Czechoslovakia. some of which resulted in the formationof new political movements and parties. to leave it. despite the fact that here also the party landscape is far from established. thus contributingto a resounding victory of the National Salvation Front. the Union is well on its way to becoming a permanentfeatureof the Bulgarianpolitical landscape. In Romania opposition forces also remaineddivided. the former Czechoslovakia. partiesproliferated. disagreementsover the methodsand process of transformation turnedinto 390 . in 1992 political life in Romania was characterized by "increasing confusion and fragmentation.which in turnhas undermined elite consensus. In 1990 none of the opposition parties was able to gathermore than7.and competition among them increased. Another indication of the weakness of party organization-and the perceived need to stay above partisan politics-was the official nonpartisancharacterof the presidents of Romania.50Indeed. By virtue of party split-ups. In these circumstances. and some membersjoined other parties and movements. in subsequentelections during 1992 the Convention was able to garner major parts of the electorate. The opposition was helped by developments within the National Salvation Front. contributingto early elections in most centraland easternEuropeancountries.The high degree of partyfragmentation fostered intransigenceand delimitation.ComparativePolitics July 1994 competition for personal and political power came to the fore. In spring 1991 personalambitions seem to have been the major motivation in the decision of one of its key players.Competitionas the prevailingmode of conflict resolution already characterizedthe Hungarianpolitical scene by the time of the 1990 elections and has continued since then.personal rifts and diverging opinions regardingthe speed of the transitionled to its split into two movementsby late March 1992."52 In many cases. Although the Union of Democratic Forces in Bulgaria has also suffered a series of individualand group defections. or an expulsion from. the six political groups originally represented in the Czechoslovakian parliamentgrew to fifteen by mid 1991 and almost twenty by the end of the year. A first effort to unite the oppositionforces resulted in the formationof the National Convention for the Establishmentof Democracy (NCED) on December 15. only eight of the twenty ministers in the Polish "government of experts" belonged to the coalition parties. In Poland in the fall of 1991. 1990. the Civic Forum split into two independent parties. At the beginning of 1992. As one observernoted. of which twenty-twowere able to registernationallists. so far the presence of the strong BulgarianSocialist Party helped keep theirrankstogether. twenty-nine in has partiesachieved representation the parliament. the National Liberal Party.5'Althoughits compositionis far from stable. The parliamentbecame fragmentedand deeply divided along party lines.
While bargaining and compromise contributedto the peaceful and orderly transfer of power and the institutionalizationof pluralist political structures in central and eastern Europe. furtherprogress towardthe consolidation of these emerging democracieshas been hamperedby unresolved issues of power distributionand. This change was illustratedin the shift from conglomeratepartiesto competitivepartiesand from overarching (maximum-winning) to minimal-winning coalition governments.ethnic conflicts. For example.53 Conclusion All modes of transitionentailed the element of negotiation. first ministerof finance and later Czech prime minister. Welsh personal power struggles. 391 . The emergence of competitive strategies was a logical step from extrication to consolidation. to I have suggested that bargainingand compromiselie at the heartof the transitionprocess. is dependenton both competition and cooperation. negotiationfacilitatedthe peaceful and organizedtransitionfrom authoritarian democraticallyconstitutedpolitical systems. Further progress toward democratic consolidation. bargaining and compromisedecline in favor of more competitive modes of conflict resolution. In countries where elite bargainingand compromise are largely absent or limited in their outreach. The first stage in the transitionto democracyis characterizedby the switch from command and imposition to intense bargaining and compromise. Further progress toward democratic consolidation may be substantially influenced by how the skills of bargaining and compromise were employed during the second phase of the transition. and between ArpaidGancz and J6zsef Antall in Hungaryare cases in point. Lines of division can be drawn between former dissidents and emerging career politicians of "old" and "new" origin and according to positions in the vertical and horizontal distributionof power. In Czechoslovakia much of the struggle for influence initially involved formerfederal presidentVaclav Havel (now Presidentof the Czech Republic) and Vaclav Klaus. however. Once the transition enters the stage of consolidation. the successful completion of the transitionmay be slowed down or jeopardized.Many of the currentproblemsin the region--governmental instability. to some extent. Most important.Helga A. I argued that the transition to democracy is also a transition in the modes of conflict resolution and that the examples drawn from central and eastern Europe are indicative of transitionprocesses in other settings as well.only when the revival of the old system ceased to be a viable option did negotiation give way to competitive modes. political apathy--can be traced at least partly to the premature eclipse of bargaining and compromise in conflict resolution.with the exception of Romania. Different negotiating patterns were a crucialpartof the first stage in the transitionprocess. between Ion Iliescu and Petre Roman in Romania. the battle over constitutional rights between the head of government and the head of state has been intensified by constitutionaluncertaintiesbut also by personal animosities and political differences. by conflictual elite attitudes. either as singular strategies or as a more deeply ingrained behavioralpatternin which conflict resolution is the outcome of competition accompanied by cooperation. The power struggles between Lech Walsa and several prime ministers in Poland. where the negotiationphase was short-livedand dominatedby one group.
"The Struggle for Liberal Democracy in EasternEurope. 1992). "Transitionsto Democracy. 63-67. eds. 1991). 2. 1981). 1988). Negotiation Analysis (Ann Arbor:University of Michigan Press. 158-172. 10. "Change in Regime and Power in Hungary (1989-1990). Lawler. Willerton. in 1.The Third Wave." Transit:EuropdischeRevue.Democracy and Market. pp. Adam Przeworski..Mass. 1991. Transitionsfrom AuthoritarianRule: TentativeConclusions about UncertainDemocracies (Baltimore:The Johns Hopkins University Press. ed. Barbara A. Czechoslovakia prior to its division into two separatestates.Poland. 128 (May 1991). "Democracyas a ContingentOutcome of Conflicts. Much emphasis has been placed on the transformationof the centralizedplannedeconomies.. Michael Keren and Gur Ofer. 280. Samuel B. 33. 3. To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions(Berkeley: University of CaliforniaPress. Zbigniew Rau. DankwartA. 44. "Must Eastern Europe follow the Latin American Way?. 4. pp. for example. "Time as a tactical resource" is discussed by Giuseppe Di Palma. p. Samuel P. IX. For the purposes of this article. and Baltimore: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.. Democracy and the Market:Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press. Uncertain Futures: Eastern Europe and Democracy (New York: Institute for East-West Security Studies Occasional Paper 16. and Jan Thompsonfor her valuablehelp in preparingthe manuscript. Liberalizationand Democratization:Change in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (Baltimore:The Johns Hopkins University Press. and Romania. ed. 24 (March 1992). 8. See. Bachrach and Edward J. 80."Democratization and Security in EasternEurope. eds. Constitutionalismand Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 151-179: Bart van Steenbergen. Trials of Transition:Economic Bloc (Boulder:Westview Press. The article was writtenwhile I held a visiting appointmentat the University of Arizona. 1 (Fall 1990). TheReemergenceof Civil Society in EasternEuropeand the Soviet Union (Boulder: Westview Press. 1991). 2 (April 1970)." Futures. Schmitter.. Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. 7. Mih~ly Bihari.." The WashingtonQuarterly. 17. 190-208. TimurKuran. PhilippeC. Osteuropaund anderswo. 269-284. "Modes of Transitions in Latin America. "Political Dynamics of the Post-Communist Transition:A ComparativePerspective. pp. Adam Przeworski. Jan Zielonka. Valerie Bunce. Hungary. The Emergenceof MarketEconomies in Eastern Europe (Cambridge. "Now Out or Never: The Elementof Surprisein the East EuropeanRevolutionof 1989. p. 113-138. Tactics. Richter. 1990). Adam Przeworski. reprintedfrom WorldPolitics. Liszl6 Bruszt.C. 1992). See also Tsuyoshi Hasegawa.The ThirdWave:. 6. "The Types of Democracy Emergingin Southernand Eastern Europeand South and CentralAmerica. Karl and Schmitter. 107-120. Bargaining: Power. p.. for example.ComparativePolitics July 1994 NOTES I would like to thank David Gibbs. "Spiel mit Einsatz: Demokratisierungsprozessein Lateinamerika. Schmitterand TerryKarl. 1991). 114. 1990). "Transitionsfrom Authoritarian/Totalitarian Systems: Recent Developments in Central and EasternEurope in a ComparativePerspective. 5.. and three anonymous reviewers for critical readingand many thoughtfulcomments. 14.." East European Politics and Societies." in Bermeo. pp. eds. 6.. Terry Lynn Karl and PhilippeC. 337-363." in Jon Elster and Rune Slagstad. 1991). Volten. (October 1991). H. p. pp. Samuel P. 392 . Rausser. ed.: Basil Blackwell. 16." in Nancy Bermeo. 395-430." in Peter Volten. ed. eds. 12. p.Democratization the Late TwentiethCentury(Norman:Universityof OklahomaPress. 7 (Summer 1990).. "The Connectionbetween Political and Economic Reform in CommunistRegimes.p. 1992). central and eastern Europe encompasses Bulgaria. Southern and Eastern Europe.. 1992): Christopher Reformin the Former Communist Clague and GordonC." World Policy Journal. and The Johns Hopkins University Press. the formerGermanDemocraticRepublic. "East Central Europe: Democracy in Retreat?. D. eds. E. "Transformative Politics: Social Costs and Social Peace in East CentralEurope." in Kurtin S~ndor et al. See. 15. and Outcomes (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers. Misztal." Archives Europdennesde Sociologie. 1992). Dahl. 4. For a summaryof the differentterms used in analyzing the natureof regime change. Przeworski. 33 (1992).. 1986)." in H. Huntington." ComparativePolitics. MagyarorszdgPolitikai Evkinyve (Budapest:Okon6miaAlapitv~ny-EconomixRt. 13. "Negotiation Analysis. ed. 35-49. 11. Dismantling Communism:Common Causes and Regional Variations (Washington. 42-68.. John P. 9. Peyton Young." in GilbertRozman et al. Russell Bova. Rustow. 95-99. 55-72. Peyton Young. Huntington. see Huntington. Michaela W." in Peter M. 1991). Schmitter. Bound to Change: ConsolidatingDemocracy in East Central Europe (New York: Institutefor East West Studies. pp.. 63. 6 (Winter 1992). p. ed. 41." InternationalSocial Science Journal. 14 (Summer 1991).
276. "The Intangibles and Imponderables of the Transition to Democracy. of the welfare potentialof the state. 58 (Winter 1991). "Introduction:Elite Transformationsand Democratic Regimes. 336. 266-283. Cited in Przeworski." Studies in ComparativeCommunism. Nancy Bermeo. 19-21. "DemocratizationProcesses in East Central Europe: A Theoretical Reconsideration." Negotiation Journal."CommonElementsin the Analysis of the Negotiation Process. eds." Politics and Society. Cf. 23." in John Higley and Richard Gunther. p.Mass. "Dilemmas of the TransitionPeriod. 128 (May 1991)." EmanuelRichter. and Is Not. Plattner. 31. "Der Runde Tisch: Konkursverwalter 'realen' Sozialismus: Analyse des and Vergleich des Wirkens Runder Tische in Europa. "1989: The Negotiated Revolution in Hungary." in Diamond and Plattner. 365-387. 21 (July 1991)." AmericanSociological Review.. p. Robert Weiss and ManfredHeinrich." Berichte des Bundesinstituts fiir ostwissenschaftliche and internationaleStudien. The negative consequences of the roundtable agreementsare emphasizedby Wojtek Lamentowicz. 52 (June 1987). Der Runde Tisch. . 1992). Thaysen. "'EliteSettlements. This definitionof integrativebargainingis derivedfrom I. 19. The notion of negotiation is emphasized in a numberof recent articles on regime transitionsin regions other than central and eastern Europe. "Systemic Unterpinningsof the Transition in Poland: The Shadow of the Round-table Agreement. 1993). 7-50." Social Research. 29. 85 (December 1991). Schmitterand Terry Lynn Karl." East EuropeanPolitics and Societies.Helga A." in LarryDiamond and Marc F. Michael Burton et al. See also BartlomiejKaminski. 1990). " 'Social Choice' in Eastern Europe. 71 (Spring-Summer1993). 21.24 (September 1991). Burtonand John Higley. Liszl6 Bruszt. 1283-1302. Joseph M. 26-50. William Zartman. 293-298. and Grzegorz Ekiert. Democracy and the Market." International Social Science Journal. 20 (March 1992). Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press." British Journal of Political Science.. 3 (Winter 1989). 30. 57 (Summer 1990). 15 (1991). "Polen nach der Revolution:Die Marginalisierung 393 . "The Transition to Democracy in Eastern Europe: Trends and Paradoxes of Social Rationalization." Social Philosophy and Policy. A particularlygood example of the changing role of the roundtable is provided by Uwe Thaysen. "What Democracy Is . 173-190. 26. see Jon Elster. 26 April 1989. TerryLynn Karl. Andrds Nagy. Jan T. 25. pp. 306-307. The role of corporatismin East Europeanpolitics is stressed by David Ost. Herbert Kitschelt. Nikolai Genov. Gross.eds. See Michael G. 2 (November-December 1989). 20."ComparativePolitics. See RichardJoseph.titution-Making Eastern Europe: Rebuilding the Boat in the Open Sea. 898.24 (June 1991). "Towardsa CorporatistSolution in EasternEurope:The Case of Poland. pp. 147-164. 295-307. 27. see Radio Free Europe(Polish Situation Reportl6). See also John Gray.: The Belknap Press of HarvardUniversity Press. the emergenceof nationalconventionshas become a trademark of recenttransitionprocesses. 10. 4 (1991). 169-217." Studies in ComparativeCommunism. The Art and Science of Negotiation (Cambridge." Journal of ComparativeEconomics. EmanuelRichterasserts. emphasizes the elimination of competition and the role of bargaining and compromise in the economic planningprocess in Communistpolitical systems. "Upheavalsin the East and Turmoil in Political Theory: Comments on Offe's 'Capitalismby Democratic Design?'. . eds. and of international stabilityand peaceful change. 33. 28. oder: Wo blieb das Volk?Der Weg der DDR in die Demokratie(Opladen:WestdeutscherVerlag. and Howard Raiffa. 34. In Africa." Foreign Affairs. 10 (Summer 1993). 79. 152-174. 24 (April 1992). Cf. For an important discussion of the role of round tables in constitution making. 35. The Global Resurgenceof Democracy(Baltimore:The Johns Hopkins UniversityPress. 4 (1988). in "Cons. 41-43. Cf. pp. 22. "Transitionsby Agreement:Modeling the Spanish Way?. 32. Welsh 18. "Democracyand the Lessons of Dictatorship." Public Administration. "El Salvador'sNegotiatedRevolution." American Political Science Review. For a detailed account of the agreement."Social Research.. 24. "Africa:The Rebirthof Political Freedom. 7 April 1989. 37-38." UncaptiveMinds. p. 10. "The Formationof Party Systems in East Central Europe. for example. "From Post-Communismto Civil Society: The Reemergence of History and the Decline of the WesternModel. Philippe C. Piotr Sztompka. Colomer. 314-16. that in formerCommunist-governed societies the term democracy will be used less as a standardof participation "will become more and more formalizedand will provide the institutional but frameworkfor a political system that serves the demands of economic progress. 71 (Spring 1992).. and RAD BackgroundReportl67 (Poland). 99-103. 1982). 131.
"Post-Communist 6 (Spring 1992). The Reds.41 (1992). (Winter 1991-92). Eastern Europe in Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell University Press." Report on Eastern Europe. 37. 105-114. pp. See. 40. "The UDF's Members and Groups with Observer Status. 55. "Economic Reforms. 371." East European Politics and Societies. 276-308. See also AndrBsBoz6ki. "Another Front for Romania's Salvation. 44. in particular. 132-198. Weiss and Heinrich. Andris Boz6ki. 52. 50. 42. Stephen White. 155. pp. Linz. See Peter Hardi." in SAndoret al. 77. 146. Baylis emphasizes this point when he concludes that the new elites in eastern Europe "have not learned to employ the subtle mix of confrontationalrhetoric and accommodative practice that typifies democratic and Continuity among East European politics in the West. November 19-22. May 17.eds." Thomas A. 36. "1989: The Negotiated Revolution in Hungary.. "The Role of Interim Government. see also Mihaly Simai. International 41. 13-71." Siidosteuropa. Economic Reformsin New Democracies: A Social-DemocraticApproach(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press. 20. For a classification of transitionalgovernments.In turn. See Higley and Gunther. Dan Ionescu. at the time of the June 1990 elections the membershipof the Union of DemocraticForces totaled sixteen political parties and groups. eds. Problems. "WesternEconomic Diplomacy and the New EasternEurope." in Ivo Banac. 69-78. For a different point of view. For example. 51. "Hungary's Road to Systemic Change: The Opposition Roundtable." in Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereiraet al. January1990). the relatively poor election results of the Free Democrats-the partythat advocateda swift change to western-stylemarketeconomics-resulted in the immediatewithdrawalof financial backing for Hungary. Baylis. p. 1990). Bruszt. Peter Gowan assertsthat this pact was the indirectoutcome of western reactionsto the victory of the Democratic Forum. 21 August 1992."p. pp.or the Rewritingof Polish History."East EuropeanPolitics and Societies. p." Transit: Europaische Revue. 33 (Spring 1992). "The Blues. "Hungarian 49.." RFE/RL Research Report. see Irena Resentment. p. "Remakingthe Political Field in Hungary:From the Politics of Confrontation to the Politics of Competition.. 1-5. "Parteiensystemund Gesellschaft in Ungarn:Stabiles Parteiensystemoder Krisensituation?. Avram Agov. 29-30. 1991). Public Opinion. pp. 17-23." Governmentand Opposition. Peter Gowan. Martin's Press. 1992). Ldiszl6Brusztand David Stark. 43. 5-8. Constitutionalism and Political Change in Hungary (Budapest: Hungarian Institute of Affairs Policy Paper Series No. Judy Batt. and the Greens. Communistand PostcommunistPolitical Systems: An Introduction(New York: St. 27 (Winter 1992). Grudzifiska. pp. Thomas A." The New HungarianQuarterly. According to him."Journal of Democracy. and Political Institutions:Poland in the EasternEuropeanPerspective. this withdrawalwas said to have led to offers by the winning DemocraticForumto negotiate. "The Year of Incomplete Changes. "Romania'sTortuousRoad to Reform.ComparativePolitics July 1994 des Politischen. 394 . 48. 4 (Winter 1991-92). 97-98. 39." Revised paperat the Twenty-fourthNationalConventionof the AmericanAssociation for the Advancementof Slavic Studies.. 45. pp. Cf. 1. and Rada Nikolaev. pp.Adam Przeworski. 7 (Spring 1993). 1991. See Kjell Engelbrekt. Attila Agh. "Cracks in the Union of DemocraticForces. 182 (July-August 1990). "Democracyacross the Negotiating Table." RFE/RLResearch Report. 1991. 56. 1992. 47. 3 January1992. Spring 1991." New Left Review." UncaptiveMinds. 1. ed. 3 (January1992). 53. see Yossi Shain and Juan J." Report on Eastern Europe. May 17. 38. KathrinSitzler. East CentralEuropefrom Reformto Transformation (New York:Council on ForeignRelationsPress. 1993). 73-89. 171-187. 65... Michael Shafir. 19-20. Phoenix. "Plus I(a Change? Transformation Elites. 33. 46.
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