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LOGIC

THE ART OF THINKING:
BEING

THE POUT-ROYAL LOGIC

TRANSLATED
FROM THE FRENCH, WITH AN INTRODUCTION,
BY

THOMAS SPENCER BAYNES.

EDINBURGH:
STREET. SUTHERLAND AND KNOX, GEORGE

AND LONDON: SIMPKIN, MARSHALL
MDCCCL.

(

\

.MURRAY AND GIBB, PRINTKKS, EDINBURGH.

TO

SIR

WILLIAM HAMILTON, BARONET
MEMBER OF THE
INSTITUTE OF FRANCE, ETC., ETC. PROFESSOR OF LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS IN THE UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH,

THIS TRANSLATION
IS,

AS

A

MARK OF RESPECT.
DEDICATED,

BY HIS GRATEFUL PUPIL

THE TRANSLATOR.

I

DAT? APR
.

? 1QR7

TRANSLATOR S PREFACE.

No

apology

is

needful for the Port-Royal Logic.

The
ex

Translation of a
cellence, if at

work of such high repute and
faithful,

sterling

all

must needs be
from

useful.

It is

especially likely to be so,
logical studies has

now

that a revival of interest in
since,
its

commenced,

freshness ot

thought, and variety of illustration,

it is

better adapted to

meet the wants of
interest,

inquirers,

and

foster

the

awakened

than most other works on the subject.

It will

be

right,

however, to say a few words in relation

to the circumstances
It

under which the present translation was begun somewhat more than a year is published. soon after its commencement, ago, but wholly laid aside and only hastily resumed within the last few weeks, in
order that
for college in time might be carried through the press the present winter, so that the whole use
it

during has been printed, and more than a third part translated, In consequence since the commencement of the session.
of this haste,
it

appears in a
I

much more
which

imperfect form
for in in

than I could have wished.
stance,
to

have been unable,
the

add

illustrative

notes,

work

VI

PREFACE.
places requires, and, throughout, well deserves.

many
it

The

materials for these had been in great part collected, but

was impossible
It

to prepare

them
too,

in time for the present

edition.

has

suffered,

I cannot
it

but

fear,

in

other ways, from the haste with which
pared.

has been pre

After
it is,

by what
in
its

however, the book must be judged of not by what it was intended to be and, even
all,
;

present form, I hope

it

may

be found useful

to the

students of Logic.

In reference to the translation

itself,

I

may say,

that the

only virtues which have been aimed at are those of clear
ness and correctness.

I dare not say that even these have
;

but anything like elegance has always been attained never been attempted. The translation is not certainly
designed for accomplished logicians.

All

who have
for

paid

much
it

attention to Logic will be already quite familiar with
It

in the original.

was undertaken mainly
is

the
;

benefit of students,

and

designed for academical use

and, with this end in view, the virtues of plainness and
faithfulness are of the first account.

There

will be found

here and there

some expressions which are quaint, and almost antiquated. These, I have neither, on the one
hand, affected, nor, on the other, superstitiously avoided, when they seemed to offer a plainer and more pointed
rendering of the original.
times

The

literalities, too,

are some
(justesse de

awkward

such as

"justness

of
is

mind,"

Fesprit)

but they will generally,

it

hoped, be found

significant; and if a little strangeness in the expression should tend to fix attention on the thought, they will do good rather than harm.
It is necessary, also, to say

something about the use of

been always attended of printing the the old-fashioned to. This It was intended that the definitions and more be thus distinguished. is translation so whose kind encouragement this am indebted in mainly due. S. too. In conclusion. and too unimportant. 1850. of full .V STREET. EDINBURGH. and the practice was accordingly subsequently abandoned. though carried out to a con siderable extent. At first. associated with a work so exceedingly TIIOS. has not always been throughout the book. BAYNKS. regret I feel in making this acknowledgment that his name should be imperfect. to merit this distinction. This. indeed. . italics consistent. 1. but these were found too numerous. plan quotations in italics was adopted. and that these being thus form a kind of ab printed in a different character might stract of the book. and to whom I to many ways. ALV. in important illustrations should order that the attention of students might be called at once to the more important parts. No expression.PREFACE. has not. my obligations to Sir William Hamilton can be too and the only is. I have only to return my best thanks to Sir William Hamilton. however. January.

.

CONTENTS. Of Ideas of Things and Signs. I. II. Of the Clearness and Distinctness of Ideas. IV. 50 Species. position. CHAP. 27 Of Ideas in relation to their Nature and Origin. CHAP. on ON THE FIRST OPERATION OF THE MIND. and their Universality or . Of the Ten Categories of Aristotle. Of Ideas. considered in relation to their Gene 47 rality. I. CONTAINING REFLECTIONS ox IDKAS. Particularity. Page INTRODUCTION BY TRANSLATOR. II. Accident. Of Complex Terms. VII. Author s Advertisement to First Edition.&quot. WHICH is CALLED CONCEIVING.5 Particularity. - Of the five kinds of Universal Ideas - Genus. CHAP. CHAP. In which the Design of this New Logic is set I DISCOURSE Containing a Reply to the Principal Objec tions which have been made against this Logic. and Singularity. - til . Author s Advertisement to Fifth Edition. 25 PART FIRST. and their Obscurity and Confusion. in relation to their Objects. xv xli - xliii DISCOURSE forth. CHAP. VIII. - 28 CHAP. CHAP. Property.gt.&amp. Of Ideas 35 38 42 III. VI. IX. CHAP. 44 CHAP. Difference. Of Ideas in relation to their Simplicity or Com in which the method of Knowing by Abstraction is or Precision considered. V. 1 ~2 INTRODUCTION.

CHAP. XII. Of Ideas which the Mind adds to those which are expressly signified by Words. Some examples of Obscure and Confused Ideas - taken from Morals. III. 117 in - Com - 120 . and of Four - Kinds of Propositions. is ex plained. VI. MEN HAVE MADE ON - 97 97 10. V. VII. Of those which are - Complex in the Subject. Of the Falsity that may be met with plex Terms and Incidental Propositions. - 86 9 J SECOND PART. 68 Of another cause which introduces Confusion 75 into our Thoughts and Discourses. CHAP. IV. XV. finition of Important Observations in relation to the De - Names. CONTAINING THE REFLECTIONS WHICH THEIK JUDGMENTS.3 CHAP. CHAP. XI. II Of Words in their relation to Propositions. which is. and the difference between the definition of Things and the definition of Names. On the Remedy of the Confusion which arises in our Thoughts and in our Language. in which the necessity and the advantage of de fining the terms we employ. - - 108 CHAP. through which their Ordinary Signification is denoted.X CONTENTS. X. that we attach them to Words. CHAP. there are Of Simple and Compound Propositions that some Simple Propositions which appear Comso. CHAP. or in the At 114 tribute. CHAP. XIV. XIII. CHAP. - - - 78 CHAP. Of the Verb. from the Confusion of Words. Page CHAP. Of the Nature of Incidental Propositions which - form part of Complex Propositions. Of the opposition between Propositions having the same Subject and Attribute. and which are not but may be called Complex. Of what is meant by a Proposition. Of another sort of Definition of Names. - 83 CHAP. pound. 112 CHAP. I.

That there cannot be more than Four Figures. and of a species of these kinds of Propositions which Philosophers call Modals. XIV. Of the Figures and Modes of Syllogisms in gene ral. of Propositions which are of Division and Definition. III. on which this Con Of version depends. And first. which are Compound in Meaning. X. 73 THIRD PART. Of Of the Conversion of Affirmative Proposi iG * CHAP. XIX. CHAP. CHAP.CONTENTS. Other Observations for the purpose of finding out whether Propositions are Universal or Particular. Of Propositions Compound Propositions. XV. 143 CHAP. and of the different kinds of II. XII Of Confused - Subjects which are equivalent to Two Subjects. CHAP. the Conversion of Propositions. I. the nature of Negative Propositions. XVI. tive. in which the nature of Affirmation and Negation. Of Complex Propositions in relation to Affir mation and Negation. 147 CHAP. And - 101 CHAP. CHAP. CHAP. 1 24 Of different kinds of CHAP.gt. touching the nature of Affirmation. - - 17t&amp. XIII. is more thoroughly explained. Of the Conversion of Negative Propositions. General Rules of Simple Incomplex Syllogism:-. 167 CHAP. is Of Propositions - in which the Name of Things - given to Signs. 14 i CHAP. 154 CHAP. 1-27 1 34 Observations for the purpose of discovering the Subject and the Attribute in certain Propositions expressed in an unusual manner. XVIII. CHAP. tions. of Division. Of Two Kinds great use in the Sciences firstly. lto 186 . IX. XI Page CHAP. XVII. lfJ3 CHAP. Of the Definition which - is termed the Defini - tion of Things. OF REASONING. XX. 175 Of it the nature of Reasoning. IV. which may be distinguished. VIII. XI. Division of Syllogisms into Simple and Conjunc and of Simple into Complex and Incomplex. 172 1 CHAP.

XIV. - 293 Of Knowledge That we know by the Mind are more certain we know by the Senses. Of Enthymemes and of Enthymematic Sen 215 220 224 226 228 231 tences. and the way may Common Syllogisms. XI. - and Principles of the Third 195 of the Fourth Figure. - - CHAP. XVI. V. Moods. Places. of more than Three - Propositions. CHAP. and of Metaphysics. 1 89 CHAP. - - 293 . we may judge of the Ex cellence or Defect of any Syllogism. CHAP. Rules. 236 242 CHAP. the things which than those which ignorance. Moods. CHAP. CHAP. XVIII. VIII. Moods.ill CONTENTS. Page CHAP. Division of Places into those of Grammar. OF METHOD. General Principle. VII. IX. XVII. VI. many - Syllogisms which appeared to be involved. CHAP. CHAP. Of the different ways of Reasoning - 111. 201 CHAP. XIX. which - are called Sophisms. XIII Of Syllogisms whose conclusion is conditional. Of and the Bad Reasonings which - are common in - Civil Life in Ordinary Discourse. Rules. - CHAP. That there are things which the Human Mind is incapable of knowing. X. by which. in which and judged - of by the same rules. Application of this General Principle to A 208 CHAP. Figure. CHAP. Of Syllogisms composed Of Dilemmas. Figure. without any re duction to Figures and Modes. CHAP. CHAP. I. The useful account to which we may turn this necessary that there is such a thing. and Principles of the Second - 192 CHAP. 211 Of Conjunctive Syllogisms. or the Method of Finding Arguments. XV. Rules. 261 FOURTH PART. they Of the Moods Of Complex be reduced to - 198 Syllogisms. XII. and Principles of the First Figure. That this method is of little use. XX. of Logic.

and. - That the Geometers do not appear always to have rightly understood the difference which exists between the definition of Words and the definition of Things. Reply - commonly to be - met . and which may be employed as the of Great CHAP. CHAP. .CONTENTS. IV. x iii Page CHAP. II.. VIII. . and - 302 310 312 of that which the Geometers observe. to Propositions clear and evident of themselves. XII. . . CHAP. . Some Rules for the right direction of Reason 344 in the belief of things depend on Human Testimony. particularly - CHAP. V definitions. the Method of Composition. Of the two kinds of Method Analysis and Syn . X. XL . principal Rules. 317 320 Of Principles Truths. Faith. CHAP. 330 33- this The Method of the Sciences reduced to Eight . XVI. to what is said - by the Geometers on CHAP. Of the Rules which relate to Axioms. . the Rules which relate to Demonstration. IX. - 325 328 Of some Defects which are with in the Method of the Geometers. subject.. of those which relate to . XIIL CHAP. ing Future Events. XV. CHAP. thesis. that is. VI. Events. CHAP.. CHAP. VIL Of some Axioms which are important.. Application of the preceding Rule to the which - belief of Miracles. XIV. Of the Judgment which we should make touch 35 . . in the first More particular exposition of these Rules place. 341 CHAP.J54 . Human Of what we know through - whether - or Divine. CHAP.348 Another remark on the subject of the Belief of - CHAP. IH.53y CHAP._Of Example of Analysis..

.

There are perhaps few men. moment at the state of pre-eminently the period of inquiry and discovery the age of Galileo and Torricelli of Leibnitz and Descartes. The influence of the writings of Descartes. as by what he . A Instead. written. of giving a life of its author. at the time of its first appearance. spirit than from the letter of his teaching. we shall attempt a brief sketch of the character and history of the work itself. This was Before doing so. occupy more space than can be devoted to the present introduction. his contribution to must The value. and of Logic in particular. therefore. had been very an influence arising. as there are certainly plcte. indeed. however. be estimated in this re lation. of philosophy. however. of whom so little is generally known. AN very few indeed whose lives are so well worthy of being biography of Arnauld would. however. it may be well to glance for a philosophy in general. not so much by what he did himself. or less promising. if full and com* ought to contain a life of Antony Arnauld.INTRODUCTION BY THE TRANSLATOR. had opened a world scarcely less new. for philosophy. its author. introduction to the Port-Royal Logic. equally celebrated. The experiments of the two former had a new world opened of discovery in science while the new direction given to mental inquiry by the two latter. in particular. by fixing its point of de parture in consciousness. more from the great .

touch of vitality by rejecting the vain search after absolute prin and the vain delusion of having found them by founding philosophy on the sure basis of facts. accepted no heritage of philosophic faith for himself . It would seem. as by the spirit which he inspired. actively at work and it by revealing the processes of You saw him ever was a fine introduction to the . and restricting its sphere to the domain Overtly. or enthusiastic. indeed. Life. and Descartes appeared to recall philosophy from the pursuit of what it could never attain. rather to over-estimate. or from abstractions Such a period had cer equally distant and inaccessible. His pages were not enriched by learned reference. . was what philo then especially needed. but the creations of his own mind. This he did both overtly and implicitly. and rarely. though not glowing was yet strong and real. task of investigating what lay within its reach. And in this respect it would be perhaps difficult to estimate. the The secret of his amount of good which he influence in ef the to current thought He but they were instinct with active doctrines they were the faithful reflex of his own mind. . the facts of inward experience.XVI INTRODUCTION BY THE TRANSLATOR. It was this intensely personal character of his writings the evidence they bore of his own severe self-questionings. For the life which they thus breathed. yet wiser. : *he delivered no traditions to others and if he has left behind him some romances. not so much by the doctrines which he taught. that gave them their power. and of his faithful replies. ciples. implicitly. or caused others to do living lay character of his writings. they are not legends gathered from elder philosophies. contained allusions fected. tainly then arrived. own mind in its search after truth. too. for it had well-nigh lost it sophy self amidst empty forms and barren abstractions. to the humbler. as though it required to be perio dically brought down from the clouds. of consciousness his . and the very is life-giving. indeed.

XV11 Art of Thinking.INTRODUCTION BY THE TRANSLATOR. and the individual respon The vices of extreme speculation were sibility of thought. The spirit of inquiry which had been already partially aroused was thus thoroughly awakened. Descartes successfully to vindicate the claims of reason. and though some noble efforts had been made against it be fore Descartes. to shake it off. step by step. names they bore. had thrown off all authority. arrived at certainty and truth. but they were at once too rash and too eccentric to destroy the influence of the church. the stillness of the cloister to the bustle of the world from exclusive converse with books to varied intercourse with men from under the shadow of great names. . until at and overthrowing length it it gradually passing on. It remained for . or overthrow the power of the schools. Bruno and Campanella. to be admitted to contemplate the to see it workings of such a mind wrestling with doubt. He fully emancipated it from the yoke of authority. Passive acquiescence reverence for tradition . these had not been thorough-going or sus tained enough. it is true. that in matters belonging to reason they had a right to inquire. Patricius had revolted from Aristotle in the interest of Plato Ramus had done the same. to the light of reason. the tained. Reason had long been subject to the yoke of authority. and could only thus be truly said The value of opinions was estimated. not by to know. gave way to active examination . but by the truth which they con Those who studied philosophy now passed from . was overcome by the instinct of freedom authority was broken by the power of truth. the power of Men awoke to the consciousness. through scepticism.&quot. difficulty. and old opinions. . and and indecision. and recalled (as we have said) philosophy to its true office the investigation of the relative and knowable. true &quot. The example of such thorough independence in philo sophy was as new and strange as it was inspiring.

and almost equally at home upon all sub divided the marvellous energy of his mind between jects. And if with these virtues to there is sometimes blended a confidence which seems . there appeared a spirit of freedom. honour. In none was this influence better seen than in the writings of the Port-Royalists. was unable to ren blended the der into words. his body of experiments to the physical science of his time. could yet leave the solemn sanctuary of his own meditations to mingle with the Provincial Letters &quot. fearless intrepidity. of health. &quot. and watchful eye. and a tone . are found singularly united many of the best virtues of his time. occupied with thoughts whose very presence was spiritual companionship. deed. great alike in friends and for the truth. was admirably represented in that small brotherhood of religious and learned men. fond of scholas tic retirement. could yet leave the quiet which he loved so well. stainless are ever found in his writings. indeed. in the active warfare of his day. to do earnest battle for his While Arnauld. were pursued corrected facts of harmoniously together and. exquisite subtilty and occupied with moral delineations of and discrimination. The severity of a self-consuming dialectic was tempered by a more varied range of study and a wider sphere of sympathy. and inflexible justice. In Arnauld. a love of truth. and to contribute with steady hand. Nicole. divine as was his gift of speech. word and science and philosophy. and whose high significance and power even he. religion and politics. Pascal. Meta physics and physics. in philosophical writings to which they had pre viously been strangers. Love of truth and freedom.XV111 INTRODUCTION BY THE TRANSLATOR. philosophy and science. by a constant and wholesome reference to the experiment and observation. as the natural result. of different sciences. The spirit of an age which happily life of inward reflection with the life of outward and well balanced the hitherto conflicting claims activity.

yet maintaining his ground against them all replying to every attack with an energy which was never wearied. and the intolerance will be His life was found. scarcely any sight. yet fearlessly discussing he vindicated its founder. single-handed. with an earnestness and impartiality which the love of truth alone it contained dogmas with could inspire. banished by Louis the Fourteenth* condemned by the Sorbonne and the Vatican assailed incessantly with every with kind of weapon. never excelled. from a folio to a pamphlet. the church. and urged by the * In effect. Descartes. more apparent than real.INTRODUCTION BY THE TRANSLATOR. which compelled him to leave France. It was the spirit of the old Breton chivalry revived under the garb of the modern ecclesiastic of France and it glowed . and a freshness of thought. that when grown old and grey in the warfare. yet confronting the thunders of the Vatican rejecting theold philosophy. and a vehemence and determination apparently allied to intolerance. it may be safely affirmed. yet reproducing the truth which its accepting the new. by the most numerous and influential parties both amongst Catholics and Protestants. that is Louis. at . and power of argu ment rarely equalled. and. There is. indeed. a ence of continual controversy. this is not to be wondered was the natural manifestation of his force of cha and dialectic power. a fertility of resource which was never exhausted. for it is reported of him. all that was mightiest both in church and state. brightly to the close. perhaps. and maintained to the last Bowing to the authority of spirit so catholic and just. have resisted so well the corrupting influ . even in that age of great men and great controversies. more inspiring. it racter throughout one of incessant warfare yet few. . than that of Arnauld doing battle. after all. issued an order for his arrest. instigated by Arnauld s enemies. XIX border on arrogance. incessantly the claims of reason and of faith.

&quot. because (with the exception of General Grammar&quot. were the first acuteness . and is probably due to his own New Elements of Geometry&quot. is the fact and the marvel is. finer hypothesis of ideas. and while engaged in theological controversies. Descartes directed attribute these works to him. &quot. . His merit Inferior as a philosopher must. Rest we shall rest through Thus incessantly occupied. and for the production of works which have become text books in Grammar. his attempt at a strictly philosophical arrangement of that branch of science. was new though not new to philosophy. &quot. however. laid the foun to his &quot. What. and rest in peace. the record of his share in which fills upwards of forty quarto volumes. ever rank high. indeed. day. his General Grammar&quot. Logic. was the state of logic when the Port&quot.XX INTRODUCTION BY THE TRANSLATOR. and writing upon almost all might reasonably be imagined that he would . Royal Art of Thinking &quot. ! he promptly and energetically eternity. The contrary. not excel in any. however. that has since been done in the philosophical * his (of which we are Logic exposition of language dation of all &quot. indeed. and is at present in general use in the schools of France. he excelled him in and. fallen into considerable neglect. * We the . immediately to speak) has never been superseded. and had. he yet penetrated more profoundly into the foundations of philosophy. first appeared ? It was certainly not in a flourishing condition. &quot. &quot.) he certainly wrote by far the greater part of each of them. it subjects. . while never rising to the elevation and precision spiritual beauty of Malebranche. that amidst a life so harassed. replied. and inves His tigated more thoroughly the relations of knowledge. and Mathematics. he could yet find time for profound discussion with Descartes and Malebranche on the most abstract points of philosophy. it gentler Nicole to give up. if not into contempt. to Descartes in originality and power.

before the appearance of the Port-Royal. probably. his attention exclusively to method. its vitality generally been the signs of they have and the omens of its The last considerable era in the history of logic. has. have generally remained in essence faithful to the old traditions. we may say. useless and was held responsible for much of their subtile trifling and sterile disquisition. xxv &quot. it had descended from the schools. Better for it. ant to detepniL and held logic. since. and noble-minded man. Ramus from Aristotle. though an putation. Looking at its later history. into his philosophical discussions a spirit of personality so . to have less of original power and critical insight brought to bear upon it than any other branch of mental science. that with the exception of a few men of really independent thought. had these been more numerous.INTRODUCTION BY THE TRANSLATOR. carried. It . indeed. such as Laurentius Valla and Ludovicus Vives. independent &quot.&quot. little in telligent criticism had been shown in the science since the in the track of time of Boethius. an epoch of excitement and dis Ramus. in gene had presumptive evidence against it. ral. since it was identified with a system now overthrown as in other words. tical It was. history of logic has thus been chequered with fewer revo lutions than have marked the progress of any other branch of mental science. very few logical heresies have ever arisen and the few sects who have in form revolted. nevertheless. The . was that which had been produced a hundred years before by the revolt of and the publication of his Dialec however. Few were found disposed intelli It gently to examine its claims. progress. been the misfortune of logic. and the doctors of the schools their authoritative expositors. to be of little use. rather than of progress. Assum ing the books of the Organ on to be the canonical books of logic. and all in the track of Aristotle. in relation to philosophy. from the first. Every writer followed his predecessor. and vindicate its worth.

in order to deprive him of the glory of having in he went back to the earliest records of his tory. attributing its discovery even to Prometheus among the Greeks. The intro duction or recal of a few verbal novelties. a rejection which had before been made by Vives the adoption of the old division of logic into invention and judgment the thorough-going application of the logical principle of divi sion by dicothomy. rather than of a serious attempt to overthrow the system of which he was the author. What we have just said of sects in general is thus eminently true of the revolt of Ramus. and of the book of the categories. such as the term axiom for proposition axiomatical for the part of logic which treats of judgments dianoetical. while none of them at all change the existing form of the science. that which had been universally held he seemed. he revived the old and obsolete slanders against his private character.ATOI? intense. comprise the majority of the changes effected by Ramus. disparaged the character of Aristotle. Many of these. derived from Plato and a fresh arrangement of the different kinds of syllogisms. and to Noah among the Hebrews.XX INTRODUCTION BY Trre. He endeavoured to show that the logical works usually attributed to him were not really his . to be attacking men rather than doctrines. are not new. It was more apparent than real more in words than things a change of outward arrangement rather than of inward essence. even when combating opinions for more than a thousand Thus years. his polemic against Aristotle took the form of a personal attack upon that philosopher. by the rejection of old elements or The boldness of his attack upon . and professed to have found the science long before his time. vented logic. but effected no change in the fundamental principles of logic. it will be seen (unimportant as they are). and. either the introduction of new. TT? AKST. for that which treats of reasoning the rejection of the He common introduction of Porphyry.

however. it and the other branches of philosophy. after its old life was dead. Logic alone seemed It underwent no change. Aristotle was. The excite larity was ment. to have soon fallen into a worse state than that in which it had between previously been and the contrast thus presented . to giants the system with which all this upon the dew of second intentions. It may be said. since it of personal rather than of scientific concernment). incapable So long still retained its old form. Philosophy its was displayed. if not into contempt. which was was evidently casting aside the conditions of scholastic existence in the interest of a higher and nobler development. full of inquiry and examination of promise. relapsed into its old state. however. to see the veritable tree of knowledge whereon genera and species grew. indeed. conspired tention on his writings. certain kind of quaint vitality about the old was not without its logic of the schools. but of advancement.&quot. But when was connected had passed it was no longer possible to discuss with aw ay. controversy his eventful . in which so much new life was manifest. and from which they were gathered to meet the exigencies of man extra-mundane and to be introduced to those kind. to fix at life. &quot. and hyperphysical spaces. as scholasticism remained that form for there was a was entitled to respect . where chimeras feed and thrive &quot. when could grave simplicity whether twenty thousand angels . and disembodied universals. soon passed away and as it had evolved no principle which could form the basis of a new development.INTRODUCTION BY THE TRANSLATOR.&quot. of itself sufficient to while the energy of his personal character. logic speedily . which defect of the life with which &quot. charm. thus produced (as was natural. and tragical death. logical quadrupeds.&quot. Avas pleas ing to meet with beings of reason. could scarcely fail to bring it into Everywhere else a spirit discredit. it In we were familiar. and to give them a wider popu than they would otherwise have had.

the attention is diverted from the form to the matter the better. had been better said times innumerable before while with it was necessary that the science with was identified should . until they itself had become stereotyped In in the science.XX INTRODUCTION BY THE TRANSLATOR. fallen on the science. and they had thus become in some life sort the symbols of that decay. what the schools. deviated where they deviated. it retrograded it became but a feeble echo of The best works at most only said well. they might have sufficed. bility was still racteristic of man postulated as the unique and catholic cha Sortes (Socrates) was the only individual . could no longer be. have said. for. intance together on the point of a needle. but that the life of intelligence and active thought had died out of them. resithe threshold. and the tree of Porphyry the only vegetable product in nature. It was not. scarcely a single exception. and share in the onward Instead of this. in a formal science like logic. only with less power of hopeless rigidity seemed to have recovery and return. . stumbled where they stumbled. without mutually v incommoding each other. however. we say. and almost . . many respects it was a good . should reflect the rising intelligence of the age. which it assume a new form. the differential varieties of centaur and hippogriff) the only animal in . equally important. the more formal the examples the less (that is). It was not that the mere repetition of the same examples. A The same divisions invariably the predicables and predicaments were ever at appeared The same illustrations always recur . touching the penetration of bodies and the traduction of souls. was in an evil. therefore. in the world the horse (excepting. when all this. the mere repetition of the old forms that was so bad . creation . all followed servilely in the track of the elder writers. with other questions. perhaps. The infusion of new into the science would thus naturally. as we progress of philosophy.

looking at its general division.INTRODUCTION 3Y THE TRANSLATOR. In the first place. of its essential principles. by a vigour of thought. and through which it may be said to have formed an epoch in the history of the science. a work not only of but of general interest and instruction. Logic was thus re deemed from the contempt into which it had fallen. too.. b we may . in the interest of a newer and better manifesta are have seen that these prL.. and placed on a level with the advancing philosophy of the time. So much in relation to the historical position and general to mention. sweep away many of its existing accidty^ forms. We mination would exhibit them in a their better statement and form. a vivacity of and variety of illustration. Avhich had been already employed its with so much success in other branches of philosophy. necessarily. new of an enlightened criticism. Its authors. We do not intend to give an analysis of the book. They brought to its examination the same spirit of inquiry. character of the Port-Royal Logic. while much that was at once scientifically valuable and new was added. and power of analysis. and an appreciation of its true value. ciples had been obscured by the blind statement and inane A fresh exa illustration which had been given of them. in the beneficial results illustration. a freshness and love of rendered it truth. but only to mention one or two of the points in which it is favourably distinguished from other logics. was cast aside. an honesty and withal a human sympathy. as was the custom of their day. which specific scientific value. This is exactly what the Port-Royal Logic accomplished. Their treatise was character ised throughout. and show. while depreciating the science. and the science emerged from their hands in a new and Much that had previously encumbered it better form. XXV. more in detail. had nevertheless a clear knowledge of true nature. some of It will its be right now special excellencies. criticism.

and others which might be given. of Claubergius. which contains a very good exposition of the doctrine in general. I find. m hat r time. so that we have nowhere a clear and connected view of the doctrine. written under the inspiration of the new exposition of method. par excellence. admirably clear and good. The Nova. Logica Vetus et published in 1654. in general and in special but these are scat &quot. I think. that the true relation of the doctrine of method to logic. as well as a correct appreciation of its more important relations in detail. be said. be naturally expected that an important place in logic method would occupy work which is. of partial appreciation. in an English work. as the exposition of the means through which the elementary processes of thinking are conducted * preacher of Syntagma Logicum. do not mean to say that no attention had been We previously given to method in logical works on the con trary. By Thomas Granger. however. 1620. Still. the of the Cartesian philosophy and which was not only a .* much earlier than either of these. eight years before the first edition of the Port-Royal. notwithstanding these examples. It might. a fourth part devoted to method. God s Word.&quot. though brief. contains a fourth part on method. which. however.&quot. for the first me j |. tered throughout the Avork in different and widely separated places. London. -rhaps. published The Logic of Gassendi (a posthu in 1658. under its two divisions of analysis and synthesis (termed in it the context! ve and retextive methods). the doctrine of method received. like all the writings of that truly great and learned philosopher. mous work). contains many passages of great excellence on method. . attention which its importance demands. is. .XXVI jn* &quot. it had been gradually rising into value and im . portance. but contains also direct contributions from the writings of Descartes himself. INTRODUCTION BY THE TRANSLATOR. it may. or the Divine Logic.

a protestant gentleman of the 16th century. It was pub adopt for the time the Cartesian language. the latter for teaching doctrine of definition. I logic. and through which. lished in the year 1589. embodied in an idea. since we may call an idea by any name we like. the former as the exposition of the idea\ we attach to a word being arbitrary. conceptions or notions. the they bear to knowledge. was. from genera to species. elementary constituents of a science are built up into scientific completeness and perfection. to the XXV11 end they seek of the thinking well. by Edward Digby. but the two parts of the same method. (grandfather of Sir Kenelm Digby). who wrote several philosophical tracts. provided we say so beforehand the latter as the exposition of the nature of a thing. with the body of rules in relation constitute together a most valuable demonstration. the dis crimination between the definition of -words and things. f idea. viz. The exposition which it gives of the true nature of analysis and synthesis. the doctrine of division. and generally in to one of its species. and use the term Its generic latitude. is restricted here. rightly apprehended and expounded in the Port-Royal. . since we cannot have any ideas we like of the nature of things .INTRODUCTION BY THE TRANSLATOR. Hamilton) entitled &quot. unicam P. which are highly spoken This tract on Method is remarkably clear and good. or the neces sity of descending in a regular order from wholes to parts. therefore. its nature and importance. for the first * time. De Duplici Mcthodo libri duo. of. Rami Meihodum Refutantes. being immutable. the discrimination of the different relations which the former being adapted for it when found . as being not two different methods. not in the path they traverse. Esq. as the road from a valley to a mountain differs from the road from the mountain to the differing only in the point valley . seeking out truth. contribution towards the exposition of the true science of to * I am work (for the almost tempted to recall this statement in favour of a small knowledge and the sight of which I am indebted to the kindness of Sir W. from which they depart. however.

) is headed and distinctness of ideas. and come so near to the distinction afterwards taken by Leibnitz. : approaching this discrimination. de Phil. ii. and their obscurity and confu and after explaining what is meant by the clearness and confusion of an idea. 39.* while the Italian philosopher of the last century. quartam ejus artis partem optima? esse frugis plenam omnique pretio superiorem. Sed ego sic censeo. says. the former relation. or confusion that we can it but marvel how they missed it. f Ant. they abandon the whole inquiry. is yet more concisely. though of psychological confusion. but before reaching it. completely expounded. we say. Proleg. to wit. the discrimination of ideas. however. Genuensis Elementa Artis Logico-Criticce. of distinctness Under the dis completes the analysis of ideas in this relation and indistinctness. IX. than by Descartes himself. but distinct when we are able also to distinguish the parts of which it is the sum after. 1748. for the chapter which &quot. Chap. covery. the authors discriminate. . t. p. in ideas. Paris. They even take in terms. after high praise of the logic in general. of this in parti &quot. Genovesi. from others. which tinction. 1847. as a whole. and miss the glory of the dis by confounding together the qualities of clearness and the opposite qualities of obscurity and These discriminations. the qualities of clearness and obscurity. that sion . relates to this on the clearness subject (Part I. and distinctness. in rela tion to their quality and quantity. | In the second place. of great * Historic Comparee des Syst. and states that the whole doctrine of method. are.&quot. rather than of logical concernment. and going on to the further dis crimination of distinctness from indistinctness. and method. 255. cular.&quot.. is well worthy of remark. Baron de Gerando specially praises the account of analysis and syn thesis.XXV111 INTRODUCTION BY THE TRANSLATOR. to wit. an idea is clear when we are able to distinguish it. clearly. while Cartesian in substance. Nor has its value been overlooked.

* It was there. indeed. constitute a new. at least. which we may hope to receive from the hands of that distinguished philosopher. far more important discrimination. The will be the last. fully investigated. my not go at all 1 It is right. due to his own acuteness. &quot.. to state here generally. XVII. two quantities of comprehension and extension Part II. to any conversant with logic.f was familiar to the knowledge of this I am indebted to Sir W. Hamilton. From the Port-Royal It it has passed into most of the subsequent works on logic.INTRODUCTION BY THE TRANSLATOR. I do into any detail which might be given touching the history of this distinction. importance. will. science. p. taken by Arnauld. in any way. though taken in general terms by Aristotle. I need scarcely say. to anticipate the history and exposition of it. has remained wholly barren in the science till quite a recent period . (Part tinction. that this distinction. 1. languce Francaise&quot. appreciated. from whom alone it could have been derived.). revolution in its as history the era of its completion second only in importance to the era of its discovery. and explicitly enounced with scientific precision by one. and. to the XXIX com plete history of ideas. and. is scientifically complete. essentially necessary. This dis I. t. VI. of his Greek commentators.. combined with the new doctrine of the predicate. because I am unwilling. as practically valuable as development to exposition and application of this distinction. had escaped the marvellous acuteness of the schoolmen. . into * For some on grammar. indeed. is that A made under the second relation the distinction. appliques a la ii. and applied throughout the whole and that this thorough-going appli logic. by Sir William cation of it gives a new it Hamilton . and is. however. ) . Chap. Paris. for the first time in modern philosophy. and repeated in almost every logic since their time. also. for the first time. to wit. 1801. Chap. since there is no evidence or in ideas of the . likelihood of his having been at all acquainted with the Greek commentators on Aristotle. that its scientific significance has been. indeed. and remained totally overlooked and forgotten till the publication of the Port-Royal Logic. See Sicard s Eltmens de Gramminaire Generals. 99. it cannot reasonably be doubted. though thus taken by the Port-Iloyalists.

J Aldrich is the only older Oxford writer.&quot. X. Oxford. Essay towards the Improvement of Reason. 1849... Norris &quot. by Richard Kirwan. vol. Mansel. i.. See &quot. and he.XXX INTRODUCTION BY THE TRANSLATOR.&quot. p. that I remember..&quot.&quot. iv. 198. L. or an Essay on the Elements of f See the &quot. H. For this. and thus well expound the doctrine touching the quantification of terms universally held by logicians. 2. by the Rev. . Artis Logics rudimenta. to have been almost forgotten till quite a recent period. p. p. pp. the Rev. by .Elements of Logick.). &quot. ^[ x. 1707. B. Reasoning.A. reviles it. with Notes. 24. &c.* and expressly taken by most of the logical writers of the same period. and the reduction of their general laivs to a single principle. by the last editor of the Rudimenta. may be mentioned as worthy of note. published at Dublin Logica Compendium&quot. Chap. H.. to have been the re-discoverer of it will constitute no slight claim to honour able mention therein.. in the very able and learned notes with which he has enriched that work. p. 178.! except the Oxford ones4 however. 1807. however. 1849.. ii.&quot. among others. Esq.&quot. he has been properly censured. from the text of Aldrich. the Rev. of the utmost importance in logic . Govea. 1704. Logica Elenctica of Tho. It is a distinction of the widest application.. &quot. when we see it is beginning to be again revived. See the notes to pages 85 and 86 of Mr Hansel s edition of Aldrich. London. In the third place. These demonstrations evolve explicitly the principles (which are rarely formally given by logicians) on which the rules implicitly proceed. and justice done the Port-Royal Logic. Thompson. See. (by Hutcheson). the demonstration given of the special rules of syllogisms. &quot. and when the history of the science comes to be fully written. L. M. W. philosophical writers of this country at the beginning of the last century. 1754. 128 and the work just referred to. I. p. by William Duncan (of Aberdeen). The reduction of the general laws of syllogism to the single principle (Part III. that * vol. &quot. Logich . who alludes to the Port-Royal at all. 41. Mansel. in the &quot.An Outline of the necessary Laws of Thought. 25. Oldfield s Theory of the Ideal World. M. p. 70. most ungratefully (since he was much indebted to it). year 1683. &quot. chap. 23. &quot.A. and It seems.

Above all. subsequently reduced all the that what is in the con &quot. of those distracting sources. influences which ordinarily interfere with the exercise of to its essential necessities. writers. As our thinking powers and pervert our judgments. through which we are a continually deceived. belongs rather the accidental condi realised by us. This dissertation. and is characterised throughout by tone of high moral thoughtfulness. effects of prejudices on the vices of reasoning itself. and evidently led the way for the further reduc gistic tion effected by Buffier. two from the which have been bestowed upon it Baron de eulogiums Gerando. indeed. and noble is. spirit. Third Part of the various sources whence the vices of ordinary reasoning spring. if not an of logic. just. tains a fine analysis of the inward sophisms of passion. logic is it is tions pure under which thought to true. at all events both external and internal. since it is. that this is a part of their work which is peculiarly . who rules of syllogism to the principle. and self-love. attention. and far more im of the peripatetic logic portant than all the apparatus and it must be recorded to the praise of the Port-Royal . to modified than to This. that beautiful dissertation on the origin in civil and life. To praise. a full. constitutes. speaking of the parts which especially merit select only &quot. of a logic entirely new. a part which has excited general and called forth universal praise. was an important simplification of syllo law. There are several other parts of special excellence which more might be signalised but we shall only mention one Twentieth Chapter of the The catalogue given in the : . rather than a contribution to this part it is of high value. Nor has its merit been overlooked. however. XXXI other one of the premises must contain the conclusion. It con interest. almost sufficient.INTRODUCTION BY THE TRANSLATOR. says. and the show that it does so. enumeration of the absolutely complete. tained is in the containing&quot. and a truly humane. It indeed. prejudice.

pp. therefore. f Preliminary Dissertation to the Encyclopaedia Britannica. are ideas. feeling rather than a knowledge was almost always. but also feelings. accordingly. . is the Twentieth Chapter of the Third Part.. Mr more frequent. a a sensation. p. 55.&quot. but too long to be extracted.XXX11 their INTRODUCTION BY THE TRANSLATOR. this statement is some what modified. 1806. What we have said * Historic (Ed. ii.) comp. not only notions. and its every modern logic terms. and regretting &quot. and much extended. A confused idea. it was an impression rather than a perception or notion. speaking of the original throughout the work. as we have clear and confused ideas are spoken say. about the phraseology employed in the Port-Eoyal. to comprehend not only the products of our faculties of knowledge in particular.. the precise significance of whose technical language it is. or seen. idea meant is generally indicated by the of. which deserves the attention of every logical student as an important and in that these have not been : structive supplement to the enumerations of sophisms given by Aristotle. Thus. de Syst. 254. in short. in the earlier Cartesian synonymous with sensation. Thus. 253. Philos. ii. In the later edition published at Paris in 1847. and desires. 81. The passage is a beautiful one. is Almost written in the interest. 50. as we have said. p. but objectively obscure. or under the influence. Vol. says Among these discussions. or rather universality. are employed in their Cartesian signi fication. of some particular philosophical system. images. in my opinion. The Port-Royal is. in passing. Cartesian. but also every modification of the mind in general. in order to interpret it aright.. and perceptions.&quot. the most valuable. we may writings. own. necessary to know. The particular kind of volitions. f It may be well to say a word or two. by some ideas significant epithet. Tom. context. subjectively distinct or definite. * While reflections scattered Stewart. Thus the word idea is used in its Cartesian generality.

The specially open to this kind of favourite study or profession of the writer is would generally determine from what branch of science the examples should be taken and the source from which they were thus selected often gave a distinctive epithet to Law and divinity have been specially favoured the logic. and the and extension common throughout need scarcely be said. and the latitude in which it is taken. yet dependent upon some for its illustration. is. from Descartes. &quot. * This is a very able. Lawyers Logicke&quot. in this way. a very common practice amongst logical writers. is equally true of the terms thought and thinking . curious. Fourth Part. identified with no particular matter. and copiously illustrated by examples taken from legal authorities. and a later British writer frankly con he had composed his logic in the interest of orthodoxy. XXX1H of the word idea. Before leaving the consideration of the general charac work. and learned book. of Geneva. is the Cartesian antithesis of thought the volume. indeed. be dependent for their logic. as they add to the size of the work without being of any The introduction of special logical relevancy or value. as a formal science. not to go beyond English works on one called The logic. or abuse. deeming it a scandal to Protestants that they should with scarcely any exception (he excepts Derodon. as the great criterion of certainty found in the clearness of an idea. and was published .INTRODUCTION BY THE TRANSLATOR. Logic. Thus. and Jesuits in particular. on Catholics in general. it version of intuitive evidence. by name). use. ter of the It is somewhat unfortunate that these were introduced. in my own collection. written while he was at Lincoln s Inn. I have. by Abraham Fraunce the poet. equally applicable to all. however.* Another entitled . as they were. Milton reprehends it in the pre face to his logic fesses that . which is given in the. such discussions was. it may be right to make some allusion to the theological discussions which occur in two or three parts.

Ireland. This Royal.&quot. : able magnanimities. though but a grain or atome. for the most part. fyc. gent. and was distinguished for the excellence of his English hexa meters. which are among the earliest and most beautiful attempts in that kind of verse. and by your unwearied zeals may shortly obtain the full prospect and fruition. which is : with theological examples To the illustrious his Excellency Oliver Cromwell. and Scotland. &quot. The dedication is very curious. Whereof (my Lords). is. by the conduct of providence and advantage of your incompar &quot. This. favourably distin guished from other logical works. as we have said. far from being the case with the Portfrom this error. dedicated to be found in most catechisms. or.&quot. like most of the older works. may serve to show Sirs. and preacher of logic. in the year 1588. indeed. the crown and apex of their glories. God s Word. * The Art of Logich . by the novelty and variety of which work. of Gray s Inn. and stands. &quot.XXXIV &quot. Generalissimo of England. . too. the eommodement of the publike in the appendages of an holy place.. INTRODUCTION BY THK TRANSLATOR. which comprises the first two sentences. the entire body of Logich in English. ters . 1654. The Divine Logike serving especially for the the use of di vines in the practice of preaching. whom God shall honour to contribute thereunto. London. The theological discussions contains are not wrought into the body of the They occur. and to the most renowned his General Council of Officers. Fraunce was a protegee of Sir Philip Sydney s. It is in general singularly free however.&quot. at the end of chap and many of them were added subsequently to the First Edition. * which contains about as much Scripture doctrine and history as is by Thomas Granger. so hterentes capiti multa cum laude corona. as it is the a*/^ and just carac of Heroick Enterprizings. after long exagitations and repugnance of affairs. a tolerably full Ramist and a third.&quot. we have gotten more than a (glad) glimpse. as the following extract. parts in the previous editions had been laid hold of in Some by the London. The reason of their introduction is explained in general terms in the Preface to the Fifth Edition. it its illustrations. by Zachary Coke. Chancellor of Oxford.. is of considerable scientific value. further help of judicious hearers. and for generally for all. .

and un however. in conformity with this law. Your bane and false. we may admire the piety of both parties. say. Happily the time for morbid dread say). Thus. quite at the statement of opinions opposed to our own. Calvinist ministers. it should be explained. and the value of religious rites and observances.&quot. is gone Protestantism. manly by. and is withered by the It built itself on strong first breath of adverse doctrine. and rests upon them therefore. should seem. however. As they were. These were mainly touching the authority of the church. We may all &quot. Though are. hostility the practical were. not without effort at their perversion or concealment. without sympathising in the acrimony which their controversies often displayed. Happily. bit waged incessant warfare on each other. reasons of old. the instrument of it in your hands through overthrow the reasoning confirm the true. they interest. we terly opposed. against the Jansenists in particular. it behoved them test to signalise their separation by a more earnest con about the points in which they differed. most of the dis cussions introduced into the present volume relate to the eucharist and the Catholic mystery of tran substantiation. and (as we need scarcely harmless. as evidently there introduced for a temporary pur we have said. and. is not the sickly thing that cannot bear the light. nearly agreed in doctrine. and say. fearlessly to all students : still. anti dote are both before is you. and. . the wider the too often the fiercer practical separation. ferences were. pose. as it XXXV The and turned against the Catholics. of no great logical value. it may be presumed. and that of Arnauld and Nicole was certainly as sincere and deep as that of Claude and Jurieu. Jansenists and the Calvinists.INTRODUCTION BY THE TRANSLATOR. in obedience to the great law of all religious dif that the nearer the doctrinal union. We proceed to give a brief sketch of the History of the Port-Royal Logic.

137).| the additions are by Nicole . on the subject in the manuscript of the is contained younger Racine (who was himself a pupil at Port-Royal). on True and False Ideas . for a long time. on matters pertaining to philosophy. It arose out of the conversations in which Arnauld.&quot.* The question of its authorship was. Paris. assisted by Nicole. 1806. p. p. et Dictionnaire des Ouvrages Anonymes i. B. We displayed a knowledge of the science. the first parts are by Arnauld and Nicole together the fourth by Arnauld alone. or they could never have produced such a work that those who within so short a time. Tom. so minute. however. 496. Sacy. established that the authentic information.Hilaire. and also in a letter to Leibnitz. i. It was attributed sometimes to Nicole alone. may be sure. Lancelot. in the retirement of Port-Royal. traduite par J. sometimes to Arnauld alone.XXXVI INTRODUCTION BY THE TRANSLATOR. Nicole. ready. and their friends were accustomed to engage. contenant outre tions nouvelles. a vexed one. Arnauld himself refers to it as his own f in his defence of his work. under the title . however. f I I give this reference 1 uauld s works. Paris. against Malebranche. had been diligent students of logic. The first edition &quot. since it is now volume is mainly the work of Arnauld. Its origin is briefly detailed in the Advertisement to the First Edition. Pseudonymes. . * See Logique cTAristote. The latter may be regarded as the true opinion. and sometimes to both. les Regies communes. was published at Paris in the year La Logique on VArt de 1662. Tom. plusieurs observa propres a former le juyement. Penser . 1844. quoted by Barbier in his Diction- According to this manuscript the dissertations and ary. and exact. 12mo. and was at first undertaken rather in jest than in earnest.. as on the faith of the French editor of Arhave been unable to verify it. The most minutely written in June in the year 1690. (Preface. Saint.

This was reprinted at London in 1667. 14th. and 19 and 20 of the Third. seen is an anonymous one published at Leyden. How many were I cannot positively . and another. The additions .&quot. 2. published at Paris. published in 1666. are reprinted. the subsequent editions. must have been another. as through ten editions. the 1st and 2d of the Second Part. were also published at Amsterdam before the close of the century. at least one by Ackersdyk. together with some additions.INTRODUCTION BY THE TRANSLATOR. which have been From num berless. and included. &quot. indicated at the beginning of the latter chapter. in the Second. to wit. at Amsterdam. To this . The and 15 fifth edition was published at Paris in 1683. in the First Part. were added the 10th Chapter of the First Part the 13th. &quot. are taken almost verbatim from the General Grammar. was pub lished in 1664. The edition fourth was published at Paris in 1674. Two there appear to have been. had gone . as is the fifth. as the others. these. Chapters 1. 12. the two first and the two last are taken in great part from Arnauld s Book on the Perpetuity of the Faith . which. and 15th of the Third. The fourth edition was reprinted in the year 1678. in 1704. amongst the Elzevir collection A number of other editions from the same. and 14. revised and augmented. and again in 1674. with a Preface by Buddeus. other presses. and of works. Chapters 4 Of and. The third appeared in 1668. early as the year 1702. It was also different Latin translations there very soon translated into Latin. and the 1st of the Fourth while considerable changes were made in Chap . &quot. as the only one which I have say. ters 10 and 11 of the Second Part. made to this were. also at Paris. in 12mo. while the others. and was. XXXvii The second edition. published at I think there Halle.

as 1680. which was published in 1702. it . and conditional particles where * it is as bad seem not to work which it und Gruber. &quot. 38. 1759. f Elementa Artis Loyico 1748. taken from The That of Regis is confessedly only an while Le Grand reproduces verbally its more important parts.* and are informed by Genovesi. I am informed by Sir W. acquired tion. not certainly a knowledge of English. The translators.XXXV111 INTRODUCTION BY THE TRANSLATOR. well can be. which went through many to editions. if not earlier. indeed. im provement as it would be difficult to say. indeed. The first was pub lished in London The only as early.&quot. edition of this translation which I have seen is The title-page the fourth. Critics. abstract of lished in Holland. of which it is right to say something. under the title of &quot. it &quot. It very soon a European reputa and became a classical work on the science. in substance. and also that this edition is corrected &quot. Hamil ton that an abridgment of the Port-Royal was also pub the Port-Royal. There have been two previous translations into English. have had any of the qualifications for their behoved them to possess. for public good translated into English states that it is by several hands . was also translated into Arte de pensar into Italian. indeed. These facts all tend prove how widely its popularity extended. All the Latin translations. are also. I think. . appear to have gone through a great number of editions. with the benefit of these corrections and amendments. and amended.j logical treatises published in the Cartesian systems of Regis and Le Grand. proleg.&quot. It &quot. Logica Contracta&quot. for they introduce connecting particles where there is nothing to connect. vou Ersch Leipsic. after its publication. Madrid. Allgemeine Encyclepadie der Wissenschafter und Kiinste. &quot. 1820 (art.What it was before it received this since. Arnauld). as we Spanish under the title Lngica admirable.

and Spanish languages. published in London in the year 171G. . too. Italian. the application of this Art of Thinking into all the actions &quot. in every respect.&quot. disfigured by whole. for they say (in the preface). at the beginning of the last century. finally. by &quot. through copying also imperfect. for not knowledge and understanding be his aim.INTRODUCTION BY TIIK TRANSLATOR. who and are. sometimes of paragraphs. and is. phical errors. often of sentences. evidently. the passages left out extend to pages. the Pope. The The translation. while. I need I cannot approve. and indeed into making nonsense of the not a original. not a knowledge of French. I may mention that one long passage (the account of the miracle at Hippo. is left out in all the translations I have seen. they translate vicaire de Jesus -Christ. than the preceding. for vice of offensiveness without the virtue of strength. example. Thus. the meaning of the original without the slightest intima tion of having done so. is by Mr John Ozell. page 352). an immense number of typogra however. both English and Latin. &quot. of his life if good taste. they constantly use words which have the and. since it has several more than one instance. in some of the the previous one. knowledge of the most elementary divisions of philoso let the reader disperse phy. faith. and have. well done. for they are led into error. and again in 1723. almost systematically perfidious first when they are not unintelligible. This is a much better one.&quot. a gentleman of French extraction. inscarcely say. is incorrect in many parts. on the edition I have seen (1723) is. who translated a number of works from the French. to take the shortest. but not the most flagrant. not good they alter and reverse. from St Augustine. le is Pape qui Antichrist est .&quot. It is omissions. XXXIX there is no condition. at will. indeed. The other translation. by the accidental resemblances of words. Of this. While speaking of omissions. in instances. therefore.

in this and would not permit me to take from. notions of the duties of a translator. serted My to. If any has been left out of the present transla thing. therefore (and to these I am keenly alive). are stringent. respect. not through bad faith. it. anything has been mis-rendered. therefore. it has been so through Whatever may be its ignorance. it is more complete I trust.Xl INTRODUCTION BY THE TRANSLATOR. also. defects. if tion. . that it will be found more correct than the previous translations. it has been done so by accident. not by design. add or alter the original in any way.

than a day. displayed much depth and penetration of mind. and it was thought that it would not occupy more or exact. held that science in no great esteem. and is due rather to a kind of sport than to any serious intention. . however. so many new became Thus. met with a person who in fifteen days made him acquainted with mention of this led the greater part of logic. in four or five This proposal. at it was resolved it random.AUTHOR S ADVERTISEMENT TO THE FIRST EDITION. when him self young. at A an early age. who made while. four or five days were occupied in forming the body of this Logic. happened to mention to him that he had. person of quality. to reply. But although it thus embraced many more topics than it was at first designed to include. spor would take the trouble he could tively. days. entertaining a young nobleman. that if Mr confidently engage to make him acquainted. in order to proceed. who. On engaging in it. reflections presented themselves to the mind that it necessary to write them down. common logics were not sufficiently was determined that a brief abstract should be made from them for this purpose. having afforded entertainment to make the attempt . but as for it a was con thought that the cise. This is all that was contemplated in undertaking the work. The and another person who was present. to which several additions have since been made. instead of a single day. with all that was of any use in logic. THIS small work had quite an accidental origin.

It is certainly true. at least with justice. without even having need of any one as instructor. however. cannot be made manuscript copies. and since it was under stood that the printers were about to publish it.Xlii ADVERTISEMENT TO THE FIRST EDITION. that we ought not to expect that others will learn it with tables. it was judged better to give it forth to the public in a correct and perfect copies. for the the attempt. it is well known. without many mistakes creeping in. nevertheless. be condemned. easily learnt the same ease. succeeded as had been promised. the printing of it cannot. But whatever opinion may that gave rise to this work. since it was compulsory rather For since many persons had obtained than voluntary. explain the end which the work proposes. young nobleman having reduced the work to four them one a-day. be held respecting it. . which. form than to allow it to be printed from imperfect make it became necessary to various additions. it being thought that the views it contained In consequence of this. which have increased its size about a third. his mind being quite extraordinary in every Such is the accident thing that depends on intelligence. first ought to be extended further than they had been in the It is the design of the following Discourse to essay. and the reason of those subjects which are treated of in it.

It will be seen. VARIOUS important additions have been made These were occasioned by the Edition of the Logic.AUTHOR S ADVERTISEMENT TO THE FIFTH EDITION. as being far from the one without source. \ . by these explanations. that reason and faith streams from the same perfectly harmonise. certain observations objections made by the Ministers to to this New which it contained it thus became necessary to explain and defend the parts which they had endeavoured to attack. they are disputes have thus given not less appropriate or less natural to logic. and that we cannot go But although theological departing also from the other. who the truths of our faith with false subtileties. rise to these additions. . even though had attempted to obscure any ministers in the world. and they there had never been might have been made.

.

It is not alone in the sciences. well. as an instrument for perfecting our reason justness of mind more .DISCOURSE IN I. THERE is nothing more desirable than good sense and just ness of mind. we ought to avail ourselves of the sciences. exactness of judgment. the everything. but also in the greater part of those subjects which men discuss in their affairs. and in all the employments of life. is of general utility in every part. are those who have minds who have minds^ ill-regulated. There in relation every-day are. different routes other false and it is reason which must choose between them. Those who choose . to form our judgment. and this is the first and most import ant difference Avhich we find between the qualities of men s minds. and to all ant than being infinitely import .\\ ^ . the greater part of our studies ought to tend. the main object of our attention should be. &quot. are those well-regulated those who choose ill. that it is difficult to distinguish truth from error. Thus. by means of sciences the most solid and well-estab lished. WHICH THE DESIGN OF THIS NEW LOGIC IS SET FORTH. and render it as exact as possible and to this end. All other qualities of mind are of limited use but . on the contrary. This ought to lead wise men to engage in these only so far as they may contribute to that end. to almost the one true. e employ reason as an instrument for acquiring the sciences whereas. the speculative knowledges which we can obtain. in discriminating between truth and false hood.

perhaps. who allow themselves to be carried away by the slightest appearances who are always in excess and extremes . to employ their time in measuring lines. but they ought to be just. or displays some warmth. their life too short. in all their converse. find. These sciences not only have nooks and hidden places of little use. and not the occupation. no one ever could who make no difference between one speech and another. equitable. and which. on the other hand. ill-regulated minds which have scarcely any discernment of the truth . in examining the relations of angles. such as geometry. and considering the different move ments of matter. and affords no room for that empty vanity which is often found con nected with these barren and unprofitable knowledges. since they are attached to them rather by chance than by any clear insight . being in the right he who has some difficulty in explain ing himself. who have no bond to hold them . which they do not understand. firm to the truths which they know. to be engrossed with lative sciences. We on every side. entrench themselves in their opinions with such obstinacy. or who.2 DISCOURSE I. This care and study are so very necessary. and in all the business they transact . in the wrong they know nothing beyond this. they are even totally useless. : . who determine rashly about that of which they are ignorant. the study of the specu and physics. Hence it is. in all their actions. make them the exercise only. which has at least this advantage that it is less laborious. will be little else than a vain amusement. considered in Men are not born themselves. that they will tiot listen to anything that might undeceive them . men who receive all things with a wrong bias . and for themselves alone. very such petty objects . that it is strange that this exactness of judgment should be so rare a quality. astronomy. their time too precious. If we have not this end in view. of their mental powers. that there arc no absurdities too groundless understand . prudent. and to these things thev ought specially to discipline and train themselves. their minds are too great. and scarcely better than the ignorance of these things. or judge of the truth of things by the tone of he who speaks fluently and impressively voice alone.

that a great part of the false judg ment of men does not spring from this principle. the Crocodile. 3 Whoever determines to deceive the be sure of finding people who are willing enough to be deceived and the most absurd follies always find minds to which they are adapted. signs in the zodiac. and which might as well have been called the Elephant. will be just and equitable. which are called. and others persuaded by them. since it depends very much on the measure of intelligence with which we are endowed.. we need not be surprised at anything more. It is true. nevertheless. of unjust unfounded law-suits.DISCOURSE to find supporters. But this correction is as difficult of accom we meet it is desirable. and that even grave persons treat this subject se riously. that are born under that constel There are three other lation. another the Goat. Common-sense is not so common a quality as we imagine. may . who take medicines Avhen the moon is under these constellations. by withholding them from judging about those things which they are not capable of knowing. and illquarrels. . those. but only by restricting them to those things which are suited to them. but is caused solely by precipitation of mind and want of atten tion. I. therefore. certain persons to call the Balance. which we plishment as cannot reform by giving them the understanding of the truth. After seeing what a number are infatuated with the follies of judicial astro logy. There is a constellation in the heavens which it has pleased world. and the Goat. rash counsel. The Ram. so that there is no defect which it more concerns us to correct. but also of the majority of the offences which are committed in civil life. are in danger of vomitins them aerain. arranged undertakings. There are a multitude of minds heavy and dull. like a balance as a windmill. therefore. not only of the errors with in the sciences. to propagate them. the Bull. which leads us to judge rashly about that which we . O O O The Balance Such extravagant reasonings as these. There are few of these which have not their origin in some error. and in some fault of judgment. another the Bull. arc ruminant animals . and the Rhinoceros. and which is is as much the symbol of justice those. one the Ram. who have found persons allow themselves to be This falseness of mind is the cause.

for the most distinguishing what is true from what is false. and to make the other doubt of things the most certain . They thus free themselves from the labour of examination. For as the one will not give themselves the trouble of discerning errors. and thus they fill the memory with a mass of things false. and then reason on these prin . it questions those which are doubtful. and I know nothing about the matter. in They allow to examine them if they do not comprehend them. from another kind of vanity. and wishing. We are all full of ignorance and errors . and on this evil principle they bring into doubt the most firmly established truths. than to confess we are not sufficiently informed on the subject to give an opinion. considering at all. having light enough to know that there are a number of things obscure and uncertain. want of attention. and acknowledges. which. they like better to suppose things true.DISCOURSE I. of things very false. determine at random. though apparently opposed to the rashness of those who believe and decide everything. rejects those which are false. . in good faith. The little love men them to take no pains. and in both cases it is the same want of application which produces effects so different. the others will not look upon truth with that care which is necessary for perceiving its evi The faintest glimmer suffices to persuade the one dence. and yet it is the most diffi cult thing in the world to obtain from the lips of man this I confession. who. obscure. and unintelligible. and so suited to his natural state. This is the source of Pyrrhonism. springs neverthe less from the same source. they are willing to believe that others understand them well . and to be ignorant and we prefer rather to speak and ciples. leads only obscurely and confusedly. so just. another extravagance of the human mind. all sorts of reasonings and maxims to enter their minds . and even religion itself. on the contrary. Vanity and presumption contribute We think it a disgrace to doubt. am in error. to show that they are not led away by the popular credulity. which is. We find others. still more to this effect. True reason places all things in the rank which belongs to them . scarcely or . know have for truth. than part. either what they speak what they think. take a pride in maintaining that there is nothing certain.

which is. destroy the None ever reasonable assurance we have of many things. and for the unrestrained indulgence of their passions. the earth. seriously doubted the existence of the sun. that they must also have a common ate belief of . AVe may indeed easily say outwardly with the lips that we doubt of all these things. &quot. the neglect of that at tention which is necessary in order to discover the truth. take a pleasure in doubting everything. the other to the doubting of what is clear and certain). springing from the depths of nature.&quot. because it is possible for us to lie . themselves in uttering their opinion. these persons. Thus Pyrrhonism is not a sect composed of men who are persuaded of what Hence they often contradict they say. without being embarrassed by the vain reasons of the Pyrrhonists. : and much more probable. 5 those which are evident. some things which are more probable than others. therefore. but a sect of liars. Thus. says he. who attempted to revive this sect in the last century for. these are words which escaped him without thinking of them. which never could. and very favourable for allaying the remorse of . inasmuch as the Academics maintained that some things were more probable than others. li of the Pyrrhonists is terms in . since it is impossible We see this for their hearts to agree with their language. even in the minds of those who proposed them. the moon. or that the whole was greater than its parts. which the Pyrrhonists would not allow. which no illusion of opinions can destroy. but we cannot say this in our hearts. though apparently opposed (the one leading to the inconsider what is obscure and uncertain. their conscience. But the evil is. therefore. withhold their mind from any application. or apply it only imperfectly to that which might persuade them. Montaigne. he declares himself on the side of the Pyrrhonists in the following The opinion. There are. have never theless a common origin. tainty in relation to the affairs of religion for the state of dark ness into which they have brought themselves is agreeable to them. Nor was it for the sake of effect that he spoke thus. after having said that the Academics were different from the Pyrrhonists. these disorders of the mind.DISCOURSE I. and thus fall into a voluntary uncer bolder.&quot. It is clear. that in relation to those who things which are more removed from sense.

being open. unless we had some signs by which. they are able to perceive their error. when. and thus on these reflections form rules by which they may avoid being deceived for the future. they correct all the . is by fixing minute attention on our judgments and thoughts. since the mind often allows itself to be deceived by appearances. we could distinguish him from others. what method they have followed when they have reasoned well. and in relation to which they make such mag If we may believe them. they will nificent promises. as it wouldbe impossible toidentify a runaway slave we mightbein search of. notwithstanding all that may be said self. remedy. and since there are many things which can not be known. that it was im possible to discover the truth unless we had its characters. they may thus notice. and that the only wayin which wecan preserveourselves from them. in consequence of not giving due atten tion to them.6 DISCOURSE I. is only a vain subtlety. than they are capable of preventing the eyes from seeing. Nor is it impossible to secure such rules . and which subdues and persuades the mind. save by long and difficult examination. with a light capable of dispell ing all the darkness of the mind . they are assailed by the light of the sun. as they reason some times well and sometimes ill. in that part which is devoted to this purpose. and at other times are not deceived. and as. by reflecting on their thoughts. supposing we were to meet him. when it is strongly imbued with it. for since men are sometimes deceived in their judgments. that which the Academics were wont to say. This is the only thing that is For absolutely necessary to preserve us from deceptions. against it . This is what philosophers have specially undertaken to accomplish. and what was the cause of their error when they were deceived. after they have reasoned ill. and which they call logic. it But false would certainly be useful to have some rules for its guid ance. so that all the reasonings of these philosophers are no more able to withhold the mind from yielding to the truth. furnish us. so that the search after truth might be more easy and certain. As no marks are necessary in order to distinguish light from darkness but the light which reveals it so nothing else is necessary in order to recognise the truth butthe very brightness which environsit.

do not all belong to the author of this work. with the view of accomplishing made . which. themselves bestowed on their precepts. previously written on logic have little sought of the new reflec rectify this. that they conduct us infallibly to the truth. however. in any of the common logics. be acknowledged. which we . and that some of them he has bor rowed from the books of a celebrated philosopher of this It must. although we cannot say these rules are reasoning.DISCOURSE errors of our thoughts . of certain useless. in logic because of the abuse which has been of it. Since it is is good there not. which is the main design tions which are to be found scattered through this book. i and they give us rules so sure that so necessary. who have to however. ourselves in this work. both in logic and in other parts of the philosophy. we believed contribute something to public utility to select from the common logics whatever might best help towards forming This is the end we specially propose to the judgment. for it appears the common philosophers to do little more than to give the rules of good and bad Now. that these reflec call new because they have not appeared tions. and to arrange our thoughts in a more convincing manner. But if we consider what experience shows us of the use which these philoso phers make of them. Those judgments. form the greatest and perhaps the most important part of have attempted it. have discovered nothing at all solid and finally. false by wrong conclusions. but in their proceeding from whence wrong conclusions are deduced. since they often help to discover the vice intricate arguments. and as it is not possible that all the great minds which have applied themselves with so much care to the rules of reasoning. still this utility must not be supposed The greater part of the errors of men to extend very far. not from their allowing themselves to be deceived arise. I. we shall have good grounds to suspect truth of their promises. just to reject absolutely the. without them it is impossible to know anything with com These are the praises which they have plete certainty. since custom has rendered it necessary to know that it would (at least generally) what logic is. there arc many new reflections Avhich have sug and which gested themselves to our mind while writing it.

since figure cult . and common. truths. Pascal. for where a difficulty leads to the knowledge of no truth. yet we ought not to avoid it in the same way when it contains some truth. it right to omit. which how &quot. to respect . much are. the divisions of terms and ideas. If we do not overcome this distaste and aversion. and garnished with the ornaments of eloquence. in order that he might not sup pose them to be more useful than they are. and the demonstration of the rules of but we have determined not to omit them. we have reason to say. There are other things which we deem sufficiently such as the categories and the laws. touching the definition of names and things. in either case. What is said in the Ninth Chapter. certain reflections on proposi tions. or. however. rather. This is. to train our minds to discover however concealed or disguised it may be. is derived from this source.8 DISCOURSE I. and it under whatever form it may appear. but profitless which. called by him The Spirit of Geometry&quot. More of doubt arose in relation to certain matters . what judgment to form of them. age. a a real weakness. Some othershave been ob tained from a small unpublished work of the late M. farther than they were in that writ With respect to what has been taken from the common books of logic. stultum est difficiles habere nugas&quot. and so there are some minds which can only apply themselves to understand truths which are easy. . diffi enough and but of little use such as the conversion of propositions. as they were short. blameworthy We ought fastidiousness. we did not think : . not altogether without its use. There are some stomachs which can only digest light and delicate food. who is distinguished as much for perspicuity as others are for confusion of mind. which is the easiest thing in the world. the following is to be observed In the first place. to contract at anything which apthe truth. it is intended to comprise in this work all that was really useful in the others such as the rules of figure. since it is bene ficial to exercise oneself in the comprehension of difficult is their very difficulty it although is true that &quot. extended ing. forewarning the reader. easy. ever. and also the five rules which are explained in the Fourth Part.

Neither have we thought it needful to be perplexed by the distaste of some who have quite a horror of certain artificial terms. To this end. if they read them. that which it knows. . and hold more These are the reasons which iirmly. which have been invented for the purpose of retaining more easily the different ways of reasoning. we have taken care duly to forewarn them at the head of the chapters. which is a great defect. and that. often. To extol thin GTS trivial . True reason and good sense do not allow us to treat as ridiculous that which is not so. as savouring strongly of pedantry. and eve^i to treat them as suhtilely as any other logic. Those who object to this may pass over these parts without reading them. insipid enough. and that. we are perplexed and discouraged. when a truth depends on three or four principles. we fall into it our selves. and generally all difficult things. for instance. and not of a and and there are pedants in all robes. or in felapton. The capacity of the mind is enlarged and extended bv exercise and to this the mathematics. very ridiculous. provided they be not made too mysterious . 9 pears a little subtle or scholastic. they may do it voluntarily. as though they were words of magic. and say. and who often make jests. as they were only made to assist the memory.DISCOURSE I. there is nothing ridiculous in these terms. we shall insensibly contract our minds. and in profession everv state and condition of life. in attributing it to others. have induced us to retain these difficult matters. and render them incapable of understanding those things which are only to be known through the con nection of many propositions . on baroco and baralipton. for we judged these jests to be more contemptible than the words them selves. and thus. which it is necessary to look at all at once. such as those we are speaking of. we do not introduce them in common discourse. Pedantry is a vice of the mind. and practise it to consider more attentively. that we are going to reason in bocardo. that they may have no ground of complaint. The reproach of pedantry is sometimes much abused. mainly contribute . for they give a certain expansion to the mind. Now. which would indeed be . and are deprived in this way of the knowledge of many useful things.

the relations. so that. be we may avail ourselves of it. as against a disturber of the public peace. It is true. notwithstanding that this is not the main which we considered for. useful. and many others of a similar kind. All that is of service in logic belongs to it and it is quite ridiculous to see the trouble that some authors have given . who does not sufficiently appreciate Cicero. the universal d parte rei. however. ingeniously enough devised for the sole parent. to heap together Greek and Latin quotations without judgment. in doing If a matter the most natural manner be observed. as if religion and the state were endangered to wish to excite all the world against a man thereby. different classes according to his need. not This explains as foreign. and such other useless dis to pillage an author while abusing him. and almost as much of meta physics as it is necessary to know. though in this we do not profess to have borrowed anything from any one. provided they be em ployed with the precautions which we have already in dicated. we cared but The arrangement of little to what science it belonged. how it is that a number of things will be found here from physics and from morals. as though he were one s truly called pedantry. of which it is almost enough to say that they belong rather to metaphysics than to logic. to decry outrageously those who are not of our opinion as to the meaning of a passage in Suetonius. but as pertinent to the subject. this is own what may be But there is none at all purpose of assisting the memory. to interest oneself in the reputa to do against Erasmus. and mean. as Julius Scaliger attempted putes. and regard it. in understanding and explaining artificial terms. printing this. . tion of an ancient philosopher. . to get in a passion about the order of the Attic months. the garments of the Macedonians. or as to the etymology of a word. . if we judged that a subject thing would be useful in forming the judgment.10 DISCOURSE to I. make a vain show of science. our different knowledges is free as that of the letters in a each has the right of arranging them in office. It only remains for us to explain why we have omitted a great number of questions which are found in the com such as those which are treated of in the mon logics prolegomonas.

inasmuch as they are held in but little esteem. and to prevent them from trespassing on each other. however false we may believe them to be. not only in the world. not to be ignorant of what is said concerning them. But we have more liberty in relation to the former and the logical ones which we have thought right to omit are of that kind. ret. It is right. that. We owe this civility. thank God. by means of the It is reasonable thus to purchase. in the writings of men of great repute. we believed we could more easily omit all mention of them.DISCOURSE I. these our said . or no ground to apprehend that any one will be offended at about them besides which. and have obtained a place . to mention that we have not always rules of a method perfectly exact. having followed having . or rather justice. that they are held in no esteem. of which books of philosophy are full. favoured them. not simply that they are difficult. without examination. and of little but use. There are some which arc despised even by those who and there are others. without offending any one. but by those even who teach them. who have taken as much pains to limit the jurisdiction of each science. which merits none. though other wise very able men. matters are so ill &quot. II themselves as Ramus and the Ramists. which discuss them are celebrated and accredited.the . since we have considered some of this nature. What led us to omit altogether those questions of the schools was. also. It seems to be a duty which we owe to these well-known and celebrated opinions. trouble taken in understanding them. in beings of reason. where they artunknown. not to their have falseness. now takes any interest in the universal d parte Thus there is in second intentions. on the contrary. nothing that adapted to the French language. and determining the prerogatives of parliament. They have this advantage. the philosophy of they would have tended rather to degrade the schools than to make it esteemed. having these bad qualities. For there is a great difference to be observed among the useless questions. No one. as might be taken in marking out the boundaries of kingdoms. the right to despise them. but to the men who not to reject what they have valued.

and this condition they should not con sider either unjust or onerous. For if they are reallv dis- works public. at the same time. brief. containing so great of things. after will profit by it. because but little attention monly given reflections to putting precepts in practice on them. to calculate on having as many judges as readers . For this reason. there are few persons who or who will be conscious of the good they it. we reserved what was to be said of axioms and demonstrations for the same place. Be this as it may. that those read it with some care may receive an impression from it which will render them more exact and solid in their judgments. THOSE who have determined to make their ought. nevertheless. it cannot trouble any one long. and this is the main business of method which is treated of in the Fourth Part. consider in the same place all that was necessary in order to render a science perfect. CONTAINING A REPLY TO THE PRINCIPAL OBJECTIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN MADE AGAINST THIS LOGIC. have obtained from are the views we have had in writing all. because we judged that it would be useful to . each does not find adversity something to repay him for the trouble of reading it.12 DISCOURSE II. and it will be strange if. These. Perhaps. those who are a little advanced being able to read and understand it in seven or eight days . by DISCOURSE II. also. as there are some remedies which cure diseases in is com by express who have creasing the strength and fortifying the parts. placed many things in the Fourth Part which ought to have been referred to the Second and Third but we did this advisedly. . even without their being conscious of it. in this logic. But we hope.

in the first place. and cor rected many things. since AVC ought not to suppose that we shall have none but intelligent and able readers. in order to obtain their opinions respecting them and that then. that. the different views which these different opinions have given them. Prudence would nevertheless dictate that we should often yield to those judgments which do not appear to us just. at least. it were to be desired that the first editions of books be considered only as unfinished essays. which are submitted by their authors to men of letters. with all . Thus. to have abandoned property in them. for which purpose these different criticisms which are made on books. suppressed. since. who have taken the trouble to point out some defects which had and certain ex slipped into the work through negligence pressions. to choose a medium so just. we may see. that it is not adapted to the minds of those who complain of it. good usage. lo making their works public. know what they dis cerned faulty in And. and do no harm when they are unjust. we do not displease those who have a judgment less exact. nevertheless. and have added. As to the language. And we have failed to comply with their . in II.DISCOURSE interested. are extremely serviceable for they are always useful when they are just. they ought. have. is that of correcting what may be defective. in obedience to the thoughts of those We who have had the goodness to let us it. they should go through the whole again. in order to exhibit their works in the most perfect form to which they can bring them. if we had heard more of what was said in the world about the First. and to consider them henceforth with the same indifference as they would those The only right which they can legitimately of strangers. when we are able to do so without falling into ti greater inconvenience. since we are not obliged to follow them. though we may not see any fault in that which is objected to. which they considered were not sanctioned by . we have followed almost entirely the advice of two persons. This is the course which we should have liked much to have followed in the Second Edition of this Logic. reserve to themselves. It is doubtless better. done what we could. in pleasing judicious persons. .

we are suddenly transported to the highest sciences. we found that opinions were divided. here. that it is enough to say. to reply to the chief of these objections. as Aristotle himself remarks. for simple ideas are thoughts. or reckon wrongly. &quot. since we were persuaded that those even who made them. a method of doing something well. there was scarcely any other word which included all these -operations . Hence Another against the objection. logical precepts. the art of painting. than either alterations or retrenchments. might have said. and reasonings are thoughts. would be easily satisfied. but we did not think it right to dwell upon these. is true. and Geometry? When we expect to find &quot. since it was already sufficiently indi cated by the word art. of itself. To what end. multitude sciences. since the end of logic is to the title. instead of which they would have us put. the art of reckoning. that we knew of some general objec which were made against this book. tions. it is asked. It nevertheless. and thus gives us an opportunity of explaining that design. in which case we thought we might be allowed to take a free course. on consulting others. The art of thinking well.&quot. has been made of things. that. Physics. We give rules for all the operations of the mind. But we request these objectors to consider. judgments are It is true that we thoughts. which is tion it is necessary to weighty. but this addition was not necessary. since we were less acquainted with what was objected to in this respect. Hence. The art of reasoning well. This objec much more examine with more care. Metaphysics. there will be found more additions. and the word thought certainly comprehends them all . when we had pointed out to them the design which we had in view in those things of which they complain. it is. Ethics. only when. views. which signifies. while the author knows not whether we under- . because it is supposed that there is no need of art in order to paint ill. In relation to things.14 DISCOURSE II. taken from different to be found in this Logic. and thus as well for simple ideas as for judgment and reasonings. it will be useful. since it attacks the design of the whole work . is all this medley of Rhetoric. have found some persons who are dissatisfied with The art of thinking.

Avith difficulty. which it had received re they are never renewed by practice. the principal design to induce all the world to read this collection. contributes also to its usefulness. which months that all the subjects which so common. Whereas. This was not. and number of caused it to be read with less distaste than is felt in read in ing others. there are not ten six who remember anything Now after they have finished their course. 15 to suppose. are treated of in logic. that it is quite Ought he not we had &quot. of not being read. are still connected with examples of no interest. having nothing to keep up its atten subject tion. stilled ? that a But those who reason thus. to have given us one quite simple and plain. it is just that collection of different things which has given this work such a run. than that.DISCOURSE stand them or no. this ignorance. being in themselves very abstract. and which are not read. on the con already all these knowledges. in remedying. the true cause of this oblivion. and very far removed from common use. Avhich had attended to the elsewhere. we should only have added to the those of which the world is already full. For experience shows that. of an animal and a horse). and that thus everything which helps to make a book read. maintain. by ren dering it more diverting than the common logics. since it can only benefit those who read it . it is certain. an inconvenience which We had rendered the study of it almost useless. specting make Again. and of which we never speak Thus the mind. trary. of a thousand young men who of is it learn logic. easily loses it. the ideas. that if IT. that if we had followed their advice. appears to be. we had it. and had made a logic altogether barren (with the ordinary examples. however. and the most advantageous for illustrating this art. in which the rules should have been ex plained by examples taken from common things. rather. since the common examples do not sufficiently all since . as far as possible. than to have embarrassed it with so many matters. do not sufficiently consider book can scarcely have a greater defect. we should have no need of this Logic ? And. Now. that we have followed a course the most natural. would it not have been better for him.

not to separate logic. in this Logic. For example. the most important points. to join it in such a manner to solid knowledges. Thus its whole use almost consists in preserving us from certain bad ways of writing and speaking. useful. that the best remedy of this evil was. logic. by means of examples. which is the greatest of all vices. Now there will be found. perhaps. and embellishments. we have always more than enough of these. Thus from stifling the precepts. we have not borrowed the examples from these sciences at random . that nothing can contribute more towards making them well since they are in them understood. they never use it at all. and especially from an artificial and rhetorical style. that the rules and the practice might be seen at the same time to the end that we might learn to judge of these sciences by . there fore. In order to render this collection the more useful. so much as is commonly done. sensuous. cus tom gives forms of expression. and discovers the true rules by . it exists for the very purpose of being an instrument to other sciences. We believed. but have chosen from them. as they have never seen its true use. The last Chapter of the First Part. we considered that the help which we were able to obtain from it. unless they are attached to something more interesting and more . . the use which ought to be made of it. that this science applicable to everything to restrict logic to logic. expressions. was not very considerable. The mind furnishes thoughts enough. the learners are accustomed . and to retain logic this diversity is so far by means of these sciences. without extending it further whereas. in showing the nature of a figurative style.16 it DISCOURSE is II. in finding thoughts. and are willing enough even to lay it aside as an unworthy and useless knowledge. in relation to rhetoric. at the same time. understood. for whose service it is intended but. and easily retained selves too subtle to make an impression on the mind. and such as might best serve as rules and principles for the discovery of truth in other matters which we were not able to discuss. from other sciences. and as for figures and orna ment. as much that is useful for knowing and avoiding these de fects as in the books which treat expressly of that subject. teaches. And thus.

is of very wide application. which is. it will be seen. and sufficient light may be obtained from what is said of ponderosity. that what is found in the chapter on false ideas of good and evil. in teaching that we should never consider that which is false as beautiful. are treated of . which are so much the more dangerous. for whom a more sreneral knowledge of these sciences . and one which will. founded on this distinction and these points.DISCOURSE II. one of the most important rules of true rhetoric. will be found. in different places. of magnetic powers. which the prejudices of youth have left in our minds not that we shall thus be enabled to dispense with more careful study of all these things in the books which treat expressly of them. the main subject treated of did not I believe. In metaphysics. however. and of substantial forms. of occult virtues. very fully There and Fourth parts. be allowed. and that which treats of the wrong reasonings which are common in civil life. its language). and may help to make us acquainted with a great part of the errors of mankind. natural. the . in the First Part. simple. of sensible qualities. as it were. and the evidences of the soul s immortality. but we considered that there were many persons not devoted to the study of theology (for which it is necessary to know minutely the philoso phy of the schools. 17 which we ought to distinguish good and bad figures. that it will permit us to insert much. propounds. more than all others. That in which we treat of places in general. which are very easily apprehended . in passing. The article where we speak of the bad reasonings which eloquence insensibly begets. as they are difficult to detect. to correct a multitude of false ideas. what we have said in the same chapter of the care which ought to be taken not to excite the malignity of those whom we address. corporeal images. teaches us to avoid a very great number of defects. there is nothing more important than the the separation of spiritual ideas from origin of our ideas. of the operations of sense. and judicious. the greater in the First part of the general principles of physics. will much help to restrain the superfluous abundance of common thoughts. form the mind to a manner of writing. In relation to morals. the distinction between mind and body. Finally. also.

indeed. except in express and separate discussions. . this might suffice. enough of themselves.18 DISCOURSE II. is true only in relation to the geometrical examples for. Now. and very doubtful for. The objection. or sufficiently illustrated examples. if the places in which these are employed be examined. and comprehend none the less the theory to which this is where but in this science we had determined to employ the example which commonly used risibility which is said to be a pro perty of man. it will be seen that it would have been very difficult to find others by other equally suitable. For example. we have said. indeed. Again. or in matters clear which are not sufficiently . and perhaps. and propositions which are incontestible. there are some who do so. as to the others. and those who do not understand it may suppose it. with truth. to render those taken from geometry unneces sary. since scarcely any can we obtain ideas which are quite pure. than by those who have their minds filled with the maxims of the common philosophy. which may easily be passed over. but also the intelligence which accompanies and produces . that there will be found almost all that it is needful for us to remember. But if we include in this word. if we understand by the word risibility the power of making such a grimace as is made in laughing. in speaking of reciprocal properties. that it was one of rectangled triangles. we should have advanced a thing obscure enough. we do not see why brutes may iot be trained to make such a grimace. that there are . This is clear and certain to those who understand it. example applied. they will be more readily understood by those who have as yet no pre judices. not But if is . only the change which laughing makes in the countenance. it is true that they will not be under stood by every one for we believe that they will scarcely ever be found. some of the examples adapted to the intelligence of be ginners. we may nevertheless say. In relation to the ex amples from geometry. although there will not be found in book all that it is for us to know in relation necessary to these subjects. though they had never learnt anything of philosophy and perhaps. that the square of the hypothenuse is equal to the square of the sides. they may be understood by all who have any expansion of mind.

It only remains for us to answer a more odious objec tion. It is clear that this example equal to 1990 right angles. that there are some corporeal things which we conceive after a spiritual manner. whose reputation may arouse us to be more on our . more serviceable. . therefore. to a figure of a thousand angles. experience shows that the greater part of the examples commonly given are of little use. taken from sonic author of cele brity. that one of the properties of that figure was. had they sufficiently considered the true rules which ought to be regarded in citing examples of faults. But they would never have formed a judgment so inequit able. and eats with intelligence. when connected with intelligence. Provided we extend it thus. possible to fall into them. It is. since it is man only who walks. which some persons have founded on the examples of imperfect definitions and bad reasonings. to eat.DISCOURSE II. which we conceive clearly by the mind. and which appear to them to be the offspring of a secret desire to degrade that philosopher. 19 it. In the same way. as they are formed at pleasure. we shall be in no want of ex amples of properties but still these will not be certain to the minds of those who attribute intelligence to truth. as an example. Thus we may say that it is the property of man to walk. same way. drinks. in the ing with intelligence. whereas the example which we have employed is certain to the minds of all men. by risibility. and thus understand. and which we have had In view in quoting Aristotle. although we are not able to form any distinct image which represents its properties and we said. that it is scarcely in the first place. equally well attribute to them laugh ing with intelligence. and re main but for a short time in the mind. and to avoid them. and who may. the power of laugh all the actions of man ought. in order to make us remember what is said of these defects. to drink. in passing. therefore. we wished to show. and are so plain and palpable. in another place. to choose real examples. we referred. that all its angles were . and without imagining them and for this purpose. to be considered reciprocal properties. . which we have taken from Aristotle. there being none of them which are not peculiar to man alone. proves very well what AVC wished to show in that place.

we should have introduced them with pleasure. we have referred to these in order to explain them . as our aim ought to be to render all that we have written as useful as possible. Again. in truth. points Avhich we have criticised are of little It showing that so great a mind has fallen into it and his philosophy has become so celebrated by the great number of persons of repute who have embraced it. therefore.20 DISCOURSE II. in order to pre vent any from being deceived. in the course of our work . points of that philosophy. There consequences . which discovers in the subjects of which he treats a great number of connections and and hence he has been very successful in what he has said of the passions in the Second Book of his Rhetoric. to seek for ex amples in the works of authors so celebrated that we are in sort obliged to know them. in various . that we took these examples from his works and it is plain that the . we ought to endeavour to select examples of faults which it is important not to be ignorant of. seeing that the greatest men may commit them. even to their defects. ance. and should not have failed the&quot. for nothing can tend more powerfully to avoid a fault than some Now all passing. Thus. and of Paracelsus. that we are under the necessity of knowing even the defects which it may have. and we have indicated. it is because no occasion offered for these. and do not affect the foundation of his philosophy. to do him as much honour as possible. It is better. we have not referred to those many excellent things which are to be found in books of very import to give him the just praises which he merits. was everywhere Aristotle. which we had no intention whatever of And if assailing. at all useful to not. For it is certain that Aristotle had. a very vast and com prehensive mind. by the way.^ was not be deceived. but. and that. any defects which might be found in them. as we judged it very useful for those who might read this book to learn. of Vanhelmont. therefore. nevertheless. for it would be very useless to burden the memory with all the reveries of Fludd. in those things wherein we differed from his opinion. guard against such mistakes. but if we had found occasion. to degrade Aristotle. this is found in perfection in Aristotle. . on the contrary.

and that it would be imprudent * M. it is certain that it also merits some respect. that it had the And. truth can never oblige us to respect falsehood in any man. and that it teaches us only things of which But who can doubt that it is impossible to be ignorant. 21 are also many beautiful things in his books of Politics and of Ethics. be he who he may. that it is too true. this can only be for two reasons. that is to say. either on account of the truth Avhich they maintained. If any are to be found who maintain that it is not lawful for us to declare that we are not of Aristotle s opinion. they ought always to be respected when they have reason on their side but the . in fine. With regard to the agreement of men. faculties ? But after we have learned all these things. it must be confessed. in his book. as a learned author has shown. nevertheless. so that there is. which all depend on form that there are place. that almost all that we know of the rules of logic is taken thence . and the approval of a philosopher. de Launoi. in this condemned and prohibited by the church. if we ought to yield defer ence to any philosophers. needs something which it had not before. And whatever confusion may be found in his Analytics. or to be at all better able to give an account of any of the effects in nature. in a book written expressly for this pur pose . on the contrary. It is true that his Physics appears to be the least perfect of his works. but. and in the History of Animals. for. it will be easy to show them that this scrupulous ness is very unreasonable . those privation of it ? other metaphysical principles. and a certain form of Who can doubt that matter. or on account of the opinion of the men who have supported them.* but still the principal defect to be found in this part of his work is. we do not seem to have learned anything new. in the Problems.DISCOURSE II. De Varia Aristotelis Fortuna. all things are composed of matter. as it was that which was for the longest time in fact. that matter alone does nothing movements. . who can doubt. not that it is false. in order to that matter? acquire a new manner and a new form. no author from whom we have borrowed more Logic than from Aristotle. In regard to the truth.

having had divers fortunes. a medium between these extremes. for and The conferences at against the philosophy of Aristotle. since anatomy has clearly proved that they have their origin from the brain? whence Saint France. as well as the books. and no one offends now by declaring himself against him. very hard to condemn . in this case. we expose ourselves to the charge of presump tion by supposing that we have more light than others but when the world is divided with regard to the opinions of an author. and in Germany. This is properly the state in which we now find the philosophy of Aristotle. to oppose it. and we de . and the reason of this is. being at one time generally rejected. without using great precautions. Works are continually and freely written in generally doned. clare may freely him on opposed this point. anc all extremes are violent. &quot. that in attacking what is received by all the world. in those books in relation to which men of letters are divided. For. while it is attacked by others of equal reputation. And where is the philosopher who is hardy enough to affirm that the swift ness of heavy things increases in the same ratio as their Augustine says. and those who support him. and many men of reputation on both sides. and what we do not approve. we do not so much prefer our own opinion to that of this author.22 DISCOURSE II. for where is the physician now who would under take to maintain that the nerves come from the heart. in England. and at another it is now reduced to a state which is generally approved. The most cele brated philosophers are bound no longer to the slavery of receiving blindly whatever they find in his books. Paris are divided. weight. as arrange ourselves on the side of those who are to what we approve. and there are even opinions of his which are aban Qui ex puncto cerebri et quasi centra sensus omnes quinaria distributione diffudit&quot. we are not bound to this reserve. in the swiftness of which. never theless. as Aristotle believed. being maintained by many learned men. since there is no one now who may not disprove from a high place very unequal weights. in Holland. there will be remarked very little difference ? this doctrine of Aristotle s by letting fall No violent states are commonly of long It is duration. because.

much less that we have any aversion to believe that this him. that we do reject the opinion either of Aristotle or not agree with this author in that particular it cannot be at all inferred that we do not do so in other points. and rejecting that which is judged to For there is nothing contrary to reason in yield be false. which profess to be founded only on reason. treating of things which are above reason. when we is. inferred. without espousing. of another. both ancient and modern. without any prejudice or partiality. and this can only be that of Divine authority but there . ought to follow another light. and also without declaring ourselves So that all that ought to be generally against any one. Men cannot long endure such constraint. and that there will be found. for being enslaved by autho rity contrary to reason. through the whole of this work. ing to authority in those sciences which. which was afterwards done. is this. as far as we may be able to do so in a work of this nature. generally.DISCOURSE II. we have considered truth alone in both. and it is a very great constraint to lie obliged to believe and approve everything he has written. which consists in receiving that which is judged to be true. as was formerly done. no ground whatever in human sciences. . 23 Aristotle generally. We disposition will be approved of by all impartial persons. only a sincere desire of contributing to public utility. . and to take him as the test of truth in all philosophical opinions. or any desire to degrade him. The rule which we have followed is in speaking of the opinions of philosophers. the opinions of any one in particular. and re turn insensibly to the possession of their natural and rational freedom.

.

THOUGHT. . and that the virtue of the heathens was not referred to him. FOR THE INSTRUC TION BOTH OF OURSELVES AND OTHERS. Judgment is that operation of the mind through which. A TREE. c . having judged that true virtue ought to be re ferred to God. A CIRCLE. judgments. having the ideas of the EARTH and ROUNDNESS. it affirms or denies the one of the other as when. we thence conclude that the virtue of the heathens was not true virtue. without forming any determinate judgment concerning them and the form through which we consider these tl ings is called AN IDEA. different ideas. LOGIC is the ART OF DIRECTING REASON ARIGHT. By conception is meant the simple view we have of the objects which are presented to our mind. judging. for instance. Reasoning it . OR THE ART OF THINKING. BEING. reasoning. joining different ideas together. for instance. and disposing (ordonner). knowledge of the This is also called Method. it them in the manner best fitted for obtaining u subject. we think of THE SUN. as when. By disposition is here meant that operation of the mind. it affirms or denies of the earth that it is round. by which. A SQUARE. It Consists ill the reflections which have been made on the four principal operations of the mind conceiving (concevoir). for disposes instance). : .LOGIC. for instance. THE EARTH. IN OBTAINING TITE KNOWLEDGE OF THINGS. is that operation of the mind through which forms one judgment from many others as when. having on the same subject (the human body. and reasonings.

to consider IDEAS in their connection with WORDS. Third. without being able. in itself. as those who are not skilled in painting may be sensible of defect : in a picture. without being able to determine how it is so. In making us better acquainted with the nature of our mind. it follows that logic may be divided into four parts. sidered merely in a speculative point of view.26 INTRODUCTION. and often times better by those who are unacquainted with the rules of logic than by those who know them. since nature alone furnishes these in giving us reason. unless they are accompanied with outward signs . that a reasoning is false. which are infinitely beneath those which are spiritual. In assuring us that we employ reason aright . by the light of nature alone. Second. having recourse we we have been accustomed others . than the knowledge of all corporeal things. suffice to consider to words or are not able to express our thoughts to each other. without But since signs. to explain what is the blemish which offends them. con operations. but in reflecting on that which nature does within us. things present themselves to our minds only in connection with the words to which any other in themselves. for it often happens that we dis cover. for the consideration of the rule which guides it. All these operations are performed naturally. and that this custom is so strong. tion with IDEAS. that even when we think alone. Thus logic consists. more excellent. to have recourse in speaking to in logic. not in discovering the means of performing these operations. From what has been said. and WORDS in their connec it is necessary. which is of service to us in the following respects First. according to the different reflections which are made on the four operations of the mind. In enabling us to discover and explain more easily any error or defect which may be found in the operations of our mind . . awakens within us fresh attention to its operations. And them if the reflections which it we make on our would thoughts referred to ourselves alone. nevertheless. by the reflections which we thus make on its And this is.

the reflections which may he made on our ideas form perhaps the most important part of logic. IN RELATION TO THEIR CLEARNESS AND OBSCURITY. OR DISTINCTNESS AND CONFUSION. TION. since it is that which is the foundation of all the rest. WHICH IS CALLED C ONCE! VING CONCH VOW). THEIR UNIVERSALITY. OF THE OBJECTS WHICH THEY REPRESENT. THAT IN RELATION TO THEIR EXTENSION OR RESTRIC IS TO SAY. ( SINCE we cannot have any knowledge of that winch u us. OR ON THE FIRST OPERATION OF THE MIND. . Third. IN RELATION TO THEIR NATURE AND ORIGIN. AND INDIVIDUALITY. These reflections may be reduced to FIVE HEADS. Fifth. CONTAINING REFLECTIONS ON IDEAS. IN MIND IS IN RELATION TO THEIR SIMPLICITY OR COMPOSI PRECISION OF THE TO BE CONSIDERED. IN RELATION TO THE PRINCIPAL DIFFERENCE Second. PARTICU LARITY.FIRST PART. WHICH THE ABSTRACTION AND Fourth. without First. ac cording to the five ways in which ideas may be considered. save through the medium of ideas which are within us. TION.

The second of these false opinions is that of an English man. which we have connected with that sound. and sometimes more obscure and confused. what possible foundation is tain that I that. The first is. since if no idea be attached to them. we could conceive only these four letters i e u. they appropriated to themselves the name with this idea ? But if we have no idea of God. sound. and a Frenchman. that he is eternal.30 IDEAS THEIR NATURE AND ORIGIN. in hearing the name of God. and which custom has connected with the word God. would have nothing more in his mind than if. as that he is one alone. For if we had no idea connected with it in uttering the name of God (Dieu). that. connecting with the word God a part. Whence also was not the Hollander accused of impiety who called himself Ludovicvs Dieu ? In what then consisted the impiety of those princes but in this. and being altogether ignorant of the Hebrew language. that by reason we conclude nothing at all con- . all-good. may be seen. they would not have been guilty of any impiety. nevertheless. entering a synagogue. For it would be a contradiction to main I say in pronouncing a word. Hence. since it has been but because the idea attributed to them by the heathens which we have of a Sovereign Being. all-powerful. too. who says. as will be here after explained. account that we refuse the name of God to all not because the word may not be attri . of its idea. Whence follows. and nothing in pronouncing it. but the sound of the word itself. as that of an exalted and adorable nature. [PART I. And when men have taken the name of God. blage of it names connected together by the word est. belongs to the true God alone. allsince there is nothing of all this contained in this wise. that we have no idea of God. buted to them if it be taken materially. Dieu but in the idea alone which we have of God. And it is only . the falseness of two very dangerous opinions which have been advanced by some philosophers of our time. at least. though sometimes that idea may be more clear and distinct. he heard pronounced in that tongue Adonai or Elohim. that reasoning is nothing but an assem on this false divinities . there is nothing in these letters or syllables which may not be attributed to a man. I conceive know what D there for all that we say respecting Him. as Caligula and Domitian.

for example. there is much that is equivocal It is indeed a thing quite arbitrary that we join a trary. or blue . !! cerning the nature of things. too. as I believe it does. . that is to but only concerning their say. it appears. rather the ideas are not arbitrary thintrs. and even to those which are most clear and simple as. as it very possibly is. who do not agree with the French in giving the same significations to sounds. Further. it is important to show their For the falsehood. for instance. impossible make a blind man understand what by any conven is meant by the words. if their reason ings depended on that convention. And thus. we have tion to not within the ideas of the things. different nations having given different names to things. T. red. not having these ideas. perhaps. and imagination will depend. reasoning will depend on words. To which lie adds . could never have been anything more than the determination to which men have come to take certain sounds as the signs of ideas which we have in our minds. We are willing to believe that these words contain an objection far removed from the mind of their author. and do not depend upon . words on imagination. to those which are the objects of geometry they could not have the same reasonings touching the same con truths. . than to another but given idea to a certain sound. besides the names. if this l/e so. if reasoning were only an assemblage of names nected together by the word est. when we speak of the signification of words as in the term arbi arbitrary. taken dogmatically. in relation to the agreements we have established in oar imagi nation touching their signification. would not be able at all to agree in their judgments and reasonings. we consider simply whether ice have connected together these names of things well or ill.CHAP. that convention as it is would have impossible. he is unable to connect them with any sound. In fine.] IDEAS THEIR NATURE AND ORIGIN. because. that the Arabians. on the movements of the bodily organs : and thus our mind ^c ill be nothing more than a movement among certain parts of an organised body. in consequence of these different words. but since. appellations . if. they tend to the destruction of the immortality of the soul. So that. convention of which that philosopher speaks. which it will not be difficult to do. green.

[PART I. idea takes its origin from sense.&quot. . whether all our ideas come to us through sense. . nevertheless. as when. if being round it pass through a round hole but that it could not be turned without turn ing the one above. from the separate images of gold. and which it has pleased men to represent by certain names. either by composition. who not seen. it remains to say a word or two of their origin. The whole question resolves itself into this. He confesses. nihil est in in- tellectu quod non prius fuerit in This is the opinion of who commences his logic with this Omnis idea orsum ducit a sensibus. IDEAS THEIR NATURE AND ORIGIN. we form a mountain of gold or. &quot. be all corporeal. his reasoning in this case was not an assemblage of names according to a convention which depends entirely on the fancy of men but a solid and effective judgment on the nature of things through the consideration of certain ideas which he had in his mind. When. be clearly shown. by amplification and dimi nution. however. as when. they would. from the image of a man of ordinary sta ture. might be turned with out turning the one below. since it would be ridicu lous to suppose that effects which are very real could depend on things purely arbitrary. and whether we . for instance. we form the image of a house which we have And thus. at all events those which fire clear and distinct. &quot. and we could represent .&quot. by accommodation and analogy. we conceive God. if being square it were fixed in a square hole in this upper stone the effect which he has supposed this And may . for in stance. that common maxim sensu. says he. as when. We see therefore sufficiently what is understood by the term idea. Every proposition. follows infallibly. . that all our ideas have not been in our sense in the same a philosopher of repute. is not an object of sense. or which had struck our sense. though some of our ideas might not resemble any particular body which we had seen. may accept. as true. form which they are in our mind but he maintains that they have at least been formed from those which had come through our sense. we form a giant or a pigmy . from the idea of a house which we have seen. under the image of a venerable old man. And therefore. or. and a mountain.32 our fancy . According to that opinion. a man has by reasoning come to the conclusion that an iron axle which passes through the two stones of a mill.

or acute sound. or by analogy ? no reply can be given to these inquiries. therefore. sense. that they have entered through smell ? a good. hard or soft. it must be confessed that the ideas of leim/ and thought do not. for. that they have entered through taste ? cold or hot. that conceive distinctly and it cannot be that we explain these terms. But. that they have entered through sight ? of a have entered grave. because they are among the number of those which are so well understood by all the world. ideas of being and of thought. If. within. or bad odour. that we have by diminution. I do not hesitate to say that it is and as contrary to religion as it is to true very absurd. to do this by .] IDEAS THEIR NATURE AND ORIGIN. or coloured./ think. by means of sensible images of those. therefore. which are formed in our brain. 33 nothing which had not entered through sense. to wit. I. and how have they been formed. by composition. or And if mind has the faculty of forming for it though it often happens that it is aroused something which strikes the sense. that they liave entered by touch ? and if it be said that they have been formed from other sensible images. although this opinion is common to him with many philosophers of the schools. which are so reasonable. unless to be anything which we perceive more distinctly than our thought itself. in consequence of the sum which has been promised him.CHAP. it cannot be denied they through hearing ? of a good. on that account. from which it is pre tended that these ideas of being. I ask. I am ? Now we cannot have any we what it is demanded and what it is to think . to say that the painting had its ori gin in money. it may be asked. through what sense have they entered ? arc they luminous. when we see or imagine to ourselves some corporeal object. what are those other sensible images. as a painter may be induced to make a picture. in the least. have been formed. without being able. derive their origin from or by amplification. that they would only be obscured by any certainty of this proposition. and of thought. or can any proposition be more clear than this. at least in And thus we could conceive nothing but part. but that the self these ideas. to say nothing of its clearness. or bad flavour. is there attempt at explanation. philosophy .

we must conceive of God as a sound. since in this case we could have no idea of the Holy Spirit but that of a dove. or which confounds the true ideas which we have of spiritual things with the false imaginations which we form through the bad habit of striving to imagine everything. judge. that he is invisible. having no connection with any bodily image. that at the same moment in which we have an idea in the mind. that is he this is in .34 IDEAS THEIR NATURE AND ORIGIN. cannot. that God has no parts. contrary. if we had no none of all old man. that the idea which we have of God takes its rise from sense. come through be affirmed. idea of God. we form some bodily image at . whilst it is as ab surd to try to imagine that which is not corporeal as it is to endeavour to hear colour. it does not follow that we must have this idea of him. is a notion worthy only of the anthropomorphites. since they would be contrary to that idea . without manifest absurdity. that he is not cor To refute this opinion. the impulse from sense giving oc casion to the mind to form different ideas which it would not have formed without it. be referred to . for instance. as of thought. And if any one objects. it may except on occasion of those movements which are made in the brain through sense. sense. all the judgments which we form of God would be false. since harmony with the idea of a venerable And if God is sometimes represented under this form. therefore. of things spiritual. that. that no idea in our minds has taken its rise from sense. everywhere. though these ideas have very rarely any resemblance to what takes place in the sense and in the brain and there are at least a very great num ber of ideas which. It is false. when we see clearly that they are contrary to the And thus we could not ideas which we have of things. with truth. for we are naturally led to believe that our judgments are false. But that which these same authors add. it is only necessary to consider other idea of God than that of a vener able old man. since the sound of the name helps to awaken within us the poreal. since he is represented to us in the form of a dove or. that all our ideas On the which we have sense. because we conceive him under the idea of a venerable old man. or to see sounds. [PART I.

being conceived in the thing. . that which. and which needs no other subject in order to exist. determined in a certain manner or mode. to subsist without it. having no images of sounds. or as a I call a manner of a represented to our mind. either thing. When I consider a lody. as&amp. CHAPTER II. determines it to be of a certain fashion. But when I consider that this body is round. because I consider it as a thing which subsists by itself. at least when they reflect on what they think about. and to be so denominated. the idea which I have of it re presents to me a thing. forms at once an idea of the thought al together spiritual. or attribute.] IDEAS IX RELATION TO THEIR OBJECTS.modi tiling that which we conceive as subsisting by and as the subject of all which we conceive of it. I call manner of a tiling. and is connected with it by custom only. or mode. this will not be at all opposed to what we have already proved for that image of the sound of the thought Avhieh we imagine is not the representation of the thought itself.. OF IDEAS IX RELATION TO THEIR OBJECTS. that we conceive is as a thing.gt. This is otherwise termed substance. This is least of the . oO sound which expresses it. or (/i/alit//. I call a tiling modified when I consider the substance. but only of the sound and it helps us to conceive of it only inasmuch as the mind being accustomed. ideas of their thoughts. the idea which I have of roundness re- . This will be better comprehended by a few examples. who.CHAP. ALL fied. or as a thin&quot. II. or a substance. and as not able itself. Avhen it conceives the sound. seen in the case of the deaf. nevertheless. which has no natural relation to the sound. to conceive also the thought. have.

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one of the other.ctt-rne manner in what is called in the schools fkn(/iniand if these modes are taken from some which we conceive things. c. conceive very distinctly all which I had conceived of the substance which thinks. as extension. because thev are modes under which we conintentions. which is called body. nevertheless. to conceive very distinctly the substance extended. Avhich thinks. and it . when we conceive two things as two substances. they are called second this is Thus. are second intentions. 37 rally exist . seen. when I have considered all that belongs to an extended substance. I consider all that belongs to the mind. as thinking. may be denied of thought. not that Ave cannot conceive the mode without giving a distinct and express attention to its subject. all that I have conceived of the substance extended. is. since extension. willing. are some which remarked. likewise. . II. square and others which maybe called external. because they are taken from something which is not in the substance. and to substance . I am able clearly to conceive prudence without paying distinct attention to a man who may be prudent but I cannot conceive prudence in deny ing the relation which it has to a man. without ceasing. doubting. and and. on intelligent nature which may have that virtue the contrary. divisibility and when. without destroying the ideas which we For example. and all the purposes which belong to it. that there may be called internal. that we are not able to deny that relation of mode without de stroying the idea which we had of it.] IDEAS IN RELATION TO THEIR OBJECTS. being attribute. because they arc conceived to be in the substance. mobility.CHAP. I can deny of the substance extended all that I conceived of the substance which thinks. all the other attributes which are joined to I can reciprocally deny of the substance which thinks. but what shows that the notion of is relation to a substance involved. desired. another. at least confusedly. that thought is not a mode of substance extended. in that of mode. on the other hand. . as round. as loved. remembering. figure. on the subject of modes. on that account. or to some other arid. whereas. we may deny the had of each. while we are still able to con ceive thought very clearly. reasoning. . being subject. This proves. nation and . which are names taken from the actions of It maybe .

though they are not really so. because they represent to us substance. are modes of this sort. ceive things. They are the following : . There are others which may be called simply. because they represent to us true substances. and these are the true modes. real or substantial. but manners of substance. and of gold. finally. WE may bring under this consideration of ideas in relation to their objects. with a negation of some mode. which are not substances. [PART I. some which may be called negative. and all accidents under the nine others. which it represents as united. which has connected together two ideas in affirming the one of the other. that there are some modes which may be called substantial. clothed. the ten categories of Aristotle. real. since they are only different classes to which that philosopher chose to reduce all the objects of our thought. And if the objects represented by these ideas. comprising all substances under the first. they are called true . whether substances or modes. which consist commonly in the union which the mind makes of two ideas real in themselves. CHAPTER III. which are obtained from the operation of the mind. OF THE TEN CATEGORIES OF ARISTOTLE. further. it is a being of reason. be really such as they are represented to us.38 THE TEN CATEGORIES OF ARISTOTLE. There are. and these are what are called in the schools beings of reason (entia rationis). armed. applied to other substances as their modes and manners . because it is composed of two ideas of a mountain. and as when we may form to ourselves a mountain of gold. It may be remarked. in the way which they may be. they are false. but which are not truly connected together so as to form a single idea . and if they are not such.

and all which indicates comparison. at Paris. either ing. Quality. to be lighted. motion . the live senses. that which answers to the . breadth. as like. cubical. length alone constitutes lines. will. of king. and then it is either successive. ^9 Substance. The second. of servant. vices. . cold. colour. equal. smaller. and the three together. as beating. Action. of master. dancing.] THE TEN CATEGORIES OF ARISTOTLE. the different tastes. in oneself. VII. VIII. of sight to that which is visible . sensible qualities: as hardness. in length. third. of subject. that which answers to the questions respecting place. I. HI. Relation. heat. falling. virtues. which is either spiritual or corporeal. Quantity. as of father. the power of walking. which is what is otherwise called space or extension. Passion. writing. of son. which is called discrete when the parts are not connected. as walking. length and breadth. When. natural powers : such are the faculties of the mind or body understanding. that is to say. V. surfaces. smell. as time. memory. larger. to VI. of first : The acts. form or fly/ire: which is the external deter mination of quantity. square. The The fourth. &c. loving . warming. as the sciences. when they are con nected. break ing. Where. in his bed. solids. softness. and depth. which Aristotle makes four kinds comprehends habits: that is to say. know or without oneself. as to be at Home. in his chair. sound. that is to say. IV. spherical. heavi ness. as to be round. lighting. dancing. in his cabinet. II. be warmed. skill in painting. to be broken. the dis positions of mind or body which are acquired by repeated III. or permanent. of one thing to another.CHAP. to be beaten. as number continuous. of power to its object .

substance extended. III. Situation. That may 1. as sitting. that is to say. thoir tiguro. im-risura. and not do not contribute much to form the judgment. foxA/. 3/oteria. his method of And. there are philosophising. 11. behind. for defence . When did he live ? A hundred years ago.&quot. the objects of their thoughts. . indeed. thoir rest. il/&amp. as.lt. whereas. . to the right. [PART I. after another manner. important to remark. VII. to be sandalled. about which there has been so much mystery. wo are capable of considering : &quot. alone. each according to it is which The first is : Mons. /Yt/Hw. for ornament. only following every thing in the world which. to be crowned. IX. in relation to IV. is to 8ny. or modes. they are in themselves of very little use. thoir motion. standing. or the substance which thinks. When was that done ? Yesterday. to the left. for two reasons. what we have about one for clothing. but often are very injurious. or lessor motion.w/mr. to be clothed. and are founded only in the imagination of a man who had no authority to prescribe a law to others who have as much right as lie to arrange. These are the ten categories of Aristotle. which is the end of true logic. Afotas.THE TEN CATEGORIES OF ARISTOTLE. fijrurn. they are alto gether arbitrary. to be armed. questions which relate to time as. That we regard the categories as some thing founded on reason and truth. lying. although. VI. positura. (Jttics. groutness or smallness of each part of matter. each other. Sunt cum nuvteriu euticturum oxordin rontni. Habit. in the distich. thoir situation V. X. Poitfura. iiiotus. quips. some who have comprised. that those philosophers maintain that we explain everything in nature by considering these noven things. before. in truth. according to the new philosophy. or MCII^ MI ml.

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was connected with Noah and his children. but when we regard a certain object only as representing another. and its nature con sists in exciting the second by means of the first. OF IDEAS OF THINGS AND SIGNS. as the expression of the countenance. symptoms which are the sign of disease are connected with those diseases . the idea which we have of it is the idea of a sign. such as respiration of the life of animals and there are others which are only probable. which is a sign of the emotions of the mind. one of the thing which repre sents. when it may spring equally well from other causes. a probable sign of the pregnancy of women. without extending the view of the mind to that which it may represent. Thus our material temples. to have recourse to higher examples. and from our attributing an effect to a given cause. the idea we have of it is the idea of a thing. and. or often connected with the faith- . It is in this way that we commonly regard maps and pictures. as paleness is only I. and in its own nature. There are some signs which are sure. There are signs which are connected with things. as of the earth. which are signs of the faithful. which are Greek re/c^pta. and which are called in Greek. we consider an object in itself. of the sun .42 IDEAS OF THINGS AND SIGNS. is connected with those emotions which it expresses . cr^/zeta. another of the thing represented. and is thus only a probable sign of that cause. who were the true church of that time. a sign of the church. II. but we shall content ourselves here with three. which are of the greatest WHEN importance. Thus the sign contains two ideas. [ PART CHAPTER IV. called in . Various divisions of signs may be made. The majority of rash judgments arise from our confound ing these two kinds of signs. as the ark.

and in another a thing it is very possible that one thing may hide and reveal another thing at the same time. ful. Thus connected with the Holy Spirit. it is a certain state may : in one state a thing signifying. 3. the dove. that a thing nified. and the thing si-that is to say. since nevertheless very possible that a thino. since they are signs of things which are It is. IV. and that thus the only distinction necessary between the thing signifying. That may thing. That we are never able to reason certainly either from the presence of the sign to the presence of the : offering of Christ Jesus. while they reveal it as a symbol.j signified. which are signs of the were separated from that which they represented. Holy was There are also signs which are separated from things. Thus. This division of signs enables us to establish the follow ing maxims 1. ashes hkle the fire as a thing. therefore. have advanced a maxim far from true for since . a sign thus the warm We . the same thing may be at the same time both a thing and a sign. may conclude that since the nature of the sign 4. it that which it reveals as obscure. by its own nature that the sign must be judged. which is the figure of spiritual regeneration. as it is very possible that a man in his chamber may represent himself preaching. the image of the 43 Spirit. That though a thing in one state cannot be a sign of itself in the same state. and reveal it as a sign . is that of state may be represented. as the sacrifices of the ancient law. since every sign requires a dis tinction between the thing representing. too.CHAP. from the presence of the sign to the absence of the or^ thing signified. tiling they are signs of things which are absent. . as a l&amp.] IDEAS OF THINGS AND SIGNS. thus the forms assumed by angels hide them as things.gt. present.^ consists in exciting in the sense by means of the idea of . and that which is ^ signified. the water of baptism. is connected with that regeneration. and reveal them as signs thus the eucharistic emblems hide the body of Jesus Christ as a thing. and that thus those who have said that nothing is -made manifest that u-hich hides it.in represent itself in another state . 2.

which do not depend on the fancies of men. that so long as that effect remains that is to say. and that we are the same enabled by this impression to realise God s promise in way it matters not whether the bread of the Eucharist remains in its proper nature. to wit. provided that it always excites in our sense the image of that bread which enables us to conceive in what way the body of Jesus Christ is the nourishment of our souls. II.44 IDEAS IN RELATION TO THEIR SIMPLICITY. Thus words are by institution the signs of thought. and . in treating of propositions. . The third division of signs is that of natural ones. even though the thing in its proper nature be Thus it matters not destroyed. We CHAPTER V. and how the faithful are united to each other. as an image which appears in a mirror is a natural sign of that which it and of others which exist only from institu represents tion and establishment. and which have only a distant relation to the thing signified. IN WHICH THE METHOD OF KNOWING BY ABSTRAC TION OR PRECISION IS CONSIDERED. an important truth in relation to these kinds of signs. that we are able on some occasions to affirm the thing signified. that of the thing signified. III. none at all. OF IDEAS IN RELATION TO THEIR SIMPLICITY OR COMPOSI TION. provided that our senses always receive the same impression. are able to consider a The remark made by the way. whether the colours of the rainbow which God has taken as a sign that he would no more destroy the human race by a flood. [PART I.. shall explain. ETC. the thing signifying. or it may be. that we mode without making any distinct . be true and real. in Chap. so long as that double idea is excited the sign remains. characters of words.

gener ally. . who have taken as the object of their science. for instance. fur nishes us with an opportunity of explaining what is called Mental Abstraction. body extended in length. however. taking them all The second knowledge by mode without paying parts. breadth. they have first applied themselves to the consideration of it. This is what is done by the geometers. sive our mind might be. since the mind is able to comprehend them all at once thus the whole art consists in counting by parts that which we are unable to count as a whole. it is scarcely possible to have any distinct knowledge. the different parts of a number it is in such cases very easy to conceive that our mind can apply itself to consider one part without consider is ing another. in any other way than by considering them in their parts. that without this. what means have we of obtaining a knowledge of the human body except by dividing it into all its parts. They have afterwards con sidered it in respect to the two dimensions of length and breadth. knowing by means of abstraction. v. and they have then given to it the name of line. ETC. since it would be impossible. finally. considering them each apart. consider- . however comprehen . and have called it surface. when ire consider a substance. and there are some which are composed of parts really distinct.] IDKAS ix PJ-:LATION TO THEIR SIMPLICITY. For example. similar and dissimilar. and All arith giving to each of these different names? metic is founded on this. to multiply two numbers of eight or nine figures each. and. Jt is. This is what may be termed. the human body. as it were. for there is no need of art in order to reckon small numbers. And. or two in the same substance. through the phases which they are capable of receiving. since these parts arc really distinct . is attention to the modes which are united together together at once. as. and this not even called abstraction. and thickness. which is length .CHAP. For in order to obtain a better knowledge of it. reflection The limited extent of our mind renders us incapable of comprehending perfectly things which are a little com plex. But since things are differently compounded. in relation to one dimension alone. 45 on the substance of which it is the mode. even in these things so useful to consider the parts separately rather than the whole.

The third way of conceiving things by abstraction is. who would call in question the certitude of geometry. And thus the idea which I have conceived of a person who thinks. as when we measure the distance from one town to another. if I confine myself to the consideration of it in the place where it is. but all other persons who In the same way. the more we are able to distribute things into different modes. for example. consequently. not myself alone. I shall have the idea of that triangle alone . Hence it may be seen how ridiculous is the argument of certain sceptics. which is now easily accomplished by that distinction. and thickness have called it solid or body. ETC. and from different parts even in the same determination. it is myself that is thinking. without paying any regard to the fact that it is myself. and I consider. or surfaces without depth. in relation to motion. but if I detach my mind from the consideration of all these particular circumstances. that as long as the determination towards a certain spot was not distinguished from the motion itself. they suppose only that we are able to consider length. having drawn on paper an equi think. without troubling ourselves with its breadth. because it supposes lines and surfaces which are not in nature for the geometers do not suppose that three dimensions. when a single thing. breadth. I am able to confine my attention to a thing which thinks. without paying attention to breadth . myself and he who thinks may be only one and the same thing. there are lines without breadth. together. lateral triangle. they .46 ing IDEAS IN RELATION TO THEIR SIMPLICITY. [PART all I. although there may exist between them only a discrimination of reason . as may be seen in the second chapter of the Optics of Descartes. the more capable does the mind become of obtaining a thorough knowledge of them . Now. and that. we measure only the length of the road. will be able to represent. in the idea which I have of myself thinking. length. although within me. and this is indubit able. this is brought about as follows that I think. and thus we see. so long no satisfactory account could be given of reflection and refraction. and consider only that it is a : . with all the accidents which determine it. we think of one without thinking of another. having different attributes.

represent to me more accurately that equality of lines . . step by step. being less determinate. AND SINGULARITY. the ideas of singular things become common. VI. considered in relation to their universality or particularity. not re represent to me all equilateral triangles. . as myself compr lends that which thinks. it is clear that.CHAP. we are never by means of these abstractions which we have just explained. I consider only that it is a figure bounded by three right lines. PARTICULARITY. . CONSIDERED IN RELATION TO THEIR GENERALITY. in these abstrac tions. on the other. ETC. ALTHOUGH theless. again. by these abstractions. stricting my^lf to that equality of lines. If. Finally. I simply consider that it is a plane surface. . and thus. enabled to have many sorts of ideas. on the one hand. is able to represent a greater number of things. all things that exist be singular. 47 figure bounded by three equal lines. I am able to ascend to extension itself. not confining myself to the number of lines. many as when any one has conceived a without considering anything else respecting it. the idea which I form of it will. the idea which I form will repre sent all rectilineal figures . and the common.] IDEAS THEIR GENERALITY. we see 1 at the inferior degree always comprehends the superior. more common and thus this gives us the opportunity of passing to what we have to say concerning ideas. OF IDEAS. I shall form an idea which will represent all kinds of triangles. and. bounded by right lines. will be able to And if.ihcr with some particular determination. Now. rectilineal figure . well to represent triangle. some of which only represent to us a single thing as the idea which any one has of himself. others being able equally . but proceeding further. and triangle. and equilateral triangle comprt ends triangle. to. CHAPTER VI. but that the superior degree.

And thus the idea which I have conceived of a person who thinks. The third way of conceiving things by abstraction is. and thickness together. length. without paying any regard to the fact that it is myself. and I consider. myself and he who thinks may be only one and the same thing. but if I detach my mind from the consideration of all these particular circumstances. for the geometers do not suppose that there are lines without breadth. with all the accidents which determine it. it it breadth. the more capable does the mind become of obtaining a thorough knowledge of them . that as long as the determination towards a certain spot was not distinguished from the motion itself. Now.46 ing IDEAS IN RELATION TO THEIR SIMPLICITY. having drawn on paper an equi think. in the idea which I have of myself thinking. and from different parts even in the same determination. will be able to represent. and consider only that it is a : . when a single thing. because it supposes lines and surfaces which are not in nature . for example. and thus we see. without troubling ourselves with its breadth. in relation to motion. may be seen how ridiculous is the argument of who would call in question the certitude of geometry. [PART all I. consequently. Hence certain sceptics. not myself alone. as when we measure the distance from one town to another. ETC. I shall have the idea of that triangle alone . ice think of one without thinking of another. this is brought about as follows that I think. if I confine myself to the consideration of it in the place where it is. although there may exist between them only a discrimination of reason . they suppose only that we are able to consider length. and this is indubit able. it is myself that is thinking. they have called solid or body. we measure only the length of the road. but all other persons who In the same way. which is now easily accomplished by that distinction. lateral triangle. and that. the more we are able to distribute things into different modes. having different attributes. three dimensions. I am able to confine my attention to a thing which thinks. or surfaces without depth. as may be seen in the second chapter of the Optics of Descartes. so long no satisfactory account could be given of reflection and refraction. although within me. without paying attention to breadth .

the more of singular things become common. to the kinds of triangles. and thus this gives us the opportunity of passing in to what we have to say concerning ideas. If. without considering anything else respecting it. represent a greater it is clear that. determinate. ETC. and the common. the we superior. in these abstrac able to ascend to extension itself. CHAPTER VI. triangle.CHAP. on the other. ALTHOUGH theless. together with some particular triangle. and and triangle. see that the inferior degree always comprehends determination. enabled to to us a single thing . will be And if. some of explained. of it will. OF IDEAS. being less equilateral rectilineal figure. and. but that able to the superior degree. as the idea which only represent others being able equally which any one has of himself a well to represent many as when any one has conceived all by means of these . bounded by three equal lines. considered or particularity. common . ideas by these abstractions. AND SINGULARITY. step by step. CONSIDERED IN RELATION TO THEIR GENERALITY. the idea which I form will repre I am sent all rectilineal figures and thus. Now. PARTICULARITY. again.] IDEAS THEIR GENERALITY. tlie idea which I form on the one hand. represent to me more accurately able to that equality of lines . not re to me all equilateral triangles. we are never things that exist be singular. . abstractions which we have just have many sorts of ideas. I shall form an idea which will represent all right lines. as myself comprehends that triangle is comprehends which thinks. . bounded by right lines. figure VI. number of things. but proceeding stricting myself to I consider only that it is a figure bounded by three further. relation to their universality Finally. tions. number of lines. . not confining myself I simply consider that it is a plane surface. represent that equality of lines.

or sign. Those ideas which only represent a single thing are and the things they represent individuals. called singular or individual.48 IDEAS THEIR GENERALITY. the idea which he has formed of it will enable him to conceive all other triangles. but according to different ideas with which it has become connected through custom. town. of two kinds. we only join it to some other idea. so that the same sound applies to many. but it also signifies these in relation to ideas altogether different. may be But : called general terms. is the air being the cause of health. and those which represent many individuals are called universal. and to food for the idea united to this word is principally health (sante). town. Rome. [PART I. The names which we employ to mark the first are called proper. with which it is connected such are the words to which we have referred man. and an it . because it has some relation of cause. because they contribute to the preservation of health. must be remarked that words are general in two One which is called univocal. The other. as man. or general. that food is healthy. article of dress . and accord ing to the idea itself. which applies only to an animal but there is united to it another idea related to that. both according to its sound. common. . as when a word being principally united to an idea. so that the same word answers to many. when they ways are connected with general ideas. which is. except that it is a figure containing three sides and three angles. Thus the word canon signifies an engine of war. to the air. is when the same sound has been joined by men to different ideas. or resemblance. as in the word canon . not according to the same idea. which is called equivocal. which For the . which leads us to say that is healthy (sain). Bucephalus . and those which are employed to mark the last. or they have some connection. . as when the word healthy (sain) is attributed to an animal. a decree of council. to the first and these kinds of equivocal words are then termed analogous. as well as the common names. or effect. This equivocal universality is. horse . . horse. as Socrates. and the universal idea. and appellative. nevertheless. common. different ideas which are united to the same sound have either no natural relation between themselves. ETC.

. the common term is then said to become particular. and the common name expresses them all. / call the EXTENSION &amp.Jr.lt. in relation to them. to all the different sorts of tri But although the general idea extends indistinctly to the subjects to which it belongs. this restricts that idea to a single species of triangle. to which it is thus restricted. to it another idea. figure. 49 When. that is to say. whereas ice may restrict it. however. and which cannot be taken away from it without destroying it. we understand the v^ivocal. while it is. three and the equality of these three angles to two rigid &amp. as we have already said. I call the COMPREHENSION of an idea.gt. by applying it only to some of those subjects to ichich it agrees. angles.f an idea those subjects to which that idea applies. . of the idea triangle includes extension. . J IDEAS THEIR GENERALITY. I add that of having a right angle.&amp. this restriction or contraction of the general idea. as when I say some triangle. Now The as to its extension. we here speak of general terms. which arc united to universal and general ideas. nevertheless.lt. those attributes ivhich it involves in itself. is called superior. ETC. to the general idea of triangle. not determined what that part is. may first is. three lines. Now. since it extends only to a part of these subjects to which it before extended. that all none of its attributes can he taken a/way without destroying it. distinct and as when. by joining to it only an indistinct and indeterminate idea of a part. nevertheless. as to its extension. which is the rectangled tri determined angle. The other is. as the comprehension angle?. as the idea of triangle in general extends angles. VI. ivithout effecting its destruction by so doing. which. there is. which it is very important accurately to distinguish COMPREHEN SION and EXTENSION. this difference between the attributes which it comprehends and the subjects to which it extends. in these universal ideas there are two things. by joining be effected in two ways. which are also called the inferiors of a general term.CHAP. to all its inferiors.

: is Avhat all there is of termed the lowest species (species infima). DIFFERENCE. And a genus which is not a species. which are all of the same species. species. which they extend trapezium lelogram substance extended. extends. to wit. And those common ideas which are one more common or general are called SPECIES as paral are species of quadrilateral body lelogram and trapezium S and mind. or whether it genera whether is ^ . Thus body. PROPERTY. is a species in relation to But there is another notion of the word species. For. . the highest this genus be being. which ideas which cannot become genera applicable only to the this is the case when an idea contains under it only the singular. is and trapezium. ideas when general represent and are marked by terms or they are called genera called substantive or absolute. . is a species in relation to to body animate substance and quadrilateral. and to sub is called mind. the five Universals. And thus the same idea may be it a cenus. as things. to us their objects. which are so com mon are yet themsekts universal* . G-ENUS. SPECIES. in a few words. as circle has under it only individual and This individual circles.50 THE FIVE KINDS OP UNIVERSAL IDEAS. and inanimate. . which stance that thinks. WHAT we have said in the preceding chapters enables us to render intelligible. ACCIDENT. [PAKT I. which is called body. OF THE FIVE KINDS OF UNIVERSAL IDEAS GENUS. quadrilateral is a genus in relation to paral substance is a genus in relation to and . which are commonly expounded in the schools. which is a genus in relation . that to other ideas. CHAPTER VII. Those are called GENERA. to parallelogram figure. under SPECIES. as. which is a genus in relation is more general. when compared with other ideas to which when compared to another which and a species. of substance.

these connotative terms signify essential attributes. without destroying in our mind the idea of that thing as This it is necessary to explain round. by the mind. properties. &c. in reality. which belongs.CHAP. when their object is an attri bute. They arc called. there would be only the genus. heavy. at least. every species ivould agree icitJt each other. or accidents. 51 be substance. immortal. though directly (whether. hard. to the essence of the thing. in truth. but only dependent on the first as divisible. DIFFERENCE. on the con figures curvilineal and rectilineal. otherwise. properties. reasonable. which may be separated. and. VII. if we compare them with the substances trary. but to other ideas of mode. as the genus agree* with every Thus species. : when the object of these an essential attribute. but differences. They ideas is are called differences. for it not necessary that the objects of these ideas be really it is things and substances. itself. if each contained only u-hat is comprised in the genus. are called genera or species. and belongs metaphysics than to logic. enough that we consider them as things. from the thing of which it is termed the accident. those ideas which these connotative terms signify confusedly. z . is a genus in relation to And. they are not then called either genera or species. which distinguishes one species from another as extended. the -idea of each species must necessarily comprehend something icldch x not comprised in the idea of the genus. prudent. which represent their objects to us as things modified. more is a point of little consequence. is And they are called common accidents when their object a true mode. we do not refer them to their substances. When a genus has two species. I have said that the general ideas which represent their to hings.] TUE FIVE KINDS OF UNIVERSAL IDEAS. indeed. but which is not the first we consider in that essence. and which are expressed by terms adjec tive or connotative. only the thing or whether they signify true modes). : more particularly. objects to us as mode in relation to figured body. more or less general as figure. teach : able. just. inasmuch as. even where they are modes. which is only a is . which are.

and the idea which we have of it is a universal idea. tute* another see. it is. that thinks. found that the difference. essential [PAKT I. that in certain things we do not see any attribute such that it agrees to the whole 4 a species. that is to say. gether agree with man alone. by that of ie genus and that of its species united together. extended. thinks. because one and the same idea may represent to us that difference wherever we find it. since it agrees also with beasts but the two to . may see.52 the first THE FIVE KINDS OF UNIVERSAL IDEAS. holding the demons to be rational animals as well as man. mortal. that the difference one io the genus. which it divides and to the species. is called its DIFFERENCE. comprehends more than the genus. therefore. This is what is termed definition: as substance substance . and that of mind. and to nothing but that species. however. difference Platonists. or. as dprocally everything that thinks is mind and all that is mind. be something more Now the first Hence we may has two aspects shares. that is to say. making the thinks. as mind. And we proceed in the another. bodv will be a substance extended. hence Ihus the which is . by two words. In this case we join several attributes together. in the second place. the union of which being only found in that species. substance. body. that we must needs be able to affirm them reof each other. thought. necessary that there in the idea of body than in that of pody substance.. and distinouishes it from other species. constitutes its We they added to it not convertible with man either. It often. which it creates and consti which chief part of that which is included in the idea of species according to its comprehension whence t happens that all species may be expressed by a single name. it must have the same extension as the species and thus. and mind a substance which that of mind. in the first place. happens. and abo in thing we see more in the bod v extension. and the first thing we see more in spirit is Thus the difference of thought body will be exten sion. viz. rational was not convertible with man. that since the differ ence constitutes the species. each species attribute. in all the inferiors of the specie* and mind are two species of Example.

Example. discover in it some other attribute which is necessarily connected. inasmuch animal as man is an animal endowed with a mind.] TILE FIVE KINDS OF UNIVERSAL IDKAS. it may be remarked. if one has a commission which the other has not. and that the single idea which we have once formed of it will represent that property wherever we may meet with it. and expressing bute it species as its by a connotative term. and to them alone. does not involve thouglit either. and. . . involves nothing positive which may not be in man there is only joined to it the negation of that which is in man. it* main essential attri from all other species. we. and since it follows neces of the sarily. When ice is it a species. if. the equality of these squares is re garded as the property of a rectangular triangle. consequently. exclude it since it includes in its as. that the square side which subtends it be equal to the squares of the tvvo all sides which contain it. ice attri And since it agrees property. It is thus that man is distinguished from the beasts in general. where con/prehension. To have a right angle is the essential differ ence of a rectangular triangle . so that ail the difference which exists between the idea of animal and that of brute. in relation to a right angle. and that a beast is simply an animal animal memni . is. mente pra ditum. we make it the fourth of the terms common and universal. for the idea of beast. constitutes bute. and extension . that which distinguishes the difference which say. in general. and which. to omni et soli we denominate -it PROPERTY. OO in the idea which we form to ourselves of the majority of animals. which is common to all rectangular triangles. PROPERTY. but does it not. as two men are dis tinguished from one another. with the first.CHAP. the idea of brute excludes it in its thus cannot agree with an animal that thinks. mind. to wit. that the idea of animal same way. Finally. it is sufficient if one be so. with the inferiors of the species. VII. con have found to sidering its nature more particularly. in it* comprehension. agrees that species alone to t/ie it to the whole of that specie. that it is not always ne cessary that the two differences which divide a genus be loth positive . though he who has not the commission may have nothing which the other has not.

may be so also. as we can easily conceive a man without conceiving that he but we cannot conceive prudence without is prudent other intelligent nature. ex term prudent. and always that the lines drawn circle. ACCIDENT. sed non omni&quot. but only in old age. as it belongs to all man alone to be men may not be &quot. in the second chap ^ a mode is that which can only ter. et semper&quot. were. . idea of round. this. and which is not exist naturally. that what is called means of a substance. The though third is &quot. The fourth quod convenit omni is sed non semper&quot. essential to the capable of representing anything the as the idea of prudent. by the idea of a thing. as we of extension. so that we necessarily connected with can easily conceive the thing without conceiving the mode. we may regard one as a mode of the other. Thus a man dressed may be considered as a whole made up of the man and his dress . &quot. round makes the pressed by a connotative which we call accident. thing and force. attributed for. of the circle alone. a physician or a philosopher. from the centre to the circumference &quot. idea can exist fifth universal. The word property tended beyond criminated. however. Now. quod convenit so. But it must be noticed here. all prudent men. and to men alone. soli. number. that when we consider two substances together. if it thing to which it is would be difference or property.quod explained as it is the property of every venit omni. it . when we connect a confused and indeterminate idea of substance with a distinct idea of some mode. sed non soli&quot. that . conceiving either a man or some which may be prudent.54 THE FIVE KINDS OF UNIVERSAL IDEAS. we have The second be equal. an example of which of the hair to grey given in the changing of colour canes cere which is common to all men. et soli. all round bodies and then this idea. since any say that divisibility is the property extended may be divided. since it is not is : in which the mode . [PAUT I. has. although time. as we before said. quod convenit omni. et soli. and four species of been sometimes ex it have been dis con- The first is that which &quot.We have already said.

which. as if I say: A body WHICH is transparent. after having. could not affirm or deny of the terms taken separately Examples of complex terms are a prudent man. but to be dressed is. WHO it the son of Philip .WTIO is the vicar of Jesus Christ. the Pope. On this matter we shall throw some of all. species. it is always in some sort understood. say. of&amp. We it may be expressed. in relation to the man. of complex terms. that though the relative be not always expressed. properties. if we will. first light in the said something CHAPTER VIII. what we . WE sometimes join to a term various other terms. their true properties. may. VIII. ETC. &quot. AXI) THEIR UNIVERSALITY OK PARTICULARITY.] COMPLEX TERMS 11110111 UNIVERSALITY. . Alexander the son of Philip. constitute in our minds a total idea happens that we can affirm or deny of the whole. transparent. following chapter. or a body which is transparent. the main triK- genera of things. OF COMPLEX TERMS. And thus to be clothed is simply a fifth universal. to recognise the true and accidents . thing is differences. This addition is often made by the relative pronoun. although the parts of the dress may be themselves substances. indeed.gt.CHAP. without changing a body the proposition for it is the same thing to say. and it often together. the species of each genus. which are treated at such length in the schools. Alexander. a trans : parent body. only a mode or phase of existence under which we regard him. and the accidents which may be attributed to them. What is most worthy of remark in these complex terms since . For it is of very little consequence to knoAv that there are genera. This is more than sufficient touching the five universal*. their true differences.

when I siv TfopL - .56 COMPLEX TERMS-THEIR UNIVERSALITY. ETC. [PART I individual conditions: as.

which makes to a single individual. : There are words. for.] COMPLEX TE1UIS TIIEIK UNIVERSALITY. who is denoted in the schools by this word. since the word prince is determined by that of philosopher. apply it. as the name of master in each family. There are a multitude of terms in the ordi nary discourse of men which are complex in this way. though though mure confusedly.s a complex term in meaning. sometimes of a body. and also in meaning on another as when we say. or complex in meaning. but we men tally add thereto the idea of Louis XIV. still agreeing that the term signifies only a single thing.. king. because men. a suhject. Thus the word true religion. The prince of philosophers. and which still preserve a cer tain equivocal universality. these connotative terms denote. as of a are was said in Chapter II. one of whose terms is not expressed. VIII. KTC. in /v/zV//. sometimes of a being. But what is more remarkable in these complex terms : is. when it is understood. for want of clearly discriminating what that single thing really is. which is more commonly determined by a distinct idea of the form which is joined to it as. by any sound which /. which are complex in expression on one account. and indirectly. the form or made .CHAP. because we have in our minds. more distinctly. that there arc some which are determined. in pronouncing the word king. some to another. it is complex in meaning only. and thus the subject is only an idea very general and confused. Tin. not only the general idea which answers to that term. it necessary for it to be still determined. &c. but in relation to Aristotle. directly..-arts dis All connotative or adjective terms are either cntuplex term. but understood simply as when we say. (Mum signifies a thing which has whiteness. since the idea of Aristotle is in the mind alone. . who is now king of France. which may be called an equi vocation through mistake. even. some to one thing. it i. without being expressed tinguishes him in particular. either by various circumstances or by what follows. 57 The last arc those. in France. which determines the confused idea of a thing to represent those only which have that quality. there is a complex term : in the expression. in order that we may know exactly what it means. when their substantive is exiire^et/.

The complex very easy to measure men. that is be attributed to those men who were thought to so. in the mouths of men. . unless . and that thus each will give that name to the man whom he believes to be superior to the others. And when we read in a history that a prince was zealous for the true religion. we know he was a . for though these terms may be determined by individual conditions.58 COMPLEX TERMS THEIR UNIVERSALITY. and were really not terms of comparison are also very subject to be come equivocations through mistake : the greatest geome ter of Paris The the most learned man the most dexterous the richest. in order to determine if they are six feet but if it had been said that only valiant men should be enrolled. signifies a single and unique religion. this word is very equivocal. though it belongs only in reality to one. there being only one man who is the greatest geometer in Paris. the term valiant men would have been . as we see the . because it is very easy for men to be divided in opinion on this subject. it being the only one which is true. since it is take. be valiant. nevertheless. which in reality the Catholic. If I say. we cannot say what was intended what was the Protestant. for example. terms which are thus equivocal through mis are principally those which involve qualities of which the senses do not judge. the complex term. more to say. men of six feet. But since each body and each sect believes that its own reli gion is the true one. who spoke thus of his prince. on which men may easily have different opinions. ETC. that only men of six feet high were enrolled in the army of Marius. especially when an author has been so wanting in clearness. to subject to the equivocation through mistake. religion of the historian for. but the mind only. The words. that word may. though by mistake. be easily attributed to many. thereby. it would refer to the Mohammedan religion and we could not determine that it was the Catholic religion unless we knew that the historian was a Catholic. as to render it a matter of dispute what his opinion was. meaning of an author doctrine of an author on suck a subject are also of this number. if it would mean the Protestant if it religion was a Mohammedan Arab. [PART is I. is not liable to the equivocation through mistake.

expressed. in the place of that sub ject confused. opinion of Aristotle. to whom distinctly.CHAP. to all philosopher. since men have different opinions on this subject. invariable. because each calls the opinion of Aristotle that which he understands to be his true opinion. because of the subject confused. the different opinions which be attributed &quot. nor it is there not pro is it when . as we have words. but the equivocation happens solely because the mind. remains in that confusion. which. nevertheless. to which it attributes the form and mode for. but con fusedly expressed. they may give that quality to different persons. and noAV Aristotle. often substitutes a subject distinct and deter minate.gt. however individual words. is happens any equivocation in these words.$ philosophers continually dispute about Aristotle.. and whiteness. either already said. and another another. and the form or mode which is distinctly.may to him. words are connotatives. J COMPLEX TERMS TIIEIK UXIVKRSAUTV. these take. as he is differently understood. the ex pression prince of philosophers can never be equivocal./. :&amp. the relation of that it is Now when it thought being distinct. some thought. some doctrine and some opinion. it must be remarked that //&amp.. perly because of this form or mode. we ought to consider. opinion of Aristotle on such a subject. which they believe belongs to them. and they will express in the mouth of each person that which each may conceive to be the opinion of that they may viz. to Aristotle. confusedly.. and thus. body though indirectly. confusedly . and denote them afterwards by this word. the . in subject which is direct!. distinctly. one under standing one thing. attributed. KTC. each dragging Aristotle him to his own side for though had only a single and unique sense on a given opinions of subject. expressly or in signification. the totle signifies. But in order to understand better in what consists the equivocations in these terms. so long as this idea -prince of philosophers is not applied to any individual distinctly known. will belong to many things. as formerly Plato was known by the name of prince of philosophers. Thus white signifies a. VIII. are equivocations through mis be in themselves. . For example. the terms. . Opinion of Aris connotative Now.gt. which we have called equi vocations through mistake.

generally. but when. that is to say. then that term will become equivo cal. is not equivocal. that he believed it immortal. would signify a person who was not truly the son son of Philip. indirectly expressed. these words are not at all equivocal . Hence the Calvinists are not more Catholic . sense of Scripture. does not belong. the doctrine this philosopher had taught on that subject. It is the same. Thus the opinion of Aristotle. being applied through mistake to Alex ander. and in the mouths of many other interpreters of that philosopher. the form of worship which it considers as the true. would by a signify. who maintained. ETC. which signifies. in the mouth of each body. Supposing. of Philip. in that opinion. that Philip had not been really the father of Alexander. in his mouth. who maintained that he believed it mortal . as well as his masters. re maining in its confused idea. simply and generally. and signifies. Alexanderhimself wished to have itbelieved. they signify. since it signifies only that which is in fact the true religion. one who was be gotten by Philip. on the contrary. as that which which Aristotle taught on the nature of the soul id quod sensit talis scriptor and this id. call sense of Scripture. But when the mind has joined that idea of true religion to a distinct idea of a given particular form of worship distinctly known. The expression. philosopher on such a subject opinion of such a remaining in their general idea. and which he will. not being connected with the distinct idea of any particular religion. being applied heretic to an error contrary to Scripture. of that doctrine con touching the nature of the soul. is an equivocal expression in the mouth of Pomponacius. that error which he believes to be the sense of Scripture. with these words for. true religion. also. The expression. the expression. according to the various distinct ideas which may be substituted for it. that expression becomes very equivocal.60 COMPLEX TERMS THEIR UNIVERSALITY. in place of that id confused. [PART I. and remaining in its confused idea. for example. this doctrine. Plato and mind substitutes a distinct doctrine distinct subject. without being applied to a distinct idea. as Socrates. the and a may And hence it happens that these kind of words often express a thing to which the form. fusedly conceived.

and yet as in the the it is very confuted. C II AFTER IX. that the sensation i& in our hand. and that which belongs to it. thought. ivishing. 61 for these all protesting that they follow only the Word of God. is very clear. the idea of everything which depends on our feeling. as iiie idea of pain. in this also. the single sensation which strikes us is clear. in any distinctness. nevertheless. . as tigure. to nlij in-. the errors which they falsely take to be the Word of God. and the obscurity say that an idea is it may not be distinct. in their mouth. which we We . but what is confused. But this will be known better by examples than by any other way and . the clearness and distinctness of ideas. The idea which each has of him develop the principles of tiiose ideas self. reasoning. OF THE CLEARNESS AND DISTINCTNESS OF IDEAS AND OF THEIR OiJSCUlUTY AND CONFUSION. rest . is not clear to us. for we dear u-Iicn it strikes us sensibly. in We wounded. as judging. doubting. strikes though clear. words Word of God signify. and the principles of those which are confused and obscure. since is it represent* pain it hand which mind. e. Taking. therefore. motion. desiring. stance extended. idea.. IX. we may which are clear and distinct.] IDEAS THEIR CLEARNESS. as something that thinks. as the same thing. i. it is of great importance to examine how the one are clear and the other obscure. and on that account may be called the clearness from the from the confusion . although is in may. that every idea is arises only tinct so far as it is clear. us very sensibly. in the case of pain. WE may may distinguish. for though it is possible for us to pretend that we have no idea either of body or figure. and that the obscurity from the confusion as. and. way. : say. arid is also dis distinct. have also very clear ideas of sub imagining.C1IA1 for . ETC.

so long as we are thinking yet we are not able to hide from our selves. and we ex . naturally. causing different sensations in our mind. by the impressions which they made on our body. existence. of heat. for it is perfect when it represents to us all that is in its ob . of taste. though it may be obscure and very imperfect in another. and as external things have acted on us. as also of our appetites. its own will that but that it had them onlv in connection with certain bodies.2 IDEAS THEIR CLEARNESS. being finite. these sentiments were excited in . or ideas. clearly being. of sound. order. is clear in one sense. if we compare it with that which the blessed in heaven have of Him and it is imperfect. of cold. that the idea which we have of this life. is able to conceive an infinite But the conditions of an object only very imperfectly. cannot pretend of the substance which thinks. conceive. was not satisfied with judg ing therefrom that there was something without it which had been the cause of these sensations. the : mind. so that thus order We number and number are not different in fact from the things which are ordered and numbered. and it is clear when it represents to us enough for forming a clear and distinct conception of it. often wishing to make them more clear. of hunger. as when it was conscious of heat in approaching the fire. that what was in these objects was perfectly like the sensations. so long as it continues to be . provided we consider only that the duration of each thing is a mode. under which we consider that thing. of weight. which were excited on occasion of . can be found in God alone but it is obscure. that. also. of thirst. It is clear. of bodily pain.f&amp. we are assured. idea s perfection are different from those of its clearness. [PART I. of smell. Confused and obscure ideas are those which sensible qualities. in that our mind. which sees that it was not through it. We may say. . ject. in .gt. or phase. and not being satisfied with those which we form them. that we conceive clearly of extension and figure. since it suffices to reveal to us in God a very great number of attributes which. ETC. All these ideas are so clear. &c. may As we have plain the cause of confused ideas as follows been children before we were men. we obscure also. we have of as of colour. time. God. &c. in which it would not have been deceived but it has gone further in believ ing.

IX.&quot. Cum qua. This has been confessed. o/ensio est annnce ex came. but we have not placed there burning. burns. m . suat in his nuncupating rebus. body. (!3 and from these judgments it has formed them. pain. which is in the body and on account of the body. but also by St Augustine in several places. as the pain of mind. pain. And as these ideas are not natural but arbitrary. of colour. there great inconsistency amongst them for though heat and burning are only two sensations. is what is called &quot. et qucedam ab ej/ts passione dlssensio . or the pain which is felt on approachintoo near it neither have we said that the fire has is . we have placed heat the fire. 15). he adds. which we call sorrow. book of the do not arise from the City of God. as the Cyrenaics. And in the vii. is the opposition which the mind feels to those things which happen con Dolor carnis tantum modo trary to its pleasure. &quot.&quot. But though men have seen clearly that pain is not in the fire which burns the have still been deceived hand. one feebler. it is only in the although on occasion of what takes place in the hand. . mind. and we have said that the fire has heat. and the position to that which has been done in the body. but from the mind. not only by some ancient philosophers. says he (in the xiv. ideas of them.c came. And these are those confused and obscure ideas which we have of sensible qualities. when considered aright. cap.&quot.] IDEASTHEIR CLEARNESS. Dolores dicuntnr animcn &quot. and the other stronger. 19. nobis noletitibus decider ant&quot. qua tristiticK dissensio est ab &quot. et e.- made in its temperament. for pain of body. sicuti animoi dolor. ETC. the repugnance which the mind feels at seeing that the action through which it governs the body is impeded by some disturbance which is came. nothing else but a grief of mind on account of its body. book of Genesis. &c to the things themselves. Those pains. since qni carnis. which are without it. &quot. they the in believing that it is in hand that the fire pain of body is nothing else but a feeling of aversion which the mind conceives at some movement contrary to the natural constitution of its body. qua.is op&quot. in the note. cap. whereas. the mind having added its false jud-ments to that which nature reveals to it. by transferring the sensations of heat.CHAP. afflictioms corporis moleste sensit (anima) actionem suam.

but that that movement must be communicated to the brain by means of the small fibres contained in the nerves. is agitated and this is why. sed aliquando etiam igne ureretur adtnoto. sentiret. etjacebat simillimus mortuo. could so alienate himself from sense &quot. and not only was not conscious when they pinched or pierced him. 24. as in tubes. are still able to affect that part of the brain to which they are attached in the same manner as before. . as is the case in paralysis. pungentes minime properly injured state of the hand. It must be remarked. being excited by some movement about the elbow. cause none when our mind is strongly occupied elsewhere. but even when they burnt him. what appears strange enough. that he would remain as though dead. because the fibres of the nerves which extended from the hand to the brain. . extended clown to the hand. which makes the mind conscious of pain. where they terminated when the arm was cut off. that the same things which occasion us pain when we think of them.&quot. cap. book of the City of God. [PART I. as it happens very often to those who have their hand cut off. which are extended as small threads from the brain to the hand and the other parts of the body. he may have what is called pain in the hand without possessing a hand at all. is. regendo adest. further. fact. of whom St Augustine speaks in the xiv. ETC. not in the body. that In as that priest of Calamis. when they . sine allo doloris sensu.64 illi IDEAS THEIR CLEARNESS. turbato ejus temperamento impedire offenditur dolor vocatur&quot. et hcec offensio which shows us that the pain which we call corporeal is in the mind. a man may see his hand cut and burnt without being conscious of any pain and. who. if any obstruction prevents these threads of nerves from communicating their movement to the brain. as it felt which causes the mind to feel when the limb was perfect. as often as he wished. ita se auferebat a seiisibus. nisi post modum ex vulnere&quot. ut non solum vellicantes atque &quot. that part of the brain also. and the change which the burn ing causes in it. And this it is the same pain then. as the extremity of a cord can be agitated in the same way by pulling it at the middle as at either end. Qui quando ei placebat. in Africa. ad imitatas quasi lamentcmtis hominis voces. that it is not the whence they derive their origin. on the con trary. so that when these small fibres are stirred.

at the place in the brain to conic. that they have attached the name of gravity. which arose only from their error. of some cause may we Why. For. as what see in a mirror appears to us in the place where it would e the movement was accustomed that fall. the pain of the burning was in it. and it is to this confused idea. which seems so clear. since. which moves them towards the amber or the matrnet. therefore. IX. which is also true.CHAP. because that the most common manner of viewing And this will enable us to show how objects. for children. and was. and that it may feel the ie pain as we feel when we are burnt. That of wei /ht. they have seen also straws which attracting . Never have not cho-scn to do so but they have theless^ they placed in amber a quality for straws. and one .f attention. as reason to place a much^ quality in the straws and in the iron. and not that which impels it. ETC. therefore. and that thus the stone fell of itself by an in ward principle. as they have seen stones which fall down towards the earth of themselves. indeed. which move towards the magnet. and small pieces of iron or steel. which idea is natural and true. 65 we have been. as in the stones to move them towards the earth. and not in the body. nothing else but a thought sadness which it felt on occasion of what happened* in body to which God had united it. without there being anything else to impel it downward. or iceiyht. as that the movement of that matter may be an occasion to that mind of afflictive thoughts. is no less confused than the others of which we have to speak. They have. very possible it is that a mind separated from the body may be tormented by e either ot hell or of purgatory. if it had been seen by direct rays. of not conceive that the justice of God may so dis pose a certain portion of matter in regard to a mind. move towards amber. &amp. have formed from this the idea of a thins that falls. and further. But because they see nothing but the stone. even when it was in the body.* by a hasty judgment they have concluded that what they saw not.gt.] because it IDEAS excites its THEIR CLKARXESS. which is all that can hap pen to our minds in corporeal pain ? But to return to confused ideas. was not. seeing that stones and such like things fall to the ground as soon as they ceased to hold them.

for none of these ics. rejects/aT . ETC.t. that when for filled with air &quot. the Socinians. [ PAKT 1 SSSra^^A^^tt woignc. simply from our m one sense.IDEAS-THEIE CLEARNESS. nom a false reasoning which Ins 11 a u tor these ideas arise SHH? even true. that our ^s t SH d mind is a subtile flame.

or in the Avhich. but this is sufficient to enable us to understand all other confused ideas. occasions this feeling in us unless we have stone.7 untenable absurdity. which makes it fall to the earth. or in moderate motion. it makes. The only way of remedying this inconvenience is. with thought . agitated or not agitated. and had received three or four additional boilings. less material that at length it might become capable of thinking. terrane tibi aut hoc ncbugross air loso. determining nothing as to what the cause may be. subtile or gross. might extend this subject much further. IX. as the water. on the other. or a Quid enim. the idea that it could be of earth. and that all things which are called heavy arc impelled downwards by some cause. Sato. but only through that which we judge of it now. . clear reasons. than another. in being divided into parts smaller and more agitated.gt. more easily insinuates itself into their pores but. divided or not divided.CHAP. we shall retain some thing clear as. We : . aut concreta esse videtur tanta vis : memorial! But they believed that. affording us the knoAvledge of these things. Thus we shall arrive at natural ideas. obsecro te . that in the fire there is something which is the cause of our feeling warmth. and to believe nothing which is within the province of that reason through which we have judged of it before. and in relation to those which are confused. aut caliyinoso ccelo. they rendered it less gross. in the fire. in subtilising this and material. except that. it is not on that account less material. f&amp. to throw aside the prejudices of our youth. could come to know itself when agitated somewhat more. and. or less corporeal. ETC. on the one hand. as the earth. or figure of matter. less resistance to other bodies. or that a matter which did not think when it was in repose. which is a ridiculous fancy. .] IDEAS THEIR CLEARNESS. which almost all of them arise from some causes similar to those which we have mentioned. For one matter is not more subtile . or more capable of think ing since it is impossible to imagine that there is any relation between the motion.

n d and evil bei -= * or ob- OB .68 EXAMPLES OF OKSCURE AND CONFUSED [PART i. SOME EXAMPLES OF OBSCURE AND CONFUSED IDEAS TAKEN FROM MORALS. CHAPTER X.

and hence it is t he forms a multitude of obscure and false ideas in representing to himself all the objects of his love as able render him happy. and the ordinary course of these false ideas is as follows The first and principal tendency of concupiscence is s the pleasures of sense which arise from certain :ernal and when the mind objects. despises riches isure which it loves comes to it from these tiling it immediately connects with them the idea of good.CHAP. trod. perceives that the But the corruption of ^ whom j : seeing and human power are the common means of en- it to possess the objects of its desire. of baseness and excellence he desires happi ness. He has also ideas of smallness and greatness. and by which baseness. . true greatness and true excellencethus he is constrained.ose vain phantoms after which men . 69 In order to unfold these.as it remains general. and those which deprive him of them.-then. it be-ins to consider them as great goods.ive some examples of the manner in which they are formed. run. in joining together a great number of different ideas which are not connected in reality. which is not so in reality 3 from himself his misery and his poverty. which separates him from alone he can find his true happiness. con fers the rich and the great. through sin. and o whom alone. and to inude in his idea of happiness a great number of things entire y separated from it. and. of which we make . as rendering him miserable. X. In the same way he has lost. it would be necessary to eo through a complete course of morals but we intend here mly to . who possess these things. consequently. in excellence. aiufthat of evil to what deprives it of them . to the end that he may elorify f and become great. therefore. they are rendered miserable all their lives Man finds in himself the idea of happiness and misery. he ought to attach the idea of him to connect it with a multitude of things into the love of which he is precipitated. and this idea is neither false nor confused so Ion. he slums misery he admires he . that sin. . in order to seek there that happiness which he had lost.J IDEAS TAKEN FROM MORALS. in order to love himself to represent to himself another.

and even saints &amp. for which they labour all their life Ion&quot. and the poor. but also with all those favourable judgments which we have formed of riches. with all the advantages which are connected therewith. when he forbids the giving of a seat more elevated to the rich than the poor in religious assemblies. and as small those whom it considers poor and miserable. and by our own experience. and it considers always as great those whom it reckons to be happy. since the order of the world. miser- Now. allows these preferences. which religion does not disturb. which makes the idol of the ambitious. and regards them with sentiments of inward tear. composed of all the admirers and of the great. for that passa-e can not be understood to the letter as a reproof for rendering a certain external respect to the rich rather than to the poor. that St Thomas believes that it is this respect and esteem for admiration that is condemned so severely by the apostle St James. in the soul. and the honour which is done to the rich These judgments are so unjust and false. neverthe less. and this is the reason of the contempt which is shown to the poor. And hence it happens that we not only form these ideas of rich men. are false and &amp. they are.gt. and which we know by the common discourse of men. common to all men who have not corrected them since they are produced through the concupiscence by which they are all infected. and expose themselves to so many dangers.lt. it of the rich It is unreasonable. it selves have practised them which arise . so that we consider their state not only rich as infinitely superior to the poor. which we conceive surrounds their throne. properly this phantom. But though these ideas and these judgments. appears that we ou^ht to understand it as that inward preference which causes us to regard the poor as under the feet of the rich. but we know also that others have for them the same feelings of respect and admiration. of respect. and the it.o surrounded with all pomp. who are deprived of them. and of abasement. since there is a certain excellence in happiness the soul never separates these two ideas. [PART I. And to show what it is they seek after and worship.EXAMPLES OF OBSCURE AND CONFUSED happy.

for their greatness. .. which they excite in others Hence we see that the idea which fills them is as vain and as groundless as that of those who are properly calk thoSe hich d respect of s not.nned to these opinions. J J1IC illlu me otner but the one chose certain thoughts-the other.].xn tori . -a.? titles. the secret of moving them bv certain springs. for. and of obtaining from them all the services which we obtain from men. that if there were world only one man who thought.. nevertheless.%t tlUelvL wi and other things of tint thi &quot. we could believe that he wou d sometimes divert himself with the various move 88 11 Uld Dever C01tail% knowing him outwardly were single perfectly that all the statues that. the simple men . ive happiness on the thoughts of others . and of ideas con &amp. composed of the false judgments of men. knew.gt. - . by which men regard them as b +1-1 Heir o. others I -e is nothing more common than to see these vain phantoms. therefore.. moreover.7 &amp. ll ] &quot. needs only to be considered. f the feelings exciting. . tTet elo^u ^ and judgments which They ddi^hTin whereas vain men make it their aim ^^ aiKl rCSpeCt f r their knowledge! terrible. . -the ambitious wish to excite emotions of terror.+. of reand of awe. this reasoi^n n&quot.. which rctmS ^ - ^W ^ outward effects of the separated from the consideration of the r thoughtS3 which constitute the objects of love to the am bitious they wish to command men.IDKAS TAKEX FliOM MOKALS.lt. and their pleasure consists in seeing those movements of fear of awe. and of admiration. and that ill tl of those who had the 7] human fi-ure tons.^i. and were Lf t hTpkalu^idS entirely deprived of reason and thought.. not automaton&quot. acclamations.

and. and for the they imagine that all those who look leive for is it which those propose to themselves who build magnificent houses far beyond their condition or their It is not simply convenience which they seek n this.. and that double phantom occupies their attention. beyond his own that they labour. and the hope insignificant reputation of a good soldier. W rld which . and it is clear that if they were alone in the world they would never take that trouble. that they regard. are more valiant and more Thus captains have than commonly more and gentlemen than those who are courage soldiers. their excessive magnificence is a hindrance rather than any nelp to this. being more filled with the thought of these opinions.* lose than t get. because. who have their eyes upon him. which often does not extend t 1 But company. is.IT-wf 2 iTT&quot. emotions of respect and shall praise. because a general is sustained by the judgments of a whole army. ow object through the whole course of and **ve as the principal men s lives &amp.EXAMPLES OF OBSCURE AND CONFUSED [ PA RT 1. on the other the flatteries winch are given to valiant men. The same labours. are not equally painful to a general of an army to a soldier. tremble ifc Ettacks them that which produces the bravery which they manion such occasions. m( e . rai enes which come to the coward. And this is the reason why those who have reason to believe that men look at them. on the one hand. and those who appeai to face death at the breach or in the battle. or f they believed that those who saw their houses would view them only with feelings of contempt. not so. they are also more sensibly affected by it. It therefore mat men is. said a rn-eat captain. Considered brave rush without fear into the greatest dangers is often only the effect of the impression made by vain and empty ideas which fill their minds Few persons seriously despise life. whereas a soldier has nothing to sustain him but the of a small reward.gt. their palace will admiration for him who men who upon . and diverts them from the consideration of dangers and death.

being deprived of this usual nourishment. on the tenure of and never speaking with any one of his hap It is only the Christian religion which has been piness. that for men ? load their carriages with such a number of servants It is not for the services which they render. that they present frequently to the mind the idea of emotions of respect. powerful. and that which recompenses the troubles and the fatigues which accompany them. is. so that they have not hesitated to say that their wise men would not possess it On living alone. magnificent and it is for this idea. that they put them selves to so much expense. And the master of in the midst of their palace. And to the majority of is on this account that pagan philosophers have con sidered a solitary life insupportable . all the employments. happy. we shall find that that which renders them agreeable. if we examine all the states. from below. arid all the professions which are esteemed in the world. But it is necessary to remark that the love of men does not properly terminate in the knowledge of the thoughts E . able to render solitude agreeable. why is it. in those who be the idea that a person of great state is passing . every possible good of mind and body. of admiration. we may ask. which fills them. the contrary. or intercourse with men. they inconvenience rather than hold them. help them but it is . it gives them. it . and the consideration of this idea. 73 and thus they represent themselves as by a crowd of people who. other objects more fitted to occupy their minds. since. satisfies the vanity of those to whom they belong. which they imagine may be formed in viewing their carriages. X. that which renders solitude wearisome men is. of fear. and take so much trouble.] is IDEAS TAKEN FROM MORALS. they are also separated from their judg ments and thoughts. that being separated from the company of men. which others have for us.CHAP. environed . to excite as they go. Thus their heart remains empty and famished. of esteem. In the same way. and not finding ought in themselves to supply the void. and more worthy to fill their hearts. and who judge them great. at the same time. leading men to despise these vain ideas. for which they have no need of the society of. regard them as high above them.

that they are really greatest. or as particular favourites of God. because we represent ourselves as having strength enough to resist the and the We We We ) We in we do games of chance. in joining to it. . that he will be so. which miserably amuse and . in 1 hence it is. an idea which makes us appear. either is prudent. which appear to have nothing in themselves which would be capable of diverting or of pleasing them. for the reason of the pleasure they take in such things is. there are some whom players choose. that a man has been successful up to a certain moment. by means of these accidents. greatest evils. and they imagine. love of diseases of which we are speak cured. but for the moment after there is no greater pro bability. because they dwell the greatest house. and incorporating with it. it seems as though fortune had advantage in every thing. by some vain circumstance which they have added to it take pleasure in speaking of the dangers through which we have passed because we represent to ourselves. by a gross illusion. and even which there is no skill. which may give us the right to hope for the same success in future- not play for gain. even conceive this pre tended good fortune as a permanent quality. all iese extraneous ideas. and with whom they love rather to connect themselves than with others. than those who have been less fortunate. that the idea of themselves which is repre sented to them is greater than is common. may hence discover what it is that renders many things pleasant to men. [PAKT I. and all these opinions of other men. add thing to them-leaving them as poor and miserable as tney were before. even when We Thus the mind of those who love only the world has for object only vain phantoms. which is for we may say perfectly ridiculous well enough. but that they employ these only to aggrandise and heighten the idea which they have of themselves. since we join to the idea of suethat of happiness . and that we had become her favourites in consequence of our merit. made choice of us. although all these things which are without them.74 EXAMPLES OF OBSCURE AND CONFUSED IDEAS. and because they have there more people who admire them . on that account. desire to obtain feelings of others.

ATTACH THEM TO WORDS. XI. which effected his nourishment and growth. have consileied the same things in very different ways. even as others. WHICH IS. each expresses his idea by the same word. while. 75 occupy it. wiser only and those who have the reputation of fill Those alone who join their life and ac ons to eternal tilings can be said to have a substantial object ea and material. r mtyand alter falsity Ve regard to &quot. we are easily perplexed. man having perceived that he had in him sometang. always collected these various ideas under -[ single name. . it true with being and dreams themselves. nevertheless. ad all other that they run CHAPTER XL OF ANOTHER CAUSE WHICH INTRODUCES CONFUSION INTO )UR THOUGHTS AND DISCOURSES. in different ages. and extended that idea to &amp. For it must be remarked. and have nevertheless. on pronouncing that word.gt.CHAP. they employ.gt. othin S ^s&amp.] CAUSE OF CONFUSION IN THOUGHTS. sometimes taking it for one idea. neverthe less. THAT WE have already said that the necessity which we have employing outward signs in order to make ourselves understood. virtue Further. the same men. so that. kow this is one of the most common causes of the confusion of our thoughts and discourse. sometimes for another. For ex ample. whatever it might be.r WE . with IS bei Vf7-/ and error. that though men have often different ideas of the same things. causes us so to attach our ideas to word* that we often consider the words more than the things. the same words to express them as the idea which a pagan philosopher has of virtue is not the same as that which a theologian has of it. or in it learing pronounced. called this soul.

the two others only in our soul. of a certain The first of these three figure. . In the same way. on the contrary. and sensations. the third is as of the rainbow. what resembled And . under the same name of sense. although so different. there is much of equivocation in the words sense. of For when we say that the eye sees. and at a certain distance. the second give occasion to our mind of conceiving something. it has the ideas of red. and not the body. we see anything. the judgment we form of that which we see. and that it cannot judge of them. but even in plants. and that which caused the body to be nourished and&quot. according to that signification of the word see. In the same way. that through that re semblance of name. say. in conse quence of what passes in our eye and in our brain . it. as when following from the movement which is made in our eye. as that these movements the eye and the brain . sight. he further called by the name of soul that which was the principle of thought within whence it has happened. and who strikes our eyes. We mind which sees. since it is very clear that the eye has no perception of the objects which strike it. that we have not seen a person who is present before us. that cannot be understood simply in relation to the movement of the bodily organ. and which we conceive of a certain size. although on occasion of what passes in the body and we nevertheless comprehend all three. which are two things utterly different in their nature. by the reflection of light in the drops of rain opposite the sun. of blue. not only in animals. that the ear hears. things is in our body alone . having further seen that he thought. the word to that which is the cause of life has been applied equally animal activity. &c. The first is as when. even when these words are taken only in relation to the five bodily senses for three things commonly take place in us when we use our senses. and of orange . and to the thinking principle. it is the . and sensations. that certain movements are made in the bodily organs. and. hearing. . when we have not noticed him.76 CONFUSION INTRODUCED INTO THOUGHTS [PART I. as Plato maintains. to increase. And then we take the word sight for the thought which is formed in our soul. to which we attribute these colours. for instance. he has taken for the same thing that which thought.

would be . which judges of their greatness or small- when we : . or in the single per ception of the soul. which is only a simple apprehension but that all the error arises solely from our having judged in concluding. Finally. or smaller.&quot.dam stint ad oculos. with any common sense. 77 and Cicero after him. on occasion of that which takes place in the bodily organs. apertis auribus. which. ct oculis. either in what passes in the bodily organ. it is then almost impossible that we can be deceived. nee ridemus. in these words Nos enirn ne nunc quidem oculis ccrnimus ea quiv vidcmus. atque integris. and not our eye.gt. the words sense. as no one. infancy. we attribute it to the sight. ct . are nevertheless signs of ideas altogether different.] BY ATTACHING THEM TO TVOKDS. two feet in diameter. ness. say the senses are deceived as. Itaque : scppe aut cogitations ant aliqufi vi morli impediti. hearing. about the same size as that which would be formed there of an object of two feet in diameter. with scarcely any reflection. &quot. for the judgment which the mind forms from the perceptions which it has. having only a single sound. ad aures. non eas partes quce quasi fenestrce sunt aniini. placed at a certain distance more proportionate to our common manner of But since we have made this judgment from our seeing. that when an equivocal name signifies two things which have no relation to each other. Vice quasi qurr&amp. and which men have never con founded in their thoughts. because its great distance makes only that image which is formed of it in the centre of our eye. are taken for the last of these three things that is to say. and when the sun appears to us to be only two feet in diameter. But it must be remarked. that we make it at the same instant in which we see the sun. &c. that we see objects greater. For it is certain there cannot be anything at all of error or of falsehood. sight. when we see in the water a crooked stick. ad nares.CHAP. for example. according as they are nearer or further away from us. a scde animce perforate. and that it can become the cause of any error. All languages are full of a multitude of similar words. animum ct vidcre et audire. nee audimus : ut facile intelliffi possit. XI. although it is our mind. Neque enini est ullus scnsus in corpore.. and say. that the sun was wrongfully. and arc so accustomed to it.

to have. IS EXPLAINED. But for this purpose it is not necessary to make new sounds. that which agrees only with ideas of things incompatible. when the equivocation arises from the error of men themselves. it is difficult to be undeceived. is to make a new language and new words. in order that we may give them that which we may wish them ing. as we have shown . by designat through other simple words. deceived by the ambiguity of the word ram. THE is best way of avoiding the confusion of words which found in common language. ON THE REMEDY OF THE CONFUSION WHICH ARISES IN OUR THOUGHTS AND IN OUR LANGUAGE. FROM THE CONFUSION OF WORDS. I wish to show that the soul is im mortal. . and thus we often content ourselves with pronouncing these. without perceiving that this arises only from our having confounded two different things under the same name. and a sign of the zodiac. . IN WHICH THE NECESSITY AND THE ADVAN TAGE OF DEFINING THE TERMS WE EMPLOY. since we sup posed that those who first used these words thoroughly understood them. which may be attached only to those ideas which we wish them to represent. AND THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE DEFINITION OF THINGS AND THE DEFINITION OF NAMES. confounded diiferent ideas. Whereas. for instance. about whose meaning the idea to which we wish to apply there is no ambiguity. CHAPTER XII. since we may em them as ploy those which are already in use by regarding if they had no signification. who have.78 REMEDY FOR THE CONFUSION OF THOUGHTS [PART I. as in the word soul. them as. the word soul being equivocal. which signifies an animal. by mistake. without ever examining if the idea which we have of them is clear and distinct and we attribute even to that which we call by the same word.

if. as so. saying. which we define./ call soul that which is the principle of it what I am about to regard the word soul a thing. every sound being indifferent in to take care not to confound the of which we here speak. or measure of motion. Of this we shall speak in another But here we place. without considering at all whether others take it in the same sense And from this it follows 1st. as we have already said. words. with that 1 which some philosophers speak. and I would solely to that within us which is the principle of thought. in order that his thought may be clearly conceived. XII. we determine that sound 3 the sign of an idea. a rational animal. also. were a sound which had no meaning. whereas. 79 may it it say. in easily produce confusion from order to avoid this. and those of for things are not so necessary. on the other hand. and. and afterwards. in the name. we regard only the sound. for it does not depend on the will of men that ideas should compre hend all that they would wish them to comprise so that. 1 may be for my own allowed. for instance. definition of the name : fatted . It is contained. use. .] WHICH ARISES FROM G OXFUSIOX OF WORDS. who understand bv it the explanation of that which a word signifies. or according to i etymology. it. to determine a sound to signify precisely a certain tiling. without any mixture of but it is anything else quite otherwise with the definitions of things. only the particular sense in which he who defines a word wishes it to be taken. equally well to express all sorts of ideas. we attribute to these ideas some- . by nature. in wishing to define. which we designate by other definition of a Time u the measure we leave to the terms of motion.CHAP. and provided I forewarn others ot it. these what is called the definition of a name definitio which geometers have turned to such o-ood ac and which it is count. necessary to distinguish from the is This nommu reifor in the definition of Man is a rational animal- itself. I would apply thought within us. or time. according to the common custom of a language. regard. their ordinary idea in which we maintain that other ideas are definition of a thing definitio as. as man. That the definitions of names arc arbitrary.

of it .80 REMEDY FOR THE CONFUSION OF THOUGHTS [PART I. but. leaving ordinary signification and idea. further than this idea. it being impossible for a figure of three lines to three angles. two right angles. provided I take it exclusively in this sense. I were to say that a parallelogram is a figure with three lines as this would then be a definition of a thing it would be very false. because they are arbitrary for we cannot deny that a man has given to a sound the sig nification which he says he has given to it. It follows. and I shall then say that a parallelogram has if. neither that it has that signification only in the use which he makes of it. It follows. must be proved. explanation. as we have before shown. thing which they do not contain. as other propositions. is anything. after tions of things. we fall necessarily into Thus. error. to dispute that the idea which has not be called by that name which But we ought not to infer anything needs some because we ought not been designated may has been given to it. and not taken for granted. at least when they are not evident of themselves as axioms. or believe. as to the defini often necessary to contest them. because we have given it a name. may be taken as a principle. that the definitions of . that it signi For example. and are truly propositions which maybe denied by those who find any obscurity in them. stripping the word parallelogram of all signification. in the second place. I may define a chimera. But if. and I do not commit any error. that every definition of a name. in the third place. names cannot be contested. Nevertheless. con sequently. I apply it to signify a triangle. by saying. I call a chimera that which implies a contra diction and yet it will not follow from this that a chimera in the same way as if a philosopher says to me. fies anything real. This is allowable. whereas the definitions of things cannot at all be taken as principles. principle . it is we have been forewarned since it cannot be contested. to give an example of the one and of the other. what we have just name may be taken for a said that the defini . which is that of signifying a figure whose sides are parallel. equal to to this word its have its sides parallel. and which. tion of a For this is only true. since they may be false.

and which thev had defined in the Thus philosophers commonly believe that there is nothing world clearer than that fire is hot. XII. bavin. because it enables me to understand what he wishes to say but I will deny that what he means by the word heaviness is anything real. they leave them their confusion. The second abuse is. which are very false. in by understand only that which really produces the sensation heat in us. what they understand by the word hot. as he may very easily. they wish us then to consider these efimtions as principles which none may contradict. since there is no such principle in stones. in order to estab lish that which is obscure and t their wished to explain this.. whether that which mav be denied on this matter is clear. on defining them. nor the ideas which we aturally have of them. . whence it happens that the greater part of their disputes are onlv disputes about words and further. I will receive i cheerfully. 81 heaviness the inward principle which makes a stone fal without being impelled by anything. . or obscure for it will then be de manded of them. hundred definitions. they have good ground for say- they may persuade all men of this. it will be easily found _out.CHAP. of confounding the definition of the thmgwith the definition of the name. and which do not explain the true nature of things.as the unes are undefined. by the word heavy. . former that which to the latter. easily have perceived to be so. I wi u not contest tins definition. and fixing to them certain ideas clearly described. that which falls to the ground when nothing upholds it. they pre tend that he is not worth disputing with. scarcely ever employing the definition of names. since there are two C re-U abuses which are current on this subject in philosophy 1-he first is. that they employ that which is clear and true in confused ideas. and a stone heavy and that it would be folly to deny this. that. and winch if any one denies. and by heavy. but of things. to suit I all m . If they answer. -I call fancy. on the contrary. but. for.J WHICH ARISES FROM CONFUSION OF WORDS. that heat thev fact. would false. and of attributing to the.niade -i belong on!. and. in order to remove that obscurity which is in them. if they the names. so lono. not of names.

to be al ways repeating this long series of words. is not to deny a clear thing. not to say very false. besides this utility. to the end that we may not uselessly dispute about words which one understands in one sense. which. Hence it is. an even number saying. takes the place of all the others. that which has in itself a quality resembling what we imagine when we feel heat. we attach to a single word the idea which we have conceived. but it is not at all clear that has anything in it which resembles what we feel when we approach the fire and it is also very clear that a stone descends when we let it fall. without being impelled by anything. without there being any which it the fire . Thus. having explained the thing by all these words. which is. that which has in itself a principle which makes it fall towards the centre. every parts we call is divisible into two equal parts. that number which is divisible into two equal an even number. But. and have that definition so present. as is so often the case in ordinary con names to enable us to versations. whenever we use the word which we have defined. This proves that.82 REMEDY FOR CONFUSION OF THOUGHTS. that it would be unreasonable to deny that fire is hot. but one that is very obscure. that as soon as Ian- . thus. and an other in another. and by weight. since it is very clear that the fire gives us a sensation of heat by the impression makes on our body. except by employing many words to describe it. stone heavy. g. it would be wearisome. the great utility of the definition understand exactly what is the point at issue. in order to avoid the constant repetition of these terms. that. that to deny that in this sense fire is hot. Now. and a . thing to impel it downward. if they understand by heat. having comprehended that there are some numbers which may be divided into two equal parts. ETC. it will be easy then to prove to them. but it is not at all clear that it descends of itself. that. ing. and that these two things are so inseparably joined in thought. we must mentally substitute the definition for the word defined. of We may see. [PART I. and a stone is heavy but. there is still another. especially in books of science. as soon as we mention it we understand exactly that which e. we give a name to that property. we often are not able to give a distinct idea of a thing. in this way.

] OBSERVATIONS ON DEFINITION OF NAMES.ft m names.CHAP. This is the case in very simple things. be useless. it and it . of which all men have naturally impossible to be done. that the word be attached to a clear and distinct idea. do it only to abridge the language. multitude of words would create. and when ail those who under stand the language form the same idea in hearing a word pronounced. Ne says CHAPTER XIII. XIII. for anything is distinct. and thus those who employ hem only to denote a clear idea.- tlu* would often. it is im portant to make some observations relative to the manner of using them. by any time there be any obscurity in principal attention. need not fear that they .gt. guage expresses the one. 83 circumloquendo moms faciamusas St Augustine but they have no intention of abridging the ideas whereof they speak. since they suppose that the mind will a complete definition to the supply abbreviated terms which they may employ. for those who define immediately terms with so much care as the geometers. are understood in the manner all those who or. The first isthat we must not nmleriake to all ies. explained what is meant by the definition* and how useful and necessary they are. if at ieir mpioy them. since it al ready answers the end of definition. to the end that they be not abused. which is. less to define certain oi I sav that nave would often be un when the idea which men same idea. assidiKc . because define /.&amp. to avoid the embarrassment which a. IMPORTANT OBSERVATIONS IN RELATION TO THE DEFINITION OF NAMES. AFTER having words. falls always that which is clear in them . it would be useless to define it. so that the words by which they are exed. nevertheless. the mind attaches to it the other. which uch frequent repetitions would render wearisome.

extension. we ought. and to detach it from some other idea to which custom had joined it. . therefore. as that time is the measure of motion. that when we are to define a word. Hence. it would be umvise to change the received definitions of mathematicians. For. nevertheless. to The third observation is. we should still have need of others. has attached it at least among an idea. and conceive only that which others naturally conceive of it and thus the wise and the ignorant understand the . and others thought. and which they have called definitions. to accommodate our selves to custom. or time. we must of neces sity have others which may designate the idea to which we may wish to attach that word . [PART I. as far as possible. further. will not be understood. and so on to infinity. : . word understood.84 OBSERVATIONS ON DEFINITION OF NAMES. they do not themselves rest in these definitions when they hear time spoken of. being. that it would be impossible to define all words for. perhaps. than when it is necessary to affix it to a new one. that ive must not change de finitions already received when we have nothing to com plain of in them. and if we still wish to define the words which we have employed for the explication of it. as. though some have obscured the idea of time by different propositions which they have formed. is necessary that we stop and at some primitive terms which cannot be defined it would be as great a fault to wish to define too much as not to define enough. in order to define a word. the learned. unless there were any that were perplexed. Such are the words. thing. I say. and which might be even contrary to their etymology as when I say I call a but conparallelogram a figure bounded by three lines. for it is always more easy to make a same . those of the angle and of proportion may be in Euclid. The second observation is. of a similar description. when recognised custom. and whose idea had not been designated with sufficient clearness. equality. in not giving to words a sense altogether removed from that which they have. when it is said that a horse takes less time to go a league than a tortoise. duration. according to anteriority or posteriority. with the same facility. because by one or the other we should fall into that confusion which we pretend to avoid. It.

imagining that the plague was a Saturnian evil. in stripping words which have two senses of one of these. I may employ the feel. or which distinguishes it from heat taken from the sensation. 85 tent ourselves. easily to forget the new. and giving to the name of that sensation. do not easily separate the two and thus. upon which was engraved. such or the same name. as we might say virtual heat. which you in defining that word. and could cure. without any advantage. with some as that of burning (ardeur) addition which determines it. effectually. as if these connections. . : diseases. and of giving them those which already signify other things which have no real relation to the new ideas Avith which they connect them. to a I say to gram make it signify a figure whose sides could never be parallel. name heat in applying it to one of these ideas. the former idea always returning. the figure which astronomers use to denote that planet. arbitrary and without reason. The reason of this observation is. on a Saturday (which also derives its name from Saturn). for the r sivel} to the other: as most part. and a quality which we imagine to be in the fire. causes . It is a mistake into which all chemists have fallen who have delighted to change the names of almost everything whereof they speak. pretended that people would be cured of the pestilence by hanging round the neck a bit of lead (which the chemists call Saturn). resembling altogether that which we In order to avoid this ambiguity. so that it would be them would give them more easy to ac : custom them when word which signified nothing at all as I call bara a figure bounded by three lines than to accustom them to strip from the word parallelo the idea of a figure whose opposite sides are parallel. and the small mark which denotes it. and between the same planet and Saturday.] OBSERVATIONS ON DEFINITION OP NAMES. in order to attach it exclution. This has given rise to some ridiculous arguments as that of the man who. XIII. in its common accepta both sensation which we have. heat expresses.CHAP. that men having at one time attached an idea to a word. either a name altogether different. and detach ing it from another: as I say I call heat the sensation which I have when I approach the fire. could have any real effects. between the lead and the planet Saturn.

of fixing their soul in their body . having found the means. that they are the chosen race. each has. the right to make a dictionary for himself. who imagine that thoughts the most groundless. . the holy nation. they make We CHAPTER XIV. by G-assendi. But what [PART I. is the profanation which of the most sacred mysteries of religion as a veil for their pretended secrets . through the philosophers stones. who showed that there was scarcely any character of mind worse than that of these enigmatical writers. and many others like them. is more intolerable. indeed. but he has no right either to make . inasmuch as (say they). so far. ALL that we have said about the definition of names is to be understood only of those in which an author defines the words which he especially employs and it is this which renders them free and arbitrary. the people whom God has chosen. indeed. may see these reveries. since it is allowed to every one to employ whatever sound he pleases to express his ideas. OF ANOTHER SORT OF DEFINITION OF NAMES. the royal priesthood. according to them. in the examination of Fludd s philosophy. sages who have attained to a glorious immortality. But as men are only masters of their own language. and not of that of others. and whom he has called out of darkness into his wonderful light. would pass for grand mysteries when clothed in forms of speech unintelligible to common men. not to say false and im pious. who are. there is no body more fixed and incorruptible than gold. that there are some who have been impious enough to apply what the Scripture says of true Christians. to the chimerical brotherhood of the Rosicrucians. THROUGH WHICH THEIR ORDINARY SIGNIFICATION IS DENOTED. provided he explains beforehand the use of them.86 ANOTHER SORT OF DEFINITION OF NAMES.

not the truth definitions commonly taken. that he who uttered we regard For example. which are very important to the exactness of our cpntested.] ANOTHER SORT OF DEFINITION OF NAMES. besides the principal idea. the contrary of what you say. first. although this species of verbal definitions seems to belong to grammarians. happens that a word. . nevertheless.ke several reflections in reference to this subject. though the mind receives the impression of them. _ of for others often do not consider the entire signification that is to say. we do not represent the whole. if they do not join to sounds the same ideas which are connected with them. that men very words. You lied there. But. iiK.lt. .ard as the proper signification of that word. that these definitions are lso. in the ordinary meaning of those who employ them. we may. For to signify. the signification which custom gives to terms. and when we would explain the signification of them. And this shows. and they are J be reckoned false if they do not faithfully express this custom -that is to say. besides this principal si-niincation. since it is their office to compile tioiianes which are nothing but an explanation of the ideas which men have agreed to connect with certain sounds. the by free from beino- since disputes continually arise touchin&quot. 87 one for others. excites many other ideas. or to explain their language bv the peculiar sigmficanon which he has attached to words/ Thus when Ave undertake to explain. by striking our cars or our Now it often eyes. is the same thing as if he had said to him. but also that in which it is of he things but the truth of the custom. than they seem to do. XIV.CHAP. no means which we give of it are by no moans arbitrary they are bound and restricted to represent. that words often express more which may serve as a foundation if one says to another. Yon Lwu&amp. these words convey an idea of contempt and out rage and they inspire the belief. im pression which they make on the mind. The is. in relation to a sound uttered or written is only to excite an idea connected with that sound in our mind. Now. judgments. and only the principal signification of that expression. not simply in what sense we take a word. which may be termed accessory. wh?ch we . to which we pay but little attention.

others vicious . which diversify. very common among those who complain which if which they have received. since these words do not signify the same thing for the stantives into adjectives. And this constitutes the dif ference between expressions which appear to signify the same thing some being offensive. but are joined to them only by him who uses them. gestures. impress on it. flattery. . and for reproof. whom he was reproving somewhat sharply. besides the principal idea to which they belong. so that. and often it is. by by the tone of the voice. which is unreasonable. which renders them offensive and injurious. others impudent . Sometimes these accessory ideas are not attached to words by common custom. which attach to our words a multitude of ideas. if we only spoke loud enough to be heard. for instance. if he who said that it was necessary to modulate the tone of our voice to the ears of him who meant to say that it was enough. them would not hesitate to do us harm. . the judgments.88 ANOTHER SORT OF DEFINITION OF NAMES. diminish. change. And these are properly those which are excited tenance. some virtuous. not only to reach the ears of him to whom it is spoken. indeed. But sometimes these accessory ideas are attached to the words themselves. since the tone signifies often as much as the words themselves. I hear you well enough. [PART I. since they are excited commonly by all those who pronounce them. No one would take it well. There is a voice for instruction. should answer. which is the cause of this diversity. men attach to them other ideas. if a servant. by joining to them the image of the emotions. he knew not a great part of the use of the voice. others kind . since the tone constitutes part of the reproof. or impostors. This remark will enable us to point out is an injustice. Wherefore. some modest. they say that they have been called ignorant men. and the opinions of him who speaks. and it is necessary to convey to the mind the idea you wish to listens. and augment their signification. : since. Speak loiver. and pierce them. and by the expression of the coun other natural signs. of the reproaches that of changing sub they have been accused of ignorance or imposture. sir. but to strike them.

we may judge the use ought to be made of it. in conceiv which ing or speaking of them. the idea man who challenges death. while it is rarely excited. quite simple. denote the thing just as tion. we may perceive the difference between a simple and how the same thoughts style and a figurative style. or impostor. Primum &quot. Hence. involve also the idea of contempt. upon the mind whereas a simple expression denotes For example. that it strikes us more. images image of emotions. besides the principal thing. with the things. in matters purely speculative.&quot. 89 adjective words. or imposture. the emotion and passion of him who speaks. Si vis tibi. and thus impress both figure. Usque adeone tnori iniscnun est? Non est usque adeo mori simply. besides the signifi cation of blame Avhich they denote. tranquil eye. because the figurative expressions signify. since the mind is instructed by the of truths. except by the And much more than . less force. ignorant. it is. Thus it is not wonderful itself with which it is connected. but it represents.] ANOTHER SORT OF DEFINITION OF NAMES. to us much more lively when they are expressed appear whom by a than when they are contained in expressions For this happens. thus it cannot be doubted that it would have much miserum. and without a figure. idea. and what are the subjects to which It is clear that it is ridiculous to employ it it is adapted. signifies the reason is. were expressed Virgil. me flerc. and which produce no emotion . and which way would evince a desire to spare the feelings of him against find others We may that which in a would involve a softening ways which And these are the the reproaches were made. whereas those of ignorance. that the first expression the second for it expresses not the thought that death is not so great an evil as it is only of a supposed to be. without aggravation or pallia signify the same thing. XIV. further. the wise and moral will choose. and who looks it fearlessly in an image much more lively than the thought the face.CHAP. the emotions which we experience. dolendum est ipsi But since the figurative style commonly expresses. if this half verse of the naked truth alone. at least when they have no special reason to act with greater severity. ideas . which are regarded with a in the rnind.

Thus divine truths. being propounded. is. For. and a species of convulsions. feeling emotions than acquiring knowledges. who maintained that expressions which are we might employ. say they. For the infamy. Whether there be unchaste ivords ? and to refute the reasons of the Stoics. the noble. as to hear certain preachers who declaim indifferently on everything. Finally. conveying thus to our minds the image of that holy dis position. commonly reckoned obscene and impudent. when the matter of which we treat is such. revered. since it not only teaches us these truths. and figurative style in which the holy fathers have treated of them. but also much more. It does not arise exclu- . maintain. or in the words. unfigurative style of the scholastics . in order that they may be loved. This is why there are few things so disagree able. and who are as much excited in philosophic arguments as in truths the most awakening.90 ANOTHER SORT OF DEFINITION OF NAMES. exalted. says Cicero. that there are is the things. and the most necessary to salvation. the same remark will enable us to answer that celebrated question of the ancient philosophers. in a letter which he wrote no words either lewd or shameful. since figures express the emotions of our soul. it is a defect to speak of it in a dry and cold manner. and without emotion. indifferently. and renders them in this respect. whereas the scholastic style being simple. but represents to us also the feelings of love and of reve rence with which the fathers spoke of them . on the contrary. not only less useful. are emotions contrary to nature. is less capable of producing in the soul the emotions of love and respect which we ought to have for Christian truths. [PART I. While. may contribute much towards impressing the like on us . where the mind is not moved. either comes from They on this subject. much better adapted to them than the bare. those which are introduced into subjects. since it is a defect not to be touched by that which ought to affect us. and recognising only ideas of the naked truth. that we ought properly to be affected. but also less the pleasure of the soul consisting more in agreeable. and adored by men. and which. not simply for the purpose of being known. without doubt.

himself and others . Thus the words adultery. that the same sound signifies different and is considered unchaste in one things. though law ful. and if another. are not infamous. for hence it comes to pass. which hides the infamy of it. winch are not considered unchaste. since we may express them in other words. and immodest at another. Neither is in the words. which arises solely these philosophers not having considered sufficiently those accessory uleas which the mind joins to the princi pal ideas of things. on the contrary. and rather as pleasant than as criminal. so that these words signify rather the crime of these actions than these actions them selves . and them as much Hence it sometimes happens also. all this is but a vain subtilety. whereas those who should speak of Miern in another manner. which. and unchastely by another. in certain in the mar-in. it is not wonderful that the words which express that idea should be considered unchaste who shows by his as possible. certain actions. partake somewhat of the corruption of nature For these circumlocutions are. XIV. incest. that he hides speaks of them in this way. But om who the same also with certain circumstances by which express. since they express not only the tilings. which causes them to be regarded exclusively as crimes . if one of these sounds joins to it some other idea. without exciting horror. both from Hebrew words substitute. sively from the things. This obliged the Hebrew doctors to parts of the Bible. though they represent actions which are very infamous. that the same thing may be expressed chastely by one sound. to IK- . And these are those impudence which are called unchaste and infamous. signification and . 91 not so in another. but also the disposition of him It is we reserve. in reality. chastely. whereas there are certain other words which ex press them. since they represent them only as covered with a veil of horror. presents it to the mind in a shameless manner. that the same word is reckoned chaste at one time. chaste. which even connect with them an idea of and effrontery. considered as sounds since it often happens as Cicero shows. abom inable sin.CHAP. would show that they delimited in considering these kind of objects: and that delight being infamous.] ANOTHER SORT OF DKFIXITIOX OF NAMES.

than to know them. on that account. unchaste they should throw aside these last altogether. and others. were not un chaste. when the prophets employed them. there was not then connected with them that idea of effrontery which renders them infamous now and he did wrong to con clude thence. and one which partakes. Thus it Avas a bad defence made by an author. but afterwards. beside the principal idea which belongs to them. that the Rabbins wished others to be pronounced instead of them. . because these words do not signify. it would . chaste. and to make known. of libertinism and impudence. change the text. abusive. that offensive. that is to say. leno. in fact. for having employed an unchaste word to express an infamous place. for example. that idea having been separated used by those from them. in order that that bad idea might not strike the mind. to some extent. with reason. the words which are or rather. that he might be allowed to employ those which are reckoned immodest in our language. and it is with reason. as they were connected with some idea which caused these objects to be regarded with modesty and re serve . and that we often find in their writings meretrix. who read it in place of those which the For this arose from the fact that these Scriptures use. . and who was reproached. [PART I. be useful for the authors of dictionaries to indicate them. since.92 ANOTHER SORT OP DEFINITION OF NAMES. and custom having joined to them another of impudence and effrontery. they became immodest . who was bound to a strict modesty by his religious profession. . the same thing as those which the fathers used. which would hardly be endured in our language for the freedom with which the fathers employed these words. they involve also the image of a bad inclination of the mind. in reading the Bible. since it is always better to be ignorant of them. words. and diversifying so widely the principal significations. although they did not. to allege that the fathers had not scrupled to employ the term lupanar. polite. These accessory ideas being therefore so important. ought to have taught him that they were not reck oned shameful in their time.

but extends there when this the its view further. we employ pronouns. ideas. other attributes and phases. as well as first and principal one. res. for the idea of the attribute. when. are not excited by it in applied to a diamond but they the same manner. another accessory comprehend. taking occasion to consider. thing. beyond which is presented to it. XV.CHAP. is excited. object and thus of conceiving it by ideas which are more distinct. are excited by the word ^oc. instead the neuter. those which the mind adds. which the mind adds to the exact signification of the terms for a special reason. the mind does not confine itself to that single attribute thing. hoc negotium. the All these ideas. But as the demonstrative denote the thing in itself. it does not rest too general and confused. This happens specially in the case of the demonstrative of the proper name. under the kind of ideas. but commonly gives that to certain other distinct Attri butes. WE is. WHICH THE MIND ADDS TO THOSE WHICH ARE EXPRESSLY SIGNIFIED BY WORDS. denotes an attribute very general of every object. but . having conceived that exact may also name of signification which answers is to the word. thing pre of the word. hoc signifies hcec res. but adds thereto the ideas of a hard shining body of such a form. hoc does not . hoc.] IDEAS WHICH THE MTND ADDS. Hence the . which that ft often happens when. there being only nothing to confused. are not expressly denoted by the pronoun hoc. to a Thus when we employ the word that. this for it is clear that this signifies iAis Now. and sent. which it may not be applied. pointing it diamond. 93 CHAPTER OF IDEAS XV. as the proper signification the others are excited as ideas which the mind conceives which as connected with that first and principal idea. and that and the word thing. simply pronoun but also causes it to be conceived as present. the mind is not satisfied with conceiving and as a thing present. ETC.

^7. in relation to different things! If I say hoc in pointing outa diamond. ich the have rendered celebrated. and the mind which addsThese other m tLS are&quot. and in whTch hey found their main argument for n - provin^ their Aira ^\f5S^HBS bably added to the on-nf^^A IA c ^- WJ P ro . Sd Inese added ideas must.7. according as we apply the hoc. additions are different. therefore.. the term xvill always signify this thing. . but the mind will supply and dd PP 7 ? n . for they both found the same mind. .IDEAS WHICH THE MIND ADDS [ PART j.gt. be clearlv di tinguished from the ideas expressed. WG ar en bled t08ilence an intrusiv e whioh th ministers l ! wranglin./. they are not found there h the same manner.4* which is a ^&amp../ thereto.

The subject of a pr^ position does not signify an entire else )0rtance of *** -mark will be it is well to add here. f Tf s ? ^ &amp. and excited the nifies word question is not whether they conceived bread. 95 bread. winch has the same sense. that is to say.CHAP. m proposition. f oth bcins c nnected wi hout the mind s perceiving this cliange of object. but are not signified ex pressly by the words thing present.-. They make a thousand useless efforts to prove that the apostles when Jesus Christ showed them the We . and Erected their attention to it by the term hoc.A ^ i has occasioned all the perplexity of the ministers. provided it be true thaHhe apostles conceived that what Jesus Christ called ill this but establish it. that even when they undertake to prove that the term tins signifies bread. you know to be bread Who tllat the terms you know to be bread are clearly added to the words. thing present. since this IV signified by consequently. term never sig anything but a confused idea. say the ministers.VOKDS.1 j_l j * _ T does not It require comuch to show this &quot. and not expressed by it. if they had in their minds a d tinct idea of bread. and on this point we may say that i ey conceived. ^ - s that the term Bigon . for this is impossible. could not have con ceived anything but bread.gt. but they had it as an idea added to that confused idea. by an incidental proposition. says a minister who poke last on the subject. but how they conceived it. this which you know to be bread. grant that they fllM PAn^Oi \rr* Kv. But what matter is it. the word bread is clearly added to he woid tins. XV.] TO THOSE SIGNIFIED BY . nor. This word.-n. ^ MW P** ^ * ^^ * ^ srr*^^ ^ . proposition. they did not have it as the hoc. that this dis tinction is so indubitable. the/do notht Tlle ra by tir n what follows SnTl S? ?li i But l . that the word ^signifies expressly bread. J thc precise idea of a!Ud S the di&tinct Meas nify breUd winch tlfp P added t0 lf rcmains alw s a Pble of 1 . . SU Chrf8t affinSed f that f the apostles had only to cut off the ideas which .. only signifies t/ns thfnglrebut this thing present which sent. .

when treating of unity of confusion in subjects. to have two different terminations. . [PART I.96 IDEAS WHICH THE MIND ADDS. and they would conceive simply that it was the body of Jesus Christ. with the attribute body of Jesus Christ. they had made by the distinct idea of bread. would connect the word hoc. that this thing Thus they present was now the body of Jesus Christ. by an incidental proposition. who caused this subject. and at the end of the proposition. and detaining the same idea of thing present. but from the change effected by Jesus Christ. this. The attribute body of Jesus Christ would oblige them indeed to remove the added ideas. they would conceive after the proposition of Jesus Christ was finished. but it would not make any change in the idea precisely de noted by the word hoc. which arose not from the ob scurity of the terms. hoc. Here is seen all the mystery of this proposition. which they had joined to bread. ETC. at the commencement. as we shall explain in the Second Book.

some use to the end which logic contemplates that of thinking well to understand the dif ferent uses of the sounds which are devoted to the expres- Now. CHAPTER I. and verbs. As it is our design to explain here the various reflections which men have made on their judgments. whether that knowledge be special to it. which are principally nouns. CONTAINING THE REFLECTIONS WHICH MEN HAVE MADE ON THEIR JUDGMENTS. or whether it be common also to other arts and sciences which contribute to it.SECOND PART. pronouns. It is of little importance to examine whether it belongs to grammar or to logic to treat of these things . that everything which is of use to the end of any art. it is enough to say. it is necessary to begin with the explanation of these parts. it is certainly of F . OF WORDS IN THEIR RELATION TO PROPOSITIONS. and as these judgments are propositions which are composed of various parts. belongs to it.

we conceive modes without connecting them with any subject. It will be here the place of nouns. the subject. that it scarcely conceives the one without the other . And. at the same time. and which the mind accustomed to connect so thoroughly. or Those which signify modes marking. which are essential. are called NOUNS ADJECTIVE. are principally of three kinds. they then subsist in some sort by themselves. We may say. as human. judging. the substantive humanity. and since that which passes there may be reduced to conceiving.98 WORDS IN RELATION TO PROPOSITIONS. Thus. so that the idea of the thine/ excites the idea of the sound. and verbs. in general. taking away from these adjectives formed from nouns of substance. colour. of our thoughts being. been invented for this purpose. and of which it will be sufficient to These are nouns. TIVE. by mental abstraction. sun. we form from the adjective human. they are made substantives anew. which take speak. necessary to explain this more in detail. but in a different way. as good. that of the thing. OP NOUNS. and those which have . and. the words which express it in this relation become adjectives. reasoning. . comes to be conceived in relation to another subject. and the idea of sound. their relation to these. Those which signify things are called NOUNS SUBSTAN The objects said. the words set apart to signify both things and modes are called nouns. and disposing. on this subject. either things. This these since is why when. as we have already modes of things. pronouns. however. after having formed from the substantive word homo (homme). the adjective human. as wis dom. as we have already said words serve to indicate all these operations. sion of ourideas. that WORDS are sounds distinct signs to express and what articulate. carnal. in the mind they are expressed by a substantive word. as earth. when that which is of itself the substance of a thing. whiteness. just. when men have taken as passes in their mind . on the contrary. of which they are the modes round. is [PART II.

gt. milul! &quot.&quot. si by henou^ &quot.i&quot. tint thev iro tllou 8 . Men perceiving that it was often useless and ungraceful to . Tl&quot. . at were the no un vel &quot.. i. ct&^SS-SSSS OF PROXOL NS.&amp.&quot.CHAP. h S ...J DIPFEBENT K they denote the n r 8nce a for SllbJ cct - But the reason why 7 they the y bclon S onlytoa single subject.lt. a be!ns joined OF DIFFERENT KINDS OF PRONOUNS. present them.l P^no-ns &quot.f me nS3 8S iswVnoincon emence 7 &quot..&amp.! pa-ceives.. Se lvere &quot.

thou. quod who. ego (moi.100 WORDS IN RELATION TO PROPOSITIONS. which they have called the pronoun of the second person. but there is this specially in the neuter of these pronouns. that of the pronoun. the thing name spoken of. sibi. ilia. It has this in common. in order that they might not be obliged to repeat the names of other persons and things of which they speak. the signification of which thing. nevertheless. when it is taken absolutely. they have thought good to denote him by a word. and confused. Thus. that it takes the place of a noun. illud. while. and confused hoc erat in votis. that called reciprocal. that is to say. which. je). . illud. because they denote the relation of a thing to itself. and that of the word negotium. without a noun expressed kinds are often. . there are some which point out. as we already said. as the pronoun sui. as with a finger. se Cato slew himself. &c. on the contrary. which OF THE RELATIVE PRONOUN. that is to that whereas the other say. Romanis : i^ *ter. denote only confusedly ilium ^irantem fiammas. is yet another pronoun which is called relative gut. that the proposition into which it enters may be made part of the subject. introduced the pronoun of the first per son to supply the place of him who speaks. [PART II. which they. themselves. h(KC res. It lias this peculiar. and are hence there are also called demonstratives hie. iste this. they have invented pro nouns of the third person ille. some which are mon All the pronouns have. there confused. is al ways is also general. and some thing peculiar to itself. indeed almost always. related to distinct ideas. that. that is to say ilium Ajacem : : : His ego ^vtas rerum nee tempora ponam. or predicate of a propo- There guce. hoc negotium erat in votis : hoc erat alma parens. hoc. Among these. or you . this in com they mark confusedly the noun whose place they occupy . is always related to a word generally. . and excites a confused idea. And in order that they may not be obliged to name the person to whom they spoke. This relative pronoun has something in common with the other pronouns. is a double confusion in the neuter to wit. that is to say. .

when Cicero says. was not the Christ.) hence. which to is. / say a thing which is. leaning. with the attribute contained in the word answered. which has led some able men to say. sition. thing objected conobscurely.-Johnan^l qmd ttbi objicio quod hominem is. We is : What folly is rarely. is then particularised by the incilental proposition. of God woo and thus form one of those added or i which we shall speak more at L iS (We presume good. connected by the quod quod hominem seived before . in . may. which signifies futi respondent. I. take in A/on who would make ft an which the Latins somethe same sense as our that ^^f^t (que] ^.CHAP. positions. appears here with much less truth. Non tibi objicio quod hominem spoliwsti. Ihe term I my causes us at once to conceive confusedly a tiling said. pronoun. The other use. however. say. The same thing may be remarked in these questions r 1 suppose that you will be wise I say that you are icronn. We the same- spohasti. subject and predicate z^**%r* til Y \ V he r nnes though S verb and appears to be related to nothing s Pilatesaid in Jesus Christ. for. the quod refers to the confused idea of a thing objected termed by the word and that oljido. in that proposition. Tnere are some a rd meaning explained. in saying that Jolm answered. and say that. In retains it without it in this case. thus. But the truth more than the teas not the spoliasti. theil . and it is to this con tused idea of answer that this that refers. able to resolve this question the precise of the word that when meaning it place W h cre are. that it here also.] TIIE RELATIVE PRONOUX. says Cicero word that (quod) is nothin. retains the office of connecting another proposition. -the world WHICH is visible here that these terms. we understand that he made an answer. that this that was entirely snp^ the way. And. and it preserve. John answered that he that the relative Christ. that it is to this thing said that the that refer* is to say. to wit. the that place of the noun.

gt. in a confused manner. the noun TOVTO eo-Ti TO fiov TO vrrea vfitav 8(o/iez/oi&amp. : . because. being specially designed to avoid the distinct repetition of the same word. for / suppose means. to which we have referred above. that as the relative pronoun. in trans this lating it.102 WORDS IN RELATION TO PROPOSITIONS. qui. / suppose.ov. he who says. it joins. but an article this is my body. so that this con fused representation. that though the article occupies the place of the noun.. St Luke. and the relative. ought to be translated. notwithstanding. 6. of a pronoun and the only difference there is between the article. so also the article. which is offensive.ei&amp. for it is certain. a separate proposition.cov for you. WHICH is given for you. the. . we in some sort destroy the end of the article. gives a confused idea of a thing supposed . there is not a relative pronoun. and the that refers. given and not which is given for you . TO. in taking the place of the noun. though joined to the first o SiSorat.gt. says St Luke. only represents it in a con fused manner. when it is cro&amp. the attribute which follows it to the noun which precedes . with the attribute following. uayia. employed in this manner. the same way.gt. From this use of the article. represents to the mind the Thus it has the office body. suppose that. / make a supposition . for the r6. quod datur. 17. and that the passage is not properly translated when we express it in these terms : This is my body. my body given for you or. / make a supposition which We may fj. quce. to translate the text thus This is my body . quod. place in the TO. and not 6 Imep v^mv 8c8oTai. quod datum est. This pretension is founded solely on the imperfect man ner in which that author has penetrated into the true nature of the relative pronoun. that to this idea of thing supposed that is to say. in the Greek text. it is / is. TO vnep vp. rank of pronouns the Greek placed after. [PART II. is. by an express repetition of the same word article./za . we may judge that there is little solidity in the remark which has been lately made by a minister on the manner in which these words of the evangelist. that is to say. but the relative makes. it is absolutely necessary. in order to express the force of this article. He maintains that di86p. 6. the body given for you. only represents confusedly the noun to which it refers . and of the article . instead of before.

and becomes the subject of a new o proposition : quo&amp. necessarily obliged to use the we have no right to condemn the first in choosing the second. in truth. is II.] TIIE VRB&amp. from a little book printed some time ago. ^ the article beino. - we of representing the noun only in a confused manner. when we translate it by the relative pronoun. But one or the other. which we have explained in a different way but in regard to the verb. we shall merely transcribe what he has .intro this repetition is } my body my whereas. duced for the express purpose of avoiding body given for you. which would seem less essential. which Avoulcl have other. quod. with the exception of some points. SCOTCH. virep inSa. as that author professed to do by his the article. OF THE VERB. CHAPTER II. divides it somewhat more. contrary to the nature of the is lations. of which that author treats in his 13th chapter.gt.. is Thus. my body yiveu far yon. and the This w mi/ given for you. . neither of these trans bod//. is .gt. under the title of a General Grammar. and thus of not presenting the same image to the mind twiceand fail only to preserve another.CHAP. This my which body. which preserves that confused signification. if we arc been avoided by remark. WE have borrowed thus far what we have said of nouns and pronouns. the one quite perfect changing the confused signification of the article to a si mfication distinct. qm. separating the sentence into two propositions by means of the relative pronoun. that the article so takes the place of the noun that the adjective which is connected with it does not make a new preposition TO trip l^ v 8t86^ vov whereas the relative pronoun. article. preserve that essential condition of the which article.

which also signify affirmation. in which the verb is distinguished from other nouns. and at certain times for. as when I say lives. to denote that the discourse in which the word is employed is the discourse of a man who not only con ceives things. as those of But this is done entreating. as affirmans. which is the principal man ner of our thoughts. and thus we shall con sider the verb. being alive. Petrus vivit. but there is only the verb to be. said. it is employed also to express other movements of the mind. so that constitute a proposition. diversity of verbs in every language. which we call substantive. affirmatio. whereas. the attribute of the same thing to say. through the whole of this chapter. is. And herein properly consists that which we call verb. Peter because the Avord vivit contains in itself the affirmation. only by the inflection of the mood. and thus they do not denote that he who employs these words affirms. which is that which it has in the indicative mood. I. as men naturally come to abbreviate their expressions. thus it it is and besides this.&quot. as Hence has arisen the great to say. which has re mained in this simplicity. I said that the principal use of the verb was to signify affirmation. there are joined almost always to the affirmation other significations in a single word. commanding. . desiring. Peter lives. but only that he conceives an affirmation. which may denote affirmation. to say. as we shall come to see further on. in its prin cipal signification alone. since it [PART II. &quot. They have when two words joined that of some attribute. have not less need to invent words says he. because these signify it only so far as through a reflection of the it becomes an object of our thoughts. the principal use of which is to express affirmation. has only remained so in the third person present.1 04 NOUNS IN RELATION TO PROPOSITIONS. be mind cause. According to this. than to invent those which may denote the objects of our thoughts&quot. if men had is . to it. which is nothing else than a word. and even it. &c. but who judges and affirms of them. properly speaking. appears to us that nothing can be added &quot. we may say that the verb of itself ought to have no other use than that of marking the connection which we make in our mind be tween the two terms of the proposition . that is Men. Peter is alive.

added significations. because they have not considered it in relation to that tion. in certain cases. as we have said. expressing actions or passions. a word having various inflections with times and persons. The diversity of these significations has prevented many persons. Julius Caesar Scaliger thought that he had found out a and passions. commonly found in all verbs. consists in the significations. which are accidental Thus Aristotle. hence arises the difference of is I am living. having added the second. to wit. and which we always express in our language (je suis I am a man. II. may make a complete proposi tion. qua verb. which is called substantive. which is the subject of this proposi tion. the subject of the proposition. cum tempora. that. defined it vox signijicans. tion and the already in the first person they contain also the subject. so that then two words. as when I say sum homo. as when I say vico. komme). 105 been satisfied with giving to the verb the general signifi cation of affirmation. et -persona. not in relation to the present time. as Buxtorf. which persons. as cainasti. the action of supping. dwelling on the third of it. a single word even. I am sitting. sedes. so that a single word. which is affirma but according to other relations. and considering that the attributes which men have joined to the affirmation in a single word. have believed that the essence of the verb And finally. indeed. A single word. and. but to the past. since sum ex presses not only affirmation. common to all verbs. have de fined it. They have also added a relation to the time in re gard to which we affirm. which also is. from clearly understanding the nature of the verb. a word which is significant with time. signifies that I affirm of him to whom I speak. ibr the most part. vox flezilis cum tempora. are commonly actions . t which is essential to it. II. and hence arises the diversity of times. They have further joined to it. added to that which is essential to the verb. each language would have needed only a single verb.] THE VERB. III. without joining to it any particular attribute.CHAP. two words. and bein^. Others stopping at the first of these. otherwise very able. these verbs contain in themselves both the affirma attribute. but includes the signification of the pronoun ego. Others.

and of the future. and that. than the verbs whence they are derived . alget. And . nevertheless. sufficiently proves this. those of active verbs do not signify actions less. in saying that the distinction of things. for there are verbs which signify neither actions nor passions. nor to it alone. in his book on the Principles of the Latin lan guage. &c. calet. cum persona. what passes away. for it is certain that participles are true nouns. which is. since they are of the present. was the true origin of the distinction between nouns and verbs the office of nouns being to express what remains and verbs. and those which pass away. and do not express the true nature of the verb. mystery. neque soli. passions less. in changing the verb into a participle . quiescit. especially in Greek . tepet. existit. more or less. as viret. only a difference. which passes away. in this point of view. according to the definition of Scaliger. of the past. that they belong neither to the whole thing defined. and those of passives. To which we may add. nor that frigit. into those which remain. against the two first definitions of the verb. that the vocative is a true second person. that it does not express affirmation . that all these definitions are false. and not with out reason. in permanentes et fluentes. they have the two great vices of a definition. except by being joined to a verb . which signify actions and passions. between the vocative and the verb. that is to say. cum tempo-re. The two last are still worse . But it may be easily seen. And thus the essential reason why a participle is not a verb is this. and those who believe. The manner in which the two first are conceived. that the participles also signify time. neque omni. albet. there are words which are not verbs. whence it happens that it cannot make a proposition which it is the property of the verb to do. claret. and even things which pass away. and there is no reason at all for maintaining that flucns does not signify a thing which passes away. especially when it has a different termination from the nominative. will hold that there is on that. by that being restored to it which had been taken away. but only what its signification is connected with. since it is not said what the verb signifies.106 WORDS IN RELATION TO PROPOSITIONS. as well as fluit. [PART II.

whence it appears. without any difference of persons or of times. verb. that (le boire. it would still.at once both the affirmation and the attribute rubensthe participle signifies simply red. signifying redness. et temporis. It ought.] for T1IK VERK Peter lives is how is it that Petrus vivit and that Petrus vwens Peter livinos r unless you add est to itPetnis est vivensPQ te r is livinexcept because the affirmation which is contained in vicl had been taken away in order to make the participle vivens. the whole is than its part . inus the verb.CHAP. while the infinitive is a noun substantive. as est. without any affirmation. in the same way as troni candidus is made candor. word which time. that the infinitive. is a signifies affirmation. and diversity of times by adverbs. and no verb which does not denote it. and from white comes whiteihus the verb rubet expresses is red. therefore. all bodu is divisible. that the participles are nouns adjective. its onlv vox synificans ajfirmationema word widen signifies affirmation. always marking affirmation. is the case in the propositions which philosophers term those of eterir. in relation to what is essential to it. nevertheless have been a true verb. these are in relation to all times. to be laid down as established. to eat-is then different n the participles in this. and without fixing the atten tion of the mind on any diversity of persons. i a drink. we may 3 it thus vox significant affirmationem cum designation persona nuinen. made by abstraction of that adjective. the word est greater signifies. : word denoting affirmation which is not a verb. God ts infinite. le manff er)-to noun. H. or not a verb On which you may further remark. at least the indicative .l truth: as. so that the diversity of persons be denoted only by nouns and pronouns. we say onsidermg simply what is true definition is essential in the verb. that the presence or m a word is that which constitutes it a absence of affirmation. As. and rubere is taken for a noun. by the way. in fact. includiu. which is as when very often a tion. affirma tion alone without any relation to because find For we can no But if in the definition of the verb its principal accidents. that if one had een invented. and it is unquestionable.a word which signifies affirma- we wish to include . simply.

AFTER having conceived these ideas together . AND OF FOUR KINDS OF PROPOSITIONS. affirmat is the same thing as est affirmans . et temporis. being united to verbs. in so far as they differ from the substantive verb. number. by the particles non. that since affirmation. things through ideas. contains an affirmation. we may define them as follows vox significans affirmationem ali: cujus attributi a word desionatione persona?. whether this be oneself or another. in passing. and it then makes my affirmation. the af The firmation which I conceive and attribute to Peter. this verb signifies two affirmations. and time . however. for the It is. on the contrary. no body is indivisible. still necessary to remark. verb nego. not. together cum with the determination ofperson. but some of them negations. yet. or the judgment I make touching Peter. : CHAPTER OF III. as in the verb affirmo. which denotes the affirmation of some attribute. finding that some agree together. Petrus affirmat. or by words involving mdlus.. WHAT IS MEANT BY A PROPOSITION. and a conceived. no one. number. we compare and. and affirmans. of which one regards the person who speaks. change them from affirmative to negative no man is immortal . may remark. [PART II. and the other the person who is spoken of. same reason. which belongs specially to the substantive verb. nemo none. For when I say. with the designation of person. . WHAT IS MEANT BY A PROPOSITION. by the union which men have made of the affirmation with certain attributes. as We may also be the attribute of the verb. nevertheless. and time. numeri. that verbs only signify of the negations being expressed themselves affirmations. negation. which. that though all our judgments are not affirmations.108 tion. For in relation to the other verbs.

h ist^:^s ^ alon not sufficient to coceze these two tm.CHAP. oiu iu word.^ . as in tion is C/imtianus..%i ... IC &quot. . which is contained in num. vet. we^ tree things. d.. 1 say.. J oinci1 t the most being. Whence it ap- bum especially in Latin. . for/ means the subject ^. But though every proposition contains ._ L JAi CIJ and second persons of the verb. necessarily mese Y these ) that is to s p rj - S 1S 8 &quot.. for the subject of this procyo.-is \ i.] WJIAT Ig M and that others do not which is called affirm!ay It is the verb u..

expressed or understood as. whatever it may And hence it is that be. the proposition is called particular. it is called singular. But though this singular proposition may be different from the universal. said in the First Part. are three propositions. is a fool. . for this very reason. or common.110 WHAT IS MEANT BY A PROPOSITION. as. or universal. by their nature. But there from their is subject. as some man. it For it matters so far as the universality of a proposition is concerned. none. which is. that every proposition is affirmative or negative. some poor men are not unhappy. since it is then re stricted by the indeterminate word some. the whole is taken entire. which. as. pears. for negation Or according to an indeterminate part of their extension. nullus. some. when the common term is taken according to an indeterminate part only of its extension. nevertheless. or singular. and that this is denoted by the verb which is affirmed or denied. [pART II. No vicious man is happy. veni. Louis XIII. which is taken in all its extension. to be referred to it. rather than to the parti cular . by joining them : . thus. from this. that it is singular. some men or others. For terms. when there is joined to them aliquis. And universal terms may be taken according to to universal signs. called universal. some cruel men are cowards. provided that. as when I say. propositions are . . that in that language a single word makes a pro position in the first and second persons of verbs. as. in that its subject is not common. which constitutes the a universal from the particular. attribute. We see. took Rochette. Every impious man or negative. another difference of propositions which arises which is according as this is universal. for affirmation all men. whether it affirms. And whether affirmative. omnis. as we have already particular. already contain the affirmation with the vici. and which distinguishes little. Whence arises a remarkable difference of propositions for when the subject of a proposition is a com mon term. essence of proposition. it ought. whether its subject be great or small. since it is necessarily taken in all its extension. according to the custom of languages. are either singular. . all. their whole extension. or whether it denies. vidi. And if the subject of a proposition is singular. no man. as.

/ is mea thl aJV-mtaon or negation..] WIIAT IS MEA aflirmative: man is a E. It is customary to call the universality or particularity of propositions their quantity. . Hi. again. and in the same way. Universal negative as. according to their matter true and And it is clear that there are false.CHAP. things true 6 JUd ment S Cmif rmCd t0 Uth and Sse iTis not so conformed s 1 J since we are often in want . since every proposHion denoting the judgment which we form of &quot.^tr appear to us true but whose truth is not so evident as tofree us from nil en 1 &1Se r Whidl 7 to u* i. The following two remembering of those verses have been : made for the better Propositions are divided. Asserit 1. which depends on the veib . ise. negat O. E and quality. articular negative r : m : as.gt. vcrum ^cncralitor ambo. Assent A. sod particulariter ambo. Some men {&quot.w of a proposition 1 hus and in A mto t wS aLT fZ lt V Se ^ &quot. ? ! P : . and differ ic conhng to quantity. but of whose I falsity we are not certainly * ure These are the propositions which we caa and the E agree quantity. No vicious man is ho Ul affim tive ^. fT ^ * probable. Besides those propositions CCrtahll rUe and those * -PP-r rer there are others which Jrtamly false. e which are notdther true or false. By ^alit. of IMit o recognise true and false.rich. Some vicious men are not rich. ne-at E. and differ according to and so also with I and O. But A and I ((yrce according to quality.nd this is regarded as tlio&amp.

not true that every man This is so clear that it would only be ob is an animal.112 THE OPPOSITION BETWEEN PROPOSITIONS [PART II. when they are particular. no man is an animal. some man is not sinless. different kinds of propositions. both in quantity and quality. no man is If they differ in quantity free from sin. they are then called contraries. Contraries can never be both true. and the same attribute. some man is sinless. E. it cannot be true that some man is not an ani mal and if. inquire now what agreement or disagreement 0. some man is not an animal. when we make from the same subject. We said there are four sorts of propositions A. they have together. we may easily determine 1st. and if one is For if it is true that every man is an animal. That contradictories are never either true or false to gether. consequently. but they may be often both false. as In con some man is an animal. scured by further explanation. and agree in quality. as an animal. alone. according to their truth or falsehood. WE have I. some man is an ani mal. A every man is A And if they differ in quality. as every man is an animal. they are called subalterns. on the contrary. every man is an animal. And it is easy to see that this opposition can be only of three kinds. no man is sinless. but if one is true the other is false . as I. This is what is called opposition. when they are universal. they are called contradictories. Contraries. some man is not an animal. it is true that some man is not an animal. OF THE OPPOSITION BETWEEN PROPOSITIONS HAVING THE SAME SUBJECT AND ATTRIBUTE. Sub-contraries. or sub-contraries. it is. and agree in quantity. false the other is true. and E 0. For if it is true that every . O. and E 1. For if propositions are opposed. though one of the three is divided into two others. CHAPTER IV. They can not be true because the conti adictories would be true. sidering these opposed propositions. . 2d.

for it does not follow. With m?rrf sub-contrary.CHAP. fP sed * 0M man toCe 6 the affirmation n tions . and not to another and . IIe ce the man is just . n ne O te P~P08il&amp. there may be just men. But they cannot for if lt otherwise the contradictories wouW be both were false tlmt some men were it wou d at - just. the con. it is still more false that n^is ov false t/f e ti . Hence it they . - it ^t may it is m just. &quot. as these. though J all of be lolk true.gt. the falsehood of parti culars mvolves the falsehood of universal*. 8 WaW T mV ^ ^ a. Wlwhich C 7/ ^^ ^ ^e animal8 &quot.gt.&quot. but the tl l^/ir&quot. and on the contrary. some is just some man ls not because justice just.gt.7 f the to hei-e are e |ons follows that which these subalteniate many cases proposiare both true. f I^T* * ? o tl . and others in which are both *&amp. both false. may belong part of men. thus may are not just. 113 is f isc that s me ?.] HAVING THE SAME SUBJECT AND ATTRIBUTE. is the ff 1VCS that of thc Particulars. by consequence. because L Itruethat tlth of ^ SraT? T ^0 1 ^^ &quot. m(m ** 7 * still &amp. T T man 1S P? rticulara for although JUSt U does not foll() .&amp.gt.^ ? ^wis is not any equentsTf true Z animal. 4th. and for another in 1 nmi the other.lt.? 18 &quot. since false . ? truth of the particulars does not involve that of the umversals. for if it is false that some man is sinless. &amp. Contoadlctol and . #o Part hf V C?iai e ^ subalterns. IV.^ Which S is &quot. there larS &quot..

come from the Lord&quot. attribute. are called compound. of good and evil. [PART II. OF THOSE WHICH ARE COMPLEX IN THE SUBJECT. But before explaining these compound propositions. Those. which are. which have. there are many propositions which have. it must be remarked there are some which appear to be so. BUT MAY BE CALLED COMPLEX. CHAPTER V. is affirmed. whose property it is to join propositions so that they compose only one. only one subject ject. being joined by the relative together u-ho. two propositions. Now. He that doth the will Thus when Jesus Christ says. or attribute. two subjects. shall enter into the king dom of heaven. to wit. pro perly. therefore. but as they are joined together by whd. AND WHICH ARE NOT SO. poverty and riches. simple . are called simple. as when I say Good and evil. subject alone. ivhich. containing other pro positions. OF SIMPLE AND COMPOUND PROPOSITIONS THAT THERE ARE SOME SIMPLE PROPOSITIONS WHICH APPEAR COMPOUND.114 SIMPLE AND COMPOUND PROPOSITION S. only one subject and one attribute. &c. which constitute only a part of the subject. of my Father which is in heaven. since I affirm equally of the one and of the other that they come . properly. but of many. jj j WE ject and have said that every proposition ought to have a sub an attribute but it does not hence follow that it may not have more than one attribute. the subject of this proposition contains pronoun many &quot. come from the Lord. that attribute.&quot. which may be called incidental. nevertheless. not of one &quot. or attribute. life and death. OR IN THE ATTRIBUTE. they constitute only a part of the subject whereas. since it comprehends two verbs . and those which have more than one subject. but whose sub a complex term. is and one attribute. for the simplicity of a proposition is derived from the unity of subject and attri bute. from God. . when I say good and evil come from the Lord there is. or more than one .

ib&amp. Beatus ille The Ut prisca gens mortaliuin Solutus omni fcenore. -d hmg to T^MM* God .(te r &amp. temost generous of kings. and that he was the of Darius. 115 hiCh UlVe be en P ade bef rc &quot.hth we .gt.CHAP. and last proposition the rest the subject.Ct ju b t then only conceive as simple ideas. tails on the subject when the subject a complex term. for it create. Whence it hin idifferCnt WhethCT WG erCnt &quot. on the most generous of all kings. as in this proposition^^ man who fears thing is a king : the king is he who fears nothing.gt. And thus it is with reason.gt.gt. it must be remarked that these complex proposi tions may be of two kinds. by participles with verbs. pronoun. both that he was the most generous of all kings. V. in either case. and of Alexander.as the most generous of all kings. - - ? &amp. it is clear that I y Alexander.] SIMPLE AND COMPOUND IMPOSITIONS. but. con But if I were to say Alexander was hJ!Xfi should affirm _ ^^nqmror of equal r ^ att&amp. complex*. the quered Darius.tse pr on r positions by adjective nouns or b nouns.gt. supposing each as de clared before. the most qenerous of of Darius. suis. or that Alexander w-. And.. while the others may be termed complex propositions Again. that theseconqueror last kind ot propositions are called compound propositions. that he conquered Darius. conceived asinvisiblt that created the visMe world. rny principal aim is not to aflirm that God is invisible. I affirm of God. Mh r also on ^ ie f rm &amp. conquered Darius who &quot. that is to say.l done 1st. beatu* . Paterna rura bobus cxercet For the verb is is is understood in this all the attribute. qui procul negotiis. conceived as generous. for the complexity may fall either on the matter the of proposition. and without the relative prongs ( vl which ) or with verbs and the relative tti: &quot.

either by saying Brutus killed no one. Brutus kitted a tyrant. and suppose the other. If I say. must be particularly noticed here. two propositions. The complexity a complex term : falls on the is attribute when the attri bute is as. and he whom he killed was a tyrant whence it happens that this proposition may be contradicted in two ways. in some sort. or by saying that he wlwm lie killed was not a tyrant. as the we shall notice more compound arguments. and contain. it . et egressus silvis. qui quondam. Lavinia venit Littora. The three first verses and a part of the fourth compose the subject of this proposition. that is. in relation to their matter. who the great who oppress the poor will be is the protector of the oppressed. when these kinds of propositions enter into argument. this means Brutus killed some one. that all propo sitions compounded of active verbs and their objects. parerent arva colono Gratum opus agricolis et nunc horrentia Martis Arma virumque cano. Sometimes the complexity falls upon both the subject and the attribute each being a complex term. Trojse qui primus ab oris . may be called complex. for example. These are the three ways according to which proposi tions may be complex. 3d. as in this pro : position God. by changing the active into the passive. : Italiam. which often makes it necessary to reduce these arguments to a more natural form. Sum pius ^Eneas fama super sethera notus. viciria coegi Tit quamvis avido. But It is very important to notice this. the rest of it composes the attribute. in order that the part which is proved may be expressed directly. gracili modulatus avena Carmen. we sometimes prove only one part of them. which arise at length in treating of from these complex propositions.116 2d. Piety a good which renders man happy in the greatest adversity. [PART II. and the affirmation is contained in the verb cano. . because. in relation to their subject and attribute. fato profugus. Ille punished by ego. SIMPLE AND COMPOUND PROPOSITIONS.

as . which is. as maybe seen in the first example. which constitute part of the subject. BUT on before the negation there are several important remarks to be made on the nature of incidental propositions. the attribute of the incidental proposition is affirmed of the subject to which the who refers. that is to say. the attribute of the incidental proposition is not properly affirmed of the sub ject to which the who refers .. and in all its extension : as in the first who are created to know and to love example- First. Ine other which may be called determinatives. men u-ho are pious. on the or affirmation falls have already seen that incidental 1st. the rest signification of as in the second example. W V Part nU8 J remember llc ^ men who aTpi^ : an incidental propo- what was said in change mm God if.] THE NATURE OF INCIDENTAL PROPOSITION. Accord we may say there is a who ingly explicative. when the addition T Chapter ?4 T T MIL. for after it. away the term men. is taking 10 &quot. having said. when the who is explicative. because what is added to a term does not belong to a term in all its extension. so that we may sub stitute the subject even for who. or. propositions are those whose subject is the relative who . of those which are complex acto the matter. although this may be only incidentally of the whole proposition. one which may be called that of simple apKeatb*. men were created to know and love God.CHAP. because that which is added agrees with it generally. for we may say. But when the who is determinative. men who are created to know and love God. 1 ] 7 CHAPTER VI. but restricts and determines the effects no in the idea of the term. OF THE NATURE OF INCIDENTAL PROPOSITIONS WHICH FORM PART OF COMPLEX PROPOSITIONS. men .-that the addition of complex terms was of two kinds. and a who determinative Aow. or the attribute. cording speaking of propositions whose complexity form. VI. To ted to We know and to love God.

according to which it is understood. that . for this would be to affirm the word pious of men . and making them a total idea. and that thus it may be considered as united with it. The ivhich. we sition is. position which is general. and that afterwards it may be examined with what agrees with them in relation to this union. as of being maintained by dif ferent men. being composed of many parts. cannot. who men be we were to substitute the word for who. This proposition has for attributes un worthy of a philosopher. is the whole indicates and the subject to complex term. and thus there may be found in it the divers incidental propositions. and the iclio or This will be seen better by which of another. to that which affirms that the sovereign ticular. There are often terms which are doubly or trebly complex. explicative. is unworthy of a philosopher. substitute the word which for the word doctrine. doctrine singular and individual. this which refers. without absurdity. whence it happens. which ivas taught by Epicurus. connecting the idea of pious with that of men. the in doctrine which places the sovereign good bodily pleasure. doctrine places the sove The second incidental propo reign good in bodily pleasure. in saying men are pious. which contains two inci the first is. the proposition would false. for it determines the word doctrine. men who are pious are charitable. good of men that is found in bodily pleasure. judges that the attribute charitable agrees to that total idea . The doctrine which places the sovereign good in bodily pleasure. II. each of which is in itself complex . Thus the subject is a complex term. at least in this particular point. an example.118 THE NATURE OP INCIDENTAL PROPOSITIONS [PART are pious are charitable. or of any men in par they are pious . as men but in saying. saying. capable of various accidents. but the mind. and this is why the which the . and all the rest for subject. although it is determined in itself to be always taken in the same sense. in this incidental pro good in bodily pleasure. which which ivas taught by Epicurus. ivhich places the sovereign dental propositions. is determinative. and thus all the judgment which is expressed in the incidental proposition is solely that by which our mind judges that the idea of pious is not incompatible with that of men. we do not affirm of men in general. 2d. and of various kinds who or which of one may be determinative.

taught * pronoun - ^ . since all this will not enable him to judge whether the Gazette were true or false. as for January 1662. and when it is determined by an idea tinc and though not expressed l-kcn there a winch is joined to the word. this utd If a man said to me. is false I should be sure that he had something in his mind beyond what these terms express. and that hence it must be that he had in his mind some distinct and particular news. wluch he judged contrary to truth. I am assured 1 e t^kinff did not leave the word king in its general idea. &quot.&amp. &2s ~ creave we for must is determinative O1 attention to the meaning a eanng on of the ons speaker than to the simple expression here are often complex terms which often pay more (^ ^) less complex. *. in general. an individual and distinct Uea. as in the mouth of a Frenchman the word ang signifies Louis XIV. fur the what passed in Paris. for kin. VI. manifest absurdity in connecting the attribute in its a rule that following enable us to judge when a common tern remains Tn general idea. may its : vM ^ the subject gew-al idea. Sex hoc Jhi impe^Mt commanded me to do such a thing.CHAP. But the is di&quot. can give no particular command rwmmng particular. by a man.lt. appear iIcon or for a part of tl Twhich pL u~e mustMieve thathe who did not leave that subject in its general idea propo^on it said ii I hear Thus. than they really are. the relating to &quot. of the second incidental ^ .] FO R M1NG PABT OF proposition. which determines it to signify only a single thing \V e have said that this commonly appeared from cir cumstances.Brussels Gazette&quot. Uth of .

prin that it is a great error to maintain that the soul is composed of atoms . since the quality of falseness cannot belong to a doctrine. had said that the Icing had made a hundred knights of the of the So also. which is. which contrary to truth.gt. as being of such an author. without distinctly expressing what that doctrine is. is false. have said may enable us to resolve a celebrated which is. if that Gazette&quot.120 THE FALSITY THAT MAY BE MET WITH &quot. as that the doctrine of Lu cretius touching the nature of the soul is false. affirmations. doctrine of such a philosopher. which regards truth in itself. is false. Whether falsehood is to le found only in question. when any one says that the doctrine of such a philosopher is false. OF THE FALSITY THAT MAY BE MET WITH IN COMPLEX TERMS AND INCIDENTAL PROPOSITIONS. CHAPTER VII. it does not also enter into ideas propositions. because there a truth which is in things in relation to the mind of . which regards only a point of history. [PART II. one. . judgments which are made And thus these kinds of propositions such an necessarily resolve themselves into the following such an author. So that these judgments involve always two even when they are not distinctly expressed ciple. instance. incidental. : l&amp. the other. in the opinions of philosophers. or whether and simple terms ? is WHAT we I speak of falsehood rather than of truth. which is that error was taught by Lucretius. but only as being such an opinion in particular order of the Holy Ghost.y ly Lucretius. It must necessa form these kinds of judgments have in rily be that those who their minds a distinct and particular opinion under the general term. the opinion which was taught was taught opinion that our soul is composed of atoms.

: proposition . who was the son nf Philip : I affirm of Alexander. and that which is incidentally connected with it. does not prevent it being true. The titles which are commonly given to certain dignitaries dignities. however. this better by considering in detail two sorts of complex terms. which are important. although incidentally. 2d. the attribute of the principal proposition be related to the incidental proposi tion. in one of which the who is ex in the other. Alexander. consequently. or whether they do not but falsehood can only be in relation to the mind of man. affirmation of the principal proposition falls only on Alex ander. Thus. since here the attribute of the incidental proposition is affirmed of the subject to which the relative refers. plicative need not wonder that falsehood is to be found in the first kind of complex terms. whether men think it. there is falsehood in this. That the falsehood of the incidental proposition does not commonly affect the truth of the principal for We We shall understand . the son of Philip. true in a sense understood. example. ? We reply but this does not secure that there shall not be sometimes falsehood.CHAP. which judges falsely that a thing is that which it is not. 121 . either expressed or is which commonly no. God. If. VII. since it is enough for this that there be some judgment and affirmation. was the grandson ofAmyntas. must be remarked here 1st. may be given to all those who possess these though that which is signified by the title may not belong to them at all. because formerly the . determinative. conquered the Persians. It is asked. though false. whether this falseness is only found in propositions and in judgments . in this case only would the false hood of the incidental proposition make the principal proposition false. This proposition ought to be considered true. that he was the son of Philip and. Alexander. or to some mind subject to error. J IX COMPLEX TERMS. that Alexander conquered the Persians. as if I were to say. not in simple ideas but in complex terms. though Alexander be not the son of Philip since the . who was the son of Philip. if it be not so. But two or three things. Alexander. ETC. then.

chaste pontiff. in general. as Baronius allows and yet those who should call him very holy could not be accused of falsehood. and of very holy. though false. was given to all bishops. gives the title of very excellent to Festus. or simply. although they may propositions. or according to popular error. therefore.. they are not susceptible of false hood. Gassendi. a very So much touching the first kind of incidental proposi which the relative (ii ho. as a man who is pioiis. believes that there was a void in nature. The case is different when a man is the author of the title which he gives to another. did not hesitate to bestow that name on Donatist bishops : although they knew well that holiness could not belong to a schismatic bishop. in only have done this by incidental John XII. was neither holy. or very pious. in the Council of Carthage. but for himself alone for we may then. and which he gives to him. with justice. not according to the opinion of others. 3d. where the relative is determina it tive. were great . since the attribute of the incidental proposition is is . and we cannot be accused of it in giving to him another which belongs to him still less in truth. we might dispute with such a man the quality which he wished to bestow on Gassendi. Aristotle. impute to him the falsehood of these proposi tions. be accused of dental proposition. the prince ofphilosophers. ordained such a thing. We see also that Paul. we see that the Catholic bishops. Thus. In relation to the others. tions. certain that. ofphilosophers.122 title THE FALSITY THAT MAY BE MET WITH [PART II. kings who love their people. in the Acts. falsehood in giving to the same person a title which does not belong to him. governor of Judea. and those who called him very chaste. in this. the common opinion. when a man says. believed that the origin of the nerves was in the heart. we ought not to tell him that this is false. for it is enough that he followed. who is the prime* Sanctissimus Petillianus dixit. nor pious. For example. as if they were to say. and make him responsible for the falsehood which we might maintain was to be found in that inci He may. because that was the title commonly given to these governors. John XII. because Aristotle is not the best of philosophers . But if any one said. of holy. liars. . ivho was the most able of philosophers. the pope. is explicative. chaste. u hich)..

as if. that. this . incidental propositions ought to be reckoned hold that such false. affirmation. 123 not affirmed of the subject to which the relative refers. are round. taken for the principle of thought. Thus. it is striving . for. that of a substance another idea which of a substance extended. that there is any judge in the world say. for example. we consider body. doubts. they is this. the idea of square and round being incompatible I with the idea of mind. which pens. we believed never belonged to it. as when and that it our soul must fill a space as the body does. which leads us through error. it often hap thinks. the subject to which the who refers. having the idea of a is we often join to incompatible with it. although.CHAP. I believe agreement. we mingle insensibly with it something we imagine that the idea of a substance extended. in the Tenth had no parts. error of those who believe the soul this subject by St see an excellent discourse on may Book of the Trinity. VII. wills. we When. to attribute to this idea that which in ourselves two ideas. it compatible. Minds which. of which thinks. We shows that there plexes is nothing which may of the soul. We may even from it number of errors spring say that a greater thing. that jucljes who never do any are worthy of praise. for example. knows. ETC. but they join to what it is. who has attained to that perfection nevertheless I believe that there is always in these propositions a tacit or virtual not of the actual agreement of the attribute with . And if have reason to hold that there may be falsehood we shall it were in these incidental propositions. but of its possible an error be committed here. finding which could not exist if it exclusively to the to be mortal. wishing to diiu with that which they may know without satisfied which thinks. For if we say.] IN COMPLEX TERMS. we do not thing by request or favour on that account. where he Augustine. on the other hand. easily than the nature be known more But that which per are not know it. that it is a substance men not. things which belong arisen the impious body and hence has . and that is a substance that when we consider our soul. that which some of those forms through which they imagine it under are accustomed to conceive of corporeal things. are square are more solid titan those which said.

they rail against him.124 COMPLEX PROPOSITIONS IN PvELATION TO [PART II. or the attri bute. nor thought anything about it and imagine that there is in us anything . . is a complex term. that it is nature which is striving to get rid of that which offends it and of a thousand other things especially in our body. all-wise. of plants. which regard only the form of the proposition. that nature wishes to do this or that. which is incompatible with his goodness. as though he had done them wrong in laying upon them the evils which they suffer. they conceive him cruel and unjust. and as the sovereign ruler of all the world. though we are well assured that we have not willed it. that they seek the nourishment which is proper for them of the crisis of a malady. CHAPTER VIII.WHICH PHILOSOPHERS CALL Modals. at the same time. because they have incidental terms. OF COMPLEX PROPOSITIONS IN RELATION TO AFFIRMATION AND NEGATION. which seeks the other. AND OF A SPECIES OF THESE KINDS OF PROPOSITIONS &quot. and all-good. I believe that it is to this mixture we may attribute all the complaints which men make against God . for it would be impossible to murmur against God if we conceived of him truly as he is all-powerful. that is to . or propositions. conceiving of him as all-powerful. BESIDE the propositions of which the subject. it is ridiculous to else beside ourselves which knows what one and avoids the is suitable or hurtful. attribute to him all the evils which happen to them. . there are others which are com plex. And since. very great difficulty in consequence of mingling Avith it some thing of the idea of that which thinks. Avhich leads us to say of heavy bodies. But wicked men. they incline towards a centre . wherein they are right.

OHAP.

VIII.]

AFFIRMATION AND NEGATION.

125

which is expressed by / maintain that the earth is round the verb as, if I say, I maintain is only an incidental proposition, which must be a part of something in the principal proposition. Yet, it is clear that it makes no part either of the subject or the
say, the affirmation, or negation,
:

and they it makes no change in them at all would be conceived in precisely the same way, if I said,
attribute, for
;

And thus it can belong only to simply, the earth is round. the affirmation, which is expressed in two ways, the one, which is the usual, by the verb is, the earth is round, and the other more expressly by the verb I maintain.
In the same way,
is

when

it is

said,

/ dent/

that

it is

true,

it

-not

true

;

supports
convince

its
-us

or when we add in a proposition that which the reasons of astronomy truth as when I say that the sun, is much larger than the earth ; for
:

part is only a support of the affirmation. nevertheless, important to notice that there are some of these kinds of propositions which are ambiguous, and which may be differently taken, according to the de all philosophers sign of him who utters them as if I say, assure us that heavy things fall doicnwards of themselves.
that
first
is,

It

:

If

my design is to show that heavy things fall downwards of themselves, the first part of this proposition would be incidental, and would serve only to support the affirmation of the last part but if, on the contrary, my design is merely to express this as the opinion of philosophers, without affirm ing it myself, then the first part will be the principal propo sition, and the last would be only a part of the attribute. For what I should affirm would not be that heavy things fall and themselves, but simply, that all philosophers maintain this it is clear that these two different ways of taking this same proposition, so change it, that it constitutes two different
;
:

>>f

propositions

which have altogether

different

meanings.

generally easy to determine by the context which For example, if, after of these two senses we are to take. having uttered that proposition, I were to add now stones it would be clear that I had taken it in the first are heavy but if, on sense, and the first part was only incidental noic this is an error, the contrary, I were to conclude thus and, consequently, it is possible that an error may be taught ly it would be manifest that I had taken all -philosophers

But

it is

;

126
it

COMPLEX PROPOSITIONS.

[PART

II.

was the

in the second sense, that is to say, that the first part principal proposition, and that the second was

only part of the attribute.
these complex propositions, where the complexity on the verb, and not on the subject or the attribute, philosophers have specially noticed those which have been called modals, because the affirmation or negation has been qualified in them by one of these four modes, possible, con And, since each mode may be tingent, impossible, necessary.
falls

Of

affirmed or denied, as it is impossible, it is not impossible, and, in both respects, may be joined by a proposition, affirmative, or negative, as, the earth is round, the earth is not round each mode may have four propositions, and, the four together, sixteen, which have been denoted by these four words: Purpurea, Iliace, Amabimus, Edentnli, the whole mystery of which is, that each syllable denotes one of the four modes. First possible.

Second contingent. Third impossible. Fourth necessary.
the vowel which is found in each syllable, which is A, or E, or I, or U, points out whether the mode ought to be affirmed or denied, and whether the proposi tion which is termed dictum ought to be affirmed or denied in that way.
either

And

A. The affirmation of the mode, and the affirmation of the proposition. E. The affirmation of the mode, and the negation of the proposition. The negation of the mode, and the affirmation of I. the proposition. U. The negation of the mode, and the negation of the
proposition.
It

would only be

loss of
it is

easily be found ; Purpurea answers to

may
E,

A of

time to bring examples which only necessary to observe, that

Amabimus

to

I,

Edentuli to

complex propositions, Iliace to U; and that thus if we

CHAP. IX.]

COMPOUND PROPOSITIONS.

found a wish our examples to be true, we must, having which may be urn take iov purpurea an attribute subject, for illace one winch may be univer versally affirmed of it; that may be particu denied of it for amabwus one sally that may 1 of it; and for edcntuli one
;

affirmed larly it. particularly denied of But whatever attribute

may

be taken,

it is

always true

that all the four propositions all the rest are the same sense, so that one being true,

for the

same word have only

CHAPTER

IX.

PROPOSITIONS. OF DIFFERENT KINDS OF COMPOUND

WE

have already said that compound propositions double subject, or a double atti those which have either a the one where Now. of these there are two kinds, butc and the other where is denoted expressly
?he composition which logicians have, for this re* it is more concealed,
called expombles, since they

are

need

to

be expounde.

emay
and

reduce those of the

first

kind to

Copulativ*[and disjunctives,
diseretives.

conditionals

and

six species.causals, rel

COPULATIVES.

which contain either several an affirmative several attributes, united by subjects, or is to say, by and, or neither, negative conjunction, that same effect as and, since produces the which falls on the verb, and fies and, and a negation, which it joins as, i 1 say, on the union of the two words and rides do not render a man happy-

We

call copulatives those

1<

31

-f^

:

knowledye

128

COMPOUND PROPOSITIONS.

[PART

II.

much

unite knowledge to riches, in affirming of both that they do not render a man happy, as if I said know ledge and riches render a man vain. We may distinguish three kinds of these propositions.
1st,

When

they have several

subjects.

Mors et vita in manibus linguae. Death and life are in the power of the tongue.
2d,

When

Auream

they have several attributes. quisquis mediocritatem

Diligit, tutus, caret dbsoleti

Sordibus tecti, caret invidenda Sobrius aula.

He who

loves moderation, which is desirable in all things, lives neither sordidly nor superbly.

Sperat infaustis^ metuit secundis Alteram sortem, bene prosperat urn

A
3d,
butes.

Pectus. well regulated mind hopes for prosperity in adver sity, and fears adversity in prosperity.

When

they have several

subjects

and

several

attri

Non domus

etfundus, non ceris acervus Aegroto Domini deduxit corpore felres,

et

auri,

Non animo

curas.

Neither houses, nor lands, nor the greatest heaps of gold and silver, can chase away fevers from the body, or cares from the mind of their possessors.
truth of these propositions depends on the truth of thus, if I say faith and a good life are neces This is true, because both are sary to salvation. necessary ; but if I said, good life and riches are necessary to salvation,

The

both parts

:

would be false, since, although good life thus necessary, riches are not. Propositions which are considered as negative and con tradictory, in relation to the copulatives, and to all the other compound ones, are not all those in which negations are found, but only those in which the negation falls on
this proposition
is

CHAP. IX.]
;

DISJUNCTIVES.

129

the conjunction and this happens in different ways, as by Non enirn placing the not at the top of the proposition amas et deserts, says St Augustine, that is to say, you must not believe you love any one when you desert him. For it is in the same way we render a proposition con tradictory, the contradictory, or copulative, by expressly denying the conjunction: as when we say it cannot be that a thing should be, at the same time, this and that.

That we cannot be in love, and be wise. A mare ct sapere vix Deo conceditur. That love and majesty do not agree together.

Non
ct

be tie conocniunt, ncc in

una sede moruntur,

/ttitjtstos

amor.

DISJUNCTIVES.
Disjunctives are of great service, and are those into (7, or, enters:

which the disjunctive conjunction,

A

Friendship either finds friends equal, or renders them so. Amicitia pares aut accipit, autfacit. woman loves or hates there is no medium. Aut amat aut odlt mulier; niliil cst tertium. He who lives in utter solitude is either a beast or an
;

angel (says Aristotle). Men act only through interest, or through fear. The earth moves round the sun, or the sun round the
earth.

Every

deliberate action

is

either

good or

evil.

The truth of these propositions depends on the necessary opposition of the parts, which ought to admit of no medium. But as, in order to be necessarily true, they must admit of
none at all, it suffices that they do not ordinarily admit of Hence it any, in order to be considered as morally true. is absolutely true that an action done deliberately is good or bad, since theologians prove that there are none which are indifferent but when it is said that men act only through interest, or through fear, it is not absolutely true, since there are some who act from neither of these passions,
;

130

COMPOUND PROPOSITIONS.

[PART
all

II.

but from consideration of their duty: and thus

the

truth which it contains is, that these are the two motives which influence the majority of men. The propositions which are contradictory to the dis junctives are those in which we deny the truth of the disjunction ; which is done in Latin by putting the nega tion at the beginning, as in all the other compound pro
positions
:

Non
is

omnis actio

est

bona vel mala ; and in our
is

language, It

not true that every action

either

good or lad.

CONDITIONALS.
Conditionals are those which have two parts united by the condition if, whereof the first that contains the con dition is called the antecedent, and the other the consequent. If the soul is spiritual, is the antecedent, it is immortal, is

the consequent.
immediate.

This consequence is sometimes mediate, and sometimes It is mediate only when there is nothing in the terms of either part which binds them together, as when I
say
:

If the earth is immoveable, the sun turns round. If God is just, sinners will be punished. These consequences are very good, since the two parts, having no common term, are connected together only

by that which

is

in the

mind, and which

is

not expressed

;

that the earth and the sun, being found continually in different situations with regard to each other, it necessarily
follows, that if one is

immoveable, the other moves.
is

When
be,
1st,

the consequence

immediate,

it

must generally

Either when the two parts have the same subject If death is a passage to a happier life, it is desirable. If you have failed to nourish the poor, you have destroyed
:

them.

Si

non

pavisti, occidisti.

2d,

Or when they have

the same attribute

:

CHAP. IX.]
If all

CONDITIONALS
trials from

CAUSALS.
to us,

God

should be dear

to be so. Afflictions ought

3d,

Or when
:

the attribute of the

first

part

is

the subject

of the second

I/ patience

be

a

virtue,
virtues.

There are painful

4th, Or, lastly, when the subject attribute of the second, which can only be

of the

first

when

part is the the second

part

is

negative

:

If all

true Christians live according to the Gospel,

There are few true Christians.
the consider, in relation to these propositions, only were truth of the consequence; for although both parts if the consequence of one or the other false, nevertheless, is conditional, is true. is good, the proposition, so far as it as is capable of preventing tht If the will of the creature
:

We

God

absolute will of God from being accomplished, is not almighty.

as negative or contradictory to Propositions considered are those only in which the condition is the conditionals, in Latin by placing tl itdenied, which is accomplished at the beginning negation Non, si miserum fortuna Sinonem
:

But

Finxit, van urn etiam mendacemque improba finget. in our language we express these contradictions by

although,

and a negation

:

If you

eat of the forbidden fruit, you shall die. Although you should eat of the forbidden fruit,

you

Khali

not die.

Or equally well bidden fruit ye shall

by
die.

It

is

not

true,

that if ye eat

of the for

CAUSALS.
eonCausals are those which contain two propositions

132

COMPOUND PROPOSITIONS.
or

[PART
ut, to
tJie

II.

nected by a causal particle, quia, because,
that
:

end

Wo

to

the rich, because

they have their comfort in this

world.

The wicked are
height, their

exalted, in order that, fallingfrom

a greater

downfal may be greater. Tolluntur in altum,

Ut
They are

lapsu graviore ruant. are able.

able, because they believe they

Possunt quia posse videntur. Such a prince was unhappy, because he was born under a certain constellation. We may also reduce to these kinds of propositions those

which are Man,

called reduplicatives : as man, is reasonable.

Kings, as kings, depend on

God

only.
it is

For the truth of these

propositions,

necessary that

one of the parts be the cause of the other, which makes it also necessary that both be true for that which is false but both parts may is not a cause, and has not a cause be true, and yet the causal connection false, because it is enough for this, that one of the parts be not the cause of the other. Thus a prince may have been unfortunate, and may have been born under such a constellation, while it may still be false that he was unhappy because he was born under that constellation.
;

;

Hence

properly in the other
:

the contradictories of these propositions consist this, that we deny the one to be the cause of
ideo infelix, quia sub hoc natus sidere.

Non

RELATIVES.
Relatives are those which involve comparison and some
relation
:

Where

the treasure
lives,

is,

there the heart

is

also.

As a man

so he dies.

tories. and we contradict them by denying the relation It is not true. Ca luin non animum mutant qui trans mare currunt.CHAP. though both the parts were true. pour perfumes on Jesus Christ. and not upon knowledge. denoting by the particles xed. The truth depends on the justness of the relation. but. DISCRETIVES those in which we make different judgments. are valued in the world in proportion to your wealth. Happiness depends neither upon riches nor knowledge. so he dies. . quantum habeas. Happiness depends upon riches and knowledge. Fortune may take away wealth. as if it Happiness does not depend on riches but know : We may ledge. but it cannot take away Et mild virtue. them: as. or others like these. contradict this proposition in all these ways Happiness depends on riches. It is not true that we are valued in the world in pro : portion to our fortune. non me rebus submittere conor. tauten. nevertheless. They who The cross the seas change only the country. a proposition of this kind would be ridiculous if there was no opposition between two parts. truth of this sort of proposition depends on the and the separation that is made between them .] RELATIVES DISCRETIVES. 153 You Tantl es. that as a man lives. non potest animum. I try to place myself above circumstances. not the disposition. res. if I said to Judas was a dalene A and yet lie would not suffer Mag thief. for. not to be the slave of them. IX. proposition of this sort may have many contradic were said upon. expressed or understood Are that difference : Fortuna opes auferre.

Thus we see that copulatives are the contradictories to the discretives. Hoc unum scio quod ni/til scio. and that it agrees with that subject only. THERE tion is are other compound propositions whose composi more concealed. these we may reduce to the four : following kinds paratives. in French. reliqua utcnda. and that they are. . said the Academics. solus fruendus. Exclusives. Exceptives. EXCLUSIVES. riches Nobilitas sola est atque unica virtus. and there is only obscurity and uncertainty in everything else. CHAPTER X. for his Deus That is to say. which denotes that it agrees with no others . we ought to love God and to love other things for God s sake. 1. consequently. Virtue alone is true nobility. which will remain with you are those which you have freely given away. It is certain that there is nothing certain. Com Inceptives. or Desitives. call exclusives those which indicate that the attribute agrees with the subject. This is expressed by the word alone. Quas dederis solas own sake. 2. [PART II. 3. 1. whence.134 PROPOSITIONS COMPOUND IN MEANING. compound in meaning. it follows that they contain two different judgments. il n y a) God alone is worthy of being loved We for his own sake. 4. OP PROPOSITIONS WHICH ARE COMPOUND IN MEANING. The only semper habelis opes. for these two last propositions are copu latives. or some other like it (or.

was contradicted differently by and the Pyrrhonists . although thus that verse of \ irgi exclusion may not be expressed : in which the exclusion is denoted . That birth confers nobility. true nobility. 3d. a the Druids had opinions touching the nature of though from other nations. for the Dogmatists op Dogmatists that it was doubly false. Druids held the truth in relation to the gods. that there are propositions the of this kind which are exclusives in sense. Either you know the gods. of the Academics. X. since Thus. that maxim posed there are by maintaining with the utmost many things which we know and that thus it was not true that we were cer certainty.] EXCLUSIVES. even uncertain whether in what Lucian Hence. single subject that it agrees with something Id. 2. These propositions are contradicted in three ways . for a contrary reason. It may be maintained . there were nothing certain. that virtue alone is Thus. Ant soils neseire datum est. 3. Both may be maintained. and the Pyrrhonists also said tain of knowing nothing that it was that it was false. they were not less in God different . speaking of the Druids. them. or that they since different errors may be held only were in error for. else. while all besides are ignor ant of them while all others know Or. it. that it is certain that the there is nothing certain. denied that what is said to agree with a 1st. error than other nations. That birth confers nobility as well as ^virtue. gives these disjunctive propositions composed of two exclusives : Solis nosse dcos. et cceli numina vobis. That virtue alone does not confer nobility. against we may say 1.CHAP. . and not virtue. al touching the nature of God. It may be does not agree with it at all. is. it might easily happen.. What is more remarkable. viz. this sentence. for. there is a defect of judgment since it was not necessary that the said of the Druids. 135 Lucian. you are ignorant of them.

what reward do si tales Seneca in his Troad. second. vi. EXCEPTIVES. although. 7. Quce seminaverit homo. Thus glorietur 2 ought Corinthians. none : as if he had 2. It is. and thus renders these propositions compound in sense as when I say None of the ancient philosophers. to under stand exclusions. in Latin. Ephes. Galat.136 PROPOSITIONS COMPOUND IN MEANING. Si diligitis eos qui vos diligunt. except the Platonists. x. judgments. let him dem glory in the Lord alone. avaricious man does no good. unum baptisma. m . one faith. to be translated Qui gloriatur : in domine He who glories. Matt. Nullas habet spes Troja. to which we show. : corporeal. quam merce- A habebitis ? If you love those only you deserve ? who love you. iv. Avarus The nisi cum moritur. however. The safety of the vanquished is to look for none. First. This means two recognised the spirituality of God. so that there are often passages which cannot be translated in all their force. much more common. una fides. 17. in Latin. except by dying. man shall reap only that which he has sown. happily translated by this French verse. and one baptism. that this does not belong. If Troy has only said Si tantum this hope. 46. 5. There is only one Lord. habet. v. the exclusion may not be expressed. Le salut des vaincus est de n en point attendre. Unus Dominus. that the ancient philosophers believed God things. by which the exclusion is understood. it has tales habet. with the exception of certain inferiors of that subject. hil recte facit. licec et metet. whole Exceptives are those in which we affirm a thing of a subject. [PART II. Una solus Has been metis nullam sperare salutem. by some exceptive par This clearly involves two ticles. that the Platonists believed the con trary.

and thus these kinds of propositions are compound in sense. Nemo Iceditur nisi a seipso. We often produce more impression. We have no evil. A niicum perdere. who were not fools. may be contradicted in the same way By maintaining that the wise fool as well as other man of the Stoics was a 2. all men are truly fools. COMPARATIVES. Ridiculum acri maynas plerumque secat res. except by compar ing himself with those who are more happy. 137 Et miser nemo. said the Stoics. so that it is always very easy expressed to change them reciprocally from the one to the other .] EXCEPTIVES riisi COMPARATIVES. argument. by a little agreeable raillery. 1. by Fortius ac melius . It must be remarked that the exclusive and the inceptive so speak.CHAP. except what we do to ourselves Except the wise man. besides their wise man. contain two judg Propositions in which we compare since it is one tiling to say that a thing is such. than another . Imperitus. men. The est damnorum maximum. if we may somewhat differently. was affirming that the wise man of the Stoics and that other men were not. No These propositions as the exclusives. and ments. and thus we see that exceptive proposition of Terence nihil rectum putat. one thinks himself miserable. By a fool. comparatus. even in most im than portant matters. By maintaining that there were others. is greatest of all losses the loss of a friend. Cornelius Gallus into that exclusive has been 3. nisi quod ipsefacit. changed by Hoc tantum rectum quodfacit ipse putat. another thing to say that it is more or less such. only the same thing propositions are. X. 3.

in another way by the Peripatetics . maxim and other evils. with a stone about his neck. was contradicted in one way by the Stoics. than strength.138 PROPOSITIONS COMPOUND IN MEANING. Better are the blows of a friend than the treacherous kisses of an enemy. than to scandalize the ter to live least of the faithful. must be but custom is : habitare cum dracone. quam cum muliere litigiosa. It is better that a man be cast into the sea. we may say that a good is better than an evil. It is bet with a dragon than with a quarrelsome woman. in these propositions. it is necessary to suppose that two things are good. : Whether always necessary. were much greater whereas. since we see that the Scriptures employ the word better. the Stoics would not even acknowledge pain to be an evil. before we can say that it is It appears at first that this opposed to it. but maintained that vices. The reason of this usage is that a larger good is better than a smaller one. so far were they from admitting that it was the greatest of all evils. for the same reason. since the diminution of evil. et vir prudens qvam fortis. and if. patient man is better than a proud one. that the positive or the comparative belong to both members of the comparison . for instance. melior est paA. : These propositions that as. And we may also say that a smaller evil is better than a larger evil. [PART II. may be contradicted in many ways that pain is the greatest of of Epicurus. holding the place of good among evils. because there is more of goodness in it than a smaller good. There is a question which may be here discussed. melius est is one better than the other. that which is . not only in compar ing together two things which are good melior est sapienWisdom is better tia quam vires. And even in comparing two evils together. tiens arrogante. But also in comparing a good with an evil. though with less propriety. Now. and the prudent man than the strong man. viz. for the Peripatetics allowed that pain was an evil. and all evils. And in the Gospel. Meliora sunt vulnera amid quoin fraudulenta oscula inimici. so . irregularities of the mind. because it has more of goodness in it than that which has none.

ergo meliora piis. should therefore avoid the unnecessary embarrassment which arises in the heat of debate. non qida. how same way. But St Augustine. Si enim vos probabilius. bad has more of his kind of goodness than that which worse. profcrre spmas et tribute*. says that Father. When we has say that a thing commenced or ceased to . for the fire. auget non quod ante dictum est. IXCEPTIVES OR DESITIVES.CHAP. quasi nudis lamaqui discissos ac non potius magna mala bant dentibus artus. supra du-erat. in writing against St Augustine.] less is INCEPTIVES OF DESITIVES. from wrangling on these forms of speech. mala tantis bonis contraria. Cresconius that he might conclude from these Avords that St gined Donatists had ground to re Augustine allowed that the the Catholics. having said _ was accursed. bona says that Father. et sed macjis qula mala erant ut illis devitatis meliora cligerent And then hoc cst. nos We proach nam yradus iste quod ante positiun eat ergo probabiliter. he showed him. et ultionem mereri. than the Donatists had to reproach ima traditionem nos vobis pmbabiUus objicimus. because he wishes a bet themselves with ter fortune to good people : Dii meliora piis. and among others. says he. since he might. books. as was done by a Donatist grammarian named Cresconius. ^ first refuted that vain subtilety by examples from the that passage in the epistle Scriptures. erroremque hostilms ilium Discissos nudis laiiiabant dentibus artus . from the most celebrated authors of in the false this consequence was. . that that to the Hebrews. that to saint having said that the Catholics had more reason with having abandoned the sacred reproach the Donatists the Catholics. conjidimus fit only autem de vobis fratres carissimi bona ilia erant qua meliora. optarent. reproach Virgil with having reckoned as a good a disease which leads men to tear thing the violence of their own teeth. adds. 4. improbat. his art. X. in which St Paul. Quomodo essent istis. and ground which bore only thorns.

from that simple negation. on the exception. exceptives. ceased common in Italy. fifth GENERAL REFLECTIONS. Thus some are contradicted last. because it might be believed. tradicted it by maintaining the is still that the use of points contrary. later than the i. The Jews did not begin to use points for marking the vowels until Jive hundred years after Christ. that when we deny them simply. though falsely. and it were ways.140 PROPOSITIONS COMPOUND IN MEANING. according to either of their relations to the two different times.. the other. to be to from disuse their ancient characters. &c. 2. knowing the probity of a judge. on the change denoted by the words of beginning and of ending. the other desitives. without any further explanation. and they are so like that it is more to the purpose to consider them as only one species. Epicurus alone placed in it the chief good . the negation falls naturally on the exclusion. but that he believes that he was not alone that told him he denied this simply. what the thing was before the time of which we speak. which the captivity of are those now called the Samaritan. if.e. if without adding anything else. These propositions may be contradicted. by saying century. may ex be contradicted in several it is nevertheless true. tvhich are 1. that the Jews always used points. The Latin language for Jive hundred years. Although we have showed that the propositions clusive. at least for their books. Babylon. has. one. we form two judgments. Hence. on the com parison. and that these were kept in the temple and others con . that he still allowed that Epicurus had indeed placed the sovereign good in bodily pleasure. what it is after. after the return and treat of them together. The Jews commenced. by maintaining. . are compound in sense. [PART II. In the same way. it would not fully express his opinion. and thus these propositions of which the one class is called inceptives. be such. if a man believes that Epicurus did not place the chief good in bodily pleasure. in that opinion.

and the last the attribute. doubtless a defect in common logic. to discriminate necessary to exercise judgment in order these things in with the subject many and propositions.gt. aliquis. or of morals.CHAP. and it is to . . no one could not justly reply to them without ex plaining himself in relation to both.] OBSERVATIONS FOR DISCOVERING. or of other sciences. since the no would signify that he did not sell it now. Nevertheless all this leads astray very often. which is often very different from is IT study which they are fashioned in the world. CHAPTER XL OBSERVATIONS FOR THE PURPOSE OF DISCOVERING THE SUBJECT AND THE ATTRIBUTE IN CERTAIN PROPOSITIONS EXPRESSED IN AN UNUSUAL MANNER. Hence it may be seen that there are some propositions which it would be unjust to demand that any one should answer simply by yes or no. that of which ice affirm. I could not simply reply by saying no. bute. as they involve two senses. except that the one is the first term and of universality and particu and the other the last there is in the one omnis or nulltia. some. We will commence the sense attribute. none. only as they follow the order and in the arrangement according to which they are fashioned that according schools. that those who it are accustomed to find out the nature of proposi tions or reasonings. in first is always whatever order they may be found. XI. but would leave it to be inferred. for the the subject. and in books whether of eloquence. Thus we have scarcely any other idea of subject and attri of a proposition. to The sole and the true consider l&amp. 141 any one should ask me if lie sold justice still. rule is.y and that which we affirm. since. (til or larity. ETC. at the same time. except that and in the other. that I allowed that he had formerly sold it.

from which I may conclude that we ought to honour Louis XIV. So also in these verses. It is often necessary to change the active verb into the passive. e. at first sight. in St Paul.142 OBSERVATIONS FOR DISCOVERING. that in those complex propositions. It is dis in which it is graceful to be a slave of one s passions . Pietas cum sufficientia est qucestus magnus. that turpe. and the rest the subject. are propositions very common in It is hail our language ft is foolish to listen to flatterers . and obsequi libidini that of which we affirm. also. the true order will be. i. proposition. Kings ought to be honoured Eeges sunt honorandi . in order to obtain the true subject of that principal For it is clear that. the subject. in which the first part and the last are the principal. my principal intention in the major is to affirm something. and we have already seen that we can sometimes only judge by the sequel of the discourse. in addition to what we have already said. what we disgraceful. The following. the subject of the conclusion. although. plain from the sense. Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas . and Louis XIV. and. each appears to be only a part of the attribute. et inexorabile fatum Subjecit pedibus strepitumque Acherontis avari Felix is the attribute. is king. in such propositions. we may further remark. properly. is that which we affirm. But. and. which is the principal proposition. consequently. cum svfficientia . whence it follows that kings is the subject of the major. and the intention of the author. reasoning thus. Est qucestus magnus pietas. the attribute . The subject and the attribute are often still more cult to discover in . Atque metus omnes. disgraceful. Thus nothing more : common in Latin than such propositions as these Turpe est obsequi libidini. diffi complex propositions . only an incidental proposi tion. us to XIV. as in the major and the conclusion of the following reasoning : God commands us Louis to honour kings. declare to be So again. and which the inci dental. as in this very example. there is [PART II. : . and thus what I say of the Divine command is. confirming this affirmation. consequently. ETC. Therefore God commands honour Louis XIV.

143 Now the which falls It is a God who has redeemed iis. they nevertheless in their ordinary speech. in order to add here a of what is called subject in propositions. them ference between them. since it belongs to logic. and all these examples are to have adverted to this now we ought to judge by the sense. but which. when there does not appear any sensible dif principally. placing the subject before the attribute. It is. them in their sense proves to us. XII. be not deceived by considering syllogisms as that we for vicious which are in reality very good ones since.] CONFUSED SUBJECTS. to the rules when they are exactly think they arc contrary conformed to them. may find a place here. we want of discriminating the subject and the attribute. that when two or more things which have some resemblance succeed each other in the same place. . embracing tinguish them the them under a common idea. WHICH ARE EQUIVALENT TO TWO to understand better the nature important. and their subject at the end. CHAPTER OF CONFUSED SUBJECTS SUBJECTS. universal in where there all is propositions which . that in order to arrange we natural order. and not but to show that This advice is very necessary. and. but. commence with is. by the order of the words. although men may distinguish do not dis in speaking metaphysically.CHAP. that they have their attribute at which It is sufficient mencement. is hail That u-hich : And falls this is almost it afterwards found a the com or that. To listen to flatterers is folly must express them thus He v:ho has redeemed us is God. which does not exhibit . works remark which has been made in more important IT is than this. XII.

And when it afterwards forms propositions about it. though we are assured. was turbid two days ago. Augustus said that he had found the city of Rome of brick. of a church. to which it attributes these two qualities being of brick at one time. The body of this animal was composed ten years ago of certain parts of matter. . Thus. and had left it of marble. of a town. that the same term is taken for different subjects We . and at What are these towns. while it is impossible it could be the same water. in the same way we say at such a time. they speak of them as if they were the same thing. that at the end of a few years there remains no part of the matter which at first composed them and not only do we speak of them as the same body. whereas often that air which we feel cold is not the same as that which we find warm. but we do so also when we reflect expressly on the subject. that it was destroyed and rebuilt at such another time. This water. for example. and churches. and speak of them. What. and of marble at another.144 difference. nevertheless. says Seneca. which are destroyed at one time. manet idem fluminis nomen. that another time of marble? . as if it were the same. as being always the same. and rebuilt at another ? Is the Some of brick the same as No but the mind. . these mansions. and when it says. which was at one time of brick. is this Some. For common language allows us to say. in this different application. There appears to be some contradiction in speaking thus for if the parts were altogether different. It is true but we speak of it. then. CONFUSED SUBJECTS WHICH ARE [PART II. behold. now it is clear as crystal. and denotes only what they have in common. from being cold. and. true is. never theless we consider the air which surrounds us as being always the same and we say that. in speaking of a river. the Some of marble ? forms to itself a certain confused idea of Some. then is it not the same body. though we change the air every moment. become warm. nevertheless. it has . we also say. consider the bodies of animals. . In idem flumen bis non descendirmis. And what renders these propositions as of the same body. aqua transmissa est. of a mansion. and now it is composed of parts altogether different. without reflecting what we say.

in the form of an incidental pro Thus. which is perfectly clear. two. if we said of a church which had been burned and rebuilt this church was burned ten years ago. that which is bread at this moment is m// body at this other moment and since the mind supplies all that is not expressed. was marble when he died. we could not reasonably say there was any difficulty in understanding this proposition. which it expresses by this. which prevents the mind from perceiving the distinction of these subjects. of the First Part. the being bread at one moment. there is no difficulty in the proposition.] EQUIVALENT TO TWO SUBJECTS. and only unity of confusion. the common idea of a chm ch. as we should never think of saying it was a proposition very perplexed. having formed of that church burned and rebuilt. XII. which are really distinct. the mind adds thereto the clear and distinct ideas obtained from the senses. and very difficult to be understood. when Jesus Christ pronounced the word position. ferent moments. since it is only an abridgment of this other proposition. and has been rebuilt in a twelve month in the same way. the precise idea formed by the pronoun remaining con fused. which is really twofold. 14o Rome. but united under the confused idea of Rome. It is by this means that the author of the book from which we borrowed this remark has cleared up the affected perplexity which the ministers delight to find in that pro this is mil body which no one would ever find. when we used the demonstrative pronoun hoc to denote something which is presented to our senses. nevertheless. the word Rome. that irhich is bread at this moment is my bod// at this other It is true that it is not the same this in these dif moment. taken in the sense of the Catholics. it gives to that confused idea two attributes. attributes to that object. Hence it follows that. For. which appears to be only one subject. denotes. just as. as the burned church and the rebuilt church arc not really the same church but the mind con ceiving the bread and the body of Jesus Christ under the common idea of a present object. which was brick before the time of Augustus. As we have remarked at the end .CHAP. which cannot belong to the same subject. . this is mi/ bod//. position following the light of common sense. and the body of Jesus Christ at another.

obstinately maintain that the words of Jesus Christ cannot bear a catholic sense. is so also. which which might be alleged equally against these propositions: this church was burned at such a time. ETC. it is not out of place to show here. this is my body. reasonable. and rebuilt at such another time and that they must all be disintricated through this way of conceiving many separate subjects under a single idea. without any notice being taken by the mind of this transition from one . and conformed to the common language of all mankind. for it is not enough to show that a proposi tion may be taken in a certain sense. And as to the difficulty proposed by the ministers. we do not here profess to decide the import ant question touching the way in which we ought to understand these words. subject to another. when Christ said that it was his body. which diminishes nothing of the idea. they conceived that this was his body at that moment. briefly. the minds of the apostles added to it. but it ought to be proved that it must be so taken.146 CONFUSED SUBJECTS. this ivhich is bread at this moment is my body at this other moment . that the catholic sense has in it nothing but what is clear. After all. tlm formed also this idea. which is bread. But as there are some ministers who. formed in them that total pro position. since it belongs equally to the extended proposi tion other this moment it is is bread at this moment is my body at this and the abridged proposition this is my body clear that it is no better than a frivolous wrangling. and thus the word this ivhich is bread at this moment. they made. whether in a figurative or in a literal sense . on the principles of a false logic. and this expression being clear. In the same way. and as they conceived that it was bread at that moment. [PART II. the abridgment of the proposition. Thus the expression. the addition of time. this. . also. that the same thing cannot be bread and the body of Jesus Christ. which occasions the same term to be sometimes taken for one term and sometimes for another.

as these propositions are not so general as to ad mit of no exceptions. that he was a liar and an evil beast. venires pigri. strictly from them. young people are inconstant. 1st OBSERVATION. ever// when it is perfect without exception. ut plurimum. mala? bestice. as it could not be inferred of each Cretan in particular. since in moral things is sufficient and approves of: Cretenses semper mendaccs. touching the universality and particu larity of propositions. the conclusion may be false. Or. must distinguish between two which may be called meta We call universality. the other moral. apostle : says : Omnes quce sua sunt non quce Jesu-Christi . WE may make some observations of the like kind. For. as. common aphorisms : praise past times. the nunquam desistant. when it it admits of some excep that things are generally such. although the apostle approves . as Horace says Omnibus hoc vitium est cantoribus. Or. that which St Paul quotes tion. XIII. Injussi Or. what the same qucerunt. And universality. We lands of universality. in all such propositions. inter amicos Ut nunquam inducant animum cantare rogati. physical. OTHER OBSERVATIONS FOR THE PURPOSE OF FINDING OUT WHETHER PROPOSITIONS ARE UNIVERSAL OR PARTICULAR. the one. and we ought not to conclude anything all old people That That That all all women love to talk. and equally important.] PROPOSITIONS-UNIVERSAL OR PARTICULAR. as. metaphysical. which admits of no exception.CHAP. man is living. It is enough. that the thing be commonly so. moral. 147 CHAPTER XIII.

as is the case with those who are born deaf. because . only wrangling to who. Thus the moderation which ought to be observed in these propositions. cause it is sufficiently clear.148 PROPOSITIONS UNIVERSAL OR PARTICULAR. not to contradict them. when in is There are some propositions which universals. if I two arms this proposition ought to be in ordinary use. although instances may be adduced in which they do not hold. although they . to satisfy ourselves. and not de singulis generum. on the other. that mutes may be found to falsify this proposition. that this ought to be understood only of those who have no natural impediment to the use of sounds. in the same way. to draw particular conclusions only with great judgment. had four arms. either because they cannot learn them. since it is clear enough. The Cretans generally of this verse of one of their poets are always liars. if we hear them carried too far. which are only morally universal. great gluttons because there might be some persons who had not the vices which were common to the others. . but that all men do not employ writing and it would not be a reasonable objection to this. ought to be considered as metaphysical they may admit of exceptions. may say. in the order of nature. that all men em ploy sounds for the purpose of expressing their thoughts. but we mean to say that. but. or reject them as false. were nevertheless considered men be in these general propositions. though common custom it : comprised in universal terms as. Thus we say that all animals were saved in Noah s ark. [PART II. evil beasts. on the one hand. men have but tAvo arms. also. e. as the philosophers say . is. or because they cannot form them. of all the species of each genus.. 2d OBSERVATION. and not of all the particulars of these species. And it would be maintain that there had been monsters. There are some propositions which are universal. We 3d OBSERVATION. with showing that they ought not to be taken so strictly. and. only because they ought to be understood de generibus singulorum. we do not speak of monsters. without being expressed. i. not necessary for these extraordinary exceptions to be say all men have considered as true. as is the case with the dumb.

. and who. men are just. . As in Adam all die. for instance. and. who were so numerous. that they have in that glorious life of which St Paul here speaks. Thus we say. which would be frivolous. through every kind of office. alone. parts. And it thus. too. among others. by a part for it stricted by a part of the attribute. have not been justified through the grace of Jesus Christ. because it was to proposition were true. since it is suffi it is intended to say only. so all those who are made alive. consequently. if proposition is rigorously true. XIII. as if it were maintained.] PROPOSITIONS-UNIVERSAL OR PARTICULAR.CHAP. There are some propositions which 4th OBSERVATION. part the meaning of the apostle is. so also one For it is certain that a in Christ all are made aline. through the grace of Jesus Christ. Christians. or evil-doers. that a man has passed through all offices. with reason. are just. but because there were no kinds of herbs whereof they did not pay a tenth. St Paul says. All men and has two plex. that all men ciently clear that are so through the grace of Jesus Christ who are just. would be ridiculous for it to be restrained by the whole that this attribute. might appear false. But when the attribute is com as in this proposition. are wicked. are made alive through Jesus Christ. 14i) some of every species were saved in it. that as all those who die through Adam. Sicut et ego omnibus per omnia placeo. that is. we consider only what is multitude of heathens. no Thus die. decimatis omne olus. Gentiles. in which St Paul says. also. All be understood in this sense that all just men are just. There are a very great number of propositions in Scripture which that ought to be taken in this sense. this though there being so many men who expressed in the subject. that he accommodated himself to all sorts of persons Jews. that they paid the tenth of all not that they paid a tenth of herbs. Thus. Jesus Christ also said of the Pharisees. and it may be maintained. that the term just is understood in the subject. have not been made alive in Jesus Christ. all the herbs in the Avorld. who have died in their infidelity. though it be not expressed. that is to say. although he did not seek to please his persecutors. are universal only because the subject is to be taken as re I say.

denotes only some particular physicians. The French are good soldiers. Hence there is a great deal of difference between these two pro positions. Physicians believe now it is well to drink during the heat of the fever . The Dutch are good sailors. it very some. The Flem ish we mean are good painters. language. in the second. or des. [PART II. il y a des plaisirs funestes . it causes the nouns to be taken particularly. are soldiers. whereas they are commonly taken generally. and. with the article les. : . that which is expressed by quelques in the style of the school Quelques douleurs sont salutaires .150 PROPOSITIONS UNIVERSAL OR PARTICULAR. especially in our lan is guage (French). II y a des douleurs salutaires . quelque humilite est genereuse . in the singular. that For les medecins. whether it be the first or the last : as. We are not to suppose that there no other mark of particularity than the words quidam. and des medecins. on the contrary. in the first. commonly good and so of the rest. as when we say. For. 5th OBSERVATION. or un. Les medecins croient maintenant qu il est bon de boire pendant le chaud de la fievre. aliquis seldom happens that we use them. and the like. or which) II y a des craintes (There are some fears which are qui sont raisonnables But this qui does not prevent these proposireasonable). we place il y a (there is. and thus in the others. to say that the French who are soldiers. by simply placing : after des or un the sub stantive to be the subject to the proposition. as. humilite genereuse . denotes the mass of physicians at the present day . : il y a y a des de faux amis . There are also many propositions which are morally universal in this way only. il y a des medecins . or are). according to the new remark of the General Grammar. and in the liver. il y a une vices converts de The second way is that of joining the adjective to the substantive by a qui (who. The Italians are good comedians . il Vapparence In this way we express in our (French) de la vertu. But after or before de. When the particle des or de is the plural of the article un. this in The two ways first is. Des medecins croient maintenant que le sang ne se fait point dans le Some physicians believe now that the blood is not made foie.

still we These 11 y a des hommes more common than the preceding sont tnn aiment q eiix memes .Quid-am existimant There are some who think me too pointed in satire. fi mined by what follows. We : humilmt. that in Latin the negation pre all (tout): intrabit in follows cedes omnis. Quelques cmintes are following forms of speech love themselves (There are men who dignes de wow of the name). as omnis mvens.] PROPOSITIONS-UNIVERSAL OR PARTICULAR. to either of these that we ought to determine the sense cannot be doubted a proposition. Eat qui nequiter^ There are some who humble themselves wickedly. with a negation. though complex as if ex pression . there are Christians who are unworthy Latin have the same expression sometimes used in in satyr u videor nimis acer. Man is rational. 151 in from being simple in sense. in this case. none. . se tion. because. This happens. Lord.Ko man living shall be justified the negatic God. omnis. Hebrew. Lord.CHAP. non omnis is often put tor say unto me. and which are not dete of those which have senses . Non justificabHur in conspectu tuo before useful The foregoing observations are very 6th OBSERVATION. omne pcckingdom of heaven. il y a des Chretiens qui qui alone : said simply. me nimis acrem esse in satyra. Doming Non reg- num ccelorum.. and not on Nevertheless. as is whether these a celebrated question among philosophers. Which is the same thing as if it were said. ought to be called propositions. nullus. with this difference. which they This question must be understood universal or particular. where panies Considering it it in the discourse of it has any ambiguity. no context. . for it is sont raisonnables. and none &c but when there when I say. in in the psalm. et ultra Sunt quibus Leqern tendere opus. philosophers say in itself. all. tions XIII. of particu is no such term. as all. So also in the Scripture. Non Every sin is not a crime. man is just. when there is a term of universality. by what accom which it forms a part. call indefinite.gt. and in French it omnis qui dlcit mi hi Dominc. makes a particular proposi Omnis.Sot shall enter into the all who catum est crtww&amp. falls on the verb. that then. it larity either.

The French are brace . which is false. the Germans heavy . [PART II. very false trary. with which men rest satisfied in their common discourses about things in the world. although this may not be true of every individual. that men are black. imposuerunt capiti ejus. as. because is There much it is true of the majority. on the con nevertheless. and not of all soldiers . indefinite pro black. another distinction on this subject. that these indefinite pro we are satisfied that is. being indefinite in contingent matter. angels positions are universal in matters of doctrine have no body and they are only particular in matters of fact and of history. It is. . the Orientals volup tuous. the . which more reasonable. . but And this is the natural as a universal. that Poles are Socinians . For who would allow it to be said. Italians suspicious . and particular in contingent matter. ought not to be considered as a particular proposition. It is. as those of Nova Zembla some men . in contingent matters. which is. and it may be said. reject ing them as false when they are not true generally. they generally agree to . as when it is said in the Gospel : coronam de spinis. but in a con positions of this kind are taken universally matter we are satisfied with moral universality. since. clear. Milites plectentes that in the case of particular actions. then. the reason of which is. there fore. And thus. ought to be considered universal in necessary matter. judgment which all men form of such propositions. the indefinite proposition ought to be considered universal. these propositions ought to be considered quite true. they ought to be reckoned particular. It is very clear that this ought to be understood only of some soldiers. that in any matter whatever. at least when they have not moral generality. that when we attribute any quality to a common term. tingent Whence we may very well say. according to the distinction of these philosophers.152 PROPOSITIONS UNIVERSAL OR PARTICULAR. some Parisians gentlemen some Poles Socinians some Englishmen Quakers. I find this maxim approved of . as the Ethiopians . that the Parisians are gentlemen . especially when they are determined to a given time. by very able men. Now it is very true that there are some bears white. that Englishmen are Quakers ? and yet. that bears are white. what it ever its matter may be.

of do every which would be false neither are they particular. for this means more than if I were to say some Romans con . in which he had no part. when taken collectively. of community. a distinct idea of which is in the mind of those who make these propositions. 7th OBSERVATION. man who was also at the times. 8 . Roman that he had conquered the Carthaginians. but they are singular. XIII. though.] PROPOSITIONS-UNIVERSAL OR PARTICULAR. 153 common term. to glory in the or in the skill of the hand. conquered the Gauls in the time of Cuesar. These pro of such a place have condemned otherwise AVC might conclude positions are not universal. Whence it happens that we may say that the took Romans. these ages man acts by his by those who compose it. tor people. being conquered and victorious at another. still less particular. into which they not. Cap.CHAP. who were conquered by the Gauls who Rome. each individual has on account of the noble actions of his which is as senseless nation. 6. but rather singular. as we propositions are rather singular from what has been said of terms complex in may judge sense. these than particular. who remains as and who acts through all long as he composes a state. properly. there was not a single And this shows the foundation of the vanity which other. so that. and as it would be for an ear which was deaf. Cap. inas quered the Carthaginians much as we consider every nation as a moral person. the whole body. Romans. . only because of some particulars. 2d Part. the whole community.) belong to a The names of body. (1st Part. considering them aright. the whole people. as they commonly are. make the propositions enter universal. . at one of these one time. as when I say the Romans conquered the Carthaginians the judges the Venetians carry on war against the Turks a criminal. as a members. whose existence is for several centuries. attribut at ing thus to the same term. of the quickness eye.

in order to prove that a pro position is reasonable. the sense in which these propositions are to be understood putes. principally in relation to the signs of institution . when taken in a figurative sense. and this has given rise to many dis appears to some that this may be done indiffer is sufficient. there is no difficulty. to do this. by any visible relation. and of a of Italy. ideas of signs attached to words enter into the composition WE have of propositions. because they Thus a man who has settled it in his are extravagant. others signs. which do not make known. in the First Part. is not true. said. CHAPTER XIV. since And the visible connection there is between such signs and things. a circumstance happens which it is import ant to examine in this place. this is Italy. for there are a multitude of propositions which if we were to give to signs the name of the thing signified. that we examine the rule which allows us to affirm of things signified their signs. . that of ideas some have Now. of a portrait of Caesar. in map relation to instituted signs. and that it And yet this to the sign the name of the thing signified. that we sometimes affirm of them the thing it is important to know when it is right signified. indicates clearly that when we affirm of the sign the thing signified. thus we might say. since these things for their objects. and figuratively. mind that certain things should signify others. . therefore. and without ceremony. It is only necessary.3 54 PROPOSITIONS NAMES OF THINGS [PART II. this is Caesar. to say that it is common to give For it ently. but that it is so in intent. without any introduction. which is never done. would be would be extravagant. in relation to natural signs. and in the sense of sign. and which properly belongs to logic it is. we mean not that sign is really this And thing. for. IS OF PROPOSITIONS IN WHICH THE NAME OF THINGS GIVEN TO SIGNS.

Who does not see that it would shortest way to acquire the reputation of folly to pretend It is necessary. that relations which find such relations us to the are not seen at once. and an ass -was the king of Persia. we may not for there are scarcely any things between which and it is clear. ^ wlio would allow. nor. since the proposition cannot be taken it must. but solely and virtually of a secret determination. Distant relations.] ridiculous. discovered by meditation. sense. sufficient. tain way. . nevertheless. It is not sufficient to give of in the first establishment which is made thing signified. to the mind. that we are not allowed to signs. therefore. we have a which are certainly 1st. XIV. must not be literally. to 1 whom considered it We know. is. which is a consequence of the first. ot for example. at first sight. . that a stone was a horse. GIVEN TO SIGNS. as a sign of another thing altogether different.CHAP. be explained in a figurative otherwise there would be none of these extravagant sense and the more impossible they were in their propositions into their literal sense. 15o it to if. that the simple manifest incompatibility of the terms is not a sufficient reason to lead the mind to the figurative sense. because he had established these signs in his mind. are not sufficient to lead . Thus the first rule that ought to be followed on this subject. for instance. and should say. without having previously explained he should take the liberty of giving to these fan any one. be the that a tree is a king. that of these explanations tions . before speak right to employ such proposi and it must be remarked. to introduce this language into the world ? be prepared. that the laurel was the sign . is. that one should say that the sea is heaven. in a cer that he to whom we therefore. the more easily should we fall for figurative which. and without any previous explanation. ciful signs the names of things. to the give indifferently names of things The second. and to conclude that. and others there are some which are certainly insufficient. figurative sense. . to a sign the name oi 2d. we speak have hitherto to know that those it. are by no means suffi are only cient to give at once to signs the names of things signified. that the earth is the moon. which do not present themselves and which to the senses.

a dead men and the prophet distinguishing visions from realities. to give to the sign the name of the thing signified. Thus God having shown vision. 3d. Thus Joseph might reply to Pharaoh. the thing as a sign. in the explana tion of every part. that. they represented the house of Israel. and the seven lean kine and the seven thin sheaves were seven years of famine. should say without cere mony.156 victory. in spiritu. when we utter a parable. considering certain things as signs. a field full of . who chose to make the laurel the sign of the king of China. if we. of this the But it is certainly a sufficient ground for giving to signs names of things. and the olive that of the Grand Seigneur. considering already all that composed it as signs). that the seven fat kine and the seven full sheaves which he had seen in his dream were seven years of plenty. and the olive of peace but this knowledge by no means prepares the mind to find what is meant. PROPOSITIONS NAMES OF THINGS . represent? Thus Daniel answered very appropriately to Nebuchad nezzar that he was the head of gold. and that he inwardly asked himself this question What do these seven fat and lean kine. they are in difficulty only as to what they signify. in walking in a garden. [PART II. which only prepares the mind to expect some great thing. these seven full and empty sheaves. do you see that laurel ? it is the king of China and that olive? it is the Grand Turk. since he saw that Pharaoh was in trouble only on this point. Thus. because he had pro posed to him a dream which he had of a statue with a golden head. without preparing it to . to the prophet Ezekiel in . tion is clear. consider. in particular. since there is no direct and natural connec between the idea of greatness and the idea of a sign. does not at all afford sufficient ground for attributing to this sign the name The reason of the thing signified at its first institution. we have a right. when we see in the minds of those to whom we speak. and required from him its interpretation. Any previous explanation. that is to say. God spoke very intelligibly when he told him that these bones were the house of Israel. and thus the one does not at all lead to the other. and being accustomed to consider them as signs. and proceed to explain it (those to whom it was spoken.

the that circumcision is only figuratively word covenant having led him to form this idea. Behold the covenant ivhich you. is sufficiently prepared the covenant. and as in which it is agreed that there we give should be given to the sign the name of the thing signified. so that. Avhich runs simply shall observe between you. we may this proposition. not before in his mind it was pronounced. viz. as covenants are commonly denoted by outward signs. but about what the// represent. that circum suppose that he who hears to conceive cision is the covenant. the name of things only. when AVC iind in is the covenant. the mind that the subject to which it is united conceives is immediately intended to designate it. it may be that Scripture that circumcision there is nothing to surprise where covenant fixes the idea And thus. sion is the covenant. Thus. the mind will be immediately led to conceive that it is affirmed of it as of its sign. and qualities of the attribute. and me. this proposition. and when supposing that they are already considered we see that the minds of others are in doubt. ichen we have grounds for to signs as signs. not about what But as the greater they are. Every cumdsed. thus. in order that we because the contrary might affirm of it the thing signified. by a fitness of reasoning. to be denoted by an exception to the established rule. whether we ought not to make one here in favour of u is such. male among you shall be ciryour posterity. as requires soon as the name of that thing is pronounced. For. but before it was joined with the word circumcision. that it might be thought that the things which require. 1st. if we affirm the word covenant. Now it is not said in these Avords that circum- . should form which demands a preliminary preparation. hears a proposition conceives the attribute. when the thing signified in some sort to be denoted by a sign. as he who of sign on that to which it is united. through which we might be led to regard the sign as a sign. before he unites it Avith the subject. signs. is not in the Scripture. I have said.] GIVEN TO SIGNS. it may be doubted part of moral rules have exceptions. or any outward thing. XIV. 157 we These are certain and see no other examples sufficient preparations . circumci might also be believed. so that. that it single case. that u-e may derive this maxim from common sense.CHAP..

cision is the covenant. new covenant. it is by all the these principles that all the world has decided.158 PROPOSITIONS NAMES OF THINGS. ut sit in signum foederis . membered. This is my body. This cup is the new testament in my blood. doubtful. For the apostles. These of my blood. or. God might be a sign of the covenant. in all their force in the things which are not comprised in these exceptions. this exception being. nevertheless. but that is not sufficient. regard what was done as something great. a figurative sense . that the majority of rules having exceptions. as words in St Luke. and there being few things which require of themselves to be denoted by signs. these are St Luke s words. which is contained in the preceding verse. but. but still more appropriately 2d. of the last will of Jesus Christ. and without de ceiving them. the pledge and the instrument of the sign. but circumcision is in them com manded as a condition of the covenant. for. This cup is the new covenant which. [PART II. when translated literally. Jesus Christ could not have given to the signs the names of things without speak ing contrary to the custom of all men. these do not hinder the use and application of the rule in relation to all other things which have not this quality. not regarding the bread as a sign. and on the other. rather. and to exclude the figurative. and being in no difficulty about what it signified. in order that it might be a sign. it is alleged. . on the one hand. remain. and made a condition of the covenant. since it is peculiarly the mark. It is by these principles that we must decide this im portant question. They might. there is nothing figura tive in calling the cup the the blood of Jesus Christ testament. whether we are to give to these words. have still less evidence for confirming this exception. it was necessary that its observance be commanded. nations of the earth having been naturally led to take them in a literal sense. It is true that required that condition in order that circumcision it is said in the follow ing verse. perhaps. as the word testament signifies not only the last will of the testator. Now. the instrument which represents it. very rare. and which men are accustomed to represent by For this principle of equity must be re instituted signs. But. be that as it may.

The division of this whole is called properly integral parts. XV. 159 signs to it is have nothing more to remark on the subject of those which the names of things are given. and we do this only when they are sufficiently pre pared to conceive that the sign is the thing signified. Mum. in Latin. its parts. there are also two There is a whole composed of parts really kinds of division. but applies by no means to the to the second. PROPOSITIONS WHICH ARE OF GREAT USE AND DIVISION AND DEFINITION. in which we affirm expressly of the solely For we employ these expressions sign the thing signified. we affirm of it For this rule that it is necessary the thing signified. IN THE SCIENCES FIRSTLY OF DIVISION. a partition : as when we town into its wards. called. to teach those to whom we speak what the sign signi only fies .] &quot. only figuratively. divide a house into its apartments. into its province*. except that the ex extremely necessary to distinguish between the name of a thing to denote pressions in Avhich AVG use the sign. and whose parts are called distinct. a kingdom or state. and by representation.VVe TWO KINDS OF PROPOSITIONS. the sign as a sign. that the minds of those to whom we speak already consider . . Division is the separation of a whole into But as there are two kinds of wholes. as when AVC call a picture of Alexander by the name of Alexander and those in which the sign being denoted by its own name. TWO KINDS OF IT is tions in detail of two proposi necessary to say something which are of great use in the sciences division and definition.CHAP. and are in doubt as to what it signifies first kind of expressions. or by a pronoun. CHAPTER OF XV.

in Latin. the sole rule of this division is. all nations employ. for the purpose of expressing themselves. there is a certain medium of knowledge which removes a man from the rank of the ignorant. that the : make rule. term. as division of goods into those of mind and body. when we even. these being ac cording to its different inferiors. every line is straight or The third is. or in relation to different times : every body as. every number is even or un is. The when we divide the genus by its differences : every rational or irrational. The first substance is second is. either speech alone. but which. and its parts are the terms comprising its exten the The word animal is a whole of this nature. even and uneven comprehend the whole extent of the term num ber. or writing together with speech. The rules of division are 1st. divide the. are subjected parts. make the enumeration of particulars very exact. subjected or inferior parts. every star is luminous by itself. and there are four kinds of division which may be noticed. is in motion or at rest . but which. man The body into its members. every man is well or ill . that is members of the division comprehend the whole extent of the terms into which it is divided as. of which which are comprehended inferiors as man and beast its under tains properly the This division ob extension. between ignor ant and learned. That it be complete. or by reflection only . all the French are nobles or commoners . The other whole is called. . when we divide a common subject into the opposite accidents of which it is susceptible. there being no number which is not either even or uneven. and that there be nothing wanting and soul. have one. every animal is man or beast. genus by its species: every body or mind. still. is animal curved. so many false reasonings as want of attention to this What deceives us here is. There is scarcely anything which leads us to to say. The fourth is that of an accident into its different subjects. every proposition is true or false. omne.160 TWO KINDS OF into body PROPOSITIONS. nevertheless. to to them. does not place him in the rank of the learned . name of division. that there are often terms which appear so opposed that they seem to allow no medium. [PART II. and its parts. Thus. inasmuch as the whole is a com mon sion.

which constitute its opposed members. and for the other to be the genus alone with the negation of another difference.CHAP. as between avarice and prodigality there is liberality and a laudable frugality . and that which is extended. having no gross vices. second rule. that it is not necessary for the diiFerences. viz. not being virtuous. irrational. are not called vicious. may be a great vice . and sometimes this mean is twofold. is only the absence of reason. and who. this can be done. cannot be called virtuous. when express the opposed differences by positive terms. or equally into that which is corporeal. and that number which is called first. into that which is material. as piety between im and superstition . inasmuch as this explains better the This is why the nature of the members of the division. between piety a mean of virtue. differs from the compound one only in this. must be here noticed. magis extra vitia quam cum virtutibus for there are some people who. It is. that it has no other measure save unity. the difference between a beast and a man. or convales cent . which is nothing positive the unevenness of a number is only the negation of its divisibi The first number has nothing lity into two equal parts. division of substance into that which thinks. way that we make the members more Thus. between the timidity which fears every thing. in this very certainly opposed. between sick and well there is the state of the man indisposed. which is a consequence of the first. there is the bravery which is not frightened at dangers. unity being the measure of each. and the rashness which fears nothing. between day and night there is twilight .. before God. it must be confessed that it is better to . Nevertheless. and the reason able prudence which leads us to avoid those which it is not opposite vices there is fitting we The that the should be exposed to. although. the First Part. uneven. is much better than the common one. But what we have already said in rational. which the compound number has not. to be positive. but it is sufficient for one to be so. is members of the division be opposed: as. indeed.] DIVISION AND DEFINITION. and that which is not corpo- . good. and that which is immaterial. even. 1G1 and virtuous there is a certain state of which what Tacitus said of Galba. XV. doing no between vicious we may say.

cannot. since every probable opinion but we may first divide them into true and then divide each into certain and impro . is true or false We and false. and to make too many divisions the one Finally. is it not more short. and natural. from being divided into line. All extension is either line. The into equal. bable. for line is included in superficies.162 reed. only very imperfect and confused. for thus. into true. that one is solid. is of the members be not so contained in the other. to which it is much more made at once say. superficies. we should load it with a great number of subdivisions. who is a philosopher of pates it too much. [PART II. difficult to retain than if we had more members in that which we divide. it is better bers. we ought not to reject divisions into three members. simple. linea- tum et superficies. which is a consequent of the second. has injured his . have laboured very hard to more than two mem When this may be done conveniently. . than to say with Ramus. and probable. and superficies in solid. substance that thinks. as a term of superficies. the other dissi Crassotus. and when it would require forced subdivisions in order to reduce them to two members . it is already contained in the Neither ought we to divide opinions first two numbers. Magnitudo est linea. or incorporeal. But this does not prevent extension as a term of solid. or superficies. on the other hand. unequal. instead of relieving the mind. divide number and square. of that which is understood much better by the expression. that the other may be affirmed of it. does not sufficiently enlighten the mind. or that superficies third rule. and solid. or solid. TWO KINDS OP PROPOSITIONS. vel lineatum. false. although it may sometimes be contained in it after another manner. since every square num ber being even or uneven. furnish us with an idea. because we cannot say that line is superficies. and especially when they are more natural. worth among the interpreters of Aristotle. vel solidum ? we may remark that it is an equal defect not to make enough. which is the principal effect of division. considered in the sciences. but clearness and ease being that which ought first to be his followers Ramus and show that no divisions ought to have . For example. inasmuch as the words immaterial.

and are not to be taken as princi which need after to be but considered as ples. in the First Part. propositions. exact. God. since the definitions of names are arbitrary. a thing compounded of mind and bod//. a rational animal. that Sometimes. being. we define by integral parts. of the definition of names. and those which are special. 163 book by too great a number of divisions. here. WE have spoken at considerable length. be the proximate and not simply the remote. It is. But there is something which holds the place of even then and the rest takes the g enus the term thing compounded.CHAP. Of this there are two kinds. whereas the definitions of things do not depend on us. also. into the confusion which we seek to avoid. a perfect It is necessary. the other less so. as when we man is place of difference. body. that we speak then. but on what is involved in the true idea of the thing. XVI. and which may be termed by its description. a substance The more essential attributes. that that which is placed as genus in the definition. which thinks. is that which explains the nature of a thing of which those which are common are called genus. genus of the thing defined. Thus we define man. disputed. . and we have shown that we must not confound it with the definition of thinys.] DEFINITION OF THINGS. mind. We fall thus est Confusum CHAPTER OP THE DEFINITION XVI. a substance extended. which retains the name of definition . the one more exact. quidquid in pulvercm sectum cst. say. which is established by reason. difference. too. as far as possible. of this last kind of definition alone. WHICH IS TERMED THE DEFINITION OF THINGS.

it must 3d. which we now know are not formed from the exhalations of the earth. definition of the elements. is that which gives some knowledge of a tiling by the accidents which are peculiar to it. and which determine it sufficiently to enable us to discriminate it from others. definitions or descriptions of things by their causes. as far as pos sible. . being not less say. 2d. the common time. It is in this describe herbs. that it be universal. that is to say. fmits. matter. as simple corruptible bodies. which is what A . to comprehend its nature. The descriptions of size. by the confession of these philo sophers themselves. so that it may help us to give an account of its principal properties. that it is the measure of motion. There are three things necessary to a good definition. colour. and that it enable us. composed of different wheels.164 DEFINITION OF THINGS. There have been discovered spots on the sun. that it the common simple than the elements. which have formed and dispersed there in the same way as our clouds. we have no reason to suppose that the heavens are subject to alterations like those which take place on earth. and that it be clear. as Aristotle imagined. as well as that it has been moving for so long a time . that Hence whole thing defined. whatever that state may be. animals. for the celestial bodies. For we say that a thing has been so long at rest. is probably bad. [PAKT II. way that we form. definition must be clear. that is to say. so that it is clear that time is nothing more than the continuance of a creature in some state. end. &c. although they are of much greater magnitude. 1st. whose regular movement is intended to mark the hours. as if we define a clock. that it be appropriate. by their figure. without speaking of comets. serve to give us a clearer and more distinct idea of the thing which we define. The which is termed description. definition less exact. that is to comprehend definition of Hence belong exclusively to the thing defined. since it is very likely that time measures rest as well as motion. an iron machine. There are also some poets and orators are of this nature. It is necessary that a definition be special. seems bad . and other such accidents. It is necessary that it a definition the be universal.

easily whence. we say that one air is dry. facile cdieno.CHAP. The the dry.] DEFINITION OF THINGS. for that it since dry. which collects unlike bodies. the true cause which leads us to call one body hot. et disgregat homogenea. Hot. Quod And suo termino facile continetur. Virgil calls fire liquid. is accommodates pretended dryness. in the first place. and cold. XVI. et liquidi simul ignis . and it is vain subtilety to say. 165 is ought principally to be considered in definitions. but not always . and . is that which is easily retained in the boundaries of another body. because it is always fluid. itself to the limits of another body. provided there be any because of its smoke stifles it if it opening through which it may discharge that which it constantly exhales. for this is not is. is that which is easily retained within its own limits. also. and with difficulty in those of another body. but because its own has no air. but it does not at all enable us any better to understand cold. we do not see how Aristotle could say that fire. than to dry and humid bodies . the hot. Is not the idea which nature gives us of it is in power ? it motion better through that has ever learned from a hundred times more clear than this? and who is there it any of the properties of motion ? The four celebrated definitions of these first four qualities. that fire. dry. though it may be always retained within the bounds of another body. And congregat homogenea. that which unlike. tlie moist. and with dif Quod suo termino dijjicidter continetur. And further. he defines. these two definitions belong more to hard and liquid bodies. But. according to this definition. ficulty in its own. disgregat heterogenea. This sometimes belongs to cold and hot. says he. with Campanella. Hence it is easily confined within the limits of another body. and that another air is humid. is For who there that ever comprehended the nature of : this definition Actus entis inpotentia the act of a being in power as far as quatenus inpotentia. on the contrary. that like. when confined. flame. et and separates Quod Quod and separates congregat heterogenea. diflicidter alicno. collects like bodies. are no better. aut rumpit aut rumpitur . and what neglected in a great number of Aristotle s definitions. the moist.

there being We nothing common to these two things. as it depends much more on a knowledge of the matter treated of than on the rules of logic. But although there is nothing more important in the sciences than to divide and define well. potentia The first act of a natural organised body vitam habentis.166 another cold. And since we cannot go on to infinity. or cultivated vines. . He is explain ing an obscure term by four or five more obscure. DEFINITION OF THINGS. if it is the soul. cannot be determined to one or the other except by a foreign cause. the idea which we have of life is not less obscure than that which we have of the soul. so far as it is common to men and beasts. So that the chancellor Bacon had reason to say that these definitions were like to that which one might make of a man. and that artificial bodies had it only from without where as it is clear and certain that no body can impart motion . to itself. it is unnecessary to say more about it here. that natural bodies differed from artificial bodies in this. he is defining a chimera. it must necessarily be God who has impressed motion on matter. The celebrated definition of the soul appears still more defective : Actus primus corporis naturalis organici. that natural is bodies had within them the principle of their movement. Principium motus et quietis in eo in quo The principle of motion and of rest in that in which est. being of itself indifferent to motion or rest. in defining him to be an animal that made shoes. and who preserves it in it still. The same philosopher de fines nature. [PART II. do not know what he intends having life in potentia. 1st. it is . 2d. which founded on a fancy that he had. And to refer only to the word life. These are some of the rules of division and definition. these two terms being equally ambiguous and equi vocal. because matter. For. to define.

identify. mal . IN WHICH THE NATURE OF AFFIRMATION AND NEGATION. . ON WHICH THIS CONVERSION DEPENDS. IS MORE THOROUGHLY EX PLAINED. XVII. when I say. negation. That union cannot be better expressed than by the Avords them selves which we employ for affirming. AND FIRST. we have to say of reason we must reproduce some said of affirmation and part of what we have already the nature of both. I do not place : just on all men. some man is just. and another word which denotes mind conceives between them. except by employing two ideas. well of ing. all man is an animal position that everything that is man is also ani say. but only on some men. OF THE CONVERSION OF PROPOSITIONS. 167 CHAPTER XVII. to treat it. The following Chapters are somewhat difficult to comprehend. And it follows. Hence those who do not wish to tire the mind with things of little practical use. that it is the nature of the affirma tion to place the attribute in all that is expressed in the which it has in the pro subject. when we say that one thing is another thing. and I express. ] WE have refrained till now from speaking of the conver sion of propositions. one the other for the attribute. others. simply. Hence it is clear that the nature of affirmation is to unite the union which our and bute. but if I say. TOUCHING THE NATURE OF AFFIR MATION. the subject irith the attri signified by the word is. may pass them over. and explain thoroughly It is certain that we cannot express a proposition to for the subject. if ive and this is may what is so speak. according to the extension I mean to as.CHAP. on it and thus it is better that this matter should depends not be far removed from what . of which we are to speak in the following part. also. and [ are not necessary in practice. although.] CONVERSION OF PROPOSITIONS. because the foundation of all argu mentation.

1 G8 CONVERSION OF PROPOSITIONS. at least when its extension is not greater than that of the subject. We Whence we may collect these four indubitable axioms : . in taking away any one of its essential attributes. I do not say that they alone will be damned. so that it is no longer the same idea and consequently. for if I say that all dissolute men will be damned. if that be greater than the subject. it would follow that the whole idea did not belong to it. And it follows. Thus the affirmation. and does not take in all its generality. . for being restrained only by the subject. Thus when I say that a rectangle is a parallelogram. I said that the attribute is not taken in all its gene rality. if the subject is as general as the at tribute. ought to be denied and not affirmed of the rectangle. if it is greater than the subject. Hence to its it follows that an idea is always affirmed ac cording comprehension. it is clear that the attribute remains in all its gene we rality. remember here what we have already said. I affirm of rectangle evert/thing that is comprised in the idea ofparallelogram. because. and the identity which it denotes. that in ideas it is necessary to dis tinguish the COMPREHENSION from the EXTENSION. placing the idea of the attribute in the subject. For if there were any part of this idea that did not belong to a rect angle. and that the comprehension denotes the attributes contained IN an idea and the extension the subjects (or classes) which contain that idea. since it will have as much as the subject. we utterly destroy and annihilate it. is properly that which determines the extension of the attribute in the affirmative proposition. shall see that this is the principle of all affirmative arguments. that every lion contains the idea of animal. but only a part of that idea and thus the word parallelogram. But we must also. considers the attribute as restricted to an extension equal to that of the subject. it is always affirmed in relation to everything which it comprehends within itself. on the contrary. which signifies the whole idea. that the idea of the attri bute is not taken according to the whole extension. . and suppose that by its nature it can have no more. for it is true that all lions are animals. when it is affirmed. [PART II. that is to say. but that they will be among the number of the accursed. in like manner. but it is not true that they alone are animals.

3. There are examples of this above.] CONVERSION OF PROPOSITIONS. so that extension of the attribute is restricted by that of the sub it denotes no more than that part of its extension which agrees with its subject : as. CHAPTER XVIII. 4. not affirmed itself greater lias been than already AXIOM. The proof of this given. but simply those animals which are men. is The attribute of an affirmative proposition according to its whole extension. attribute is according to the placed in the subject by the affirmative propo whole extension which the subject has in the proposition . The proof of this AXIOM is above. that is to say. that is to say. and if the subject is particular. OP THE CONVERSION OF AFFIRMATIVE PROPOSITIONS. when we say that men are animals. the word animal signifies no longer all animals. is attribute to the cording of an affirmative proposition whole proposition . The ject. XVIII. if it is in that of the subject. the attribute is conceived in the whole extension of the sub ject. AXIOM The its 2. the attribute is con ceived only in a part of the extension of the subject. the conversion of a proposition the changing of and of the attribute into the i . 169 AXIOM The sition. affirmed ac to all according attributes. if the subject is universal. WE call the subject into the attribute.CHAP. 1.

e. the subject and the attri bute are both particular the subject. beginning with animal. restraining and confining it to men alone. and tion. add to it some mark of determination. signifies only the justice which is in some man. wr hich is called conversion. some just is also identified with some man. mutually to affirm the two united terms. without affecting the truth of the proposition. on the contrary. which is the most perfect of all unions. we ought not to Therefore. just. when we make it the it must preserve the same restric to it a mark which determines it. that we be able less that union be reciprocal. So that. or rather. Thus. [PART II. by what we have just said. taken according to its whole The attribute. being limited extension. being so also. when we say some man is just. Thus. it is clearly impossible that two things can be conceived as identified. because in these propositions the subject alone is universal. preserving the same particularity. and that thus we need only change the attribute into the subject. inasmuch as its extension being restricted by that of the subject.170 CONVERSION OF PROPOSITIONS. B is joined it follows very clearly that if to A. when I wish to look at that union under another and then affirming man. in the manner in which they are united. it term the same restriction. and that is joined to B. that is to say. as in particular affirmative propositions. that of may not be taken generally. when I say man is an animal. aspect. since universal affirmative propositions can only be converted into particular affirmatives. subject.. it is evident that if some man is A identified with some just. with out that other thing being also joined to the first. subject that it by conversion. The same thing cannot be said of universal affirmative propositions. restrained. so that it necessarily follows from the conversion that it is true. supposing that it was so before. man. un that is to say. in order to convert such propositions. and have added and consequently. and in order that no mistake may be made. being particular by the mark of particularity which is added to it and the attribute. for as it is impossible that one thing can be joined to another. it will be easily under stood how this conversion must be effected. g. is necessary to preserve to this . Now. I unite the idea of man with that animal.

Particular affirmative propositions are to be converted with out any additional change. when the attribute is not in itself of wider extension than the subject. adding a mark of particularity affirmative propositions may be converted by to the attribute when changed RULE 2. we must pre serve that restriction and give it a mark ofparticularity. that is to say. as when we affirm the difference. less 171 conclude that tliey are converted properly than the others. it is clear that when they are con verted by changing the attribute into the subject. XVIII. it often happens that universal affirmative But propositions may be converted into other universals. that is to say. this happens exclusively. or the property of the species. the mark of But it is particularity which belonged to the first subject. which includes them both. the attribute not being re stricted. subject was all man is rational . all rational is man. by the simple transposi tion of the terms. easily perceived that these two rules one. whether were universal or particular. whereas they are made up of a general subject and a restricted attribute. : RULE The universal into the subject. particular whence we obtain these two rules. are not reckoned true conversions. then. these conversions. being true only under particular circumstances. . 1. . they ought to have a subject restricted and confined.] CONVERSION OF PROPOSITIONS. may be reduced to The attribute being restrained by the subject in all affirmative propositions. may be taken as generally in conversion as the the first subject Nevertheless. when changed into the subject. if -we wish to change it to the subject.CHAP. which But ought to be certain and infallible. by retaining for the attribute. or the definition of the thing defined for.

therefore. and to be contained in its extension. THE nature of negative propositions cannot be expressed clearly than by saying. therefore. I mean to say that he is not among the number of the insensible and I. beings Whence we may obtain this other axiom. If I say that matter is it is . [PART II. is nothing else but to include that idea . to be the subject of an idea. as it is enough. I should not a substance.172 THE NATURE OF NEGATIVE PROPOSITIONS. not. for the negative proposition separates from the subject the idea of the attribute. . It is quite the reverse with the extension of idea. Whence we may obtain this axiom more . if I say that man is not an insensible being. separate them all from him. which is termed deny ing. and. but it separates only the total and complete idea composed of all these attributes united. we say that it is not one of the subjects of that idea. it is not necessary that it should have nothing in common with it it is enough that it has not all which the other has. which is the total and com plete idea that I deny of matter. but. but I say that it is not a thinking substance. Thus. when we say that one idea does not include another. and it is not necessary that it should have nothing of what is in man. : AXIOM 5. that it is the conceiving that one thing is not another . say that not a substance that thinks. in order that one thing be not another. for. and the reason of this is clear. according to the whole of its extension . consequently. that it should not have all that a man has. CHAPTER XIX. The negative proposition does not separate from the subject all the parts contained in the comprehension of the attribute. in order that a beast be not a man. OF THE NATURE OF NEGATIVE PROPOSITIONS.

are also denied of that other idea . Man is a subject of animal. the species also is denied. and particularly. idea. SINCE it is impossible totally to separate two things. If triangle is denied of square. but they separate also this attribute from the subject according to the whole extension which the subject has in the proposition that is to say. they separate it uni .] CONVERSION OF NEGATIVE PROPOSITIONS. which mean the same thing: If the r/enus is denied. if versally. all that is contained in This rule is commonly triangle will be denied of square. because he is contained in its extension. I separate all the happy persons from all the vicious persons and if I say that some doctor is not learned.CHAP. the subject is particular. OF THE CONVERSION OF NEGATIVE PROPOSITIONS. Not only do negative propositions separate the attribute from the subject. obtain this axiom .gt. denied of even/thing contained in the extension which that subject has in the proposition. : AXIOM Every that is 7. expressed in the schools in these terms. which is denied of the other. 173 AXIOM The attribute 6. is attribute denied of a subject. that an idea is always denied according to its whole extension. CHAPTER XX. I And hence we may separate learned from some doctor. that is to say. of a negative proposition is alwa&amp./s taken generally. If I say that no vicious man is happy. XX. if the subject is universal. it is clear that if . for the species is subject to the genus. according to the whole extension of the attribute. except the separation be mutual and reciprocal. which may also be expressed more distinctly thus: All the subjects of the one.

and because the idea of triangle is sepa rated from that of some figure in the other proposition. consequently. CONVERSION OP NEGATIVE PROPOSITIONS. that negative propositions some physician is not a man. its it by no means follows that figure is not a triangle. when a particular subject becomes the attribute. which ought not to change the extension or limitation of the terms. and triangles which are not figures. Some . so that. This arises. from the very nature of the negation which we have just explained. is taken particularly . it would not be true that no man was a stone. the same universality ivhich the first subject had. by conversion. in this proposition. and. Thus. man. but in this false conversion. for the attribute. when it has become the subject. since it is denied according to the whole of its extension. as I said. by simply changing the attribute into the subject. as we have already shown above. may be converted. Some man is not a physician. is No man a stone. rated from some man in this proposition. because the quality of physician is sepa versally. there are physicians which are not men. Some physician is not a man. it becomes universal. man I can say also that no stone is a man would be a any stone. and changes its nature contrary to the rules of true conversion. : for if stone were a man. Some man is not a physician. and preserving to the attribute. But for this very reason we cannot convert particular we cannot say. in a particular negative pro position. and according to the whole of . And thus. the word man is taken uni Now. that EULE Negative universal propositions 3. [PART II.174 I say. which is. the term. in negative universal propositions. that in negative propositions the attribute is always taken universally. extension . is always taken universally. for example. because we said that some man is not a physician.

and. is regarded as the comprehends and is almost the only one which in most logic. somewhat more. . considering them. arises much more from on their false principles. only who are not the consequences are ill deduced and those such errors by the light of reason of . and in relation to they are of service turn of those persons who. being of a lively and inquiring at times. the rules would probably rectify. it is But it may be doubted as it has been supposed to be. as we have already their reasoning on said elsewhere. be useful as mental speculative truths. to mind.THIRD PART OF REASONING. subject. allow themselves. important has been treated of with any care. indeed. whether really as useful The greater part of the errors of men. THAT we now have to treat. on some occasions. capable discovering understand the rules which alone. would not commonly of are given for this purpose. than from their reasoning wrongly It rarely happens that men allow themselves principles. it cannot be denied that discipline . what is commonly said on this following chapters contain and. and which part of which the rules of reasoning. they may always further than this. Be this as it may. because to be deceived by reasonings which are false. which attention to these false be deceived by consequences. for want of attention. much less the application these rules simply as Nevertheless.

either complex or incomplex (according to what we have said of complex terms). the consideration of these two ideas is not sufficient to enable us to determine whether we should affirm or deny the one of the other. thinking and spiritual. the belong. [PART III. should choose the idea of thought in order to make it clear to me. having to judge which is. in this of the truth or falsehood of a proposition is not connection. OF THE NATURE OF REASONING. for a contrary reason. Now. AND OF THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF IT WHICH MAY BE DISTINGUISHED. unless I conceive that it had some relation to the attribute spiritual. to the soul. but I shall not be able to conclude that it is I conceive some relation to exist therefore spiritual.176 THE NATURE OP REASONING. is spiritual. it is manifest that it would be useless to compare thought with the soul. and this third idea is called the mean (or middle term). to compare it with only one of the two If I wish to know. by means of which I might be able to judge whether it belonged. and not seeing clearly into the question at first. that the middle term . It is necessary. it would be of no service. unless between the terms be com both with the subject or minor term. for example. soul thinks . and that which is the attribute is also called the major term. therefore. because the subject is generally less extended than the attribute . When. which. indeed. and with the pared whether this be done separately attribute or major term. therefore. CHAPTER I. of which that which is the subject is also called the minor term. it is necessary to have recourse to a third idea. whether the soul terms. for example. for the purpose of effect ing this comparison of the two ideas through the medium of this third idea. or did not I may say. THE necessity of reasoning is founded exclusively on the limits of the human mind. termed the question always able to do this by the consideration of the two ideas which compose narrow it.

It is true that the two premises are not always expressed. or does not belong. but there may be many more without rendering defective on that account. being once compared with tin- attribute of the conclusion (which can only be done bv affirming or denying). after having consulted a third idea. is not expressed. because often one alone is sufficient to enable the mind to conceive them both . but in relation to the simple ones this is clear. and after having compared it with one of the terms. the truth of the conclusion necessarily follows. that. was called THE QUESTION. as in the arguments which are called conjunctive. but which is imperfect affords its conclusion only in virtue of that suppressed proposition. supposing the truth of the pre : mises. It is well to know that the two first propositions are also called premises (premissce). I said that there were at least three propositions in a and reasoning it . conjunctive arguments in detail . makes the proposition which is called the major. being again compared with the subject of the con makes what is called the minor (proposition). And And then the conclusion. I. if the syllogism be good that is to say. know whether an attribute belongs. I might choose a fourth in order to make this clear to me. or does not belong. if that in order to . which is the proposition itself which had to be proved. For if. But in either way this comparison demands two shall speak of the positions. or with both the terms at once. this sort of reasoning is called enthi/niem^ which is a real syllogism in the mind.J THE NATURE OF REASONING. We pro since the middle term.OHAP. to the second term. and when we thus express only two propositions. 177 with each of these terms. not knowing as yet whether it belongs. to a subject. as in the syllogisms which are for this reason called simple. which ought to be a necessary consequence from them. provided always that the rules be observed. because they are placed (in the mind at least) before the conclusion. before it was proved. because this attribute of the conclusion is called the major term. because the subject of the conclusion is called the minor clusion. since it applies the proposition which in expression. and which. term. and ujifth.

composed of many proposi tions. that it is therefore full examine what to be many things. But because. are only one of the. I consider. first. when they are long. for example. Such reasonings as these. the mind has more difficulty in following them. we have taken more pains in examining the rules of good and bad syllogisms. until I arrive at an idea which connects the attribute of the conclusion with the subject. DIVISION OP SYLLOGISMS INTO SIMPLE AND CONJUNCTIVE. since it is impossible for them to satisfy all their desires . of argu ments of three propositions. . and so of the rest. those in which the middle term is joined The to simple. AND OF SIMPLE INTO COMPLEX AND INCOMPLEX. are called sorites. whether avaricious men are miserable. that the avaricious are full of desires and passions . those who are full of desires leant the conclusion. and able . [PART in. if this does not aiford ground for may they are miserable. inasmuch as they may all be reduced to syllogisms.178 is DIVISION OF SYLLOGISMS. not sufficient. If I question. and are those which are most common in mathematics. CHAPTER II. since the rules which are given for these may be easily applied to all the reasonings which are composed of many propositions. SYLLOGISMS are simple or conjunctive. This it is well to follow. I may of desires. that is to say. which will enable me to form this reasoning: Avaricious men are full of desires . and misery in this privation of things which are desired . those who are without that which they desire are miser men are miserable. and I shall find in this idea that of being without many things which are desired. therefore avaricious the three propositions are better adapted to the capacity of the mind. if they are good. of which the second depends on the first.

we shall treat of separately. Therefore every pious king is loved by his subjects . kitty.] DIVISION OF SYLLOGISMS. in which. II. Therefore an elective state is not of long duration . composed of complex terms. in which each term is joined completely with the middle. with the whole attribute in the major. to join with the middle in one of the propositions. 179 terms of the conclu-sion at the same time. Now. The other. Simple syllogisms. The one. that is to say. which is the subject of the conclusion his subjects. which is its attribute. which is the subject. Louis XIV. and of long dura tion. are those in which it is joined to loth. Thus this is argument simple : Every good prince is loved by his subjects . and the others involved or complex those in which there are complex propositions are of this last kind. but because there are none of this last kind in which there are not complex propositions. The divine laic binds us to honour kings. is king . to join with the middle in theother proposition. although the rules which are commonly given for simple syllogisms may hold in all complex syllogisms. the conclusion being complex.CHAP. which is the attribute. which forms only a single term. : and to be loced by But the following is divisions. or a part of the subject. because the middle term is joined separately to pious . Therefore the divine law binds us to honour Louis XIV. As these kinds of syllogisms have separate rules. call the first kinds of arguments plain and incomnot that all plex. and with the whole subject in the minor. which are those in is them which the middle term joined separately with each term of the conclusion. by We . we take only a part of the attribute. to wit. enter into the major proposi tion. it is conjunctive. since elective state. . Every pious king is a good prince . are also of two sorts. and all the rest. is subject to not of long duration Now an elective state is subject to divisions . for the opposite reason If an elective state . the conjunctive.

[ This Chapter. that a simple syllogism ought to have only three terms. and these rules are founded on the axioms which were established in the Second Part. nevertheless. having proved them else where. But because all sorts of conclusions cannot be obtained from all sorts of premises. WE have we shall only state. are among the number of those spoken of in the Discourses. universal and particular. and a single middle term. . touching the nature of propositions affirma tive and negative. in the preceding chapters. containing things which are subtile. into which.180 GENERAL RULES OF [PART III. ] seen already. 1. two terms for the conclusion. the middle term and the subject of the conclusion (which is called the smaller term) enter . of which the lesser term is the subject. into which the middle term and the attribute of the the conclusion (which is called the greater term) enter minor. reversing them. Particular propositions are contained in general ones as they are. and the greater term the attribute. also. as the strength of the conclu sion does not depend on that inversion. but which are of little practical utility. constitutes three proposi ions: the major. we shall here ap ply the rules of simple syllogisms only to the incomplex. each of which being repeated twice. These. such . CHAPTER III. and the following ones until the twelfth. and the conclusion. there are general rules which show that a conclusion cannot be properly obtained in a syllogism in which they are not observed. reserving complex syllogisms to be treated of separately. and necessary to the speculative part of logic. GENERAL RULES OF SIMPLE INCOMPLEX SYLLOGISMS.

CHAP.

III.]

SIMPLE IXCOMl LEX SYLLOGISMS.

181

I in of the same nature, not the general in the particular, in I, or E in 0. A, and O in E, and not 2. The subject of a proposition, taken universally or par ticularly, is that which renders it universal or particular.

A

3. The attribute of an affirmative proposition having never more extension than the subject, is always considered as taken particularly, since it is only by accident that it is sometimes taken generally. 4. The attribute of a negative proposition is always taken

generally. It is mainly on those

axioms that the general rules of

syllogisms are founded, which rules without falling into false reasonings.

we

cannot violate

RULE
be taken, once
at,

1.
it

The middle term cannot be taken twice particularly, but
ought
to

least,

universally.

conclusion,
for

For, before uniting or disuniting the two terms of the it is clear that this cannot be done if it is taken

two difFerents parts of the same whole, since it may, which is united or separated perhaps, not be the same part from these terms. Now, if taken twice particularly, it may be taken for two different parts of the same whole, and, consequently, nothing could be concluded, at least to render an argument vicious, necessarily, which is enough since we can only call that a good syllogism, as we have cannot be false, i\\Q pre already said, of which the conclusion mises being true. Thus, in this argument some man is holy,
some

man is a thief, therefore some thief is holy, the word man unite being taken for different parts of mankind, cannot the same man who is holy, holy, since it is not ?/m/with and who is a thief. We cannot say the same of the subject and attribute of twice particu the conclusion for, though they be taken
;

they may, nevertheless, unite them together, by whole ex uniting one of these terms to the middle, in the for it follows hence, very tension of the middle term is united in some one of its clearly, that if this middle
larly,
;

parts to

some part of the other term, that
already stated to le united

first

we have

to all the

term, which middle, will

182

GENERAL RULES OF

[PART

III.

be united also with the term to which some part of the middle is joined. If there are some Frenchmen in every house in Paris, and if there are Germans in some houses in Paris, then there are some houses in which Frenchmen

and Germans are together.
If some
rich

And
for the rich

all rich

men are fools, men are honoured,

Then are some fools honoured ;
are fools are also honoured, since all are honoured ; and, consequently, in these rich fools which are honoured, the qualities of fool and honour are joined
together.

men who

RULE

2. be taken

The terms of the conclusion cannot

more universally

in the conclusion than they are in the premises.

Hence, when either term is taken universally in the conclusion, the reasoning will be false if it is taken parti cularly in the two first propositions.

The reason is, that we cannot conclude anything from the particular to the general (according to the first axiom), for, from the fact that some man is black, we cannot say that all men are black.
1st

COROLLARY.
in the premises one universal term

There must always be
more than

in the conclusion, for

every term which

is

general

in the conclusion ought to be so also in the premises, and besides, the middle term must be taken at least once gene
rally.

2d COROLLARY.

When

the conclusion

is

negative, the greater term must

necessarily be taken generally in the

major, for

it

is

taken

generally in the negative conclusion (by the fourth axiom), and, consequently, it must be taken generally in the major

(by the second rule).

CHAP.

III.]

SIMPLE 1NCOMPLEX SYLLOGISMS.

183

3d COROLLARY.
-whose conclusion is (proposition) of an argument can never be a particular affirmative, for the subject and attribute of an affirmative proposition are both taken and third axioms), and thus particularly (by the second term would be taken only particularly, con the

The major

negative,

greater trary to the second corollary.

4th COROLLARY.

The

lesser

term

is

always

in the conclusion as in the

pre

can be only particular in the conclusion, as it is particular in the premises, it may, on the contrary, be always general in the conclusion when for the lesser term could not be it is so in the premises in the minor when it is the subject of it, unless it general be generally united to the middle and it cannot be the in it, unless the proposi attribute, and be taken generally tion be negative, because the attribute of an affirmative taken particularly. Now, negative proposition is always denote that the attribute, taken in its full ex
mises, that is to say, that as it
;
;

propositions tension, is separated from the subject. the lesser And, consequently, a proposition in which er a union of the middle term term -iii general denotes with the whole of the i .ser term, or a separation of the

middle from the whole lesser term. Now if, through this union of the middle with the lesser idea is joined to this lesser term, we conclude that another it is joined to all the lesser term, we ought to conclude that and not to a part alone, for, the middle being joined term, to all the lesser term, nothing can be proved by this union
of one -part, which cannot also be proved of the others, since it is joined to them all. In the same way, if the separation of the middle term from the lesser term, prove anything of any part of that it is lesser term, it proves the same of all the parts, since from them all. equally separated

5th COROLLARY.

When

the

minor

is

a universal negative,

if

we wish

to

184

GENERAL RULES OF

[PART

III.

obtain a legitimate conclusion, it must always le general. is a consequent of the preceding corollary, for the smaller term must be taken generally in the minor, when it is a universal negative, whether it be its subject (by the second axiom), or whether it be the attribute of it (by the

This

fourth axiom).

RULE

3.

No conclusion can be drawn from two negative propositions.
For two negative propositions separate the subject from the mean, and the attribute from the same mean. Now, because two things are separated from the same
thing, it does not follow either that they are, or that they are not, the same ; for because the Spaniards are not Turks, and the Turks are not Christians, it does not follow

that the Spaniards are not Christians neither does low that the Chinese are so, though they are not any more than the Spaniards.
;

it fol

Turks

RULE

4.

A

negative conclusion cannot le proved by two affirmative

propositions.

For from the fact that the two terms of the conclusion are united with the third, it cannot be proved that they are separated from each other.

RULE
The conclusion always follows

5.

the

weaker part, that

is to

say, if two propositions be negative, it ought to be negative, and if one of them be particular, it ought to be particular. The proof of this is, that if there be a negative propo

middle term is separated from one of the parts of the conclusion, and thus it is incapable of uniting them, which must be done in order to conclude affirmatively. And if there be one particular proposition, the conclu sion cannot be general, for if the conclusion is general affirmative, the subject being universal, it must also be the universal in the minor, and consequently its subject,
sition the

CHAP.

III.]

SIMPLE IXCOMPLEX SYLLOGISMS.

185

attribute being never taken universally in affirmative pro Therefore the middle term joined to this sub positions. and hence it will be ject, will be particular in the minor,

general in the major, because otherwise it would be taken It will be, therefore, its subject, and twice particularly. consequently that major term will be also universal, and
thus there cannot be a particular proposition in an affirma tive argument whose conclusion is general. This is still more clear in the case of universal negative conclusions, for then it would follow that there ought to be three universal terms in the two premises, according to the first corollary. Now, as there must be an affirmative is taken par proposition by the third rule, whose attribute three terms are taken ticularly, it follows that the other and, consequently, the two subjects of the two
universally,
propositions,

which makes them universal, Q, E, D.
Gth COROLLARY.

A

The particular
infers I,

is

what

What infers inferred from the general. infers O, but what infers the infers

E

the general. This is a consequent particular does not infer of the preceding rule, and of the first axiom ; but it must be remarked that men have thought right to consider

the species of syllogism only according to its worthier con do not reckon as clusion, which is the general, so that we a particular species of syllogism that which infers only have a general conclusion. particularly, when it might Hence there is no syllogism in which the major being A, and the minor E, the conclusion is O, for (by the 5th a negative universal minor corollary) the conclusion of so that if we cannot obtain a must be

we cannot obtain any general conclusion, it will be because Thus A, E, O, is never a syllogism separately, but at all. in A, E, E. only so far as it may be contained
RULE From
For
G.

always general,

two particular propositions nothing follows. there are two affirmatives, the middle will be taken twice particularly, whether it be the subject (by the
if

i

FIGURES AND MODES OF SYLLOGISMS.

[PART

in.

2d axiom) or whether it be the attribute (by the 3d axiom). Now, by the 1st rule, nothing can be concluded from a term is taken twice particularly. syllogism whose middle And if there be a negative, the conclusion being nega tive also, by the rule preceding, there must be at least two universal terms in the premises (according to the 2d co
ought rollary). Therefore tion in these two premises, since

be a universal proposi impossible to arrange three terms in two terms, where two terms must be taken two negative attributes, universally, without having either which would be contrary to the 3d rule, or one of the
there
to
it is

subjects universal,

which makes the proposition

universal.

CHAPTER

IV.

OF THE FIGURES AM) MODES OF SYLLOGISMS LV GEKERAL. THAT THERE CAXXOT BE MORE THAN FOUR FIGURES.

AFTER

establishing the general rules
all

which must necessarily

be observed in

simple syllogisms, it remains to show how many sorts there are of such syllogisms. may say in general that there are as many sorts as there may be different ways of arranging the three propo and the three terms of which they sitions of a

We

are
laid

made
down.

syllogism, rules up, without violating the

which we have

The arrangement of the three propositions according to and the the four differences, A, E, I, O, is called mood, of the three terms, that is to say, of the arrangement middle term with the two terms of the conclusion, is called
figure.

Now we may

reckon

how many moods

there are which

afford a conclusion, without taking into account the differ ent figures in which the same mood may constitute differ

ent syllogisms, for,

by the doctrine of combinations, four

CHAP.

IV.]

FIGURES AXD MODES OF SYLLOGISMS.

187

terms (as A. E, I. 0), being taken three by three, can be But of these in sixty-four ways. differently arranged only will take the trouble to con sixty-four ways, those who sider each apart, will find that there are of them, rules, Twenty-eight excluded by the third and sixth from two nothing can be concluded from two negatives, or
particulars.

Eighteen by the

fifth,

that the conclusion follows the

weaker

part.

Six by the fourth,
clusion from

that

we cannot have a

negative con

two

affirmatives.

One.

I.

E, 0, to wit, by the third corollary of the gene

ral rules.

One. A, E. 0. to wit. by the sixth corollary of general
rules.

valid

These make in all moods remain
/

fifty-four,
:

and, consequently, only ten

fE, A. E.

Four

1

A. A, A. I. I. \

I

affirmative

<*

\

^

j

Six negative

j
<

A, E, E. E, A. 0.

(i. A, L
But
it

|O!A O
I

^ Q,
E,

gr,

o.

does not follow from

this that there are

only ten

sorts of syllogisms, since any one of these moods may be made into different syllogisms, according to the other way are diversified, by the different arrangement in which

they of the three terms, which
figure.

we have

already said

is

called

Now.
two

conclusion
:

supposed can be arranged only, with the prove it and as the middle two terms of the conclusion, in four different ways, there
are thus also only four possible figures. For the middle term is either the subject in the major, a/id the attribute in the minor, which makes the first figure. Or it is the attribute in both, which makes the second figure.

in order to this disposition of the three terms, the since the first propositions alone are to be considered, before we make the syllogism to is

Or the subject in both, which makes the third fijure. Or finally, it is the attribute in the major, and subject m

the

1

88

FIGURES AND MODES OF SYLLOGISMS.

[PART

III.

minor,

we may

which makes a fourth figure, since it is certain that sometimes have a necessary conclusion in this form, which is sufficient to constitute a valid syllogism. Examples of these will be given hereafter.
Nevertheless, since, in this fourth figure, the conclusion is obtained in a way that is by no means natural, and which the mind never takes, Aristotle, and those who have fol lowed him, have not given to this mode of reasoning the name of figure. Galen maintained the contrary but it is clear that it is only a dispute about words, which ought to be decided by making each party say what they under stand by the word figure. But, without doubt, those are mistaken who apply to the fourth figure (which they blame Aristotle for not recog nising) the arguments of the first, of which the major and minor are transposed, as when we say, All body is divisible ;
;

I

is imperfect ; therefore all body is imperfect. surprised that Gassendi has fallen into this error, for it is ridiculous to take, as a major of a syllogism, the pro position which stands first, and for the minor that which If this were so, it would be often neces stands second. sary to take the conclusion itself as the major, or minor of

all that is divisible

am

a reasoning, since it is often enough placed first or second of the three propositions which compose it, as in this verse of Horace, the conclusion is the first, the minor second,

and the major

third.

Qui melior servo, qui Kberior sit avarus; In triviis fixum, cum se diraittit ad assem Non video nam qui cupiet, metuet quoque porro Qui metuens vivit, liber mihi non erit unquam.
: :

For

it is all
is

reducible to this argument

:

He who
Every

in continual fear is not free, miser is in continual fear ;

Therefore no miser is free. are not, therefore, to consider the simple local ar rangement of the propositions, which effects no change on the mind ; but we are to take, as syllogisms of the first

We

which the middle term is subject, in the proposition where the greater term (that is to say, the attribute of the conclusion) is found, and the attribute in that where the lesser term (that is to say, the subject of
figure, all those in

and would be affirmative. and the conclusion negative by the fifth . thus violating the which forbids us to conclude from the parti cular to the general. this word term. This figure has only two rules. the minor being affirmative. that in which the middle term is subject in the major proposition. for would be negative. And it is in this way that we shall speak of the figures. by jiyure. without any being able to complain of our so doing. OF THE FIRST FIGURE. 189 the conclusion) is found. V. This reason holds also in the third figure. where the greater term is also attribute in the major. if it were negative. and attribute in the minor.. MOODS. and it is its attribute in second rule. THE first figure is.CHAP. then. ETC.] RULES. For. since we have stated beforehand that we understand. the major would be affirmative by the third general rule. by the preceding rule. And thus it follows. only a different arrangement of the middle CHAPTER RULES. AND PRINCIPLES OF THE FIRST FIGURE. V. The major must be universal . . since it in the major . MOODS. and subject in the minor. where the middle term is attribute in the major. RULE 2. 1. therefore the greater term would be taken uni particularly this figure. RULE The minor must be affirmative . that those syllogisms only are of the fourth figure. For. versally in the conclusion.

A T T (A. E. A. And. A. is taken particu larly . A. A. . (E. T (^Ui.. (A. of which the three syllables denote the three propositions. that there can be only ten valid moods but of these ten moods. otherwise it will be taken twice particularly. 1. are ex cluded by the fourth corollary from the general rules.lt. a species of syllogism. in order that they may be more easily retained. of hunger whom they RA. E. These four moods. where it is subject. Two rr. A. for the lesser term being the subject in the minor. 0. &amp. the conclusion may be universal also. A.lt. not give alms in times of public All the rich who do necessity. suffer those to die ought to support. and O. if it be universal. the major must be universal. this great service in the schools. have been reduced to artificial words. 0. rp 1 wo negative . contrary to the first general rule. which is its attribute.190 RULES. DEMONSTRATION. Therefore they are homicides. that they denote clearly. I. therefore it must be universal in the major. there remain only these four moods: . and A. That the first figure can have only four moods. a murderer. in the preceding chapter. 0. A.. are excluded by the second.. which renders this proposition universal . affirmative . which is. . 1. 1. and E. A. the middle term. MOODS. 0. Which was to be demonstrated. &amp. that the minor must be affirmative I. E. A. and the vowel of each syllable points out of what kind the proposition ought to be so that these words have been of . consequently. viz. I. n U. which otherwise could not have been explained without much circumlocu tion: BARBA- Whoever die suffers those is whom he ought to support to of hunger. are excluded by the first rule of this figure. by a single word. We have shown. AND PRINCIPLES [PART III.

that it is not necessary to say more of It is sufficient to state.CHAP. taken universally. and that.] OF THE FIRST FIGURE. Therefore there are some pleasures ivhich are not be wished for. There are some pleasures ivhich are followed by a just repentance . PRINCIPLE OF THE AFFIRMATIVE MOODS. by antecedent. men. 191 CELA- No All impenitent thief can expect to be saved. V. explained in the chapter where we treated of the nature of tension this idea. that it is com monly expressed in the schools in the following manner : Quod. church. is understood the general which is affirmed of another. belongs also to e eery thing of which that idea is affirmed. the sub- . convenit antecedents. That which belongs to an idea. DAHI- Everything ivhich is a help to salvation is beneficial. the other for the negative moods. and. Since in this figure the greater term is affirmed or denied of the middle. idea by the term consequent. one for the affirmative moods. it is clear that it is founded on two principles. and this same middle is then affirmed in the minor of the lesser term. those who die without making restitution. to o. convenit consequenti. There are some afflictions which are helps to salva tion . Therefore there are some afflictions which are bene ficial. or subject of the conclusion. Thus the idea of animal belonging for these expressions are to all of affirmative propositions. Therefore none such can expect to saved. or which synonymous. BASIS OF THE FIRST FIGURE. belongs This principle has been so clearly also to all Ethiopians. after haviny enriched themselves w-ith the wealth of the lie REXT. i. are impenitent thieves. FERI- Whatever is followed by a just repentance is not to be wished for . taken universally. it here. or which is is comprehended under the ex subject of that idea.

obtained. AND PRINCIPLES [PART III. negatur de antecedentL What we have said. renders it unnecessary to say more here. it is. the attribute if it be man. and attribute in the minor. and. therefore. since they are animals. be taken generally in the particularly. that it is only in the first figure that we obtain a conclusion in all the four A. lesser term must be taken generally in the minor. VI. Tree is denied of all animals . thus Quod negatur de consequent!. I. E. MOODS. PRINCIPLE OK NEGATIVE MOODS. is denied of an idea. be its Now the characteristic of the first figure is. and the middle term its attri bute . in treating of negative propositions. since. it must observe these two rules. that subject. THE second figure is that in which the middle term is taken twice as attribute . It must be remarked. AND PRINCIPLES OF THE SECOND FIGURE. that in clusion in the form of order to make the conclusion a universal affirmative. . is also animal. therefore. denied of It is commonly expressed all men. And that it is in the first alone that we obtain a con the reason of which is. O. in the schools. be its subject. that. by which it is affirmed. CHAPTER RULES. major by the first general rule. taken universally. as a consequent from the subject. whence it happens that the middle is there taken It must. MOODS. consequently. the Whatever also : A .192 ject is it RULES. whence it follows. is denied of everything ofivhich that idea is affirmed. and. in reality. in order to its concluding necessarily. consequently. the middle term be subject in the major proposition.

{^ (. is excluded by the second rule. who are who followers of Jesus Christ crucify the flesh. All those CAMESTRES. No liar is to be believed.-&quot. The major proposition must be universal . can be only four moods in the second figure. the middle. which is. the conclusion being negative. Of the ten valid moods the four affirmative are excluded by the first rule of this figure. That There remain. Therefore no good man is a liar. the conclusion also. is excluded for the same reason as in the first figure for the lesser term is also subject in the minor.} ^i ^ -L&amp. particular.CHAP. only these Two general. contrary to the first general rule. which is here always attribute. that one of the premises must be negative.] OP THE SECOND FIGURE.gt. of these ten moods. VI. O. Which was to be demonstrated. quently. Every good man is to be believed . ffi (J\. O. render the major universal. therefore it must be universal. is taken universally. and. All those lead an effeminate and voluptuous life do not crucify the flesh . consequently. RULE 2. if the 1 . four : therefore. two propositions must be negative. Now. that the major must be universal. U. there . 193 RULE One of For. Therefore none such are followers of Jesus Christ. which is. this same term is subject in the major. DEMONSTRATION.- Two *&amp. U. A. conse . . or attribute.. the greater term. These four moods have been comprehended under the following artificial words : CESARE. would be taken twice parti cularly. A. and. E. by the sixth general rule both propositions were affirmative. For.lt. 0.

they may be considered first . a zeal without discretion . the force of the argument. of all the subjects of that idea . that the reasonings in Cesare are. is Therefore there is a zeal which is not a virtue. by It is true that this saying that no liar is to be believed. Therefore there a love of peace which is not virtue. by this term reasonings. Every There virtue is accompanied with discretion. But. for it is clear that the arguments in Cesare and Festino are established on this In order to show. BAROCO. aspect of denying is indirect. easily and clearly. for example. 1. love ofpeace which is a a love of truth NO. MOODS. that no good principle. clear and . notwithstanding. but it is more beneficial to reduce two of them to one principle. man is a liar.194 RULES. of these principles is that which serves also as a basis for the negative arguments of the first figure. is more clear and immediate. that which is denied of a universal idea is denied also of everything of which that idea is affirmed. indirect. and I denied liar of every man who was to be believed. since. and the connection they have with them. and two to another. I denied to be believed of liar. The as direct. we deny that universal subject of the attribute. to be believed of every good man. It would be easy to reduce all these different sorts of reasonings to a single principle. in place of denying liar to be believed. FESTI- No virtue is is contrary to the love is of truth. since that which is denied of them is only denied indirectly but as this does not prevent the mind from comprehending. since their dependence on these two principles. by a little explanation . This shows. that is to say. opposed to There a . BASIS OF THE SECOND FIGURE. as universal negative propositions are converted simply by denying the attribute of a universal subject. to wit. PRINCIPLES OF THE ARGUMENTS IN Cesare AND Festino. AND PRINCIPLES [PART III. in some sort. I affirmed. understanding natural.

the mind is. CHAPTER RULES. nevertheless. No liar is to be believed. Cesare and Festino. twice taken as sub whence it follows : . although the direct order of _ differ us to say. AND PRINCIPLES OF THE THIRD FIGURE. nevertheless. VII. VII. it often happens. therefore true Christian of those . have given. MOODS. is IN the third figure the middle term ject. This also shows that the two moods. in that which we readily employs them. which shows that they are established directly on this principle Nothing that is comprehended under the extension of a universal idea belongs to any of the subjects of which that idea is denied. as we have proved in the Second Part. and denied of the subject. is affirmed of the conclusion. from Celarent and Ferio of the first. In these two moods the middle term attribute of the : True Christians are comprehended under the extension of charitable. 195 negation require is a liar. But though we may say that the negative moods of the first figure are more direct. who this are without mercy towards the poor Every true Christian which makes charitable.CHAP. which answer to them. Therefore none who are without pity to the poor are true Christians. and that the mind more For example. No man is to be believed who PRINCIPLES OF THE ARGUMENTS IN Camcstres AND Banco. that these two of the second figure. since every true Christian is charitable. the attribute of a negative proposition being taken in the whole of its extension. are more natural.] OF THE THIRD FIGURE. only in having their major reversed. which would have made an argument in Celarent. naturally led to say. charitable is denied of those who are pitiless towards the poor . argument is None who are without pity for the poor are charitable.

and A. For the minor being always affirmative. some enemies which he cannot abandon.E. of matter is most certain.0. A. first rule of the already proved by the in both the attribute of the conclusion is figure. 3 negative -&amp. (E. which is its attribute. are ex cluded by the first rule of this figure. A. That figure. contrary to the second general DEMONSTRATION. therefore. be particular. though in a different order : DARAPTI. A. 1. (0. and E. A. E. the second rule. Therefore. 0. therefore. Which was to be demonstrated. therefore. The The infinite divisibility infinite divisibility There are. of matter is incomprehensible. these six moods (A. There : remain. A. MOODS. A. that the minor be not negative. 0. There are.196 RULES. since this would be to infer the general from the particular. O. is particular. No man is able to is Every man abandon himself. I. an enemy to himself. E. it cannot be universal in the conclusion. A. A. that the conclusion cannot be general.lt. (I. . FELAPTON. O. EULE That This first minor proposition must be affirmative. [PART VI.1. These six moods have been reduced to the following artificial words. which is. I.A. AND PRINCIPLES 1. the lesser term. some things most certain which are incomprehensible. EULE The conclusion must 2. where it is subject. 3 affirmative \ A. E. rule. there can be no more than six moods in the third Of the ten valid moods. since the we have also the attribute of the major. are excluded by which is. 1.

CHAP.
DiSAMIS.

VII.]

OP THE THIRD FIGURE.

197

There are some wicked men in the highest state; All wicked men are miserable ; Therefore, there are some miserable who are in
highest state.

the

DATIsi.

Every servant of God

Some

is a king; are poor ; Therefore some poor are kings.

servants of

God

BoCARDO.

There

Every kind of anger

some anger which is not blameworthy; is a passion ; Therefore some passions are not blameworthy.
is is

FERI-

No folly
There
is

eloquent;

SON.

into figures ; Therefore there arejigures which are not eloquent.

some folly put

BASIS OF

THE THIRD FIGURE.

The two terms of the conclusion being attributed, in the premises, to a single term, which serves as the middle, we may reduce the affirmative moods to this figure to the fol
lowing principle
:

PRINCIPLE OF AFFIRMATIVE MOODS.

When
may

two terms may be affirmed of

the

same

thing, the;/

also be affirmed taken particularly.

For, being united together in that thing, since they belong to it, it follows that they are sometimes united to the one of the other gether, so that they may be affirmed But in order that we may be sure that these particularly. terms have been affirmed of the same thing, which is the middle term, it is necessary that this middle term be taken once universally at least for if it were taken twice par different parts of a common ticularly, they might be two term, which would not be the same thing.
;

PRINCIPLE OF NEGATIVE MOODS.
Wli-en of two terms one
???.
//

firmed, of the same thing, tiny each other.

may

be denied, and the other af be denied particularly of

198

MOODS OF THE FOURTH FIGURE.

[PART

III,

For it is certain they are not always joined together, since they are not joined in this thing therefore we may sometimes deny them of each other, that is to say, we may deny them of each other, taken particularly. But it is necessary, for the same reason, in order to its being the
;

same

thing, that the middle at least.

term be taken universally once

CHAPTER

VIII.

OF THE MOODS OF THE FOURTH FIGURE.

THE fourth figure is that in which the middle term is attribute in the major, and subject in the minor. But it is so far from natural, that it is almost useless to give the rules
for it

they are, however, given below, in order that nothing may be wanting to the demonstration of all the simple forms of reasoning.
;

ElILE

1.

When the major proposition is affirmative, the minor is always universal. For the middle term is taken particularly in the affirma
tive major, since

the

It must, therefore, by it is its attribute. general rule, be taken generally in the minor, and consequently render it universal, since it is its subject.
first

RULE When
ticular.

2.
is

the

minor

is

affirmative, the conclusion

always par

For the
sequently,

lesser
is

Whence

it

term is attribute in the minor, and, con there taken particularly when it is affirmative. follows (by the second general rule) that it

CHAP.

VIII.]

MOODS OF THE FOURTH FIGURE.

ID!)

must be

also particular in the conclusion, particular, since it is its subject.

which renders

it

RULE
In
the negative

3.

moods

the

For the conclusion being
there taken generally.

major proposition must be general. negative, the greater term is It must, therefore (by the second

in the premises. general rule), be also taken generally Now it is here, as in the second figure, the subject of the as in the second figure, major, and consequently it must, being taken generally, render the major general.

DEMONSTRATION.
there can be no more thanfice moods in the fourth jifjure. the ten valid moods, A, I, I, and A, O, 0, are ex cluded by the first rule A, A, A, and K, A, E, are ex cluded by the second O, A, O, by the third. There remain, therefore, only these five

That

Of

;

;

:

2 affirmative

^
{ J I

A T L
,

3 negative

O. JK, A,
(E,
I,

O.

ficial

These five moods may be embodied words
:

in the following arti

BARDARI.

All

the miracles
is

of nature are common;
does not arrest our attention; do not arrest our at

Whatever

common

Some
All

which things, therefore,

CALENTES.

DiBATIS.

of nature. of life are transitory evils; No transitory evils are to be feared; that are to be feared are Therefore none of the evils evils of this life. Some fools speak the truth;
tention, are miracles

the evils

FESPAMO.

Whoever speaks the truth deserves u ho deserve to be imitated. Therefore there are some ivho are nevertheless fools. No virtue is a natural quality; its author; Every natural quality has God for there are qualities which hace God jor Therefore their author, which are not virtues.

to be

imitated;

200

MOODS OF THE FOURTH FIGURE.

[PART

III.

FREsi-

No

miserable

man

is

content;

Some

are content

who are poor;
.

SOM.

are not unhappy Therefore there are poor people ivho

It is well to state that these five

moods are commonly

way, BaraKpton, Celantes, Dabitis, Faexpressed This arose from the fact that Aris pesmo, Frisesomorum. totle never having made a separate figure for these moods, indirect moods of the first they were regarded as only was maintained that their conclusion was figure, since it reversed, and that the attribute was the real subject. Hence, those who have followed this opinion, have placed as the first proposition, that which contains the subject of the conclusion, and as the minor, that which contains the Thus they have given nine moods to the first attribute. four direct, and five indirect, which they have in
in
this
figure,

cluded in these two verses

:

Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferio, Baralip-fow.
Celantes, Dabitis, Fapesmo, Frisesom-orMwi.

And

for the

two other

figures

Ccsare, Camestres, Festino, Baroco, Darapti, Felapton, Disamis, Datisi, Bocardo, Ferison.

But as the conclusion is always supposed, since it is that which we design to prove, we cannot say properly that it
is

ever reversed ; we, therefore, thought it better to take into which the attri always, as the major, the proposition bute of the conclusion enters, which obliged us, in order to put the major first, to reverse these artificial terms, so we may include them that, for the better retaining of them,
in this verse
:

Barbari, Calentes, Dibatis, Fespamo, Frisesom.

RECAPITULATION

Of

the different Sorts

of Syllogisms.

From all that we have just said, it may be concluded that there are nineteen kinds of syllogisms, which may be divided in different ways.

CHAP. IX.]
I.

COMPLEX SYLLOGISMS.
(
<

201
Affirmative
AT
,

Into

General
T-,
,

5.
-, /.

TT

.

(

Particular 14.

,

II.

T Into
,

(
<

7.

(

Negative

12.

AI.
III. Into those

which

ive conclusions in

^

^ 1

b.

08.
4. According to the different figures, in subdividing them by moods, which has already been sufficiently done,

in the explanation of each figure.
5. Or, on the contrary, according to the moods, in sub dividing them by the figures, where we shall still find nine teen species of syllogisms, since there are three moods, each of which only concludes in a single figure ; six, each of which is valid in two figures, and one which is valid in all

the four.

CHAPTER

IX.

OF COMPLEX SYLLOGISMS, AND THE WAY IN WHICH THEY MAY BE REDUCED TO COMMON SYLLOGISMS, AND JUDGE! OF BY THE SAME RULES.
IT must be confessed, that if there are some to whom logic a help, there are many to whom it is a hindrance ; and it must be acknowledged, at the same time, that there are none to whom it is a greater hindrance than to those who and who affect, with the pride themselves most upon it, that they are good logicians ; for this greatest display, a low and shallow mind, very affectation, being the mark of to it comes to pass that they, attaching themselves more
the exterior of the rules than to good sense, which is the soul of them, are easily led to reject as bad reason since they have not sufing, some which are very good,

>

is

202
ficient

COMPLEX SYLLOGISMS.

[PAKT

III.

penetration to adjust them to the rules, which serve no other purpose than to deceive them, because they

comprehend them only imperfectly. In order to avoid this defect, which partakes strongly of that pedantry which is so unworthy in a noble minded man, we ought rather to examine the solidity of a reason ing by the light of nature than by mere forms and one of the means of satisfying ourselves, when we meet with any
;

difficulty, is to

us to afford a good conclusion, by considering only the good sense of it ; if we find, at the same time, that it contains something not conformed to the rules, we ought rather to believe that
ferent matters,
this is

make other reasonings similar and when it appears clearly to

to

it

in dif

owing

to

some

defect in our explication than to

its

being so in
aright,

reality.

But the reasonings of which it is more difficult to judge and in which it is more easy to be deceived, are

plex, not

we have already said, may be called com simply because there were found in them complex propositions, but because the terms of the conclusion being complex, were not taken in all their entirety, in each of the premises, in order to be joined with the middle, but only a part of one of the terms, as in this example The sun is a thing insensible; The Persians worship the sun; Therefore the Persians ivorship a thing insensible. In which we see that the conclusion having its attribute, worship a thing insensible, only a part of this is placed in the major, to wit, a thing insensible, and worshipped in the minor. Now we shall do two things in relation to these syllo
those which, as

be reduced

show, in the first place, how they may incomplex syllogisms of which we have hitherto spoken, in order to their being judged by the
gisms.
shall
to the

We

same

rules.

And we shall show, in the second place, that more gene ral rules may be given, for judging at once of the validity
to

or viciousness of these syllogisms, without having recourse any reduction.

It is a thing strange enough, that although logic has occupied a higher position thrxi it deserved, so that it has been maintained that it was absolutely necessary for

CHAP. IX.]

COMPLEX SYLLOGISMS.

203

with so

it has, nevertheless, been treated of attention, that hardly anything has been said touching aught that is of real use ; for logicians commonly content themselves with giving the rules for simple syllo

acquiring the sciences,
little

gisms, and almost all the examples given of them arc com posed of incomplex propositions, which are so clear that no one would ever have thought of seriously composing them in any discourse for who has ever heard of any one
;

making such a syllogism as this Every man is an animal; Peter is a man ; therefore Peter is an animal. But little pains are taken in applying the rules of syllo gism to arguments of which the propositions are complex,
:

though this is often very difficult, and there are many arguments of this nature which appear bad, which are nevertheless very good and besides, the use of such rea
;

sonings is much more frequent than that of syllogisms which are quite simple. This will be shown more easily by examples than by rules.

EXAMPLE

1.

have said, for example, that all propositions com of active verbs are complex in some manner and posed of these propositions reasonings are often made, whose
;

We

form and force are difficult to recognise as this, which we have already given as an example The divine law commands us to honour kinys ;
;

Louis

XIV. is a king ; Therefore the divine law

commands

us to honour J^n/ts

of small intelligence have accused such are reasonings of being defective, because, say they, they of pure affirmatives in the second iigure, which composed
is

XIV. Some persons

But these persons have shown an essential defect. more the letter and sur clearly that they have consulted face of the rules, than the light of reason, by which these for this reasoning is so true and rules were discovered
;

to the rule, it would prove that the rule was false, not that the reasoning was bad. for in I say that, in the first place, this argument is good this proposition, the dicine law commands us to honour kittya,

valid, that if

it

were opposed

;

204
this

COMPLEX SYLLOGISMS.

[PAKT

III.

in parti word, kings, is taken generally for all kings and consequently Louis XIV. is among those whom cular, the divine law commands us to honour. middle I say, in the second place, that king, which is the the divine law not the attribute in this proposition term, is commands us to honour kings though it may be joined with the attribute command, which is a very different thing,
is affirmed, and really the attribute, and does not king is not affirmed, agrees. law of God ; second, the attribute is re agree with the the word king is not re stricted by the subject, the divine law commands us to in this proposition stricted honour kings, since it is taken generally.

for

what, which

is

Now,

first,

Now

But if it is demanded, then, what it really is, it is easy in to reply that it is the subject of another proposition law com volved in this ; for when I say that the divine mands us to honour kings, as I attribute command to the
to kings, for it is as if I said, law, I attribute also honour law commands that kings be honoured. the divine the divine law commands us in this conclusion

So

also

XIV. Louis XIV. is not the attribute, he is, on the contrary, the sub although joined to it, and as if of an involved proposition for it is the same ject law commands that Louis XIV. be honoured. said, the divine are unfolded in the following Thus these
to

honour Louis

.

;

propositions

way

:

The

divine latv

commands
;

that kings be honoured;

Louis

king law Therefore the divine honoured.

XIV.

is

commands

that Louis

XIV.

be

It is clear that the

whole argument

consists in these

propositions Kings ought

:

to be
is

honoured;
;

Louis

XIV.

king

to be honoured. Therefore Louis XIV. ought And that this proposition the divine law commands which appears the principal, is only an incidental proposi the in this argument, joined to the affirmation, which

tion,

divine law helps to prove. in Barbara ot the It is clear also that this reasoning is, Louis XIV., standing first figure, the individual terms, as

the propositions of which affirmatives in the second figure. reduced not to this negative. t/:Jn&amp. ought The Scripture ought Tradition way to be believed. this argument. Therefore ice ought not to believe tradition. IX. And the conclusion. taken in all their 205 extension.CHAP. which contains in sense this pro the present pastors are not ready to give Most position. EXAMPLE 3. of their lives for their sheep. EXAMPLE 2. Therefore tradition ought we are not able to conclude anything from the first figure. is worth nothing is : For not Scripture. Therefore there are in the present day few good pastors. which. being of minor appears to have a negative Those who cannot be robbed of what they love are out of : the reach of their enemies. may be Many of the present pastors are good pastors. that we conclude Now there are For the minor is an affirmatively only in appearance. as they are we have already remarked. But what makes this reasoning good is. exclusive proposition. also. For the same reason. and conformed to the rules of that figure. Now is not Scripture. to be reduced to the first figure in this it ought Tradition We to believe the Scripture. not to be believed. as Every good pastor is ready to give his life for his sheep. appear There are other reasonings.gt. as for universals. EXAMPLE Here figure. . which to be pure : are nevertheless very good. 4. are few pastors in the present day ready to give their lives for their sheep. which appears to be of the second figure. from a negative minor.] COMPLEX SYLLOGISMS. the first is another argument.

206 COMPLEX SYLLOGISMS. Now not happy. that is to say. is what happens again. Therefore there are rich men who are not happy. but. since is not friends of God. affirmatively. loves [PART III. where the major an ex clusive proposition. and is in reality affirmative. since the subject of the major. Now. is not those who may be robbed of what they love. Therefore there are rich men man is not the friend of God. For the particle only makes the first proposition in this the friends of God syllogism equal in meaning to these two are happy. Now. which is clearly an affirmative proposition. becomes affirmative. Therefore all those who love reach of their enemies. . that it is the same thing to say negatively. as. are there are rich it is on this second proposition that the force of the reasoning depends. is negative What makes EXAMPLE This is 5. Now all those who love God alone are among the. Now. who are not the friends of God. and. that a are no friends of God. so that the sense of the minor is. on the contrary. and to take away from it the appearance of a negative proposition. which ought to be the attribute in the minor. is. and to say. that the minor only in appearance. but those who are not the friends of God. those who cannot be robbed. number of those who cannot be robbed of what they love. for the subject of the major. he cannot be robbed God alone. all others. which ought to be the attribute in the minor. so that the whole argument ought to stand thus All those who are not the friends of God are not happy. are out of the this argument quite valid is. But what makes it necessary to express the minor in this way. when a man of what he loves. which appears to be negative. Those only who love God are happy. that he is no friend of God. the minor. that he is among the number of -those who are not the friends of God. men who do not love God . there are rich men among the number of those who : who are not happy. God alone. Now this is what we affirm of those who love God alone.

no enthythese examples are only enthymemes.CHAP. 6.] COMl I. and. which are conclusive only first. since the middle. sition affirmative of a negative attribute. and in reality. therefore he is not a man. affirmative. without distinction. because there in appearance. which. John not consequently. no animal sees. in the mind because they contain these syllogisms complete who uses them. very good. the minor of this and such other syllogisms. Therefore the soul cannotperishby the There are several who advance such syllogisms to show that we have no right to maintain that this. ought in both these examples. though it be not expressed. as negative only we have already shown. the therefore a man . true generally. save in virtue of a proposition meme to be in the mind. stood. and that under is conclusive. neverthe is in them one which is less. and as we may still further see by this example its : That which has no parts cannot perish by parts. . consequently. of which all the propositions appear negative. that negative these conclusives reasonings are sometimes conclusive. not/tiny cart be. cannot say that these syllogisms are purely negative. which is a propo minor is. Now the subject of the major is not that which has parts. this is all man is rational. but that which has not parts. . and on the other every man is therefore \ve an animal. the dissolution of The soul has no parts dissolution of its parts. : sees. The same persons sometimes prove. and thus the sense of the the sonl is a thing without parts. No animal But they ought to consider that no man sees. IX. and which are. In the proposition understood is necessarily affirmative. by John is not rational.is but they have not observed that in sense. Now. is affirmative. John is not rational. again.EX SYLLOGISMS. ^07 EXAMPLE There are many reasonings such as these. which is the subject of the major. therefore no man sees. Now. proved by pure neyatives. is in it the attribute. the enthymemes. cannot be brought as examples to of him which show that there are some purely negative reasonings afford valid conclusions.

the truth of which is not evident. it appears that all we have to do is to find a proposition. and thus be of no service in making it clearer. for this reason. in order. . But as it does not appear that our minds need this reduction in order to make this judgment. if it did. we were led to think that there must be rules more general on which these common ones themselves were founded. CHAPTER X. and the following is what has occurred to us in relation to this matter. if I doubt whether a vicious man is un happy. BY WHICH. and this one may the excellencies or defects of be called applicative. WE MAY JUDGE OF THE EXCELLENCE OR DEFECT OF ANY SYLLOGISM. When we wish to prove a proposition. and reason thus Every one who is the slave of his passions is unhappy. by reducing them to the form of more common reasonings. by which we might recognise more easily all kinds of syllogisms. to judge of them by the common rules. since they both in some sort. because. WE Lave seen how we may judge whether complex argu ments are conclusive or vicious. A GENERAL PRINCIPLE. WITHOUT ANY REDUC TION TO FIGURES AND MODES. then. and each serves to show that the other contains it. contain what we wish to prove. same terms. Therefore every vicious man is . better known. which. it is necessary there should be yet another proposition which may show that that which we called containing. it is often indifferent which of the two is called containing. [PART III. In affirmative syllogisms. may be called the proposition But since it cannot contain it expressly in the containing.208 EXCELLENCIES OR DEFECTS OP SYLLOGISMS. For example. does. Every vicious man is the slave of his passions unhappy. contain the conclusion. in reality. it would not differ from the other. which confirms the other.

that the minor. and the minor contains comprehends in its it also.Baroco. according to the major. as in Celarent. separating. and that the other shows this and that arguments are vicious only when we that they are always good when it is fail to observe this observed. and in the conbe. contained in the It is not difficult to prove that all the rules which we have given serve only to show that the conclusion is con tained in one of the first propositions. : term can be more general in the conclusion titan in the premises. whether the negative be the major. which is nega tive. is happy : Every happy man No content . Cesare. and as the negation is properly con tained in the negation alone. since slave of Ms passions contains under it vicious. and that the other shows it . that vicious is contained under its extension. happy is it also happy. since slave of his passions. which are the foundations . as the is major shows. it almost always the more as the proposition con is commonly regarded as the proposition applicative.CHAP. as the major general. as the minor shows . totally miser from content.Whichever proposition you take. and is one of its subjects. as in Camestres and . if the same term. whole extension of content. and the affirmative as the applicative exclusively. this clearly depends on the general principle that the which could not premises ought to obtain the conclusion. which is also negative. that no ples. or whether it be the minor. Therefore no miser is happy . being in the premises Now . and that the major serves the purpose of showing that it con For this minor. Festino. for the major contains it. Nevertheless. that is to say. X. Ferio. idea that of unhappy. it is more natural to say. as there is only one and the minor negative proposition. no miser is content. 209 &quot. it appears that we ought al ways to take the negative proposition as the containing. contains the conclusion. taining. In relation to negative syllogisms. you may say that it contains the conclusion. for all these rules may be reduced to two princi of the others one. . tains it. For if I prove miser is by this is argument that no miser content. separates from since.] EXCELLENCIES OR DEFECTS OF SYLLOGISMS.

clusion. Taken univer . every saint is a friend of God. some friend of God is poor. And consequently. a particular term is of no determinate extent. in relation to the other. only in virtue of a proposition in which it is taken uni versally. since it must be shown that friend of God is con tained in the comprehension of the idea saint. some friend of God. man. it is necessary that every saint be the friend of God. I say that we shall never be able clearly to see that this proposition contains the conclusion. D. III. may contain the term. except by another proposition in which the middle proposition. supposing is we wished to God poor. for it is clear that in order that this proposition. which can only be shown by affirming saint of God. is taken universally. [PART elusion. contain the term. may be contained in the idea of saint. it is necessary that friend of God be contained in the comprehension of premises. some saint is poor. E. some friend of God is poor. this proposition. since. some friend of God. in order that the term. and consequently none contain the conclusion. whence it follows that this conclusion. for the less general premises than in the con does not contain the more some man does not contain all men. is taken particularly). . may be affirmed of every man sally. they have it in common. some saint is poor (where the middle term. that the middle term ought to be less extension in the had taken at least once universally. For. can be contained in this proposition. of the premises will when the middle term tions. which is saint. in order that friend of God. may contain the conclusion. general. Q. some saints are poor. all that is contained in the comprehension of an all that is con idea. may be universally affirmed of it tained in the comprehension of the idea of triangle may be affirmed of every triangle. Now.210 EXCELLENCIES OR DEFECTS OF SYLLOGISMS. that the conclusion ought to be contained in the friend of to prove that some employ. some saint. all that is contained in the idea : and consequently. and it contains certainly only that which is involved in its comprehension and idea. Now. and were the idea of saint. which depends again on this principle. The other general rule is. unless it is taken particularly in one of the proposi be taken universally in the other. for this purpose. saint. it is both necessary and sufficient that the term some saint.

and that it .] APPARENTLY INVOLVED SYLLOGISMS. complex or incomplex. or does not contain another. those who commit cri minal actions. is taken universally. Second Part. by what has been already said in the meant by the comprehension and extension of terms. and the This will be better compre other s/iow that it contains it. will contain which there is engage in a dud. we may judge of the excellency or defect of every syllogism with out considering whether it is simple or compound. That one of the tico propositions must contain the conclusion. except that in the one. exclusively by this general principle. criminal actions. consider whether the conclusion is contained in one of the two first propositions. Now. and I find at once that the first having nothing different from the conclusion. EXAMPLE I 1. mitting criminal actions contains engaging Now it is clear by the sense that the term those who that in commit criminal actions. therefore. without paying any attention to figures or moods. what is proposition contains. Therefore it is the duty of a Christian not to praise those who engage in duels.CHAP. XI. and if the other shows it. and in the other. provided that com in duels. I need not trouble myself as to the figure or mood It is sufficient for me to to which this may be reduced. hended by some examples. Nowthosewhoengagein a duel commit a criminal action. am in doubt whether this reasoning be good. by which we may determine when one KNOWING. The duty of a Christian is not to praise those who commit. that in which there is commit criminal actions. 211 CHAPTER XL APPLICATION OF THIS GENERAL PRINCIPLE TO MANY SYLLO GISMS WHICH APPEAR TO BE INVOLVED. those who engage in duels.

. in which case the live will be false. 3 in form but the major of the second is false. although first the place of subject in attribute. are good who unless we understand by the word Christian. to Christians. in the in the second. is it by another the Second Part. and not for Christians the gospel promises some Christians only. showing that to engage in a dud is contained under this term. Therefore the gospel promises salva these wicked Christians to not be among the number of those the gospel promises salvation. commit criminal actions. since promises it to wicked men. who commit criminal actions. in the one case. that of which we affirm Now. we must judge viz. when it is expressed indefinitely. also that the first proposition contains the conclusion. form part of example. For that it tion only to some Christians. and it is not conclusive not Christians only. if salvation to wicked men. [PART III. those who engage in a duel com mit a criminal action. since there are no wicked men who . they to them. which is given in in relation to facts. extends to all those who commit any such actions what ever and thus the minor. Some wicked men are Christians. if it be taken for some Christians. that salvation not being restricted. they nevertheless take For it is relation to another part of the same attribute. But in order to determine whether it was taken univer sally. EXAMPLE The gospel promises salvation 2.212 APPARENTLY INVOLVED SYLLOGISMS. and in the other. it does not follow who may be Christians. that we ought not of them that we affirm. shows . and Christians. I doubt whether this reasoning be good. is promised to praise them. conformably to the gospel. I need only consider that the unless the word major cannot contain the conclusion be taken generally for all Christians. those minor live conformably to the gospel. In order to determine this. consequently. for then the first proposition will contain the conclusion. . And. Hence is this reasoning is sufficiently conclusive (but the major all if the word Christians be taken in the major for men may whom false). Except rule. taken universally those an and thus both arguments ought to be taken universally.

says that you an animal. things Nou. as it ought to do in order to guarantee the conclusion in This is the case in the following virtue of this minor. in the number of things which is comprised are contrary to the law of God. ing is easy to see. first propositions is contained in the does not follow that because the divine law does not command one thing it has not commanded another . are says that you are a goose. Bishops are not secular magistrates. argument. We lowing may. . servants to obey Therefore Christianity does not oblige their masters in an unlawful business. The divine law commands us to obey secular magistrates . easily refute common sophism He who He who says that you are an animal speaks truly. since the minor.CHAP XI. and the major being ex does not clusive. unlawful traffic is contrary to the law of God. and renders o it valid : EXAMPLE 4. by this same : the fol principle. the major contains the conclusion. Therefore he who says that you are a goose speaks truly.] APPLICATION OF GENERAL PRINCIPLE. The divine law servants to obey their masters in anything that is con oblige trary to the law of God. 213 EXAMPLE It is 3. command us to obey For neither of the conclusion. since it and that the commandment to honour secular magistrates But the major does not say does not include bishops. Therefore the divine law does not bishops. it is as though we said. by the same principle. that this reason worth nothing. EXAMPLE 5. that God has made no other commandments besides this. their masters in those Christianity obliges servants to obey only ivhich are not contrary to the law of God. For unlawful traffic. and thus the minor shows well enough that bishops are not comprised under the term secular magistrates.

a man. and goose in the conclusion). as appears from his saying. I am a man. animal must contain goose. since he who speaks is not every man. does not show that it is contained in it. / am a man. but only some man. too. is negative. now and the other / am the general is not contained in the particular. This argument is unsound by the rules of the figures since its it is of the is first. the term man is there taken universally.214 For APPARENTLY INVOLVED SYLLOGISMS. . of these propositions. the attribute of this incidental proposition. since it is the attribute of an affirmative proposition . it could contain goose only in its comprehension to show which. which is But is enough to say that the con first clusion not contained in the proposition. pro positions contain the conclusion for if the major contained it (differing from the conclusion only in this. since animal is again taken particularly : in the minor. and is not either. EXAMPLE 6. and thus is not contained in the term what I am. Therefore you are not a man. which cannot be done. it is ETC. and consequently. and the first proposition. but animal is taken particularly in this major. enough to say that neither of the two . since proposition. in the applicative proposition. it is the attribute of this affirmative incidental you are an animal. [PART first III. in which the term man is restricted to a partial signification. being there. For the conclusion being negative. minor. we may refute that ancient sophism re : ferred to by St Augustine You are not what I am. the word animal must be taken universally in the minor by affirming goose of every animal. that there is animal in the major. By this. you are an animal. as well as in the major.

tee posit the conse quent : If matter cannot move of itself its first motion must have been gicen to it by God. in we to this rule affirm the antecedent in the minor. the consequent.. Conditional syllogisms are those in which the major is a conditional proposition which contains all the conclu sion : as. The major has two the antecedent. he ought is a God . if there be a God. Now matter cannot move of itself. but those only whose major is so compounded that it contains the whole of the conclu These may be reduced to three kinds conditional.] CONJUNCTIVE SYLLOGISMS. he ought to be loved. . ALL syllogisms arc not conjunctive whose propositions are conjunctive or compound. having affirmed the consequent the major. Therefore none of the elect perish. xii. by God. we take away the ante If any of the elect perish. according In positing the antecedent. disjunctive^ and copulative. This syllogism may be of two kinds. The first is. second.HAP. when. order to take away the antecedent. If there is Now there a God. Its first movement must therefore have been given to if . parts : to be loved. OF CONDITIONAL SYLLOGISMS. sion. Therefore he ought to be loved. first. 215 CHAPTER XII. OF CONJUNCTIVE SYLLOGISMS. But God is not deceived. when we take away the consequent. in The second kind is. God is deceived. according to this In taking away : rule cedent the consequent. since from the same major we may form two conclusions.

idque recte factum esse defenderem. when the major is an irrational condition. some of these conditional argu ments which appear to have this defect. whether it be true or false. quia nonfallitur Deus. of which the consequent is contrary to the rules as if I conclude the general from the particular in saying. of conditional arguments which are false. though not expressed. we deceive ourselves in all But this falsehood in the major of these syllogisms re gards rather the matter than the form thus we consider them as vicious in relation to the form. If the Chinese are Mohammedans. The one is.216 This is CONJUNCTIVE SYLLOGISMS. however. we infer the negation of the consequent : as in the same The second kind example. quid This est quod meam defensionam latio legis impediat ? argument would seem to resemble that of a blasphemer. Therefore they are Mohammedans. fallitur the reasoning of St Augustine Horum si quisquam Deus . Example Cicero having published a law against those who bought suffrages. of acting in this defence stood in : contrary to his own law. cum vero nihil commissum contra legem esse defendam. Now they are infidels. they are They are not Mohammedans. is when. justifying himself from the reproach which Cato brought against him. : . : when we infer the antecedent from the consequent: they are infidels. because there is an exclusion under the major. facerem improbe. etiam si alius legem tulisset . when the conclu sion is wrongly deduced from the major. perit. never theless very good. things. which is done . which are. by this argument Etenim si largitionem factam esse confiterer. Therefore they are not infidels. as if we say If the Chinese are Mohammedans. If we : deceive ourselves in anything. and Murimus being accused of buying them. in two ways First. from the negation of the antecedent. Conditional arguments are vicious in two ways. reasonable or unreasonable . infidels. : [PART III. Cicero pleaded for him. There are. sed nemo eorum perit.

lut although I blaspheme.CHAP. because there are other crimes besides atheism. to their will. which render a man wicked but that which makes Cicero s good. and tain that he nevertheless justified his action . in IfJudas entered into Virgil. in speaking to Jupiter in Virgil : The same may be Si sine Juveris auxilio pace tua. the . Therefore he ought not to be rejected by God. as though it had been The Trojans then alone would have been punishable. rieque illos sin tot responsa secuti. But that which preserves the reasoning of Venus.st. But they have not come contrary to the will of the gods Therefore they are not punishable. &c. If I denied there was a God. Or we may say. therefore I am not a wicked sinner. It is therefore necessary to it . This argument proves nothing. which is the same thing. they are punishable . I do not deny there is a God. and may be reduced to these terms . : For this reasoning may be reduced to these terms If the Trojans have come into Italy contrary to the : will of the gods. clusive : supply something. if they had come into Italy contrary Therefore. that i. 217 who should say in self-defence. and unworthy the help of the gods. will resemble the following. if I maintained that Murinus bought the voles. that it contains in sense a particle exclusive. otherwise which certainly is not con the apostlcship without being called. cur uunc tua quisquam aut cur nova coudere fata. is. is that we must consider the major as exclusive in meaning. XII. said of this reasoning of Venus. although Ilamus has given it as an example of a bad reasoning. he ought to have been rejected by God . I should be a wicked man. : I could only be reasonably reproached with acting contrary to my law. atque invito numine Troes Italian) petiere. from being vicious.] CONJUNCTIVE SYLLOGISMS. luatit peccata. super! manesque dabant Flectere jussa pote. : Qua. but did not buy the votes to consequently I main I do nothing opposed my laic. But he did not enter without being called .

either in this world or in Now there are some wicked men who are not punished this world . whose parts are joined together by rel. Therefore they will be in another. is when take we one of the parts. &c. in his Book on Lying Autnonest credendum bonis. or the following : Now All wicked men must be punished. Those syllogisms are called disjunctive of which the first proposition is disjunctive. Therefore he was not an impostor. There are two kinds of these. or. but less natural kind. Therefore they are defenders of liberty. through which the division . ut nnnquam mentianiur boui. and then we take away two in order to keep one. it [PART HI. restat ergo. by miracles. &c. as in that which we have given. or defenders of liberty . Therefore. involved in tive : nega If the Trojans came into Italy only by the will of the gods. his preaching the crusade. OF DISJUNCTIVE SYLLOGISMS. they did come by order of the gods alone .. was either a saint or an impostor. se- cundum stultum . that is to say. the first when we take away one part in order to preserve the other. in another . Now it is not just to reject them . they are not paricides . except falsity of a major. he was a saint. as in this argument of St Augustine. aut non est credendum : bonis aliquando mentiri. The : second. through the These disjunctive syllogisms are rarely false. in order to take away the other. There are sometimes three members in this sort of syl logism. aut credendum est eis (chap. this affirmative. as the following of Cicero : Those who have slain Ccesar are paricides. si sine pace tua. 8) quos credimus debere aliquando mentiri. as if we say Saint Bernard. Now.218 DISJUNCTIVE SYLLOGISMS. affirming that God had confirmed. Horum primum pernicioswm est.

Both reasonings are false. Now a miser is a worshipper of money . common which is. which denies. Therefore we must obey them in that which is contrary to the law of God. Therefore lie is not a servant of God. however. because there is a mean in this disjunction. prodigals are not worshippers of money . which was observed by the first Christians. without. in order to take away the other. are contrary to the law of God. Therefore we must rise against them. a servant of God and a worshipper of money . who patiently suffered all things rather than do anything contrary to the law of God.CHAP.] COPULATIVE SYLLOGISMS. Now. OF COPULATIVE SYLLOGISMS. These syllogisms are of one sort only. But such a syllogism does not conclude necessarily when we take away one part in order to posit the other. when we take a copulative proposition. Therefore they are servants of God. Or. we must contrary not obey them it-hen command things to t/ie law of God . Noiv we must not rise up against them . at the same time. A man cannot be. These false disjunctions are one of the most sources of false reasonings among men. leaving a mean between the opposed mem bers as if I were to say We must either obey princes when they command those : things icldch . XII. or they rise against them Now. as may be seen by the following reasoning derived from the same propositions : A man cannot be. 219 is not exact. a servant of God and a worshipper of money . rising in revolt against princes. . at the same time. and then establish one part.

thus If every body which reflects light from all its parts is uneven. and not when we obtain it conditionally. Or. But this is true only when we obtain a conclusion absolutely. CHAPTER XIII. and the moon reflects light from all its parts. OF SYLLOGISMS WHOSE CONCLUSION IS CONDITIONAL. And I may an uneven body. if the it is moon reflects the light from all its parts. in order to conclude Now conditionally in this way Every body which reflects : light from all its parts is uneven. But I need only two propositions.220 SYLLOGISMS OF CONDITIONAL CONCLUSION. [PART III. since there are few who are friends to this extent. except in three propositions Every body which : reflects the light from all its parts is uneven . I cannot conclude this absolutely. and even both. Therefore. as Aristotle believed. Therefore the moon is an uneven body. WE have seen that a proper syllogism cannot have less than three propositions. EXAMPLE. or since If every true friend ought to be ready to give his life for his friend there are few true friends. and hence we are not to imagine there is no reasoning. and not polished like a mirror. it must be confessed that it is not a polished body. except when we see three propositions separated and ar- . besides the conclu sion. equally in connecting one of the propositions by the causal particle because. If I wish to prove that the moon is an un even body. because then the conditional proposition alone may contain one of the premises. but uneven. the moon reflects the light from all its parts . This way of reasoning is very common and very good. even include this reasoning in a single pro : position.

This will appear from the examples of many conditional propositions. that the con themselves. And thus these reasonings are. ditional conclusion always comprehends one of the premises This is sometimes the major and besides the conclusion. Therefore there are few true friends. figures. only prepara tory to an absolute conclusion. is that the first cannot be conceded entirely. they are. for it is certain that single pro position comprehends this entire syllogism Every true friend ought to be ready to give his life for his friend . From this we may AFFIRMATIVELY. Note there are few people who are ready to gice their lives for their friends . and the other negative. whether the affirmation be already proved. . Every feeling of pain conclude is a thought. which may be obtained from two general maxims. Therefore. XIII.CHAP. since it remains with him to prove that the condition on which the consequence which was conceded to him rests. very suitable for this purpose and are. that being further removed from the manner ot the schools. if all brutes feel pain. the one affirmative. while they have this advantage. All the difference between these absolute syllogisms. in all the and thus there are no all the moods other rules to be observed but the rules of the figures It is only necessary to remark. 221 ranged as in the schools. All brutes think. it must also be con fessed. very common and natural. but they are.] SYLLOGISMS OF CONDITIONAL CONCLUSION. on this account. and those in which the conclusion is contained with one of the premises in a conditional proposition. properly. sometimes the minor. whereas. 1. better received in . Barbara. without the proposer having gained anything thereby. We may and through . nevertheless. is true. we may concede everything. in this way. the world. in the last. or conceded without proof. obtain a conclusion. except we agree to that of which it endeavours to persuade us.

No beast feels pain. 4. 11. Darii. negative proposition. 6th.222 SYLLOGISMS OF CONDITIONAL CONCLUSION. Some burnt. and others. No 6. notice We may still obtain some other conditional conclusions We which may be derived from a general for example. III. Therefore. if some part of man does not think. Therefore. tional conclusions 1. of pain is in the body. is no thought in the body. 10th. NEGATIVELY. if all the souls of the of a brute thinks. is a movement of matter. such. 8. Therefore. Darapti. of the mind. Therefore. No soul brutes are matter. Therefore. Celarent. and the different condi may. is 5. llth. Therefore. if all feeling an an action action of the mind. of pain is an evil. Every feeling of pain is a thought. Some part of man does not feel pain. if some feeling of pain is not voluntary. Some thought is not agreeable. Therefore. in the same way. Therefore. as No matter thinks. Felapton. 8th . they are not worth enu merating. if the feeling of pain is not agreeable. Therefore. 9. 5th. to the conclusion. [PART 2. the 3d. 2. there are some which to wit. Therefore. from this general maxim. if the feeling of pain in the hand which is There is some thought in the hand which is burnt Disarms. Celarent. if no movement of matter is a thought. Therefore. is is 3. if there No feeling feeling ofpain 10. Bocardo. 1st. the major. Baroco. if no beast thinks. thought is an evil. Therefore. Camestres. Cesare. comprise the minor in addition to wit. Some plant if some plant feels pain. 2d. 7th. if some part of man Some part of man is matter. Ferio. 7. thinks. Of those which we have given. if all thought All feeling of pain Barbara. 9th. does not think. Some thought is not voluntary. but as these are not very natural. 4th. .

] SYLLOGISMS OF CONDITIONAL CONCLUSION. Therefore. is 6. and sepa rated from the true matter.without pledging himself cause it is proposed to him only conditionally. We must to make them in the rank of syllogisms which not. And lute conclusion more easily the abso disposed to receive is derived from it. not matter.CHAP. if all matter No Camestres. . Ferison. XIII. Hence we see that four propositions are necessary.j not matter. Festino. place Therefore it does not think. if Our soul is 4. be allow. in order to posit the consequent. so to speak. I may hence. substance does not think. The greatest use of these kinds of reasoning is to com we are discussing to recognise. Cesare. Some 7. if the soul of brutes thinks. place. if some matter which appear very marvellous. he is which it must me be distinct from matter. Therefore. to anything further. Of these conditionals there are only five which contain all the others the major in addition to the conclusion contain the minor. a substance. which it contains. Therefore. Everything which is the cause of marvellous effects does not think. is the cause of many e/ects Therefore. in the pel him with whom the validity of a consequence which he may first . Therefore. Therefore. 223 our soul thinks. Some part of man &amp. them establish anything absolutely. thing that feels pain thinks. if ever part of man is thinks. either by positing or by the antecedent. antecedent. however. Therefore it is distinct from Or equally well on the contrary Now the soul of brutes is not distinct from matter. Felapton.gt. No matter 1hmks. I And as he cannot_deny may obtain from it one : or other of these two absolute consequences Now the soul oflrtif.es thinks . Thus. in order to take away the taking away the consequent. . 3. if some 5. matter feels pain. in and order to make these kinds of reasonings complete. matter. a man having granted me that conclude from it. this conditional conclusion.

from the Medea of Ovid. . able to save thee I am able to destroy thee. since there is. on the contrary. that if. and. by abbreviating conversation. renders it more lively and It is certain. I to am able to destroy thee. one of them clear enough to be understood. because these four propositions con tain nothing more in sense than these three propositions of a common No syllogism matter thinks.224 ENTHYMEMES ENTHYMEMATIC SENTENCES. OF ENTHYMEMES AND OF ENTHYMEMATIC SENTENCES. commonly. therefore. that it is rare. . but imperfect in the expression. of this verse effective. to express all the propositions. we were make a formal argument is in this way : He who able to save is able to destroy . WE have too well already said that an enthymeme is a syllogism perfect in the mind. Therefore no soul of a brute thinks. Every soul of a brute is matter. [PART III. are called compound. and as being of those to whom we since the nature of the human mind is something be left it to supply. since some one of the propositions is suppressed as too clear and easily supplied by the mind This way of reasoning is so speak. and known. rather to prefer that it thought that this suppression flatters the vanity of those to whom speak. common in conversation and in writing. I am able to save. for example. I am Therefore. which contains a very elegant Thus we enthymeme : Servare potui perdere an possim rogas. in leaving something to their intelligence. than to have it needs to be taught everything. Now. : CHAPTER XIV.

225 . an enthymematic and of which he furnishes the following ex ample : \\. Therefore. and to contain few thoughts. also. to be void of sense.gt. in some sort. you are mortal.CHAP. let not your hatred. for this reason. &c. All the grace would be taken away from it the reason of this is. sometimes the minor. therefore. and this the major. as it does. therefore. sometimes. propositions of an enthymenie Enthymemes sentence. the ordinary way the proposi express their reasonings. although. so it is. op-yrjv pr) (piiXarre 6i&amp.6dvarov. no new This is what renders these kind of arguments so sense. and one of the propositions being sufficient to enable it to conceive two. be immor tal. on the contrary. which Aristotle calls. it is not properly called enthymenie. by suppressing tion which they judge will be readily supplied . It happens. that as one of the principal beauties of discourse is to be full of meaning. is actually necessary to make our meaning under men in which are. rare in ordinary aside that life. without reflection even. cherish not immortal hatred. The entire argument would be to cherish mortal ought not Noiv. contained in the two first propositions. 7/e who is an immortal hatred . the mind going faster than the words. that we include the two in a single proposition. since. And the perfect enthymenie would be You are mortal. for. one of its greatest defects.r)Tos (av. in this last case. . Mortal. we lay to that which wearies us. proposition is sometimes and often the conclusion. XIV. which is almost inevitable in philosophic syllogisms . and confine ourselves which stood. the expression of the second becomes useless. containing.] ENTHYMEMES ENTHYMEMATIC SENTENCES. and to furnish occasion to the mind of forming a thought more extensive than what is expressed. the whole argument being.

it is. necessary when we advance doubtful ones. the proofs with them. nevertheless.226 SYLLOGISMS COMPOSED OF [PART III. 2. Xeiprjfj. that we are obliged to repeat the Hence. instead of proposition which we wish to prove. . it is much better that these proofs should follow the doubtful propositions im mediately. or both and of this we shall speak 3. dangerous to produce. . to join to the doubtful proposition the proofs which establish them. who are often indignant when we attempt to persuade them by reasons which appear to them false or doubtful for. at the same time.a). even for a short time. OF SYLLOGISMS COMPOSED OF MORE THAN THREE PROPOSITIONS. of which we shall treat in the following Chapter. Of these we may distinguish three kinds 1. than that they should be separated from them. which makes a kind of argument com posed of many propositions for to the major are joined the . also. then. Gradation. the method of the schools which is. and. That which the Greeks have called Epichirema (CTTIwhich comprises the proof. . of which it is not necessary to say more than what has been said in the First Chapter of this Third : WE Part. either of one of the two first propositions. CHAPTER XV. and then to prove the proposition which may that which is followed in ordinary dis present a difficulty course is. have already said that syllogisms composed of more than three propositions are generally called Sorites. That separation produces another inconvenience very troublesome. which is. Dilemma. to connect. it is often. in order to restrain the impatience of those to whom we speak. although there be a remedy in the end. As we are often obliged to suppress certain propositions as too evident. that disgust in their minds . in this Chapter. to propose the whole argument.

alone remains. injustice of God. Adam The evidence of these miseries compelled pagar and believed nothing about tlu philosophers. which is original sin. Then it would be necessary to prove the major and the minor the misery of the major by this disjunctive argument children can only spring from one of the four following another life . and from examples. But it is easy to see with how much more of beauty and of power St Augustine has set forth this proof. sorrow to cast them down .] MORE THAN THREE PROPOSITIONS. Sj of children. merating that children are miserable. . who knew tc sin of our first father. Original sin might be proved by the miseries according to the dialectic method. XV. of fears . . of which the major is that it is The proofs of lawful to slay one who lies in wait for us. who has not the power to pre . &c. who inflicts 4th. it was lawful for Milo to slay him. them . to say that we were born only ? . then. the fourth. pride to lift them up and who can represent. The upon them without cause . labour and pain to weaken them lust to inilame them . therefore. 227 of the minor. causes 1st. : serve it Now. Sins committed previously in 2d. it Original sin. and when they in order to seduce begin even to serve God. all the various afflictions which weigh down the yoke of the children o) &quot. therefore. them from it 3d. The conclusion the equipage of Clodius. his train. had lain in wait for Milo and the proofs of the minor are. of afflictions. : . by compre man hending it in a compound argument. now they are sin which : they miserable . The weakness of God. in a few words.CHAP. and how the first years of their life are full of vanity. the laws of this We major The minor is that Clodius nations. when they grow up. to the minor the proofs and then the conclusion is drawn. The minor. is proved by enu their miseries. error tempts. may thus reduce the whole oration for Milo to a compound argument. are derived from the law of nature. i that therefore. the cause of this is original sin. in the following ner Consider the number and the greatness of the evils under which children labour. . proofs of the major. in this way Children can only be miserable as the penalty of some derive from their birth. is impious to say that it springs from the three first causes . of illusions.

and not simply what we had affirmed of it for that alone is truly a dilemma. in which. OF DILEMMAS.&quot. we may do it to prove that we cannot be happy in by this dilemma : . since God is neither unjust nor impotent. what WE we had concluded of each part. therefore. and that thus our minds had been attached to corruptible bodies. or the penalty of the sin of man ? But. which we had merited. But this opinion. remains but that the cause of these appalling evils be either first the injustice or impotency of God. but which you must acknowledge in spite of yourselves that the yoke. having world. I say. the earth. where what we say of each part is supported . CHAPTER XVI. may define a dilemma to be a compound reasoning. by this its special reason. there only remains that which you are unwilling to acknowledge. what we had concluded of each part. that our minds are joined to bodies as a punishment for sins previously committed in another life. to dead bodies. would never have been. [PART in. after having divided a whole into its parts. so heavy. is rejected by the apostle. which the children of Adam are obliged to bear. we conclude affirmatively or negatively of the whole. by crimes committed in another life. What. from the time in which their bodies are taken from their mother s womb till the day when they return to the womb of their common mother.228 suffer the chastisement DILEMMAS. as a punishment of the same nature with that which the Tuscan tyrants in flicted on those whom they bound. For example. while alive. had they not deserved it through the guilt which they derive from their ori ginal.

229 can only be happy in this world by abandoning our our passions. its duties . they are without excuse before God. is also an unhappy state. If tee abandon ourselves to them. si pares. if they do not labour for the salva however of the souls committed : to their care. we shall offend the gods. we may do so by a dilemma : we wish Either they are capable of that office. If they are capable. And consequently tion this maybe. cur tain negligentes. Thus. that bishops who do not labour for the salvation of the souls committed to their care. by which an ancient philosopher proved that we ought not to meddle with the affairs of the first is. have in this life true happiness. when they icere unable to perform . this is an unhappy selves to state. therefore. also.CHAP. this is and we could never be since content with it. Si tanto muneri impares.] -DILEMMAS. there We If nothing more painful than that inward war which ice are continually obliged to carry on with ourselves. or by combating them. it Therefore ice ought not to engage in them. But other observations may be made on reasonings these kinds of not always express all the pro For example. cannot. or they are i?icapable . there are many things understood in that celebrated dilemma. are with out excuse before God. is that by which another proved that was best not to marry Of the same kind : . they are without excuse for not ful filling it . they are without excuse for having undertaken an office so important. cur tarn ambitiosi. that The we do positions which enter into them. the di lemma we are about to give is contained in these few words of a speech of St Charles on entering one of the provincial councils. republic : If we manage them If we manage them ill. ice shall offend men . to prove. If ice combat them. We since it is disgraceful. well. If they are incapable. XVI.

which is injurious. and thus. being sufficiently the particular propositions in which each of. [PART in. she disgusts. we shall be incapable of any evil. as not comprehending all the is founded members of the whole which we divide. which is. If the wife you espouse be beautiful. that the soul. we offend the gods. therefore death is not to be feared. indicated since by easily understood. For Therefore it is best not to marry. we offend men. is injurious in every way to engage in the of the republic. for example. affairs it God. is principally through two defects. she If she be ugly. excites jealousy . it is part is treated And. This caution is very important in order to judge well of the force of a dilemma. surviving the body. if the soul survives the body. that it is not in jurious to offend men. it will be more happy than it was in the body. that dilemma is very false which the ancient philosophers employed against the fear of Either our soul. If we manage them ill. or so ugly as to disgust. or. as Montaigne has very wisely remarked. death. Thus the dilemma against marrying is not conclusive. which is also tained in the premises. when the disjunctive on which defective. perishes with the. For the same reason. in order that the conclusion be con it is always necessary to understand something general. For that. as in the first example If we manage them well. The second observation is. which renders the one above inconclusive is. in both these dilemmas the proposition is which should this is contain the separation understood . . that a dilemma may be it vicious. said they. One. and very common. For. since we must only avoid offending Therefore. which may belong to the whole. since there may be wives which are not so beautiful as to awaken jealousy. will find itself in a state of torment and misery. : injurious . it was great blind ness not to see that there might be conceived between these a third state.230 DILEMMAS. body. having no feeling. moreover.

was turned upon himself. The Thus third observation it is. it is not advan tageous to please men by offending God. are certain general heads. we sitall Jf ice please them. so valuable that she cannot but please him. dilemma by which the : Aristotle testifies.] PLACES METHOD OF FINDING ARGUMENTS. This retort. ice ice shall please the gods . Another defect which renders dilemmas inconclusive. CHAPTER XVII. being ugly. loci anjiimentorum. either. the rhetoricians and logicians call places. is nothing else than that which teaches of these places WHAT . Thus. It is not necessary. and the part of logic which is termed invention. since she may have other qualities of mind and of character. thus If ice govern according to the corrupt ndes of men. that he must take care that may who employs a dilemma not be turned against himself. 2M1 Avhich would give us just ground of apprehension in re lation to death. THAT PLACES. maintain true justice.CHAP. because she may be so wise and virtuous that there is no room to doubt of her fidelity. that. was not wise for Therefore ought to . however. it is not necessary that a beautiful wife should occasion jealousy. OR THE METHOD OF FINDING ARGUMENTS. from the fear of falling into that state. THIS METHOD IS OF LITTLE USE. that the philosopher endeavoured to prove that one ought not to engage in state affairs. engage in them. XVII. emerges when the particular conclusions of each part are not necessary. she should displease her husband. to which may be reduced all the proofs which we employ in the various matters of which we treat .

all that science which tells us nothing about the art of finding arguments. it is It is. and what pertains to invention. nevertheless. therefore. since they did not speak of places at all. as it was taught by the Stoics. But it may. might say. in order to apply the rules of argument but it is not true that it is necessary to find that matter by the method of places. in order to its arrange ment. not necessary that we should learn how to find the matter before having learnt how to dispose of it. without its being needful to borrow them from ter. in like manner. of no service to trouble ourselves about the order in which places should be treated of. the places. before treating of these rules. But this reason is very feeble. says he. perhaps. whether it will not be more to the purpose not to treat of them at all. what is an argument. since it is a matter of very little consequence. on the contrary. as examples but the mind and common sense always furnish enough of these. For. before we can think of arranging it. in order to learn how to dispose of the mat . and that Cicero preferred it to all dialectic. and what a syllogism. Let us leave. and with the philosophers of the schools. But it might. true that it is neces art or method. know that the ancients made a great mystery of this method. perhaps. The reason Ramus assigns for this is. [PART III. be replied. for although it be neces sary for the matter to be found. in the places. the exposition of places teaches us to find this matter. enough to have some general matter. It is. and he maintained against them that it was necessary to explain the places. which is sufficient to enable us to understand what is said of it in syllogisms. be more useful to inquire. it is. that since we undertake to teach. because they treated of places after having given the rules of arguments.232 PLACES METHOD OF FINDING ARGUMENTS. sary to have some matter. therefore. whereas the rules of argument can only teach us Now to arrange it. that we must have the matter found. the art of finding arguments and any : We it is necessary to know beforehand. Ramus quarrelled on this subject with Aristotle. that nature alone furnishes us with a general knowledge of what reasoning is. and which is We .

Quintilian. and has sought there the reasons which were necessary for his purpose ? Consult all the advocates We and preachers which are in the world. whether they know They practise these rules them. but they do not adhere to them . For find out the proofs which are taught in the colleges. and proofs.&quot. obliged to confess that we need not. all who speak and write. Istam artem totam relinquamus qucc in excogitandis argumentis muta nimium all est. which we call places but it is not by this method that we prove them. enable us to furnish these. and to those general subject may terms. in order to obtain arguments studiosi eloquenticc Illud quoque&quot. that the rules of eloquence are ob find. because they are eloquent. go knocking at the door of all these places.&quot. XVII. he is.CHAP. the subject. tion of &quot. served in the speeches of eloquent persons. so that we may say truly of places what St Augustine said in general of the precepts of rhetoric. nevertheless. Nature. although they never think of these in making them. and who. by this artificial method. ab effectu.] THIS METHOD OF LITTLE USE. And although Quintilian seems to have held this art in much esteem. in judicandis nimium loquax. says he. the knowledge of different truths. forte respondeant. have learned. We &quot. almost as many persons as have passed through the ordinary course of to study. probandum quod intendimus. in order to prove that which he wished to establish. so that we could hardly differ from their opinion. says he. and I question if one could be found who had ever thought of making an argument a causa. materla dicendi scrucogitent non esse cum proposita fiterit tanda sinyula et velut ostiatim pulsanda. and the other rhetoricians. he has reflected on these places. ut sciant an ad id &quot. 233 only too prolix in teaching us to j udge of them. if general experience did not ap pear entirely opposed to it. may adduce. &quot. and all the philoso phers speak of it in the same way. ah adjtmctis. that when he has been obliged to discuss any subject. as evidence of this. when we treat of any matter. and who always have matter enough. and then art connects these in certain ways. the attentive considera It is true that all the . arguments which we make on any be reduced to those heads. Aristotle. is there any one of them who could say truly. or are ignorant of them.

make certain movements in the joints. Me. may form these rules very well by observing what nature causes us to do. &quot. little use which has been made of this method of places during the whole time that it has been discovered and taught in the schools. that we must send the spirits to certain nerves. in order to produce such noble and spirited verses. and lean on one while the other ad vances. and we can say nothing that is not connected with them but it is not by making a formal reflection on them that we produce these thoughts. me adsum. is a manifest proof that it is of The . Coelum hoc.234 PLACES METHOD OF FINDING ARGUMENTS. also to forget himself. nee ausus. qui in me : O Rutuli ! mea fraus omnis nihil iste This is an argument. He would never have made them had he stopped &quot. when he wrote these verses. put one foot before the other. Implent quippe quentes.ZEneid. et sidera conscia testor. for instance. in order to be eloquent. but we could never make . to say. Tanturn infelicem nimium dilexit amicum. in some sort. but. puts these words. as the same father observes another place. feci .&quot. Nee potuit. in the mouth of Nisus : convertite ferrum. in order to realise the passion which he portrayed. says Ramus. which are the true ornaments of every kind of discourse. move certain muscles. represented Euryalus surprised and surrounded by his enemies. but we may judge with certainty. Thus.&quot. to search out that place and it was necessary for him. [PART ilia HI. that Virgil. never dreamt of the place of efficient cause. such reflection will only help to damp the ardour of the mind and to prevent our finding natural and striking reasons. full of passionate emotion. in the Ninth Book of the . we treat of all these places in the most ordinary discourse. non adhibent ut sint eloquentes. after having . which Nisus. a causa efficiente. to forget these rules. not only . the friend of Euryalus. if he knew them. Virgil. had slain. and in walking we make certain regular movements of the body but it would avail nothing for the purpose of teaching us to walk. We those actions by the help of these rules. quia sunt eloin We walk naturally. who were about to revenge on him the death of their companions.

nothing which more chokes up good seed. . save for the finding of these kinds of thoughts. nothing renders a mind more barren of just and weighty thoughts than this noxious The mind is accustomed to fertility of common thoughts. is to dis cover. then. ordi of their nary. that it is far below stupidity. in order to produce in men a wise and solid eloquence. remote. our discourses are only too full of matter. . we see that we cannot gain anything which is truly useful and valuable. than a crowd of noxious weeds . Thus. on every subject. that there is nothing which more depraves the judgment. this facility. We . of which some are vain. with which books and discourses are filled. so far is it from being useful to obtain this sort of abundance. which can only be dis covered by an attentive consideration of the subject.] THIS METHOD OF LITTLE USE. good and bad. we may say. that if it is right to know what is said of them. for all that can be accomplished by this method. in talking about everything. And since the use of places hardly avails for anything. it would be much more useful to teach them to be silent than to speak. general. 235 no great service but when we apply ourselves to obtain all the good which may be derived from it. Now. different thoughts. it is far more important to be thoroughly per suaded that there is nothing more ridiculous than to em as to no purpose^ ploy them. to repress arid to cut off the low. that is and false thoughts. and of finding a reason for everything. to say. common. Hence the whole advantage which can be derived from these places is reduced rather to the general effect which . special. that the abundance is sought after by means of these places is an exceedingly small advantage it is not wanted by a greater part of the We sin much more by excess than by defect. since so of them that there has celebrated men have many spoken arisen a kind of necessity to know in general so common a thing. XVII. such as the Lullists find by means tables. which ought to consider. and no longer makes any effort to find appro and natural reasons. which are kinds of places and that that fatal facility of talking about everything. and world. is so wretched a characteristic of mind. priate. the Lullists do by means of their general attributes.CHAP. than to give them forth as they arise a confused mass of reasonings.

named Claubergius. argue from etymology when we say. [PART III. DIVISION OF PLACES INTO THOSE OF GRAMMAR. CHAPTER XVIII. in the subject of which we treat. is that of a very solid and judicious German philoso pher. OF LOGIC. The places are taken either from grammar. and by Quintilian. in enabling us to recognise at once. to which these books specially also better adapted for speeches relate .236 DIVISION OF PLACES . and they are never occupied . more of its phases and parts. We seriously. in his Books of Invention. The places of grammar are. whose Logic fell into our hands after the printing of this had been begun. or from meta physics. that of Ramus is too embarrassed with subdivisions. AND OF METAPHYSICS. perhaps. THOSE who have different treated of places have divided them in a That which is followed by Cicero. and words de rived from the same root. for example. they produce which may. GRAMMATICAL. which appears a very convenient one. be of some service without our knowing it. that many people in the world never divert themselves. which are called in Latin conjugata. but it is at the bar. etymology. and in Greek 7rapdi/v/m. is way. in the fifth book of his Institutes. GRAMMATICAL PLACES. properly speaking because to divert oneself is to desist from serious occupation. The following division. . or from logic. less methodical. and in the second book of the Orator.

difference. of the genus. he who does not speak at all. definition. the genus is destroyed: The forms which are called substantial (excepting the reasonable soul) are neither body nor spirit therefore 2. Mortali urgemur ab hoste. species. is What the great . 4. 6. In destroying the genus. which it is well to know. humani nil a me alienum puto. If we can affirm or deny of anything the property. we may affirm or deny the species : Extension does not be long to thought therefore it is not matter. If we can affirm or deny of anything the whole difference.] DIVISION OF PLACES LOGICAL. can never speak indiscreetly. It is only necessary to remark that there are commonly joined to these places certain general maxims. We may affirm or deny the thing defined. or a round or square thought. they are not substances. the species is also destroyed: does not judge at all. property. 3. mortales. 237 Words derived from the same root also help in finding out thoughts Homo sum. The places of logic are the universal terms genus. accident. : indignum misericordia quam superlvs miser ? What is more worthy of our compassion than a miserable man ? and what is less worthy of our compassion than a miserable man who is proud ? tarn Quid Quid tarn dignum misericordia quam miser ? LOGICAL PLACES. cannot judge wrongly. we may affirm or deny the species: Since we cannot figure to ourselves the half of a thought. . is affirmed or What belongs to all men.CHAP. 5. He who . XVIII. of that in re. In destroying all the species. have already noticed some of these under other terms. but it is well to know them under the ordinary terms but as We : affirmed or denied. it cannot be body. but they cannot pretend to advantages which are above humanity. it is not necessary to treat of them further here. not because they are of any great use. all these points have been explained before. belongs to denied of the species: 1. division . but because they are common.

is or that through which a thing is. are so vague. that is. to wit. Man is the end of medicine in this sense. either for the purpose of showing that a thing is imperfect. since it is not adapted to persuade . is the end for which a thing is. labour is called finis cut. cujus gratia. parts. There are principal ends those. METAPHYSICAL PLACES. since it is for him that it seeks to obtain a cure. because it is conformed to the end which he is accustomed to propose to himself: whence came that celebrated maxim of a Roman judge. which are only in The FINAL CAUSE directly considered. is so celebrated. efficient. since our idea of it is as clear as the definitions. some action. and it so difficult to see how they agree to all kinds of causes. it would be much better to leave this word amongst those which are not defined. as. The definitions which are given in the schools of causes in general. since it to procure it. and accessory ends. and formal. since there are few who have the firm and abiding purpose of rendering to each what be longs to him.238 DIVISION OF PLACES METAPHYSICAL. which are mainly regarded. wholes. There is nothing more common than to derive arguments from the consideration of the end. or in order to show that a man has done. Cut bono 1 that is to say. in saying that a cause is that ivhich produces an The belonging to effect. material. that we ought to inquire before all things else. referred. That which we undertake to do or obtain is called finis Thus health is the end of medicine. effects. to which many arguments are as causes. opposed terms. that a speech is a bad one. or will do. places of metaphysics are certain general terms all beings. since men commonly undertakes He for whom we . into final. [PART III. But the division of causes into four kinds. lation to which we may affirm or deny the definition : There are few just persons. that that it must be known. what interest a man would have in doing such a thing.

intellectual cause. it is only probable. each only partial causes. but it is only an ac cidental cause of the death of a man killed by its heat. 239 or to show. because they are of the to his child same nature with him. on the con . which good sense will discover better than all pre cepts. trary. since he was weak before.CHAP. fire which burns the wood is a necessary cause. The father is a universal cause. by showing that effect is not. There are different kinds of efficient causes. Avorkman is the principal cause of his work his in struments are only the instrumental causes. or will be. The nurse is only a preserving cause. in relation to creatures. the argument is ne cessary. an or that present. since nothing had co-operated with Him but the father and mother are useful to . harmony of the organ. God. which is also true of the other places. The grandfather is only the remote cause. The father is the proximate cause of his son. are the particular causes versal. The EFFICIENT CAUSE is that which produces another we may derive arguments from it. The mother is a producing cause. There are still many other ways of reasoning from the end. by allowing that all the causes are If these causes are necessary. in creating Adam. The sun is a proper cause of light. God is only an equivocal cause. because they are not of the divine nature. that we ought thing. in relation ren. not to suspect a man of such an action. The particular disposition of each plays.] DIVISION OF PLACES act according to their interest METAPHYSICAL. . in relation to their child. has not been a sufficient cause. since there it is. of which it is know the names. was the total cause. and he who which determine the uni The sun is a natural cause. if they are contingent and free. since both are needed. The air which fills an organ is the universal cause of the A . XVIII. pipe. since it would have been contrary to his purpose. in relation to that Man The is an which he does with judgment.

Louis XIV. which is bring under efficient cause the exemplary the model according to which a work is made. or simply the arrangement of its parts. The common way of argu these words being reciprocal. .240 DIVISION OF PLACES METAPHYSICAL. The MATERIAL CAUSE is as gold which renders a thing what it is. is the exemplary cause of his portrait. health . as. when its effects are good This. therefore. as the plan by which an architect erects a building . according to the opinion of the It is by schools. Contraries Privatives deafness . properties. since there can be nothing without a cause. whether it be a thing really distinguished from matter. and sickness. that or bad. servant. and heat. A man who walks is a. good or bad. The which burns a house . . life. what belongs. ing from them is to show that if the effect is. free cause. however. dition. the man who set it the physical cause of on fire is the moral We may also cause. cold as. or. is not always true in accidental a cause is its parts in the not necessary. ignorance. in general. and is add anything further here. causes. There are as We also. : death sight.. or of any other image whatever king. the matter of which a golden vase is made . father. belongs. blindness hearing. : is that of which things are formed. that which is the cause of the objective ex as the istence of an idea. [PART III. without which the fire effect would not be is conditio sine qua non. the conflagration cause. the cause is. to We have said enough of the whole and it chapter on Division. the knowledge of this form that we are able to explain its is The FORM that distinguishes it many different effects as there are causes. to the things which are composed of it. prove. or does not belong. The sun shining into a room is the proper cause of its light the unbarring of the window is only a cause or con . to the matter. knowledge. : master. There are four kinds of opposed terms : Relatives : as. and from others. son. or does not belong.

advise any one to look into the topics of Aristotle. that the privative terms express the negation of a form in a subject which is capable of it. that we cannot attain. to an equal or similar thing. because it is not capable of either is which there between the two seeing or living. to this subject in the First Book of his Rhetoric. This is. that which is less probable is not. we prove. whereas the negatives do not indicate that capacity. roughly. any very valu able knowledge. or smaller. as we destroy the argument which derived from a judgment. greater. or dissimilitudes. in which he sets forth various ways of finding out that a thing is It is nevertheless useful. Those who wish to know more may it in the authors who have treated this subject more at large. that if that is more probable is not. however. We by these similitudes. to another thing to which it is equal or similar. similar or dissimilar. commonly employ differences. 241 Contradictories.] DIVISION OF PLACES METAPHYSICAL. that which is more probable.VVe In unequal things. for a or. we employ the one in order to deny the other. pleasing. Contradictory terms have this property. negatively. or does not belong. not seeing. XVIII. cannot. a part of what is said on the places. which consist in a last term of the simple negation of that term seeing. in order to destroy that which others have wished to estab which . or does not belong. since there is strange confusion in those books but there are some things very pertinent find We . Hence. belongs. true. The difference kind of opposites. by showing that it was given in another case. &quot. As these terms are opposed. in that way. is also. is. that in taking away one we establish the other. . we do not say that a stone is blind or dead. prove that what belongs. that if that stronger reason which is less probable is. There are many kinds of comparisons for we compare things either equal or unequal. . There are some things which it is more useful to know lish is only in this way.CHAP. affirmatively.

. CHAPTER XIX. and controversies of men. We I. have re duced all these to seven or eight. in order to carry on the con or to impute to him conse test with greater advantage quences which we imagine may be derived from his doc All this trine. some being so gross that they are not worthy of being noticed. Passion. never theless. or bad faith. ALTHOUGH. WHICH ARE if we know the rules of good reasoning. This sophism is called by Aristotle ignoratio elenchi. OF THE DIFFERENT WAYS OF REASONING CALLED SOPHISMS. leads us to attribute to our adversary that which is very far from his meaning. since this will enable us yet more readily to avoid them. ILL.242 DIFFERENT WAYS OF REASONING ILL. although he disavows and denies them. may be reduced to this first kind of sophism. that is to say. It could have been wished that Aristotle. had been more careful to avoid it for it must be confessed that he has not com bated honestly many of the ancient philosophers in re He refutes Parmenides and Meporting their opinions. it will not be without its use to set forth the principal classes of bad reasoning. the ignorance of that which ought to be proved It is a very common vice in the against an adversary. it may not be difficult to recognise those which are bad. We dispute with warmth. which an honest and good man ought to avoid above all things. which are called sophisms or paralogisms. . [PART III. often without understanding one another. lissus for having admitted only a single principle of all things. as examples to be avoided often strike us more than examples to be imitated. Proving something other than that which is in dispute. as if they had understood by this principle that of . who has taken pains to point out to us this defect.

a principle which could explain nothing and it is an sion and a sophism to have produced to the world . that what he represents as a great mystery which had been unknown till he revealed it. XIX. that is to say. suppose it to be well known that a We thing is not. as the first instruction. would have given. 243 which they are composed. It is. could treats them. in in structing any one how to make a statue.] DIFFERENT WAYS OF REASONING ILL. that it was not a table before it was made into a table? It is true that these ancients had not availed themselves of this knowledge to explain the principles of natural things. but we wish composed by what cause to it know of has been produced. illu this principle of privation as a rare secret. the first thing that that in order to make a statue. there is nothing which could less contribute to this purpose.r recognised privation as one of the principles of natural tilings. they meant the single and unique principle from which all things have derived their origin which is God. it is necessary to choose a piece of marble which not already that statue which you wish to make. as clowns and fools. and he who on this account. since it is not this that we look for. when we attempt to discover the prin ciples of nature. since. unjust in Aristotle to reproach the ancient philosophers with having been ignorant of a thing which it is impossible to be ignorant of. He blames all the ancients for not havin&amp. . since it is impos sible not to see that the matter of which we make a table must have had the privation of the form of a table. But docs not see. Avho. There never was.CHAP. it being sufficiently evident that we do not at all know better how to make a clock in consequence of that the matter of which it is knowing made could not have been a clock before it was made into a clock. for example. before it is what elements it is made. and to accuse them of not having employed. therefore.lt. a sculptor. for the explanation of nature. is behoves you to know is. whereas. in reality. that lesson which Aristotle would begin the explanation of by all it the works of nature : My friend. never have been unknown to any one.

there are We the have only to distinguish the equivocation in the word generation. the centre of the earth the same as the centre of the world. in all reasoning. tained. If there are not sub stantial forms. are the greater part of those arguments which are employed to prove certain anomalous kinds of substances. there is generation substantial forms. by this ar gument : The nature of heavy things is to tend to the centre of the world. as the production of the chicken which is formed . . argument. there could be no generation now. too. has accused him. therefore. are corporeal. of having himself fallen into this error. argument is but a pure begging of the question word generation the natural we understand by production of a new whole for if in nature. [PART III. It is clear that there is in the major of this argument a manifest begging of the question for we see well enough that heavy things tend towards the centre of the earth but where did Aristotle learn that they tend towards the centre of the world. in the schools. however. and that light things go off it from . in order to see that this . that which is employed as proof ought to which is be clearer and better prove. say they. it is main is difficult though they have no body. Among the pure beggings of the question. Avhich it comprehend. enough to . and with justice. Assuming as This is true the thing in dispute. the experience proves that heavy things tend towards centre of the earth. when he tried to prove that the earth was at the centre of the world. ILL. these. since. what Aristotle calls a begging of the question. and of light things to go offfrom it. Now.244 DIFFERENT WAYS OF REASONING II. known than that which we seek to Galileo. is Therefore. substantial forms . in the world. unless he assumed that the centre of the earth is the same as the centre of the world ? which is the very conclusion that he wishes to prove by that . which are called. clearly altogether opposed to true reasoning.

since it is plain that he who denies substantial forms will not allow that nature produces substantial and so far is it from being necessary that he forms should be led. say they again. If there are substantial trary conclusion in this way forms. that he ought rather to derive from it a directly con . in But if they under and we shall see that the schools. and substantial forms . we may say. the very thing which is in dispute. 245 an egg. to wit.CHAP. The following is another of the fore there are substantial forms. nature must produce something which did not exist before. We have thus stopped a little by the way. since this would be a kind of creation . and of which we know nothing further than that they are called substantial forms because. nature did not produce new substances.] in DIFFERENT WAYS OF REASONING ILL. these sorts of substances. although those who defend them do so with . XIX. that substantial form. totum per se. since the simple arrangement of parts. which are discovered neither by the sense nor by the mind. therefore. they are wholes per se . and these new But if by the word generation is under natural beings. there : there are no substantial forms. that there are genera but we cannot conclude that there are tions in this sense . consequently. with reason. : If there same kind are not substantial forms. . which they term per se. they prove nothing. there are substantial forms. natural beings should say could not be composed of matter. for if they understand. it is clear that It is still ment to this is a begging of the question. stand anything else. to avow such produc tion. stood what they commonly understand by it. totum per se. as they do. and substantial forms now. and. necessary to ask those who employ this argu have the goodness to explain what they understand by a whole per se. by nature. substantial forms. the produc tion of a new substance which did not exist before. by this argument. the principles. Now. let them say so. nevertheless. a very good intention. is assumed . which . natural beings would not be wholes. they are composed of matter. but beings per accident now. to show the feebleness of the arguments on which are established. a being composed of matter and of form. may produce these new wholes. since it is as though they If there are not substantial forms.

It is called non causa pro causa. of actions purely Hence. it is useful. One is. to this kind of sophism. by another equally or more unknown or an uncertain thing.246 DIFFERENT WAYS OF REASONING ILL. by another which we ought in the Scripture. a thousand effects to the abhorrence of a vacuum. because this alone . and to which we attribute in animals a properly multitude of thoughts. for the conviction of the scoffers and irrreligious. since nothing is said of it in the Scripture. dogmas equally established amongst catholics that all the points of faith cannot be proved by Scripture . we may bring under this sophism in which we prove a thing unknown. by means of these substantial forms. [PART III. called substantial forms. and spiritual. for. There are. they employ. be bad reasoning capable of baptism. is equally or more uncertain. III. through simple ignorance of the true causes of It is in this way that philosophers have attributed things. that is to say. proof would assume that is to believe only what denied by the catholics. for the sake of religion. very common amongst men. which are not matter. also. reduce. Taking for a cause This sophism is that which is not a cause. for example. two the one. therefore. perishing through the changes which happen to matter . which is not matter. that it is a point of faith that infants are It would. which. and the ideas which they give of these forms. which is . obscure and disturb the very solid and convincing proofs of the immortality of the soul which are derived from the distinction of minds and bodies. . all reasonings Finally. in an anabaptist to prove against the catholics that they are wrong in believing that infants are capable of baptism. and from the impossibility of any substance. to take away from them rest this reply. and we fall into it in many ways. by showing that nothing can on a worse foundation than these perishable sub stances. the proof which is derived from a principle different from that which is in dispute. but which we know is equally contested by which are We may him with whom AVC dispute. the other. we unwittingly furnish free thinkers with examples of substances which perish.

break. &quot. Another cause which makes men fall into this sophism. corruption or alteration of body. all body as body.] in our time. but only when this reasoning that the smallest atom is as perfect as the world .CHAP. for thus it rather to feign imaginary causes we are asked to account. three dimensions are perfect. and thus leaves a vacuum which nature cannot endure. been discovered. vessels full of water break when they freeze. the circular motion from east to west We see still less how is not contrary to another circular motion from west to east. in its is not bodies. however. He proves also that the heavens are unalterable and have a circular motion. DIFFERENT WAYS OF REASONING ILL. either sufficiently clear of themselves. than to is us ashamed to acknow happens that we prefer of the things for which confess that we do not . when frozen. may refer to the same sophism all attempts to prove and prove nothing. principally. ^47 have been proved to demonstration and by the weight of very ingenious experiments to be caused by the air alone. because three arc all (quia tria sunt omnia) . things by causes which are remote. because there are three dimensions. on the contrary. 1. It is diffi cult to sec liow the one follows from the other. and incorruptible. and the perfection of the world consists. on the contrary. We since it has three dimensions as well as the world. because the water contracts. or false. and three are all because ice the word all. is essentially imperfect. of motion has to do with the do not see what the contrariety 2. when there are but one or two cannot is : The world is be it employ there are three. oc did before. It has. body is perfect because it has three dimensions . that they M. containing creatures which are The same philosopher proves that there are three simple movements. as when Aristotle endeavours to prove We world cause perfect perfect by this reason contains bodies . this But so far from proving that the world is perfect. that. because water. XIX.We there is nothing contrary to circular motion. or at least that the doubtful. the empty vanity which makes ledge our ignorance. as we may see in the excellent treatise of The same philosophers commonly teach that Pascal. might prove by things. which also occa it cupies more room than sions ice to float in water. because they But.

it. the properties of the mag net. have checked the admiration which clocks excited in that country. hours on the machine had an indicating virtue which marked the dial. and that the poppy lulls to sleep. and to whom ignorance is no disgrace. who does not know that his that iron. who would blush to confess so much. and men may be allowed to call the disposition. we imagine discovered it. in addition to these. all these terms would not convey any false meaning. that we have effect Those who make no profession of knowledge. which forms. which we knew well before we found that word. when we have joined to that a general word of virtiie or faculty. He would thus have become as learned in the that in the know ledge of the stroke of the pulse. of senna. in the senna a purgative virtue. vir knowledge of clocks as these philosophers are tue and faculty. Thus is the diffi and there is not a culty very conveniently resolved Chinese who might not. and a sonorific virtue. and the way in which we escape this con When we fession of our ignorance is amusing enough. with as much ease. which was nothing else than that . in our mind. frankly avow that they know these effects. and pretend that they have discovered the true cause of these effects. But still. but that they are ignorant of the cause . antipathy. for it is cer tain that there is in the loadstone a disposition which leads iron to unite with it. [PART III. if those who used them would content themselves with giving to these words. that senna purges. the cause of which is unknown. be it . whereas the learned. . go about the matter in a different way. net a magnetic virtue. interior or exterior. and in the poppy a soporific virtue. which sounded them forth. whatever it may be. and of the poppy. when they were introduced from Europe for he need only have said that he knew perfectly the reason of that which others thought so marvellous. unites Avith pulse beats. disposing or active. being near a loadstone. for example. rather than with any other stone. which in the mag is. know the cause.248 DIFFERENT WAYS OF REASONING ILL. There is no one. that there is in the pulse a pulsific virtue. a general notion of cause. such as sympathy. occult qualities. see an effect. There are. other words which serve to render men learned at little expense. no other idea except that that effect had some cause.

which neither they nor any one else ever did comprehend. who ture pure chimeras. which would cause great confusion in the world. that if the earth turned round the sun. took. magnetic virtue. or the death of some nl. refer everything to the influence of the stars.] DIFFERENT WAYS OF REASONING ILL. 249 whatever it may. India mitt it c. the immobility of the earth. plagues. and especially the city of Rome. which was to have upset the world. the cause of which must be referred to the influences of a heaven. * See the &quot. although there is no reason why either comets or eclipses should have any considerable effect on the earth.CHAP. an immoveable heaven beyond that One of them. wars. Thoughts on Comets of Bavlc.but . by these influences that the people are frightened a comet* appears.-o prince. or when an eclipse happens. however. sometimes. have discovered that there must to which they assign motion. because the earth produces different things in dif ferent countries (Non omnis fert omnia tellus . having undertaken to prove. that it would be artizan. they happen Moreover. effects are so general and so common. and threaten a king or a prince rather than It is when There are. which. has always the same aspect towards different parts of the earth. a hundred of them which have not been followed by any remarkable effect and it. by which the magnet attracts iron. and who ac be tually. in this way. moreover. of his principal demonstrations. So that they are de ceived only when they imagine themselves to be more learned for having discovered that word. . or inasmuch as they would persuade us that through that word we com prehend a certain imaginary quality. Roma fa1 alls. mortalities. as it was expressly said in the Chronology of Helvicus. . these without comets and without eclipses. this mysterious reason. by as one physical reasons. happen after comets and eclipses. XIX. But there are others who allege as true causes in na This is done by the astrologers. as that one in the year 1654. molles stia t/uira /Sabcei). the influences of the stars would be disordered. or why causes so general as these should act rather at one place than an another. being im moveable.

Nature abhors a vacuum. says one of them. they still retained the habit . any aspect. ought to have more influence on the body of the child than the planet Saturn. Why those colts which had been chased by the wolves are swifter than which do not exist. so that those who say vaguely that such a comet threatens some great man with death. it happens by chance that some are true. when we engage in seeking after the causes of alleged extraordinary effects. and of the events of without having any other ground for doing so. in the in chamber at the hour of birth. by means of that which is not. for nature abhors nothing. or in any conjunction whatever. and that thus those which escaped were the swiftest . that fear having given them an extraordinary swiftness. Finally. which are still more imaginary. or again. But if we would judge of things by good sense. and that she exerts herself to avoid it (which is an imaginary effect.250 DIFFERENT WATS OF REASONING ILL. perhaps it was because those that were slower had been seized by the wolves. except that of a thousand predictions. which proves that which is not. in seeking after the reasons of things and there are an infinite number which ought to be resolved in the same way as Plutarch resolved that question which he proposed to himself. after which is all. are continually ad vancing reasons for that imaginary horror. strange if they did not happen every year in some part of the world . their their particular actions. . says apparently the real one. for after having said that. there are some who assign chimerical causes for chimerical effects. and for the propagation of qua lities. others . It is still worse when they assign chimerical influences as the cause of the vicious or virtuous inclinations of men. for often men weary them selves uselessly. as those who maintain that nature ab hors a vacuum. In this way must be explained not true. but all the effects which are attributed to that horror de pend on the weight of the air alone). [PART III. it is perhaps. it is necessary to examine with care if the effects are true. because she needs the continuity of bodies for the transmission of influences. he finally suggests another solution. he. Hence. do not risk very much. we must allow that a torch lighted and even of life. It is a strange kind of science this.

that bones and crawfish are found indiffer all the ently. there is for that nothing more unreasonable than this imagination. ground than we have for believing that the dog-star brings them cold. for The world will be grafting trees. ergo propter This happens after such a thing. as Gassendi has very well remarked. In this way it has been concluded caused by that thing. delivered. those who pretend that. The same is true. XIX. Although. star being on the other side of the line. which is called. to all appearance. for there are some who say that all this is false. as some careful observers have assured us they have proved. we ought to receive it without examination. from all this bondage. and empty when it is on the wane . by degrees. as that bones are full of marrow when it is at the full. the inhabitants have much more . which has no other foundation than suppositions of which no one has Hence the injustice of ever seriously proved the truth. therefore it must be hoc. which led Virgil to say. for reaping and sowing corn. to which it is more perpendicular notwithstanding which. that common fallacy of the human mind. if they allege an experiment as a fact derived from some ancient author. bring under this kind of sophism too. that the star Aut Ille Sirius ardor : sitim morbosque t erons mortalibus aegris Naseitur. ct kuvo contristat lumhie ccelum. into scarcely any vice of reasoning which able . post hoc. in that country.] DIFFERENT WAYS OP REASONING ILL. that the same is true of crawfish. IV. We may which is called the dog-star. its influence ought to be much more powerful in these parts. for taking medicines. . during changes of the moon. sometimes full and sometimes empty. There is Incomplete En numeration. when in Latin. 251 the great number of effects which are attributed to the moon. in relation to a number of observations which are made for the cutting of wood. the days which we call dog-days here are the winter season there so that. Sirius speaking of that star.CHAP. for believing that it is the cause of our heat. is the cause of the extraordinary heat we feel during the days which are termed the dog-days.

reputation.252 DIFFERENT WA?S OF REASONING ILL. and that . or that it exists in such and such a way. called by him vacuum disseminatum. and of not sufficiently considering all the ways in which a thing may exist. no body could move without taking the place of some other. . in moving a body. And we refer to these the more willingly. so far. may find examples of these defective reasonings in the proofs by which M. that infinity. move. it proceeds in a circle. which leads them to conclude rashly. that the motion goes on in a circle. must also displace another. B and B. to wit. men fall more easily than that of making imperfect enu merations. although it may still be in another way. Gassendi establishes the principle of his philosophy. either that it does not exist. maintained is. are not to be despised. . it must displace another body at least equal to itself. though it may exist in another. inflexible. and the whole were filled with bodies. because M. stored with a great fund of curious knowledge. that this displacing of bodies goes on to ways. the faults even which may be met with in the great number of works which have been published since his death. which is ridiculous and impossible the other. and the universe would be only one vast mass of rigid. The prove first this diffused argument which Gassendi employs in order to vacuum. which they have not considered. There is not here. and which he maintains. or take place. in order to move. the bodies which displace All that is one another would be moved to infinity. should be considered as a demonstration as clear as those of mathematics. which is that of a vacuum diffused among the parts of matter. for the universe being completely filled. . any imperfect enu meration and it is further true. A. Thus if a body. [PART III. is this If there were no vacuum. motion would be impossible. Gassendi having been a celebrated man. Now this can happen only in two the one. and thus the last displaced body occupies the place of A. be cause it does not exist in a certain way. and immoveable matter. however. that it is ridiculous to suppose that. in one : place. but whereas it is very useless to load deserve being known the memory with those which are found in authors of no We .

This is still more clear in a circle of iron which turns round its centre for in this case each part occupies at the same instant the space which has been left by that which preceded it. that a body the place of another body at the same moment in which that body quits it.] DIFFERENT WAYS OF REASONING ILL. A yet empty and therefore. move. is X. and in this case there is no incon quits that place A pushing B. and in this way there will be motion. which is A. which we will suppose ? be wood. and that thus all will be filled. aii- And why may not the body A. cannot cither therefore everything remains immoveable. which we will and that the body B displace another. and not filled by the second. which is not not being able to move. that the place so that. . without there being any necessity for imagin Now. it not be so in a circle partly of wood and partly of why may . X A : X : may occupy to is possible. which is immediately before A. to . of A be already empty when it begins to move before the moment in which it occupies that place. if. But this supposition is false and imperfect. suppose to be air. and B pushing C. since there is still another to move. if we admit any continuous matter. and so on venience. which is. at the same instant in which the first and that there space quits a space. it X X . if this is possible in a circle of iron. there be another in which it may be said to be empty. The whole of this reasoning is founded only on this sup position. we distinguish in a rod two parts which immediately follow each other.CHAP. that way in which it is possible for at the same instant in which it occupies the place of A. that space is occupied by the second. that is to say. XIX. that the body X. . is no interval in which we can say that is void of the first. it is clear that when we move it. : which order to move. which is. 253 the last body moved occupies the place of the first. which is A. This M. at the same moment occupying the place to X. but no va of A cuum. ing a vacuum. is a thing which we are obliged Now that this acknowledge in any hypothesis whatever. can move on only one condition. cannot move unless the last. because. Now cannot move. push and displace the body B. in must take the place of A. for example. Gassendi undertakes to refute by the following argument The first moved.

Gassendi s reasoning springs from his belief. because this subtile matter. is able to receive a fresh quantity by compression. says he. renders his argument invalid for we may suppose that between the greater particles of air there may be a matter finer and more subtile. until X. that it is necessary in order that a body may take the place of another. being able to pass through the pores of all bodies. and that we may force fresh air into a space which seemed already full. And M. . But it is very capable of being filled with new bodies. but which. tirely. . other another. which is. what I maintain. of which he says nothing. and passes through all pores. On these experiments he founds this reasoning If the space A. since he himself admits this subtile matter which penetrates bodies. being driven by the particles of air which are forced in. which will take the place of at the same instant in which leaves it ? It is clear. strange that M. there is a third. besides the hypothesis of penetration. [PART III. that there are void spaces between the parts of matter. for that A A empty previously. : did not fill it en or that the air contained in but that there were between the particles of air void spaces. it must be either that this fresh air which passes into it. to be naturally impossible. therefore. gives place to them by escaping . as we see in air-balls and air-guns. and that. which is impos place to be before. does so by penetrating into the space already occupied by the other air. by which he showed very clearly that air may be compressed. that the defect of M. and which. which he judges. Gassendi was the more called upon to reject that hypothesis. with rea son. The other proofs which he adduces are derived from different experiments. through the pores.254 DIFFERENT WAYS OF REASONING ILL. Gassendi could not perceive that he was sible. being already full of air. makes the space which appears full of air able still to receive new air . being possible. into which the fresh air is received and this second hypothesis proves. and for at least a moment and from his not considering that it is sufficient if it be empty at the same moment. A reasoning in an imperfect enumeration. and that of diffused voids between the particles of matter which he wishes to estab lish.

which he held to be a body. being misapplied. and since he confesses even in that celebrated experiment which he made with the quicksilver. the invocation of saints. since he confesses. nor the con- . called in the schools fallo. is done by the number of people who decry antimony. as the inventions of Satan. and which certainly was not tilled with any sensible matter. whereas it is to neither the Christian religion. when we draw a simple. We often fall into this vicious reasoning when we take As if any should accuse simple occasions for true causes. that it could not with reason be maintained. we say. authorised by all antiquity as though the bad use which men may make of the best things ren . new bodies. because somewhat of abuse and superstition had crept in amongst these holy practices. the Christian religion of having been the cause of the murder of an infinite number of persons. which is. in filling with subtile matter those spaces. Thus. This sophism is because. in a tube much longer than this. since he says the same thing of light. which he maintained to be empty. it produces bad effects . the veneration of relics. thus leaving a space above which appeared to be empty. others. who have chosen rather to suffer death than to renounce Jesus Christ. or to medicine the faults of cer tain ignorant doctors. It is who in this way have led so many deluded people that the heretics of the present day to believe that we ought to reject. as though Judging uf a thing by that which only belongs to it accidentally.cia accidentis. and abso This lute conclusion. the prayer for the dead. unrestricted. since light passed into it.] DIFFERENT WAYS OF REASONING since he considers heat ILL. and by attribute to eloquence all the bad effects which it produces when abused. which remained sus pended at the height of two feet three inches and a half. 255 and cold to be corpuscules which enter into our pores. there would have been as much room left for the entrance of they had actually been empty. dered them bad.CHAP. from what is true only by accident. XIX. that that space was absolutely void.

it must be But avowed. . or from a a divided sense. also. and the deaf could not hear. they were very blind. two hands. because in man it is accidentally united with that form. see also a famous example of this sophism in the ridiculous reasoning of the Epicureans. cannot be true if we take these things separately. who concluded that the gods must have a human form. Passing from a divided sense connected sense to to a connected sense. not the human figure which en it being absurd to imagine ables men to think and reason. remaining nected sense. if they had chosen to relax in that strict observance of the law of God. but now saw and so of the deaf. are very happy . The blind see. . cheeks. in a divided. of these sophisms is called fallacia composithe latter. two feet . that good people pagans. that is to say. the lame walk. VI. in the gospel. said they. that reason and thought depend on anything which is in a nose. but blind . The gods. and not in a con For the blind could not see. stancy of the martyrs. in speaking of his This miracles. because among all creatures in the world men alone had the use of reason. that the gods have the human form. . those who had been blind before were so no longer. [PATCT III. are often said to be the cause of all the evils which they might have avoided by doing things which would have offended their conscience because. there is no virtue without reason . that these murders ought to be but simply to the injustice and cruelty of the It is through this sophism. remaining deaf. nevertheless. and reason attributed. the deaf hear. They will be under stood better by examples. not to see that although in men the substance which thinks and reasons be united to a human body. The former tionis . and it was thus a puerile sophism in these philosophers to con clude that reason could only dwell in the human form. these evils would not have happened. Jesus Christ says. and not together. a mouth.256 DIFFERENT WAYS OF REASONING ILL. fallacia divisionis. two arms. We is found noickere except in the human form . none can be happy without virtue . it is. therefore.

having forsaken should despair of their salvation. The . pass from one of these senses to the other and that those. and covetous men shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven. again. women of evil life shall enter into the kingdom of God before or who. that the gods must have simplicitcr. in For this does not mean. that which is only promised to those who cease to be so. would reason ill. by true conversion . Avho live ungodly lives. to sinners remaining in Passing from what is what quid ad dictum is true in some respect. by his grace. on the contrary. The first would pass from the divided sense to the com pounded. 257 the same sense. to absolutely. because it is said that the anger of God is reserved against all those the Pharisees . Scripture. VII. that he considers as just those who are still ungodly. but who cease to be so by turning to their sins God.CHAP. For this does not mean that none of those who have had these vices shall be saved.] DIFFERENT WAYS OF REASONING It is in the ILL. in promising themselves. to justify the ungodly. though still continuing sinners. fornicators. XIX. without a sophism. and because it is said in the gospel that : . and that none who are vicious shall have any part in the inheritance of Jesus Christ. what is true This is called in the schools a dido secundum : The following are examples the Epicureans proved. It is easy to see that we cannot. propositions which are true only in an opposite sense to the divided sense as when St Paul says. and the last would pass from the compounded sense to the divided. also. on the other hand. who should promise themselves heaven while remaining in their sins. but that he renders just. but only that those who have continued addicted to them. that liars. because Jesus came to save sinners. as having nothing to expect but the punishment of their sins. There are. and have never left them by turning to God. that God is said. evil. shall have no place in the kingdom of heaven. for example. in applying to those who have been sinners. those who before were ungodly. that which refers only and wicked life.

since he is of neither pain nor labour. nor strength. what is so marvellous is. How. And those in men therefore. can that be a god which has neither danger. that he can do nothing. and that those who dwell there are very miserable. There can be no virtues in God like Cicero. which may be referred to the same vice. and having heard that there were in towns no roofs of thatch. nor temperance. . and is not exposed to any How. And thus. therefore. not being capable of Shall we say that he has intelligence and reason? any But reason and intelligence serve to discover to us that winch is unknown from that which is knoivn.258 DIFFERENT WAYS OF REASONING it is ILL. or rather. what need can God have for this choice.? since he has susceptible no desires to moderate. since ive can attribute no For shall we say that he has prudence 1 But virtue to him ? since prudence consists in the choice between good and evil. there can be Neither can justice be in God. says he. be- . [PART III. now. should conclude therefrom that there were no houses in towns. there is no virtue in God. It resembles the notion of a rustic who. reasoning. human form because the most beautiful. it did not follow that it must be in God because all perfections are in God. only because the imperfection which is found in human virtue cannot be in God so that what proves to him that God has no intelligence. that he concludes that there is no virtue in God. This is how Cotta. an absurd argument of Cotta against the existence of God. evil&quot. cause this relates only to the intercourse of men . intelligence nor virtue ? It is difficult to conceive anything more impertinent than this method of reasoning. and every This was bad thing which is beautiful must be in God. reasons. that is to say. be nothing unknown to God. that he sees nothing . because he sees everything . can we conceive God. which contain no imperfection. but only in relation to bodies. which were necessary in God. having never seen houses covered with any thing but thatch. and not absolutely. is the fact that nothing is hid from him. the perfection being only in some respect. in the Third Book. for the human form is not beautiful absolutely. it being only those which are perfections abso lutely. of the nature of the gods. We find also in Cicero. that is to say. being exposed to all the incle mencies of the weather.

On this subject. which which may be taken either signify some whole. though having four terms. they take them for the same thing. may reduce to this kind of sophism all those syllo gisms which are vicious. because that which //as the use of rat son is better Now there is nothing. or because it in the second.- But in limitconceive anything better. therefore. which sometimes deceive such as those which we often find in words of ^ ability. because fied by the same word.CHAP. and in another the terms of the conclusion are not taken in the same sense For we do not restrict in the premises as in the conclusion : We the word ambiguity to those words alone that are mani which scarcely ever mislead any one. because position. although we may say that there ourselves . collectively. especially when men do not easily different things being signi perceive that change. say they. with referring to this ambiguity. for each of these parts. VIII. because he possesses all happiness. or more perfect. which may be done indifferent ways.&quot. than that which has not. for all their parts together. cisely that none can We some examples of men shall content ourselves. since it attributes to the world that which belongs only to to God. which is better than the world. the use of reason. who way is to be resolved that sophism of the stoics. we comprise under it anything which may change the meaning of a word. the world has In this &quot. whether this be because the middle is taken twice parti is taken in one sense in the first pro cularly. Abusing the ambiguity ofivonls. ILL. but festly equivocal.&quot. therefore. 259 cause he can do everything that he enjoys no happiness. that of being such that it is impossible in&quot. we may refer to what has been said to wards the end of the First Part. The minor of this argument is false. where we have also be employed against spoken of the remedy which should the confusion of ambiguous words by denning them so pre be deceived.] DIFFERENT WAYS OF REASONING . to creatures. XIX. finally. or. or distributive!/. concluded that the world was an animal endowed with reason. which is.

th^. and from this it does not at all . thoughts. however. we infer. all that we can conclude from this at most is. It is. This would be the same kind of bad reasoning as to say man thinks now. When. such as are angels and men. as we shall show in another place. leads us to judge that this is And since no people have ever been true of all gold. Deriving a general conclusion from a defective induction. when we find. [PART III. man is composed of mind and body therefore. follow that he thinks in the other. For it is enough. nothing better than the world. employ sounds to express their It is in this way that all our knowledge begins. since individual things present themselves to us before universals. IX. by the examination of many seas. in order that we may attribute thought to the whole man. that is to say. The consideration of in dividual things furnishes to our mind only the occasion of turning its attention to its natural ideas. that induction alone is never a certain means of acquiring perfect knowledge. which furnished me with the occasion of thinking of it. But it. taking it.260 is DIFFERENT WAYS OF REASONING ILL. found who do not speak.t the world has the use of reason in relation to some of its parts. for the totality of all the beings that God has created. and not that the whole together was an animal endowed with the use of reason. know although. that I might never perhaps have been led to consider the nature of a triangle if I had not seen a triangle. . is not the particular examination of . collectively. that he thinks in re lation to one of the parts . The experiments by which we have found that gold does not diminish in the fire. that the water of the sea different is salt. and that of rivers fresh. the universals help us to the individual. for example. generally. Thus. nevertheless. that the water in them is fresh. from the examination of many particular things. mind and body think. and of many rivers. For it is true. we believe confidently that all men speak. according to which it judges of the truth of things in general. nevertheless true. we rise to the knowledge of a general truth this is called induction. afterwards. that the water in them is salt.

that verified by a most certain induction derived from a multi tude of experiments but. . all 261 the triangles which makes me conclude generally and contain is equal certainly of all. of the diameter of raise water. Be this as it may. up to the present time. reserving the consideration of this to say here. those. OF THE BAD REASONINGS WHICH ARE COMMON IN CIVIL LIFE AND IN ORDINARY DISCOURSE.CHAP. it would be impossible to draw out the piston without make water rise as high as it. provided we employ a force equal to the weight of a column of water of more than 23 feet in and that we cannot the syringe height. both are found to be false. which are not and I shall con complete. it is enough defective inductions. that the space which they to that of the rectangle of their whole base and a part of their side (for this examination would be impossible). All philosophers had believed. that is to say. XX. higher than 22 or 23 feet . and that we might bursting we chose in pumps by suction. that a syringe being well stopped. since the use of reason is not in relation to those kind of . often lead us to fall into error with referring to one remarkable example of tent . but the consideration of what is contained in the idea simply of a triangle which I find in iny mind.] BAD REASONINGS COMMON IX CIVIL LIFE. WE common principal have seen some examples of the faults which are most in reasoning on scientific subjects but. as an undoubted truth. that subject for another place. since . however well it may be stopped. CHAPTER XX. by suction in a pump. myself this. new experiments have been made which have proved that the piston of a syringe. What made this to be so it was supposed to have been firmly believed was. may be drawn out.

when we judge that a stick which appears bent in the water is really so. there being always something which operates on the motive and principle of that judgment. inasmuch as this design would require a separate work. and principally on that of morals. this judgment is founded on that general and false proposition. it would. though not developed. some of the causes of those false judgments which are so common amongst men. in which one prevails more than the other . do not stay to distinguish false judgments from bad reasonings. and hence we shall treat of . certain errors. But. which would comprehend almost the whole we shall content ourselves with indicating here. nevertheless. is so really and this involves a reason In considering them generally. ing. and Now which deceive our minds by false appearances. For example. and which constitute the ordinary subject of their conversation. and produce them as a necessary conse quence. OF INTEREST. and of other things which are important in civil life. bad reasonings. the causes of our errors appear to be reducible to two the one interior the irregularity of the will. and because in reality there is almost always a concealed and enveloped reasoning in what appears to be a simple judgment. If we examine with care what commonly attaches men rather to one opinion than to another. of morals. OF THE SOPHISMS OF SELF-LOVE.262 SOPHISMS COMMON IN CIVIL LIFE. : We them separately. although these causes almost always appear united to gether. and shall inquire indifferently into the causes both because false judgments are the sources of of each. I. and in which there is much less danger of being deceived. principles which troubles and disorders the judgment. be much more useful to consider generally what betrays they men into the false judgments which make on every kind of subject. that what appears bent to our senses. [PART III. there are. the other ex ternal^ which lies in the objects of which we judge. in general. AND OF PASSION. subjects which enter but little into the conduct of life. without doubt. we shall find that it .

I am of such an order . or institution.] is SELF-LOVE INTEREST PASSION. judge of things. is to lead us to consider with more attention the reasons which may enable us to discover the truth of that which we wish to be true but it is only the truth which must be found in the thing itself. But this illusion is much more evident when any change . though you had been of another country. a country therefore. 263 not a conviction of the truth. no interest at Nevertheless. or even as false. For. at most. true II. of interest. which gives the greatest impetus to our judg ments. Of Avhatever order. and truth and utility are to us but one and the same thing. judge of it in a different way. and which holds us to them most forcibly. are considered most certain by all of some one nation. are no reasons. and the force of the but some bond of self-love. but by what they are in relation to us. having stake. and of whatever . which ought to convince us. and which decides us in the greater part of our doubts.CHAP. I must believe that such a privilege is right. so differently constituted from those of as that. . judging by the same rules of rea that which appears generally true to the one this diversity of should appear generally false to the others. not by what they are in themselves. and that the others. or profession. soning. nor that the minds of all It is this We Spaniards are Frenchmen. to show that the things which are held every where else as doubtful. I must believe that such a saint preached the gospel there. you ought to believe only Avhat is and what you would have been disposed to believe. may be. since it cannot be that what is true in Spain should be false in France. country you . independently I am of such of our desires. No other proofs are needed than those which we see every day. and of another profession. it is plain that judgment can arise from no other cause except that the one choose to hold as true that which is to their advantage. passion. there These fore. what can be more unreasonable than to All take our interest as the motive for believing a thing ? that it can do. of another order. reasons. or of This is the weight which bears down the scale. XX.

without faith. nevertheless. or who have been op posed in something to their feelings. they realise therefore. and without conscience. though they do not expressly realise to their mind . that they are right. and interests? This is enough to render them at once. I love him . that they know the truth . takes place in the passions . that the change which has taken place in their own heart alone. reduce to the same illusion of self-love. rash. If they love any one. therefore. those We may who the conclusion is necessary. desires. he is nobody . [PART III. The error of these persons springs solely from this. which is. that the good opinion which they have of their own insight . to those who are moved by some new passion. from which it is not difficult to infer that in fact.264 SOPHISMS COMMON IN CIVIL LIFE. he is free from every kind of defect. has changed all ex ternal things which have any relation to them. without honour. it we may to a great extent. and call sophisms and delusions of the heart those kinds of errors which consist in transferring our passion to the objects of our passions. and in judging that they are what we will or desire that they may be . for. in their estimation. that of decide everything by a very general and con venient principle. m. without their being able to assign any other reason for all these judg ments than the passion itself which possesses them so that. which is effect without doubt very unreasonable. though all things remain in their place. those who are not of their opinion are deceived. he is the cleverest this reasoning man in the world : I hate him . in their hearts . proud. and since it is God enough to render all things alone whose will is efficacious what he would have them to be. Their affections and desires are not any more just or moderate than their hatred. either natural or acquired. Every thing which they desire is just and easy. therefore. often do we see persons who are able to recognise no good quality. in those against whom How they have conceived an aversion. everything which they do not desire is unjust and impossible. since our desires can no change in the existence of that which is without us. it appears. ignorant.

who are not of our opinion. &quot. There are some. though they be not in those which have been recently discovered. V. the blood circulate. XX. for a long time. These things. and most certain discoveries for those who had not known them previously. if nature does not abhor a vacuum. they sel dom listen to the opinions of others. if the food is not carried to the liver by the messaric veins. I should not be a clever man now. therefore.&quot.&quot. folly.CHAP. cannot But. if heavy and have a movement below. I have been ignorant many important things in anatomy and in physics. without proof. nothing more common than to see people mutually reproaching each other.] SELF-LOVE INTEREST PASSION. and that is they may be accomplished in other things. if the blood rise by the descending hol low vein. 2G5 leads them to consider all their thoughts as so clear and evident. Hence it is that they so rarely trouble themselves to furnish proofs. again. rity IV. so neither are they of the opinion of others. who have no other ground for rejecting certain opinions than this amusing reasoning if this were so. it is not so.What. if the venous artery carry the blood to the heart. I am a : . have . that they imagine the whole world must accept them as soon as they ai-e known. This is the main reason which. again. they would have confessed themselves clever . simply because they are persuaded that we are not in the right. to remedy this of be. . been hitherto deceived. they wish all to yield to their authority. There is. without considering that if others are not of their opinion. man therefore. it there is also necessary to represent fully to such that very little discredit in being mistaken. since they never distinguish their autho from reason. fancied that by admitting them. and that it is unjust to assume. led to the rejection of some most useful remedies. that we are in the right when we attempt to convince others. said they. if the air be to &quot. and accusing one N . They treat with contempt all those who are not of their opinion.

on their side. with almost the same language. and chicanery are of different opinions. of blindness. quce did ex utraque parte possunt^ licet vere did ex it tr ague parte non possint. This is one of the most injurious things possible in the life of men. since they assume that truth is on the side of him who persons. [PART III. are just and right on the part of those who are not so . These are clear and weighty reasons. wise and thoughtful sense. before they have tolerable absurdities before they have clearly proved this. again. from this. of wanting common makes them. They will thus be content to defend truth by the wea pons which are her own. nevertheless. not say. and extravagances for the others. and which falsehood cannot borrow. They will shown it. from the same malady which leads each one to take. to be obstinate is not to submit to the right. make the same complaints. for it throws truth and error. passion. although it be true that these reproaches of into . that he is in the right for. as a principle. All this confusion springs. when they for example. and concealing the truth by artifices of speech and thus those who are in the right. passion. an obscurity so profound. and thus accom And thus they will prefer rather to observe plish nothing. it is not difficult to infer. . There are scarcely any advocates who do not accuse each other of delaying the process. and that others con demn both as being equally wrong. say the same of them. by chance and without knowledge. . should avoid using them. and of quibbling. will : . that the Avorld. But still. to one of these parties. that most equitable rule of St Augustine Omittamm ista communia. who treat of any contested matter. that they fall into in . which are very un just on the part of those who are mistaken. of rashness. justice and injustice. in general. that many attach themselves. and attribute to each other the same vices. They will never then accuse their adversaries of obstinacy.266 another SOPHISMS COMMON IN CIVIL LIFE. since. of obstinacy. and those who are in the wrong. cannot distinguish between them and hence it happens. that all who oppose us are obstinate. before they have thoroughly established the truth and justice of the cause which they maintain.

indeed. and think only of the means by which it may be repressed and obscured in which they are almost invariably success . which always lives in men. therefore. and furnish views. shows us that one of the most important rules which we can observe. : that book is . but desires it all for itself . but it also naturally jealous. the source of the spirit of contradiction so mon amongst men. it is an opinion which is convenient. which dwells deep in the heart of men. When this vice is in excess. others. Thus.] SELF-LOVE INTEREST PASSION. therefore. as self-love often leads us to make these ridiculous reasonings It is an opinion which I discovered. in order to win those to whom we speak from error. and bring them over to the truth of which we would persuade them. : natural ill-will leads us often to make these others. which are equally absurd Some one else said such a thing it is. it is. it is that of my order. and which leads them. XX. without reason. and to think only of those which they think may be offered against it they are always on their guard against truth. since it has its root in self-love. which rinds its greatest pleasure in quibbling with others on the and in contradicting everything with a pure But it is often more imperceptible and more concealed and AVC may say. to pay but little attention to the reasons which might have persuaded them. It can scarcely bear that they should have any advantage. false I did not write therefore. the fertility of the human mind in false reasons being inexhaustible. envious of. The knowledge of this malignant and envious disposi tion. and ill-disposed to wards. which often leads men to combat. true . and as it is an advantage to know the truth. The mind is of man is not only in love with itself. 267 VI. malignity. . This it is. that no one is alto gether free from it. ful. : . a secret desire arises to rob those men with new who do this of the glory. a bad one.CHAP. the opinions and inventions of others. it constitutes one of the leading characteristics of the spirit of pedantry. is to excite their envy and jealousy as little as pospettiest things. . com when they hear or read anything of another.

to escape observation. as well as of his good qualities. objects by speaking of ourselves. and towards all that they say. which has something . by speaking freely of his defects. since men love scarcely any but themselves. as any one ever and even to avoid using the words I and me . as well as a violent love for himself. is not to be observed too rigidly. and they commonly pass from the hatred of the man to the hatred of his opinions and reasons. by hiding themselves in the crowd. for there are many occasions in which it would uselessly embarrass us to avoid these words. by a natural consequence. his maladies. and seek rather. and thus throw into shade the main object of their regard. Hence.2G8 sible SOPHISMS COMMON IN CIVIL LIFE. but it is always good to keep it in view. who speak only of themselves. to preserve us from the wretched custom of some individuals. This rule. they avoid attracting at tention to themselves in particular. and by presenting which may engage their attention. who knew as much of true rhetoric did. and thus excites in them. they cannot bear that another should intrude himself upon them. Pascal. that one of the characteristics most unworthy of a sensible man is that which Montaigne has affected in entertaining his readers with all his humours. The late M. and that human civility con cealed and suppressed it. [PART to III. carried this rule so far as to maintain that a well-bred man ought to avoid mentioning himself. It is true that he attempted as far as possible to remove from himself the suspicion of a low and vulgar vanity. All that does not refer to themselves is odious and imper tinent. his inclinations. his fancies. them For. and he was accustomed to say. wise persons avoid as much as possible revealing to others the advantages which they have. a secret aversion to these This shows us people. however. that Christian piety annihilated the human me. his virtues. which could arise only from a weakness of judgment. on this subject. in order that only the truth which they propose may be seen in their discourse. when their opinion is not asked for. This leads those who hear them to suspect that this constant recurrence to them selves arises only from a secret pleasure. and who quote themselves continually. which leads them continually to that object of their love. and his vices.

at all more vile or con . that though he takes great pains. and that there are even men of mind who have not discovered the . and as one unconnected with the brief and gown. . nevertheless. and had been succeeded by But the greatest vice of this author is not that of vanity. without any occasion. after having in formed us that he had succeeded Marshal de Brion in that Marshal de Matignon. for he is filled with such a multitude of shameful scandals. No other proofs are necessary. to inform us. 20 J . not that they may be detested he does not think for a moment that he ought to be held in less esteem he regards them as things very in if he different. and he believes that he will not be. office. probable. he declares. he has not taken the same pains to inform us that he had also a of clerk. in many places. that he had been his vices . as he has chosen to inform us that he had been mayor of that town. that he would not have concealed this circumstance of his life if he could have found some marshal of France who had been coun sellor of Bordeaux. that he had a page. having been himself counsellor of the parliament Bordeaux. and that if he had to live over again he would live as he had . and rather as creditable than disgraceful reveals them it gives him no concern. than the manner in which he speaks even for allowing. he is as careful as any one to conceal hence. in two places of his book. from the appearance trick and artifice. It is. nevertheless. This employment.] amiable in SELF-LOVE INTEREST PASSION. temptible. poison. however. that he did not repent of them at all. of sincerity but it is it. Avho was an oiFicer of very little use in the house of a gentleman of six thousand livres a year. that it is wonderful that he has been endured so long by every body. He speaks of his vices in order that they may be known. and of epicurean and impious maxims. which easy to see that all that is only a should onlyrender it still more odious. . but only. on that account.CHAP. did not satisfy the vanity with the air of a gentleman and of a cavalier. a celebrated author of the present day pleasantly remarks. guilty of a great number of criminal excesses. though very honourable in he had of appearing always itself. in order to judge of his of libertinism. But when he apprehends that anything will it degrade him at all. XX.

SOPHISMS COMMON IN CIVIL LIFE. and largest portion If I had to live over again I would live as of the whole. being occupied with one s This wonder self. it belongs to it nevertheless. . I cannot condemn my universal form. as into a dark and silent abyss. does not deserve any special precepts. and who bear witness by what means they have become so. And in another place Death. so that if they make known their good actions.&quot.&quot. and pray God for my entire reformation. Those only may be allowed to speak of themselves who are men of eminent virtue. which is only a quarter of an hour s passion. which denote the entire for the future. But. &quot.&quot. and it is insufferable effrontery to . and if they publish their faults. . or that the meagre end of my life was to disavow and deny the most beautiful. . though I may be displeased with it. I cannot desire in general am.270 done.&quot. without consequence. &quot. for ordinary per sons. it is only to humble themselves before men. him who I plunge myself another place headlong blindly into death. [PART III. As for &quot. extinction of all religious feeling. full of a mighty sleep. : lethargy. Although this digression appears widely removed from this subject. through the vanity which always accompanies these discourses. and to deter them from committing these. for this reason no book which more fosters that bad cus tom of speaking of one s self. . or to instruct them . and overwhelms me in a moment. and repent ance does not properly refer to things which are not in our power. both in ourselves. that there is fully corrupts reason. by the contempt and aversion which they conceive for us. and for the pardon of my natural weakness but this I ought not to call repentance any more than the dissatisfaction I may feel at not being an angel. me. which engulphs me at once. and in others. but which are worthy of to be other than I . also. complete. and wishing all others to be so too. it is a ridiculous vanity to wish to inform others of their petty advantages . : and without injury. or Cato my actions are regulated and conformed to my state and condition I cannot be better. in &quot. says he. full of unconsciousness and said. I never expected incongruously to affix the tail of a philosopher to the head and body of an abandoned man. I have done I do not lament over the past I do not fear Awful words. it is only to excite others to praise God for these.

to find reasons for everything. The movement of the mind. It is true. and plunge us into error. We become accustomed. always replies . may distinguish to some extent. and to have no concern or re pentance on account of it. not to blush for it. in regarding both This is why it is so rare a thing for as equally probable. from malignant and envious contradiction. generally. in that proportion. and pride ourselves on maintaining our of opinion at whatever cost. warmth to inspire it.] SELF-LOVE INTEREST PASSION. that provided they be rightly used. another kind of disposition not so this bad. and it is com monly through the various obstacles which we meet with that we discover wherein the obscurity and the difficulties of conviction consist. a vice very inju . since their aim is not to find certain. in which mainly lies the wit of Mon VII. on the contrary. is it dangerous when we abuse it. and awaken its ideas. and to place ourselves above reason by never hold nothing as yielding to it. is It needs a certain commonly too cold and languid. . 271 reveal their excesses to the world without expressing their sorrow for them. which leads us by degrees to and to confound truth with error.CHAP. and without any mixture of passion. which leads us to endeavour to over come them. however. both for finding the truth. that just in proportion as this exer cise is useful. or recommending it to others. and in contradicting that can separate us more widely from the others. We rious to the mind. can be censured. a question to be determined by discussion and why it They scarcely ever happens that two philosophers agree. unconsciously. We may say. but to speak of it indifferently as of anything else taigne. when we employ it aright. there is nothing which contributes more towards for giving us different hints. in the examination of any subject. but which produces the same faults of reasoning is the spirit of debate. which is. XX. It is not that discussions. however. than this kind of disposi tion. since the last degree of abandonment in vice is. Nothing truth. so. and rejoinders. . when it works alone.

and another at the side another neither listens to. not persons. what his opponent says. affecting a proud contempt.272 SOPHISMS COMMON IN CIVIL LIFE. who. provided only that he is another counts effective. you. and another wanders amidst a crowd of details and after an hour s storm. it is very difficult not to lose sight of truth in debates. . and since they think it less dis graceful to remain always in error than to avow that they were mistaken. [PART III. Thus. unless at least we have been accustomed by long discipline to retain the perfect mastery over ourselves. fear everything. since there are scarcely any exercises which so much arouse our What vices have they not excited. become obstinate and are silent. brated author. and make a german quarrel in order to finish the dispute. may hence judge how liable these kinds of confer ences are to disorder the mind. nor still less under similitude stands. avoid error but silence. or a stupid modesty of avoiding contention. conscious of their weakness. refuse everything. confuse the discussion at the onset. says a cele passions. Finally. which are ingeniously enough represented by this who. again. another one seizes on a word or below. and then of the We We learn to dispute only to contradict and each contradicting and being contradicted. One is above. These are the common vices of our debates. and others We see some who conclude against who weary and bewilder every one with prefaces and useless digressions. in the midst of it. There are some. at least unless we take great care not only not to fall ourselves first into these We . without ever having known the true grandeur of man. or. they know not what they were discussing. themselves. One goes to the east and another to the west one loses the principle in dispute. has sufficiently canvassed his defects. it comes to pass that the result of the debate is the annihilation of truth. writer. One. and is so engaged with his own course that he only thinks of following himself. when they have been worsted in argument. there are some who arm themselves with abuse. cares not how he exposes himself his words and weighs his reasons a third relies on his voice and lungs alone. being almost always governed by anger ? pass first to a hatred of the reasons.

knowing very well how incon venient and disagreeable these controversial dispositions are. There is not a single preacher in the Gazette. But though the false hood were only in the words.CHAP. amidst this profusion ceive from their friends of praises. and the pettiest All who die are illustrious for piety authors might make books of praises which they re so that. and who does not ravish his hearers by the profundity of his knowledge. it is matter of wonder that some are found so eager for them. for as the controversial hold as true the contrary of what is said to them. ance.] SELF-LOVE INTEREST PASSION. but also not to follow those who do. and are given so indifferently to every one. but it is necessary to praise only what is truly praiseworthy. It is quite impossible that this confusion in the language should not produce some confusion in the mind. which is a disposition more convenient indeed for our fortune. in the first place their discourse. which may be bad. which is under discussion. and without losing the end which we ought to seek. the complaisant appear to take as true everything which is said to them. for those who adopt the habit of praising everything. to them. which is that of contradicting nothing. who. that we know not what from them. become accus tomed also to approve of everything. to avoid it. but of praising and approving We who This is what is called complais everything indifferently. and then their minds. who is not most eloquent. . this would be sufficient to lead those who sincerely love the It is not necessary to reprove everything truth. find some persons. XX. again. and who treasure so carefully those which are given to conclude . adopt an immediately opposite course. and so to go vern ourselves that we may see them wander without wan dering ourselves. and not in the mind. Hence it is that praises are become so common. 273 errors. but very injurious to our judgment. principally amongst those attend at court. is the elucidation of the truth which VIII. and this habit corrupts. otherwise we lead those whom we . which are made with such little discernment.

which are governed. Does he wish to destroy the advantage which men have over beasts 1 He relates to us absurd stories. or rather strengthens them in it. and con fuse all ideas and words. but whether they will avail to de is. according to their influences. one of the principal and most common. This is the engaging to maintain any opinion. we destroy all the trustworthiness of language. how can we deprive them of a soul. and we com mit a wrong against those who truly deserve praises. the dominion reasons. Amongst the various ways by which self-love plunges men into error. he employs them as good When we consider. we maintain. : &quot. Finally. and disturbed. and derives from fend that which reasons. when he needs them for the purpose of foolishly degrading mankind. [PART III. if they will contribute to the end which we seek. but also on our inclina tions. We employ all sorts of good and bad. but simply an out ward civility which we give to those whom we praise as we might do a bow. . &quot. . IX. by giv We ing them equally to those who do not deserve them. and of discourse?&quot. we must not forget one which without doubt.&quot. not only on our lives. help to deceive those who judge of these persons by these praises . and on the state of our fortune. praise in this way into error. and pre vents their escape from it. Nevertheless. says he. to which we may attach ourselves from other considerations than those of its truth. The following are some examples An intelligent man would hardly ever suspect Montaigne of having believed all the dreams of judicial astrology. and power which these bodies have. whose ex travagance he knew better than any one. in order that there may be some to suit every one and we sometimes proceed even to say things which we well know to be absolutely false. driven. by causing them to be no longer signs of our judgments and thoughts. of life. For this determination to defend our opinion leads us no longer to consider whether the reasons we em ploy are true or false.274 SOPHISMS COMMON IN CIVIL LIFE. for this is all that we ought to infer from ordinary praises and compliments.

believe. by telling them things which he does not. and speak of the contrary But he is amusing himself at opinion as evidently false ? our expense when he speaks in this way. r ) There have still more absurd conclusions some who boasted that they understood says he. as Apollonius Thyaneus. and which the wisest Amongst all the predictions of amongst them derided ? the most ancient. 27. for it is insuffi cient to attribute so great an effect to some natural ordi nance. and others .&quot. however. the language of brutes. . that order of the moving of the to come wing. and the most cer time he. they must give a certain inter pretation to his voice and movements. &quot.] SELF-LOVE INTEREST PASSION.CHAP. which is. &quot. for the same reason. and sincerity of a good man. on the subject of the auguries which the pagans made from the flight of birds. that there are some nations which receive a dog as their king. a vice utterly opposed to the justness of mind them these : &quot. We . says those which were derived from the flight of have nothing of the like kind nothing so admirable that rule. without the intelligence. must certainly have been directed by some past. his design was not to taigne of this bad consequence speak reasonably. might conclude. means to so noble an operation . XX. were birds. and such an opinion is evi dently false. in a treatise expressly designed to establish Pyrrhonism. and he is without excuse in thus sporting with his readers. would tolerate this other reasoning of same author. Melampus. the again. Is it not a delightful thing to see a man who holds that nothing is either evidently true or evidently false. agreement. and could not without absurdity. Thales.&quot. but to gather together a confused mass of everything which might be said against men. through which the consequences of things were obtained. We . tain. Tiresias. and to destroy evidence and certainty. the orders which he gave in the discharge of that office must have been clearly But AVC should do wrong in accusing Mon understood. been. or discourse of excellent the agent which produces it. and since Avhat the cosmographers say is true. deliver to us seriously these dreams as certain truths. &quot. Who.&quot.&quot. that when Caligula made his horse consul.

and the most dangerous. indeed.&quot. because the engagement into which we have entered to defend an opinion disturbs the view of the mind. which may be called the outward. OF THE FALSE REASONINGS WHICH ARISE FROM OBJECTS THEMSELVES. hinc ille avium concentus in agris. aut rerum fato prudentia major. ut corpora motus Nunc Et hos. et quse densa relaxat Vertuntur species animorum. who without doubt. et Jupiter humidus austris Deusat erant qu?e rara modo. . : Non equidem Verum credo quia sit divinitus illis Ingenium. and leads it to take as true that which contributes to its The only remedy which can be applied to these is end. when it is not as yet sufficiently enlightened. all that is necessary avoid them is a little good faith. et ovantes gutture corvi. He was. Isetae pecudes. The most common. Mutavere vias. have already noticed that we ought not to separate the inward causes of our errors from those which are de rived from objects. This may be seen in these admirable verses from the Georgics &quot. Concipiant. from which we may derive some conjecture as to rain and fine weather. does not ascribe to any intelligence in the birds even those periodical changes which we observe in their move ment according to the difference of the air. nuiic alios : dum nubila ventus agebat. if the will did not hurry the mind into forming a precipitate judgment. [PART III. to have no end but truth. it is plain that the obscurity of the objects contributes somewhat to our mistakes . ubi tempestas et coeli mobilis humor. are those of which we are not conscious.276 SOPHISMS COMMON IN CIVIL LIFE. it cannot exert this power over the We understanding in things perfectly evident. that even prejudice shall not be able to mis to But lead us. and. there are often cases in which the . Since. be cause the false appearance of these objects would not be capable of leading us into error. however. as good a philosopher as Virgil. these mistakes being voluntary. and to examine reasonings with so much care.

XX. Hence it is useful to consider separately those illusions which arise principally from the things themselves : I. 277 passion which leads us to reason ill is almost imperceptible. of virtue and vice. that in all things which of good and evil. Hence the fathers of the church . by reason of their errors. that it tinguish between them but it is true falsehood. the truth which they advance ought not to be rejected. though men. a manifest injustice to judge in this way. Thus are thus justice made up and truth require. there is a mixture of truth and error. It is a false and impious opinion. they do not notice the errors which are mixed with it and. and It does truth is not less truth for being mixed with error. when they perceive a good deal of truth in a discourse. It is. they pay attention only to the errors. on the contrary. of perfection and imperfection. being the remains of human infirmity.CHAP. and in this wise separation is that mental pre cision mainly appears. that men rarely consider things in and virtue to vice. not belong to men. and that this mixture is one of the most ordinary sources of the false judgments of men. strong bears away the weak. however. which. in the majority of cases. : .] THOSE WHICH ARISE FROM OBJECTS. and that God leaves in the best imperfections. they pression. since we do not consider that the most imperfect are not so in everything. For it is through this deceptive mixture that the good qualities of those whom we respect lead us to approve of their errors. when the truths are mingled with detail. ought not to be the objects of our respect or imitation. The reason of this is. many the errors. There can be no possible reason for rejecting reason. Thus. is so like to that. that truth is . we distinguish between it them . and the most vivid impression effaces that which is more obscure. although men may propound it. and that the defects of those whom we do not esteem lead us to condemn what is good in them. impossible to dis judge only according to their strongest im and perceive only what strikes them most thus. may deserve to be condemned.

Thus we ought to say that a man is a good philosopher who commonly reasons well. We call. to make this distinc we have not always time to examine in the good and evil that may be in everything. want of penetration leading them not to discover what is most important. but it is true also that there is nothing more periods are well turned. but the most important . and thus St Augustine has not scrupled to borrow from an heretical Donatist seven rules for inter preting Scripture. in one place. but since detail right. and the multitude of figures. be confessed.2 78 SOPHISMS COMMON IN CIVIL LIFE. since those who know nothing about them defer more readily to the opinion of those who are well informed but they are most fre quent in those things which lie within the jurisdiction of the people. are very much deceived in these general judgments for they often praise and blame things from the consideration only of what is least important in them. the ignorant are. for the purity of language. such as eloquence. however admirable in design. We must believe that this is simply a truth of fact which he relates. only its lower and more sensuous part . when he uses no inelegant words and from this M. . Men. when his . Reason obliges tion . and that a book is a good book which has notoriously more of good than evil in it. or delicacy of touch. however. unreasonable than these judgments . it is in such circumstances. than by another more sober in colour. when we can. Vaugelas says. : although those who are wise judges in painting value in finitely more design than colour. It must. that a bad Avord does a preacher or an advocate more harm than a bad reasoning. and of which the world claims the liberty of judging. [PART III. more impressed by a painting whose colours are bright and vivid. and not an opinion which he supports. are but to eloquence what the colouring is to a painting that is to say. however. and . for example. us. nevertheless. have taken from pagan books very excellent things for their morals. a preacher eloquent. It is true that we find people who judge in this way. that false judgments are not so common in the arts. to give to them the name which they deserve from their preponderating element. when it is not the most striking thus.

&quot. happy are those who are not clever. who excel in colours do not commonly excel in design the mind not being capable of this double application. with which we conceive them and this we may find in men of inelegant speech and unbalanced in those who pay so periods. the causes which lead us into error. and this we are bound. we may justly reckon a certain grand and pompous eloquence. and by the who . but with the emotions. and on seeing a multitude of insignificant minds preferred before him. but they insensibly engender them.We may say.CHAP. much II. as in favour. Such a one . Cicero calls abundantem sonantibus verbis uberibusque sentenis wonderful how sweetly a false reasoning tiis . but it is a vast one to follow these false judgments. in general.] THOSE WHICH ARISE FROM OBJECTS. to avoid. It is no great evil not to have the reputation Avhich we merit. since it often happens that they are neces- . or of a figure which surprises us by its novelty. but he does not speak fluently. by a false which prevents our recognising it. is you will. These ornaments not only veil from our view the false hoods which mingle with discourse. XX. solid. while we meet with it rarely . that those vigour of their thoughts. and weakens the as painters remark. and in the contemplation of which Ave are delighted. that the world values most things exterior alone. intelligent. which Amongst lustre. and attention to the one injuring the other. much attention to words and embellishments. and cannot turn a compliment well he may reckon on being little esteemed through the whole of his life by the generality of the world. since we find scarcely any penetrate to the interior and to the bottom of them un everything is judged according to the fashion. since this care distracts their attention from things. and in express ing them so that we may convey to the minds of the hearers a bright and vivid image. and to judge of things only superficially. 279 part consists in conceiving things forcibly. also. for it flows in at the close of a period which well fits the ear. as as far as possible. which shall not only convey these things in an abstract form.

and a German poet. or the metal of a statue he cuts it. even. with the pope. that it was the word vestal which pleased an author of our time. since it rarely happens that he finishes it with out exaggerating the truth. though not a very judicious writer. It is probable. that the poems of Hesiod. having been justly reproached by Francis Picus Mirandola with having in troduced into a poem. or an antithesis of many members. in proof of which he alleged this strange reason. sary to the completion of the period or the figure. it would not have been a poem. which they would doubtless have rejected had they exer . for instance. [PART III. and of Virgil. and which led him . and the emperor. who imagine that the essence of poetry consists in the introduction of pagan divinities . beneficiis? and having mixed up Apollo. disguises it. where he describes the wars of Christians against Christians. They are deaf ened by the sound of their own words. and of what is called pure Latinity? Who could help smiling to hear Benibo say that a pope had been elected by the favour of the immortal gods Deorum immortatium : There are poets. Thus. distinctly main tained that. and the grandeur of certain words attaches them unconsciously to thoughts of little solidity. in order to adapt it to that vain work of words which he wishes to make. cised a little reflection. Diana. as he thinks fit. are full of the names and the fables of these gods whence he con cluded that he might be allowed to do the same. and deceive them first. the electors. we have reason to be on our guard. all the divinities of paganism.280 SOPHISMS COMMON IN CIVIL LIFE. narrows it. dazzled with the lustre of their figures . when we hear an orator commencing a long gradation. without this. He commonly disposes of it as we do the stones of a building. through the affectation of using only Ciceronian words. lengthens it. a good versifier enough. and Mercury. of Homer. in order to accommodate it to the figure. How many false thoughts has the desire of making a good point produced? How many have been led into falsehood for the sake of a rhyme ? How many foolish things have certain Italian authors been led to write. These bad reasonings are often imperceptible to those who make them.

. which are met with continually in the writings of those who most affect elo quence. must do so on all occasions. to prevent her from being ashamed knowing Latin. that the vestals have nothing this author to do with justifying or condemning maidens who learn . A man of learning is found to be of the same opinion with It is a very of the actions . and they almost al ways fall into it by a bad reasoning. he would have seen that of he might as justly have said to that lady that she ought to blush to speak a language which had been formerly spoken by the courtezans of Rome. For. again. which has accident ally. The impression which it makes is less strong. are as good as that of and the truth is. It is true that this precision renders the style more dry. which would take away from discourse a multitude of vain ornaments and false thoughts. that she need not blush to speak a language which had been spoken by the vestals. suppose that a cause. when it may have been produced by many others or. since the ancient vestals spoke only their natural language. they attribute that effect definitely to one cause. in not recognising with sufficient clearness all the causes which might produce any effect. Latin. which is true . more lasting . whereas that produced by these rounded it periods is so transient. The false reasonings of this kind. that as we have heard them. passes away almost as soon III. which are worth nothing.CHAP. show us how necessary it is for the majority of those who write or speak to be thoroughly convinced of that there is not/ti/ty beautiful except that this excellent rule. more serious. but much . more vigorous. XX.] THOSE to say to a WHICH ARISE FllOM OBJECTS. common defect amongst men to judge rashly and intentions of others. if he had considered this thought. and more worthy of an honourable man. through which. who were far more numerous than the vestals or that she ought to blush to speak any other language than that of her own country. 281 young lady. produced an effect on one occasion. . and less pompous but it also renders it clearer. when united with many circumstances. All these rea sonings.

and stupidity. rashly and maliciously. constitute one of the most common sources of the false reasonings of men. be accused of hatred and animosity against the authors who have advanced it but he will be so unjustly and rashly. a heretic. concluded that he approves of his conduct. perhaps he knows nothing about them. perhaps he has no part in them. just as well as from hatred of the men who op led him A writer may : . Three or four examples are enough to make a maxim and a common place. we . independent of religious controversies malicious adversary concludes from this that he is favourable to heretics but he concludes this : A . signs : A man which may signify many things. and is a par taker in his crimes. in a matter of criticism. and sometimes of sincerity. sometimes heaviness of mind. All exterior things are but equivocal signs. without having any special reason for doing so. Change is sometimes a sign of inconstancy. : is the friend of a vicious man it is. pose it. since this earnestness may arise from zeal for the truth. therefore.282 SOPHISMS COMMON IN CIVIL LIFE. but this was perhaps only an inadvertence or simple forgetfulness. and we judge rashly when determine this sign to mean a particular thing. speak with some strength against an opinion which he believes to be dangerous he will. rv. that is to say. There are many maladies hidden from the most skilful . which they then employ as a principle for deciding all things. [PART III. and sometimes of Slowness sometimes indicates prudence. Silence is some times a sign of modesty and wisdom. The false inductions by which general propositions are derived from some particular experiences. We fail to render true civility to those to whom it is due we are said to be proud and insolent. simply from the fact that he has changed his opinion for he may have had good reason for changing it. Thus it is bad reasoning to conclude that a man is inconstant. since it is perhaps reason and truth which have to adopt that opinion. from this. This does not follow.

to judge of purposes by the event. conclude.&quot. justice. that there is nothing so evidently clear as to be clear enough for it the easy and the hard are both . in which We only think what will it . and we can not know the truth of anything with certainty. happens every day. There are light and loose women : this is sufficient for the jealous to conceive unjust suspicions against the most virtuous. that medicine is absolutely useless. we will in we we will nothing nothing absolutely. Reason/ say they.ilike to it all subjects are equal. say the ancient and modern Pyrrhonists. and for licentious writers to condemn all univer sally. . hence. &quot. disclaims the very freely. its moment jurisdiction. is so weak and blind. or through the malice of others who had thwarted it. guilty of all the evil consequences which may have happened therefrom.] THOSE WHICH ARISE FROM OBJECTS. but which we rarely avoid. only by general and extreme propositions. from which none are exempt. and nature. and this is enough to constitute a common place. either simply through acci dent. There are some things obscure and hidden. nothing constantly. in the discourses of men. some partial actions we infer a habit from three or four faults we conclude a custom and what happens once a month or once a year. and we are often grossly deceived all things are obscure and uncer tain. . so far as they could see them. in general. so little pains do they take to observe in them the limits of truth and : . There are some persons who hide great vices under an appearance of piety libertines conclude from this that all devotion is no better than hypocrisy. . : There is a want of equality in some of the actions of men. . and every moment.CHAP XX. weakness and injustice which we often condemn. and only a craft of charlatans. at every hour. : 283 physicians. and remedies often do not succeed rash minds. Most people set forth the defects or good qualities of From others. V. &quot. and to reckon those who had taken a prudent re It is a solution according to the circumstances.

To understand how common these are. We are ingenious in finding out the faults which we imagine have produced the want of success and as astrologers. and in this way it has always reasoned. nor between the unfortunate and the guilty. VI. . of this is. truth. as outward marks of truth are clear and sensible so men naturally incline to that which is easiest. the latter the sophism of the manner. because there has always been little equity in the judgments of . He is unsuc In this way the world cessful. But there are no false reasonings more fall. [PART it III. was impos Men not only love to be fortunate as much as to be wise. it is only neces sary to consider that the majority of men are determined to believe one opinion rather than another. their . while that. This distinction is too subtile for them. not knowing the true causes of things. and because. The reason is that the interior truth of things often deeply hidden . that those who have met with them have deserved them by some imprudence. but they make no distinction between the fortunate and the wise. they substitute others according to the event. reasons. that the minds of men are com monly feeble arid dark. therefore he is in fault. but by certain exterior and foreign marks which are more consonant to. after dis graces and misfortune. not by any solid and essential reasons which might lead them to know the truth. by praising those who are successful. than to falsehood. and blaming those who are not. when they know a given event. fail not to discover the aspect of the stars which produced it. or which they judge to be consonant We to. so also we never fail to find. they almost always range themselves on the side where they see those exterior marks of truth which are readily discovered.284 or through sible for SOPHISMS COMMON IN CIVIL LIFE. some other circumstances which them to foresee. full of clouds and false light. men. or by deciding the inward essence call the former the sophism by the outward manner. common amongst by judging men than those into which they either rashly of the truth of things from some authority insuffi cient to assure them of it. of authority.

\vhich. we simply indicate some gross faults which often lead We are committed in this matter. being clear and evident. . that we fall into . Wherefore God. and which God has left more to the discernment of the reason of each one in particular. relieves the mind of the perplexities which neces sarily arise from the particular discussion of these mysteries. of religion from the see. XX. the authority of the church universal. but in giving us. men who endeavour to propa gate their opinions by bloodshed and the sword when we see them arm themselves against the church by schism. the authority who propounds the thing. and to prevent the most ignorant from listening to them. in not making this to depend on the particular examination of all the points which are proposed to faith . undertake to change the faith and disci pline of the church in so criminal a manner. which proposes them. has had the condescension to accom modate himself to this weakness of the spirit of man. . But in those things. and with the plain marks rather of licentiousness. without any external marks of piety. who willed that the sure knowledge These of him of the mysteries of faith might be attained by the sim plest of the faithful. and refusing to We may derive. it only when wandering from submit ourselves to it. as the certain rule of truth. convincingarguments in matters When we manner in which they are advanced. the knowledge of which is not ab solutely necessary. and the manner in which And these two ways of persuading are it is propounded. it is more than sufficient to make reasonable men reject them. for its authority. in matters of faith.] THOSE WHICH ARISE FROM OBJECTS. when we see people without the common commission. without miracles. Thus. in different ages of the church. against temporal powers by revolt . the authority of the church and so far is it from being universal is entirely decisive possible that it should be liable to error. example. 285 may be reduced to two principles. moreover.CHAP. and principally in the last. and they many to form judgments contrary to the truth. the authority and the manner are not so important. so powerful that they carry away almost all minds. do not undertake to give here the rules and the precise limits of the respect which is due to authority in human things.

and penetration. experience. and even on the know ledge of God. . tion. and easy ways. are. But this disposi This arises. number of the witnesses. considering whether the number increases the probability of their having discovered the truth. unreasonable . however. they will trust to him in everything if they do not in one. Thus the following is not a valid inference this opinion is held by the majority of philosophers . therefore. for it is most probable that God commu but nicates more to those who serve him more purely there are a multitude of things which depend only on human intelligence. We are often persuaded. moderation. of the things which we there are a number of people who trust and who have had more which do not depend on implicitly to those who are older. often regard only the all [PART III. those who have the superiority in intel lect and in study.286 SOPHISMS COMMON IN CIVIL LIFE. and many others. because they are not distinguished and that it is bad reasoning to conclude he . deserve to be relied on more than The contrary. We which each must discover for himself. it is. also. and. plain. mination perplexes them they will have all or nothing. contrary to reason. nevertheless. Thus by certain qualities which have truth. which shows us that the same persons are not to be in anything trusted to in anything. in difficult things. the : truest. often happens. even in these things. they will not in any they love short. but on the clearness of the mind.?y trust to a man in one thing. from the fact Discri that men do not like to make these distinctions. the most estimable qualities in the world. without doubt. . . Piety. it is more likely that a single per son will discover the truth than that many will. for. and in part. the most devout men. as an author of our time without at has wisely remarked. experience. is. even in those things age or experience. reckon it best to follow. . from the fact that these advantages decorum which appears in pious persons. though common. of mind are not so obvious as the external . If th. in part. no connection with the examine. wisdom. in these things. and they ought to give great authority to those who possess them in those things which depend on piety or sincerity. however. which is.

all are &quot. who bend * Eccles. Nevertheless. speaks. XX. . unconsciously. et verbum illius usque ad nubes perdupauper locutus est. and by one of no distinction. and by a noble. to the skies &quot. of believing that a man speaks the truth because he is a man of birth. those theless. in that perfect representation which is given of it in the book of Ecclesiasticus. that. Not that any formally make these kinds of reasonings he has a hundred thousand livres a year therefore. through an inward abasement of soul. he is wrong. the inquiry Who is this ? if the poor Dives locutus omncs tacuerunt. indeed. man cent . of fortune. but which is. very common. also. : . et dicunt. xiii. that we approve of it in the mouth of the former. . et . which is sometimes so distinctive that it is almost impossible for it to be imitated by those est. that if any through our excessive deference to the But there is opinion of good men. : . and natural bearing. he he is of high birth therefore. something of this kind passes through the minds of the majority. therefore he is intelligent and clever everything. and it will often be found . Quis cst hie ? It is certain that complaisance and flattery have much to do with the approbation which is bestowed on the ac tions and words of people of as also that they quality often gain this by a certain outward grace. Let the same thing be proposed by a man of quality. and his words are raised is. 23. namely. a delusion much more absurd in itself. Scripture designed to teach us this disposition of men. or high in office. VII. silent. never into fall which we errors are pardonable.* AVhen the rich man speaks. what he possesses judgment advances must be true he is a poor man therefore. who are of low birth. is 287 in a serious man. It is true. when we scarcely condescend to listen to it in that of the latter. free. bears away their judgment. and. are among the number.] THOSE WHICH ARISE PROM OBJECTS. that there are many who approve of everything which is done and said by the great.CHAP. It is certain.

them as things altogether foreign from their character. They are accustomed from their infancy to consider . and which do not prevent their judgment even from being as weak and as liable to be deceived as that of all others. and. that the out strong enough to bear its lustre ward pomp which environs them always imposes a Hi and makes some impression on the strongest minds. &amp. But which is in when they have not laboured their fortune naturally their inferiors. having a strong passion for honours ai. sess them. and whose sight is not as. commonly do things by halves we. The love which we have for all those things which are valued by the world. lord. Men do not insensibly from their fortune to their mind. makes us judge those happy who pos .gt. necessarily conceives a great affection for the means by which these honours and pleasures are obtained. to correct the impression makes on their minds. we place them above ourselves. pleasures.288 SOPHISMS COMMON IN CIVIL LIFE. their equipage. All this springs from the same source. than it Some derive from their estate and riches a reason for maintaining that these opinions ought to prevail over those who are beneath them. This illusion springs from the corruption of the hei of man. both in mind and body. They cannot bear that those people whom they regard with contempt should pretend to have as much judgment and reason as themselves. this illusion is still stronger in the great themselves. and this makes them so impatient of the least contradiction. and wealth. . give them minds as exalted as their rank we submit to their opinions. and regard them as eminent and exalted This habit of regarding them with respect passes persons. under the weight of grandeur. which do not prevent them at all from being perfectly equal to all the rest of men. all these qualities of grand. who. in some sort.. [PART III. incorporate with their very essence. nobility. that is. they exaggerate their idea with these. indeed. prince. and this is the reason of the credit which they commonly obtain in the affairs which they manage. from the false ideas which they have of their Instead of considering grandeur. in thus judging them happy. and never repre sent themselves to themselves without all their titles. rich. they. master. and their train. noble. therefore.

a long beard. and then to make a comparison with the opposite reasons . since there are very false opinions which have been sanctioned by men of great mental power. or manifests anything of passion. mind. on the contrary. themselves as of a different species from other men they never mingle in imagination with the mass of human kind they are. and . in their own eyes. from separate individual things we can conclude nothing with certainty. naturally led to possesses with grace. grand clothes. and believe themselves as much above others in mind as they are above them in birth and fortune. labour. with moderation. that a man is in the wrong when he speaks harshly. may A make upon the mind. that there is not serve to aggrandize the idea which beautiful horse. for we are believe that a in the mistakes man . who possessed these qualities to a great extent. but it is very difficult to guard entirely against the secret impression which these outward things folly The of the nothing which it has of itself. and these qualities. make men consider themselves more clever. Age. VIII. in his actions and words. All that we can do is to accustom ourselves as much as possible to give no influence at all to those qualities which cannot contribute towards finding the truth. XX. or presumption. It is easy to con vince everybody that there is nothing more ridiculous than these judgments. with gentleness and. Thus they shape themselves a soul and judgment according to the measure of their for tune. and to give it even to those which do thus contri bute only so far as they really contribute to it. There is something still more deceptive which arise from the manner. acrimony. . human mind is such. if we judge of the essence of things by judgment when he speaks with gravity. Nevertheless. avail to find the truth of hidden things.CHAP.] THOSE WHICH ARISE FROM OBJECTS. therefore. deserve to be respected . always counts or dukes. experience. and there are few who do not think more of themselves on horseback or in a coach than on foot. ac curacy. knowledge. memory. with ease. for. study. but it is always necessary to weigh with care. energy. and never simply men.

. and others who think better than they speak. and it is a great evil to have only right. falsehoods. for the same person may speak truly in one thing. it is a small thing that we have right on our side . There are some who speak better than they think. and very superficial. the truth on their side. therefore. should study to clothe it in the garb most suitable for making it acceptable. or under the in fluence even of some passion. It is necessary. [PART III. judging not by these outward things. and others. nevertheless. to yield to the truth. nor the manner by the matter. on the contrary. and he does right to speak the truth and. being naturally of a quick temper. Thus reason regards those who possess it. and wrong in another. not only when it is proposed in that are offensive and disagreeable. and not the matter man by the manner. where the art of pleasing is studied and practised better than anywhere else. it is right. which appears in their countenance or their words. because it is proposed in such a way. does wrong to speak with anger. to consider each thing sepa . from having been nourished at court. and not to have also that which is necessary for making it relished. and falsely in another may be right in one thing. these outward and sensible appearances. have. but even when ways it is mingled with much of falsehood. A . a great and solid mind within. who. They ought to remember that when we seek to move the minds of people. on the contrary. who. deceived . by means of which they render many false judgments accep table and there are others. having nothing outward to recommend them. But as it is reasonable to be on our guard against con cluding that a thing is true or false. and to avoid those revolting ways of stating it. and the matter by the matter. have. that is to say. which only lead to its rejection. on the contrary. There are some men of very moderate capacity. and he is wrong in advancing rately. and does not hesitate . that those who wish to persuade others of any truth which they have discovered. nevertheless. for there are many people we must be often who utter follies gravely and modestly.290 SOPHISMS COMMON IN CIVIL LIFE. also. another is right in speak ing calmly and civilly. we must judge of the manner by the manner. have very agreeable manners. who.

all these fiery. for it is we it persuade should lead .] honour . and by a kind of tyranny. he necessarily revolts the minds of others. as true. since all. nevertheless. We do this. however. that which ought only to be obtained by persua and reason. but an individual This injustice offensive ought never to maintain that his authority should prevail against that of all others. but justice itself. 291 If they seriously honour the truth. marks only the authority which he who speaks arrogates to himself. they ought not to dis it by covering it with the marks of falsehood and deceit and if they love it sincerely. they ought not to at tach to it the hatred and aversion of men. of the manner are often greater and more important than those of the matter. not only modesty and prudence. obstinate. obliges us to assume a modest air when we combat com mon opinions or established authority. since the mind is more prompt to notice the manner of the speaker than it is to comprehend the solidity of his proofs. when we propose the truth in this offensive manner. bitter. men in this to them always very right that the truth when we know it but way . presumptuous. passionate manners. It is the most important. is still greater when we employ these ways in combating common and received opinions. Now comprehended he appears sion to wish to gain. indeed. and to defer to our authority alone. everything that we believe. the faults. In reality. always spring from some disorder of the mind. for al though it is a different thing to be wrong in the manner from being wrong in the matter. which are often. otherwise we cannot . not at the manner of the discourse being thus separat ed from the proofs. that it be hoves us to govern the spirit as well as the words .CHAP XX. THOSE WHICH ARISE FROM OBJECTS. for the judgment of an individual may indeed be preferred to that of many when it is more correct. precept of rhetoric. by the offensive way in which they propound it. Thus. indeed. as well as the most useful. which we reprehend in others and it is. by authority. is wrong to compel others to take. so that if he is bitter and imperious. which is often more serious than the defect of intelligence and of knowledge. unjust to seek to . For the way of speaking generally enters into the mind before the reasons.

&quot. and for becoming capable of receiving it. If they were things common and authorised.292 SOPHISMS COMMON IN CIVIL LIFE. they prefer rather to keep it back for a while. escape the injustice of opposing the authority of an indi vidual to an authority either public. although they themselves very clearly recognised their truth. in order to give time for growth. in what way the wise and reli says he. gious catholics taught that which they had to communicate to others. than to make it known to them in that state of weakness in which it would have overwhelmed them. they still proposed them rather as doubts and as questions to be examined. propounded them in a manner full of assurance. things. [PART III. and free from every trace of doubt by being accompanied with the greatest possible gentleness but if they were extraordinary . This is so true. and more cannot exercise widely established than our own. they Observe. having given this excellent rule to all those who have to We instruct others &quot.&quot. that St Augustine extended it even to religious truths. or greater. . than as dogmas and fixed de cisions. : &quot. That if a truth is so high that it is above the strength of those to whom it is spoken. in order to accommodate themselves in this to the weakness of those who heard them. too much moderation when we seek to disturb the position of a received opinion or of an ancient faith.

without doubt. which we rarely transgress. CHAPTER I. And since demonstration has knowledge for its end. in order to de unite with it . by which we incontrovertibly prove some truth and. and to avail ourselves of those which are clear and evident. it is necessary first to say something of it. OF KNOWLEDGE THAT THERE IS SUCH A THING. THE USEFUL ACCOUNT TO WHICH WE MAY TURN THIS NECESSARY IGNORANCE. but of a series of several reasonings. it is indeed of little avail to know the rules of syllogism. OF METHOD. because. have thought it right to We what belongs to demonstration. because this does not commonly consist of a single argument. we recognise the truth and by an evidence which we perceive with- . THAT THERE ARE THINGS WHICH THE HUMAN MIND IS INCAPABLE OF KNOWING. moreover.FOURTH PART. IT remains that we explain the last part of logic that re which is. THAT THE THINGS WHICH WE KNOW BY THE MIND ARE MORK CERTAIN THAN THOSE WHICH WE KNOW BY THE SENSES. monstrate well. to penetrate into what may appear more obscure. IF. when we it of in itself. consider any maxim. one of the most lating to method useful and most important. while it is of the first importance to arrange our thoughts clearly.

and by a quality of clearness. called opinion. which is more vivid and penetrating. by a stronger persuasion. If it is authority which leads the mind to embrace what is proposed to it. that all these opinions. attention. some other motive is necessary to render it so. have denied even this probability. and these are the new Academics the others. disputes. But if this reason is not only apparent. is what is Or either this reason it is produces complete conviction it . They were only the sport and amusement of unoccupied and intheir profession. in general. and have main tained that all things are equally obscure and uncertain. then either this reason does not produce complete conviction. and then. whether we certain reasons. [PART IV. or writings. . ciples. . out the aid of any other reason. than the conviction which this reason produces. probability. If it is reason. there be such a thing ? that is have cognitions founded on clear and There are some philosophers who have made denying and who have even established on that and amongst foundation the whole of their philosophy these philosophers some are satisfied with denying cer tainty. who are the Pyrrhonists. which have made so much noise in the world. But the truth is. or. and this motive is either authority or reason. but weighty and true. and the persuasion which in relation to which many questions arise. this is what is called faith. for this question relates as much to intelligence as to knowledge. at least. a rash judgment. .. The first is Whether to say. which we recognise by a longer and more minute attention. and this acqui escence of the mind. nevertheless.294 KNOWLEDGE. . save in discourses. at the same time.is called knowledge. this kind of knowledge is and it is thus that we know first prin But if it is not convincing of itself. called intelligence . had not sufficient reason for be lieving it to be true. and requires produces is an error. admitting. clear only in appearance. and no one has ever been seriously convinced of them. being true in itself. if it be really false or. but leaves still some doubt. we. if. whether we have clear and certain cognitions. accompanied with doubt. have never existed any where.

that I believe I see. or madness from sound mindedness. impossible thought. It certain. whose truth it is impossible to doubt. despite their argument. or able even to to their believe that the existence of all external things was un of a sun. he may form clear as thoughts which he may find as to be. and to believe that lives? what thinks neither exists nor And from this clear. enable us to decide another This consideration 1 may to in relation to this subject. question which has arisen which we know only through wit. when I believe I see. we find a vast number of clear cognitions. and that he lives to separate being and life from since it is . And if any one were found who could entertain a doubt as to whether he were awake or sane. IS SUCH A THING. restricting ourselves to the mind alone. 295 but never the feelings of which they genious persons were inwardly and deeply conscious. no one could. and were of a sound vain subany sincerity. be such things as the sun and the earth or not. I am cer I am certain that I doubt tain that I imagine 1 see them. that he lives. that I believe I hear. inasmuch as he thinks. after all these discourses. and to require from them. however. Hence the best means of convincing these philosophers would be to refer them conscience and good faith. whether there separate them from their objects. by avowing freely that they to believe these things when they had tried to do so. whether. and so of So that. For whether he were asleep or awake. and indubitable a rule for accepting as true all this one appears we when is equally impossible to doubt our perceptions Thus.] THERE . whether he were deceived or not deceived. in which they had laboured to prove that it is impossible to distinguish sleep from waking. whether the things . they would have denied all their had never been able tilties. knowledge. a certain. that he thinks. or of matter. as St Augustine says. when I doubt. he is at all events certain. I. they were not persuaded. that he exists. the rest. And if they had had sleep.CHAP. being in doubt as to the existence found moon. be to doubt. when I believe I hear. and by which they endeavoured to conduct their life. that they did not mind. and considering its modifications. whether he were of a diseased or sound mind. that he is.

And hence it must be confessed that St Augustine had good ground to maintain. that a given body. For example. neverthe a foot may not be less. and all the measurements of bodies.296 the KNOWLEDGE. according to that size only in which they had appeared to us through these Now our eyes themselves are glasses. but we cannot know with certainty what is the true and natural size of each only necessary to consider external objects in any other way than through the medium of magnifying glasses. that we are more assured of those per ceptions and ideas which we discover only by a mental re flection. and we do glasses. after Plato. it is see&quot. through which we discern when we ought to believe. which we imagine diminish or augment them. that the determina tion of truth. And. that if To understand we had never this. mind ai*e [PART IV. We . of which we cannot affirm that we have a complete : assurance. arises. but from a reflection of the mind. represent their true size. on the contrary. it is certain that we should have figured to ourselves bodies. and the rule for its discernment. that while the senses do not always more or know through We deceive us in the report which they give. whether our perception of the same as that of others for although two persons may agree together in their measurement. that which the one conceives to be size of objects is the . we may know through sense that one body is larger than another body. nevei theless. or whether these artifi cial glasses. and when we ought not to believe. may say further. and also. less certain than those which we For it is clear from what we the senses? have said above. the senses. not know exactly whether they may not diminish or aug ment the objects which we behold.n any body. but to the mind in sensibus . that the certainty which may be de there being rived from the senses is of no great extent. yet. than we are of any of the objects of sense. for example. many things which we imagine ourselves to know through sense. our assurance. belong not Non est judiciwn veritatis to the senses. either. we do not know the natural and absolute size of body. may not. do not know. not from the senses themselves. is only five feet. that they do not deceive. therefore.

either be cause we have not the principles which would lead us to them. for the most part. is probably not great. compels us to acknowledge. however. However this may be. There is. . 297 the same as that which the other does ceive it for they each con what may their eyes severally represent to them. The first kind comprehends all that we know through demonstration. . though the judgment of the size of objects be to some extent uncertain.] MENTAL MOKE CERTAIN THAN SENSUOUS. they are. I. mistake to maintain that all things should be considered either as certain or uncertain.CHAP. There are others which we cannot know with the clearness of truth. The second is the matter of the study of philosophers. on the other hand. be that the eyes of one do not represent the Now same thing to him which the eyes of others do to them. in relation to this. This diversity. however. or through intelligence. as I have said. the truth of objects. if they cannot discern the things at the knowledge . But they may spend their time uselessly. I do know. certainty and uncertainty both in the mind and in the senses and it would be an equal . . and we are not from it to conclude that there is no certainty in any of the other representations of sense for. that he is greater than a horse. . For there are some things which we may know clearly and certainly. And. except when their natural figure is : ground injured or disturbed by some defect. though our eyes are glasses. there are some which it is impossible to know with certainty. and less than a whale which is sufficient for all the purposes of life. finally. because we do not perceive any difference in the conformation of the eye sufficient to produce any remarkable change be sides which. this is not very important. that is to of say. though I may not know exactly. or because they are too disproportionate to our minds. therefore. however. but to the knowledge of which we may hope to arrive. Reason. three degrees. if they do not know how to distinguish these from the third. because they are glasses differently cut. what is the natural and absolute size of an elephant. so that we have good glasses cut by the hand of God for believing that they represent.

or uneven ? Is one infinite greater than another ? I know nothing about He who should say at once. which is that of be lieving himself to know what he does not. is that of never engaging in the search after any of those things which are above us. and which we Of cannot reasonably hope to be able to comprehend. too abstract. But it must be remarked that there are some things .298 which the mind may KNOWLEDGE. will have advanced as far in a moment. and remains overwhelmed with the multi is . which absurd to attempt to reduce within the limits of our mind for our mind. tude of conflicting thoughts which it furnishes. In this way. There are also a great number of metaphysical questions. as he who should have spent twenty years in reasoning on them . to be ever resolved . [PART IV. and. which are too vague. to resolve boldly to be ignorant of them. on which we may dispute for ever. that he who had laboured to solve these questions is in danger of falling into a lower state than that of simple ignorance. what they are. is lost and confounded in the infinite. and generally it all that belongs to the infinite. arrive. we shall be able to make more progress in those which are adapted to the capacity of our mind. these things. and too far removed from clear and well-known principles. being finite. and the best way is for us to have as little to do with them as we can . magna pars sapientise. from those which it is incap able of reaching. This is the shortest and most convenient solution which can be given of a great number of questions. this kind are all the questions which relate to the power of God. and the only difference there would be between them is. The shortest method which can be found in the study of the sciences. Is it possible for a creature to have been created from eternity ? Can God make a body infinite in size ? a movement infinite in swiftness ? a multitude infinite in number? Is an infinite number even. in general. Nescire qusedam. after having learned. by freeing ourselves from inquiries in which it is impossible to succeed. because we can never attain to any knowledge of them sufficiently clear to fix and hold our minds.

and since geometry has furnished us with proofs of of the truths it. stars. however nu merous these may All these things are inconceivable . but that it not only contains many others. I. as many whole world. What is more incomprehensible than eternity. whose littleness is already incomprehensible to and so on to us. as the diagonal of a square. a heaven.CHAP. nevertheless. necessarily be so. nevertheless. are unable to conceive how they can be. while it is certain. as the whole world. that all imaginable forms are actually found in it. as plain as those of any which it reveals to us. For this science shows us that there are certain lines which have no common measure. incommensurable. in order that we may be able to say truly. and. since we can demonstrate the divisibility of matter to infinity. with all its parts a sun. 299 which are incomprehensible in their manner. How can we comprehend that the smallest grain of matter is infinitely divisible. and that we can never reach a part so small. that they are. for and the this reason. and that it contains in itself a small world. and they must. are obliged to attribute it to the most vile and contemptible of all things. Now. if this diagonal and the sides were composed of a certain number of indivisible parts. is more certain ? So that those even. have destroyed in their mind the knowledge of God. infinity. one of these indivisible parts would be the common measure of these two lines. consequently. contains still another world proportional . these two lines . and which are called. which is matter. that what a grain of wheat is in relation to the whole world. that part is in relation to a grain of wheat ? Nevertheless that part. but also an infinity that the smallest grain of wheat con . but which are certain in their existence. and that there are none of the parts of that grain which do not still themselves contain a proportional world ? What must be the part in so small a world which answers to the size of a grain of wheat ? and what a tremendous difference must there be. and what. planets a world tains in itself as many parts. sides. without our being able to find any which has not relative parts as the be. though with admirable exactness of proportions. at the same time. We who. proportionally smaller. through an awful blindness.] MIND INCAPABLE OF KNOWING SOME THINGS.

they are two negations of extension. as far as is possible. must renounce human certainty before we can doubt the truth of these demonstrations . whether If they these have extension. again. which sets out from port in a straight line. which is impossible. if these two extended squares were composed of a certain number of ultimate parts. if they have not. It is demonstrated. and that to a plain of a hundred thousand leagues we may join another of a We hundred thousand leagues. Now this infinite augmentation of extension proves its infinite and in order to comprehend this. and a vessel on the shore of that sea. by this science. [PART IV. I have added yet another proof. but to help us to con ceive. that it is impossible for a square number to be double of another square number. we cannot. there is nothing more clear than this principle. through a glass. taking two of these parts. while. however. It is certain that. they are therefore divisible. that two non-extensions cannot form an extension. Now. without ever arriving at rest. the large square would contain double the parts of the small one. which we assume to be indivisible. or whether they have not ? have. this infinite divisibility of matter. and have many parts. or any other diaphanous body. cannot be composed of a certain number of indivisible parts. and a motion which slackens to infinity. It is certain that to any one looking from the port at the hull of the vessel re . we have divisibility only to imagine a level sea which extends infinitely in length. and thus it is impossible for them to constitute an extension. Finally. and that an extended whole has parts. at all events. I ask. it is very possible that an extended square may be double of another extended square. which shows us at the same time a division to infinity. and both being squares. in proportion as the vessel flected . there would be a square number double another square number. and that the horizontal ray will pass through another point of the glass higher than the first. Now. and so on to infinity. though we may doubt whether exten sion be divisible to infinity. doubt that it may be augmented to infinity. Now.300 KNOWLEDGE. the ray which terminates at the base of that vessel will pass through a certain point of the glass.

and so on to infinity. make the third. which are in themselves barren enough.CHAP. which will always diminish to infinity at one of the ends. and the third. which will be infinite in length on one side. could never be either parallel or in the same line. which appear impossible from the terms find an infinite space equal to a finite space. and the third of the third. while diminishing continually in . that there are some things which exist although we are not able to comprehend them. and the half of that half. The fourths. and the following one. farther the vessel goes. whether we will or no. 301 moves away.. We may is them in different ways : . because the two lines. and the fifths the fourth. arid then join shall all these halves together by their longest line. for the half. or which may be It is arises : only the half or the third. and so on to infinity so on to infinity. The advantage which may be derived from these specu lations is not simply the acquisition of these knowledges. without ever ceasing to rise. of a resolve finite space.] MIND INCAPABLE OF KNOWING SOME THINGS. If we take the half of a clumsy enough. constitute a half. and to take away from him the boldness which would lead him to oppose his feeble intelligence to the truths which the and hence it is . and the half of that half plus the half of that second half. the point of the ray which terminated at the base of the vessel will always ascend. &c. and of a diminu tion to infinity of motion. we form from them an area of an irregular figure. we shall make from them a figure which will contain the half or the third of the whole area. but very easy square. and in making us confess. the slower it will ascend. which from its divisibility. and which will be equal to the whole square. in well for a man to weary himself with these order to check his presumption. intersecting each other in the eye. and will infinitely divide the space which is between the two points and the . Thus this example furnishes at once the proof of a division to infinity of extension. taken in the same way. and without ever arriving at the point of the horizontal ray. breadth. through this infinite diminution of extension. subtilties. that we are able to prove these To problems. By joining the ends of these thirds or these fourths. I. but in teaching us to know the true limits of our mind.

and that we may not be surprised when we meet with them in the books or in the discourses of philosophy . causes through their effects. be called. and since these reasons are commonly composed of many parts. but it was well to notice them in passing. METHOD may a series of many thoughts. on the contrary. OF THE TWO KINDS OF METHOD ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS. either by proving effects through their causes. infinitely how this can CHAPTER II. which is called proving a priori. church proposes to him. EXAMPLE OF ANALYSIS. that we may understand them. being above it. divisible. through the consideration of those objects which are above it. it is and to confess that without being able to comprehend manifest that we sin against reason in refusing to believe the marvellous effects of the omnipotence of God (which is in itself incomprehensible). that we must endeavour to choose. also.302 ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS. for our ordinary occupation. under the pretext that he cannot understand them for. and which. since the strength of the human . and whose truth we may be able to discover and compre hend. it is certain. method we shall treat in the greater part of the present book. subjects and matters which may be more adapted to our capacity. the art of disposing well either for the discovering truth when . This is done. in order to bring under them all kinds of demonstrations . abase and humble it. which is called proving a posteriori. in general. [PART IV. in order to render them clear and conclusive. be. mind is compelled to bow it before the smallest clearly sees that it is atom of matter. because our mind is unable to comprehend them. It is necessary to extend these terms a little. it is necessary. or by de monstrating. But as it is profitable for the mind sometimes to be led to feel its own feebleness. to Of this dispose them in a certain order and method.

and so regular. not having sufficiently examined what effects might flow from these causes. which ought to be the result of true physics so that we may say that the first kind of questions in : lative which we seek causes through effects. the practical. or to explain. known that wind and water possessed treat power over the movements of bodies. we for example. The second always. which M. seek effects by causes. which wonderfully labour of men. or for proving it to when it is two kinds of method. Thus there are truth. . We do not commonly treat of the entire body of a science by analysis. through the words. It was example. Questions of things may be reduced to four principal we to find the sense of kinds : the first is. did not apply them as they have since been applied. It. constitute the specu in which we part of physics and the second kind. not those in which we inquire into words. Clercelier had the goodness to lend me. Descartes. and which may be also called the method of doctrine. or the method of resolution. one for discovering which is called analysis. but those in which. is. The third kind of questions is. and which may also be called the method of invention . . the different effects of the loadstone inquire into the cause of these . The greater part of what is here said of questions is taken from a of the late M. but the ancients. which is called synthesis.CHAP. and we have found that it is not we know the ebb and flow of we ask what can be the cause of a motion so great the sea . or the method of composition. By questions of words we here mean. but employ it only to resolve some question. for when we seek effects through causes. inquire into things. 303 others we are ignorant of already known. to a great number of pur lessen the poses very useful to society. We know. as those in which we engage an enigma. we know the different effects which are commonly attributed to the abhorrence of a vacuum we inquire whether that is the true cause. from obscure or ambiguous words. what is the true meaning of an author. when ive seek causes through effects. when through * the parts we MS. by means of mills. II.* All questions are either of words or things.] EXAMPLE OP ANALYSIS. and the other for explaining it to others when we have found it.

we shall modes. having a number. its properties. its extremities. For we must avoid what happens to some. accurately and distinctly. whatever may be the nature of the question which we propose to resolve. as when. as [PART IV. But it must be remarked that. in general. necessary that even that which is unknown should be marked out and designated by certain conditions which may determine us to seek one thing rather than another. seek a part by the whole. should hurry away before having learnt more particularly from his master who that friend was. so that. that it is the thing of which we were in search. we seek another part . who. engage in the resolution of what is proposed to them before having sufficiently considered by what signs or marks they might recognise what they seek for if they met with it. and. we seek their product by multiplying them together. when commanded by his master to fetch one of his friends. Now. for example. and which may enable us to judge. precisely what it is we are seeking. . having many numbers. and we shall. we seek what such a part of it their sum by adding them . otherwise there would be nothing to seek. we seek what remains or when. And these conditions ought to be well considered before hand. by a precipitation of mind. having two. that we may not add anything which is not contained . who. as a valet. having the whole and some part. on the contrary. we seek together or when. will be. it is necessary to take the word part in its most general signification for all which a thing comprises its accidents. Now. when. having one number and another which is to be subtracted from it. that is. in order to extend further the two last kinds of questions. The fourth is.304 seek the whole : ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS. and in order that we may comprehend what cannot be properly brought under the two first. when. all its attributes. nevertheless. the first thing which we must do is to conceive. when we have found it. and another part when we seek to find the side of a rectangle from knowing its area and one of its sides. it is. its seek the whole by its parts when we seek to find the area of a triangle from its height and base. although in every question there is something unknown. what is the precise point of the question.

by metaphor. if we were to busy ourselves in seeking after some secret wonder in the figure of this Tantalus. for we need only hide in the column a syphon which has one small opening below. was never able to do so. because the water. that we were asked by what artifice the figure of a Tantalus could have been made. but it is sufficient that these words may. It is asked.CHAP II. evening. through which the water enters. middle-day. if when. at mid-day on two. feet. What could be the secret of that water drinker who exhibited himself at Paris twenty years ago. lying on a column in the midst of a vase in the posture of a man bent down to drink. for example. and which would let it all flow away again if it were filled soon as it the question : And this is very easy. in their strict and literal meaning for he who proposes this enigma has not laid it down as a condition that we must take them in this way. water which we put in the vase does not reach the height of the syphon it will remain there. is 305 we believed ourselves obliged to take all these words. by adding conditions which would not at all contribute towards the solution of this question. again. as soon as it reached his lips all flowed should sin away. so long as the beyond. which caused the water to flow away as who We had touched his lips for this is not involved in and if we would conceive it aright. which. until none was left in the vase. and how it mouth he filled. and thus that question when we say that that animal is man. which is hidden below the foot of the vase. and the longer leg of which has an opening below the foot of the vase . it will all flow away through the longer leg of the syphon. and in the evening on in that which resolved referred to other things. but when it reaches it. be three.] EXAMPLE OF ANALYSIS. proposed. though able to rise very well in the vase up to his mouth. again. and that we may not omit anythingwhichit does contain. morning. five or six diS erent ? glasses with water of different colours If we imagine that . we were asked what animal that is which goes in the morn ing on four feet. is properly Suppose. forwe may sin in both these ways. could be that in throwing out water from his at the same time. We should sin in the first way. . we ought to reduce it to these terms To make a vase which would hold water so long as it was filled to a certain height.

and which do not contribute anything to its discovery. is. inasmuch as our intelligence can go no further than the recognition that what we seek partici pates in such and such a way in the nature of things al ready known. and he separated them in throwing them up. The other way in which we sin in the examination of the conditions of what we seek. we should not then solve the problem of finding. having imagined that the earth turns on its centre. It is also an artifice of those who propose questions which they do not wish should be easily resolved. therefore. and that we thus lose time. for we know well that there are some which are perpetual in nature. and it is very likely that this would be from some tincture that he had placed at the bottom of each of these glasses. to find. by art. a man were blind from birth. it would be in vain to seek after arguments and . of seas. these waters of different colours were in his stomach. that we cannot easily detect the true point of the question. There are some who. since it is not possible whereas we ought to inquire only how water coming at the same time from the same mouth appeared of different colours in each of these glasses. such as the movements of fountains. If. for example. and uselessly weary the mind in keeping its attention fixed on things which do not at all contribute to resolve it. proposed. we must then examine what is known. for we need not imagine that we shall find a new kind of being. . by art. to sur round that which is to be found with so many conditions which are useless. since that motion would be as natural as that of a wheel exposed to the current of a river. It is things which are essential to the question proposed. perpetual motion. when we omit some . since it is through this that we must arrive at the knowledge of what is unknown . we should inquire after a secret which we could never find.306 ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS. one into one glass and another into another. have also believed that we might dispose a magnet so that it would always turn circularly but even if this were so. of rivers. When. and that it is only a great mag net. of which the loadstone has all the properties. for example. we have well examined the conditions which designate and mark out what is unknown in the question. [PART IV. perpetual motion .

respecting it. we remark. if the magnet about which we interrogate nature. the idea which fi-om this that thought being divisible. and that it may doubt of everything else without being able to doubt whether it thinks. account. we could proofs to convey to we never attain to the knowledge of it by reasoning. and so.). that all which happens in what we call destruction is . which we call body. it cannot be conceived to exist when that of which it was the mode is denied. were a new kind of being. from this examina many truths which may of what we seek. that analysis mainly art being to derive. and being of such or such a figure. short. that it is the property of the soul to think. and conduct us to the knowledge As. the like of which our mind had never conceived. having diversity of parts. if we can distinctly conceive such a mixture of the beings and natures which are known to us as may produce all the effects which we see in the magnet. that thought not being a mode of substance extended. in the first place. it is in the attention Now we give to that which is known in the question consists.CHAP. on that we have of thought. II.thought. in order to discover this. since doubt itself is a . we wish whole to resolve. and that thus the substance which thinks and the substance extended are two substances really from which it follows that the destruction of the one does not involve the destruction of the other. suppose it be asked whether the soul of man is immortal. 307 him the true idea of colours such as possess through sense . deep. for we should need for this a different mind from our own. And so we ought to believe that we have found all that can be found by the human mind.] EXAMPLE OF ANALYSIS. since. then inquire what it is to think. that. we conclude is not a mode of substance ex tended. must be the attribute of another substance. without destroying. according to the nature of a mode. and finding that nothing is contained in the idea of thought which be longs to the idea of substance extended. but distinct . &c. and that we may even deny of thought everything We which belongs to body (such as being long. we infer again. we apply ourselves to consider the nature of the soul. since even the substance extended is not properly destroyed. Whence. the tion.

these . that what is called destruction is only a dissolution of parts . as will be shown hereafter. two methods differ only as the road by which we ascend from a valley to a mountain from that by which we descend from the mountain into the valley. we : We lish them at first. &c. although we say that the clock is destroyed which proves that the soul. as we know well enough that in breaking all the wheels of a clock none of its substance is destroyed. we estab 2d. Finally. properly speaking . an unknown genealogy. not being divisible. in the other. always to pass from that which is more known to that which is less for there is not any true method which can dispense with this . but only a difference in the going . that thus that which has no parts cannot be destroyed. But we ascended by degrees to these general knowledges. But it differs from that of composition in this that take those truths known in the particular examination from the thing which we are supposed to know. and not being composed of any parts. on which it may be remarked 1st. we did not begin by the establishment of these general maxims That no substance perishes. cannot perish. and so on to St Louis and the other. This is what is called analysis or resolution. person in question. propose clear and evident maxims only in pro portion as we need them. rule. : method. or. That we ought to observe in it. which is called that of composition. And since this it is example certain. whereas. who was the son of such a one. as we do in the method of doc trine. we order to must remount from the that. as well as in the . nothing more than the change or dissolution of some parts of matter which always remain in nature. therefore. and not from things more general. 3d. of which the one is to show that this person had such a one for his father. and is. . which is no difference of road. and he of another. as the two ways differ.308 ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS. immortal. and that from these children others descended down to the 4th. [PART IV. in the example which we have given. and showing that he had such children. is the more in suitable on find this occasion. that of commencing with St Louis. Thus. which we may employ to prove that a person is descended from St Louis.

indeed. the geometers for it proceeds as follows question having been proposed to them. with objects the most simple To conduct our thoughts in and the most order. The second. A third. that they do not naturally precede each other. where. But if they fall. and to comprise nothing more in our judgments than what is presented so clearly to the mind that we have no room to doubt it. they apply generally to all kinds of method. in explaining it after it has been found. they conclude from this that what is proposed . at some clear truth from which what is proposed to them is a necessary consequence. if a problem. this is the analysis of : We may hence understand that . nevertheless. The four following. A them is true and.CHAP. by commencing to ascend by degrees to the knowledge of posing even. whereas. of its truth or falsehood. from the order between them. easily known. in that examination. they demonstrate it by another method which is called composition. returning then through the way they had come. and as may be necessary for re not clearli/ solving it. Descartes proposes in his method. to avoid carefully precipitation and prejudice. the most common method is to commence with the stock.] EXAMPLE OF ANALYSIS. The first is. and not specially to analysis alone. into some absurdity or impossibility. in order the most complex. although. sup . which M. of its possibility or impossibility they assume that it is as it is pi-oposed and examining what follows from this. in relation to which they are ignorant if it be a theorem. which is also what is commonly done in the sciences. that is to say. that what is pro posed to them is false and impossible. which consists more in judgment and sagacity of mind to . after having used analysis to find some truth. as a necessary conse quence from what is proposed to them. II. than in particular rules. This is what may be said generally touching analysis. 309 son to the father. we employ the other method for explaining what is found. when seeking after the truth in human sciences. To divide each of the difficulties ive examine into as many parts as possible. Never to accept anything as true ivhich ive do know to be so. if they arrive. they conclude from this. in order to show the descendants from it. may be useful for preserving us from error.

so complete that fourth. and for fully convincing shall first consider what is its excel the mind of it. way we avoid repetitions. as it is impossible to know well a species without knowing its genus. which is the most important. inasmuch as it is that which is em ployed for the explanation of all the sciences. that being always considered best adapted for proving the truth. were we to treat of the species before the genus. and as far as our mind is capable of knowing it. but it is always advantageous to have them in the mind. precepts are more difficult to comprehend when they are separated from all matter. in order to pass to In this those which are less general and more complex. we will consider the method which the geometers follow. OF THE METHOD OF COMPOSITION. wherein it appears to be We defective. it would be necessary to explain the nature of the genus many times in the ex planation of each species. to make. lence . in the second place. which is. There are still many things to be observed in order to render this method perfect. and. enumerations we may be assured of having omitted nothing. WHAT we have said in the preceding chapter has already given us some idea of the method of composition. This method consists principally in commencing with the most general and simple things. AND PARTICULARLY OF THAT WHICH THE GEOMETERS OBSERVE. in relation to everything. that of giving us a But as general clear and distinct knowledge of truth. CHAPTER III.310 METHOD OF COMPOSITION. and to observe them as much as possible when we try to discover the truth by means of reason. [PART IV. It is true that there is much difficulty in observing these The rules. and fully fitted to the end which it ought to propose. . since.

To employ in the definitions only terms already known or perfectly explained. For Axioms. to which they advance. Thus we may reduce to these three heads all that the geometers have observed for convincing the mind. 2. to leave no ambiguity in the terms. obscure. To prove have been already demonstrated. To admit no terms in the least obscure or equivocal with out defining them. : Definitions. finitions by availing themselves only of prove demonstratively all the conclusions the de which they have laid down of principles which have been accorded to them as being very evident. first of all.] METHOD OF COMPOSITION. or ploying in their proof only the definitions which the axioms which have been accorded. The second is. The third is. which afterwards become to them the same as principles. all propositions winch are at all. and include the whole in these five most important rules : NECESSARY RULES For 1. to lay down axioms The geometers having which is of that : clear that they which they require to be granted to them. by em have preceded. or the propositions which 4. have believed that they could secure this by observing three things in general The first is. which leads them. 311 for their aim the advancing only convincing. III. or of propositions which they have derived from these by the force of reasoning. as being so would only be obscured by any attempt to prove them. which they have provided for by the definition of Avords. to establish their reasonings only on principles clear and evident. To demand as axioms only things perfectly evident. and which cannot be contested by any one . For Demonstrations. of which we have spoken in the First Part. 3. or the construction of the thing .CHAP.

which is DEFINITIONS. MORE PARTICULAR EXPOSITION OF THESE RULES AND. since all the rest which is. CHAPTER IV. since we may by it clear up a number of disputes. which restrict and explain them. if one or other of the disputants took care to mark out precisely. were founded only on this ambiguity of words. and especially between the Stoics and the Academics. Never to abuse the equivocation of terms by failing the definitions to substitute for them. 5. that we cannot have it too much impressed on our minds. IN THE FIRST PLACE. and in a few words. which one takes in one sense. [PAKT IV. thing. So that some of the greatest contro versies would cease in a moment. be confessed that attention to the observation of these rules is sufficient to enable us to avoid false reasoning in the treating of the sciences. what he understands by the terms which are the subject of dispute. This is what the geometers have judged necessary in order It must to render their proofs convincing and invincible. the main may be called useful rather than necessary. which have as their subject often only the ambiguity of terms. . ALTHOUGH we have already spoken in the First Part touching the utility of the definition of terms. Cicero has remarked that the greater part of the dis putes between the ancient philosophers. without doubt. the Stoics being delighted. TIONS. it is never theless so important. OF THOSE WHICH RELATE TO DEFINI . and another in another.312 itself EXPOSITION OF THE RULES. ivhen there may be any operation to perform. in dispute. mentally.

second rule. 313 in order to elevate themselves. the Stoics.CHAP. It is For this. by defining them in other terms so clear. in avoiding evils. in en joying pleasures. and not in things. to take several terms in a different sense from others. or already explained.] EXPOSITION OF THE RULES. if it will . it another word with which nature furnishes us and it is easy to discover this by formally substituting the definition for the thing defined. but simply things a caution very useful to cast away from all disputes everything which is founded only on the equivocation of words. call them good to things. that while other philosophers employed the common terms of good and evil. did not ferable things (Trpo^eW) . in the course of the avoid passing to another idea than that out. every time we to say. to almost impossible for us. will be better comprehended by some examples. IV. the same idea which we had designated. But in order to derive all the profit it do from these definitions. we substitute for . If we consider this definition as the simple definition of a we have always kept to the same change it if we have not done so. that it is impossible for them to be any longer mistaken. The wise man of the Stoics did not less enjoy other with all the pleasures of life sects. cision For when we have not marked out with sufficient pre and distinctness the idea to which we wish to attach it is a word. instead of use the word. to employ in is necessary which we ought to still to add the the definitions only terms perfectly well knoivn. which we had marked that is mentally substituting. less care its evils and than the philosophers of and did not avoid inconveniences. For this ought not to change the proposition at all idea. This created the belief that their morality was much more severe and perfect. argument. whereas All this Euclid defines a plane rectilinear angle the meeting of two right lines which incline towards each other in the same plane. although in reality this pretended perfection was only in words. they did be rejected (dno evils. apparently not so strict. DEFINITIONS. the first of the rules which we have laid down avails: never to leave any term at all obscure or equivocal without defining it. with this single difference. but pre and not call them Trpotjfieva).

Now. member this. it is restricted to signify a plane recti And when we have thus defined an angle. He for example. how to divide an angle in two. by it is indubitable that everything which we say of a plane rectilinear angle (such as may afterwards we find in all . . DEFINITIONS. so that the word angle be considered as having been deprived of all signification in order to receive that of the meeting of two right lines. This definition designates so exactly the idea which all of an angle. but simply that it was a space contained between two right which meet together. there be found any absurdity in what is said of an angle.314 EXPOSITION OF THE RULES. tells which is that of nature. there is nothing to cen sure in it for Euclid may be permitted to call the word But he is bound to re angle the meeting of two lines. the definition of it which he has given and if. linear angle. between the lines. word. and never to take the word angle in any other sense. whereas. wherever he uses it. it is only necessary to substitute for the word angle. and withheld him from designating an angle by the words space com was. does not see that it is not Substitute his definition : us. except that the word angle com men have prises also. which has for its centre the point in which these lines lines relation to the one of the meet. but that he has uncon . in substituting this definition. it will follow that he has not kept to the same idea as he had designated. a solid angle. that it is at once the definition of a word and of a thing. indeterminate in two dimensions. to the other by the proportional part of a circumference. sciously passed to another. [PART IV. concluded from this that the rectilinear angle was not a space. that he saw prised within two lines which meet together that this space might be larger or smaller when the sides of the angle were longer or shorter. and not to the meeting of the lines? It is plain that what perplexed Euclid. in common discourse. which answers and determinate in relation to the length of these lines. in order to do this. Who the meeting of two lines which we divide into two. but it is not the meeting of two lines which has sides and a but that all this belongs to the space base or subtendant. without the angle But he ought not to have within being greater or less. this definition.

following are other definitions of Euclid.CHAP. they are equal. and. as Ramus has remarked. &quot. can be Nothing. which has for its centre the point in which the lines which contain the angle meet. consequently. According to these definitions. obtain the means of scarcely any improvement. IV. Whereas. it which line it is terminate on the side which is itself indeterminate. bein&quot. thus explained. angle.] EXPOSITION OF THE RULES. therefore. says he. the term ratio ought to comprehend the habitude which is between two magnitudes. between contained. when two angles have for their measure equal aliquot parts of its circumference. 315 the definition for the For thing defined. is the habitude compared likeness together. and if one has the tenth. without our ever being obliged to change the idea. space is only determined by the proportional part of a circumference. equal to another angle. too. the tenth part . we ought to measure By less this definition. which produces a terrible confusion in his Elements. Proportion is a of ratios&quot. we cannot understand in what the equality of two angles consists. of two magnitudes of the same land according to quantity. though he himself makes whether one angle judln^ The &quot. because. according to the definition of Euclid. and without our meeting with any absurdity in substituting rectilinear may into four . in which he commits the same fault as in that of the Ratio&quot. and the other the twelfth. for instance. it is that space which we may it is that space* two. into three.indeterminate in relation to this dimension. it is not from this that is that space which has two sides. that which has the tenth is greater than that which has the twelfth. DEFINITIONS. four magnitudes will have a proportion together when the difference of the first to the second is equal to the difference of the third to the fourth. which we divide into figures) will be true of this angle thus defined. when we consider how far is cannot be denied that this in relation one exceeds the other for it a habitude of two magnitudes . as. is we its greatness or smallness. or greater or for since the size of that . by a which is called the base or subtendant it is that . provided that he always . said against these definitions of Euclid. to their compared quantity . space which is not considered as greater or less for being con tained between lines longer or shorter.

by changing that idea. of the difference or of the ratio. that when we simply speak of proportion. 5. and since this makes two species. . to remark that we may compare two magnitudes in two ways. It is necessary. to define pro portion as the equality of one or other of these kind of habitudes. or proportional magnitudes. are not proportional. a like habitude to that which exists between the third and the fourth. and the other. according to what follows in his book. accordingly. it is necessary to give them different names. therefore. [PART IV. by taking the word in another sense from that which we had given to it in the definition. that the definition of words is arbitrary. ferent. proportion. in order not to be deceived by this disagreement. and have removed the All this shows us that we ought not to abuse that maxim. these four numbers. 3. that is to say. but that great care ought to be taken to designate so accurately and clearly the idea to which we wish to connect the word which we define that we cannot be deceived by it in the subsequent discourse. by calling the equality of the dif ferences arithmetical proportion. 8. compared according to quantity. and that we mean arithmetical only when it is so expressed. 10. keeps to the notions which he has designated by these words. since. giving to the first the name of difference. and the equality of the since this last is of much greater use than the first. we might still further premise. ratios geometrical proportion. so that we cannot substitute the definition for the thing defined without falling into some absurdity. one by considering how much one exceeds the other. in what way one is con tained in another and since these two habitudes are dif . although the definition which he has given to the word proportion agrees with them. and to the second the name of ratio. since there is between the first number and the second. This And would have cleared up equivocation. that is. and to which he has given the names of ratio and But he does not always keep to them. all obscurity. we mean geometrical proportion.316 EXPOSITION OF THE RULES DEFINITIONS. to distinguish them also by two different names. It is necessary.

CHAP. that the first are . that they have not always regarded the difference which ought to be observed between the definitions of things and the defini ALTHOUGH finition of words tions of words. the one. Whether the unit is to number what a point is to a line ? it is necessary to distinguish this. against those who is that by which the quantity of every gets immediately into a great rage do not allow unity to be a number. whether the unit is to number what a But . a very celebrated mathematician of the Prince of Orange. THAT THE GEOMETERS DO NOT APPEAR ALWAYS TO HAVE RIGHTLY UNDERSTOOD THE DIFFERENCE WHICH EXISTS BETWEEN THE DEFINITION OF WORDS AND THE DEFINI TION OF THINGS. and that the others cannot be disputed for there are some who dispute about the definition of words as earnestly as though they were the things themselves. open to dispute. in the Commentaries of Clavius on Euclid. that Simon Stevin. Thus we may see. there are no authors who have turned the de to better account than the geometers.] DEFINITION OF WORDS AND OF THINGS. V. which Pelletier affirmed was not an does angle. nevertheless. to wit. having defined number thus thing is : angle ? Number explained. not see that all this might have been settled in a word by demanding from each what he understood by the term Who We see. I feel myself. touching the space between the tangent and the circumference. a long and very angry dispute between Pelletier and himself. whether the unit is separately these two questions a number . 317 CHAPTER V. obliged to remark here. when Clavius maintained that it was. ETC. which is. the other. to treat not confuse two things very different. breaking into rhetorical exclamations as though it were a most important discussion. It is true that he mingles with that discourse a question of some importance. in order that we may And thus. again.

keep the term.318 point DEFINITION OF WORDS AND OF THINGS [PART IV. a room is one part of a house. but this does not prove that we are obliged to give the same name. This argument proves. This argument is worth nothing at all . for a multitude of units. Unity is part of a multitude of units . Hence the first question is void and we cannot say any thing against those who choose to call unity a number without a manifest begging of the question. as we may see by examining the pretended demonstrations of Stevin. the If. from a given number The part A . or may not be. the given is the same . consequently. defining it as Euclid a multitude of units together it is plain that number . as this definition of Euclid was arbitrary. if unity were no number. a part of a square is not a square. according to which unity is a number. or of a part of a number. if we choose. is to a line it must be said about the first that it is only a dispute touching words. in taking one from which number would remain ridiculous. but that. it very often happens that it soldier is one part of an army. absurd. a number. number is is the unit not a . and. The does. we may give to it one such as that which Stevin proposes. and not a house a semicircle is not a circle . Therefore unity is of the same nature as a multitude of units. for. since we may. : number remains three. Therefore. and that the unit may be a number. therefore. it will not follow that it must always have the same name as the whole . in relation to which we may say that it is of the same nature . and give to the unit only the name of unity. has some thing in common with the whole multitude of unities. has not the same name. and. rather that unity. according to the definition which we choose to give of number . on the contrary. to a unit and a multitude of units. is But the major here and supposes the very . The second reason of Stevin is no better we take away no number. for though the part be always of the same nature as the whole. number. first is : is of the same nature as the whole . and we may thus give another to the word number. number. the same. being part of a multitude of unities. and not an army .

it does not. that we take away from it either a number. since it is enough for its not continuing what it was. the arguments of Stevin prove rather that we word number in such a way that it may apply to unity. is a often justly contested. V. that in taking away a semicircle from a given circle. does remain. the given line . that every root. And if this argument were good. Unity is part of number. in order that we may not be obliged to except unity whenever we explain the properties Thus all may define the . whereas. for the definitions of things which may be very metrical. When unity is taken away from a number. such as the unit is. to wit. and the multitude of unities. which belong to all numbers but unity. and is not a dispute of a word. when a point is added to a line. since we have taken away from it no circle. or a part of a number. as when he labours zealously to prove that number is not a discrete quantity that the propor tion of numbers is always arithmetical. . the given number does not remain and when the point is taken away from the line. we might prove. thing in dispute . . 319 for Euclid will deny that the given number remains when we have taken away no number from it. and not geo finition of The same of any number whatever it which proves that he did properly definition of a word was. since unity added to a number makes it greater. But the second question that.] NOT RIGHTLY UNDERSTOOD BY GEOMETERS.CHAP. the given circle must remain. have sufficient in common to enable them to be but they do not prove at all signified by the same name that we may not also define number by restricting this word to a multitude of units. Stevin is full of such disputes on the de words. inasmuch as unity. in the same way. For it is absolutely false that the unit may be to number as the point is to the line. number understand what the may be. and that he has taken the definitions of words which cannot be con tested. whether the unit is to other numbers as the point is to the line is not of the same nature as the first. but of a thing. and the point is no pai t of a line.

320

RULES WHICH RELATE TO AXIOMS.

[PART

IV.

CHAPTER

VI.

OF THE RULES WHICH RELATE TO AXIOMS, THAT IS, TO PROPOSITIONS CLEAR AND EVIDENT OF THEMSELVES.

agrees that there are propositions so clear and so evident in themselves, that they do not need any de monstration ; and that all those which are not demonstrated

EVERT one

ought to be such, in order to become the principles of a true demonstration. For if they be at all uncertain, it is clear that they cannot be the foundation of a conclusion
altogether certain.

But many do not sufficiently comprehend in what this and evidence of a proposition consists. For, in the first place, we must not imagine that a proposition is clear and certain when no one contradicts it; and that we ought to consider it doubtful, or, at least, must be obliged If this were so, there to prove it, when any one denies it. would be nothing certain or clear, since philosophers have
clearness

been found

who have professed to doubt, generally, of everything, and some even who have maintained that there is no proposition at all more probable than its contrary. ought not, therefore, to judge of certainty and clear ness by the disputes of men, for there is nothing that may not be contested, in word, at least ; but we must hold as clear that which appears so to all those who will take the trouble to consider things with attention, and who are sincere in the utterance of what their inward conviction is. Hence, what Aristotle says is of most important meaning, that demonstration properly relates to the interior dis course, and not to the exterior ; since there is nothing so well demonstrated that it may not be denied by an obsti nate man, who undertakes to dispute in words the things

We

even of which he
ill

is

inwardly persuaded.

This

is

a very

and altogether unworthy of a well consti tuted mind, though it is true that this humour often
disposition,

CHAP.

VI. ]

RULES AVHICH RELATE TO AXIOMS.

321

obtains in the schools of philosophy, through the custom which is introduced among them of disputing about every
thing,

and making

it

a point of honour never to yield, he
;

of most mind who is most prompt at discovering evasions for avoiding it whereas the cha racter of an honourable man is to lay down his arms

being accounted the

man

before the truth as soon as he perceives it, and to love it in the mouth of his adversary. Secondly, even those philosophers who hold that all our ideas come from sense, maintain also, that all the certainty and evidence of propositions comes either immediately or

even

even that For," mediately from sense. say they, axiom which is considered as clear and evident as we can possibly desire the whole is greater than its part is firmly established in our minds only because that from our infancy AVC have observed in detail that a man is greater than his head, and a whole house than a chamber, and a whole forest than a tree, and the Avhole heaven than a star." This fancy is as false as that which AVC have refuted in the First Part, that all our ideas come from sense. For if we Avere assured of this truth the whole is greater than its part
"
"

only through the different instances in which AVC had observed it from our infancy, AVC should have only a pro bable assurance of it, since induction is only a certain means of knowing a thing Avhen we are assured that the induction is complete there being nothing more common than to discover the falsity of Avhat AVC had believed to be true, on inductions which appeared to us so general, that we could not imagine any exception could be found. Thus, not long since, it Avas believed as indubitable that the water contained in a curved vessel, of which one end was much larger than the other, remained always level being no higher in the small end than in the large be cause it had been proved by a multitude of observations. It has been, hoAvever, lately found that this is false Avhen one of the ends is extremely narrow, since then the Avater rises higher in it than in the other. This shows that inductions alone could never giA^e us complete certainty of any truth, at all eA-ents, not before AVC Avere assured that
;

they were universal, Avhich

is

impossible.

And, conse-

322

RULES WHICH RELATE TO AXIOMS.

[PART

IV.

quently, we could only have a probable assurance of the truth of this axiom, that the whole is greater than its part, if we were only assured of it in consequence of having seen that a man is greater than his head, a forest than a tree,

the heaven than a star, since we should be always open to doubt whether there might not be some other whole, which we had not observed, which was not greater than
its

part. It is not, therefore,

on these observations which we have

that the certainty of this axiom de There is, on the contrary, nothing more capable pends. of keeping us in error than the holding fast to these preju dices of our childhood. But this certainty depends solely on this, that the clear and distinct ideas which we have of a whole and of a part manifestly involve that the whole is greater than the part, and that the part is smaller than the whole. And all that could be effected by the different ob servations which we have made, of a man being greater than his head, a house than a room, has been to furnish us with occasions of paying attention to the ideas of whole and part. But it is positively false that they were the cause of the absolute and immoveable certainty that we have of the truth of this axiom. This, I think, I have de monstrated. What we have said of this axiom may be said of all others, and thus we believe that the certainty and evidence of human knowledge in natural things depends on this
principle, All that
is

made from our infancy

contained in the clear

and

distinct idea

of a thing

may

be affirmed with truth of that thing.

Thus, since the being animal is contained in the idea of man, I may affirm of man that he is animal ; since, having all its diameters, equal is contained in the idea of a circle, I may affirm of every circle that all its diameters are equal since, having all its angles, equal to two right angles is contained in the idea of a triangle, I may affirm this of
;

every triangle. cannot dispute this principle without destroying the whole evidence of human knowledge and establishing an absurd Pyrrhonism. For we can judge of things only by

We

the ideas which

we have

of them, since the only means

we

CHAP.

VI.]

RULES WHICH RELATE TO AXIOMS.

323

have of conceiving them is what we have in our mind, and they are there only through our ideas. Now, if the judg ments which we form by considering these ideas do not regard things in themselves, but simply our thoughts that

when I see clearly that the having three if, angles equal to two right angles is contained in the idea of a triangle, I have no right to conclude, in truth, that every triangle has three angles equal to two right angles, but simply that I think so it is plain that we could have no knowledge of things, but simply of our thoughts, and, consequently, we should know nothing of the things we are persuaded that we know most certainly but we should only know that we think them to be so and so, which
is to say,
;

would manifestly destroy

all

the sciences.

And

it

need not be thought that there are any

men who

seriously acquiesce in these consequences, that we do not know in relation to anything, whether it be true or false in itself. For there are some things so simple and so evi

dent

as,

/

think, therefore

I am

; the ivhole is greater

than

its

part that it is impossible seriously to doubt whether they are in themselves such as we conceive them. The reason is, that we cannot doubt of them without thinking of them, and that we cannot think of them without believing them
true, and, consequently, we cannot doubt them. Nevertheless, this principle alone is not sufficient to

judge of what ought

be believed as an axiom for there are attributes which are really contained in the idea of things, which, nevertheless, may, and ought, to be demonstrated as, the equality of all angles of a triangle to two right angles, or of all those of a hexagon to eight right angles. But we must carefully observe whether we need only consider the idea of a thing with a slight attention, in order to see clearly that such an attribute is contained in it, or whether, be sides, it is necessary to join to it some other idea, in order to perceive that connection. When it is necessary to con sider only the idea, the proposition may be taken as an axiom, especially if that consideration requires only a mo
to
;

derate attention, of which all common minds are capable. But if some other idea be necessary besides the idea of the
thing,
it

is

Thus we may give the two following

a proposition which needs to be demonstrated. rules for axioms
:

324

RULES WHICH RELATE TO AXIOMS.
1st

[PART

IV.

RULE.

When, in order to see clearly that an attribute belongs to a subject (as that it belongs to a whole to be greater than its part), we need only consider the two ideas of subject and attribute with moderate attention, so that we cannot give this attention without perceiving that the idea of that attribute is truly contained in the idea of the subject. ought, then, to take this proposition as an axiom which needs no demonstra

We

because it has, of itself, all the evidence which demonstration could have given to it, since demonstration could do nothing more than show that this attribute belongs to the subject, by employing a third idea to show this connection, which we see already without the aid of any third idea.
tion,

But we must not confound a simple exposition (though
this should

even take the form of an argument) with a true demonstration for there are axioms which need to be ex plained, in order that they may be better understood, although they do not need to be demonstrated, the exposi tion being nothing more than saying in other words, and more at length, what is contained in the axiom, whereas, demonstration requires some new mean which the axiom did not clearly contain.
;

2d RULE.
the simple consideration of the idea of the subject and the at tribute is not sufficient to enable us to see clearly that the attribute to the subject, the proposition which affirms that it does ought belongs not to be taken as an axiom but it ought to be demonstrated by em ploying some other ideas to show that connection, as we employ the idea of parallel lines in order to show that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles.
;

When

for

These two rules are more important than we may think, it is one of the most common defects among men, that

of not consulting themselves in relation to what they affirm or deny, of referring to what they have heard said, or

what they have previously thought, without carefully ob serving what they would think of them themselves if they were to consider with more attention what passes in their own mind of confining themselves rather to the sound of the words than to their true ideas of affirming, as clear
and
evident, that

which

it

is

impossible for them to con
it

ceive, and denying, as false, what for them not to believe true, if they to consider it seriously.

would be impossible would take the trouble

CHAP.

VII.]

AXIOMS WHICH MAT BE EMPLOYED, ETC.

325

besides

For example, those who say that in a piece of wood, its parts and their situation, their figure, their motion, or rest, and the pores which enter into their parts

is still a substantial form distinguished from all this, think they say nothing but what is certain, while, how ever, they utter a thing which neither themselves nor any one else comprehends, or ever will comprehend. While, if, on the contrary, we would explain to them the effects of nature, by the insensible parts of which bodies

there

are composed, and by their different situation, size, figure, motion, or rest, and by the pores which traverse these parts, and which allow or arrest the passage of other mat ters, they believe that we speak to them only of chimeras,

although we tell them nothing but what may be conceived very easily; and, by a strange perversion of mind, the facility even with which these things are comprehended induces them to believe that they are not the true causes of natural so effects, but that these are more hidden and mysterious
;

more disposed to believe those who explain them by principles which they cannot conceive than those who employ only principles which they can understand. And it is, again, humorous enough, that when we speak to them of insensible parts, they think themselves entitled
that they are
to reject them,

because they can neither see nor touch

them

while, however, they rest satisfied with substantial forms, ponderosity, attractive virtue, &c., which they not only never saw or touched, but which they cannot even
;

conceive.

CHAPTER

VII.

OF SOME AXIOMS WHICH ARE IMPORTANT, AND WHICH MAY BE EMPLOYED AS THE PRINCIPLES OP GREAT TRUTHS.

EVERY one allows that it is important mind many axioms and principles, which,

to

have

in

the

being clear and

326
indubitable,

AXIOMS WHICH MAY BE EMPLOYED

[PAKT

IV.

may be employed as a foundation for obtain ing a knowledge of things more obscure. But those which are commonly given are of such little use that it is scarcely worth while to know them for that which is called the first principle of knowledge it is impossible for the same is very clear and certain but I thing to be, and not to be do not see how it can avail to furnish us with any know I believe, therefore, that those which follow will ledge. be of more use. I commence with that which we have
; ;

already explained.
1st

AXIOM.
distinct idea

Everything which is contained in the clear and of a thing may be affirmed of it with truth.

2d AXIOM.
Existence (possible at least)
thing ivhich
is

contained in the idea of every
distinctly.

we

conceive clearly

and

as soon as a thing is conceived clearly we cannot but regard it able to be so, since it is only the contradic tion which we find between our ideas, which leads us to

For

believe that a thing cannot be. there can be no con tradiction in an idea when it is clear and distinct.

Now

3d AXIOM.
Nothing cannot
corollaries
;

be the cause

of anything.
this,

Other axioms spring from

which may be
:

called

its

such as the following

4th AXIOM, or 1st COROLLARY of the 3d.

No thing, nor any perfection of that thing actually existing, can have nothing, or a thing non-existent, as the cause of its
existence.

5th AXIOM, or 2d

COROLLARY

of the 3d.
is

All the reality or perfection which is in a thing, formally or eminently, in its first and total cause.

found,

CHAP.

VII.]

AS THE PRINCIPLES OF GREAT TRUTHS.

327

6th

AXIOM, or 3d COROLLARY of the

3d.

that is to say, to give body is able to move itself, motion when it has none. This principle is so evident, naturally, that it caused the introduction of substantial forms, and the real qualities of heaviness and lightness for philosophers, seeing, on the one hand, that it was impossible for that which was moved to move itself, and being falsely persuaded, on the other, that there was nothing without the stone which pushed
itself
;

Wo

downwards when it fell, felt themselves obliged to the matter which re distinguish two things in a stone ceived the motion, and the substantial form, aided by the accident of heaviness, which gave it. They did not, how
it

ever, observe, that thus they either fell into the difficulty which they wished to avoid, if that form was at once or that, if it was material, that is to say, a true matter,

not matter,

from

it

;

it must be a substance which is really distinct which it was impossible for them to conceive

clearly,

at least, to conceive as

a mind, that

is,

a substance

which
that of

thinks,

which

is

truly the form of

man, and not

any other body.
7th AXIOM, or 4th COROLLARY of the 3d.

No body can move another, unless it is itself moved. For a body, being at rest, is unable to give itself motion, it still less able to give it to another body.
8th AXIOM.

if
is

We ought not to deny what is clear and evident because we cannot comprehend ichat is obscure.
9th AXIOM.
It belongs to the nature of a finite mind, that
it

cannot com

prehend

the infinite.

10th AXIOM.

The

testimony of one infinitely powerful, infinitely wise, in-

These three last axioms are the ground of faith. [PART IV. that there be nothing in the matter but what is certain and indubitable . For we ought to be more assured that he who is in finitely intelligent cannot be deceived. we ought to consider them as as well established and indubitable as though u-e had seen them with our own eyes. and who cannot be suspected of having conspired together to support a deception.328 finitely RULES RELATING TO DEMONSTRATION. ought to persuade our minds more powerfully than the most convincing reasons. This is the ground of the greater part of our knowledge. and that he who is infinitely good cannot deceive us. and infinitely truthful. of different times. those facts of which sense may easily judge are at by a very great number of persons. since the things which we know in this way are more numerous by far than those which we know by our own observation. TRUE demonstration requires two things the one. who affirm that they have tested When personally known them. we shall certainly secure both if we observe the two rules which have been laid down. good. the other. llth AXIOM. different interests. if all the propositions which we employ as proofs Now . of which we shall say something hereafter. that there be nothing vicious in : A the form of the argument. OF THE RDLES WHICH RELATE TO DEMONSTRATION. For there would be only what is true and certain in the matter. different nations. CHAPTER VIII. than we are that we are not deceived in things the most clear.

which is. Now it the most common defect of vicious arguments. shall never advance as a proof any proposition which is not certain and evident. : is. VIII. Not but that there are besides that other vices of reasoning which springs from the equivocal meaning of terms.CHAP. nor might divert the attention which we ought . It we It is also easy to show that we shall not sin against the form of reasoning if we observe the second rule. being arbitrary. 329 Either definitions of words which have been already explained. in the two first propositions. when there may be any operation to perform. clear that we shall avoid this defect by observing that still second rule. according to the third rule : : propositions already demonstrated. that by observing the first rule. For if we ever sin against the rules of syllogism. if there was any doubt as to whether it was so. ever to fall into. which ought to be as indubitable as the rest. and which have become clear and evident by the demonstration which has Or been given of them Or a construction of the thing itself which is in question. and in another sense in the other which principally happens in the middle term of a syllogism. and by taking it in one sense in one of the propositions. but these it is almost impossible for a man of aver age mind.] RULES RELATING TO DEMONSTRATION. clear. and which ought not to have been assumed unless they were clear and evident in themselves. since the application which would be given to these superfluous rules to pay to things more necessary. always to avoid choosing the equivocation of terms by mentally substituting the definitions which restrict and explain their meaning. Thus we see that the geometers never take any trouble about the form of their arguments. especially in speculative matters. and possessed of some knowledge. therefore. which. the taking of . since this construction ought to have been beforehand shown to be possible. and urge their observance . it is by deceiving ourselves with the equivocation of some term. and it would indeed be frivolous. which is is in two different senses. cannot be disputed Or axioms which have been granted. and thus it would be useless to give rules against these vices.

[PART IT. however. is as whence this evidence arises for it is one thing to know that evi a thing evidently. We may say. we its its part . as they might almost all be by that proposition which we have said may be taken as the foundation of all evidence Everything which we see to be contained in a clear : . and for distinct idea may be affirmed ivith truth. think of conforming to the rules of logic. example : Everything which we see to be contained in a clear and distinct idea may be Now we part. there would be scarcely any axiom that would not need to be demon strated. that we positions which need to be demonstrated ought not to place amongst this number those which may be so by the application of the rule of evidence to every evident proposition for. may affirm with truth that the whole is greater than But though less this proof may be very good.330 DEFECTS IN THE METHOD OF GEOMETERS. affirmed with truth . and another to dence springs. since it is done naturally. see clearly that the clear and distinct idea which we have of 1 a whole contains the being greater than Therefore. WE five geometers possesses. being at all defective in this particular. because our mind supplies that major it. which we cannot too thoroughly fix in our . without. OF SOME DEFECTS WHICH ARE COMMONLY TO BE MET WITH IN THE METHOD OF THE GEOMETERS. and evidently that the whole without the need of any reflection . know whence CHAPTER IX. have seen what of excellence the method of the We have reduced this method to rules. without the need of study. it is neverthe not necessary. if this were so. There is still an observation to be made about the pro it is. without having any need to pay special attention to and thus to sees clearly its greater than part.

I will endeavour to show this by selecting from Euclid some examples of these defects.] DEFECTS IN THE METHOD OF GEOMETERS. and thus not necessary to explain it further here. though they have not turned them aside from their end. derived from the nature of suffice for the the thing this point. itself. we penetrate into the reasons. and to the conviction of the mind than to its enlightenment. IX. have nevertheless prevented them from reaching it by the short est and most convenient route. that it does not . beyond this. among all philosophers. which. why it is true. 331 minds: and it must be confessed that there is nothing more admirable than the discovery of so many hidden things. The geometers are worthy of all praise in seeking to advance only what is convincing but it would appear that they have not sufficiently observed.CHAP. Nevertheless. which marks that it has not We may say that this defect is the yet a true knowledge. 1st DEFECT. by reasons so strong and so invincible. since we shall speak of it sufficiently in what follows. not necessary to under They nevertheless The geometers maintain what is that it is clear of itself. so neither can we deny that they have not fallen into some defects. through the employment of so few rules so : them alone belongs the advantage of having banished from their schools and books controversy and dispute. and their demonstration. Paying more attention to certainty than to evidence. Proving take the proof of things ivhich have no need ofproof. it is source of all the others which we shall notice . to be convinced that it is true. 2d DEFECT. For until we arrive at our mind is not fully satisfied. if we would judge of things without pre judice. establishment of a perfect knowledge of any thing. unless. as we cannot take away from them the glory of having followed a much more certain course for the dis that. and still seeks greater knowledge than this. to covery of truth than any others. .

each . I know. its clear it with others. IV. as we have already said above. more bent on convincing the mind than enlightening as we have said. although this was evident from the very notion of a right line. to make the following To draw a line equal to a given line not a postulate. being it. which is the shortest possible distance between two points. to be regarded as principles which have no need of proof. but I believe without connecting that it is enough that they are able to be seen clearly with a moderate attention. we cannot pay much attention to the idea of a right line without perceiving not only that its position depends on two points alone (which Euclid has taken as one of his postulates). and indeed more so than to draw a circle having a given : radius. at most. indeed. and the natural measure of the distance from one point to another. It is this which led Euclid to prove that the two sides of a triangle are greater than a single one. of a little explanation. with a rightly con stituted mind. often do because.332 DEFECTS IN THE METHOD OP GEOMETERS. they believe that they shall convince it better by finding some proof of those things even which are most evident. This is what led him. but that we can also comprehend. and that no man. again. is able seriously to doubt them for those propositions. from its not having been sufficiently considered that all the certainty and evi dence of our knowledge in the natural sciences spring from this principle That we may affirm of a thing all that is : contained in that when we need is tribute and distinct idea. This defect has arisen. than by simply proposing them. but. and there are two points in the cutting line. without trouble. Whence it follows. that there are some attributes which may be seen more easily in ideas than others. [PART it. that if a right line cut I maintain that another. only. but a problem which must be demonstrated. which are derived thus from the simple con sideration of ideas. which it would not be if it were not also the shortest of all lines which could be drawn from one point to another. and leaving the mind to recognise their evidence. and very clearly. Thus . it ought to be considered as clear and evident. to consider the idea simply. no doubt. although it is easy. in order to recognise that an at contained in an idea.

] DEFECTS IN THE METHOD OF GEOMETERS. of which we shall speak below. however. 3d DEFECT. this desire of proving what ought to be assumed as clear and evident of itself. what is contained will be less than that which contains. should have been treated of afterwards. and is not so in itself. propositions less clear than these as Archimedes. for we may are to be altogether oftentimes employ them to prove . but by some absurdity which would follow. Not that these demonstrations rejected. which ought to be the chief result of knowledge . It is clear. springs . are well established. before the things which are demonstrated by perpendicu of which lars alone. since it is from this that the inversion of the natural order. as proofs. for our mind is not satisfied unless it knows not only that a thing is. are very common in Euclid. who established his beautiful That if two lines in the same demonstration on this axiom : plane have their extremities common. and are bent or hollow towards the same part. it will be easy to determine when a line is perpendicular to another without employing either angle or triangle. 333 is equally distant from two points in the line which is cut. which cannot be learnt from a demonstration which duces it re to the impossible. there will be no other point of the cutting line which is not equally distant from these two points of the line which is cut. IX. Those kind of demonstrations which show that a thing is such. they do not enlighten it. in what ought not to have been proved) which. according to the order of nature. which ought not to be treated of. but it is important in its consequences. that while they may con vince the mind. not by its principles. as principles. having often obliged the geometers to treat of things (in order to employ them. but why it is. Hence. if it were not so. Demonstrating by Impossibility. It is also to be remarked that there are some excellent geometers who employ.CHAP. It must be confessed that this defect of proving what needs no proof does appear a very great one.

[PART IV. that these demonstrations are allowable only when we are unable to furnish others. This defect is very common among the geometers they take no trouble as to the quarter whence the proofs which they furnish are obtained. which are properly only . in fine. which may that the manner in which . where it is proved that the square of the base which contains a right angle. may be many propositions in proved in this way which may difficulty. is equal to the two squares of the sides. had the true order been observed. easier. since the equality of the squares does not depend on the equality of the triangles. which is taken as the mean in that de monstration. however. by reducing them We that it is a fault to employ them in proving what positively proved. negatives. is one of the most admired it is. many other ways existed of proving this same equality. by prolonging equally the sides of the triangle and making new triangles. either clear of themselves or demonstrated before in another way and then that kind of demonstra to the impossible. and tion. 5. prop.334 DEFECTS IN THE METHOD OP GEOMETERS. proves that an isosceles triangle has the two angles at its base equal. however.. much shorter. This will be better understood by some examples : Euclid I. provided they are convincing to prove things by foreign methods is. corollaries from other propositions. but on the proportion of the lines. and more natural? of the First Book. But is it credible that a thing so easy of proof as the equality of these angles required so much artifice to prove it. may say. whereas. occupies the place rather of an explanation than a new demonstration. propositions of Euclid sufficiently clear The 47th : it is proved is not natural. Now there are Euclid which he has only be otherwise proved without any great 4th DEFECT. as though anything would be more ridiculous than to imagine that this equality depended on these foreign tri angles. Far-fetched Demonstrations. to prove them but very imperfectly. which he compares with the others.

Paying no This is attention to the true order of nature. So much for the general disorder but it is full of a mass of confusion in detail. 5th DEFECT. 335 be easily demonstrated without employing any other line than that let fall from the point of the right angle on the base. The elements of Euclid are quite full of this defect. the greatest defect of the geometers. proving by figures the properties of simple lines. except that the first propositions may be employed to demonstrate the succeeding ones. They have fancied that there is scarcely any order for them to observe.] DEFECTS IN THE METHOD OF GEOMETERS. IX. disregarding the true rule of method. He measures the dimension of surfaces with that of lines. proves nothing of perpendicular and parallel lines. he proves that that exterior angle . Eighth. lie returns to extension in the Sixth. and begins in the Tenth to speak again of extension. he gives the general means for making any triangle of three given straight lines. except by triangles.CHAP. pro vided that two are greater than a single one. and introducing a mass of other distortions which disfigure that beautiful science. the side of a triangle being prolonged. subsequently (twenty-two propositions after). the exterior angle is greater than either of the interior and opposite angles and. After having treated of extension in the first four Books. and triangles and squares. six propositions further on. . and Ninth. and. and given line.. proposition 16 that. they confuse everything. He is equal to the two opposite angles. which involves the particular construction of an equilateral triangle on a . always to begin with things the most simple and general. and treat pell-mell of lines surfaces. He commences the First Book by the construction of an equilateral triangle. and treats of numbers in the Seventh. which is. he treats generally of the proportions of all kinds of mag nitudes in the Fifth. in order to pass from them to those which are more complex and par ticular. All Euclid is full of these far-fetched demonstrations. He proves Book I. And thus.

but that they do this simply by defining the term. comes under that rule which enjoins that we or even define. much better not to give the division of triangles before having explained and demonstrated the properties of triangle in general. It is. two only acute. two only equal. [PART IV. and it is called it is Equilateral. that of not employing divisions and partitions.336 It DEFECTS IN THE METHOD OF GEOMETERS. we finitions of all doubt that follows ? it find in the First Book of Euclid de the species of triangles. would be necessary to transcribe the whole of Euclid. For example. Rectangle. ( all A equal.lt. indeed. because the three together are only equal to two right angles. with out indicating that one genus has so many species. called Scalene. & nt and ** is calle(l and it is called &amp. and placing all the definitions one after another. because the general idea of the genus can receive only so many differences. from which we shall have learnt that at least two angles of a triangle must be acute.gt. and it is either \ I \ a ^ * nree acu te. and it is called Oxigon. or in relation to its angles. in order to give all the this confusion. the species before the genus . examples which might be found of 6th DEFECT. But who can would be much clearer to speak of them as triangle may be divided in relation to its sides. It is not that they do not mark all the species of the genera which they treat of. The defect do not treat of. called Isosceles. Employing no divisions and partitions. For the sides are either &amp. which would tend to throw considerable light upon the nature of genus and species. (either I I obtuse. and then the third is ri The angles are 1. and ( all three unequal. Amblygon. and can have no more. There is still another defect in the method of the geometers.

For the geometers may say. it perfect. 337 well known. to be desired that more attention had been paid to the more natural manner by which truth is conveyed to the mind. more entire and complete. of things which we know through their true causes and principles. way. the nature of our mind. X. in this way. . which is to convince but they cannot change. but that we are compelled to acknow ledge that of all human sciences there are none which have THERE been better handled than those which are comprised under the general name of mathematics. nevertheless. provided that they accomplish what they seek. especially when there are many things which may be said of the genus without speaking of the species. in order to render them more true. SAID BY THE GEOMETERS ON THIS SUBJECT. moreover. CHAPTER REPLY TO WHAT IS X. are some geometers who think they have justified by saying that they have paid no attention to them. All that we maintain is that something may be added to them. that these defects are not so considerable. than of those which are proved to us only through foreign and indirect ways.CHAP. if they please. which is their sole aim. though the principal thing that is to advance nothing but what is is. nor prevent us from having a knowledge much more accurate. assured of having found the truth. and that they are. and ought to be considered that. that they do not care about the true order. these defects It must be allowed. that it is enough for them that they say nothing which they do not prove in a convincing manner. or whether they prove by near or distant ways. Q in this .] ia REPLY TO THE GEOMETERS.

[PART IV. that we learn with incompar ably greater facility. indeed. We . but that it is better. This reply is very reasonable . nevertheless. indeed. everything should be most clearly demonstrated. in all things. what has been taught us in the true order because the ideas which have a. therefore. and particu plished in the order NEW larly in the new edition which has lately appeared. that it is in itself much But all better to observe this order than not to observe it. do not concede that it is impossible to observe both . and retain much better. that a small inconvenience must be neglected when we cannot avoid that thus it is it without falling an inconvenience that the true is not observed. by seeking after proofs which are more natural. is not retained by by the memory but by the judgment. and to expose ourselves to the danger of falling into error and paralogism. natural connection arrange themselves much better in our memory. that Avhat we have once known. and is with difficulty recovered when it has once passed from memory. and suggest each other much more readily. having penetrated into its true reason. all propositions proved in very simple and natural ways. and exposing ourselves to error. to disregard it than to fail of proving invincibly that which we advance. and that it becomes so thoroughly our oAvn that we are unable to forget it where as what we know only by demonstrations which are not founded on natural reasons. but which are not so convincing nor so free from all suspicion of deception. must be conceded. It is indubitable. and I confess that we must prefer. (This has since been accom ELEMENTS OF GEOMETRY. may say. and in which. and I believe that a work on the elements of geometry can be made in which all things should be treated in their natural order. that can be said with justice into a greater . is. escapes us easily.) .338 REPLY TO THE GEOMETERS. nevertheless. and that the true order must be neglected if we cannot follow it without losing much of the force of the But I demonstrations. recovering It it. the certainty of not being de ceived. because our mind furnishes us with no means of .

To demand To receive as axioms only things perfectly evident. 339 CHAPTER XL THE METHOD OF THE SCIENCES REDUCED TO EIGHT PRINCIPAL RULES. Two 1. XI. without defining them. To employ in definitions only terms perfectly well known. 4. ferred to the Second Part. ferred to the First Part of this Logic . The fifth and sixth to reasonings.CHAP. Of which and may be and may be re re The third and fourth relate to axioms. Not to leave any terms at all obscure or equivocal. to may conclude from what has been said. to the to the and may be referred and may be referred Third Part . or already explained. Tico Rules for Demonstrations. 2. so that all these rules may be reduced to eight : WE the two first relate to ideas.] RULES FOR THE METHOD OF THE SCIENCES. that in order have a method which should be still more perfect than that which is in use amongst the geometers. To prove all propositions which are at all obscure by employing in their proof only the definitions which have . And the two last Fourth Part. Rules for Axioms. Two 3. 5. we ought to add two or three to the rules which were given in the second chapter. relate to order. as evident that which requires only a slight attention to the recognition of its truth. Rules touching Definitions.

since this would often be too long but it is enough that we say of it all that we . I have added to these two rules because there are. Neither can we explain. all its every whole into all its parts. preceded. 8. as far as possible. [PART IT. every genus into species. intend to say before passing to its species. as far as possible. and explaining everything which belongs to the nature of order. But I believe that a science cannot be treated perfectly. by sub stituting mentally the definitions which restrict and explain their meaning. To treat of things. every thing which might be said of it. This occasions us to treat often of a species when cannot treat of everything which belongs to the genus we as : we treat of a circle in satisfied anything in detail of common geometry without the curved line w hich is its r saying genus. indeed. as far as possible. many occasions on which we cannot rigorously observe them. except great attention be paid to these two last rules.340 RULES FOR THE METHOD OF THE SCIENCES. . either because of the limits of the human mind. in their natural by commencing with the most general and simple. and every difficulty into all its cases. the genus before passing to its particular species. and that we should consent to dis pense with them only on necessity. or the axioms which have been granted. Two 7. which we are with simply defining. Always to avoid the equivocation of terms. or the propositions which have been already demonstrated. or of those which we are obliged to set to every science. or to secure some great advantage. in relation to a genus. Rules for Method. 6. as well as to the others. To divide.

it is right to speak of another kind of knowledge. 341 CHAPTER OF WHAT XII. although we This is called faith or ourselves know nothing about it. since God can neither deceive nor be deceived. since the senses or science. DIVINE. XII. WHETHER HUMAN OR ALL that we have to said hitherto relates to sciences purely human. whether by our senses or by our reason. WE KNOW THROUGH FAITH. This may be called. or divine and there are also two kinds of faith of men. But as this authority may be of two kinds of God. credence. themselves depend on the judgment of reason. Divine faith cannot be exposed to error. quod credimus auctoritate. there are things which we know only through human faith. who assure us that such a thing is. which we derive from authority. as we have indicated already. Human faith is of itself subject to error. and knowledges which are founded on the evidence of reason. But before finishing. Nevertheless. according to the expression of St Augustine Quod scimus debemus rationi.CHAP. for all the knowledge of an object derived from the object itself. reason. which is often not less certain or less evident in its manner. since every man is a liar according to the Scripture. The other way is. human. that. generally. For there are two general ways which lead us that a thing we have of is it to believe true : The first is. of which we are as certainly and indubitably assured as though we had received mathematical demonstrations of . and it is possible that he who assures us that a thing is true may be himself deceived.] WHAT WE KNOW THROUGH FAITH. the authority of persons worthy of credence. the knowledge which ourselves. to wit. from having known and sought out its truth. taking that term more generally than it is taken in the schools.

We may. and whether they were not fictitious personages. though we have never been there. that of those who believe too readily. mark certain limits passed in order to secure this human certainty. being truth itself. them so as what we know through the continued persons. In the same way. This is prin cipally true in relation to divine faith. like those of Amadis. according as it comes nearer to the one or to the other. naturally. and in many other places. he must have lost his senses who could doubt whether Caesar. that though we are obliged to bring our understanding into captivity to the obedience of Jesus Christ. cannot deceive in that which he reveals to us of his nature and his mysteries from which it appears. as St Augustine says. if we compare together the two general ways which lead us to believe a thing reason and faith it is certain that faith always supposes some reason. and be cause it is a reasonable action to bring ourselves thus into : And . Pompey. men have consider able difficulty. and the other. when these offend their prejudices. of those who foolishly oppose the whole force of their mind against the belief of the best attested things. if reason itself had not persuaded us that there are things which we do well to believe. [PART IV. we nevertheless do not do this blindly and unreasonably. and when it And this leads men to fall into two opposite the one. For. ever existed. as St Paul says. For example. because true reason teaches us that God. in conceiving that the antipodes exist nevertheless. we could never have been led to believe that which is above our reason. Cicero. many is : It is true that it is when human has not. which is the origin of all false religions. however. in his 122d letter. he would be a fool who did not believe in them. which must be and others beyond which it is certainly possessed.342 WHAT WE KNOW THROUGH : FAITH. leaving a mean between these two kinds of limits which approaches more to certainty or uncertainty. though we are unable as yet to comprehend them. Yirgil. on the slightest rumour . that it relation of morally impossible that they could have conspired together to maintain the same thing. if it had not been true. but with the knowledge of the cause. errors : faith often very difficult to mark precisely has reached this certainty. and know nothing of them save through human faith.

For example. : of God. because it would be a Avant of reason to imagine that our mind. when the heretics. that we do not observe the point where the evidence of our reason and senses must terminate. oppose to them these pretended impossi in this very bilities derived from reason. in order to destroy finite of faith. at the be Reason. is able to coni. themselves from reason. because reason itself shows us that we ought always to prefer that which is more certain to that which is less. bread which causes our eyes to perceive the roundness and the whiteness and thus faith is not contrary to the evidence of our senses. shows us that the same body cannot same time in different places.] WHETHER HUM AX OR DIVINE. if we consider things with minute atten shall find. either by is never reason. when it tells us that it is not the substance of bread any longer. indeed. although the substance is no longer : there. being finite. and because it is more for our reason to be deceived than for God to possible deceive us.CHAP. body of Jesus Christ by the mystery and that we only now see the images and appearances of bread which remain. Nevertheless. men the truths which we ought to to In the second place. separate . by pretending that act. our senses show us clearly. than that of which our reason persuades us. and because that is more certain which God says is true. tion. such as the miracles. they manifestly. and the mysteries the Eucharist. that what we evidently see. 34o when he has given us captivity to the authority of God. to what divine faith teaches us . or by the faithful report of the senses. in the Eucharist. nor two bodies in the same place but this ought to be understood of the natural condition of bodies. the Incarnation. which is in prehend the extent of the power and thus. and other extraor sufficient proofs which oblige us to believe that it is himself events dinary who has discovered to believe. XII. it is certain that divine faith ought have more weight with us than our own reason. but our the roundness and the whiteness [of the wai er] senses do not inform us whether it is the substance of . but that what we opposed leads us to imagine this is. having been changed to the of transubstantiation. as the Trinity.

. certa. and which may at least help us to avoid the faults into which many fall. which alone is regarded by logic blame. they are able to comprehend. since : whether we consider them as past. quia magna. than in the judgments which we form about every. I do not speak of the judgment which we form as to whether an action is good or bad. to extent of the power of God. said. perhaps. but there is scarcely any occasion on which we more frequently employ it. sed contra naturce cursum say. sed insolita sunt. in reply to all these objections. : notissimum sunt. and on which it is more necessary. and of that power of the soul which enables us to discriminate truth from false hood. what St Augustine on the same subject. but simply that which we make touching the truth or false hood of human events. et eo magis vera. to which so few are obliged to devote themselves . SOME RULES FOR THE RIGHT DIRECTION OF REASON IN THE BELIEF OF THINGS WHICH DEPEND ON HUMAN TESTIMONY. THE most common use of good sense. quia divina. as when we dread or desire that they will happen. may not be without their use. however. CHAPTEE XIII. soning. as when we seek to know whether we ought to believe them or not or whether we consider them as future.Jirma. Some reflections may be made on this subject. from not having sufficiently regarded the rules of rea .day affairs. which regulates our hopes and fears.344 BULES FOR BELIEF OF THINGS [PART IV. worthy of praise or of it belongs to morality to regulate this. is not in the speculative sciences. by their mind. quia mira. of the penetration of bodies Sed nova sunt. which. the infinite It is sufficient.

although I believe both possible.] DEPENDING ON HUMAN TESTIMONY. the very same reason. since everything is necessary. nothing is true which is not true universally and thus we may conclude that a thing is false. on the it cannot at all contribute to our In the first kind of truths. and disbelieving the other. But if \ve think of following the same rules in the belief of human events. apart from their order immutable in the providence of God. if it is false in a single . and inquire about the past. that a wide made between two kinds of truths must be and especially to human accidents events. difference 345 one. case. which : The first reflection is. but which cannot be otherwise. he would be no less unreasonable who should endeavour to make us believe anything as. happened . of two events. For these events being contingent in their nature. independently of their existence . we shall always. although we do not judge it to be impossible for the contrary to have so that. since. and make a thousand false reasonings about them. and. being unknown. when we inquire about the future. that this could not determine us to believe one rather than the other. this does not prevent contingency. judge ialsely. believing the one. therefore. that the simple possibility and of an event is no sufficient reason for our belief of it. hand. on the one other. which may or may not be. the others. that we may also have reason to believe it. I may have ground for . that the king of China was converted to the Christian in that And for this reason alone. belief of things. except we were to prove to him that it was absolutely necessary that the thing should have happened : way. it would be ridiculous to seek in them necessary truth thus a man would be altogether unreasonable who should believe nothing. All this is to be understood in relation to their proximate causes. XIII. except by accident. that it was not impossible religion for another who should assert the contrary might employ . be laid down as a certain and indu bitable maxim on this subject. when we relate to things existing. for instance. and their unchangeable essence. and it is clear. It must. therefore.CHAP. which relates simply to the nature of things.

Bishop Spondanus. indeed. and external. shall determine me to believe the one rather than the other. to consider what are the circumstances of the one or the other. we very on the contrary. Father Petavius. especially in the conduct of life. greater certainty. confine ourselves to its simple impossibility. although it may not be an utter impossibility. our mind is led. it. when there is no appearance of its being true. lied in order to . and in itself. Baronius believes it to be true Cardinal Perron. those which belong to the fact itself. if all the circumstances are such. It is asked. which is. if I judge both possible ? It will be according to the following maxim In order for me to judge of the truth of an event. But what. those which belong to the persons by whose testimony we are led to believe it. we have no . and that the fathers who followed were deceived by his testimony. whether the history of the baptism of Constantine by St Sylvester is true or false. I call internal circumstances internal as well as external. believe it to be false. these circumstances are such as often find in connection wilh falsehood. that it never or rarely happens that the like cir cumstances are the concomitants of falsehood. Father Morinus. and which must often rest satisfied in many circumstances with the greatest pro And if. but if the rule be employed which we have established. which does not : demand bability. This being done. reason determines. that testifies to the contrary. but it is necessary to pay attention to all the circumstances which accompany it. and the most If we able portion of the church. or that we consider as false what has been told us. it is not necessary to consider it abstractly. and it is right to do so. for it contains nothing absolutely impos and it is Eusebius. naturally. as we should con sider a proposition in geometry. who favour the Arians. and which of these have the most marks of truth. either that we remain in suspense. to believe that it is true . speaking absolutely. for example. we shall find that they are those of the last for. on the one hand.346 RULES FOR BELIEF OF THINGS [PART IV. and for me to believe it or not to believe it. tlien. right to reject sible . we cannot rely on the testimony of such a fabulous writer as the author of . possible.

St Dennis of Co rinth. Hence. it is not at all probable that a man so able as Eusebius would have ventured to utter a falsehood in relating a thing so celebrated as the baptism of the first we have . XIII. reconcile histories otherwise very true. but it is enough on other occa possible thing. nevertheless. and in those of the Chronicles. reconcile what is related in the books of the Kings. Caius. in fact. except by conjectures which it is impossible to prove positively. which we cannot reconcile with others which are not less so. cannot.] DEPENDING ON HUMAN TESTIMONY. for example. otherwise we might doubt a thousand wellestablished histories. it must be confessed that we have no that it is a very positive proof of this. is to be contented when a with possibility and probability. which we ought tested. since this was only four or five years after the death of that emperor. and which would have been known to all the world when he wrote. They cannot deny that this truth is attested by all ecclesiastical authors. St Irenaius. and even the most ancient as Papias. Tertullian without being able to . of the of Judah arid years of the reigns of the different kings two com Israel. There This is. emperor who had given liberty to the church. prove that St Peter was never at Rome. it is not in the just to require that all its circumstances be proved same Avay. and We the other after the death. in this last age. 347 the acts of St Sylvester. except by giving to some of these kings mencements of their reign the one during the life. to justify us in supposing it as a circumstance .CHAP. of their fathers and if it is asked what proof AVC have that such a king reigned some time with his father. who is the only ancient authority for the baptism of Constantino at Rome and. there is nothing more absurd than the efforts which have been made by some to heretics. is. which is otherwise sufficiently at opposed by the disagreements and apparently conflicting statements of other histories . for in this case it is sufficient that the explanations which we give of these contrarieties be possible and probable . on the other. because the fact itself being sufficiently proved. an exception to this rule. and we should act against reason were we to demand positive proofs of it. and that it often happened to sions.

very important for the right direction of reason in the belief of and it must be observed that. and themselves that it is enough for them to they persuade know that everything is possible with God. They reply that this is utterly without proof.348 find less. neverthe that they can destroy it by conjectures as. because they think they we would be obliged to question all if they question any. Others. for ex ample. to believe everything which is told them as the effects of his omni potence. who make it a point of conscience to question no miracle. and it is for those who maintain it to resolve these pretended contrarieties as we do those of Scripture itself. in relation particular facts . for example. APPLICATION OF THE PRECEDING RULE TO THE BELIEF OF MIRACLES. are in danger of falling into the dangerous extremes of credulity and scepticism. on the contrary. and they imagine. it is for those who dispute it to show that it is contrary to the Scripture. any who have denied it . because it is not maintained that he was so settled there but that he might often leave it to go and preach the gospel in other places. CHAPTER XIV. except that some are . without having any other reason for doing so. without doubt. BELIEF OF MIRACLES. to these. in which we have shown that the possibility suffices. foolishly imagine that strength of mind is displayed in doubting of all miracles. that St Paul has not mentioned St Peter in his may reply to them that epistles written from Rome. This is irrelevant. [PART IV. There are some. We St Peter might have been then away from Rome. because the fact which they dispute being one of the most assured truths of ecclesiastical history. THE rule which has been explained is.

and we may be very well disposed to believe what is above reason.&quot. says one of them.CHAP. and. This discourse is ingenious. Though they were strangled in their birth. and that they have no more reason to believe the one than the other. we regard them with the carriage. without scruple. I have seen the birth of many miracles in my time. this fabric of falsehood such a way. when they came to spread their story. that the reasoning of both is equally bad. and error are alike in countenances. wander as far as we may. without being obliged to believe all that men choose to relate to us as being above reason. Both parties fall back on common places. and on the blindness of the libertines. where the difficulty of persuasion lay. it is much farther from nothing to the smallest thing in the world than from Now the first who were deluded at the it to the greatest. but very feeble when adduced to persuade us of any miracle in particular. &quot. But it would be extravagant to conclude generally from it strain us . The last rest on common places of another kind. and demeanour same eye. and up Thus particular error first produces public in its course afterwards. public error produces particular error. and the last informed is more thoroughly convinced than the first. 349 which are not found true. of the extravagance. by the opposition which they met with. style. that the most distant witness understands the matter better than he who is near. we may yet foresee the train which they would have had if they had lived to manhood for it is only to find the end of the thread. Truth. . and supplied. since God does not do all that he is able to do it is no argument that a miracle happened from what had happened like it on other occa sions. what was wanting to produce commencement conviction. discovered. &quot. All this is very good in itself. .&quot. built in And thus. nevertheless. also. XIV. on certain miracles Avhich they bring to prove those which are doubtful. error is . The disposition of the former is much better than that of the latter but it is true.] often reported BELIEF OF MIRACLES. who will believe nothing but what is proportionate to their reason. The first rest on the power and goodness of God. and may be useful to re from being carried away with all kinds of rumours. .

as false. see. besides many others which he had not described. . and. to have bi-en certainly known. or rejecting all. although very remarkable and astonishing. everything which passes beyond the narrow limits of the mind. St Augustine says that there were in his time many miracles most certain. which he testifies. because they will not take the trouble to inform themselves of them. time at Faremoutier. at least. and the most things. as well founded ? For as there are some miracles which may be found to have little truth. whether in accepting all miracles. that there is nothing less reasonable than to guide ourselves by common places in We to these occurrences. nevertheless. and which. which were known to few people. who recovered her sight in a moment by touching the relics of St Fara. This led him to describe and relate before the people those which he had found true and he remarks in the Twenty-second Book of the City of God. in the single city of Hippo. but that it is necessary to examine relation . it must he confessed that we have no good ground to be assured of what we know only in this way. [PART IV. We have often curiosity about trifles and none about important False histories flourish everywhere. Our mind is not subject to one kind of malady alone. clearly. it relates rather to what we know For only through vulgar rumours.350 that it BELIEF OF MIRACLES. without inquiring into their ori . if we remount to their source. Few people know the miracle which happened in our . it is exposed to different and conflicting kinds there is a foolish simplicity which believes tilings the least credible but there is also a foolish presumption which condemns. or which find little credit in their mind. we ought plain is that to suspect all that is said of miracles. near seventy. as I know from the person who saw her both before and after. that there happened. . within two years after the building of a chapel in honour of St Stephen. But who does not see that we may make also a common place opposed to this which would be. therefore. faithful have no circulation. in the person of a nun so blind that the form of her eye scarcely remained. there gin are also others which are destroyed in the memory of men. did not pass from one end of the city to the other.

Of an infant. fessed of the latter. Stephen. Of a woman cured in Africa by flowers which had touched the relics of St Stephen.CHAP. quando illuminatm qitia et est ctvci/s. and the and knowledge of the witnesses who relate them. and in the City of God. saint relates this as a thing of which he was quite assured. since these authors are full of so many fables that we have no ground to be assured of anything on their testimony alone. in the presence of all the people. Thou knowest that I only ask his life.] BELIEF OF MIRACLES. or in [Simeon] Metaphrastes. et notitiam polait pervenire . &quot. est civifas. as Cardinal Bellarmin lias readily con But I maintain that every man of good sense. concnrrente ad corpora martyrum Gervasii et Protasii. by touching the relics of St Gervais and St Protais. chap. ad m/dtorum grandis testc. which had been made on it by one newly baptised. of a blind person cured at Milan. Piety does not oblige a man of good sense to believe all the miracles related in the Golden Legend. XIV. as true. saying to him with a strong faith. ought to receive. 8. cnluin fjuod j\Iediolard facttnn est cum illic essemtts. and of which he says. in the MiraTwenty-second Book of the City of God. being restored to life by the prayers which his mother had presented to St Holy martyr. in a sermon which he preached to his people on the sub which had hap ject of another very remarkable miracle in the church at the very time in which he was pened preaching. according to the revelation which she had had. as lie testifies in the same place. though he has no piety. which he describes at length in that part of the City of God. That order that lie may not be for ever separated from God. Of a lady of quality cured of a cancer (which had been pronounced incurable) by the sign of the cross. or of which he testifies himself to have had most minute information from the persons themselves to whom these things had hap pened as. in restore to me my son. for example. 351 faithfulness their particular circumstances. ibi ei-al tune iinperatort el immenso popalo res gcsta est.&quot. the miracles which St Augustine relates in his Confessions. as having happened before his eyes. . who had died without baptism.

because I wished rather to leave them. having placed the brother and the sister on the step of the rood loft. who still had that fearful trembling. the cause of their mis fortune had been learnt from them . there arose in the church a great shout from the people. tell him what had happened. [PABT IV. a great cry of joy arose from the side of the chapel. the malady from which the brother had been delivered by the goodness of God. and let them go. praying to God before the gates of the chapel of St Stephen. fell all at once into a stupor. of an honourable family of Cesarea in Cappadocia. perfectly well. all his history . led away with me the brother who had been cured . had been perfectly cured in the same way as her brother. I said little to them on the festival and on this great subject of rejoicing. God punished them with a disease through which they were continually. He says that seven brothers and three sisters.&quot. who (having gone from me into an aisle). which was so deformed. called Palladia. having been cursed by their mother for an injury which they had done her. Thus. and.the cries of rejoicing were over. the day before Easter. and all at once. I compelled him to and on the morrow I promised the people that I would cause him to relate it the day after. while I was still speaking. they had directions. that. agitated by fearful trembling all over the body. when he awoke. that. all left their own country to go in different and that thus one of the brothers. in order that the people might see in the sister. and the holy scripture had been read. and the sister was brought to me.352 BELIEF OF MIRACLES. during which it was observed that he trembled no longer.After. I made him read the story of their I then began history before the people. . and who ran to St Augustine (who was preparing to say mass). and one of the sisters.&quot. and being. says he. had come to Hippo. but to contem I then plate the eloquence of God in that divine work. which caused such joy amongst the people that it was scarcely possible to bear the shout which they made. not to hear. being noticed by all the city. not being able to endure the sight of those who knew them. I made him recount write it . called Paul. who praised God for that miracle. the third day after Easter. &quot. to preach on this subject (the sermon which is the 323d). to &quot. the brother. even in sleep.

regarding St Augus a very intelligent and sincere man. and tending to the ruin of all religion for it is plain that we take away from him one of his most solid foundations when we take away from true miracles the authority which they ought to have in . under the pretext of converting men more easily to the faith thereby. which would have brought disgrace on the Christian religion. such as was (by their own con fession) St Augustine.CHAP. Secondly. Now this is truly what the heretics . the reverence which the catholics render to saints and to their relics. Firstly. and re- . in order to convince the most incredulous that they would be guilty of folly in questioning its truth. all reasonable persons must acknowledge the finger of God in them . For. XIV. in which he would have been convicted of falsehood by a multitude of witnesses. have assured us that God has cured incurable diseases. because it is not probable that a wise man would have attempted to lie about things so public. 353 I wished to relate all the particulars of this miracle. supposing the things to have happened which he re lates. do. on the one hand. in treating. but that it is an awful crime to do so. and not being able to deny. have not con sidered the manner in which they speak of the invocation tine as of saints and the veneration of relics as a superstitious worship derived from idolatry. in order to give authority to the Christian religion in the minds of the pagans. Now this cannot be said with the slightest colour of truth. because there never was any one a greater enemy to falsehood than this saint. that the greatest friends of God. having established through whole books. opened the eyes of the blind. the confirmation of the truth and it is clear that the authority of these miracles is utterly destroyed when we say that God works them in return for superstitious and idolatrous worship. as a criminal superstition . as well as that of the many others which this saint relates in the same place. Hence. on the other. especially in matters of religion. and thus all that would be left to the in credulous would be to question the testimony of St Augus tine himself by imagining that he altered the truth. not only that it is never permissible to lie. it must produce excessive astonishment to see that the heretics of the pi esent time.] BELIEF OF MIRACLES.

to make a common place which is often wholly composed of maxims which. CHAPTER EVENTS. and that. because they . this consideration alone ought to lead every man of good sense to acknowledge the falsity of the pretended reformed religion. life. ANOTHER REMARK ON THE SUBJECT OF THE BELIEF OF THERE on the another very important remark to be made It is. in order to to them. must be reckoned certain in connection Avith other circumstances. who have invoked as a reward for the devotion of those the saints and reverenced their relics. XV. that amongst the circum stances which we must consider. contrary. of the judgment which we ought to make on the truth of facts. It is necessary to unite these circum stances. are often not even probable. on the appear to us true in connection which is commonly a mark of false in connection with others. decide on them. in order that the rule may be employed in similar occurrences. and not to separate them. because we fall into the same error in relation Each one thinks that it is enough. there are some which may be called common circumstances. ought to be judged which destroy this. I have enlarged somewhat on this celebrated example. which is commonly a mark of false hood. so far from being uni versally true. since it often happens that a fact which is scarcely probable in connection with a single circumstance. when they are joined with the particular circumstances of the facts which \ve examine. a fact which may with a given circumstance truth. [PART IV. whether we ought to believe them or not. in order to determine is still belief of events. Indeed.354 stored the dead to BELIEF OP EVENTS. as we shall explain in the following chapter.

on the contrary. which weaken or destroy in our are such as in the greater . so. that is to say. the motives of belief derived from these common circumstances. when we are not able to obtain complete moral certainty. if not certainly true. That if the thousand which may probity of the notaries who have signed it is perfectly well . no other particulars about a contract. not that it may not have been ante-dated. minds the motives of belief derived from these common circumstances. but cither our mind remains in suspense if the particular circumstances only lessen the weight of the common circumstances. these common circumstances are found connected with other particular circumstances. the same reason to believe that event. since it would be an outrage on reason to do otherwise. but their fortune and their livelihood. so that it is incomparably more probable that the contract which we suspect. as we ought to be contented with moral certainty in things which are not susceptible of metaphysical certainty.CHAP. if these are not counterbalanced by other parti cular circumstances. . we have reason to believe that these events are. if they are such as are commonly the marks of falsehood. if AVC know stake. is one of the nine hundred and one among the ninety-nine. than that it is the solitary be found ante-dated. or we are led to believe that the fact is false. is to because they are themselves such that the like are very we have then no longer rarely accompanied with falsehood. but because it is certain.] BELIEF OF EVENTS. Avhich destroy in our mind. either some side. which is sufficient when we are obliged to judge of them for. that of a thousand contracts there are nine hundred and ninety-nine which are not so . to believe that it is not ante-dated. 355 number of facts are found far more often connected with truth than with falsehood and then. the best thing we can do. at This consideration alone is sufficient. at least very probably so. The following example may explain this remark. XV. as we have said. by two public persons have generally great interest in not being guilty of false and hood. And if. also. when we are obliged to take embrace the most probable. a common circumstance for most deeds to be signed who by two notaries. inasmuch as they have not only their conscience It is their honour.

either by witnesses. or to confess that I had been wrong in sup posing that others in which I had not seen the same marks of falsity were not so. never theless. [PART IV. the sig nature of the two notaries would have had on my mind to induce me to believe that it is not so. then. other particular circumstances are added. to that presumption. without this. a very able show his conjectures not having appeared strong away from enough to take St Cyprian the piece which has always borne . and it would then be most unreasonable to at tempt to compel me either to believe that the contract was not ante-dated. I should then be determined to believe that there was falsity in the contract. most certainly. as that these notaries were notorious for being without honour and conscience. and that the reasons must be considerable which should induce us to believe the contrary. We may apply all this to subjects to disputes among the doctors. It is plain that the presumption who man of our time. will. which we have always read of. notwithstanding council are true or suppositious. diminish the weight which. I may conclude. which is a sufficient reason. and of the truth of the acts of a council. having endeavoured that the letter of St Cyprian to Pope Stephen on the subject of Martin. I am able to discover other positive proofs of this ante-dating.356 BELIEF OP EVENTS. But if to this common circumstance of being signed by two notaries. And if. was not written by that holy martyr. beyond . or very strong arguments. when it is not opposed by others. bishop of Aries. though it may not lead me to conclude that the contract is ante-dated. or whether the acts of a is in favour of an author has for a long time held possession of a work. known to me. and that they might have had considerable interest in that falsification this. this. from the fact of his not having a hundred when he engaged to do so. that they have not committed a forgery. Hence. such as would be the inability of a man to lend twenty thousand crowns. for trusting in the date of the contract. has not been able to convince the learned. since they might have been like that one. A question which often give rise arises as to whether a book has been really written by the author whose name it has always borne.

that we have the very letters which were cited by Eusebius. as they have even been printed by Isaac Vossius and Usserius from an ancient Greek manuscript in the library of Florence. have not prevented any from believing now. bishop of Jerusalem. these letters of St Ignatius which we now have. that Blondel and Saumaisius.] his BELIEF OF EVENTS. again. attri buted to St Ambrose. other occasions on which the particular reasons avail against that general reason of long possession. have a certain character of holiness and simplicity so in harmony . not being able to reply to the argument derived from the letters of St Ignatius for the superiority of the bishop over the priests from the commencement of the church. XV. also. since. nevertheless. that these true letters should have disappeared. But there are. it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that it is suppositions. all the difficulties which Cardinal Perron has proposed against the letter of the council of Africa. that they vindicate themselves against hood. were quoted under his name by a ten . or Eusebius besides which. as that letter supposes. though the Commentaries on St Paul. all these vain accusations of fabrication and false Again. although the letter of St Clement to St James. It is in vain. with those apostolic times. by Theodoret and Origen. and false ones have supplied their places in the time which elapsed be tween St Polycarp and Origen. that it was truly written by that council. was translated by Ruffinus. nearly thirteen centuries ago. So. as formerly. more than twelve centuries ago. there is no likelihood of the letters of St Ignatius having been received by St Polycarp. it is impossible that St Clement could have written to him after the death of St Peter. touch ing the appellations of the holy see. which perfectly resembles his other works. since that holy bishop of Jerusalem having suffered martyrdom before St Peter. in 357 style name. and was alleged to have been writ by St Clement by a council of France. have endeavoured to maintain that all these letters are suppositions. and they have been refuted by those even of their own party. by St Jerome. Thus.CHAP. avowing as they do.

which is one of the most considerable sources of the errors of men. which.358 JUDGING OF FUTURE EVENTS. of the two or three of Rome. CHAPTER XVI. nevertheless. It is thus that doctors may judge of the good or . vast number of authors. the acts which we have of the council of Sintheless. we ought also to be . as we ought to believe that an event has probably happened when the circumstances are certain. involved in many errors. that they were not by these saints. never . . which we know are commonly connected with that event. of these councils . while embodying some general truth. false on many particular occasions. under Marcellinus. and of another at Rome. at most. is convinced now nessa. THE rules which are employed in judging of past events may easily be applied to those which are future for. but by other ancient authors. [PART IT. and to accustom the mind not to allow itself to be carried away by common places. Finally. that does not agree with those times. OF THE JUDGMENT WHICH WE SHOULD MAKE TOUCHING FUTURE EVENTS. under St Sylvester. All that they can do. is to enable us to avoid the more obvious errors. under Sextus the Thii d. and the imperfect work on St Matthew under that of St Chrysostom every one. that the probability of their being false and suppositions is great. it probably will happen when the present cir cumstances are such as are commonly followed by such an lieve that effect. Such are some of the remarks which may be made in relation to these kinds of judgments but it must not be imagined that they will avail to preserve us always from being deceived. would be sufficient to convince us of the reality if they contained nothing but what was probable and in harmony with the time at which they were said to have been held but they contain so much that is unreasonable. are.

thirty thousand times more probable that each individual will lose them. if the hazard is a small amount. it will be. the majority of people fall into an illusion which is the more de ceptive in proportion as it appears to them more reason able it is. in the world. that they regard only the greatness of the re sult of the advantage which they hope for. that she acted reasonably in this. however little if it is some great good. probability which there is of that advantageous or disad vantageous event befalling. would never afterwards enter into a house without having it previously examined and she was so persuaded . probably. But in relation to events in which we are engaged. which induces many persons to take such troublesome and unnecessary pre cautions for the preservation of their health.] JUDGING OF FUTURE EVENTS. that if there be. XVI. 359 of a bad termination of diseases captains of the distant events war and that we j udge. Is it not a most advantageous thing. without considering at all the . and as the gain of a hundred thousand crowns. they think they act wisely in seeking to obtain it. having heard that some persons had been crushed by the fall of a ceiling. having been sometimes deceived. even in the smallest things. reflects. they think it the part of prudence to neglect no precaution for preserving these . to gain twenty thou sand crowns for a single crown ? Each believes that he is the happy one to whom the prize will fall and no one is . and which we may bring about or prevent to some extent by our diligence in seeking or avoiding them. was by a reasoning of this kind that a princess. The defect of this reasoning is. because. as the loss of their livelihood or their fortune. or the disad vantage which they fear.CHAP. for example. when they apprehend any great evil. that she considered who acted otherwise imprudent. It is this which renders others distrustful to excess. than that he will gain them. twenty thousand crowns. It this which attracts so many to lotteries. they imagine that they will be so in all other things. all It is this reason also. perhaps. that in order to judge of . Thus. likelihood there It may be of success. say they. of the greater part of contingent affairs.

one to lose. what we ought avoid an evil.360 JUDGING OF FUTURE EVENTS. to it [PART IV. that if each may gain nine crowns. players. There is sometimes so little appearance of success in a bability of gain thing. should compose all at . and those which are beyond this proportion are manifestly unjust and hence we may see that there is a manifest injustice in those kinds of games which are called lotteries. do in order to obtain a good and to is necessary to consider. himself nine crowns to hope for. in the same way as if a man that is to say. and : the others lose thus each of the players has only the chance of losing a crown. it is also so to each in particular. that. and however small the stake for obtaining it. Thus it would be folly to play twenty sous against twenty livres. it might appear that all have the advantage of it but it is necessary to consider. the whole body of the players is duped. or against a kingdom. If we consider only the gain and loss in themselves. taken together. . that he will lose Thus each has for his crown. it is well not to hazard it. and only one of gaining the nine. ten pistoles is as much probability of gain as of loss Now. because the master of the lottery. since it happens hence that the probability of loss is greater than the pro there that the advantage which we hope for does not surpass the disadvantage to which we are exposed. and not gain the nine. if this is disadvantageous to all the against nine. which may be illustrated by the following example There are certain games in which ten persons lay down a crown each. further. as far as games can be. which puts the matter on a perfect equality. on the condition that we could gain the stake only if an infant arranging at hazard the letters from a printing-office. one in which should play in an equal game. All games of this kind are equitable. all : . and where one only gains the whole. but also the probability of its hap pening and not happening. and there is only the hazard of losing one. not only the good and evil in itself. it is also nine times more probable. nine degrees of probability of losing a crown. taking generally a tenth part of the whole as his perquisite. however advantageous it may be. and of gaining nine by it. which is that of losing what we laid down. and to regard geometrically the proportion which all these things have. in relation to each.

also. : : : the danger nor the advantage. It is of the nature of finite things.gt. as scarcely any kind of death more rare than death thunder. not . that it less exceeds the bability. than a danger so remote as that of the accidents which they fear can be but it is necessary. however great they may be. but the proportion between them. without thinking of it. but one killed in this way and we may say. if they stop here. yet. and they are so. it is bad there is ad vantage in this . more than the great exceed them in magnitude. or if that great good is so difficult to secure. it is easy to show that this is un For of two thousand persons there is at most reasonable. therefore. therefore. only to is its magnitude. it is good since it is neither .OH. Hence it is not only necessary to undeceive those persons who take extreme and vexatious precautions for the pre servation of their life and health. there is no moment of our life in which we do not hazard more than a prince would do. but also to its probability. to disabuse all who.l once the first twenty lines of Virgil s ^Eneid. that fear does not there from occa at all help us to avoid it. of which we are to judge. . there is scarcely any violent death which is less common. for example. by showing them that these precautions are a much greater evil. Thus . therefore. If. There are. to be exceeded by the smallest.VP. if the small is often repeated. reason in the following way danger in that business . excessive apprehension. happily we cannot think too much of it but if it is simply the danger of being killed by the thunder which causes this . o(&amp. who ^hould risk his kingdom by playing on that condition. XVI. there is scarcely anything which ought to sion less fear. These reflections may appear trifling. especially. many who have an excessive terror when they hear thunder. If the ihunder leads us to think of Grod and of death. if often multi or if these smallest things exceed the great in pro plied . but we may turn them to very indeed. the fear of an evil ought to be proportionate. seeing. important account and the principal use which should be derived from them is that of making us more reasonable in our hopes and fears.] JUDGING OF FUTURE EVENTS. the very smallest gain may exceed the greatest which can be imagined. in their There is undertakings. indeed.

and make a bad use of logic. and of life. and who do not come to it. serious than all temporal evils. with which to lead all reasonable persons to come to we will finish this Logic that : the greatest of employ our time and our life in anything else but that which will enable us to acquire one which will never end. and why the slightest peril of being lost is . as well as the difficulty of acquiring these blessings. are wise and prudent. It belongs to infinite things alone. . since all the blessings and evils all follies is to of this life and since the danger of are nothing in comparison with those of another . small in magnitude than the small exceeds it in facility of attainment . though they reason ill in all the matters of science . of those reason.MURRAT AND (3IBB. is very great. as eternity tion. however accurate they may be in everything beside. that the smallest evil may be more fear. considerable than the greatest which is not infinite. that . if it exceed it in this proportion. falling into these evils. . PRINTERS. THE END. and who follow it out in the conduct of their life. This is why the smallest degree of facility for the attainment of salva tion is of higher value than all the blessings of the world put together more evils. Those who come to this conclusion. and salva they cannot be equalled by any temporal ad vantage and thus we ought never to place them in the balance with any of the things of the world. EDINBURGH.362 JUDGING OF FUTURE EVENTS. considered simply as is This enough this conclusion. and the same is true of the evils which we that is to say. are treated of in the Scripture as foolish and infatuated.

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