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Wj

Wk

Xi

Xj

Xk

Model 1:k

Model 2:j

Model 3:i

-.01 ckj -0.5 ckj -0.98 ckj -0.3 ckj -0.09 ckj

-.6285 .i.j .93384 .i.j -1.0111 .i.j -.8218 .i.j -.93935 .i.j

1.

As a whole, the models tend to trend toward a strategy. Though model 1 is a decision theory primarily geared at which side to cooperate with, once k has joined a side, however, it will have to begin in a coercive strategy against his new adversary. There is the chance that k could choose to do nothing, but this would require that both i and j be

of exactly equal value to k, but this is unlikely to occur in the real world. Model 2 is designed to deliver a coercive strategy, the only question being on where to apply resources; however, even this model can deliver an alternative of doing nothing. If two strategies yield the same payoff, then it would be impossible, based solely on the model, for a rational actor to choose, hence the decision maker must do nothing. Similarly to model 1 however, this is also not as likely as finding a definite strategy. Model 3 is the most balanced out of the models. The chance of predicting a coercive or non-coercive strategy depends on is weight and how many third parties are involved.

third party. Model ones sole purpose it to determine which side a third party (k) would join in an existing conflict. This is the extent of the models purpose. The function of model 3, however, is to plot the possible outcomes if i attacks j. In this situation k may or may not join the conflict. In order to make a decision, i must factor in the possible actions of k and their impact on the outcome. The model allows for this with the value pk, which represents, being the average of the utility it places on i and j, the amount of value k places into the conflict as a whole.

3. In model 1 the term pk represents the power that the third party (k)

brings to the conflict. In model 3 pk equals the likelihood that k will join in if Ii enters into conflict with j. In model 1, the power that k holds in the system might greatly influence the commitment that it take to aiding whichever ally it chooses. There is no need to determine whether k will join; that is a forgone conclusion, only the side it will choose. In model 3, pk represent the likelihood that k will even enter the conflict. The side it chooses is assumed to be the actor with the bliss point closest to its own. Ks individual power does not require a symbol, as it is only being factored in as to how it will change the outcome once it joins a side. The power it brings to the equation is important, but it is always being added to the power of another actor so there is no need to represent it separately.

actor. Model 1 represents ks decision, model 2 js decision, and model 3 the decision of i. When determining why there are three different models, one must first examine what each model is for, and what the situation requires of the actor. Model 1 is for determining which side a third party should join in an ongoing conflict. The two parties in the conflict (i and j) do not need to choose sides, they are already on their own side. A third party (k), however, does not know which side, if any it should join. K is making the decision in this case, hence it would be inappropriate to use it for i or j. Similarly, model 2 looks at the effect deception has on a defender (j). Assuming that this is not a prolonged engagement, the initiator (i) does not need to worry about where it should defend and neither does k, a third party. Only j is concerned with making the best choice in planning to defend against i. Model 3 is for determining whether the initiator (i) should attack given the possible interference of a third party (k). In the same manner that the other models would be inappropriate for determining what i would do, so is this model improper for calculating a decision for k or j.

5. Utility difference is used to measure how far one actors bliss point is

from anothers. In cases such as whether to attack another entity, as was the case in earlier reports, this is useful in determining how much you stand to gain from the conflict. In other words, how far, in the event that you win, will you get to move the bliss point of your target. This is the case for its use in model 3. After everything is factored in, is ith still worth it for I to attack j? The compliment of utility difference represents how close two actors are in terms of bliss point. This value is betst used in determining how much value one actor assigns to another. The closer to 1 the compliment is , the greater the value. This is why this is used for determining pk, the value that k places on the conflict and why it is used in model 1, which determines which side k will join.

if you were to add an exponent factor to represent time in model 1, it would not affect the outcome. In model 2 there is no obvious place to alter the formula in order to determine how it would affect the model. It is possible that it might influence the strategies that j might derive, but but that is impossible to know. Model 3 would be affected by time, in that the distance of i from j would affect is chances of victory, both

in a one on one fight as well as with k on its side. This is because is power can be diminished over time, also as seen in earlier reports.

party has a closer bliss point to k. The balance-of-power model states that k would try to balance out the stronger party (i) by allying with the weaker power (j). Model 1, on-the-other-hand, puts ks alliance with the actor whose bliss point is closest to its own, complete independent of the power either choice wields in the system. Model 3 violates the balance-of-power model in the same manner that model 1 does. Model 2 simply does not apply to the balance-of-power model.

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