Egypt Conference Seminar Report August2011

THE FUTURE
OF DEMOCRACY
IN EGYPT
POLITICAL PARTIES
AND THE ROLE OF

EXTERNAL ACTORS
Report from Conference and Seminar

Copenhagen 26-27 May 2011
The Future of Democracy in Egypt May 26-27 Conference and Seminar Report
Photos All photos have been taken by Thorkild Jensen. Disclaimer This presentation does not necessarily reflect the views of the Danish Institute for Parties and Democracy or the members of the Board of Directors. Production Published August 2011 by Danish Institute for Parties and Democracy Strandgade 56 1401 Copenhagen K Denmark Tel: +45 32 69 89 89 Email: dipd@dipd.dk Publication is available on: www.dipd.dk
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Contents
Foreword
The Egyptian Revolution and Democracy: from Tahrir Square to the Egyptian Parliament
By Fatema Khafagy, Ph.D
Domestic Developments with Regional Implications

By Gamal A. Gawad Soltan
The Role of Media in the Egyptian Revolution and the Future

By Fathy Abou Hatab
Introduction to group sessions

Fatemah Khafagy, Gamal Soltan, Fathy Hatab, Pepijn Gerrits, Sam van der Staak and Jakob Erle
Working Group A:
Who and what interests will, can or should the political parties ideally seek to represent?
Working Group B:
How can political parties and civil society establish a fruitful relationship in the future?
Working Group C:
Political parties and the Youth
Participants
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Foreword
This seminar report is being finalized in early August, a few days after the Friday 29 July manifestation on Tahrir Square, where the religiously based groups and parties showed their strength, and where the unity of purpose negotiated between secular and religious groups and parties seemed to fall apart. And a few days after police and military cleared Tahrir Square of the people still occupying the now historic site. Every week since the 25 January revolution has provided new dimensions and new challenges to the transition process Egypt is presently undergoing. When we met for the Future of Democracy in Egypt conference and seminar in May, we knew very well that it would be premature to predict exactly how events would unfold: how many political parties would end up running in the parliamentary elections, when exactly these elections would take place, who would be the major candidates in the presidential elections that will come after the parliamentary elections, how the military council would try to deliver on the expectations of citizens, just to mention a few of the major questions being discussed. Just like the revolution itself was not predicted by any of us, experiences over the past months since the seminar tell us that it will continue to be difficult to predict how events in Egypt will unfold. It was of course not the purpose of the seminar to try and predict anything. It was rather an opportunity for Danish members of political parties, civil society organisations, academic and other institutions to meet with a few selected experts from Egypt and representatives from a few of the international institutions DIPD is working with, to share ideas and experiences around the role of political parties in the process of developing a democratic culture in Egypt. I would like to thank our three Egyptian speakers Fatema Khafagy, Gamal Soltan and Fathy Hatab for accepting to prepare their presentations at the conference and seminar in article format for this report. Their perspectives on the background for the revolution and the future of democracy in Egypt are important. I would also like to thank the two representatives from the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD) and International IDEA for sharing their thinking and approach to working with political parties. As a newcomer DIPD will work closely with and learn from both NIMD and IDEA, as well as others of course. Finally I would like to thank the Danish Egyptian Dialogue Institute and its Director, Jakob Erle, for good cooperation and support in organizing the conference and seminar. The DEDI staff members Wafaa Ossama, Noha Nahass and Muhab Wahby did a great job as rapporteurs in the three working groups, as reflected in this report.
Bjrn Frde Director August 2011
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1 The Egyptian Revolution and Democracy: From Tahrir Square to the Egyptian Parliament
By Fatema Khafagy, Ph.D1
The 25th of January 2011 was a turning point not only in Egypts history or the Arab regions history alone but in the history of the whole world. When millions of Egyptians poured into the main public squares of Cairo, Alexandria, Suez and elsewhere in Egypt, the Egyptian squares and streets, they chanted the slogan that united the masses regardless of class, gender, age or creed: "Al-Sha'b yurid isquat al-nizam!" "The people want the downfall of the regime!".
Dr. Fatema Khafagy holds a Ph.D. in Development Planning from University of London. She is presently a consultant on womens rights in the Arab region to the European Commission and to the UN WOMEN. Formerly she was the Ombudsperson of Gender Equality in Egypt and UNICEF head of Gender and Development Program. She is a founding member of the Peoples Socialist Alliance (new political party in Egypt). Member of Peoples fact finding committee (formed after the revolution to investigate the cases of those injured during the revolution). Board member of the Alliance for Arab Women. Member of the Coalition of feminist organizations in Egypt. Member of the Think Tank for Arab Women. Ms Khafagy is also the author of several publications on Womens rights, civil society and gender based violence in the Arab region.
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Driven by the Egyptian people

The Egyptian people wanted to send a message to the whole world that they are on their feet once again. The revolution had two main reasons, economic featured in mass unemployment, rising prices, scarcity of essential commodities, large income disparities, nepotism and political reasons featured in cronyism, corruption, repression and torture. Millions of Egyptians wanted to end their frustrations with inequality, social injustice, high unemployment, nepotism and corruption Egyptians wanted to achieve what came in their slogan of the revolution Freedom, Dignity, Social Justice. The revolution succeeded in breaking down the notorious barrier of fear so that everything is now on the table and open for discussion and debate by all. The Egyptian revolution was a revolution from within, driven entirely by the Egyptian people, and because it was always a peaceful revolution, it was admired by everyone. The urgent question that faces us all: what to do now? Protesters anger is fed by years of crony-capitalism and corruption; by state thuggery against citizens who dared to think they should vote freely, by newspapers and state-owned television stations that shoot out nothing but government slogans. Egyptian people decided that accountability and freedom must be part of the equation for change in Egypt. It is not only about replacing Mubarak, but it is also and most importantly instituting real political, social, and economic change. How can we translate the symbol of the now famous Tahrir Square of Egypts pluralism, encompassing together young and old, men and women, professionals, artists, peasants and workers, Muslims and Christians, and all streaks of Egypts political spectrum. How can we protect our revolution from being hijacked, how can we translate the slogans everybody is using into a daily reality for all Egyptians. The Egyptians first test in democratic practice came only a month after Mubarak was removed, in a referendum on the constitutional amendments last March, this was the first truly free vote in the life of Egyptians. Around 14 million Egyptians, this is a little more than 40 percent of the 45 million eligible voters, voted. This is an unprecedented turnout in the country for several decades. Before the revolution, barely six million people voted in last Novembers parliamentary elections, which were also damaged by fraud. In this referendum, Egyptian citizens realized that their votes are valuable. Egyptians coming forward in unprecedented numbers to peacefully exercise their newly-won freedoms is cause for great optimism, and will provide a foundation for further progress as Egyptians continue to build their democratic future. The voters turnout was the largest in Egypts history. However, we have yet to experience a real free election process in all its enthusiasm in September when we still strongly need stability and security all over the country.
Building strong movements

The mass movement remains attentive in Egypt but is short of political instruments that reflect the general will. The first phase is over. The second, that of strengthening the movements and building strong fronts has begun.
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With everyone wanting to be part of the Egyptian transition to democracy and to be part of a real genuine change in Egypt and not being satisfied by a mere change of figures of the old regime, everyone sensed that coming together and unite in different forms and structures can be instrumental in shaping the aspired change in Egypt and is the only way to go forward. There has been over 200 different new groups, NGOs, coalitions, forums, peoples committees, alliances and political parties that have been formed in Egypt longing to be part of the democratic change. Youth who participated in the revolution formed over 30 different groups besides joining the other new structures and new political parties. Women of all ages have been active in creating coalitions of their feminist groups and NGOs besides also being present in all other structures and in the new political parties. Several workers and professionals Coalitions were also formed or being revived such as the independent workers syndicate, the Doctors without Rights movement, the Independent Teachers' Syndicate, University Staff for Reform, 9 March movement for Independence of Universities, Teachers without a Syndicate, the Democratic Engineers and the Coalition of Independent Cultural Institutions. The Youth Coalitions include among others the April 6 Youth movement, Justice and Freedom, Muslim Brotherhood Youth, El Baradei's campaign, the enlightened Egypt, the positive movement, The Democratic Front and the Khaled Said Facebook group administrators and recently a youth party.
Unprecedented desire to form political parties

But, we are facing many challenges at present ranging from those facing the upcoming parliamentary elections, the formation of new political parties, to the lacking of security and stability, the sectarian violence and the harsh economic situation. The newly formed parties face several challenges of having to collect quickly five thousand members to be able to register, having to have the necessary funds to be able to publicize all its members in two main newspapers, something that would cost around one million pounds. This besides the many activities they are undertaking in the different parts of Egypt to publicize about each party, its ideology, its program and to try to convince Egyptians to subscribe as party members. In parallel, the political groups that have been forced underground by the old regime have now resurfaced. The Moslem Brotherhood are now holding for the first time their meetings in public. They started their own non-religious political party open to women and Christians. On the extreme spectrum, the Egyptian Communist party, after 90 years of ban, announced few weeks back resuming public activities during the Labour Day rally in Tahrir Square. In addition, youth of the revolution who wish to start a fresh political life in Egypt have started hastily to struggle to learn real politics as they go. This might mean a longer process to achieve tangible political reform, and might also mean that they may hold their decision to join a specific party until some have passed the hard test and proved worthy through actions, not just glossy words Many youth and many women have joined the four types of parties; the liberal parties, the nationalist parties, the left parties and the religious parties. The January 25 Revolution has led many political activists and interested parties in Egypt to believe that greater political participation is required and will be possible. Upon that perspec-
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tive, an unprecedented desire to form political parties has been growing. Many are in the process of being formed or registered, with a few already declared. Several similar parties are coming to form coalitions of their own in order to be able to run the upcoming parliamentary elections together so that they can guarantee seats for themselves in the new parliament.
Charter by Egyptian women

The second challenge is the lack of security and stability at present and having to run the upcoming parliamentary elections under such unsafe conditions. This has led some of the newly formed political parties to ask for the postponement of the elections. Others are calling for putting a new constitution before the parliamentary elections. However the more powerful ones in terms of number of members do not want to postpone the election. But everyone is calling upon the Military Council and the cabinet to make sure that stability and security is the most urgent national issue to address at present. Under instability and lack of security, the sense of national identity that prevailed at the moment of revolution when hundreds of thousands of people of all faiths celebrated in Tahrir Square with chants of Moslem, Christian, we all are one hand has been threatened and has given way to several incidences of religious violence manifested in attacking and burning of some churches. Christian minority for the first time are articulate and forceful in putting their demands for full citizenship rights and many political forces are supporting them and calling for a civil non-religious state. One of the important challenges also facing our revolution is the position of women especially after many of them have participated actively during and after the revolution. Until now, both the Military Council and the cabinet are not recognizing the role of Egyptian women in the different spheres of life in their official discourse. They have ignored women in the new appointments of ministers, governors, members in the first committee of amending the Egyptian constitution and in the previous national dialogue. There are at present also several attacks from the ultraconservative religious groups calling for withdrawal of the laws that guaranteed some human rights to both women and children. This legislative reform they want to take away from women was the result of the continuous struggle of women activists and womens NGOs in the past few decades. Women feminist NGOs are fighting for their rights at present and having to face so many challenges with several groups who are opposing gender equality or shying away from addressing it under the claim that these are not priority issues now. But Egyptian women have put together their own charter to confirm that the revolution happened because of both men and women and that they will continue as full partners in building democratic Egypt. They are demanding their representation in the cabinet, in all decision making positions, in the parliament and in all debate forums. A representation based on equal opportunities. They want to participate in writing the new constitution that such constitution should guarantee gender equality and should clearly state that there will be no tolerance of any form of discrimination against women. They want to see that their social and economic rights are on the agenda when addressing the future of Egypt. They want the media to help in portraying a real image of the Egyptian women and they want to restructure their national women machinery to represent all groups of women.
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The end is not yet. But we are full of optimism and many of the threats to Egyptian democratization will be defeated. The path to democracy is not easy after many years of dictatorship but determination and feeling free will make us able to achieve our dreams. We strongly believe that democratic transition is possible and near. Egyptian people are feeling empowered, they are discussing their future freely for the first time and are demanding a responsive government and an end to the military regime. There has been a dramatic change in our sense of self-confidence and in the national awareness since the revolution. This change of itself is "revolutionary". Long live the Egyptian revolution, and the revolutions in all the countries of the Arab region.
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2 Domestic Developments with Regional Implications

By Gamal A. Gawad Soltan2
The dramatic changes which the Arab World currently is going through will shape the region for the decades to come. Governments in a number of countries are facing the challenge of political uprising. The recent developments take place after decades of deep political stagnation that has made many commentators and analysts pronounce politics in the Arab World dead. Authoritarian Arab regimes were, apparently, effective in shutting down genuine venues for political participation only to open the door for popular uprising.
Dr. Gaml Soltan is the director of Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies (ACPSS), Cairo, Egypt. Past responsiblities in the ACPSS included the leading position in two ACPSSs programs: Middle East in World Politics program and Survey Research porgram. He has served for two years (1999-2001) as the editor of the ACPSSs Strategic Papers, a monthly series of policy oriented monographs published in both Arabic and English. His recent publications include: Contending Political Forces in Post Saddam Iraq; The U.S. Policy in Iraq; Arab Politics and the Palestinian Intifada; Political Culture and Political Participation in Egypt; Security Perceptions in the Arab World and Euro-Med Relations. During the period 2006-2009, Dr. Soltan served as a professor of political science in the American University in Cairo, where he taught courses on theory of international relations, Middle East politics, Egyptian Foreign policy, and the international relations of the Middle East. Gamal Abdel Gawad Soltan has a Ph. D. in political science from Northern Illinois University (1995).
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Unprecedented Developments
Political uprising are taking place in a number of countries around the region. The two regimes of Tunisia and Egypt have been toppled. Libya is already in a civil war between the incumbent regime of Colonel Qaddafi and the rebels representing a broad coalition of political and tribal forces. A similar situation has developed in Yemen but with violence at a lower intensity. The tribal nature of Libya and Yemen turned what began as a youth protest into a standoff in a tribal conflict. In Syria activists have shown a great deal of resilience against a regime determined to remain in power. Protest in Bahrain was about to cause a regime change if it were not for the swift and effective intervention of the military forces affiliated with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). In countries such as Morocco, Jordan, Algeria, and Oman, protest is both more frequent and more intense than it used to be, but without posing existential threat to the incumbent. These developments are, by all means, historic in a number of respects. They take place after a quarter of a century of regime stability in the Arab World. An Arab regime has not been brought down by popular uprising since 1985 when the Sudanese people ended the reign of President Jaafar Numeri. The last major regime change in the Arab World took place also in the Sudan when, in 1989, Islamist officers undermined the democratically elected government and established the first military Islamic rule in the Arab World. In terms of magnitude and scope, for these developments to happen simultaneously in such a large number of countries is a development without precedent. The closest similar experience in the Arab World is the revolutionary wave of 1958 when radical Pan Arab forces dominated Syria to drive it into unity with Egypt, forming the briefly lived United Arab Republic. Radical military officers ended the Hashemite monarchy of Iraq. British troops were deployed in Jordan to protect the monarchy against a similar fate to its Iraqi counterpart. American troops were deployed in Lebanon to protect the pro-West government against the radical opposition and to prevent further escalation of a civil strife that was approaching a civil war. In the 1950s, international actors, particularly the United States, actively interfered to protect their regional clients and to influence the outcome of political upheaval. To the contrary in todays unrest, international actors have only very limited capacity to help their regional allies. Moreover, international actors had to take to the peoples side in all cases, but with some variance. Variant tactics ranged from bombing the regime military forces in Libya to the low profile criticism of human rights violations in Bahrain. The unrest of the 1950s enjoyed a regional leadership. It was inspired and orchestrated by President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt who successfully championed the causes of Arabism, anti-imperialism, and Palestine. Nassers leadership granted Arab revolutions of the 1950s a sense of direction and common cause. Regional goals and politics have been central to Arab revolutions of the 1950s. Recent Arab revolts, to the contrary, lack any central leadership as well as any sort of a common cause. Current upheaval in the Arab World defies attempts made by regional actors, such as Iran, or international actors, such as the United States, to regulate it and to use it to serve its foreign policy interests. This is, perhaps, the reason for the prevailing feelings of uncertainty surrounding todays Middle East.
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Lack of leadership in todays Arab revolt is not only regional but also domestic. Current revolt in different Arab states lack any kind of leadership, both personal and organizational. Collective spontaneous action of large masses characterizes current Arab revolt at the expense of leadership. Interestingly, the Arab public tend to take pride in the leaderless nature of their revolt. This can be rather seen as a sign for the limited level of trust which Arab political elites came to enjoy after decades of authoritarianism. Regime collapse in such circumstances would cause power vacuum and instability for a long period of time. This is definitely different from the experience of the nineteen fifties and sixties when power was handed from one elite faction to another. Even though the revolutionary time of half a century ago has witnessed a great deal of political mobilization, military coups were the uniform mode of change in the region.
Fragmentation and Interconnectedness

The lacked sense of direction and the absence of a master mind behind todays Arab unrest testify for the deep political fragmentation of todays Arab World. Interestingly, however, the fact that unrest in the different countries developed following the model of a chain reaction testifies for the deep interconnectedness of the different Arab nations. Interconnectedness in the Arab World is a two-tier phenomenon, where each tier enjoys different qualities. The Arab world is strongly interconnected at the mass level, while suffering from deep political fragmentation at the government level. Failure of Arab governments to develop effective regional structures is among their chronic failures. Such a failure is arguably among the reasons that turned Arab masses against incumbents. Arab governments failure in addressing regional problems from Palestine to Iraq and the Sudan contributed to the collective deligitimation of Arab regimes. The fact that Arab masses mobilized to the streets in different countries raising demands for political reform and social justice should not obscure Arab masses concerns regarding their fellow Arabs in Palestine and in many other locations. The nascent directions in Egypts foreign policy vis vis Gaza, Hamas and Israel should help making this point. The spill-over effect of revolt from one Arab country to another proves one more time that the Arab World continues to operate, as it has done for decades, as one security complex. A security complex that operates in a vacuum of regional institutions and in the absence of leadership, while strongly connected at the mass level, is rather a complex of insecurity where threats of instability, failure and conflict prevail. No matter what the final outcomes of the recent upheaval are, the Middle East is likely to continue as a conflict-ridden region should governments continue failing in developing governing regional structures.
State-Society Relations in Crisis

The unrest of the 1950s was almost everywhere in the Arab World. However, it was mainly in the Mashreq, or the East Mediterranean, where instability was caused by the conflict between regimes and opposition. In the Maghreb and the Arabian Peninsula, the unrest was mainly a function of the anti-colonial struggle. Colonialism is no longer an issue in the Arab World. To the contrary, the current unrest in the Arab World, in the Mashreq, Maghreb, and the Arabian Peninsula; is a struggle between incumbent regimes and opposition.
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The focus of the current turmoil is the state-society relations, and this is, for a great extent unprecedented. State-society relations have always been among the main driving forces for politics in the Arab World. However, never before had such an issue been so central, explicit, widespread, and violent. Even though these developments take place at the state level, such concomitant challenges are so powerful so that they are likely to bring about a change of the entire regional system. Current changes in the Arab World are just the prelude towards a rebirth of the regional system in the Middle East. What is currently witnessed in the Arab World goes much deeper than just mere changes of state-society relations in a number of countries. The more intrinsic underpinnings of regional politics are likely to change as a result of the current unrest. The state is the building block of any regional system, including the Arab system of states and the broader Middle East regional system. When such a large number of these building blocks are going through massive transformation, the resulting regional system can hardly remain the same.
Different Countries, Different Outcomes

The challenges facing the Arab governments are similar in kind but the outcome will be different from one country to another. Countries of the Arab World are diverse in a number of respects. Even though modern Arab states have been made after the model of the modern nation-state, none of them fits this model beyond doubt. Arab countries have different experience of state formation that puts each of them in a different position on the nation-state continuum. Few Arab states closely approach the ideal type of a nation-state. Others are distantly remote from that ideal. The rest are scattered on different positions between the extreme ends of the nation-state continuum. When the question of state-society relations is abruptly and violently raised in countries with such diverse experience, outcome is likely to vary reflecting the different countries experience with state formation. In North Africa, countries that closely approach the nation-state ideal can be found. This applies to Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco. In the Mashreq, countries are located on the far other end of the nation-state continuum. This applies to Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq. The remaining countries are scattered between the two ends of the continuum. The historical experience of some countries in the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula qualify them to a position closer to the nation-state end of the continuum, such as Oman, while others are much closer to the pre nation-state end of the continuum, such as Bahrain and Yemen. The structural/historical experience of state formation will, for a great extent, help shaping the outcome of the current unrest. Countries closer to the quality of a nations-state have a chance to use the recent uprising towards bringing about considerable political and social reform. The nation-state qualities of Egypt and Tunisia, in particular, should help them survive the current upheaval towards higher levels of good governance and social inclusion. On the other hand, fragmented societies in countries with less of the nation-state qualities might not sustain the violent collapse of order. Such countries are open to all kinds of possibilities, with the worst case scenarios not being excluded. Fragmented societies where order and unity were kept mainly through excessive coercion might not survive the collapse of authority. The artificially manufactured states of the Mashreq might fail to survive the current upheaval. Regime failure in these countries might deteriorate to extended civil conflict that would put the territorial integrity of some of these countries at tremendous risk.
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Concluding Remarks
This essay is not meant to provide a thorough survey of state-society relations in the different Arab countries. It is rather aiming at providing a sketchy scheme outlining the diverse reality of the Arab states in its relation to the current political upheaval. Such a scheme could be helpful providing a perspective through which meaning can be given to the rapid developments in the region. It might also help anticipating changes and outcomes in different countries. This scheme, however, should not be perceived as being deterministic. Final outcome of the recent developments shall be function of both structural-historical factors as well as agent-driven factors. While structural factors set the principal parameters of the possible outcomes, it is the agent-driven actions that should determine which of the possible outcomes would materialize. All concerned parties could contribute to the making of the final outcome in the different countries. These include domestic, both the incumbent and the opposition; regional; and international actors. Incumbent regimes still have the capacity to reform in many countries. They should be encouraged to do so through all possible means. The oppositions moves could range from risky confrontational approaches to the calculated pressure that does not exclude reconciliation. Regional actors could capitalize on the unrest to further advance their interest or choose to mediate between conflicting parties. International actors could choose between inaction on the one end to deep involvement on the other end. They also could choose to be instrumental in bringing happy ending to the transition through providing all kinds of assistance or giving democracy and prosperity no more than the lip service of diplomacy.
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3 The Role of Media in the Egyptian Revolution and the Future

By Fathy Abou Hatab3
I have no experience living in a democratic country. I am 36 years old and through all this time democracy never existed in Egypt. The young people who led the demonstrations in Tahrir Square didnt have any real political experience. What they did was based on their experiences from social networking. They know how to communicate and mobilize people. Courage and will power
As the youngest panellist invited to speak at the DIPD opening conference: The future of Democracy in Egypt and Tunisia and the Role of External Partners, it seemed natural for Fathy Abou Hatab to highlight the importance of keeping the youth engaged in the Egyptian revolution.
Mr. Fathy Abou Hatab is an Egyptian journalist living in Cairo. He is the managing editor of Al-Masry Al-Youm Arabic website edition, an independent news website. Fathy Abou Hatab also worked as a community manager for www.almasryalyoum.com. Before joining Al Masry Alyoum, he worked as a web editor of the Danish Egyptian Dialogue Institute in Cairo, Managing Editor of European Muslims page at islamonline.net and MENA program director of meedan.net. He is particularly interested in the effect of digital media in Egypt and the Arab world, and he trains journalists on the use of social media.
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A trained journalist, Fathy Abou Hatab previously worked with Islam Online and the Danish-Egyptian Dialogue Institute in Cairo before taking his current position as managing editor of the online edition of Al-Masry Al-Youm, one of Egypts independent and most vocal news media. Himself a typical representative of the movement that made history in Egypt in February this year, Hatab said: According to Hatab, the largest group currently is 6 April, which is an online network. So is the Khaled Said group on Facebook. They are, on one hand, young and do not want to lose what they gained in Tahrir Square. On the other hand, they are reluctant to conform to traditional rules of engagement meaning among others having to organise in formal structures. It remains a question, if they are willing to organize in more formal structures like parties or structures with formal organizational institutions Fathy Abou Hatab said: 6 April recently decided not to transform into a political party but to remain a movement and a lobby for change. Even so, Hatab said he was optimistic: Young people today know how to live with others and exchange ideas through social networks.Through the use of Internet they have been brought up in a culture of sharing and a culture of forming groups around common areas of interests. This is good, said Fathy Abou Hatab, in terms of sharing experiences and introducing peers to each other. He said this trend was spreading to other areas of society and stressed the importance for Danish organisations to understand the nature of the movements in Egypt that drive the revolution.
New political arena takes shape

Fathy Abou Hatab pointed out that there had been no clashes of generations, but young people reacted to mere the fact that the youth had never been involved in Egyptian politics. I think the young generation is open to bridge the gap between generations, and I believe they did so in Tahrir Square. But they also found themselves steering a revolution. With their energy and wish for change, young people in Egypt can do a lot for the future. As for the old guard, Egypt has very strong parties, like the former ruling party that used to have a very strong organisation. Fathy Abou Hatab referred to the smaller ones as window dressing that had in reality been controlled by the ruling party. Egypt also had a traditional opposition, but it was excluded from playing a real role previously. Emerging as a new and very powerful political force, the young are in a process of finding their place in the arena, Hatab explained: A new area is the middle of politics, which is attracting many new parties. A right and a left wing still exist, but mutual respect, jobs and decent salaries as well as democracy play a bigger role with the new parties than among the old political sides. Fathy Abou Hatabs plea to Denmark was clear:
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We need your experience to overcome this transitional period successfully.Old parties need technical skills and to get fresh experiences from other countries. New parties also need these tools in addition to skills and experiences regarding starting a new party and how to run it, he said during the conference.
Look beyond parties and focus on the people

Acknowledging that some parties may not last long, Fathy Abou Hatab insisted they might still need support and benefit from it: What they learn will spread to society. I believe it is not a matter of supporting specific parties but to support the right people and those groups who are interested in playing a role in politics. In terms of how to proceed without leaving anybody outside in this period of uncertainty and constant change, Hatab said: In any activity you can invite not only parties but also movements such as 6. April and others and include them in conferences and training activities.The current scene is not final, quite the contrary there is a general movement towards creating new organisations, new NGOs new everything. Referring to an Egyptian proverb, Fathy Abou Hatab referred to Egypt as moving sand everything might change and do so very quickly. Treading cautiously was therefore his best advise to Danish actors: The most important point right now is that outsiders make an effort to get an understanding of whats going on in Egypt, what the real needs are and to go through local partners to assess the situation. He warned Denmark and all international actors not to repeat past mistakes: During the Mubarak era, NGOs got billions but didnt change anything. We need to develop a good way to match people with the right activity. Its not only a matter of budgets being allocated. Most importantly there is a need for donors to invest time in researching the region and the needs much more carefully than ever before.
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4 Introductions to group sessions
The panel of presenters in Eigtveds Pakhus on 27 of May 2011, seated under a photo of the background publication prepared for the conference and seminar by Barbara Le Svarre and Rasmus Alenius Boserup. From left to right: Pepijn Gerrits, Director of Programmes with NIMD. Fathy Abou Hatab, Managing Editor of Al-Masry Al-Youm Arabic website. Fatemah Khafagy, Ph.D. and consultant. Bjrn Frde, Director of DIPD Gamal Abdel Gawad Soltan, Director of ACPSS in Cairo. Sam van der Staak, Programme Officer with International IDEA. Jakob Erle, Director of DEDI. The following does not provide a full report on the presentations of the three Egyptian speakers and resource persons participating in the seminar. However, the bullets reflect some of the key points and issues addressed.
th
Dr. Gamal Soltan

Public opinion used to be a taboo practice as access to information was limited in th Egypt prior to January 25 .Now it is becoming a flourishing industry. Some interesting results from the study conducted by ACPSS in April 2011: 70 percent were optimistic for the change in Egypt. Before the revolution there was a much higher sentiment of pessimism, especially when people were asked about the quality of life for the coming generation. Ranking by participants: The collapse of the security establishment was given 1 priority with 48 percent thinking security is a main issue. Secondly, 41 percent
st
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point to the economic situation and stability. Finally, 11 percent considered political reform and getting rid of the old regime as the main issue to be addressed. 70 percent think the revolution has achieved its goal. 50 percent think Egypt will become a full-fledged democracy; less than 1 percent thinks things will get worse; around 10 percent think the political system will not be very different from what it used to be. 80.4 percent think the economic situation will be much better, while 6.3 percent think it will be worse and 13.3 claim it will remain the same. Political participation: 77.4 percent of the sample indicated a determination to vote in upcoming elections. 64 percent of the population is still undetermined as to whom they will vote for, which is only natural with the new and emerging political environment in Egypt. Political future of Egypt remains undecided, including a constitution and the laws that shall regulate political life. Islamic parties came first with 12.9 percent, people to vote for center or Muslim brotherhood; 9 percent want to vote for the liberal block (even though they are newcomers). Support for MB was almost the same as al Wafd party around 4 percent (so they could be the black horse). It is imperative that we gather information on all of the 224 districts that Egypt is divided into for electoral purposes.
Dr. Fatma Khafagi

Women have always been active in all revolutions in Egypt. Against the British occupation, or in 1956 with the nationalization of the Suez. The problem until now is family law because of its roots in Sharia. There were several attempts to reform them, but they were always blocked by the more conservative Islamic groups. NGOization of the feminist movement is a challenge. NGOs becoming more powerful than the movements themselves. Egyptian women were very active during the uprising this year, especially young women from different walks of life. Women slept in Tahrir Square, a new paradigm for gender relations, with no threats or sexual harassment cases reported. This phenomenon, sadly to the womens surprise, did not sustain. Women are still being neglected. Surprising that the cabinet and the military stance with regards to women rights is so poor. Less women ministers in the cabinet now than before a decrease from three to one. Also very few women are invited to the national dialogue seminars held. National council for women status is worrying. There is an insistence to leave it hanging after the Board almost all resigned, as all women movements have claimed this council obsolete. Ultra conservative groups that were underground are now very present and are against women rights they are even against some of the Feminist groups success in changing the legal marital age for women from 16 to18 years old.
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Political participation of women: Coalition of women drafted a manifesto, however there are disparities between the groups of women in Egypt. 40 percent still illiterate, others do not have Identification Cards. How can voting be a sense of empowerment? In the past more rural women voted than the urban counterparts, but were often forced by relatives and family heads, which are mostly male.
Fathy Abou Hatab

Media before the revolution: State owned media organizations (traditional) very weak and small online media presence. More prominent at the time was the television channels. These were used to campaign against politicians with proof that there was an organized campaign against el-Baradie. Political parties have their own newspapers and magazines, but had no television channel. Wafd party wants to start a new television channel. Television is the most effective medium in Egypt. Private newspapers and media are doing much better than the state media nowadays, and during the uprising they were in a much better situation because of their wider and more credible coverage. There is a significant importance being given also to the regional channels (al Jazeera and al Arabia). Using mobile Internet is also growing a lot in Egypt. The issue of citizenship and active political participation was not an issue covered in the media and now has become an integral part of their coverage. Interest used to be only in voting and its coverage. The most crucial issue if the media is to improve and reform. Need to have proper access to information and this is what we all need to fight for in a new Egypt.
Pepijn Gerrits, NIMD

NIMD was founded in 2000, supported by 7 parties in Parliament, with the aim to strengthen political parties and their role in multiparty democracy. Currently working in 16 countries, with 10 of these in Africa. Funding comes primarily from Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The way of working emphasizes that ownership must be with the partner; supporting home-grown agendas; long-term engagement with flexibility; programmes that are context-specific; and using practical and innovative instruments like democracy education. Idea of Democracy Schools has been implemented in Indonesia, Georgia, Mozambique and Burundi. Vision is on the universal values of democracy but seen in the local context of cultural values and historical particularities, and with participation as the backbone of democracy. The mission of the Democracy School concept is to: facilitate citizens to shape a safe, just and plural society; to build democracy as a bridge between people, politicians, institutions, civil society and business; to monitor public decisionmaking; and to foster democratic reform using network of democrats.
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Major objectives of Democracy Schools are: generate a pool of committed, strategically capable, democratically active individuals providing knowledge and practical skills; set up and develop Community Committees (alumni groups) being agents of change transforming democracy at the local level; facilitate a dynamic network among the local 4 pillars of democracy (civil society, political society, bureaucracy, business community). Looking at the MENA region, and Egypt and Tunisia in particular, there are certain similarities like: state monopoly on all decisions and assets; a de-politicized society; extremely despotic and no rule of law; corruption has become an important tool of the government. Major challenges will be to ensure inclusiveness women and youth not least; a need to agree on basic values of a democracy and to apply them; developing proper democratic systems and institutions; and strengthening of a multiparty system and ensuring the basic civil rights for all.
Sam van der Staak, International IDEA

IDEA is developing a new programme for Egypt, but is also active in other countries in the region, and has been for some time. Mostly known for work on publications, like the handbooks on democratic dialogue being used many places around the world. The democratic dialogue handbook will be out in Arabic next month. Involved in training programmes in many countries, and female politicians has been a major focus (IDEA is also part of the iKNOWpolitics webportal together with UNDP, NDI, UN Women and IPU. IDEA has developed a database on political party finance to compare regulations. This is always a major issue in the development of multiparty democracy.
Jakob Erle, DEDI

DEDI has worked with many parts of Egyptian civil society and youth over the years and is therefore well positioned to provide support in the new phase, where Egyptian democracy has to find its feet. Election scheduled for September. Important what kind of electoral system - proportional or mixed will be agreed upon. With NDP out of the picture, it seems like the Muslim Brotherhood is best prepared. The newcomers to the field of political parties will have to find out how to relate to voters. The number of parties is an important challenge. Some weeks ago there were 38 left-wing parties. No chance for all parties to get elected, so one solution will be to create coalitions. Other burning issues are: How will the parties relate to voters? What about organization and funding? What about security, which can be a major issue in elections? And all this before September - great challenge. Important for political parties and candidates to have continuous dialogue with the electorate. We must remember that the revolution was made by Egyptians, so the future must also be created by Egyptians.
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5 Working Group A
Who and what interests will, can or should the political parties ideally seek to represent?
Chair Resource person Rapporteur Question 1
Mr. Bjrn Frde, Director, DIPD Dr. Gamal Abdel Gawwad Soltan Ms. Wafaa Ossama, DEDI What are the obstacles facing political parties, how to ensure that the interests of minorities are included in the agenda for political parties? What are the dividing lines between political parties? What are the issues and strategies to be addressed by international organisations?
Question 2 Question 3
Question 1: Obstacles before political parties

1. Funding Political parties are facing many challenges and dilemmas in relation to their finances: some parties do not have sufficient funds to implement their activities, announcements, and campaigns, while at the same time others have a challenge of being monopolised by the promoters of the fund. As a repercussion of this dilemma, some parties have a challenge of fulfilling the requirement of announcing their membership in newspapers. Other initiatives like masr el hora party founders created an internal rule, which is to have a maximum ceiling for membership contribution of 200,000 EGB.
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Transparency: the legal frame that governs the funding of political parties is clear. The real challenge is that the implementation of the legislations are costly and bureaucratic. It requires a monitoring mechanism, which could be one of the experiences, which external partners transfer. 2. Potential beneficiaries Inclusiveness vs. Selectivity: it is very important to be inclusive with a special support to new emerging parties in building a multiparty system. It will be a big mistake to be selective and refuse to work with some groups.
Question 2: Dividing lines between political parties

1. Traditional Politics vs. Modern/Ideology Politics One of the important outcomes of the revolution is the modernization of the Egyptian political system and its implication on electoral politics. Before the revolution, electoral politics used to be largely rural and characterized by elements of favoritism to big families and clans. The average turnout was around 25 percent in the rural areas. In the coming period, it is expected to have a higher turn out of voters but with new elements alongside the old ones. This is largely determined by the adopted electoral system simple majority/proportionate system. With a simple majority electoral system, it is likely that the traditional electoral values will largely continue. Proportionate electoral system: Two tier system, a mixture of modern politics (ideology) and clientelism. Old electoral values will not disappear but will take different forms. Previously, families and clans used to compete to join the National Democratic Party (NDP), but after its dissolution, options are to either join the New Wafd Party, or the Muslim Brotherhood. There are several examples from Africa were the multi-party system failed because they did not understand the former clientelism and the outcomes were completely different. 2. Religious vs. non-Religious It is important in the coming period to get out of the religious and non-religious divide, as it is a very dangerous dichotomy. It is important for non-religious parties to attract more religious groups to refute the image that they are anti religion. Moreover, it is important to engage the Muslim Brotherhood in the dialogue.
Question 3: Issues to be addressed by international organizations

Short-term vs. Long-term intervention: It is very important to distinguish between short and long term strategies. For the short-term period, it is hard to make significant change in transforming old and traditional politics to become modern, but it can be done on the longer term. The economic situation as a precondition for building a multi-party system. It is very important to support the Egyptian economy from collapsing. If the economy deteriorates, this would give more voice to any other populist authoritarianism (army/other fascist groups).
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Urban vs. Rural: It is very important to get out of urban areas and into rural ones. Egypt has a tradition of mobilizing party caravans. This tradition could be developed to create caravans for (inter-party debates). The Danish organization Kvinfo has many experiences in this regard that could be exported. Use Barometers for politicians: The USA has a long experience in creating barometers for politicians to ensure that politicians deliver on their promises. Transform ideology into policy: it is very important to transform party ideologies into policies on specialized issues (taxation/welfare/security reform). This will defuse the polarization between political parties. Create advisory group from Denmark to support DIPD: such an advisory group should not make decisions, but rather advise different partners based on the expertise existing in different Danish communities.
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6 Working Group B
How can political parties and civil society establish a fruitful relationship in the future?
Mr. Rasmus Boserup, former Director of DEDI Mr. Fathy Abu Hatab Ms. Noha Nahass, DEDI How can political parties make themselves accountable in general and to the civil society that played a key role in the revolution in particular? What are some of the concerns and issues of civil society that political parties need to be particularly concerned about? And how can political parties ensure that issues from civil society groups outside the urban centres are being addressed as well? Is there a particular role for the media in ensuring that political parties are held accountable and do different types of media have different roles and responsibilities?
Question 2
Question 3
Question 1: Accountability of political parties

1. Role of civil society in accountability There is no strong previous experience on the role of holding political parties accountable, neither with regard to civil society or the media. What we witness today is new and it all came from Tahrir and went back to it. With strong social movements that want to remain as movements and not to turn into political parties, the situation is different.
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The authoritarian regime was cutting the communication between the different forces in society. Now there is a new attempt to establish a way of communication between the different groupings. To ensure the accountability of the political parties, we have to ensure internal political roles, joining development programs, inform the public about their agendas, creating channels of communicating through the media. Pushing media forward not to dig only in the scandels but to engage in a longer term policy discussion and dialogue. which means that investments in good media is essential. Or by other means try to create a platform to reflect debates on reforms. 2. Political parties and civil society Talking about the relationship between the political parties and the civil society we have to notice that there is a big difference between Denmark and other countries. Not all countries have political parties and social society working together and trusting each other. An issue was highlighted by one of the participants: She noted that women are too skeptical about the political parties and civil society, and she added that one of the questions that should be dealt with now is the writing of the constitution in a way that reflect the relations between these parties.
Question 2: Concerns of civil society regarding political parties

1. Legal framwork The political parties should work to develop a legal framework for the media and its right of accessing the information. Such a legal framework to the access of information is not only about opening the old communication channels. We have to keep rule of independence of the media as its interest should work to provide a pluralistic image, not just focusing on one or two parties. A question should be raised: do the news agencies have enough money to work independetly and to fund their work? 2. Civil society legislation The same issue of the legal framework can be discussed in the issue of organzing the work of the civil society and its organizations, a framework that can manage to protect the existence of these NGOs more than govern the practice itself. Civil society organizations were under the supervision of the Egyptian government for a long time, and the issue of registering those NGOs are another side of the issue. Part of this is a law that was revised in 2006 and put a lot of restrictions on the work of NGOs and their legal status. Many NGOs in Egypt are registered under the liability companies regulation and they should be accomodated because they are non-profit. However, in order to have this framework, a political will should be there and the political powers and parties should have the intention and the will of pushing such laws to govern the practice of both the media and the civil society.
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Linked to that, the discussion highlighted how important the implentation of this issue is. So while a framework should be essential in the coming months, the implentation of these true pluralistic practices is more important. It took years in Denmark to change the culture of the society and nobody expect that it will come overnight in Egypt. It is something that should be well organized between all partners and be able to change the culture gradually.
Question 3: Role of Media and Civil Society

Pushing Media forward not to dig only in the scandels but to engage in a longer term policy, which means that investments in good media is essential. Or by other means trying to create a platform to reflect debates on reforms. Media should be more constructive and work as a watch dog to the political process. In Denmark for example politicians would defend the idea of the independent media, however, what can be seen in Egypt is somehow a return to the old habits of the media even with a new government. The upcoming election should become an opportunity for the media to take the lead and work to educate the people. In Egypt we have large number of voters who need to be educated about the political process. Before the revolution there was no access to the information, and all the time the newspapers worried about being shut down and TV channels as well, therefore, media was not engaged in such debates and never played the role of watchdog. Now the use of the media could be for the political awareness. As was stated before: around 60 percent of Egyptians dont have a clue on what to vote. However, another opinion was raised stating that political awareness is not a media task, but should be embedded in it by the help of the civil society and the political parties.
Lessons to be learned
In Uganda, 4 years ago multiple parties were registered in the multiparty system. Surveys indicated 77 percent of voters would like to vote, but they need to understand for whom they would like to vote. The lessons that were drawn in Uganda resulted in the formation of a coaltiion for monitoring the election, and even some polticians came to join it. In Indoensia, there was no doubt that the civil society also needed to be stabilized, and the most imprortant thing is that the civil society and the poltiical parties remain different. In Vietnam, civil society is a field of exploring, with everyone wanting to joing an NGO or civil society movement. During the elections in Burundi, they prepared a media plan one year in advance, they trained journalists, set a wide plan to the national and regional levels, and they managed to have correspondents everywhere to cover the election. The journalists had trainning in how to monitor and cover the elections and at the same time eliminate hate speech.
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Recommendations
DEDI and other organizations should work to protect the minorities and their rights in elections, to ensure a very strong system where all should have their representatives and to have their chances to be there from the begining. It is important to have a framework that govern the issue of funding the NGOs and especially regarding the funding from external sources. TV channels should have a lot of slots about political parties, and give the necessary information. Stressing on the fact that this should not be advertisments as much as promoting democracy. Media and political parties should remain seperate, and the media should be independent from political parties. The media has a role of assisting the public in translating the political knowledge to the public.
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7 Working Group C
Political Parties and the Youth
Mr. Jakob Erle, Director, DEDI Dr. Fatemah Khafagy Mr. Muhab Wahby, DEDI Is youth primarily a tool to be used by political parties seeking influence or are the political parties primarily a useful tool to address the aspirations of youth? What can political parties do to make working for political parties as attractive as being in civil society? Some youth groups have taken the position that they are critical of any form of institutionalization in the traditional form. How can political parties respond to this alternative vision of democracy in Egypt?
Question 2 Question 3
Issue 1: Generational gap between those in authority and those who initiated the revolution
Argument: April 16 meeting in Cairo University: it is obvious that political parties are currently monopolized by the older generations and want to just find ways to incorporate the youth into their ranks to capitalize on their energy but seemingly want to return to business as usual. Counter Argument: In some instances older activists do not feel welcome in youth seminars and meetings, although they just want to support and provide experience.
th
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Dialogue with regards to the constitution or transitional government and justice: the youth seem to think that whenever there is conflict about such topics that a sole solution is to just go to Tahrir Square. That is not to say that this is an illegitimate call, but youth movements need to find other ways to make their efforts channel though some sort of political negotiation and through the political will of leaders, to have their demands be taken seriously.
Issue 2: Bridging the gap between Youth clusters themselves

Arguments: Youth are not homogenous: Some are very creative and technologically savvy and pioneers in activism. On the other side of the spectrum there are the old fashioned youth activists that are not so technologically savvy yet have been active for years. We need to explore ways to bridge the gap between them. Religious and secular divides between these groups. The Muslim Brotherhood has a very strong youth wing, so how to ensure that we can address this disparity without indulging too much into the issue of the divide between them? Counter Argument: There is a group in between both dichotomies of political movements and NGOs and religious versus secular debates that are engaged in charity work. A good example is Resala. It is also a good middle ground and was not politically organized before the uprising but participated effectively. Engaging with such groups could be interesting since they have moderately Islamic views and are large followers of televangelists such Amr Khaled (who might currently be formulating his own party).
Issue 3: Absent or Nascent Youth Representation

Arguments: There is a need to move from a culture of equality of all voices to the more traditional role in politics of having a negotiator. Ultimately, there is a need to adopt better organizational skills. The label of the uprising in Egypt as The Youths Revolution was introduced by the state and the military. While this is partially true, however it must be acknowledged as a peoples revolution. Furthermore, when representation for the revolution and those in positions of authority are more than 60 years old, a patronizing act takes place in which the youth revolutionaries are told thank you for your utopian beliefs and determination in achieving what we could not do in the past 30 years, but now just leave the real business to us. Youth must be represented in positions of authority as a pivotal stakeholder within the Egyptian peoples revolution. Counter Argument: There is immense pressure and misconception that the revolutionary youth alone are going to rejuvenate things and both harness and protect the change
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that occurred in Egypt recently. More importantly, we need to address what it means to have a democracy? Its a way of life and accepting our differences including the opinions of those that did not take part in the uprising but are a part of this current reality.
Issue 4: Different expectations between youth movements and political parties

Arguments: 6 of April movement continue to promote awareness and refuse to engage in political representation through party politics. Some movements state that they have done their part in initiating the change and now its time for political parties to lead in the new political environment. However, it is necessary to create structures to include them within the political sphere. Youth is only taking part in the fun part and are not trying to take part in politics, by organizing for cultural events, even thought these events are political in nature, such as posting information about democracy and freely expressing such concepts, but are not politically aligned at the moment. Their main concern remains the utilization of the free space. Counter Arguments: New parties have delivered on these needs of the youth by having several committees in parties such as in the popular alliance party, concentrating on the freedom expression, through their media committee, vocational and craftsmanship committees, as a minimal sign of openness to their skills and needs and making sure they feel well represented within party structures. Popular committees (youth associations/movements) were first established to replace the police in both urban and rural settings but have developed themselves to playing more important roles in local governance such as, painting of public utilities, cleaning of streets, street art and garbage collection. We need to concentrate as parties on the local level in terms of democratization, which apparently is one of the main concerns of the yet un-politicized youth. (Note: Women groups are trying to map these popular committee initiatives and talk to them, as they might be key to creating coalitions between political parties and movements).
th
Issue 5: Youth choice and institutionalization

Argument: The youth should be able to retain their freedom to create their own associations and work together as interest/pressure groups to have influence on all parties and ensure accountability by any representative government with regards to the goals and objectives of the revolution. That should not exclude them for being active in party politics, and equally they should not be forced for now into party politics either.
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Counter Arguments: If the youth does not understand the consequence of not being represented then political power will lay solemnly within parliament and they will not be able to reach these objectives they set out in the revolution. Suggested solutions: a lower age of eligibility for political participation in parliament and the inclusion of smaller parties.
Other issues
An increased number of initiatives by the youth to reclaim public space through artistic expression, festivals and music is equally as important as politics. A major concern for youth involvement is the even more restrictive public space for women especially with the absence of the police and security apparatus. This issue must also be addressed immediately. People and especially the youth movements and womens movements must formulate proper good governance measures for their establishments as we cannot have these same youth leaders 20 years from now still in power. Consequently what that would mean is that this new generation would end up using the same practices as the older generations. Within our laws an important issue is to allow for younger participation in politics (less than 30 year old). This however, seems to have been restricted. Once their participation is secured, we must focus on how to make them have real influence on political decisions and not just incorporating them into ranks. One solution could be having advisory committees within parliament than can also be part of the youth groups. Time will tell us how youth should be involved and how to best engage in this new political order. We have to find new ways to engage and work together. However, there is fear of youth initiatives just turning into NGOs and the forefront of the scene, while movements and activism are slowly situated in the background. People are really forming their own types of associations (functional thing). The question remains whether donors are ready to support such institutions (movements) are they going to help multiple types of association or go on to work with the traditional formal structures of institutions such as NGOs and registered associations. (eg. in the past the EU has poured millions into the national council for women a government body - which is not representative of the feminist movement in Egypt and was insensitive to the situation of what Egyptians want).
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8 Participants
Anna Meyling Ashraf Hussein Ashraf Mikhail Asger Toft Johannsen Barbara Le Svarre Bjrn Frde Clara Christensen Claus Larsen-Jensen Dea Donkin Ehab Galal Eva Flyvholm Dr. Fatemah Khafagy Faten Hussein Fathy Abou Hatab Flemming Thgersen Freddy Hagen Dr. Gamal Soltan Greg Power Gunvor Thomsen Hans Christian Korsholm Nielsen Helene Horsbrugh Holger Vestergaard Inger V. Johansen Jakob Erle Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen Jakob Wichmann Jane Alr Srensen Jesper Hjberg Jonathan Nielsen Karin Bergquist Kate Victoria Hand Lene Andersen Line Holmung Lotte Dahlmann Louis Mllerfors Lrke Birk Maria Fahmy Common Consultants DIPD Board/SF IMS Liberal Alliance Journalist Forsvarsakademiet Det Andersenske Forlag DIPD Journalist Piapium KU Tana Copenhagen KU ANHRI IMR KU PartnerPartner DIPD MS FIC SF KU Enhedslisten Consult.Womens rights Global Partners Al-Masry Al-Youm Portal RV Journalist Al-Ahram Center Global Partners DUF AU Venstre Liberal Alliance Enhedslisten DEDI
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Marianne Victor Hansen Marie Larsen Marieke Van Doorn Martin Christoffersen Mette Fjlland Morten Damm Krogh Muhab Wahby Niels Johan Juhl Nielsen Nina Cheesman Pallesen Noha Nahass Osama Hamza Pepijn Gerrits Per sterlund Peter Lodberg Rasmus Boserup Sam van der Staak Sarah Zidan Sara Lei Sparre Stine Bech Bregnhj Sune Blom Susanne Possing Svend Petersen Sren Toft Sren Snderstrup Thomas Ebeling Thomas Vladimir Brnd Thorkild Jensen Wafaa Ossama
MVHConsult Aps. SDU EPD Forsvarsakademiet UNDP Soc.dem. DEDI RV FIC DEDI Enhedslisten NIMD DANICOM AU DIIS International IDEA
KU Forsvarsakademiet Enhedslisten Development for Change IHB Venstre C4C Kommunikation DIPD KU Fotograf DEDI
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Egypt Conference Seminar Report August2011

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Egypt Conference Seminar Report August2011

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THE FUTURE

AND THE ROLE OF

Report from Conference and Seminar

Domestic Developments with Regional Implications

The Role of Media in the Egyptian Revolution and the Future

Introduction to group sessions

Bjrn Frde Director August 2011

Driven by the Egyptian people

Building strong movements

Unprecedented desire to form political parties

Charter by Egyptian women

2 Domestic Developments with Regional Implications

Fragmentation and Interconnectedness

State-Society Relations in Crisis

Different Countries, Different Outcomes

3 The Role of Media in the Egyptian Revolution and the Future

New political arena takes shape

Look beyond parties and focus on the people

4 Introductions to group sessions

Dr. Gamal Soltan

Dr. Fatma Khafagi

Fathy Abou Hatab

Pepijn Gerrits, NIMD

Sam van der Staak, International IDEA

Jakob Erle, DEDI

Chair Resource person Rapporteur Question 1

Question 1: Obstacles before political parties

Question 2: Dividing lines between political parties

Question 3: Issues to be addressed by international organizations

Chair Resource person Rapporteur Question 1

Question 1: Accountability of political parties

Question 2: Concerns of civil society regarding political parties

Question 3: Role of Media and Civil Society

Chair Resource person Rapporteur Question 1

Issue 2: Bridging the gap between Youth clusters themselves

Issue 3: Absent or Nascent Youth Representation

Issue 4: Different expectations between youth movements and political parties

Issue 5: Youth choice and institutionalization

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