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"If it was not clear before, it is now. Domestic energy policy is at the center of our foreign
policy," said Senator Joseph R. Biden. "For our national security we have to begin the transition
to alternative fuels. We can't do that without making progress on fuel economy by upgrading to a
better system that combines protection for U.S. automobile manufacturing jobs with predictable
increases in fuel efficiency standards for cars, SUVs and light trucks. "
"If it was not clear before, it is now. Domestic energy policy is at the center of our foreign
policy," said Senator Joseph R. Biden. "For our national security we have to begin the
transition to alternative fuels. We can't do that without making progress on fuel economy
by upgrading to a better system that combines protection for U.S. automobile
manufacturing jobs with predictable increases in fuel efficiency standards for cars, SUVs
and light trucks. "
But this may become the norm, according to observers. NARUC is touting a Pennsylvania model
that allows waste coal and IGCC to count as part of its alternative energy mandate. The policy is
identical to renewable portfolio standards in numerous states across the country with one distinct
difference: it includes fossil energy.
The court's conclusion to ignore the industry definition was reached through the following rather
tortuous journey. First, section 44D was enacted to encourage the development of "alternative
energy sources" in the face of competition from "conventional fuels." The primary conventional
fuel that constituted the competition was crude oil. Therefore, a qualifying alternative energy
source must be something other than crude oil (i.e., a crude oil substitute). Because high
viscosity crude oil that could be produced through "currently used enhanced recovery
techniques" was nevertheless crude oil, it could not, by definition, constitute a crude oil
substitute and thereby be covered under section 44D of the Code. In crafting the foregoing
analytical matrix, the court appears to have been significantly (if not predominantly) influenced
by the legislative history of Title I of COWPTA, which adopted an expansive view of "crude oil"
(the subject of Title I's excise tax) excluding therefrom only "synthetic petroleum." At the end of
its analytical journey, the court essentially defined "oil produced from tar sands" as synthetic
petroleum rather than oil (fungible with any other oil) produced from a particular source.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 4
[Nielson/Ward/Brockaway] Auto’s Aff Updates
Incentives Topicality
Incentives can target social activity
Thomas J. Berger, Inter American University of Puerto Rico, 2008 (“TAX INCENTIVES AND THE WAR
ON DRUGS”, http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=thomas_berger)
In addition to the economic incentives identified above, the tax code provides
incentives to individuals for a number of transactions of significant social consequence.
Examples include the deduction for adoption expenses,91 the child tax credit,92 and a
number of provisions targeting higher education.93 In addition, some couples
contemplating marriage also receive an incentive to “tie the knot” through a favorable tax
rate structure.94 These provisions (and rate structures in the case of marriage) arguably
lower the after-tax cost of engaging in socially desirable activities.
An economic incentive program can be defined as any program that provides an economic
benefit for pollution reductions or an economic penalty for pollution. Defining economic
incentives to include both positive and negative incentives includes pollution taxes in the
definition. n155 Does command and control regulation qualify as an economic incentive program
under this definition? Imagine a pure command and control law. The law commands polluters to
perform specific pollution reducing acts, but provides no penalties for non-compliance. This law
would probably motivate little or no pollution reduction, because polluters could violate the
commands without consequence. n156 Command and control regulation only works when an
enforcement mechanism exists.
And yet, as most economists will concede, we do not live in a perfect world, and there are huge
political costs associated with imposing a gasoline tax. Which leads to a conundrum. Even if we
acknowledge that raising CAFE standards hasn't worked as planned, does that mean we should
abandon our efforts to improve CAFE in favor of pushing a gasoline tax solution whose political
viability is seriously questionable? Or should we attempt to do what might be possible.
Aligning the art of the possible with the calculus of economics is never easy. But the fact that
fuel economy efficiency standards aren't working as well as we like shouldn't be a reason to junk
them in favor of an all or nothing strategy that will require American elected politicians to show
true leadership.