US vs Ah Chong Facts:

The defendant Ah Chong was a cook at "Officers' quarters, No. 27," Fort McKinley, Rizal Province Pascual Gualberto, deceased, works at the same place as a house boy or muchacho "Officers' quarters, No. 27" was a detached house some 40 meters from the nearest building No one slept in the house except the two servants who jointly occupied a small room toward the rear of the building, the door of which opened upon a narrow porch running along the side of the building This porch was covered by a heavy growth of vines for its entire length and height The door of the room was not furnished with a permanent bolt or lock; the occupants, as a measure of security, had attached a small hook or catch on the inside of the door, and were in the habit of reinforcing this somewhat insecure means of fastening the door by placing against it a chair On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10:00 pm, the defendant was suddenly awakened by some trying to force open the door of the room He called out twice, "Who is there?" He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at the door that it was being pushed open by someone bent upon forcing his way into the room The defendant warned the intruder "If you enter the room, I will kill you." Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out wildly at the intruder (when he entered the room) who turned out to be his roommate Pascual Pascual ran out upon the porch heavily wounded Recognizing Pascual, the defendant called to his employers who slept in the next house and ran back to his room to secure bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds Pascual died from the effects of the wound the following day The roommates appear to have been in friendly and amicable terms prior to the incident, and had an understanding that when either returned at night, he should knock that the door and acquaint his companion with his identity The defendant alleges that he kept the knife under his pillow as personal protection because of repeated robberies in Fort McKinley Defendant admitted to stabbing his roommate, but said that he did it under the impression that Pascual was "a ladron (thief)" because he forced open the door of their sleeping room, despite the defendant's warnings Defendant was found guilty by the trial court of simple homicide, with extenuating (mitigating) circumstances, and sentenced to 6 years and 1 day presidio mayor, the minimum penalty prescribed by law Issue: Whether or not the defendant can be held criminally responsible Holding: No. Ratio: By reason of a mistake as to the facts, the defendant did an act for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be (i.e. if Pascual was actually a thief, he will not be criminally liable/responsible because it would be self-defense), but would constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts (i.e. if he knew that it was actually Pascual, he would be guilty of homicide/assassination) The defendant's ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith "The act itself foes not make man guilty unless his intention were so" The essence of the offense is the wrongful intent, without which it cannot exist "The guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances as they appear to him." If one has reasonable cause to believe the existence of facts which will justify a killing, if without fault or carelessness he does believe them, he is legally guiltless of the homicide The defendant was doing no more than exercise his legitimate right of self-defense He cannot be said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts RTC's decision is reversed. The defendant is acquitted.

People of thePhilippinesvs. Marivic Genosa FACTS: This case stemmed from the killing of Ben Genosa, by his wife Marivic Genosa, appellant herein. During their first year of marriage, Marivic and Ben lived happily but apparently thereafter, Ben changed and the couple would always quarrel and sometimes their quarrels became violent. Appellant testified that every time her husband came home drunk, he would provoke her and sometimes beat her. Whenever beaten by her husband, she consulted medical doctors who testified during the trial. On the night of the killing, appellant and the victim were quarreled and the victim beat the appellant.

However, appellant was able to run to another room. Appellant admitted having killed the victim with the use of a gun. The information for parricide against appellant, however, alleged that the cause of death of the victim was by beating through the use of a lead pipe. Appellant invoked self- defense and defense of her unborn child. After trial, the Regional Trial Court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide with an aggravating circumstance of treachery and imposed the penalty of death. On automatic review before the Supreme Court, appellant filed an URGENT OMNIBUSMOTION praying that the Honorable Court allow (1) the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the re-examination of the cause of his death; (2) the examination of Marivic Genosa by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the time she killed her husband; and finally, (3) the inclusion of the said experts reports in the records of the case for purposes of the automatic review or, in the alternative, a partial re-opening of the case a quo to take the testimony of said psychologists and psychiatrists. The Supreme Court partly granted the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION of the appellant. It remanded the case to the trial court for reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the battered woman syndrome plea. Testimonies of two expert witnesses on the battered woman syndrome, Dra. Dayan and Dr. Pajarillo, were presented and admitted by the trial court and subsequently submitted to the Supreme Court as part of the records. ISSUE: 1.) Whether or not appellant herein can validly invoke the battered woman syndrome as constituting self-defense. 2.) Whether or not treachery attended the killing of Ben Genosa. Ruling: 1. The Court ruled in the negative as appellant failed to prove that she is afflicted with the battered woman syndrome. A battered woman has been defined as a woman who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her to do without concern for her rights. Battered women include wives or women in any form of intimate relationship with men. Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered woman, the couple must go through the battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with a man once. If it occurs a second time, and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered woman. More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called cycle of violence, which has three phases: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the acute battering incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent) phase. The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from the battered woman syndrome. First, each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant and her intimate partner. Second, the final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced in the battered persons mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life. Third, at the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed probable -- not necessarily immediate and actual --grave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by the former against the latter. Taken altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the requisites of self-defense. Under the existing facts of the present case, however, not all of these elements were duly established. The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the cycle of violence supposedly characterizing the relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt there were acute battering incidents but appellant failed to prove that in at least another battering episode in the past, she had gone through a similar pattern. Neither did appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to the third phase of the cycle. In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in itself establish the legal right of the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the context of self-defense. Settled in our jurisprudence, is the rule that the one who resorts to self-defense must face a real threat on ones life; and the peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not merely imaginary. Thus, the Revised Penal Code provides that the following requisites of self-defense must concur: (1) Unlawful aggression; (2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense. It presupposes actual, sudden and unexpected attack -- or an imminent danger thereof -- on the life or safety of a person. In the present case, however, according to the testimony of Marivic herself, there was a sufficient time interval between the unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon him. She had already been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to their childrens bedroom. During that time, he apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of the danger he posed had ended altogether. He was no longer in a position that presented an actual threat on her life or safety. The mitigating factors of psychological paralysis and passion and obfuscation were, however, taken in favor of appellant. It should be clarified that these two circumstances -- psychological paralysis as well as passion and obfuscation -- did not arise from the same set of facts. The first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and the severity of the battery inflicted by the batterer-spouse upon appellant. That is, the repeated beatings over a period of time resulted in her psychological paralysis, which was analogous to an illness diminishing the exercise of her will power without depriving her of consciousness of her acts. As to the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion and obfuscation, it has been held that this state of mind is present when a crime is committed as a result of an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts or by a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason. To appreciate this circumstance, the following requisites should concur: (1) there is an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of mind; and (2) this act is not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the accused might recover her normal equanimity. 2. NO. Because of the gravity of the resulting offense, treachery must be proved as conclusively as the killing itself. Besides, equally axiomatic is the rule that when a killing is preceded by an argument or a quarrel, treachery cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, because the deceased may be said to have been forewarned and to have

anticipated aggression from the assailant. Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, the method of assault adopted by the aggressor must have been consciously and deliberately chosen for the specific purpose of accomplishing the unlawful act without risk from any defense that might be put up by the party attacked. The appellant acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion or obfuscation. The acute battering she suffered that fatal night in the hands of her batterer-spouse, in spite of the fact that she was eight (8) months pregnant with their child, overwhelmed her and put her in the aforesaid emotional and mental state, which overcame her reason and impelled her to vindicate her life and that of her unborn child. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of appellant for parricide. However, considering the presence of two (2) mitigating circumstances and without any aggravating circumstance, the penalty is reduced to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to 14 years 8months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum. Chua-qua vs Clave Our story begun at Tay Tung High School in Bacolod City. 30 year old Evelyn Chua had been teaching at this school for about 12 years and for the academic year 1975-76, she was assigned to handle a sixth grade class. There she met Bobby Qua, one of her students. The two was hooked up after Evelyn was tasked to render tutorial services for Bobby; the school after all required its faculty to provide remedial instructions to their students. After classes, Bobby would stay in the classroom and Evelyn would tutor him. The student-teacher relationship had gone another notch when the two fell in love, which thereto resulted to an exchange of vows in a civil ceremony on December 24, 1975. Since Bobby was aged 16 that time, consent and advice was given by his parent. On January 10, 1976, the couples observed the sacrament of holy matrimony in a church wedding officiated by a Catholic priest. It was not a happily ever after for the new couple however. Evelyns marriage to a 16 year old who also occurred to be her student had enraged the school. Tay Tung High School filed a clearance to terminate Evelyn at the sub-regional office of Department of Labor on the grounds of abusive and unethical conduct unbecoming of a dignified school teacher and that her continued employment is inimical to the best interest, and would downgrade the high moral values, of the school. She was considered immoral so to speak. Executive Labor Arbiter Jose Y. Aguirre, Jr. of the National Labor Relations Commission, Bacolod City, required Evelyn and the school to submit position papers and evidences as affidavits. In its affidavit, the school said Evelyn had defied all standards of decency by recklessly taking advantage of her position as a teacher as she lured a Grade VI boy under her advisory section and 15 years her junior into an amorous relation." The school added the fact that the two stayed in the classroom beyond class hours showed that there was something going wrong. The Labor Arbiter decided in favor of the school saying, While no direct evidences have been introduced to show that immoral acts were committed during these times, it is however enough for a sane and credible mind to imagine and conclude what transpired and took place during these times. By this, the Arbiter meant that although there is no substantial evidence of immoral acts between Evelyn and Bobby, the mere fact that they had a relationship was a proof that such immoral acts had transpired inside the schools premises. Evelyn was terminated from work. Her termination was approved without any hearings at all. Due process came short during that time according to her. Yet, she was determined not to lose. She told the commission that being in love and being wed-locked to her student didnt make her less of a dignified teacher. On December 1976, the commission reversed the Arbiters ruling, now favoring Evelyn. The school however refused to accept defeat as they appealed on the Minister of Labor on March 30, 1977. They won. However, Evelyn was given a financial assistance amounting to her six months salary. The smitten teacher elevated the case to the Office of the President on May 20, 1977. Then Presidential Executive Assistant Jacobo C. Clave came out with a decision and ordered the school to reinstate Evelyn and give her back wages. This was good news for Evelyn until the Executive Assistant had a change of heart saying that his new decision was based beyond legal issues and he had taken into considerations the fact that the rumors about Evelyn was unhealthy for a school community which has a delicate task of nurturing the children. A teacher, according to them should always act beyond reproach and above suspicion. But love still prevails. In a Supreme Court decision on August 30, 1990, Justice Regaldo said that it is unlawful to terminated Evelyn on the ground of immorality with no concrete evidence. The schools policy shouldnt be ad odds with the security of tenure. The judge also mentioned that the marriage of Evelyn with Bobby couldnt be taken as a proof that immoral acts had taken place inside the schools premises. As regards the claim that Evelyn had used her authority to malign a childs mind, Justice Regaldo said, while quoting Blaise Pascal:

If the two eventually fell in love, despite the disparity in their ages and academic levels, this only lends substance to the truism that the heart has reasons of its own which reason does not know. But, definitely, yielding to this gentle and universal emotion is not to be so casually equated with immorality. The deviation of the circumstances of their marriage from the usual societal pattern cannot be considered as a defiance of contemporary social mores. The court awarded Evelyn with three years back wages and a separation pay

PEOPLE v AYSON FACTS Private respondent Felipe Ramos was a ticket flightclerk of PALs Baguio station. PAL managementnotified him of an investigation due to his allegedinvolvement in irregularities in the sales of planetickets. On the day before the investigation, Ramosgave his superiors a handwritten note (exhibit K)expressing his willingness to settle the irregularities(in the amount of P76k). At the investigation, Ramos admitted his non-disclosure of the tickets mentioned, that the proceeds had been misused by him, andthat although he planned on paying back the money, he had been prevented from doing so out of shame. He also stated his willingness to settle the obligation on a staggered basis, the amount of which would be known at the next investigation which he desired to be held at Baguio CTO, that he be represented by Nieves Blanco, and that he was willing to sign his statement (exhibit A).- 2 months later, an information was filed against Ramos charging him with estafa against PAL. On arraignment he pleaded not guilty. At the close of the case, private prosecutors presented Ramos(above mentioned) statement, including his handwritten admission as evidence. Defendants attorneys objected, particularly as regards the handwritten confession as it was taken without Ramos having counsel. Respondent Judge declared exhibits A and K inadmissible as evidence as it appears he was not reminded of his constitutional rights to remains silent and have counsel. The private prosecutors filed an MFR, but respondent Judge justified his order citing the constitutional precept that the rights in custodial investigation cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.- Said orders are now assailed in this petition forcertiorari and prohibition. The Court required respondent Judge Ayson and Ramos to comment, and directed the issuance of a TRO enjoining respondents from further proceeding with the trial/hearing. The Solgen, who was also required to comment, sided with petitioner, praying that respondent judges orders be set aside and further ordering the admittance of exhibits A and K of the prosecution. ISSUE WON it was grave abuse of discretion for respondent judge to exclude exhibits A and K HELD YES- At the core of the controversy is Sec. 20, Art. IV of the 1973 Constitution which provides: No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence.- There are 2 rights dealt with in the section: the right against self-incrimination (now embodied in Sec. 17 Art. 3 of the 1987 Constitution) and the rights of a person in custodial interrogation (Sec 12Art. 3).The first right, against self-incrimination, is NOT to be compelled to be a witness against himself and applies to any person testifying in any proceeding, civil, criminal or administrative. It prescribes an option of refusal to answer incriminating questions and not a prohibition of inquiry. However, it can only be claimed when the specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness and cannot be claimed at any other time. The witness thus may not disregard a subpoena or refuse to testify altogether.The provision of the 1973 Constitution does not impose on the judge or any other presiding officer, any affirmative obligation to advise a witness of this right, which the witness should know, as ignorance of the law excuses no one. The right against self-incrimination is not automatically operational but must be claimed. Failure to claim it is an implied waiver of said right. The second right, or rather, group of rights, are a persons rights in custodial interrogation, which means questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. These section can be broken down into 3 rights: (1) the right to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of such right (2) no force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him(3) any confession obtained in violation of this shall be inadmissible in evidence.- The accused must be informed of these rights prior to any questioning, after which the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer or make a statement. Statements not made under custodial interrogation are not protected. It is important now to inquire whether the rights mentioned apply to persons under preliminary investigation or already charged in court for a crime. It is evident that a defendant under preliminary investigation is not under custodial interrogation, and there is thus no occasion to speak of such rights under custodial interrogation; however, the accused still possesses the right against self-incrimination.- Under the Rules of Court, the accused occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness and is entitled, among others: (1) not be a witness against himself (2) to testify as a witness on his own behalf; but if he offers himself as a witness, he maybe cross-examined as any other witness; his neglect of refusal to be a witness shall not in any manner prejudice or be used against him. Thus, unlike a nordinary witness, the accused may refuse to take the witness stand, be sworn, or answer any question altogether. The accused, if he chooses to testify, may refuse to answer only questions which could incriminate him of a crime for which he isnt charged.

It appears that respondent Judge mistakenly applied the rights set forth in Sec 20 Art. IV of the1973 Constitution. It is clear from the undisputed facts that Ramos was not in any sense under custodial interrogation, and thus his constitutional rights in relation thereto dont apply. Also, Ramos had voluntary answered the questions posed to him on the first day of the administrative investigation and agreed that the proceedings be recorded and filed as exhibits A and K, spontaneously offering to compromise his liability. Said exhibits may not be excluded as the so-called Miranda rights had not been accorded to Ramos.