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Altruism Versus Self-Interest: Sometimes a False Dichotomy*

Neera Kapur Badhwar (a1)


https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052500004039
Published online: 01 June 2009

Extract

In the moral philosophy of the last two centuries, altruism of one kind or
another has typically been regarded as identical with moral concern.
When self-regarding duties have been recognized, motivation
by duty has been sharply distinguished from motivation by self-interest.
Accordingly, from Kant, Mill, and Sidgwick to Rawls, Nagel, and
Gauthier, concern for our own interests, whether long-term or short-
term, has typically been regarded as intrinsically nonmoral. So, for
example, although Thomas Nagel regards both prudence and altruism as
structural features of practical reason, he identifies only the latter as a
moral capacity, prudence being merely rational, long-term egoism.
Similarly, John Ravvls and David Gauthier contrast self-interest and
other nontuistic interests—interests that are independent of others'
interests—with moral interest. We are morally permitted, no doubt, to
act out of self-interest within certain constraints, but such acts can have
no intrinsic moral worth. Pursuit of our own interests out of duty (if
there is such a duty) does have intrinsic moral worth, but such pursuit,
by hypothesis, cannot be motivated by self-interest. Self-interested
pursuit of our own interests as such, no matter how realistic, farsighted,
temperate, honest, or courageous, cannot be intrinsically moral. And
this remains the case even if self-interest motivates us to perform
other-regarding acts: only those other-regarding acts that are
(appropriately) motivated by others' interests count as moral, because
only such acts are altruistic.

Badhwar, N. (1993). Altruism Versus Self-Interest: Sometimes a False Dichotomy. Social


Philosophy and Policy, 10(1), 90-117. doi:10.1017/S0265052500004039

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