HAZOP

EXIT
HAZARD STUDY
HAZAN
SAFETY AUDIT
DOW INDICES (HAZARD RANKING)
ACCIDENT ANALYSIS

HAZOP
HAZARD & OPERABILITY
SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT
QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT (QRA)
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PLAN (EMP)
EIA
The above diagram of inter-relationships shows that there are there are four main areas of hazard study
namely : Hazard analysis (HAZA!" Hazard and Operability study (HAZOP!" #$enario development"
%uantitative &is' Assessment (%&A! and finally (mergen$y )anagement Plan (()P!* These inter-
relationships are more elaborated in the following diagram :
ADAPTED FROM GUIDELINES FOR HAZARDS EVALUATION PROCEDURES,
AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CHEMICAL ENGINEERS, NEW YORK, 1985, P 1-9
ACCIDENT ANALYSIS
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT
SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
SAFETY AUDIT
DOW INDICES
HAZARD CHECK LIST
HAZAN
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
ACCIDENT CONSEQUENCE
RISK DETERMINATION
RISK AND/OR HAZARD ACCEPTABILITY
BUILD AND/OR OPERATE
YES
NO
HAZOP
QRA
EMP
EIA

Formal, structured approach to identification of

potential hazards and operability problems

Line by line / by equipment evaluation of the

design

Team eercise ! input from all engineering and

design disciplines, plus operations

"tructured brainstorming to loo# for deviations

from the design intent$
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"....the application of a formal systematic critical examination of the process
and engineering intentions of new or existing facilities, to assess the hazard
potential of mal-operation or malfunction of individual items of equipment
and the consequential effects on the facility as a whole.
[courtesy: Chemical Industries Association]
(Contd.)

The %&'() method has been *idely used in the

process industries, particularly in the +,-.s and ,.s,
and has developed a strong reputation as being an
effective and thorough means of identifying hazards
in process plants

& /synthetic eperience0 that ma#es it almost as easy

to spot problems in prospect as it is in retrospect$

Technique formalized by I1I 2345 in late 67.8s

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Essentially the %&'()" procedure involves ta#ing a full

description of a process and systematically questioning
every part of it to establish ho* deviations from the design
intent can arise$ (nce identified, an assessment is made as
to *hether such deviations and their consequences can
have a negative effect upon the safe and efficient operation
of the plant$ If considered necessary, action is then ta#en to
remedy the situation$
EXIT
T%E 9&"I1 1(:1E)T
(Contd.)
This critical analysis is applied in a structured *ay by the %&'()
team, and it relies upon them releasing their imagination in an
effort to discover credible causes of deviations$
In practice, many of the causes *ill be fairly obvious, such as
pump failure causing a loss of circulation in a cooling water facility .

The great advantage of this technique is that it encourages the

team to consider other less obvious *ays in *hich a deviation
may occur, ho*ever unli#ely they may seem at first
consideration$
;uch more than a mechanistic chec#!list type of revie*$

The result is that there is a good chance that potential failures

and problems *ill be identified *hich had not previously been
eperienced in the type of plant being studied$
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1hec# the design and consider *hether any of the

conditions *hich may occur from either a mal!
function or mal!operation, *hich may cause a
general hazard to people *or#ing on the
installation, to the general public or to plant and
equipment<

1hec# *hether the precautions incorporated into

the design are sufficient to either prevent the
hazard occurring or reduce any consequence to
an acceptable level<
EXIT
HAZOP studies are mainly intended to :
(Contd.)

consider any safety interfaces *hich eist *ith other

installations or parts of this installation<

ensure that the plant can be started, maintained and shutdo*n

safely, and<

*here appropriate recommend changes to the process design

or its operation that increase process safety or enhance unit
operability$
EXIT
HAZOP studies are mainly intended to :

ne* plants *here the design is nearly firm

and documented<

eisting plants as part of a periodic hazard

analysis or a management of change
process$ 2as for e.g. changes initiated through PCOs
etc5
EXIT
HAZOP studies are best performed on:

When a process is operating within its

design envelope, the potential for hazards
or operability problems does not eist!

"t is also a primary assumption that the

original process design and the
e#uipment standards applied are correct!
F3:=&;E:T&L &""3;)TI(:
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"elect a section 2node5
"elect a )arameter
&pply /guide*ords0 to identify potential /deviations0
9rainstorm all possible /causes0 2stay *ithin the section5
"elect the first identified cause
=evelop ultimate potential /consequence2s50 2loo# inside and outside the
section5
List eisting /safeguards0 2loo# inside and outside the section5
=evelop ris# ran#ing
)ropose /recommendations0 2*eigh consequences and safeguards5
>epeat for each cause / deviation / parameter / section
Follo* up and recording
EXIT
HAZOP studies $ the stages in the conduct of the study
How %o &ead A HAZOP
%is role is to?
(rganize a team
&ct as a facilitator to bring to bear the
epert #no*ledge of the team members in
a structured interaction$
@et the team to /thin# the unthin#able0$
Focus more on the /human element0$
:ot to identify hazards and operability
problems, but rather to ensure that such
identification ta#es place$
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;anage the personal interactions bet*een the team members$
(btain balanced contributions and to minimize the effect on
individuals *hen the design is subAect to criticism$

Persons needed:

'hairman

(cribe

Process ) (ystems *ngineer+s,

Operations -epresentative+s,

Other engineering disciplines +'ontrol, *lectrical, etc!,

.ocuments needed:

.esign /asis

P)".s

'ause ) *ffects .iagrams

Operating Philosophy0 "nstructions1!!

.edicated room and facilities

.edicated +available full time, team members

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Or$anizin$ a HAZOP Study (Contd.)
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-oles and responsibilities:

'hairman ensures all are:

familiar with techni#ue,
directs on selection of nodes, parameters, etc!
ensures meeting stays on trac2
Produces report

(cribe:
records proceedings,
prepares action lists after each session

%eam members actively and freely participate

-ecording of (tudy +HAZOP (oftware or

3anually,

Assigning and close out of recommendations

4ollow up by 'hairman0 designated Pro5ect *ngineer

Prepare close out report

"election of a /Team Leader0
EXIT

Id!""#, $ %$&'"d (&) $!* +( )&& ,"&%"# !%%&,-!)d

.-)$ )$ /0&1,) '(d0 0*-. !% )$0 2-3$) + ! 0-%4
&5 $-2 (&) +-(3 %'55-,-()"# &+1,)-* -( $-% d-0,)-&(
&5 )$ )!26

H %$&'"d + ,!05'""# ,$&%( !(d + 5'""# ,&(*0%!()

.-)$ )$ H!7&/ 2)$&d&"&3# !(d -% ,!/!+" &5 (%'0-(3
%2&&)$ !(d 55-,-() /0&30%% &5 )$ %)'d#
there needs to be a person appointed who will be in overall
charge; with Hazop Studies this person is usually called the
Chairman or Study Leader.....
"election of a /"cribe0
EXIT

H-% ,&()0-+')-&( )& )$ d-%,'%%-&( 2!# + 2-(-2!", !%

$-% 2!-( 5'(,)-&( d'0-(3 )$ %%%-&(% .-"" + )& 0,&0d
)$ %)'d# !% -) /0&,d%6 H .-"" )$05&0 (d )& $!*
%'55-,-() ),$(-,!" 4(&."d3 )& + able to understand
what is being discussed6

H $"/% &03!(-% )$ *!0-&'% 2)-(3%, )!4% (&)%

d'0-(3 )$ 8!2-(!)-&( %%%-&(% !(d ,-0,'"!)% )$
0%'")!() "-%)% &5 !,)-&(% &0 9'%)-&(%6
Another important member of the team will be the Scribe or
the Secretary.....

Start on time

ll peers

!o "ad ideas

Safe environment

#veryone contri"utes

$o not design it here

%eader&facilitator limits opinions

'requent "rea(s
Typical %&'()" @round >ules
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"upplementary @round >ules
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$iversity is good

)resent your views "ut avoid arguing for them

%isten to others

%oo( for compromise

$o not change your views to avoid conflict

*e suspicious of agreements reached too

easily

void ma+ority votes, see( consensus

(ection06ode (tudy reference section of the process: used to organize the
study into manageable segments
"ntentions How the 7process8 sections are epected to operate
Parameters Process and operating variables such as flow, pressure and
temperature
9uidewords :no; :more; :less; :as well as; :part of; :reverse; and :other than;
.eviations .epartures from the design and operating intentions +9uide
word < Parameter,
'auses -easons why deviations may occur +possible causes,
'onse#uences -esults of the uni#ue cause = a hazard causing damage, in5ury,
or other loss +potential conse#uences,
(afeguards .esign and operating features that reduce the fre#uency or
mitigate the conse#uences +eisting systems and procedures,
-is2 -an2ing *valuation of the possibility that an identified conse#uence will
occur, and will cause harm
-ecommendations -ecommendations for design or operating changes, or further
study
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EXIT
A! "##"!$%&' ("&$)*" %! $+%# ,*-."## -( /)"#$%-!%!0 &!1 #2#$"3&$%. &!&'2#%#
%# $+" )#" -( 4"25-*1# $- (-.)# $+" &$$"!$%-! -( $+" $"&3 ),-! 1"6%&$%-!#
&!1 $+"%* ,-##%7'" .&)#"#8 T+"#" 4"25-*1# &*" 1%6%1"1 %!$- $5- #)7-#"$#9

Primary >eywords which focus attention upon

a particular aspect of the design intent or an
associated process condition or parameter.

(econdary >eywords which, when combined

with a primary eyword, suggest possi"le
deviations.
The entire technique of Hazops revolves around the effective use of
these keywords, so their meaning and use must be clearly
understood by the team
EXIT
Primary Keywords:
These reflect both the process design intent and operational aspects of the
plant being studied Typical process oriented words might be as follows
4low %emperature
Pressure &evel
(eparate +settle, filter, centrifuge,
'omposition
-eact 3i
-educe +grind, crush, etc!, Absorb
'orrode *rode
O$+"* -,"*&$%-!&' 5-*1# $+&$ 3&2 7" &11"1 &*"9
D0!-( I%&"!)
V() P'03
I(%/,) M!-()!-(
S)!0):'/ S$')d&.(
EXIT
Secondary Keywords:
when applied in con!unction with a Primary Keyword, these suggest potential
deviations or problems They tend to be a standard set as listed below
6o ,he design intent does not occur -e.g. 'low&!o., or the
operational aspect is not achieva"le -/solate&!o.
&ess quantitative decrease in the design intent occurs -e.g.
Pressure!"ess.
3ore quantitative increase in the design intent occurs -e.g.
#emperature!$ore.
-everse ,he opposite of the design intent occurs -e.g.
%low!&e'erse.
Also ,he design intent is completely fulfilled, "ut in addition
some other related activity occurs -e.g. %low!Also indicating
contamination in a product stream( or "e'el!Also meaning
material in a tan or 'essel which should not be there.

EXIT
Secondary Keywords: (Contd.)
Other ,he activity occurs, "ut not in the way intended -e.g.
%low!Other could indicate a lea or product flowing where
it should not( or Composition!Other might suggest
une)pected proportions in a feedstoc.

4luctuation ,he design intention is achieved only part of the time -e.g.
an air*loc in a pipeline might result in %low!%luctuation.
*arly 0sually used when studying sequential operations, this
would indicate that a step is started at the wrong time or
done out of sequence

&ate s for #arly
Selectin$ *odes+ Para&eters and
)uidewords

6odes:+discrete location on the P+I, at which the process parameters are in'estigated
for de'iations,
&ines between ma5or pieces of e#uipment
*#uipment items +tan2s0vessels, columns, reactors,
Pac2ages +compressors, chemical in5ection,
?tilities0(ervices +Air, 6@, (team, .rains,Aents 4lare,
(ewers1!!,

Parameters: :+Physical or chemical property associated with the process,

4low, Pressure, %emperature, reaction others 1
Applicable to the 6ode

9uidewords:+-imple words used to .ualify or .uantify the intention and to guide and
stimulate the process for identifying process ha/ards5
6o, 3ore, &ess, As well as, others 1
Applicable to the Parameter

Parameter < 9uideword B Potential .eviation

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D"6%&$%-!#
D",&*$)*" (*-3 D"#%0!
I!$"!$%-!
R"&.$-* F%*"1
H"&$"*
E:.+&!0"*
C-')3!,
V"##"',
T&!4
P)3, ;
C-3,*"##-*
L%!"#
USE THE DEVIATIONS BELOW FOR ALL NODES INDICATED
FLOW
N-, L-5, M-*", R"6"*#" < < < < <
PRESSURE
N-, L-5"*, H%0+"* < < < < < <
TEMPERATURE
L-5"*, H%0+"* < < < < < <
LEVEL/INTERFACE
N-, L-5"*, H%0+"* < <
START-UP/SHUTDOWN
U#%!0 A'' $+" A7-6" < < < < < <
CONSIDER THE FOUR DEVIATIONS BELOW FOR ALL NODES INDICATED
CONTAMINANT
M-*" < < < <
REACTION
L-5, H%0+ < < < <
TO<ICITY
S&3,'%!0, M&%!$"!&!." < < < <
CORROSION/EROSION
M-*" < < < <
HAZOP ,eview )uideline %able
%ypical *odes
EXIT

.eviations are used to help team identify :causes; of

upsets, i!e! how does the process brea2 down C

%he same :cause; may apply to two or more :deviations;

.o not criticize :causes; during brainstorming

.o not argue about whether or not a :cause; belongs in a

particular :deviation; +no flow, less flow,D develop it when it
comes up

.o not list the same :cause; twiceD develop it the first timeD
if a new :deviation; triggers some thoughts for additional
conse#uences of a previously developed scenario, go bac2
and revise the scenario
EXIT
Co&&on .eviations and %"eir
Causes
'low 1rong routing, "loc(age,
"lind flange left in, faulty
non-return valve, "urst
pipe, control valve,
isolation valve, pump or
vessel failure.
)artial "loc(age -filters.,
vessel or valves failing,
lea(s, loss of pump
efficiency.
!& 2ore than 3 pump
operating, reduced
delivery head, increased
suction pressure, other
routes, exchanger tu"e
lea(s.
)ressure 4pen to atmosphere. 5eneration of vacuum "y
pump drain out of
vessels, cooling or
condensation from
vapour or gas dissolving
in a liquid.
)ump&compressor
suction lines "loc(ed.
!& Surge, relief, lea(age
from 6) connection -lines
and flanges., thermal,
rate of pressurising lines.
,emperature !& 'reezing, loss of
pressure, loss of heating,
failed exchanger tu"es.
!& 'ouled cooler tu"es,
cooling water failure,
failed exchanger tu"es.
#xothermic reaction.
%evel #mpty tan(, vessel. 7ontrol valve failure,
manual error, pump out.
6igh or %ow interface
level.
7ontrol valve failure,
manual error, "loc(ed
outlet.
7omposition 8 viscosity,
density, phase
2ixing failure. dditive
-e.g. chemical in+ection.
failure.
)oor mixing, or
interruption during mixing.
)assing through
isolations, lea(ing
exchanger tu"es, phase
change, out of spec.
#xcessive additives,
mixing.
5uide 1ords
)rocess )arameters
!o, !ot, !one %ess, %ow, Short )art of 2ore, 6igh
EXIT
.evelop /Conse0uences1
wit"out /Sa2e$uards1

"dentify ultimate potential conse#uences for each

deviation

'ommon error by process hazards review teams

is to ta2e credit for safeguards when developing
conse#uences

When developing conse#uences consider the

following:

4perator is not availa"le or is not paying attention

7ontrol valves are in 9manual:

larms and safety interloc(s do not function

)rocedures are not followed or are not understood

EXIT
.eviation 2ro& desi$n intent

.esign "ntent

defines how a plant or +ust a part of it is expected to

operate. It may be to produce a certain tonnage per year of a
particular chemical( to manufacture a specified number of
cars( to process and dispose of a certain 'olume of effluent
per annum( etc

"ut in the vast ma+ority of cases it would also "e

understood that an important su"sidiary intent would
"e to conduct the operation in the safest and most
efficient manner possi"le.
EXIT
.eviation 2ro& desi$n intent
(Contd.)
EXIT
,o illustrate, let us imagine that as part of the overall production
requirement we needed a cooling water facility. much
simplified statement as to the design intent of this small section
of the plant would "e "to continuously circulate cooling water at
an initial temperature of )0C and at a rate of )) liters per hour".
A 1"6%&$%-! -* 1",&*$)*" (*-3 $+"
1"#%0! %!$"!$ %! $+%# .&#" 5-)'1 7"
& ."##&$%-! -( .%*.)'&$%-!, -* $+"
5&$"* 7"%!0 &$ $-- +%0+ &! %!%$%&'
$"3,"*&$)*"8 N-$" $+" 1%(("*"!."
7"$5""! & deviation &!1 %$# cause8
I! $+%# .&#", (&%')*" -( $+" ,)3,
5-)'1 7" & .&)#", !-$ & 1"6%&$%-!8
H"&$ E:.+&!0"*
P)3,
F&!
C--'"*
Priority 2or Sa2e$uards

;7ause elimination first, ;7onsequence

mitigation second

/nherent design cushion -"etter than

minimum consensus standards.

1ritten procedures for <

4perations

2aintenance

/nspection

,esting
EXIT
Priority 2or Sa2e$uards (cont.)

%raining

History

)revious incidents -lac( of.

#quipment inspection -i.e. clean or non corrosive

service.

*#uipment

)S=s

>edundant& voting systems

/ndependent alarms& shutdowns

7ontrol instruments
EXIT
3ualitatively 4sti&atin$ ,is5
S6,
> ? ris( is an assessment of how serious and
how credi"le is each identified deviation, its
causes and consequences@ a com"ination of the
li(elihood and the severity of the predicted or
ultimate consequences
> ? S A %
S ? ,he severity of the predicted consequences
% ? ,he li(elihood of the predicted
consequences developing given the safeguards
that are currently in place
EXIT
(*A*-" %E = 4" A* PO" 6% ('H*3* 4O- (*A*-" %E &*A*&
'lass .efinition
F A High " n plant fatalityD Public fatalitiesD *tensive
property damageD environmental damageD
*tended downtime + G or B @ days ,
@ High &ost time in5 uryD Public in5 uries or public
impactD (ignificant property damageD *ceeds
3*PA standardsD .owntime + F to @ days ,
H 3edium 3inor in5 uryD 3oderate property damageD 6o
environmental impactD .owntime + I to @I
hours , D Off=spec product
I &ow 6o wor2er in5 uriesD 3inor property damageD
6o environmental impactD .owntime + J I
hours ,
K A &ow 6o wor2er in5 uriesD 6o property damageD 6o
environmental impactD -ecoverable
operational problem
&" >*&" HOO. = 4" A* PO" 6% ('H*3* 4O- &" >*&" HOO.
'lass 4re#uency of Occurrence
F A High Possible to occur + J K years ,
@ High Possible to occur + K J FK years ,
H 3edium Possible to occur under unusual circumstances
+ FK J HL years ,
I &ow Possible to occur over the lifetime of the plant
+ HL J FLL years,
K A &ow 'ould occur, however not li2ely over plant life
+ F 0 FLL years,
S"6"*%$2
1 = > ? 5
1 1 = > ? 5
= = ? @ A 8
L%4"'%+--1 > > @ A 8 9
? ? A 8 9 1B
5 5 8 9 1B 1B
-"(> -A6>"69 3A%-"M
EXIT
HA!PS Study "ethodology
In simple terms( the 1A2OP study process in'ol'es applying in a
systematic way all rele'ant eyword combinations to the plant in
.uestion in an effort to unco'er potential problems. #he results are
recorded in columnar format under the following headings:
EXIT
DEVIATION CAUSE CONSECUENCE SAFEGUARDS ACTION
I! .-!#%1"*%!0 $+" %!(-*3&$%-! $- 7" *".-*1"1 %! "&.+ -( $+"#"
.-')3!#, %$ 3&2 7" +"',()' $- $&4" &# &! ":&3,'" $+" (-''-5%!0
#%3,'" #.+"3&$%.8
HA!PS Study "ethodology
EXIT
"ote that this is purely representational, and not intended to illustrate an actual
system
M%:"*
P)3, P1
.osing
%an2 %F
S$*&%!"* S1
AF
P;
HAZOPS Study 7et"odolo$y (Contd.)
EXIT

$eviation
,he (eyword com"ination "eing applied -e.g.
'low&!o..

7ause
)otential causes which would result in the deviation
occurring. -e.g. "-trainer -3 blocage due to
impurities in ,osing #an #3" might "e a cause of
'low&!o..

7onsequence
,he consequences which would arise, "oth from the
effect of the deviation -e.g. 4"oss of dosing results in
incomplete separation in 53". and, if appropriate,
from the cause itself -e.g. 4Ca'itation in Pump P3(
with possible damage if prolonged4..
HAZOPS Study 7et"odolo$y (Contd.)
EXIT

(afeguards
ny existing protective devices which either prevent
the cause or safeguard against the adverse
consequences would "e recorded in this column. 'or
example, you may consider recording ""ocal pressure
gauge in discharge from pump might indicate problem
was arising".
!ote that safeguards need not "e restricted to hardwareB where
appropriate, credit can "e ta(en for procedural aspects such as
regular plant inspections -if you are sure that they will actually "e
carried outC..

Action
ctions fall into two groups<
3. ctions that remove the cause.
D. ctions that mitigate or eliminate the consequences.
HAZOPS Study 7et"odolo$y (Contd.)
EXIT

Always investigate removing the cause first, and only

where necessary mitigate the conse#uences!

'or example "-trainer -3 blocage due to impurities etc".

we might approach the pro"lem in a num"er of ways<
#nsure that impurities cannot get into ,3 "y fitting a strainer in the
road tan(er offloading line.
7onsider carefully whether a strainer is required in the suction to the
pump. 1ill particulate matter pass through the pump without causing
any damage, and is it necessary to ensure that no such matter gets
into =3. /f we can dispense with the strainer altogether, we have
removed the cause of the pro"lem.
'it a differential pressure gauge across the strainer, with perhaps a
high d) alarm to give clear indication that a total "loc(age is
imminent.
'it a duplex strainer, with a regular schedule of changeover and
cleaning of the stand"y unit.
Preparatory !or5
EXIT

#his preparatory wor will be the responsibility of the

Chairman( and the re.uirements can be summari/ed as
follows:
18A##"37'" $+" 1&$& D#$%s, #&'%s, (ayouts, )&* diagrams etc+
=8U!1"*#$&!1 $+" #)7E".$ Denable him to plan a sensible strategy, duration of the
review, etc+
>8S)71%6%1" $+" ,'&!$ &!1 ,'&! $+" #"/)"!." DSplit into manageable sections,
endeavour to group smaller items into logical units+
?8M&*4-), $+" 1*&5%!0# Duse distinctive and separate colours, when node spans
two or more drawings, the colours used should remain constant+
58D"6%#" & '%#$ -( &,,*-,*%&$" K"25-*1#
@8P*",&*" T&7'" H"&1%!0# &!1 &! A0"!1& D like reference drawings, parameter,
node intention, session noetc+
A8P*",&*" & $%3"$&7'"
88S"'".$ $+" $"&3 Dchairman also to ensure the core team members are available
for the duration of the review,+
,8**I*) A HAZOP S%8.9
EXIT
After the preparatory wor( the chairman should be in a
position to easily guide an efficient and comprehensi'e
study through to a successful conclusion.

%o*ever, there are certain guideline to remember:

F&0+-d )!2 22+0% $- %'')#$*&$" $+"%* %1"&# -! $+" 3&#$"* P;ID#8

D Establish the rule right at the beginning of the sessionF

R%-%) )2/)!)-&( )& $!%)( )$ /0&,%% 72 '%#$%!0 ,-$"!$%&' .&)#"/

.-!#"/)"!."# %( #.+"1)'" %# #'%,,%!08

D& (&) !""&. ! %/!0!) 2)-(3 )& d*"&/, with two team members
conversing in low voices at the corner of the table8

E!#)*" $+&$ !"" )!2 22+0% /!0)-,-/!), "6"! $+-#" 5+- 3%0+$ (""'
)!#)*" -( $+"3#"'6"#8

R,&3(-7 !(d 0.!0d 5%$+ ,*&%#" $+" $"&3 3"37"*/# 5+- .-!$*%7)$"
$- $+" 1%#.)##%-! 5+-'"+"&*$"1'2 &!1 #"!#%7'28 However, do not allow
them to overshadow the rest of the team8
,8**I*) A HAZOP S%8.9 (Contd.)
EXIT

I( 1%#.)##%-! 5&!1"*# &5&2 (*-3 $+" 3&$$"* )!1"* .-!#%1"*&$%-!, *"-

(-.)# $+" &$$"!$%-! -( $+" $"&3 "%$+"* 72 *"/)"#$%!0 $+&$ $+" S".*"$&*2
*"&1 -)$ 5+&$ +" +&# *".-*1"1, -* 72 &#4%!0 (-* &! &.$%-! $- 7"
(-*3)'&$"18

T+" C+&%*3&! #+-)'1 7" %!1","!1"!$ &!1 )!7%&#"1, &!1 #+-)'1 !-$ 7"
,"*."%6"1 &# .-!#$&!$'2 (&6-*%!0 -!" #".$%-! -( $+" $"&3 &# -,,-#"1 $-
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T+" &.$%-! GH)#$%(2 $+" *"/)%*"3"!$ (-* & H%0+ L"6"' A'&*3G %# &11*"##"1 $- $+" client8 T+" C+&%*3&!
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'%4"'2 $- 7" .-!$"!$ 5%$+ $+%# (-*3)'&8

T+" &.$%-! GH)#$%(2 $+" &7#"!." -( & H%0+ L"6"' A'&*3G %# &11*"##"1 $- $+" contractor. T+" C+&%*3&!
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%"e ,eport
EXIT
The HA!P #e$ort is a key document pertaining to the safety of the plant
't is crucial that the benefit of this e,pert study is easily accessible and
comprehensible for future reference in case the need arises to alter the
plant or its operating conditions

T+" 3&E-* ,&*$ -( #).+ & *",-*$ %# $+" $rinted "inutes, %! 5+%.+ %# '%#$"1
$+" $"&3 3"37"*#, 3""$%!0 1&$"#, K"25-*1# &,,'%"1, &!1 "6"*2 1"$&%' -(
$+" #$)12 $"&3# (%!1%!0#8

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#)33&*2 3%0+$ $2,%.&''2 7"9
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G"!"*&' .-33"!$#
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R"#)'$#8 Dusually states the number of recommended actionsF
-
A,,"!1%: Dmaster copies of dwgs, studied, tech data used, cals produced,
)&* charts, corr bet contractor to vendor, or client to contractor etc F
S"'".$ & N-1" S"'".$ & N-1"
E:,'&%! E:,'&%!
1"#%0! %!$"!$ 1"#%0! %!$"!$
S"'".$ P*-."## S"'".$ P*-."##
P&*&3"$"* P&*&3"$"*
A,,'2 A,,'2
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S&("0)&*1# S&("0)&*1#
A##"## R%#4 A##"## R%#4
D"6"'-, D"6"'-,
R".-33"!1"1 R".-33"!1"1
A.$%-!# A.$%-!#
R","&$ (-* &'' R","&$ (-* &''
G)%1"5-*1# G)%1"5-*1#
R","&$ (-* &'' R","&$ (-* &''
P&*&3"$"*# P&*&3"$"*#
R","&$ (-* &'' R","&$ (-* &''
N-1"# N-1"#
HAZOP 3ethod 4low 'hart
HAZOP 3ethod 4low 'hart
EXIT
HAZOP : .*%A"&*. (*N?*6'* O4 *MA3"6A%"O6 HAZOP : .*%A"&*. (*N?*6'* O4 *MA3"6A%"O6
21(3>T"EB? 1hemical Industry "afety and %ealth 1ouncil, +,CC/D5 21(3>T"EB? 1hemical Industry "afety and %ealth 1ouncil, +,CC/D5
Mark vessel as
completed
Repeat 1-22 for all vessels
on flow sheet
1
Beginning
Select a vessel
2
3
4
5
6

!
"
#$plain the general intention of the
vessel and its lines
Select a line
#$plain the intention of the
line
%ppl& the first g'ide words
(evelop a meaningf'l deviation
#$amine )ossi*le ca'ses
#$amine +onse,'ences
(etect -a.ards
1/ Make s'ita*le record
11
Repeat 6-1/ for all meaningf'l deviations
derived from the first g'ide words
12
13
14
15
16
1
1!
1"
Repeat 5-11 for all the g'ide words
Repeat 3013 for each line
Select an a'$iliar& 1e2g2
heating s&stem3
#$plain the intention of the
a'$iliar&
Repeat 5-12 for a'$iliar&
Mark a'$iliar& as having
e$amined
Repeat 5-1! for all
a'$iliaries
2/
#$plain intention of the vessel
Mark line as having *een e$amined
11
Repeat 5-12
12
13
14
15
Mark flow sheet as
completed
Repeat 1-24 for
all flow sheets
#nd
EXIT
HA!P Procedure: %low diagram
EXIT
S"'".$ & #".$%-! -( $+" P'&!$
H&6" &'' $+" *"'"6&!$ P*%3&*2 K"25-*1# (-* $+%# ,'&!$ #".$%-! 7""! .-!#%1"*"1 J
S"'".$ & P*%3&*2 K"25-*1 !-$ ,*"6%-)#'2 .-!#%1"*"18 D"808 ,*"##)*"F
H&6" &'' $+" *"'"6&!$ S".-!1&*2 K"25-*1# (-* $+%# P*%3&*2 K"25-*1 7""! .-!#%1"*"1 J
S"'".$ & S".-!1&*2 K"25-*1 !-$ ,*"6%-)#'2 .-!#%1"*"18 D"808 M-*"F
A*" $+"*" &!2 .&)#"# (-* $+%# 1"6%&$%-!# !-$ ,*"6%-)#'2
1%#.)##"1 &!1 *".-*1"1 J
N-
N-
N-
Y"#
Y"#
Y"#
R".-*1 $+%# !"5 .&)#"8
A*" &##-.%&$"1 .-!#"/)"!." -( &!2 #%0!%(%.&!."J
N-
Y"#
R".-*1 $+" .-!#"/)"!."/#
R".-*1 &!2 S&("0)&*1# %1"!$%(%"18
H&6%!0 *"0&*1 $- $+" C-!#"/)"!."# &!1 S&("0)&*1#, %# &! &.$%-! !"."##&*2J
R".-*1 $+" &0*""1 &.$%-!
Y"#
N-
&he reasons 'or such wides$read use o'
HA!PS
&lthough no statistics are available to verify the
claim, it is believed that the %&'() methodology
is perhaps the most *idely used aid to loss
prevention$ The reason for this can most probably
be summarized as follo*s?

It is easy to learn$

It can be easily adapted to almost all the operations

that are carried out *ithin process industries$

:o special level of academic qualification is required$

(ne does not need to be a university graduate to
participate in a study$

EXIT
EXIT

6E4) is a qualitative, ver"al and an interactive

group process that attempts to identify hazards and
su"sequently recommend modifications in order to
eliminate unaccepta"le ris( situations

)rovides a means to reveal potential hazards and

opera"ility pro"lems at design stage

7reative approach to identifying hazards

Systematic and thorough

EXIT

'ormal >ecord of Study

2inimizes cost to implement appropriate

safeguards in new or modified facilities

)articipants gain a thorough understanding of the

facility

lways >emem"er 8 ;the primary assumption

in a 6E4) study is that the original process
design and the equipment standards applied
are correct.
EXIT