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Use of Honey-pots to Detect


Exploited Systems Across Large
Enterprise Networks
Ashish Gupta
Network Security
May 2004

Overview
Motivation
What are Honeypots?
Gen I and Gen II

The GeorgiaTech Honeynet System


Hardware/Software
IDS
Logging and review

Some detected Exploitations


Worm exploits
Sage of the Warez Exploit

Words of Wisdom
Conclusions

Why Honeynets ?
An additional layer of security

Security: A serious Problem


Firewall

IDS

A Traffic Cop

Detection and Alert

Problems:

Problems:

Internal Threats

False Positives

Virus Laden Programs

False Negatives

The Security Problem


Firewall

IDS
HoneyNets

An additional layer of security

Properties

Captures all inbound/outbound data


Standard production systems
Intended to be compromised
Data Capture
Stealth capturing
Storage location away from the honeynet

Data control
Protect the network from honeynets

Two types
Gen I

Gen II

Good for simpler attacks


Unsophisticated targets

Sophisticated Data Control :


Stealth Fire-walling

Limited Data Control

Gen I chosen

GATech Honeynet System


Huge network
4 TB data processing/day

CONFIG

Sub-standard systems
Open Source Software
Simple Firewall Data
Control

IDS
Invisible SNORT Monitor
Promiscuous mode
Two SNORT Sessions
Session 1

Session 2

Signature Analysis

Packet Capture

Monitoring

DATA CAPTURE

Data Analysis

SNORT

DATA CAPTURE

Requires human resources

All packet logs stored

One hour daily !

Ethereal used

Forensic Analysis

Detected Exploitations

16 compromises detected
Worm attacks

Hacker Attacks

DETECTING WORM EXPLOITS


Honey Net traffic is Suspicious
Heuristic for worm detection:
Frequent port scans
Specific OS-vulnerability monitoring possible
Captured traffic helps signature development

SAGA of the WAREZ Hacker


Helped locate a compromised host
Honeynet

Very difficult to detect


otherwise !

IIS Exploit Warez Server


+ Backdoor

Words of Wisdom

Start small
Good relationships help
Focus on Internal attacks
Dont advertise
Be prepared to spend time

Conclusion

Helped locate compromised systems


Can boost IDS research
Data capture

Distributed Honey nets ?

Hunting down Honeypots


http://www.send-safe.com/honeypot-hunter.php

Discussion

The usefulness of the extra layer ?


Dynamic HoneyNets
Comparison with IDS: are these a
replacement or complementary ?

HONEY
NET

IDS

IDS vs HoneyNet

IDS primary function is detection and


alerting
Honeynets use IDS to detect and alert
but nothing is done to control the
threat
Primary intent is to log and capture effects
and activities of the threat
Honeynets do not protect the network they
have protection as a benefit, not intent

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