POSITIVE THEORY AND

CAPITAL MARKET RESEARCH

&
A POSITIVE THEORY
OF ACCOUNTING
DISCRETION
Kelompok 1 :

POSITIVE THEORY AND CAPITAL

MARKET RESEARCH

PHILOSOPHY of POSITIVE ACCOUNTING

THEORY
Philosophy
Teori positif dikeluarkan untuk memahami fenomenafenomena akuntansi dengan mengamati kejadian secara
empiris dan hasil pengamatan tersebut digunakan untuk
membuat prediksi kejadian di masa akan datang.
Milton Friedman:
Tujuan teori positif adalah mengembangakan teori atau
hipotesa yang menghasilkan prediksi yang valid dan
bermakna untuk prediksi atau phenomena yang belum
pernah diamati.
Watt & Zimmerma :
Tujuan teori positif adalah memprediksi dan menjelaskan
praktek akuntansi

PHILOSOPHY of POSITIVE ACCOUNTING

THEORY
Asumsi mengenai perilaku
individu :
Para manajer, investor dan lender merupakan
orang-orang yang rasional, menginginkan adanya
keuntungan dari sisi finansial
Manajer bisa memilih metode akuntansi yang
secara langsung memaksimalkan kepentingan
pribadinya atau merubah kebijakan yang
berkaitan dengan pendanaan dan produksi yang
secara tidak langsung mensejahterakan dirinya
sendiri
Manajer memaksimalkan nilai perusahaan

STRENGTHS of POSITIVE THEORY

1

Menghasilkan hipotesis melalui pengujian empiris

Memberi pemahaman tentang bagaimana dunia ini

bekerja

Memberi pemahaman mengenai kaitan antara

akuntansi dan harga saham

Berusaha memberi pemahaman mengenai kaitan

antara informasi akuntansi, manajer perusahaan
dan pasar serta menganalisa hubungannya

SCOPE of POSITIVE ACCOUNTING THEORY

Penelitian dampak akuntansi dan

Pengemban perilaku pasar modal.

gan teori
akuntansi
positif :

Menjelaskan dan memprediksi praktek

akuntansi dalam perusahaan.
Usaha untuk menjelaskan apakah perusahaan
menggunakan metode akuntansi tertentu untuk alasan
oportunistik. Contohnya memindahkan kesejahteraan
milik pemegang saham ke tangan manajer. Perspektif
mengenai oportunistik ini sering disebut ex post.
Mengasumsikan perusahaan memilih praktek
akuntansi untuk alasan efisiensi. Sehingga kebijakan
akuntansi ditempatkan sebagai ex ante untuk
menurunkan biaya kontrak antara perusahaan dan

CAPITAL MARKET RESEARCH and THE

EFFICIENT MARKETS HYPOTHESIS
Penelitian
Studi yang berusaha menentukan
pasar modal
dampak perilisan informasi
yang secara
keuangan terhadap return saham
khusus penting Studi yang memikirkan efek dari
terhadap teori
perubahan kebijakan akuntansi
akuntansi
terhadap harga saham
positif:
Sebagian besar
penelitian
mengenai hal
efficient markets hypothesis
ini mengarah
(EMH).
pada satu
paradigma
ekonomi

CAPITAL MARKET RESEARCH and THE

EFFICIENT MARKETS HYPOTHESIS

Tidak ada biaya transaksi

dalam perdagangan sekuritas

Pasar efisien,
asumsi:

Informasi disediakan secara

cuma-cuma bagi seluruh
peserta pasar
Ada perjanjian mengenai
dampak informasi saat ini
terhadap harga sekarang dan
pendistribusian harga pada
masa yang akan datang

CAPITAL MARKET RESEARCH and THE

EFFICIENT MARKETS HYPOTHESIS

Macam
Inform
asi

Strong

Weak

Semist
rong

CAPITAL MARKET RESEARCH and THE

EFFICIENT MARKETS HYPOTHESIS

Sementara EMH adalah

teori tentang mekanisme
harga pada pasar
sekuritas,

VS

Capital market research

(CMR) adalah penelitian
empiris yang
menggunakan metode
statistik untuk menguji
hipotesis yang berkaitan
dengan perilaku pasar
modal. Kebanyakan CMR
menggunakan market
model.

CAPITAL MARKET RESEARCH and THE

EFFICIENT MARKETS HYPOTHESIS

Asumsi dalam market

model:
Investor merupakan risk-averse
Return didistribusikan secara
normal dan para investor
memilih portofolio mereka
sendiri
Investor memiliki ekspektasi
yang sama

DAMPAK PENGUMUMAN LABA AKUNTANSI

TERHADAP HARGA SAHAM
Salah satu tujuan teori akuntansi positif adalah
mempelajari informasi yang dimiliki laba akuntansi
terhadap harga saham.
Ball & Brown melakukan pengujian terhadap manfaat
laba historical cost bagi investor.
Peningkatan laba akuntansi yang tidak diestimasi
sebelumnya merupakan informasi baru bagi investor.
Dalam pasar modal efisien, setiap perubahan aliran kas
dari yang diharapkan akan mempengaruhi harga
saham.

PENGARUH PENELITIAN INFORMASI LABA

TERHADAP HARGA SAHAM ( BALL & BROWNS)

Laba akuntansi
historis
mengandung
informasi yang
cukup berarti.

Dari hasil
penelitian
diketahui adanya
informasi yang
berkelanjutan di
pasar, jadi
akuntansi bukan
satu-satunya
informasi
mengenai
perusahaan.

Pasar secara
konsisten
mengantisipasi
informasi laporan
akuntansi.

KETIDAKSEIMBANGAN INFORMASI DAN

BESARNYA PERUSAHAAN
Kandungan informasi pengumuman laba yang
tidak diharapkan mungkin berlawanan dengan
ukuran perusahaan.
Semakin kecil perusahaan, semakin banyak
informasi yang terkandung pada perusahaan.
Argumentasi yang diberikan Freeman:
Perusahaan memberikan informasi yang lebih bervariasi
Perusahaan besar mempunyai tingkat informasi yang lebih
besar yang dilakukan oleh para peneliti dan pemberitaan.

Investor institusi umumnya lebih menyukai

bertransaksi dengan perusahaan besar, untuk
alasan likuiditas dan masalah kontrak.

BEBERAPA FAKTOR YANG MEMPENGARUHI

EARNING RESPON COEFICIENT

Laba
permane
n dan
tempore
r
Tingkat
Pertumb
uhan
Perusaha
an

Risiko
dan
ketidak
pastian

Kualitas
audit

Fakt
or

Financial
Leverag
e

Industri

Tingkat
Bunga

STRATEGI PERDAGANGAN
Berdasark
an bukti
empiris
ternyata
pasar
dapat
dipengaru
hi data
akuntansi

Perubahan
informasi
setelah
pengumuman
Winner-losser
strategies
dan sikap
optimis para
analis
keuangan.

MECHANISTIC OR BEHAVIOURAL EFFECT

Cosmetic accounting

Leftwich

Two hypotheses

Market reacted mechanistically to changes in

accounting numbers, regardless whether they
were cosmetic or whether they had cash flow
implications
Market ignored accounting changes which had
no cash flow consequences

MECHANISTIC OR BEHAVIOURAL EFFECT

Manipulating
accounting
numbers:

MECHANISTIC OR BEHAVIOURAL EFFECT

Detecting the quality and probability of accounting
management :

A POSITIVE THEORY
OF ACCOUNTING DISCRETION

BACKGROUND: EARLY DEMAND FOR

THEORY
Capital markets
research
inconclusive

Observations of
accounting policy
choice
Why do managers
prepare financial
reports?
How are accounting
policy choices made?

Information
hypothesis could
not explain all
observations

CONTRACTING THEORY
The firm as a legal
nexus of contractual
relationships
Organising economic
activity to reduce
contracting costs
management contracts
debt contracts

AGENCY THEORY
Jensen &
Meckling (1976)
Contract where
one party (the
principal)
engages
another (the
agent) to act on
their behalf

e.g. where there

is a separation of
management and
control.
Managers have
remuneration
contracts

Utility
maximisation by
both parties

Agent may act on

her/his own
behalf (selfinterest)

AGENCY THEORY
Firms can be characterised as a nexus
of contracts
Between consumers of products and the
suppliers of factors of production

Firms exist because they reduce

contracting costs,
Firms provide an efficient means of organising
economic activity

Contracts include all types of

agreements between two or more
parties

AGENCY THEORY

Agency
costs
Due to self interest, the agent might act in

his/her own interest rather than that of the

principal (moral hazard)
Agents may undertake certain Divergent
Behaviours
This agency problem gives rise to Agency
Costs (monitoring, bonding and residual
loss)

AGENCY THEORY
Agency costs can be categorised
into:
1.

Monitoring Costs the cost of

observing the agents behaviour

2.

Auditing costs

Bonding Costs Costs borne by the

agent (e.g. manager) as a result of
aligning their interests with the principal
(e.g. owners)

Manager has to prepare financial reports (a

cost to the manager in terms of time and
effort)

AGENCY THEORY
Agency costs can be categorised
into (continued):
3.

Residual Loss loss associated with

not being able to fully align the
interests of the principal with the
agent

AGENCY THEORY
Price
Protection
(ex ante
up front)
Ex post
settling up
(ex post
after the
fact e.g. at
the end of
each year)

The principal reduces the

remuneration paid to the
agent in anticipation of
agency costs
Cost of dysfunctional
behaviour built into
remuneration
The principal reduces the
remuneration paid to the
agent
Remuneration based on
observed agent performance

MANAGER-SHAREHOLDER AGENCY
RELATIONSHIPS

Manager
The smaller
has
the
incentive to
Managers as manager
contract
Manager
agents of
ownership with firm to
bear cost of
owners can in the firm
reduce
owner
act in own
the more
divergent
monitoring
interest
likely
behaviours
divergent
to reduce
behaviours
price
protection

MANAGER-SHAREHOLDER AGENCY
RELATIONSHIPS
RiskAversion
Overconsumptio
n of
Perquisites

Horizon
Problem
short term
focus on
performance
of firm

Agen
cy
Costs
of
Equit
y

limited
incentive to
increase value
of firm
through
investment in
risky projects

Dividend
Retention
reduced
incentive to
pay dividends
or take on
optimal levels
of debt

MANAGER-SHAREHOLDER AGENCY
RELATIONSHIPS
Reducing the agency costs of equity
Bonuses are usually tied to firm
performance in some way to motivate
managers to act in the owners interest
Bonuses can be paid in cash and/or
shares/share options
Bonuses can be tied to:
1. Accounting numbers(such as net
income, sales, return on assets)
2. Share price (market based performance
measure)

SHAREHOLDER-DEBTHOLDER AGENCY
RELATIONSHIPS

Agen
cy
costs
of
debt

Excessive dividend paymentsreducing debtholders security

Asset substitution-firm invests
in higher risk projects (no
benefit to debtholder)
Under investment-where no
incentive to invest in positive
NPV projects
Claim dilution-issuing higher
priority debt

SHAREHOLDER-DEBTHOLDER AGENCY
RELATIONSHIPS

Debt-holders can Price Protect via

increased interest charges or reduced
amounts provided
The interests of shareholders can be
bonded to those of debtholders via
restrictions in lending agreements
(Loan Covenants)
Covenants often rely on numbers
contained in financial statements
Covenants usually restrict the
behaviour of managers acting on

EX POST OPPORTUNISM VERSUS

EX ANTE EFFICIENT CONTRACTING
Contracts provide incentives for
agents to act against principals
interest
Opportunistic perspective

ex post (after contracts finalised)

incomplete contracts
bonus plan hypothesis
debt-equity hypothesis

Efficient contracting perspective

EX POST OPPORTUNISM VERSUS

EX ANTE EFFICIENT CONTRACTING

Efficient contracting
perspective
Efficient

contracts
align
interests
of agent
with
principal

Actions
that
benefit
agent also
benefit
firm

Ex ante
before
contracts
are
finalised

INFORMATION PERSPECTIVE
AND SIGNALLING

Holthause
n

Managers
provide
informatio
Derived
Similar to
n to
from
efficient
investors
signalling
contractin
to assist in
theory
g
their
decision
making

Accounting
informatio
n precedes
cash flows

INFORMATION PERSPECTIVE
AND SIGNALLING

Aligned with the information

hypothesis
Managers use the accounts to signal
expectations and intentions regarding
the future
Incentives to signal good, neutral and
bad news

POLITICAL PROCESSES

The firm and parties

interested in the firm

Political market v. capital

market
Less demand for information in
political market
Less benefit from information
gathering
Heterogeneity of interests

POLITICAL PROCESSES
Political costs wealth
transfers
Size hypothesis

Implications for firm

behaviour
e.g. banking sector in
Australia

EMPIRICAL TESTS
Testing the opportunistic
and political cost hypothesis
Watts &
Zimmerman
Zmijewski &
Hagerman
provided little
insight

EMPIRICAL TESTS
Empirical tests tests using contract
details (Healy)

Figure 10.1: Allocation of funds to the bonus pool,

based on accounting profit

EMPIRICAL TESTS
Empirical tests tests using contract
details (Healy)

Figure 10.2: Accounting accruals as a function of

bonus plan specifications

EMPIRICAL TESTS
Refining the
specification of
political costs
Liberty & Zimmerman
Godfrey & Jones
DeAngelo
Wong
Lemke & Page
Panchapakesan &
McKinnon
Ali & Kumar

EMPIRICAL TESTS
interest capitalisation

Tests of
efficient
contracting
hypotheses

voluntary consolidated
financial reporting
changes in CEO

other studies

EVALUATION OF THE THEORY

Methodological and statistical

criticisms
empirical evidence weak and
inconclusive
McKee, Bell & Boatsman
Christie
Leftwich

EVALUATION OF THE THEORY

Philosophical
criticisms

Tinker, Merino and

Neimark
Christenson
Watts and
Zimmerman

THANK YOU

Any Question ?