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The entity that has a monopoly over the legitimate

use of force to modify the actions of adults.

An institutional process through which individuals


collectively make choices and carry out activities.

Differences and Similarities in Public and Private


Decision-Making
Competitive behavior is present in both the market and public
sectors.
Private sector action is based on voluntary choice; public
sector is based on majority rule
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The most fundamental function of government is the


protection of individuals and their property against acts of
aggression.
Involves the provision of a limited set of goods that are
difficult to supply through the market

Involves the maintenance of a legal structure within which


people interact peacefully and provision of a mechanism for
the settlement of disputes while maintaining a competitive
market.

May Fail to Allocate Resources


Efficiently:
3. Public Goods
1. Monopoly
2.Externalities

4. Asymetric Information
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INEFFICIENCY OF PURE MONOPOLY


P An industry in pure competitionS = MC
sells where supply and
demand are equal

At MR=MC
A monopolist
will sell less
units at a
higher price
than in
competition

Sellers
may gain
by
P
restrictin m
g output P
c
and
raising
price. Too
few units
will be
produced

D
MR
Qm

Qc

Q
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Externalities exist when the market fails to


register fully costs and benefits.
External Costs:
Present when the actions of an individual or group harm
the property of others without their consent.
The Problem arises because property rights are
imperfectly defined and/or enforced.
External Benefits:
Present when the actions of an individual or group
generate benefits for nonparticipating parties.

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Because costs are not fully registered, the supply


curve understates the true cost of production.
Units may be produced that are valued less than
their cost.
From the viewpoint of efficiency, too many units
are produced.
Pollution problems are often a side effect.

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Consider the market to the right.


Under initial supply and demand
conditions an output of Q1 and a
price of P1 exist.
If, though, all costs are fully
identified and measured . . .
Then the new supply curve (S2 )
would result in an output of Q2 ( <
Q1) and a price P2 ( > P1).
The result of an externality with
external costs (a negative
externality) is that too many units
are produced at a price below that
which would prevail if all the
costs of the production, provision,
and consumption of the good were
identified and factored into it.

Price

Ideal
output

S2 (includes
external costs)
S1
P2

Actual
price and
output

P1

D
Q2 Q1

Quantity /
Time

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Demand curve understates total value


of output.

Units that are more highly valued than


costs may not be produced.
From the viewpoint of efficiency, too
few units may be produced.

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Consider the market to the right.


Under present supply and demand
conditions an output of Q1 and a
price of P1 exist.
If, though, all benefits are fully
identified and measured . . . then
the new demand curve (D2 ) would
result in an output of Q2 ( > Q1)
and a price P2 ( > P1).
The result of an externality with
external benefits (a positive
externality) is that too few units
are produced at a price below that
which would prevail if all the
benefits of the good were
identified and factored into it.

Price

Ideal
output

S
P2

Actual
price and
output

P1

D1
Q1 Q2

D2 (includes
external benefits)
Quantity /
Time

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Goods that are :


jointly consumed
Individuals can simultaneously enjoy
consumption of same product or service
non-excludable
Consumption of the good cannot be
restricted to the customers who pay for it

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If a public good is made available to one


person, it is simultaneously made available to
others.

Because those who do not pay cannot be


excluded, no one has much incentive to help
pay for such goods. Each has an incentive to
become a free rider

a person who receives the benefits of the good


without helping to pay for its cost.

But, when a lot of people become free riders,


too little is produced.

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It is the characteristics of the good, not the sector in


which it is produced, that distinguishes a public good.

Examples of public goods:

national defense
radio and television broadcast signals
clean air.

Markets often develop ways of providing public


goods (e.g. use of advertising to support provision
of radio and television). Nonetheless, public goods
often cause a breakdown in the harmony between
self-interest and the public interest.
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Either the potential buyer or potential


seller has important information that
the other side does not have.

Major problems of conflicting interests and


unhappy customers can arise when goods
are either

difficult to evaluate on inspection and


seldom repeatedly purchased from the same
producer, or,
potentially capable of serious and lasting
harmful side effects that cannot be predicted
by a lay person.
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The consumers
information problem is
minimal if the item is
purchased regularly.
Brand names, franchises,
and product warranties are
helpful ways of dealing
with information problems

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The Relative Size


and Extent of
Government

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The Size of Government


Sweden

66.1

Denmark

60.8

Netherlands

58.1

Germany

56.0

France

54.7

Belgium

54.5

Italy

52.7

Austria

52.7

Greece

49.4

Canada

Government Expenditures
as a % of GDP (1996)

46.4

United Kingdom

43.7

Ireland

37.7

Australia

37.5

Japan

36.9

United States

34.4

Singapore

23.7

South Korea

22.8

Thailand

20.3

Hong Kong

17.6

20

40

60

80

The U.S. spends about a third of GDP on local, state, and federal government.
This is 3 times what it was in 1930, but not as much as many of its trade partners.
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The Extent of Government


20

20

Health Care
Income Transfers

15

15
3.8

6.3
5.0

10.4

10

10

8.7
6.3

2.7

6.5
1.3

4.3

11.4

11.8

1980

1990

13.7

8.1
5.6

0
1960

1970

1980

1990

1997

(a) Defense expenditures as a % of GDP

1960

1970

1997

(b) Expenditures as a % of GDP

Defense spending as a % of GDP has declined sharply since 1960.


As was seen before, during this period federal government spending increased.
The increase in income transfers and health care spending during the past 4
decades has more than offset the reduction in defense expenditures.
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How Government Spends:


Federal spending: $1752 billion

State & local spending: $983 billion


Insurance
trusts
8%

Defensea
18%

Social Security
23%

Net interest
15%

Highways
3%
Other
7%

Public welfare
and health
22%

Income
security
14%
Medicare
and health
20%

1997

Police
and fire
protection
4%
Highways
6%
Utilities and
liquor stores
7%

Education
28%

Administrative
and other
expenditures
21%

Interest on debt
4%

1994

The way that the respective levels of government spend money differs significantly.

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How Government Taxes:


State & local taxes:

Federal taxes:

Property
15%
Payroll
34%
Personal
income
46%

Other
3%
Customs
duties 1%
Excise taxes
4%
Corporate
income
12%
1997

User charges a
24%

Payroll
12%

Sales and
excise
17%

Personal
income
10%
From
federal
government
16%

Corporate
income
2%

Other
4%

1994

The way that the respective levels of government tax differs significantly.

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Taxes
Progressive
Proportional
Regressive

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Ability

to Pay
Benefits Received

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The Opportunity
Cost of
Government

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Opportunity cost of resources


used to produce goods supplied
through the public sector.

Cost of resources expended in the


collection of taxes and the
enforcement of government mandates.
Excess burden (deadweight loss) of
taxation.

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Overview
of Collective
Decision
Making

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-- applies the tools of economics to the political


process in order to provide insight concerning
how the process works.

Self-interested behavior is present in both market and


political sectors.
Political process can be viewed as a complex exchange
process involving:

voter-taxpayers
politicians
bureaucrats

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The Voter-Consumer:

Voters will tend to support those candidates


whom they believe will provide them the most
government services and transfer benefits, net of
personal costs.
Rational Ignorance Effect:
-- Recognizing their vote is unlikely to be
decisive, most voters have little incentive to
obtain information on issues and alternative
candidates.
Because of the rational ignorance effect, voters
will be uninformed on many issues; such issues
will not enter into their decision making process.
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The Politician-Supplier:
Political officials are interested in winning
elections. Just as profits are the lifeblood of the
market entrepreneur, votes are the lifeblood of
the politician.
Rationally uninformed voters often must be
convinced to want a candidate.
Legislative bodies are something like a Board
of Directors

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Civil Servants (Government Bureaucrats) as Political Participants:

Bureaucrats (persons that handle day-to-day operations of


government) seek promotions, job security, power, etc.
The interests of bureaucrats are often complementary with
those of interest groups they serve. This is called the
CAPTURE problem.
Bureaucrats can usually expand their own interests, as well
as that of their constituents, by working for larger budgets
and program expansion.

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When Voting Works Well

Other things constant, legislators will have a strong


incentive to support political actions that provide
voters with large total benefits relative to costs.

If a government project is really productive, it will always be


possible to allocate the projects cost so that all voters will gain.
When voters pay in proportion to benefits received, all voters will
gain if the government action is productive (and all will lose if it is
unproductive.) Under these circumstances, there is a harmony
between good politics and economic efficiency.

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Benefits Derived by Voters from


Hypothetical Road Construction Project
TAX PAYMENT
Voter
Adams
Chan
Green
Lee
Diaz
Total

Benefits
Received
(1)

Plan A
(2)

Plan B
(3)

$20
12
4
2
2
$40

$ 5
5
5
5
5
$25

$12.50
7.50
2.50
1.25
1.25
$25.00

Consider the government program above. As with many such


programs, individuals receive varying levels of benefits.
If tax plan A is adopted to fund this program, it may be simple and
seem fair, but even as Adams is getting a real deal (values the
program at $20 and only pays $5) Green, Lee, and Diaz do not even
receive the value of their taxes paid in benefits.
When each voter pays in proportion to benefits received (tax plan B),
each receives more in benefits than it costs them in taxes. If tax plan
B is used, all voters gain and the program would pass unanimously.
This example shows that harmony between good politics and economic
efficiency can exist.

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When Voting
Conflicts with
Economic Efficiency

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When Voting Conflicts


with Economic Efficiency
Special Interest Effect
- generates substantial personal benefits for a
small number of constituents while imposing a
small individual cost on a large number of other
voters.
Interest group members will feel strongly about
an issue that provides them with substantial
personal benefits. Such issues will dominate
their political choices.
Politicians have a strong incentive to favor
special interest even if action is inefficient.
Logrolling and pork-barrel legislation
strengthen the special interest effect.
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Vote Trading and Passing


Counterproductive Legislation
Net Benefits (+) or Costs (-) To Each Voter in District

Voters of
District *
A
B
C
D
E
Total

Construction of
Post Office
In A
+ $10
- $03
- $03
- $03
- $03
- $02

Dredging
Harbor
In B
- $03
+ $10
- $03
- $03
- $03
- $02

Construction of
Military Base
In C
- $03
- $03
+ $10
- $03
- $03
- $02

Total
+ $4
+ $4
+ $4
- $9
- $9
- $6

*We assume the districts are of equal size.

Consider a composite bill in Congress that would build a post office


in district A, dredge a harbor in B, and construct a military base in C.
The benefits to A, B, and C voters vary by project. In total, A, B,
and C voters come out ahead despite the costs involved in paying
taxes for activities in other districts if they agree to vote together.
With this bill, there are no direct benefits to district D and E voters.
In total, the sum of benefits for the group of all voters come out
negative despite the positive benefits for district A, B, and C voters.
In a majority rule voting system, the majority can pass counterproductive
legislation benefiting themselves but creating negative net benefits for
the whole.
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When Voting Conflicts


with Economic Efficiency

Shortsightedness Effect

-- Issues that yield clearly defined current benefits


at the expense of future costs that are difficult-toidentify.

Political process is biased toward the


adoption of such proposals even when they
are inefficient.

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When Voting Conflicts


with Economic Efficiency

Rent Seeking

-- Actions by individuals and interest groups designed to


restructure public policy in a manner that will either
directly or indirectly redistribute more income to
themselves.

Widespread use of the taxing, spending, and


regulatory powers of government that favor some at
the expense of others will encourage rent seeking.
Rent seeking moves resources away from productive
activities. The output of economies with substantial
amounts of rent seeking will fall below their
potential.

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When Voting Conflicts


with Economic Efficiency

Lack of Incentive for Operational Efficiency

In the public sector, the absence of the profit motive


reduces the incentive of producers to keep costs low.
Neither is there a bankruptcy process capable of
weeding out inefficient producers.
Public-sector managers are seldom in a position to
gain personally from measures that reduce costs.
Because public officials and bureau managers spend
other peoples money, they are likely to be less
conscious of cost than they would be with their own
resources.

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There is nothing in positive economics that


indicates one distribution of income is
better than another.

A large and growing part of government is


devoted to transferring income.

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There are three major reasons why


large-scale redistribution will reduce
the size of the economic pie:

When taxes take a larger share of ones income, the


individual reward derived from hard work and
productive service is reduced.
As public policy redistributes a larger share of income,
more resources will flow into wasteful rent seeking
activities.
Higher taxes to finance income redistribution and an
expansion in rent-seeking will induce taxpayers to focus
less on income-producing activities, and more on
actions to protect their income.

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External costs and benefits


Lack of competition
Public goods
Poor information

Public Sector Vs. Market Sector:


A Summary
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The power of special interests

The shortsightedness effect


Rent seeking costs
Lack of signals and incentives to
promote operational efficiency

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Implications of Public Choice:

Getting More From Government

Both bad news and good news flow


from public-choice analysis:

The bad news:


For certain classes of economic activity,
unconstrained democratic government will
predictably be a source of economic waste and
inefficiency.
The good news:
Properly structured constitutional rules can
improve the expected result from government.

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Structure of Budget & Accounts:

Government Account
Consolidated Fund of India
Revenue Account
Receipts

Contingency Fund of India

Capital Account
Receipts

Tax Revenue
Non-Tax Revenue
Grants-in-aid &
Contributions
Expenditure
General services
Social Services
Economic Services
Grants-in-aid & Contributions

Public Account of India


Small savings

Expenditure
General Services
Social services

Deposits &
Advances
Reserve Funds
Suspense &
Misc.

Economic Services

Remittances

Grants-in-aid &
Contributions

Cash Balance

Public Debt
Loans & Advances
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Head
In Crore of Rupees
Tax Revenue
8,84,078.32
Non Tax Revenue 1,72,252.38
Capital Receipts 6,08,966.62
Grand Total1
6,65,297.32

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Head

In Crore of Rupees

Interest Receipts

17,764.39

Dividends and Profits

73,866.36

Fiscal Services
General Services
Social Services
Economic Services

87.82
12,254.71
2,684.42
62,972.64

Grants

1456.13

Non Tax Rev of UT

1165.91

Grand Total

172252.38

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Head

In Crore of Rupees

Recoveries of
Loans & Advances

10,654.00

Misc. Capital
Receipts

55,814.00

Net Borrowings
Net Securities
against Small
Savings
State PF Net

503,844.46
5,797.52
10,000

Other Receipts

12,296.54

External Debt

10,560.10

Net Market
Stabilisation
Scheme

20,000.00

We have been talking about deficit for some time here, and
Grand Total
628,966.62
if you look at these numbers above 36.6% of the total
revenues are capital receipts, and 80% of those capital
receipts are borrowings. So, effectively we borrow 29.3% of
what we have to spend. Thats just too high, and has to be
brought under control. When you look at it from this context,
widening the tax base and better compliance is inevitable if
you have to get this number under control.
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