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Long Term Evolution

and
its security infrastructure
Fataneh Safavieh
Mobile security Seminar,Bit,07.02.2011

Outline

Introduction: some history &background


What is LTE?
LTE-SAE Security: some highlights
Home(e)Node B Security

Introduction:
some history & background

Mobile Evolution
Improvements in mobile communication
technology during the last two decades
The Mobile Broadband is as important as Internt

http://www.nsma.org/conf2008/Presentation/2-1045-Miyahara-LTE_Overview_NMSA%2021March08_final.pdf

User Expectations

Highly desire of broadband acces everywhere


1. Home, Office
2. Train, Aeroplane, Canteen, during the Breake

Ubiquity (anywhere, anytime)


Higher voice quality
Higher speed
Lower prices
Multitude of services

http://www.nsma.org/conf2008/Presentation/2-1045-Miyahara-LTE_Overview_NMSA%2021March08_final.pdf

3GPP

The 3rd generation partnership project

A global partnership of six SDOs:


1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Europe
USA
China
Japan
Korea

ETSI
ATIS
CCSA
ARIB & TTC
TTA

LTE The UMTS Long Term Evolution - Sesia, Toufik, Baker

What is LTE?

What is LTE?
The latest standard in the mobile network
technology tree
A project of 3GPP & mainly built on 3GPP
cellular systems family
May be referred as E-UTRA & E-UTRAN
Has advanced new radio interface
Circuit switched networksall-IP networks
Broadband connectivity on the move
100Mbps(DL), 50Mbps(UL), ~10 ms Latency
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UMTS and LTE architecture

Extract from Towards Global Mobile Broadband


A White Paper from the UMTS Forum

LTE key features


High Spectral Efficiency more customers, less
costs

Co-existence with other standards


Flexible radio planning (cell size of 5km30/100km)
Reduced Latency less RTT, multi-player gaming,
audio/video conferencing

Reduced costs for operators (OPEX & CAPEX)


Increased data rates via enhanced air interface
(OFDMA,SC-FDMA,MIMO)
All-IP environment SAE or EPC
key advantages of SAE

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LTE-SAE Security:
some highlights

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Security in the LTE-SAE Network

Security features in the network (from TS 33.401- Fig.4-1)

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Security features in the LTE-SAE


Network
Five security feature groups defined in TS 33.401
(I): Network access security
provides users with secure access to services
protects against attacks on the access interface

(II): Network domain security


enables nodes to exchange signaling- & user- data securely
protects against attacks on the wire line network

(III): User domain security


Provides secure access to mobile stations

(IV): Application domain security


enables applications in the user & provider domains to exchnage messages securely

(V): Visibility and configurability of security


allows the users to learn whether a security feature is in operation
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Authentication & key agreement

HSS generates authentication data and provides it to MME


Challenge-response authentication and key agreement
procedure between MME and UE
4th ETSI Security Workshop - Sophia-Antipolis , 13-14 January 2009

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Confidentiality & integrity of


signaling

RRC signaling between UE and E-UTRAN


NAS signaling between UE and MME
S1 interface signaling
protection is not UE-specific
optional to use

4th ETSI Security Workshop - Sophia- Antipolis,13-14 January 2009

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User plane confidentiality

S1-U protection is not UE-specific


(Enhanced) network domain security mechanisms (based on IPsec)
Optional to use

Integrity is not protected for various reasons, e.g.:


performance
limited protection for application layer
4th ETSI Security Workshop - Sophia- Antipolis, 13-14 January 2009

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Cryptographic network separation

Key hierarchy (TS 33.401 - Figure 6.2-1)

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Cryptographic network separation


Authentication vectors are specific to the serving network

AVs usable in UTRAN/GERAN cannot be used in


EPS
AVs usable for UTRAN/GERAN access cannot be used
for EUTRAN access
Solution by a separation bit

Rel-99 USIM is still sufficient for EPS access


ME has to check the separation bit (when
accessing E-UTRAN)
4th ETSI Security Workshop - Sophia-Antipolis , 13-14 January 2009
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Home (e) Node B Security

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System architecture of H(e)NB


UE

HNB

insecure
link

SeGW

Operators
core
network

E-UTRAN air interface between UE and HeNB


HeNB accesses operators core network via a Security Gateway
The backhaul between HeNB and SeGW may be insecure
Operators core network performs mutual authentication with HeNB
via SeGW
Security tunnel between HeNB and SeGW to protect information
transmitted in backhaul link
Figure from draft TR 33.820

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Common threats to H(e)NB


1. Physical tampering with H(e)NB
2. Fraudulent software update / configuration
changes
3. Denial of service attacks against core network
4. Eavesdropping of the other users UTRAN or
E-UTRAN user data
5. User cloning the H(e)NB authentication Token
From TR 33.820
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Security requirements to H(e)NB


1.
2.

3.
4.
5.

Unprotected data should never leave a secure domain inside


H(e)NB
Software updates and configuration changes for the H(e)NB shall
be cryptographically signed (by operator or H(e)NB supplier) and
verified configuration changes shall be authorized by H(e)NB
operator or supplier
Unauthenticated traffic shall be filtered out on the links between
the core network and the H(e)NB
New users should be required to explicitly confirm their
acceptance before being joined to an H(e)NB
H(e)NB authentication credentials shall be stored inside a secure
domain i.e. from which outsider cannot retrieve or clone the
credentials
From TR 33.820

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References and Resources

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References and Resources


A Long Term Evolution Downlink inspired channel
simulator using the SUI 3Channel Model, Thesis of
Sanjay Kumar Sarkar, August 2009
LTE The UMTS Long Term EvolutionSesia, Toufik, Baker (WILEY Publication) 2009
http://www.nsma.org/conf2008/Presentation/2-1045MiyaharaLTE_Overview_NMSA%2021March08_final.pdf
Towards Global Mobile Broadband A White Paper
from the UMTS Forum, February 2008
TS 33.401
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References and Resources


4th ETSI Security Workshop- Sophia-Antipolis ,
13-14 January 2009
TR 33.820
A Survey of Security Threats on 4G Networks,
Yongsuk Park and Taejoon Park
Security in the LTE-SAE Network,
www.agilent.com/find/lte
www.3gpp.org
www.radio-electronics.com

http://sites.google.com/site/lteencyclopedia
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Thank
You
For
Your

Attention!
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