ADOPTION

Lazatin v. Campos (1979)

Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem, which
creates between two persons a relationship similar to that
which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. Only
an adoption made through the court, or in pursuance with
the procedure laid down under the Rule 99 of the Rules of
Court is valid in this jurisdiction.
Cervantes v. Fajardo (1989)
The minor has been legally adopted by petitioners
with the full knowledge and consent of biological
parents. A decree of adoption has the effect,
among others, of dissolving the authority vested in
natural parents over the adopted child. The
adopting parents have the right to the care and
custody of the adopted child and exercise parental
authority and responsibility over him.
Bernardina Bartolome v. SSS (2014)
The Decision of the ECC not granting death
benefits to the biological mother was reversed by
the SC. That decedent was adopted, does not
deprive biological mother of the right to receive the
benefits from her sons death. Since the parent by
adoption already died when decedent was a minor,
the death benefits under the Employees'
Compensation Program shall accrue solely to his
mother, his sole remaining beneficiary.
Laws on Adoption
R.A. No. 8043 Inter-Country
Adoption Act of 1995

R.A. No. 8552 - Domestic Adoption Act

of 1998

A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC Rule on

Adoption
Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995
(R.A. 8043)
Inter-country adoption refers to the socio-legal
process of adopting a Filipino child by a
foreigner or a Filipino citizen permanently
residing abroad where the petition is filed, the
supervised trial custody is undertaken and
decree of adoption is issued outside the
Philippines.
The ICAB shall ensure that all possibilities for
adoption of the child under the Family Code
have been exhausted and that inter-country
adoption is in the best interest of the child (the
last resort).
Basis for R.A. No. 8043 - Hague Convention
The Hague Convention on the Protection of
Children and Co-operation in Respect of
Intercountry Adoption is an international
agreement to safeguard intercountry adoptions.
Concluded on May 29, 1993 in The Hague, the
Netherlands, the Convention establishes
international standards of practices for intercountry
adoptions.
Ratified by the Philippine Senate in January 8,
1996.
Principal features of the Hague Convention
adoption should be in the best interest of
the child
subsidiarity principle only after due
consideration has been given to national
solutions should intercountry adoption be
considered
States should establish safeguards to
prevent abduction, sale and trafficking
states work together to ensure protection
of children
Domestic Adoption Act (R.A. No. 8552)
R.A. No. 8552 AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE
RULES AND POLICIES ON THE DOMESTIC
ADOPTION OF FILIPINO CHILDREN AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES
February 25, 1998
Requisites to be an adopter Sec. 7
Section 7. Who May Adopt. The
following may adopt:
(a) Filipinos
(b) aliens
(c) guardians adopting ward
(a) Filipino
(a) - of legal age
- in possession of full civil capacity and legal rights
- of good moral character
- has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude
- emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for children
- at least sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee
- in a position to support and care for his/her children in
keeping with the means of the family.
The requirement of sixteen (16) year difference between the
age of the adopter and adoptee may be waived when the
adopter is the biological parent of the adoptee, or is the spouse
of the adoptee's parent;
(b) Aliens
(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above
stated for Filipino nationals: Provided,
- That his/her country has diplomatic relations with the
Republic of the Philippines
- that he/she has been living in the Philippines for at least
three (3) continuous years prior to the filing of the
application for adoption and maintains such residence
until the adoption decree is entered
- that he/she has been certified by his/her diplomatic or
consular office or any appropriate government agency
that he/she has the legal capacity to adopt in his/her
country, and that his/her government allows the adoptee
to enter his/her country as his/her adopted son/daughter:
 Provided, Further, That the requirements on residency and
certification of the alien's qualification to adopt in his/her
country may be waived for the following:
(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within
the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity; or
(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of
his/her Filipino spouse; or
(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt
jointly with his/her spouse a relative within the fourth (4th)
degree of consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino spouse; or
(c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination
of the guardianship and clearance of his/her financial
accountabilities.
Husband and wife jointly Sec. 7
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following
cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter
of the other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate
son/daughter: Provided, However, that the other spouse
has signified his/her consent thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse
adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of the other, joint
parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses.
In re petition for adoption of Michelle Lim
(2009)
Petitioner, having remarried at the time the petitions for
adoption were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the petitions
for adoption were filed only by petitioner herself, without
joining her husband, Olario, the trial court was correct in
denying the petitions for adoption on this ground. Neither
does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions
enumerated in Section 7. First, the children to be adopted
are not the legitimate children of petitioner or of her
husband Olario. Second, the children are not the
illegitimate children of petitioner. And third, petitioner and
Olario are not legally separated from each other.
 Need for Written Consent Sec. 9
(a) The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or over;
(b) parent(s) of the child, if known, or the legal guardian, or
the proper government instrumentality which has legal
custody of the child;
(c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10)
years of age or over, of the adopter(s) and adoptee, if
any;
(d) The illegitimate sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or
over, of the adopter if living with said adopter and the
latter's spouse, if any; and
(e) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be
adopted.
Landingin v. Republic (2006)
The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural
parents is intended to protect the natural parental relationship
from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the
opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child in the
manner of the proposed adoption.
Clearly, the written consent of the biological parents is
indispensable for the validity of a decree of adoption. Indeed,
the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his
consent must be obtained before his parental rights and duties
may be terminated and re-established in adoptive parents. In
this case, petitioner failed to submit the written consent of
Amelia Ramos to the adoption.

Aliens as adopters
Sec. 7(b)
(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as
above stated for Filipino nationals: Provided,
- That his/her country has diplomatic relations with the
Republic of the Philippines
- that he/she has been living in the Philippines for at
least three (3) continuous years prior to the filing of the
application for adoption and maintains such residence
until the adoption decree is entered
- that he/she has been certified by his/her diplomatic or
consular office or any appropriate government agency
that he/she has the legal capacity to adopt in his/her
country, and that his/her government allows the
adoptee to enter his/her country as his/her adopted
son/daughter:
 Provided, Further, That the requirements on
residency and certification of the alien's
qualification to adopt in his/her country may be
waived for the following: (i) a former Filipino
citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the
fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity; or
(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate
son/daughter of his/her Filipino spouse; or (iii)
one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks
to adopt jointly with his/her spouse a relative
within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or
affinity of the Filipino spouse;
Republic v. Toledano (1994)
The historical evolution of this provision is clear. Presidential
Decree 603 (The Child and Youth Welfare Code), provides that
husband and wife "may" jointly adopt. Executive Order No. 91
issued on December 17, 1986 amended said provision of P.D.
603. It demands that both husband and wife "shall" jointly
adopt if one of them is an alien. It was so crafted to protect
Filipino children who are put up for adoption. The Family Code
reiterated the rule by requiring that husband and wife "must"
jointly adopt, except in the cases mentioned before. Under the
said new law, joint adoption by husband and wife is
mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint
parental authority over the child, which is the ideal situation. As
the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate
child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly.
The rule also insures harmony between the spouses.
Who may be adopted Sec. 8
(a) Any person below eighteen (18) years of
age who has been administratively or
judicially declared available for adoption;
(b) The legitimate son/daughter of one
spouse by the other spouse;
(c) An illegitimate son/daughter by a
qualified adopter to improve his/her status
to that of legitimacy;
(d) A person of legal age if, prior to the
adoption, said person has been consistently
considered and treated by the adopter(s) as
his/her own child since minority;
(e) A child whose adoption has been previously
rescinded; or
(f) A child whose biological or adoptive
parent(s) has died: Provided, That no
proceedings shall be initiated within six (6)
months from the time of death of said
parent(s).
Effect of Death Sec. 13
Decree of Adoption. If, after the
publication of the order of hearing has been
complied with, and no opposition has been
interposed to the petition, and after
consideration of the case studies, the
qualifications of the adopter(s), trial custody
report and the evidence submitted, the
court is convinced that the petitioners are
qualified to adopt,
 and that the adoption would redound to the
best interest of the adoptee, a decree of
adoption shall be entered which shall be
effective as of the date the original petition
was filed. This provision shall also apply in
case the petitioner(s) dies before the
issuance of the decree of adoption to
protect the interest of the adoptee. The
decree shall state the name by which the
child is to be known.
Procedure in adoption
> R.A. No. 9253 - AN ACT REQUIRING
CERTIFICATION OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND
DEVELOPMENT (DSWD) TO DECLARE A
"CHILD LEGALLY AVAILABLE FOR
ADOPTION" AS A PREREQUISITE FOR
ADOPTION PROCEEDINGS

> Rule on Adoption

Effects of a decree of adoption
1. on status legitimate child
2. on parental authority adoptive
parents
Effect of Adoption: on the status
Bagayas v. Bagayas (2013)
- Consequently, the declaration that petitioner is the legally
adopted child of Maximino and Eligia did not amount to a
declaration of heirship and co-ownership upon which
petitioner may institute an action for the amendment of the
certificates of Title covering the subject land. More
importantly, the Court has consistently ruled that the trial
court cannot make a declaration of heirship in an ordinary
civil action, for matters relating to the rights of filiation and
heirship must be ventilated in a special proceeding
instituted precisely for the purpose of determining such
rights.
- The remedy then of petitioner is to institute intestate
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased spouses Maximino and Eligia.
Effect of Adoption: on parental authority
Tamargo v. CA
We do not believe that parental authority is properly regarded as having
been retroactively transferred to and vested in the adopting parents, the
Rapisura spouses, at the time the air rifle shooting happened. We do not
consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of adoption so
as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at a time
when adopting parents had no actual or physically custody over the
adopted child. Retroactive affect may perhaps be given to the granting of
the petition for adoption where such is essential to permit the accrual of
some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child. In the instant
case, however, to hold that parental authority had been retroactively
lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with liability for a
tortious act that they could not have foreseen and which they could not
have prevented (since they were at the time in the United States and had
no physical custody over the child Adelberto) would be unfair and
unconscionable. Such a result, moreover, would be inconsistent with the
philosophical and policy basis underlying the doctrine of vicarious liability.
Put a little differently, no presumption of parental dereliction on the part of
the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, could have arisen since
Adelberto was not in fact subject to their control at the time the tort was
committed.
Cervantes v. Fajardo (1989)
Besides, the minor has been legally adopted by
petitioners with the full knowledge and consent of
respondents. A decree of adoption has the effect,
among others, of dissolving the authority vested in
natural parents over the adopted child, except where
the adopting parent is the spouse of the natural
parent of the adopted, in which case, parental
authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly
by both spouses. The adopting parents have the right
to the care and custody of the adopted child and
exercise parental authority and responsibility over
him.
Effects of a decree of adoption
3. on hereditary rights Sec. 18
In legal and intestate succession, the
adopter(s) and the adoptee shall have
reciprocal rights of succession without
distinction from legitimate filiation.
However, if the adoptee and his/her
biological parent(s) had left a will, the law
on testamentary succession shall govern.
FC Art. 189 (not repealed by RA 8552)
Adoption shall have the following effects:
(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall
be deemed to be a legitimate child of the
adopters and both shall acquire the
reciprocal rights and obligations arising
from the relationship of parent and child,
including the right of the adopted to use
the surname of the adopters;
 (2) The parental authority of the parents by
nature over the adopted shall terminate and
be vested in the adopters, except that if the
adopter is the spouse of the parent by
nature of the adopted, parental authority
over the adopted shall be exercised jointly
by both spouses; and
(3) The adopted shall remain an
intestate heir of his parents and other
blood relatives. (39(1)a, (3)a, PD 603)
FC Art. 190 (not repealed by RA 8552)
Legal or intestate succession to the estate
of the adopted shall be governed by the
following rules:
(1) Legitimate and illegitimate children and
descendants and the surviving spouse of
the adopted shall inherit from the adopted,
in accordance with the ordinary rules of
legal or intestate succession;
 (2) When the parents, legitimate or
illegitimate, or the legitimate
ascendants of the adopted concur with
the adopter, they shall divide the entire
estate, one-half to be inherited by the
parents or ascendants and the other
half, by the adopters;
 (3) When the surviving spouse or the
illegitimate children of the adopted
concur with the adopters, they shall
divide the entire estate in equal
shares, one-half to be inherited by the
spouse or the illegitimate children of
the adopted and the other half, by the
adopters.
 (4) When the adopters concur with the
illegitimate children and the surviving
spouse of the adopted, they shall
divide the entire estate in equal
shares, one-third to be inherited by the
illegitimate children, one-third by the
surviving spouse, and one-third by the
adopters;
 (5) When only the adopters survive,
they shall inherit the entire estate; and
(6) When only collateral blood
relatives of the adopted survive, then
the ordinary rules of legal or intestate
succession shall apply. (39(4)a, PD
603)
Effect of Adoption : on hereditary rights
Bartolome v. SSS (2014)
From Art. 190 FC and Art. 984 NCC, the biological parents
retain their rights of succession to the estate of their child
who was the subject of adoption. The death of the
adopting parent at the time the childs minority resulted in
the restoration of the biological mothers parental authority
over the adopted child.
Cornelios adoption of John, without more, does not
deprive the biological mother of the right to receive the
benefits stemming from Johns death as a dependent
parent given Cornelios untimely demise during Johns
minority. Since the parent by adoption already died, then
the death benefits under the Employees' Compensation
Program shall accrue solely to the biological mother,
John's sole remaining beneficiary.
Effects of a decree of adoption : on the
name
IN THE MATTER OF ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE
GARCIA (2005) - since there is no law
prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by
her natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as
middle name her mothers surname, we
find no reason why she should not be
allowed to do so.
Rescission of adoption Sec. 19
Grounds for Rescission of Adoption. Upon petition of
the adoptee, with the assistance of the Department if a
minor or if over eighteen (18) years of age but is
incapacitated, as guardian/counsel, the adoption may be
rescinded on any of the following grounds committed by
the adopter(s):

(a) repeated physical and verbal maltreatment by the

adopter(s) despite having undergone counseling;
(b) attempt on the life of the adoptee;
(c) sexual assault or violence; or
(d) abandonment and failure to comply with
parental obligations.
Adoption, being in the best interest of the
child, shall not be subject to rescission by
the adopter(s). However, the adopter(s)
may disinherit the adoptee for causes
provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code.
Art. 919 Civil Code
The following shall be sufficient causes for the
disinheritance of children and descendants, legitimate as
well as illegitimate:
(1) When a child or descendant has been found guilty of an
attempt against the life of the testator, his or her
spouse, descendants, or ascendants;
(2) When a child or descendant has accused the testator of
a crime for which the law prescribes imprisonment for
six years or more, if the accusation has been found
groundless;
(3) When a child or descendant has been convicted of
adultery or concubinage with the spouse of the testator;
(4) When a child or descendant by fraud, violence,
intimidation, or undue influence causes the testator to
make a will or to change one already made;
(5) A refusal without justifiable cause to support the parent
or ascendant who disinherits such child or descendant;
(6) Maltreatment of the testator by word or deed, by the
child or descendant;
(7) When a child or descendant leads a dishonorable or
disgraceful life;
(8) Conviction of a crime which carries with it the penalty of
civil interdiction.
Lahom v. Sibulo (2003)
While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from an
adopter a consequential right to rescind the adoption decree
even in cases where the adoption might clearly turn out to be
undesirable, it remains, nevertheless, the bounden duty of the
Court to apply the law. Dura lex sed lex would be the
hackneyed truism that those caught in the law have to live with.
It is still noteworthy, however, that an adopter, while barred
from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid
reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise
accruing to an undeserving child. For instance, upon the
grounds recognized by law, an adopter may deny to an
adopted child his legitime and, by a will and testament, may
freely exclude him from having a share in the disposable
portion of his estate.
Effects of Rescission Sec. 20
- the parental authority of the adoptee's
biological parent(s), if known, or the legal
custody of the Department shall be restored if
the adoptee is still a minor or incapacitated.
- The reciprocal rights and obligations of the
adopter(s) and the adoptee to each other shall
be extinguished.
- The court shall order the Civil Registrar to
cancel the amended certificate of birth of the
adoptee and restore his/her original birth
certificate.
-Succession rights shall revert to its status
prior to adoption, but only as of the date of
judgment of judicial rescission. Vested
rights acquired prior to judicial rescission
shall be respected.
All the foregoing effects of rescission of
adoption shall be without prejudice to the
penalties imposable under the Penal Code
if the criminal acts are properly proven.
SUPPORT
A. What comprises support Art. 194
Support comprises everything indispensable for
sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance,
education and transportation, in keeping with the financial
capacity of the family.
The education of the person entitled to be supported
referred to in the preceding paragraph shall include his
schooling or training for some profession, trade or vocation,
even beyond the age of majority. Transportation shall
include expenses in going to and from school, or to and
from place of work.
B. Who are obliged to provide support
Art. 195

(1) The spouses;

(2) Legitimate ascendants and descendants;
(3) Parents and their legitimate children and the
legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter;
(4) Parents and their illegitimate children and
the legitimate and illegitimate children of the
latter; and
(5) Legitimate brothers and sisters, whether of
full or half-blood (291a)
 Pelayo v. Lauron (1909)

Professional fees for medical assistance

(wife gave birth) should be paid by husband
and not by the parents-in-law.
 Sanchez v. Zulueta (1939)

The Court of Appeals erred in not allowing the

defendant to present his evidence for the purpose
of determining whether it is sufficient prima facie to
overcome the application for support pendente lite.
Adultery on the part of the wife is a valid defense
against an action for support.
De Asis v. CA (1999)
Res judicata is inapplicable in an action for
support for the reason that renunciation of
waiver of future support is prohibited by
law.
Rondina v. People (2012)
Accused in rape must provide support for
the child who was conceived as a
consequence of the rape.
Gotardo v. Buling (2012)
The amount of support is variable.
Perla v. Baring (2012)
They failed to establish their filiation,
therefore they are not entitled to support.
Calderon v. Roxas (2013)
The court order concerning support
pendente lite are interlocutory orders, mere
incident to the main action for declaration of
nullity of marriage. Petitioners theory that
the assailed orders have ceased to be
provisional due to the arrearages incurred
by respondent is untenable.
C. Source of support
Art. 197
- from separate property of obligor
- If no separate property, from the ACP or
CP shall advance the support
C. Source of support
Art. 198
During legal separation or for annulment of
marriage, and for declaration of nullity of
marriage, the spouses and their children shall be
supported from the properties of the absolute
community or the conjugal partnership. After the
final judgment granting the petition, the obligation
of mutual support between the spouses ceases.
However, in case of legal separation, the court
may order that the guilty spouse shall give
support to the innocent one, specifying the terms
of such order.
Lerma v. CA (1974)
A petition in bad faith, such as one filed by
one who is guilty of an act which constitute a
ground for legal separation at the instance of
the other spouse, cannot be considered as
within the intendment of the law granting
separate support.
Reyes v. Ines-Luciano (1979)
It is true that the adultery of the wife is a defense in
an action for support. However, the alleged
adultery of the wife must be established by
competent evidence. The mere allegation will not
bar her from the right to receive support pendente
lite.
She was not asking for support to be taken from
her husbands personal funds but from the
conjugal property.
D. Order of Support
Art. 199
Whenever two or more persons are obliged
to give support, the liability shall devolve
upon the following persons in the order
herein provided:
(1) The spouse;
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree;
and
(4) The brothers and sisters.
Mangonon v. CA (2006)
If father cannot give support, it should be borne
by the grandfather. Since said grandfather has
the financial means to support the education of
his granddaughters, he is liable for support
pendente lite.
Lim v. Lim (2007)
This inability of Edward and Cheryl to sufficiently provide
for their children shifts a portion of their obligation to the
ascendants in the nearest degree, both in the paternal
(petitioners) and maternal lines, following the ordering in
Article 199. To hold otherwise, and thus subscribe to
petitioners theory, is to sanction the anomalous scenario of
tolerating extreme material deprivation of children because
of parental inability to give adequate support even if
ascendants one degree removed are more than able to fill
the void.
E. Manner & Time of Payment
Art. 200. When the obligation to give support
falls upon two or more persons, the payment
of the same shall be divided between them in
proportion to the resources of each.
However, in case of urgent need and by
special circumstances, the judge may order
only one of them to furnish the support
provisionally, without prejudice to his right to
claim from the other obligors the share due
from them.
 When two or more recipients at the same
time claim support from one and the same
person legally obliged to give it, should the
latter not have sufficient means to satisfy all
claims, the order established in the
preceding article shall be followed, unless
the concurrent obligees should be the
spouse and a child subject to parental
authority, in which case the child shall be
preferred. (295a)
 Art. 201. The amount of support, in the cases
referred to in Articles 195 and 196, shall be in
proportion to the Art. 204. The person obliged
to give support shall have the option to fulfill
the obligation either by paying the allowance
fixed, or by receiving and maintaining in the
family dwelling the person who has a right to
receive support. The latter alternative cannot
be availed of in case there is a moral or legal
obstacle thereto. (299a)
Art. 202. Support in the cases referred to in
the preceding article shall be reduced or
increased proportionately, according to the
reduction or increase of the necessities of
the recipient and the resources or means of
the person obliged to furnish the same.
Art. 203. The obligation to give support shall be
demandable from the time the person who has a right
to receive the same needs it for maintenance, but it
shall not be paid except from the date of judicial or
extrajudicial demand.
Support pendente lite may be claimed in accordance
with the Rules of Court.
Payment shall be made within the first five days of
each corresponding month or when the recipient
dies, his heirs shall not be obliged to return what he
has received in advance. (298a)
Calderon v. Roxas (2013)
The court order concerning support
pendente lite are interlocutory orders, mere
incident to the main action for declaration of
nullity of marriage. Petitioners theory that
the assailed orders have ceased to be
provisional due to the arrearages incurred
by respondent is untenable.
F. Amount of support Art. 200-208
Art. 205. The right to receive support under
this Title as well as any money or property
obtained as such support shall not be
levied upon on attachment or execution.
(302a)
Art. 206. When, without the knowledge of
the person obliged to give support, it is
given by a stranger, the latter shall have a
right to claim the same from the former,
unless it appears that he gave it without
intention of being reimbursed. (2164a)
Art. 207. When the person obliged to support
another unjustly refuses or fails to give
support when urgently needed by the latter,
any third person may furnish support to the
needy individual, with right of reimbursement
from the person obliged to give support. This
Article shall particularly apply when the father
or mother of a child under the age of majority
unjustly refuses to support or fails to give
support to the child when urgently needed.
(2166a)
Art. 208. In case of contractual support or
that given by will, the excess in amount
beyond that required for legal support shall
be subject to levy on attachment or
execution.
Furthermore, contractual support shall be
subject to adjustment whenever
modification is necessary due to changes
of circumstances manifestly beyond the
contemplation of the parties.
Lacson v. Lacson (2006)
The father who was remiss in his duty to
provide support was ordered to pay his
daughters support in arrears in the amount
of P2,496,000 less the amount of P124,000
which they received as support pendente
lite.
Lim-Lua v. Lua (2013)
Amounts given to the children for their
sustenance and household expenses may be
deducted from support pendente lite in arrears.
Danilo Lua can therefore deduct Php 648,102.29
from the support pendente lite in arrears to his
wife, Susan Lim Lua and their two (2) children;
He is also to resume payment of his monthly
support of PhP115,000.00 pesos starting from the
time payment of this amount was deferred by
him.
G. Renunciation & Termination
NCC 2035 future support cannot be the
subject of a compromise
H. Support pendente lite
Art. 198 - During the proceedings for legal
separation or for annulment of marriage, and for
declaration of nullity of marriage, the spouses
and their children shall be supported from the
properties of the absolute community or the
conjugal partnership. After the final judgment
granting the petition, the obligation of mutual
support between the spouses ceases. However,
in case of legal separation, the court may order
that the guilty spouse shall give support to the
innocent one, specifying the terms of such order.
I. Procedure in applications for support
Rule 61, Rules of Court
PARENTAL AUTHORITY &
CUSTODY OF CHILDREN
A. Concept of parental authority
Art. II, Sec. 12 (1987 Constitution)
The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall
protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous
social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the
mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The
natural and primary right and duty of parents in the
rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support
of the Government.

Art. 209, Family Code

Pursuant to the natural right and duty of parents over the
person and property of their unemancipated children,
parental authority and responsibility shall include the
caring for and rearing them for civic consciousness and
efficiency and the development of their moral, mental and
physical character and well-being. (n)
Arts. 356-363 NCC Care & Education of Children
Medina v. Makabali (1969)
While our law recognizes the right of a parent to the
custody of her child, Courts must not lose sight of the
basic principle that "in all questions on the care, custody,
education and property of children, the latter's welfare
shall be paramount" (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art.
363), and that for compelling reasons, even a child under
seven may be ordered separated from the mother
Unson v. Navarro (1980)
It is axiomatic in Our jurisprudence that in controversies
regarding the custody of minors the sole and foremost
consideration is the physical, education, social and moral
welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the
respective resources and social and moral situations of the
contending parents. Never has this Court diverted from that
criterion.
Vingson v. Cabcaban (2014)
The general rule is that parents should have
custody over their minor children. But the
State has the right to intervene where the
parents, rather than care for such children,
treat them cruelly and abusively, impairing
their growth and well-being and leaving
them emotional scars that they carry
throughout their lives unless they are
liberated from such parents and properly
counseled.
Caram v. Segui (2014)
Christina's directly accusing the DSWD officials of forcibly
separating her from her child and placing the latter up for
adoption, supposedly without complying with the necessary
legal requisites to qualify the child for adoption, clearly
indicates that she is not searching for a lost child but
asserting her parental authority over the child and
contesting custody over him. Since it is extant from the
pleadings filed that what is involved is the issue of child
custody and the exercise of parental rights over a child,
who, for all intents and purposes, has been legally
considered a ward of the State, the Amparo rule cannot be
properly applied.
B. Transfer of Parental Authority
Art. 210, Family Code
Parental authority and responsibility may not be
renounced or transferred except in the cases
authorized by law.
Art. 223. The parents or, in their absence or incapacity, the
individual, entity or institution exercising parental authority, may
petition the proper court of the place where the child resides,
for an order providing for disciplinary measures over the child.
The child shall be entitled to the assistance of counsel, either of
his choice or appointed by the court, and a summary hearing
shall be conducted wherein the petitioner and the child shall be
heard.
However, if in the same proceeding the court finds the
petitioner at fault, irrespective of the merits of the petition, or
when the circumstances so warrant, the court may also order
the deprivation or suspension of parental authority or adopt
such other measures as it may deem just and proper.
Art. 224. The measures referred to in the preceding article
may include the commitment of the child for not more than
thirty days in entities or institutions engaged in child care
or in children's homes duly accredited by the proper
government agency.
The parent exercising parental authority shall not interfere
with the care of the child whenever committed but shall
provide for his support. Upon proper petition or at its own
instance, the court may terminate the commitment of the
child whenever just and proper.
Sagala-Eslao v. CA (1997)
Thus, in the instant petition, when private
respondent entrusted the custody of her minor
child to the petitioner, what she gave to the latter
was merely temporary custody and it did not
constitute abandonment or renunciation of
parental authority.
C. Who exercises parental authority
Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly
exercise parental authority over the persons of
their common children. In case of disagreement,
the father's decision shall prevail, unless there is
a judicial order to the contrary.
Children shall always observe respect and
reverence towards their parents and are obliged
to obey them as long as the children are under
parental authority. (311a)
 Art. 212. In case of absence or death of either
parent, the parent present shall continue
exercising parental authority. The remarriage of
the surviving parent shall not affect the parental
authority over the children, unless the court
appoints another person to be the guardian of the
person or property of the children. (n)
Art. 213. In case of separation of the parents,
parental authority shall be exercised by the parent
designated by the Court. The Court shall take into
account all relevant considerations, especially the
choice of the child over seven years of age, unless
the parent chosen is unfit. (n)
No child under seven years of age shall be
separated from the mother unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise.
Unson v. Navarro (1980)
It is in the best interest of the child Teresa to be
freed from the obviously unwholesome, not to say
immoral influence, that the situation in which her
mother has placed herself (living with her brother-
in-law), might create in the moral and social
outlook of Teresa who is now in her formative and
most impressionable stage in her life. Mother was
granted visitation rights only.
Espiritu & Layug v. CA (1995)
The children are now both over seven years old.
Their choice of the parent with whom they prefer to
stay is clear from the record. From all indications,
Reynaldo is a fit person, thus meeting the two
requirements found in the first paragraph of Article
213 of the Family Code.
Santos Sr. v. CA (1995)
The father has not been shown to be an unsuitable and unfit parent.
Despite the demonstrated love and affection for the boy, by the
grandparents, the legitimate father is still preferred over the
grandparents. The latter's wealth is not a deciding factor,
particularly because there is no proof that the father is in no
position to support the boy. The fact that he was unable to provide
financial support for his minor son from birth up to over three
years when he took the boy from his in-laws without permission,
should not be sufficient reason to strip him of his permanent right
to the child's custody. While petitioner's previous inattention is
inexcusable and merits only the severest criticism, it cannot be
construed as abandonment. His appeal of the unfavorable
decision against him and his efforts to keep his only child in his
custody may be regarded as serious efforts to rectify his past
misdeeds. To award him custody would help enhance the bond
between parent and son. It would also give the father a chance to
prove his love for his son and for the son to experience the
warmth and support which a father can give.
David v. CA (1995)
Christopher J. is an illegitimate child since at the time of
his conception, his father, Ramon R. Villar, was married to
another woman other than the child's mother. As such,
pursuant to Art. 176 of the Family Code, Christopher J. is
under the parental authority of his mother, the herein
petitioner, who, as a consequence of such authority, is
entitled to have custody of him.
The fact that Villar has recognized the minor child may be
a ground for ordering him to give support to the latter, but
not for giving him custody of the child. Under Art. 213 of
the Family Code, "no child under seven years of age shall
be separated from the mother unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise.
Tonog v. CA
Temporary custody over an illegitimate child was
granted to the father pending resolution of the
guardianship case he filed. Child should not be
wrenched from her familiar surroundings and
thrust into a strange environment away from the
people and places to which she had apparently
formed an attachment.
Briones v. Miguel (2004)
An illegitimate child is under the sole parental
authority of the mother. In the exercise of that
authority, she is entitled to keep the child in her
company. The Court will not deprive her of her
custody, absent any imperative cause showing her
unfitness to exercise such authority and care.
Gualberto v. Gualberto (2005)
As between spouses who are separated, custody
pendente lite over a child below seven (7) years
of age shall be with the mother. This can be
overcome only by compelling evidence of the
mothers unfitness. Sexual preference of the
mother alone, being a lesbian, does not prove
parental neglect or incompetence. Not even when
she is a sex worker or had been unfaithful to the
husband would render her unfit to have custody
of her minor children.
Grande v. Antonio (2014)
Parental authority over minor children is
lodged by Art. 176 on the mother; hence,
respondents prayer has no legal mooring.
Since parental authority is given to the
mother, then custody over the minor children
also goes to the mother, unless she is
shown to be unfit.
D. Substitute Parental Authority
Art. 214. In case of death, absence or
unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental
authority shall be exercised by the surviving
grandparent. In case several survive, the one
designated by the court, taking into account the
same consideration mentioned in the preceding
article, shall exercise the authority. (355a)
Art. 215. No descendant shall be compelled, in a
criminal case, to testify against his parents and
grandparents, except when such testimony is
indispensable in a crime against the descendant or
by one parent against the other. (315a)
 Art. 216. In default of parents or a judicially appointed
guardian, the following person shall exercise substitute
parental authority over the child in the order indicated:
(1) The surviving grandparent, as provided in Art. 214;
(2) The oldest brother or sister, over twenty-one years of
age, unless unfit or disqualified; and
(3) The child's actual custodian, over twenty-one years of
age, unless unfit or disqualified.
Whenever the appointment or a judicial guardian over the
property of the child becomes necessary, the same order
of preference shall be observed.
Art. 233. The person exercising substitute parental
authority shall have the same authority over the
person of the child as the parents.
In no case shall the school administrator, teacher
of individual engaged in child care exercising
special parental authority inflict corporal
punishment upon the child.
Vancil v. Belmes
Petitioner, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute
parental authority only in case of death, absence or unsuitability of
mother. Considering that mother is very much alive and has exercised
continuously parental authority over Vincent, petitioner has to prove,
in asserting her right to be the minors guardian, respondents
unsuitability. Petitioner, however, has not proffered convincing
evidence showing that respondent is not suited to be the guardian of
Vincent. Petitioner merely insists that respondent is morally unfit as
guardian of Valerie considering that her (respondents) live-in partner
raped Valerie several times. But Valerie, being now of major age, is
no longer a subject of this guardianship proceeding.Even assuming
that respondent is unfit as guardian of minor Vincent, still petitioner
cannot qualify as a substitute guardian. It bears stressing that she is
an American citizen and a resident of Colorado. Obviously, she will
not be able to perform the responsibilities and obligations required of
a guardian. In fact, in her petition, she admitted the difficulty of
discharging the duties of a guardian by an expatriate, like her. To be
sure, she will merely delegate those duties to someone else who may
not also qualify as a guardian.
E. Special Parental Authority
Art. 218. The school, its administrators and
teachers, or the individual, entity or institution
engaged in child care shall have special parental
authority and responsibility over the minor child
while under their supervision, instruction or
custody.
Authority and responsibility shall apply to all
authorized activities whether inside or outside the
premises of the school, entity or institution. (349a)
 Art. 219. Those given the authority and responsibility
under the preceding Article shall be principally and
solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or
omissions of the unemancipated minor. The parents,
judicial guardians or the persons exercising substitute
parental authority over said minor shall be subsidiarily
liable.
The respective liabilities of those referred to in the
preceding paragraph shall not apply if it is proved that
they exercised the proper diligence required under the
particular circumstances.
All other cases not covered by this and the preceding
articles shall be governed by the provisions of the Civil
Code on quasi-delicts.
St. Marys Academy v. Carpitanos (2002)
Considering that the negligence of the
minor driver or the detachment of the
steering wheel guide of the jeep owned by
respondent Villanueva was an event over
which petitioner St. Marys Academy had
no control, and which was the proximate
cause of the accident, petitioner may not
be held liable for the death resulting from
such accident.
Child Learning Center v. Tagario (2005)
The fact, however, that Timothy fell out through the
window shows that the door could not be opened from the
inside. That sufficiently points to the fact that something
was wrong with the door, if not the door knob, under the
principle of res ipsa loquitor. The doctrine of res ipsa
loquitor applies where (1) the accident was of such
character as to warrant an inference that it would not have
happened except for the defendants negligence; (2) the
accident must have been caused by an agency or
instrumentality within the exclusive management or
control of the person charged with the negligence
complained of; and (3) the accident must not have been
due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of
the person injured.
 Petitioners are clearly answerable for failure to see
to it that the doors of their school toilets are at all
times in working condition. The fact that a student
had to go through the window, instead of the door,
shows that something was wrong with the door.
Petitioners, with the due diligence of a good father
of the family, should have anticipated that a
student, locked in the toilet by a non-working door,
would attempt to use the window to call for help or
even to get out. Considering all the circumstances,
therefore, there is sufficient basis to sustain a
finding of liability on petitioners part.
SHS QC v. Taguiam (2008)
Teacher had been grossly negligent. First,
students permit form was unsigned but she
was allowed to join the activity because she
assumed that the mother has allowed her to
join by personally bringing her to the school
with her packed lunch and swimsuit. The
teacher could have requested the mother to
sign the permit form before she left the
school or at least called her up to obtain her
conformity.
Teacher should have coordinated with the
school to ensure that proper safeguards,
such as adequate first aid and sufficient
adult personnel, were present during their
activity. She should have been mindful of the
fact that with the number of pupils involved,
it would be impossible for her by herself
alone to keep an eye on each one of them.
As a teacher who stands in loco parentis to her pupils,
respondent should have made sure that the children were
protected from all harm while in her company. Respondent
should have known that leaving the pupils in the swimming
pool area all by themselves may result in an accident. A
simple reminder "not to go to the deepest part of the pool"
was insufficient to cast away all the serious dangers that
the situation presented to the children, especially when
respondent knew that Chiara Mae cannot swim. Dismally,
respondent created an unsafe situation which exposed the
lives of all the pupils concerned to real danger. This is a
clear violation not only of the trust and confidence reposed
on her by the parents of the pupils but of the school itself.
Aquinas School v. Inton (2011)
Aquinas had an agreement with a congregation of sisters
under which, in order to fulfill its ministry, the congregation
would send religion teachers to Aquinas to provide
catechesis to its students. Aquinas insists that it was not
the school but Yamyamins religious congregation that
chose her for the task of catechizing the schools grade
three students, much like the way bishops designate the
catechists who would teach religion in public schools.
Under the circumstances, it was quite evident that Aquinas
did not have control over Yamyamins teaching methods.
The Intons had not refuted the school directress testimony
in this regard. Consequently, it was error for the CA to hold
Aquinas solidarily liable with Yamyamin.
 Of course, Aquinas still had the responsibility of taking
steps to ensure that only qualified outside catechists are
allowed to teach its young students. In this regard, it
cannot be said that Aquinas took no steps to avoid the
occurrence of improper conduct towards the students by
their religion teacher.
First, Yamyamins transcript of records, certificates, and
diplomas showed that she was qualified to teach religion.
Second, there is no question that Aquinas ascertained
that Yamyamin came from a legitimate religious
congregation of sisters and that, given her Christian
training, the school had reason to assume that she would
behave properly towards the students.
 Third, the school gave Yamyamin a copy of
the schools Administrative Faculty Staff
Manual that set the standards for handling
students. It also required her to attend a
teaching orientation before she was allowed to
teach beginning that June of 1998.5
Fourth, the school pre-approved the content of
the course she was to teach6 to ensure that
she was really catechizing the students.
 And fifth, the school had a program for
subjecting Yamyamin to classroom
evaluation. Unfortunately, since she was
new and it was just the start of the school
year, Aquinas did not have sufficient
opportunity to observe her methods. At any
rate, it acted promptly to relieve her of her
assignment as soon as the school learned
of the incident. It cannot be said that
Aquinas was guilty of outright neglect.
F. Filial Privilege
Art. 215 FC. No descendant shall be compelled, in a
criminal case, to testify against his parents and
grandparents, except when such testimony is
indispensable in a crime against the descendant or by
one parent against the other.

Rule 130, Section 25. Parental and filial privilege. No

person may be compelled to testify against his parents,
other direct ascendants, children or other direct
descendants.

 Rule 130, Section 22. Disqualification by

reason of marriage. During their
marriage, neither the husband nor the wife
may testify for or against the other without
the consent of the affected spouse, except
in a civil case by one against the other, or
in a criminal case for a crime committed by
one against the other or the latter's direct
descendants or ascendants. (20a)
Lee v. CA (2010)
But here Tiu, who invokes the filial privilege, claims
that she is the stepmother of petitioner Emma Lee.
The privilege cannot apply to them because the rule
applies only to "direct" ascendants and descendants,
a family tie connected by a common ancestry. A
stepdaughter has no common ancestry by her
stepmother. Art. 965 thus provides: The direct line is
either descending or ascending. The former unites
the head of the family with those who descend from
him. The latter binds a person with those from whom
he descends. Consequently, Tiu can be compelled to
testify against petitioner Emma Lee.
G. Effects of PA over the childs person
Art. 220. The parents and those exercising
parental authority shall have with the respect to
their unemancipated children on wards the
following rights and duties:
(1) To keep them in their company, to support,
educate and instruct them by right precept and
good example, and to provide for their
upbringing in keeping with their means;
(2) To give them love and affection, advice and
counsel, companionship and understanding;
 (3) To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance,
inculcate in them honesty, integrity, self-discipline,
self-reliance, industry and thrift, stimulate their
interest in civic affairs, and inspire in them
compliance with the duties of citizenship;
(4) To furnish them with good and wholesome
educational materials, supervise their activities,
recreation and association with others, protect them
from bad company, and prevent them from acquiring
habits detrimental to their health, studies and morals;
 (5) To represent them in all matters affecting
their interests;
(6) To demand from them respect and
obedience;
(7) To impose discipline on them as may be
required under the circumstances; and
(8) To perform such other duties as are
imposed by law upon parents and guardians.
 Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising
parental authority shall be civilly liable for the
injuries and damages caused by the acts or
omissions of their unemancipated children living
in their company and under their parental
authority subject to the appropriate defenses
provided by law.
Art. 222. The courts may appoint a guardian of
the child's property or a guardian ad litem when
the best interests of the child so requires.
Cuadra v. Monfort
In the present case there is nothing from which it may be
inferred that the defendant could have prevented the damage
by the observance of due care, or that he was in any way
remiss in the exercise of his parental authority in failing to
foresee such damage, or the act which caused it. On the
contrary, his child was at school, where it was his duty to send
her and where she was, as he had the right to expect her to be,
under the care and supervision of the teacher. And as far as
the act which caused the injury was concerned, it was an
innocent prank not unusual among children at play and which
no parent, however careful, would have any special reason to
anticipate much less guard against. Nor did it reveal any
mischievous propensity, or indeed any trait in the child's
character which would reflect unfavorably on her upbringing
and for which the blame could be attributed to her parents.
Rosaldes v. People (2014)
Although the petitioner, as a school teacher, could duly
discipline Michael Ryan as her pupil, her infliction of the
physical injuries on him was unnecessary, violent and
excessive. The boy even fainted from the violence suffered
at her hands. She could not justifiably claim that she acted
only for the sake of disciplining him. Her physical
maltreatment of him was precisely prohibited by no less
than the Family Code, which has expressly banned the
infliction of corporal punishment by a school administrator,
teacher or individual engaged in child care exercising
special parental authority (i.e., in loco parentis).
G. Effects of PA over the childs property
Art. 225. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise
legal guardianship over the property of the
unemancipated common child without the necessity of a
court appointment. In case of disagreement, the father's
decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to
the contrary.
Where the market value of the property or the annual
income of the child exceeds P50,000, the parent
concerned shall be required to furnish a bond in such
amount as the court may determine, but not less than ten
per centum (10%) of the value of the property or annual
income, to guarantee the performance of the obligations
prescribed for general guardians.
 A verified petition for approval of the bond shall be filed in
the proper court of the place where the child resides, or, if
the child resides in a foreign country, in the proper court of
the place where the property or any part thereof is
situated.
The petition shall be docketed as a summary special
proceeding in which all incidents and issues regarding the
performance of the obligations referred to in the second
paragraph of this Article shall be heard and resolved.
The ordinary rules on guardianship shall be merely
suppletory except when the child is under substitute
parental authority, or the guardian is a stranger, or a
parent has remarried, in which case the ordinary rules on
guardianship shall apply.
 Art. 226. The property of the unemancipated child earned
or acquired with his work or industry or by onerous or
gratuitous title shall belong to the child in ownership and
shall be devoted exclusively to the latter's support and
education, unless the title or transfer provides otherwise.
The right of the parents over the fruits and income of the
child's property shall be limited primarily to the child's
support and secondarily to the collective daily needs of
the family. (321a, 323a)
Hebron v. Loyola (2010)
The minor children of Conrado inherited by representation in
the properties of their grandparents Remigia and Januario.
These children, not their mother Victorina, were the co-owners
of the inherited properties. Victorina had no authority or had
acted beyond her powers in conveying, if she did indeed
convey, to the petitioners mother the undivided share of her
minor children in the property involved in this case. "The
powers given to her by the laws as the natural guardian covers
only matters of administration and cannot include the power of
disposition. She should have first secured the permission of the
court before she alienated that portion of the property in
question belonging to her minor children."11 In a number of
cases, where the guardians, mothers or grandmothers, did not
seek court approval of the sale of properties of their wards,
minor children, the Court declared the sales void.12
Neri v. Heirs (2012)
The father is merely clothed with powers of
administration and bereft of any authority to
dispose of their shares in estate of their mother.
The sale entered into by their father without the
proper judicial authority , unless ratified by them
upon reaching the age of majority, is
unenforceable in accordance with Arts. 1317 and
1403 of the Civil Code.
R.A. No. 9231
Sec. 12-B Ownership, Usage and Administration of the
Working Childs Income
Sec. 12-C Trust Fund to Preserve Part of the Working
Childs Income
H. Suspension or termination of PA
1. permanent termination
Art. 228. Parental authority terminates permanently:
(1) Upon the death of the parents;
(2) Upon the death of the child; or
(3) Upon emancipation of the child. (327a)

Art. 232. If the person exercising parental authority has
subjected the child or allowed him to be subjected to
sexual abuse, such person shall be permanently deprived
by the court of such authority. (n)

 2. non-permanent termination
Art. 229. Unless subsequently revived by a final judgment,
parental authority also terminates:
(1) Upon adoption of the child;
(2) Upon appointment of a general guardian;
(3) Upon judicial declaration of abandonment of the child in a
case filed for the purpose;
(4) Upon final judgment of a competent court divesting the
party concerned of parental authority; or
(5) Upon judicial declaration of absence or incapacity of the
person exercising parental authority. (327a)

 3. suspension of PA
Art. 230. Parental authority is suspended upon conviction
of the parent or the person exercising the same of a crime
which carries with it the penalty of civil interdiction. The
authority is automatically reinstated upon service of the
penalty or upon pardon or amnesty of the offender. (330a)

 Art. 231. The court in an action filed for the purpose in a
related case may also suspend parental authority if the
parent or the person exercising the same:
(1) Treats the child with excessive harshness or cruelty;
(2) Gives the child corrupting orders, counsel or example;
(3) Compels the child to beg; or
(4) Subjects the child or allows him to be subjected to acts
of lasciviousness.
 The grounds enumerated above are deemed to include
cases which have resulted from culpable negligence of
the parent or the person exercising parental authority.
If the degree of seriousness so warrants, or the welfare of
the child so demands, the court shall deprive the guilty
party of parental authority or adopt such other measures
as may be proper under the circumstances.
The suspension or deprivation may be revoked and the
parental authority revived in a case filed for the purpose
or in the same proceeding if the court finds that the cause
therefor has ceased and will not be repeated. (33a)
Chua v. Cabangbang
The absence of any kinship between the child and the
Cabangbangs alone cannot serve to bar the lower court
from awarding her custody to them. Indeed, the law
provides that in certain cases the custody of a child may be
awarded even to strangers, as against either the father or
the mother or against both. Thus, in proceedings involving
a child whose parents are separated either legally or de
facto and where it appears that both parents are
improper persons to whom to entrust the care, custody and
control of the child, "the court may either designate the
paternal or maternal grandparent of the child, or his oldest
brother or sister, or some reputable and discreet person to
take charge of such child, or commit it to and suitable
asylum, children's home, or benevolent society.
De Guzman v. Perez (2006)
An Information for violation of PD 603 (neglect of child)
was filed against the neglectful father.
The law intends to punish the neglect of any parent, which
neglect corresponds to the failure to give the child the
education which the familys station in life and financial
condition permit. The irresponsible parent cannot
exculpate himself from the consequences of his neglect
by invoking the other parents faithful compliance with his
or her own parental duties.
EMANCIPATION
R.A. No. 6809, amending the FC
Art. 234. Emancipation takes place by the attainment of
majority. Unless otherwise provided, majority commences at
the age of eighteen years.
Art. 236. Emancipation shall terminate parental authority over
the person and property of the child who shall then be qualified
and responsible for all acts of civil life, save the exceptions
established by existing laws in special cases.
"Contracting marriage shall require parental consent until the
age of twenty-one.
"Nothing in this Code shall be construed to derogate from the
duty or responsibility of parents and guardians for children and
wards below twenty-one years of age mentioned in the second
and third paragraphs of Article 2180 of the Civil Code."
SUMMARY
PROCEEDINGS UNDER
THE FAMILY CODE
 Art. 100 (2) & Art. 127 (2) to secure
consent of spouse to a transaction when
separated in fact
Art. 41 declaration of presumptive death
Art. 69 disagreement in fixing family
domicile
Art. 73 objection over exercise of
profession
 Art. 96 - disagreement in administration of
ACP
Art. 124 disagreement in administration of
CPG
Art. 217 parental authority over
foundlings and abandoned children filed by
heads of childrens homes
Art. 225 bond of guardian over minors
property
SURNAMES
 Article 364. Legitimate and legitimated children
shall principally use the surname of the father.
Article 365. An adopted child shall bear the
surname of the adopter.
Article 366. A natural child acknowledged by both
parents shall principally use the surname of the
father. If recognized by only one of the parents, a
natural child shall employ the surname of the
recognizing parent.
 Article 367. Natural children by legal fiction shall
principally employ the surname of the father.
Article 368. Illegitimate children referred to in
article 287 shall bear the surname of the mother.
Article 369. Children conceived before the
decree annulling a voidable marriage shall
principally use the surname of the father.
 Article 370. A married woman may use:
(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add
her husband's surname, or
(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's
surname or
(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word
indicating that she is his wife, such as "Mrs."
 Article 371. In case of annulment of marriage,
and the wife is the guilty party, she shall resume
her maiden name and surname. If she is the
innocent spouse, she may resume her maiden
name and surname. However, she may choose to
continue employing her former husband's
surname, unless:
(1) The court decrees otherwise, or
(2) She or the former husband is married again to
another person.
 Article 372. When legal separation has been
granted, the wife shall continue using her name
and surname employed before the legal
separation.
Article 373. A widow may use the deceased
husband's surname as though he were still living,
in accordance with article 370.
 Article 374. In case of identity of names and
surnames, the younger person shall be obliged to
use such additional name or surname as will
avoid confusion.
 Article 375. In case of identity of names and
surnames between ascendants and descendants,
the word "Junior" can be used only by a son.
Grandsons and other direct male descendants
shall either:
(1) Add a middle name or the mother's surname,
or
(2) Add the Roman numerals II, III, and so on.
 Article 376. No person can change his name or
surname without judicial authority.
Article 377. Usurpation of a name and surname
may be the subject of an action for damages and
other relief.
Article 378. The unauthorized or unlawful use of
another person's surname gives a right of action
to the latter.
 Article 379. The employment of pen names or
stage names is permitted, provided it is done in
good faith and there is no injury to third persons.
Pen names and stage names cannot be usurped.
Article 380. Except as provided in the preceding
article, no person shall use different names and
surnames.
R.A. No. 6085
"Sec. 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema,
television, radio or other entertainment purposes and in athletic
events where the use of pseudonym is a normally accepted
practice, no person shall use any name different from the one
with which he was registered at birth in the office of the local
civil registry, or with which he was baptized for the first time, or,
in case of an alien, with which he was registered in the bureau
of immigration upon entry; or such substitute name as may
have been authorized by a competent court: Provided, That
persons, whose births have not been registered in any local
civil registry and who have not been baptized, have one year
from the approval of this act within which to register their
names in the civil registry of their residence. The name shall
comprise the patronymic name and one or two surnames."
R.A. No. 9255
"Article 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname
and shall be under the parental authority of their mother,
and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this
Code. However, illegitimate children may use the
surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly
recognized by the father through the record of birth
appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a
public document or private handwritten instrument is
made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to
institute an action before the regular courts to prove non-
filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate
child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a
legitimate child."
Llaneta v. Agrava (1974)
The late Serafin Ferrer's widowed mother, Victoria, and his two
remaining brothers, Nehemias and Ruben, have come forward in
earnest support of the petition. Adequate publication of the
proceeding has not elicited the slightest opposition from the
relatives and friends of the late Serafin Ferrer. Clearances from
various Government agencies show that Teresita has a spotless
record. And the State (represented by the Solicitor General's
Office), which has an interest in the name borne by every citizen
within its realm for purposes of identification, interposed no
opposition at the trial after a searching cross-examination, of
Teresita and her witnesses. Whether the late Serafin Ferrer, who
died some five years before Teresita was born, would have
consented or objected to her use of his surname is open to
speculation. One thing, however, is beyond cavil: those living
who possess the right of action to prevent the surname Ferrer
from being smeared are proud to share it with her.
Telmo v. Republic (1976)
The issue is whether there is ample justification to allow
Mrs, Telmo to change the spelling of her husband's
surname.
A married woman may use her husband's surname (Art.
370, Civil Code). It is axiomatic that if she desires judicial
authorization to change the spelling of his surname, her
husband should initiate the proceeding. In the instant
case, the anomaly is that the husband did not ask for
judicial authority to change the spelling of his surname. It
was his wife who filed the petition. The irregularity in the
petition is obvious. The lower Court sanctioned the wifes
change of the spelling of her husband's surname but no
similar authority was granted to the husband because he
did not file a petition for that purpose.
 It is true that the wife submitted to the court her husband's
affidavit of conformity to the change in the spelling of his
surname But, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, that
woull not prevent him and their children from using the old
spelling. And in that event, confusion and error might
arise.
Moreover after a careful evaluation of the reasons
advanced by Mrs. Telmo for changing the spelling of her
husband's surname, the Court has arrived at the
conclusion that those reasons are not substantial and
cogent enough to sustain her petition.
Tolentino v. CA
Issue is whether or not a woman who has been
legally divorced from her husband may be enjoined
by the latter's present wife from using the surname of
her former husband.

Art. 371 is not applicable to the case at bar because

Art. 371 speaks of annulment while the case before
us refers to absolute divorce where there is a
severance of valid marriage ties. The effect of divorce
is more akin to the death of the spouse where the
deceased woman continues to be referred to as the
Mrs. of her husband even if the latter has remarried
rather than to annulment since in the latter case, it is
as if there had been no marriage at all.
 The private respondent has established that to grant the
injunction to the petitioner would be an act of serious
dislocation to her. She has given proof that she entered
into contracts with third persons, acquired properties and
entered into other legal relations using the surname
Tolentino. The petitioner, on the other hand, has failed to
show that she would suffer any legal injury or deprivation
of legal rights inasmuch as she can use her husband's
surname and be fully protected in case the respondent
uses the surname Tolentino for illegal purposes.
There is no usurpation of the petitioner's name and
surname in this case so that the mere use of the surname
Tolentino by the Private respondent cannot be said to
have injured the petitioner's rights.
Legamia v. IAC (1984)
It is not uncommon in Philippine society for a woman to
represent herself as the wife and use the name of the
man she is living with despite the fact that the man is
married to another woman. The practice, to be sure, is not
encouraged but neither is it unduly frowned upon. A
number of women can be Identified who are living with
men prominent in political, business and social circles.
The woman publicly holds herself out as the man's wife
and uses his family name blithely ignoring the fact that he
is not her husband. And yet none of the women has been
charged of violating the C.A. No. 142 because ours is not
a bigoted but a tolerant and understanding society. It is in
the light of our cultural environment that the law must be
construed.
In re change of name of Julian Carulasan
Wang (2005)
That the continued use of his middle name would cause
confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and
reasonable cause to drop it from his registered complete
name.
In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the
nebulous foundation on which his petition for change of
name is based, it is best that the matter of change of his
name be left to his judgment and discretion when he
reaches the age of majority. As he is of tender age, he may
not yet understand and appreciate the value of the change
of his name and granting of the same at this point may just
prejudice him in his rights under our laws.
Remo v. DFA (2010)
However, petitioner consciously chose to use her
husbands surname before, in her previous passport
application, and now desires to resume her maiden name.
If allowed, definitely nothing prevents her in the future from
requesting to revert to the use of her husbands surname.
Such unjustified changes in one's name and identity in a
passport, which is considered superior to all other official
documents, cannot be countenanced. Otherwise, undue
confusion and inconsistency in the records of passport
holders will arise. Thus, for passport issuance purposes, a
married woman, such as petitioner, whose marriage
subsists, may not change her family name at will.
Gonzulado v. People (2006)
Petitioner conspired with Rosemarie to
falsify, that is, by making untruthful
statement in the narration of facts in the
deed of sale, by declaring Rosemarie to be
the owner of the house subject of such sale
and signing as "Rosemarie Villaflor" instead
of her real name, Rosemarie Gelogo, in
order to sell the same to the Canlas
spouses.
Dapar v. Biascan (1984)
The mere use of a surname cannot be enjoined; it
is the use thereof coupled with the representation
that one is the lawful wife, or the usurpation of the
wifes status, which gives rise to an action for
damages.

In this case, it was in fact the husband of Gloria

Biascan who authorized Zenaida Dapar to use his
surname. No damages was awarded to the wife.
Limson v. Gonzales (2014)
On the issue of the alleged use of illegal aliases, the
aliases involved the names Eugenio Gonzalez, Eugenio
Gonzales, Eugenio Juan Gonzalez, Eugenio Juan
Gonzalez y Regalado, Eugenio C.R. Gonzalez, Eugenio
J. Gonzalez, and per Limson Eugenio Juan Robles
Gonzalez. But these names contained his true names,
albeit at times joined with an erroneous middle or second
name, or a misspelled family name in one instance. The
records disclose that the erroneous middle or second
names, or the misspelling of the family name resulted from
error or inadvertence left unchecked and unrectified over
time.
 What is significant, however, is that such names
were not fictitious names within the purview of the
Anti-Alias Law; and that such names were not
different from each other. Considering that he
was not also shown to have used the names for
unscrupulous purposes, or to deceive or confuse
the public, the dismissal of the charge against
him was justified in fact and in law.
RULES GOVERNING
PERSONS WHO ARE
ABSENT
Article 381. When a person disappears from
his domicile, his whereabouts being unknown,
and without leaving an agent to administer his
property, the judge, at the instance of an
interested party, a relative, or a friend, may
appoint a person to represent him in all that
may be necessary.
This same rule shall be observed when under
similar circumstances the power conferred by
the absentee has expired. (181a)
 Article 382. The appointment referred to in
the preceding article having been made,
the judge shall take the necessary
measures to safeguard the rights and
interests of the absentee and shall specify
the powers, obligations and remuneration
of his representative, regulating them,
according to the circumstances, by the
rules concerning guardians. (182)
 Article 383. In the appointment of a
representative, the spouse present shall be
preferred when there is no legal separation.
If the absentee left no spouse, or if the
spouse present is a minor, any competent
person may be appointed by the court.
(183a)
 Article 384. Two years having elapsed
without any news about the absentee or
since the receipt of the last news, and five
years in case the absentee has left a
person in charge of the administration of
his property, his absence may be declared.
(184)
 Article 385. The following may ask for the
declaration of absence:
(1) The spouse present;
(2) The heirs instituted in a will, who may present
an authentic copy of the same;
(3) The relatives who may succeed by the law of
intestacy;
(4) Those who may have over the property of the
absentee some right subordinated to the condition
of his death. (185)

 Article 386. The judicial declaration of
absence shall not take effect until six
months after its publication in a newspaper
of general circulation. (186a)
 Article387. An administrator of the
absentee's property shall be appointed in
accordance with article 383. (187a)

Article 388. The wife who is appointed as

an administratrix of the husband's property
cannot alienate or encumber the husband's
property, or that of the conjugal partnership,
without judicial authority. (188a)
 Article 389. The administration shall cease in any of the
following cases:
(1) When the absentee appears personally or by means
of an agent;
(2) When the death of the absentee is proved and his
testate or intestate heirs appear;
(3) When a third person appears, showing by a proper
document that he has acquired the absentee's property by
purchase or other title.
In these cases the administrator shall cease in the
performance of his office, and the property shall be at the
disposal of those who may have a right thereto. (190)
 Article 390. After an absence of seven years,
it being unknown whether or not the absentee
still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all
purposes, except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for
the purpose of opening his succession till after
an absence of ten years. If he disappeared
after the age of seventy-five years, an
absence of five years shall be sufficient in
order that his succession may be opened. (n)
 Article 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all
purposes, including the division of the estate among the
heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage,
or an aeroplane which is missing, who has not been
heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or
aeroplane;
(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in
war, and has been missing for four years;
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other
circumstances and his existence has not been known for
four years. (n)
 Article 392. If the absentee appears, or
without appearing his existence is proved,
he shall recover his property in the
condition in which it may be found, and the
price of any property that may have been
alienated or the property acquired
therewith; but he cannot claim either fruits
or rents. (194)
 Article 393. Whoever claims a right pertaining to
a person whose existence is not recognized must
prove that he was living at the time his existence
was necessary in order to acquire said right.
(195)
Article 394. Without prejudice to the provision of
the preceding article, upon the opening of a
succession to which an absentee is called, his
share shall accrue to his coheirs, unless he has
heirs, assigns, or a representative. They shall all,
as the case may be, make an inventory of the
property. (196a)
 Article 395. The provisions of the preceding
article are understood to be without prejudice
to the action of petition for inheritance or other
rights which are vested in the absentee, his
representatives or successors in interest.
These rights shall not be extinguished save by
lapse of time fixed for prescription. In the
record that is made in the Registry of the real
estate which accrues to the coheirs, the
circumstance of its being subject to the
provisions of this article shall be stated. (197)
 Article 396. Those who may have entered
upon the inheritance shall appropriate the
fruits received in good faith so long as the
absentee does not appear, or while his
representatives or successors in interest do
not bring the proper actions. (198)
Reyes v. Alejandro (1986)
The need to have a person judicially declared an
absentee is when he has properties which have
to be taken cared of or administered by a
representative appointed by the Court (Article
384, Civil Code); the spouse of the absentee is
asking for separation of property (Article 191,
Civil Code) or his wife is asking the Court that the
administration of an classes of property in the
marriage be transferred to her (Article 196, Civil
Code).
Eastern Shipping v. Lucero (1983)
There is thus enough evidence to show the
circumstances attending the loss and
disappearance of the M/V Eastern Minicon and its
crew. The foregoing facts, quite logically. are
sufficient to lead Us to a moral certainty that the
vessel had sunk and that the persons aboard had
perished with it. upon this premise, the rule on
presumption of death under Article 391 (1) of the
Civil Code must yield to the rule of
preponderance of evidence.
Manuel v. People (2005)
It was the burden of the petitioner to prove his
defense that when he married the private
complainant in 1996, he was of the well-grounded
belief that 1st wife was already dead, as he had
not heard from her for more than 20 years since
1975. He should have adduced in evidence a
decision of a competent court declaring the
presumptive death of his first wife as required by
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation
to Article 41 of the Family Code.
Pantollano v. Korphil (2011)
With the known facts, namely, that Vedasto was
lost or missing while M/V Couper was navigating
the open sea, there is no doubt that he could
have been in danger of death. Paragraph (3) of
Article 391 of the Civil Code will then be
applicable in this case. Thus, Vedasto can only
be presumed dead after the lapse of four years
from August 2, 1994 when he was declared
missing. But of course, evidence must be shown
that Vedasto has not been heard of for four years
or thereafter.
Republic v. Granada
A petition for presumptive death of an
absent spouse for the purpose of remarriage
is a summary proceeding under the Family
Code, the judgment shall be final and
executory.
Republic v. Narceda (2013)
By express provision of law, the judgment of the
court in a summary proceeding shall be
immediately final and executory. As a matter of
course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the
trial court's judgment in a summary proceeding for
the declaration of presumptive death of an absent
spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code.
FUNERALS
 Article 305. The duty and the right to make
arrangements for the funeral of a relative
shall be in accordance with the order
established for support, under article 294.
In case of descendants of the same
degree, or of brothers and sisters, the
oldest shall be preferred. In case of
ascendants, the paternal shall have a
better right.

 Article 306. Every funeral shall be in keeping
with the social position of the deceased.
Article 307. The funeral shall be in accordance
with the expressed wishes of the deceased. In
the absence of such expression, his religious
beliefs or affiliation shall determine the funeral
rites. In case of doubt, the form of the funeral
shall be decided upon by the person obliged to
make arrangements for the same, after consulting
the other members of the family.
 Article 308. No human remains shall be
retained, interred, disposed of or exhumed
without the consent of the persons
mentioned in articles 294 and 305.
Article 309. Any person who shows
disrespect to the dead, or wrongfully
interferes with a funeral shall be liable to
the family of the deceased for damages,
material and moral.
 Article 310. The construction of a
tombstone or mausoleum shall be deemed
a part of the funeral expenses, and shall be
chargeable to the conjugal partnership
property, if the deceased is one of the
spouses.
Eugenio v. Velez
As to the claim of Tomas Eugenio, Sr. that he should be
considered a "spouse" having the right and duty to make
funeral arrangements for his common-law wife, the Court
ruled:
x x x Indeed, Philippine Law does not recognize common
law marriages. A man and woman not legally married who
cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who
represent themselves to the public as husband and wife,
and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the
community where they live may be considered legally
married in common law jurisdictions but not in the
Philippines.
Valino v. Adriano
(G.R. No. 182894, April 22, 2014)
As applied to this case, it is clear that the law gives the right and
duty to make funeral arrangements to Rosario, she being the
surviving legal wife of Atty. Adriano. The fact that she was living
separately from her husband and was in the United States when
he died has no controlling significance. To say that Rosario had, in
effect, waived or renounced, expressly or impliedly, her right and
duty to make arrangements for the funeral of her deceased
husband is baseless. The right and duty to make funeral
arrangements, like any other right, will not be considered as
having been waived or renounced, except upon clear and
satisfactory proof of conduct indicative of a free and voluntary
intent to that end.9 While there was disaffection between Atty.
Adriano and Rosario and their children when he was still alive, the
Court also recognizes that human compassion, more often than
not, opens the door to mercy and forgiveness once a family
member joins his Creator.
ENTRIES IN THE CIVIL
REGISTER
 Article 407. Acts, events and judicial
decrees concerning the civil status of
persons shall be recorded in the civil
register. (325a)
 Article 408. The following shall be entered in the civil
register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal
separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6)
judgments declaring marriages void from the
beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9)
acknowledgments of natural children; (10)
naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of
citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial
determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation
of a minor; and (16) changes of name. (326a)

 Article 409. In cases of legal separation,

adoption, naturalization and other judicial
orders mentioned in the preceding article, it
shall be the duty of the clerk of the court
which issued the decree to ascertain
whether the same has been registered, and
if this has not been done, to send a copy of
said decree to the civil registry of the city or
municipality where the court is functioning.
(n)
 Article 410. The books making up the civil
register and all documents relating thereto
shall be considered public documents and
shall be prima facie evidence of the facts
therein contained. (n)
 Article 411. Every civil registrar shall be
civilly responsible for any unauthorized
alteration made in any civil register, to any
person suffering damage thereby. However,
the civil registrar may exempt himself from
such liability if he proves that he has taken
every reasonable precaution to prevent the
unlawful alteration. (n)
 Article 412. No entry in a civil register shall
be changed or corrected, without a judicial
order. (n)
Article 413. All other matters pertaining to
the registration of civil status shall be
governed by special laws. (n)
 Rule 108, Rules of Court Cancellation or
Correction of Entry in the Civil Register
R.A. No. 9048
AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE CITY OR
MUNICIPAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OR THE
CONSUL GENERAL TO CORRECT A
CLERICAL OR TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR IN
AN ENTRY AND/OR CHANGE OF FIRST NAME
OR NICKNAME IN THE CIVIL REGISTER
WITHOUT NEED OF A JUDICIAL ORDER
R.A. No. 10172
AN ACT FURTHER AUTHORIZING THE CITY
OR MUNICIPAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OR THE
CONSUL GENERAL TO CORRECT CLERICAL
OR TYPOGRAPHICAL ERRORS IN THE DAY
AND MONTH IN THE DATE OF BIRTH OR SEX
OF A PERSON APPEARING IN THE CIVIL
REGISTER WITHOUT NEED OF A JUDICIAL
ORDER,
Baretto v. Local Civil Registrar (1976)
We hold that the petition for correction is not
warranted because under the facts of this case the
alleged error is not clerical in nature. If the name in
that record of birth were Domingo Barretto and his
sex was indicated therein as female, it might be
argued that the error would be clerical. But that is
not the fact in this case. The situation is more
complicated. A person named Domingo Barretto
claims that he is Rosario Barretto and that the
word "female" in the latter's birth record is a
mistake.
Republic v. Valencia (1986)
In a Petition for Correction of Entry in birth certificate
(citizenship) - If all these procedural requirements
have been followed, a petition for correction and/or
cancellation of entries in the record of birth even if filed
and conducted under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of
Court can no longer be described as "summary".
There can be no doubt that when an opposition to the
petition is filed either by the Civil Registrar or any
person having or claiming any interest in the entries
sought to be cancelled and/or corrected and the
opposition is actively prosecuted, the proceedings
thereon become adversary proceedings.
Republic v. Marcos (1990)
Petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the
minor May Sia alias Manman Huang, also known as
Mary Pang [to] be changed to Mary Pang De la Cruz.
The general rule is that a change of name should not
be permitted if it will give a false impression of family
relationship to another where none actually exists.
The law does not authorize legitimate children to adopt
the surname of a person not their father, for to allow
them to adopt the surname of their mother's husband,
who is not their father, can result in confusion of their
paternity.
Labayo-Rowe v. Republic (1988)
Since only the OSG was notified representing the
State, the proceedings taken, which is summary in
nature, is short of what is required in cases where
substantial alterations are sought. All other
indispensable parties should have been made
respondents. They include not only the declared
father of the child but the child as well, together
with the paternal grandparents, if any, as their
hereditary rights would be adversely affected
thereby.
Zapanta v. LCR of Davao (1994)
SC reversed dismissal of petition for correction of
death certificate from Falviano Zapanta to
Florencio Zapanta. Rule 108 is an adversarial
proceeding. Case was allowed to proceed.
Leonor v. Court of Appeals (1996)
A Petition under Rule 108 seeking cancellation of
the marriage contract, cannot be used by
Mauricio to change his and Virginia's civil status
from married to single and of their three children
from legitimate to illegitimate. Neither does the
trial court, under said Rule, have any jurisdiction
to declare their marriage null and void and as a
result thereof, to order the local civil registrar to
cancel the marriage entry in the civil registry.
Silverio v. Republic (2007)
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is
a historical record of the facts as they existed at
the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is
determined at birth, visually done by the birth
attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining
the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is
no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the
determination of a persons sex made at the time
of his or her birth, if not attended by error, is
immutable.
Republic v. Cagandahan (2008)
Petitioner has Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia
(CAH).The trial courts grant of respondents
change of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a
change of a feminine name to a masculine name.
Considering the consequence that respondents
change of name merely recognizes his preferred
gender, we find merit in respondents change of
name. Such a change will conform with the change
of the entry in his birth certificate from female to
male.
Dela Cruz v. Gracia (2009)
Rules respecting the requirement of affixing the signature
of the acknowledging parent in any private handwritten
instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate
or illegitimate child is made:
1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone
piece of evidence submitted to prove filiation, there should
be strict compliance with the requirement that the same
must be signed by the acknowledging parent; and
2) Where the private handwritten instrument is
accompanied by other relevant and competent evidence,
it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to
have been made and handwritten by the acknowledging
parent as it is merely corroborative of such other
evidence.
Braza v. Civ Reg of Himamaylan (2009)
Their cause of action is actually to seek the declaration
of Pablo and Lucilles marriage as void for being
bigamous and impugn Patricks legitimacy, which
causes of action are governed not by Rule 108 but by
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15,
2003, and Art. 171 of the Family Code.
It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally, validity of
marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be
questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by
the proper party, and not through collateral attack such
as the petition filed before the court a quo.
Baldos v. Court of Appeals (2010)
Since Reynaldo was born on 30 October 1948, the late
registration of his birth is outside of the coverage of P.D. No.
651, as amended. It falls under the Civil Registry Law,( 27
February 1931). Considering that the late registration of
Reynaldos birth took place in 1985, NCSO A.O. No. 1, s. 1983
governs the implementation of Act No. 3753 in this case.
Under NCSO A.O. No. 1-83, the birth of a child shall be
registered within 30 days from the time of birth. Any report of
birth made beyond the reglementary period is considered
delayed. The LCR, upon receiving an application for delayed
registration of birth, is required to publicly post for at least 10
days a notice of the pending application for delayed
registration. If after ten days no one opposes the registration
and the local civil registrar is convinced beyond doubt that the
birth should be registered, he should register the same.
Reynaldos certificate of live birth, as a duly registered public
document, is presumed to have gone through the process
prescribed by law for late registration of birth.
It was only after the lapse of 10 long years from the approval of
the application for delayed registration, that Nieves registered
her opposition. She should have done so within the ten-day
period prescribed by law. Records show that no less than Nieves
herself informed the local civil registrar of the birth of Reynaldo.
Applications for delayed registration of birth go through a
rigorous process. The books making up the civil register are
considered public documents and are prima facie evidence of
the truth of the facts stated there. As a public document, a
registered certificate of live birth enjoys the presumption of
validity. It is not for Reynaldo to prove the facts stated in his
certificate of live birth, but for petitioners who are assailing the
certificate to prove its alleged falsity.
Republic v. Magpayo (2011)
The change being sought in respondents petition
goes so far as to affect his legal status in relation
to his parents. It seeks to change his legitimacy
to that of illegitimacy. Rule 103 then would not
suffice to grant respondents supplication.
When a petition for cancellation or correction of
an entry in the civil register involves substantial
and controversial alterations including those on
citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or
legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with
the requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court is mandated.

United Abangan Clan v. Sabellano (2012)

There is no identity and similarity between the first and the
second petitions with respect to the issues under
litigation. The action in the prior Petition (SP. PROC. No.
16171-CEB) involves a judicial declaration of heirship,
while the main issue in the present one (SP. PROC. No.
16180-CEB) pertains to a cancellation of entry in the civil
register.
In the former, what is established is a partys right of
succession to the decedent; in the latter, among those
settled are the issues of nationality, paternity, filiation,
legitimacy of the marital status, and registrability of an
event affecting the status or nationality of an individual.
Republic v. Dr. Norma Lugsanay-Uy
(2013)
Respondents birth certificate shows that her full
name is Anita Sy, that she is a Chinese citizen and a
legitimate child of Sy Ton and Sotera Lugsanay. In
filing the petition, however, she seeks the correction
of her first name and surname, her status from
"legitimate" to "illegitimate" and her citizenship from
"Chinese" to "Filipino." Thus, respondent should have
impleaded and notified not only the Local Civil
Registrar but also her parents and siblings as the
persons who have interest and are affected by the
changes or corrections respondent wanted to make.
Iwasawa v. Gangan (2013)
There is no question that the documentary evidence submitted
by petitioner are all public documents. As public documents,
they are admissible in evidence even without further proof of
their due execution and genuineness. Thus, the RTC erred
when it disregarded said documents on the sole ground that
the petitioner did not present the records custodian of the NSO
who issued them to testify on their authenticity and due
execution since proof of authenticity and due execution was not
anymore necessary. Moreover, not only are said documents
admissible, they deserve to be given evidentiary weight
because they constitute prima facie evidence of the facts
stated therein. And in the instant case, the facts stated therein
remain unrebutted since neither the private respondent nor the
public prosecutor presented evidence to the contrary.
Republic v. Olaybar (2014)
Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was
presented to show the existence of marriage. Rather, respondent
showed by overwhelming evidence that no marriage was entered into
and that she was not even aware of such existence. The testimonial
and documentary evidence clearly established that the only
"evidence" of marriage which is the marriage certificate was a forgery.
While we maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine
the validity of marriage, we cannot nullify the proceedings before the
trial court where all the parties had been given the opportunity to
contest the allegations of respondent; the procedures were followed,
and all the evidence of the parties had already been admitted and
examined. Respondent indeed sought, not the nullification of
marriage as there was no marriage to speak of, but the correction of
the record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the
evidence. Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction of the subject
certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial
court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there was no
marriage to speak of.
Onde v. Office of LCR (G.R. No. 197174,
Sept. 10, 2014)
Entry From To

(1) Date and place of Dec. 23, 1983 not married

marriage of his parents

2) First name of
his mother Tely Matilde

3) His first name Franc Ler Francler

 A petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the
civil register involves substantial and controversial
alterations, including those on citizenship, legitimacy of
paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict
compliance with the requirements of the Rules of Court is
mandated. Thus, in his new petition, petitioner should at
least implead his father and mother as parties since the
substantial correction he is seeking will also affect them.

Correction of his first name and that of his mother may be

done thru the Local Civil Registrar.