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2012
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] 131
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] 131
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] 131
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] 131
131 6 786
131
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131 8 1048 ] 131
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131 10 1310 ]
Copyright 2004 McGraw-Hill Australia Pty Ltd
PPTs t/a Microeconomics 7/e by Jackson and McIver
4
Slides prepared by Muni Perumal, University of Canberra, Australia.
P
786
655
524
393
262
P = AR = MR = D
131
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Quantity demanded (sold)
0 ] – $100
90 $ 131
1 100.00 90.00 190.00 ] – 59
80 131
2 50.00 85.00 135.00 ] –8
70 131
3 33.33 80.00 113.33 ] + 53
60 131
4 25.00 75.00 100.00 ] + 124
70 131
5 20.00 74.00 94.00 ] + 185
80 131
6 16.67 75.00 91.67 ] + 236
90 131
7 14.29 77.14 91.43 ] + 277
110 131
8 12.50 81.25 93.75 ] + 298
130 131
9 11.11 86.67 94.78 + 299
] 150 131
10 10.00 93.00 103.00 + 280
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Q
Copyright 2004 McGraw-Hill Australia Pty Ltd
PPTs t/a Microeconomics 7/e by Jackson and McIver
8
Slides prepared by Muni Perumal, University of Canberra, Australia.
Loss-Minimising Case: MR–MC Approach
200
MC
Economic Loss:
Total revenue and total costs (dollars)
Loss Minimisation
150
ATC
100 AVC
81 MR
50
0 Q
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Copyright 2004 McGraw-Hill Australia Pty Ltd
PPTs t/a Microeconomics 7/e by Jackson and McIver
9
Slides prepared by Muni Perumal, University of Canberra, Australia.
Close-Down Case: MR–MC Approach
200
Economic Loss: MC
Total revenue and total costs (dollars) Close down
150 in the short run
ATC
100 AVC
71 MR
50
0 Q
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Copyright 2004 McGraw-Hill Australia Pty Ltd
PPTs t/a Microeconomics 7/e by Jackson and McIver
10
Slides prepared by Muni Perumal, University of Canberra, Australia.
Short-Run Supply Curve
• For the individual firm: MC above AVC
• For the entire industry: horizontal sum
of firms’ MC curves above AVC
AVC1
Q
Copyright 2004 McGraw-Hill Australia Pty Ltd
PPTs t/a Microeconomics 7/e by Jackson and McIver
12
Slides prepared by Muni Perumal, University of Canberra, Australia.
P = MC: Short-Run Supply Curve
P
MC1
If costs decrease...
the supply curve MC2
effectively shifts
to the right
AVC1
AVC2
Q
Copyright 2004 McGraw-Hill Australia Pty Ltd
PPTs t/a Microeconomics 7/e by Jackson and McIver
13
Slides prepared by Muni Perumal, University of Canberra, Australia.
Profit Maximisation in the
Long Run
Assumptions:
• Entry and exit
• Identical costs
• Constant-cost industry
Goals:
• Price = Minimum ATC
• Zero economic profit model
$60 $60
50 50
40 MR 40
D1
$60 $60
50 50
40 MR 40
D1
$60 $60
$50 $50
$40 MR $40
D1
$100 Q $90 000 $100 000
Firm Industry Q
(price taker)
Copyright 2004 McGraw-Hill Australia Pty Ltd
PPTs t/a Microeconomics 7/e by Jackson and McIver
17
Slides prepared by Muni Perumal, University of Canberra, Australia.
Long-Run Competitive
P Equilibrium
MC
Price ATC
MR
Quantity Q
Copyright 2004 McGraw-Hill Australia Pty Ltd
PPTs t/a Microeconomics 7/e by Jackson and McIver
18
Slides prepared by Muni Perumal, University of Canberra, Australia.
Efficiency Defined
Allocative efficiency:
• Resources are allocated among firms and
industries to obtain a mix of products most
desired by consumers
Productive efficiency:
• Goods are produced using the least cost
production methods
Dynamic efficiency:
• Firms do not innovate
Copyright 2004 McGraw-Hill Australia Pty Ltd
PPTs t/a Microeconomics 7/e by Jackson and McIver
19
Slides prepared by Muni Perumal, University of Canberra, Australia.
Efficiency and Competition
• Allocative efficiency: P = MC
– under-allocation: P > MC
– over-allocation: P < MC
• Productive efficiency:
– P = min ATC
• The ‘invisible hand’ simultaneously:
– maximises profits
– maximises satisfaction
Dollars
Inelastic
200
50 MR D
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 Q
750
500
Dollars
250
TR
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 Q
Marginal cost
Monopoly E B
price
Average
total D C
cost
Demand
Marginal revenue
0 QMAX Quantity
Monopoly
price
Marginal
revenue Demand
30
25
Price & Cost (dollars per household
P
20
per month)
15 Consumer
surplus ATC
10 MC
0 2 4 6 8 10
Quantity (millions of households)
Economic Effects of Monopoly
• Productive inefficiency:
– Minimum ATC is not necessarily chosen
• Allocative inefficiency:
– P price does not necessary equal MC
• Dynamic efficiency:
– Because these firms make profits they can
afford the R&D costs to develop new products
and processes
Copyright 2004 McGraw-Hill Australia Pty Ltd
PPTs t/a Microeconomics 7/e by Jackson and McIver
30
Slides prepared by Muni Perumal, University of Canberra, Australia.
Price Discrimination
Three required Conditions
• Monopoly power
• Market segmentation, different willingness
and ability to pay, different PED.
• No resale
Consequences
• More profits
• More production
2100 surplus
1200
900 $48
million
600
300 MR D
0 5 8 10 15 20
Passengers (thousands per year)
Price Discrimination
1800 ATC
1600
1400
1200
900
600
300
D
0 2 4 6 8 10 15 20
Passengers (thousands per year)
The Yacht diagram
• Assume just two market segments.
• One has a high willingness to pay and
a low PED.
• The other has a low willingness to pay
and a high PED.
D1
P1
P2
D2
MR2 37
MR1
The Yacht diagram
D1
P1
P2
D2
MR2 38
MR1
Perfect Price
Discrimination
• When a firm practices perfect price
discrimination it extracts the entire
consumer surplus.
• Firm needs to be able to segment the
market into very many segments e.g.
auctions.
Perfect Price Discrimination
Increase in economic
MC Figure 11.10
profit from perfect
Price (dollars per trip)
600
300 Increase
in output D
0 2 4 6 8 11 15 20
Passengers (thousands per year)
Second order price
discrimination
• Price varies according to quantity sold, larger quantities
are available at a lower unit price. Widespread in sales to
industrial customers, where bulk buyers enjoy higher
discounts.
• Sellers are usually not able to differentiate between
different types of consumers. So suppliers provide
incentives for consumers to differentiate themselves
according to preference. Quantity discounts is a method
suppliers use to distinguish classes of consumers.
Suppliers set different prices to the different groups and
capture a larger portion of the total market surplus.
Two part Tariffs
• The price of a product is composed of two
parts - a lump-sum fee and a per-unit
charge. Two-part tariffs may also exist in
PC when consumers are uncertain about
their ultimate demand.
• The product must be identical to all
consumers, price may vary, but not due to
different costs borne by the firm, this would
infer a differentiated product.
Copyright 2004 McGraw-Hill Australia Pty Ltd
PPTs t/a Microeconomics 7/e by Jackson and McIver
42
Slides prepared by Muni Perumal, University of Canberra, Australia.
Bundling
• A quick review.
• Firms can of course combine PD, two
part tariffs and bundling to maximise
profits.
30
25
Price & Cost (dollars per household
20
per month)
Loss per
household
15 Consumer
surplus ATC
10 MC
0 2 4 6 8 10
Quantity (millions of households)
Natural Monopoly Regulation
• Regulating Monopoly in the Social Interest
• Average Cost Pricing Rule
– Sets price equal to average total cost
– Consumer surplus is less than under marginal cost
pricing
Natural Monopoly:
Average Cost Pricing
30
25
Price & Cost (dollars per household
20 Consumer
per month)
surplus
P = AR
15
Producer ATC
surplus
10 MC
Deadweight
loss D
0 2 4 6 8 10
Quantity (millions of households)
Marginal cost pricing
30 Profit maximising
Price & Cost (dollars per household
outcome
25
per month)
15 P = AR
ATC
10 P = MC (S = D)
Average cost pricing
D PC outcome
0 2 4 6 MR 8 10
Quantity (millions of households)
Monopsony
– A monopsony is a market with a single buyer.
– Rather than setting MB = MC or MR = MC to
determine quanatity and then letting the demand
curve set the price, as in monopoly,
– The monoponist sets MR = MC to determine quantity
but then uses the supply curve to set prices, both the
quantity and the price is less than the perfectly
competitive outcome
A Monopsony Market Figure A14-2
MCL
S
Wage rate (dollars per hour)
10.00
7.50 Competitive
equilibrium
5.00
MRP = D
Monopsony
equilibrium
0 50 100
Labour (hours per day)
Bilateral Monopoly
MCF
Union wage S
Blue is Union
Red is employer
Employer N1 is the optimum Q
wage
W is indeterminant
VMP = D
MRP
N2 N1
A Dominant Firm Monopoly
A competitive fringe and market Dominant firm’s output decision
demand
S10
Price (dollars per litre)
MC
1.50 1.50
A B A B
1.00 1.00
D
0.50 0.50
ED
MR
0 10 Qcf 20 Qd 0 10Qdf 20
Quantity (thous. of litres/week) Quantity (thous. of litres/week)