HAZARD AND OPERABILITY

(HAZOP) STUDY - BASIC

MUHAMMAD NANDA FARIA
88 CONSULTING GROUP
OUTLINE

1. INTRODUCTION
2. HAZOP OBJECTIVES
3. HAZOP STUDY METHODOLOGY
4. HAZOP TEAM
5. HAZOP STUDY MATERIALS
6. HAZOP GUIDEWORDS
7. HAZOP STUDY EXAMPLE
INTRODUCTION

INDUSTRIAL
PLANT

DESIGN CONSTRUCTION OPERATION

 SAFE

DESIGN

DETAIL APPLICABLE
 SAFE

OPERATION

INTEGRITY RELIABLE
DEEPWATER HORIZON FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI
 ENGINEERING
DESIGN (NEW OR
MODIFICATION)

PERSONAL HAZOP
SAFETY STUDY

PROCESS SAFETY
HAZOP
• Pioneered at Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) in United Kingdom in1964
• A form of hazard identification used to identify potential hazards and operational problems in
terms of plant design and human error
• Qualitative technique based on guide-words and carried out by a multi-disciplinary team during
a set of meetings

HAZOP STUDY
• A structured and systematic examination of a planned or existing process or operation in order
to identify and evaluate problems that may represent risks to personnel or equipment, or
prevent efficient operation
HAZOP OBJECTIVES

Identify all deviations

Decide whether actions are required to control the hazards and/or the
operability problems
Identify cases where a decision cannot be made immediately
Ensure that actions are followed up
Make operator aware of hazards and operability problems
HAZOP STUDY PROCEDURE
• Initiate the study
Definition • Define scope and objectives
• Define roles and responsibilities

• Plan the study

Preparation • Collect data and documentation
• Establish guidewords and deviations

• Structure the examination

Examination • Perform the examination

• Establish method of recording

Documentation • Output the study
and follow up • Sign off the documentation
• Follow-up and responsibilities
HAZOP TEAM
No. Role
1 HAZOP Leader
2 HAZOP Secretary/Scriber
3 Process Engineer
4 Design Engineer
5 Operation Supervisor
6 Maintenance Supervisor
7 Specialists
8 HSE Responsible
Responsibilities
Ensure the method is followed
carefully
Ensure that problems are
documented and
recommendations passed on
Explain any process details
Explain any design details
Consider plant operability by
questioning the operability and
the effect of deviations
Concerns the maintenance of
process
Give advices with relevant
technical knowledge
Ensure the HSE standards
HAZOP WORKSHOP
HAZOP STUDY MATERIALS

• Block Flow Diagram (BFD)

• Process Flow Diagram (PFD)
• Piping and Instumentation diagram (P&ID)
• Process description containing operating parameters as well as brief summary of
how each plant item functions
• Instrumentation Cause and Effect diagram
• Plant layout
• Vendor package details (if available)
HAZOP GUIDEWORDS
Deviation type Guide word Example interpretation for process industry
Negative NO No part of the intention is achieved, e.g. no flow
Quantitative MORE A quantitative increase, e.g. higher temperature
modification
LESS A quantitative decrease, e.g. lower temperature
Qualitative AS WELL AS Impurities present
modification Simultaneous execution of another operation/step

PART OF Only some of the intention is achieved, i.e. only part of an intended
fluid transfer takes place
Substitution REVERSE Covers reverse flow in pipes and reverse chemical reactions

OTHER THAN A result other than the original intention is achieved, i.e. transfer of
wrong material
Time EARLY Something happens early relative to clock time, e.g. cooling or
filtration

LATE Something happens late relative to clock time, e.g. cooling or filtration
Order of BEFORE Something happens too early in a sequence, e.g. mixing or heating
sequence
AFTER Something happens too late in a sequence, e.g. mixing or heating
HAZOP STUDY EXAMPLE
STUDY TITLE: PROCESS EXAMPLE SHEET: 1 of 1
DRAWING NO: REV NO: DATE: August 25 2019
TEAM COMPOSITION: LB, DH, EK, NE, MG, JK MEETING DATE: August 19 2019
PART CONSIDERED: Transfer line from supply tank A to reactor
DESIGN INTENT: Material : A Activity: Transfer continuously at a rate greater than B
Source : Tank for A Destination: Reactor

Action
No Guide word Element Deviation Possible causes Consequences Existing controls Comments Action required
allocated to
No flow of A into reactor Consider
installation on
Supply tank A is Situation not Tank A of a low-
1 NO Material A No Material A None shown MG
empty Explosion acceptable level alarm plus a
low-level trip to
stop pump B
Remark:
This would
Filling of tank Consider high-
have been
More Material A: from tanker Tank will overflow into level alarm if not
2 MORE Material A None shown identified EK
supply tank over full when insufficient bounded area previously
during
capacity exist identified
examination
of the tank
Measurement of
Line partially flow rate for
Transfer A blocked, material A plus a
Not
3 LESS (at rate Reduced flow rate of A leakage, pump Explosion None shown low flow alarm JK
acceptable
>B) under and a low flow
performing which trips pump
B

Locate flow
Environmental Use of accepted
AS WELL Destinatio As well as to reactor Line, valve or Qualified sensor for trip as
4 contamination, possible piping code or DH
AS n Reactor external leaks gland leaks acceptance close as possible
explosion standard
to the reactor

Reverse direction of Pressure in

flow reactor higher Back contamination of Consider installin
Position not
5 REVERSE Transfer A than pump supply tank with reaction None shown a non-return MG
Material flows from satisfactory
discharge material valve in the line
reactor to supply tank pressure

Source: IEC 61882:2016

Any Questions ?
THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION