Sesi 4

Desentralisasi Fiskal
Referensi :
Jonathan Gruber, Public Finance and Public Policy (utama)
 Capaian Pembelajaran

• Desentralisasi Fiscal
• Optimalisasi Desentraliasi Fiscal
• Redistribusi
• Desentralisasi Fiskal di Indonesia
 Introduction

• Optimal fiscal federalism is the question of

which activities should take place at which level
of government.
• For example, welfare programs were historically
financed at the federal and state level, while
education is largely financed at the state and
local level.
 Fiscal Federalism Abroad

• The higher level of centralization in other

nations exists because state/local governments
have almost no legal power to tax citizens.
• Many countries practice fiscal equalization,
whereby the national government distributes
grants to sub-national government in an effort
to equalize differences in wealth.
 1. OPTIMAL FISCAL FEDERALISM

• What is the optimal division of responsibilities

across different levels of government?
• A theory of how the efficiency of public goods
provision may differ at different levels of
government helps answer this questions.
 OPTIMAL FISCAL FEDERALISM

• Two of the major problems in public goods

provision are:
– Preference revelation: Difficult to design democratic
institutions to cause individuals to reveal their
preferences honestly.
– Preference aggregation: Difficult to aggregate individual
preferences into a social decision.
 The Tiebout Model

• Tiebout (1956) showed that the inefficiency in

public goods provision came from two missing
factors: shopping and competition.
• Shopping induces efficiency in private markets.
• Competition induces the right prices and
quantities in private markets.
 The Tiebout Model
• With public goods provided at the local level,
competition naturally arises because individuals can
vote with their feet by moving to another town without
much disruption.
• This induces fiscal discipline for local governments
and creates a new preference revelation device: mobility.
• Tiebout argued that the threat of exit can induce
efficiency in local public goods production.
• Under certain (unrealistic) conditions public goods
provision will be fully efficient at the local level.
 Problems with the Tiebout Model

• There are a number of problems with the

model, however, related to:
– Tiebout competition
– Tiebout financing
– Spillovers
 Problems with the Tiebout Model

• Tiebout competition may not hold because:

– It requires perfect mobility.
– It requires perfect information on the benefits
individuals receive and the taxes they pay.
– It requires enough choice of towns so that
individuals can find the right levels of public goods.
 Problems with the Tiebout Model

• Tiebout financing is problematic because:

– It requires lump-sum taxes that are independent of
a person’s income. This is viewed as highly
inequitable.
– It is more common for towns to finance public
goods through proportional taxes on homes, leading
to the problem of the poor chasing the rich.
– The use of zoning can ameliorate this problem.
 Problems with the Tiebout Model

• Zoning regulations protect the tax base of

wealthy towns by pricing lower income
individuals out of the housing market.
• For example, a town that prohibits multifamily
dwelling such as apartments lowers the available
amount of housing, and thus inflates the value
of existing housing, keeping the poor out.
 Problems with the Tiebout Model

• Tiebout model is also problematic because of

the assumption of no externalities or spillovers:
– Model assumes public goods only have effects in a
given town, and that they do not spill over to
neighboring towns.
– Some public goods, like a public park, probably
violate this assumption.
 2. Optimal Fiscal Federalism
• What are the normative implications of the
Tiebout model?
• That is, what should be the principles that guide
the provision of public goods at different levels
of government?
• The extent to which public goods should be
provided at the local level is determined by:
– Tax-benefit linkages
– Positive externalities or spillovers
– Economies of scale
 Tax-benefit linkages
• First, the model implies that the extent to which public goods
should be provided at the local level is determined by tax-
benefit linkages.
• Strong linkages (such as local roads) means most residents
benefit, and the good should be provided locally.
• Weak linkages (such as welfare payments) means that most
residents do not benefit, and the good should be provided at a
higher level.
• If residents can see directly the benefits they are buying with
their property tax dollars, they will be willing to pay local taxes.
Otherwise, they may “vote with their feet.”
 Positive externalities or spillovers

• The second factor that determines the optimal

level of decentralization is the extent of positive
externalities.
• If the local public good has spillovers to other
communities, they will be underprovided. In
this case, higher levels of government have a
role in promoting the provision of these public
goods.
 Economies of scale

• The third factor that determines the optimal

level of decentralization is the economies of
scale in production.
• Public goods with large economies of scale, like
national defense, are not efficiently provided by
many competing local jurisdictions.
• Public goods without large economies of scale,
like police protection, may be provided more
efficiently in Tiebout competition.
 3. REDISTRIBUTION
• The Tiebout model allows us to consider one of
the most important problems in fiscal federalism:
Should there be redistribution of public funds
across communities?
• There is currently enormous inequality in the ability
and perhaps desire for communities to finance
public goods.
• Gaps in per-pupil spending arise because of
differences in the local property tax rate, but more
importantly, from differences in property values.
 Should We Care?

• To the extent that Tiebout does not perfectly

describe reality, however, there are two
arguments for redistribution.
– The first is failures of the Tiebout mechanism. For
example, even if one desires to be in a high benefit
community, a household may be priced out of it by
zoning restrictions, etc.
– The second is externalities. It is possible that local
public goods, like education, have spillovers to other
communities.
 Tools of Redistribution: Grants
• Higher levels of government tend to use three types of grants:
– Matching grants–which ties the amount of funds transferred to
the community to the amount of spending it currently allocates to
public goods.
– Block grants–a fixed amount of money with no mandate on how
it is to be spent.
– Conditional block grants–a fixed amount of money with a
mandate that it be spent in a particular way.
• The consequences of these grants are illustrated in Figure 2.
Private Such a grant
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Figure 2 The effects of different government grants

 The flypaper effect

• As shown in Figure 2, block grants are simply

income increases to communities if they are
either unconditional or conditional but below
the city’s desired spending on the public good.
• The city should therefore reduce its own
spending, a type of crowding out, so that spending
on the public good goes up by only a fraction of
the total grant amount.
 The flypaper effect
• Researchers have compared the spending of
states that receive larger and smaller grants from
the federal government, to assess whether they
largely crowd out state spending, as the theory
predicts.
• Surprisingly, after reviewing the evidence Hines
and Thaler (1995) found that crowd out is often
close to zero, so total spending rises almost one-
for-one.
 The flypaper effect

• This finding has been described as the flypaper

effect, because “money sticks where it hits.”
• These older empirical studies suffer from
potential bias, however. States that value public
goods the most may be the most successful at
lobbying for federal grants.
– Thus, the positive correlation is not because of the
flypaper effect, but rather spending preferences
differ.
 The flypaper effect

• A number of recent studies, that use more

convincing quasi-experimental approaches find
evidence that is inconsistent with the flypaper
effect.
• These studies suggest that the traditional
conclusion of substantial crowd-out from block
grants is supported by the evidence.
Desentralisasi Fiskal di Indonesia
Era Habibie
Era Gus Dur
 CAKUPAN HUBUNGAN KEUANGAN
PUSAT DAN DAERAH

• Pemberian kewenangan perpajakan kepada daerah

(local taxing power) dan kewenangan dalam melakukan
pinjaman;
• Kebijakan transfer (revenue assignment);
• Keleluasaan untuk Belanja (expenditure assignment).

29
 Hubungan Pusat dan Daerah :
Perspektif UU No. 23 Tahun 2014
• Presiden RI memegang kekuasaan pemerintahan sesuai
dengan UUD Negara RI Tahun 1945.
• Kekuasaan Pemerintahan diuraikan dalam berbagai
Urusan Pemerintahan.
• Dalam menyelenggarakan Urusan Pemerintahan,
Presiden dibantu oleh menteri yang menyelenggarakan
Urusan Pemerintahan tertentu.
• Penyelenggaraan Urusan Pemerintahan di Daerah
dilaksanakan berdasarkan asas Desentralisasi,
Dekonsentrasi, dan Tugas Pembantuan.

Pasal 5 UU 23/2014
30
 PRINSIP MONEY FOLLOWS FUNCTIONS

 Perimbangan keuangan antara Pemerintah dan Pemerintahan Daerah (PKPD) adalah suatu
sistem pembagian keuangan yang adil, proporsional, demokratis, transparan, dan efisien
dalam rangka pendanaan penyelenggaraan Desentralisasi, dengan mempertimbangkan
potensi, kondisi, dan kebutuhan daerah, serta besaran pendanaan penyelenggaraan
Dekonsentrasi dan Tugas Pembantuan.
 PKPD merupakan subsistem Keuangan Negara sebagai konsekuensi pembagian tugas antara
Pemerintah Pusat dan Daerah atau timbul dari adanya hubungan fungsi/urusan.
 Fungsi/Urusan dibagi antara pemerintah pusat dan daerah, namun tanggungjawab akhir
tetap pada pemerintah pusat (UU No.23/2014 tentang Pemerintahan Daerah.
 Pemberian sumber keuangan negara kepada Daerah dalam rangka pelaksanaan
Desentralisasi didasarkan atas penyerahan tugas oleh Pemerintah Pusat kepada Pemerintah
Daerah dengan memperhatikan stabilitas dan keseimbangan fiskal.
 Perimbangan Keuangan antara Pemerintah dan Pemerintahan Daerah merupakan suatu
sistem yang menyeluruh dalam rangka pendanaan penyelenggaraan asas Desentralisasi,
Dekonsentrasi, dan Tugas Pembantuan.

Pasal 2 UU 33 / 2004
31
PRINSIP MONEY FOLLOWS FUNCTION

32
 KLASIFIKASI URUSAN PEMERINTAH
1) Urusan Pemerintahan terdiri atas urusan pemerintahan absolut,
urusan pemerintahan konkuren, dan urusan pemerintahan umum.
2) Urusan pemerintahan absolut adalah Urusan Pemerintahan yang
sepenuhnya menjadi kewenangan Pemerintah Pusat.
3) Urusan pemerintahan konkuren adalah Urusan Pemerintahan yang
dibagi antara Pemerintah Pusat dan Daerah provinsi dan Daerah
kabupaten/kota.
4) Urusan pemerintahan konkuren yang diserahkan ke Daerah menjadi
dasar pelaksanaan Otonomi Daerah.
5) Urusan pemerintahan umum adalah Urusan Pemerintahan yang
menjadi kewenangan Presiden sebagai kepala pemerintahan.

Pasal 9 UU 23/2014

33
 PEMBAGIAN URUSAN PEMERINTAHAN
(UU NO. 23/2014)
URUSAN PEMERINTAHAN

ABSOLUT CONCURRENT
URUSAN PEME- (34 Urusan bersama
(Mutlak urusan Pusat) RINTAHAN UMUM Pusat, Provinsi, dan Kab/Kota)

1. politik luar negeri; PILIHAN/OPTIONAL WAJIB/OBLIGATORY / SPM

• Wajib (13) Pelayanan Dasar:
2. pertahanan; (Sektor Unggulan) Pend; Kes; LH; PU & PR; Han Ngan;
3. keamanan; 8 Urusan Pilihan Adminduk Capil; Dal Duk & KB;Sos;Naker;
Pera & Waskim; Trantib Um & Linmas;
4. yustisi; Contoh: pertanian, Hub & Perlindungan Anak
5. moneter dan fiskal nasional; industri, perdagangan, • Wajib (12) tidak Pelayanan Dasar:
Pertanahan; Kominfo ; Kop & UKM; Pen
dan pariwisata, kelautan dsb Modal; Kempora; PMD; Pem. Perempuan;
6. agama. Statistik; Persandian;
Kebudayaan; Perpus; & Kearsipan

1. Dilaksanakan sendiri
2. Dekonsentrasi
3. Tugas Pembantuan
Desentralisasi
34
 PEMBAGIAN URUSAN PEMERINTAHAN DAERAH
(UU NOMOR 23/2014)
URUSAN WAJIB terkait PD (psl 12 ayat1 )
a) Pendidikan
b) Kesehatan
c) Pekerjaan Umum & Penataan Ruang
UU NO. 23 TAHUN 2014 d) Perumahan Rakyat &kawasan pemukiman
e) Ketentraman, ketertiaban & perlindungan Masyarakat dan
f) sosial
URUSAN WAJIB tdk terkait PD (psl 12 ayat 2 )
a) Tenaga Kerja
b)Pemberdayaan Perempuan & perlindungan Anak
c) Pangan
DESENTRALISASI d)Pertanahan
e) Lingkungan Hidup
f) Administrasi kependudukan & catatan sipil
g) Pemberdayaan masysrakat & Desa
h) Pengendalian penduduk & keluarga berencana
i) Perhubungan
j) Komunikasi & Informatika
OTONOMI DAERAH k) Koperasi, usaha kecil & menengah
l) Penanaman Modal
m) Kepemudaan & Olah raga
n) Statistik
o) Persandian
p) Kebudayaan
q) Perpustakaan dan

URUSAN WAJIB & r) Kearsipan

URUSAN PILIHAN ( psl 12 ayat 3 )
a) Pertanian
PILIHAN (Psl 11) b) Kehutanan
c) Energi dan Sumberdaya Mineral
d) Pariwisata
e) Kelautan dan Perikanan
f) Perdagangan
35
PD = Pelayanan Dasar g) Perindustrian
h) Transmigrasi
 13

Tranfer ke Daerah dan Dana Desa

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

0
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Dana Desa 0 0 0 0 20.8
Dana Keistimewaan DIY 0 0 0 0.5 0.5
Dana Penyesuaian 54.6 58.5 70.4 87.9 104.4
Dana Otonomi Khusus 10.4 11.9 13.4 16.1 17.1
Dana Perimbangan 347.2 408.3 445.5 491.8 521.8

*) Dana Penyesuaian pada Tahun 2014 dan seterusnya disebut sebagai Dana Transfer Lainnya
 39

Dana Perimbangan

600,000.00

500,000.00

400,000.00

300,000.00

200,000.00

100,000.00

-
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Dana Alokasi Khusus 25,232.80 26,115.90 31,697.10 33,000.00 58,820.70
Dana Alokasi Umum 225,533.70 273,814.40 311,139.30 341,219.30 352,887.80
Dana Bagi Hasil 96,772.10 108,421.70 102,695.00 117,663.60 110,052.00
 TUGAS INDIVIDU

1. Analisa APBD tempat asalmu ( bisa Provinsi atau

Kabupaten/Kota)
2. Bandingkan angka-angka APBD dengan tugas
pemerintah daerah (slide 30 s.d 35)
3. Bagaimanakah kesimpulanmu ?

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