AGUINALDO DOCTRINE

OTHERWISE KNOWN AS
THE CONDONATION DOCTRINE
What is this doctrine of condonation, and the
reason behind this doctrine?
• A public official cannot be removed for administrative misconduct
committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office operates
as a condonation of the officer’s previous misconduct to the extent of
cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The foregoing rule,
however, finds no application to criminal cases pending against
petitioner. (Aguinaldo v. Santos, 212 SCRA 768, 773 [1992])
What is this doctrine of condonation, and the
reason behind this doctrine?
• The rationale for this holding is that when the electorate put him back
into office, it is presumed that it did so with full knowledge of his life
and character, including his past misconduct. If, armed with such
knowledge, it still reelects him, then such reelection is considered a
condonation of his past misdeeds. (Mayor Alvin B. Garcia v. Hon.
Arturo C. Mojica, et al., G.R. No. 139043, Sept. 10, 1999
[Quisumbing])
•
Is the re election be on the immediately
succeeding election?
• NO.
• The application of the doctrine does not require that the official must
be re-elected to the same position in the immediately succeeding
election.

• It is inconsequential whether the said re-election be on another

public office or on an election year that is not immediately
succeeding the last, as long as the electorate that re-elected the
public official be the same. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN V.
VERGARA G.R. No. 216871, December 06, 2017
Can the doctrine of condonation be applied to a
public officer who was elected to a different
position?
• YES. This Court had already clarified that the doctrine can be applied
to a public officer who was elected to a different position provided
that it is shown that the body politic electing the person to another
office is the same. Almario-Templonuevo v. Office of the Ombudsman,
GR. No. 198583, June 28, 2017, 828 SCRA 283, 297.
• It is not necessary for the official to have been re-elected to exactly
the same position; what is material is that he was re-elected by the
same electorate.
• AGUILAR V. BENLOT G.R. No. 232806, January 21, 2019
• In the more recent case of Conchita Carpio Morales v. Court of
Appeals (Sixth Division), GR Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015, En
Banc (Perlas-Bernabe) the Supreme Court abandoned the doctrine of
condonation although the abandonment was given prospective
application only.
Briefly explain why this doctrine was abandoned.

• The Court observed that this doctrine was first applied in the 1959
case of Pascual v. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija - which ruling was
based on an American case. Upon review of American cases on the
matter, the Court found that even in the US, this doctrine was not
uniformly recognized by American courts.
•
• Besides, Pascual was decided under the 1935 Constitution which
Constitution does not give emphasis to the nature of public office as a
public trust - a novel feature of this 1987 Constitution.
•
Briefly explain why this doctrine was abandoned.

• Continuous observance of this doctrine will make a mockery of the

nature of public office as a public trust and the corresponding
accountability of public officers, hence, should be abandoned.

• Moreover, the reason behind the adoption of said doctrine as

expressed in Garcia v. Mojica appears to be based on faulty reasoning
for, indeed, the electorate cannot possibly condone what it did not
know, since it is common knowledge that a misconduct is committed
in secret. (Conchita Carpio Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth
Division), GR Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015, En Banc
When did the ruling in Morales v. Court of
Appeals on the abandonment of the doctrine
of condonation become final?
• The abandonment of the doctrine of condonation took effect on April
12, 2016, when the Supreme Court denied with finality the OMB's
motion for reconsideration in Morales v. Court of Appeals G.R. Nos.
217126-27, November 10, 2015, 774 SCRA 431.

• Thus the abandonment should be reckoned from April 12, 2016.

• CREBELLO V. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN G.R. No. 232325, April 10,

2019
• On May 2, 2016 by complainant Villasenor filed a case against the
incumbent Mayor Dator for grave misconduct, grave abuse of
authority and nepotism. Dator was reelected in 2016. Is the
AGUINALDO DOCTRINE OTHERWISE KNOWN AS
THE CONDONATION DOCTRINE still applicable in this case?
• NO.
• the case against Dator was instituted on May 2, 2016, or AFTER the
ruling of this Court in the seminal case of Conchita Carpio Morales vs.
CA and Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr. 772 Phil. 672 (2015).
• Clearly then, the condonation principle is no longer applicable to him.
DATOR V. CARPIO-MORALES G.R. No. 237742, October 08, 2018
What is the effect of failure to invoke invoke the
doctrine of condonation?
• Condonation, being a matter of defense, must be specifically invoked
by the respondent elective public official.
• The application of the doctrine of condonation prior to its
abandonment without the respondent elective public official invoking
the same as a defense is whimsical, and amounts to grave abuse of
discretion
• CREBELLO V. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN G.R. No. 232325, April 10,
2019
Is the doctrine of condonation still applicable?

• YES.
• In Ombudsman Carpio Morales v. Court of Appeals 772 Phil. 672, 775
(2015), this Court pronounced the abandonment of the doctrine
of condonation for having no legal authority in this jurisdiction, but
was also explicit that the ruling is prospective in its application.

• the doctrine is still applicable in cases that transpired prior to the

ruling of this Court in Carpio Morales v. CA and Jejomar Binay, Jr.
Office of the Ombudsman vs. Mayor Julius Cesar Vergar