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Mergers Final
Mergers Final
• Transaction valued at US $4.6 billion valuing Daiichi $4.98 billion and recorded goodwill of
• Ranbaxy has a small presence in the Japanese market where the generics
market holds good opportunities.
• The deal made the amalgamated company to be the world’s 15th largest pharmaceutical
company in the world by market capitalization.
• Ranbaxy through the merger, bypassed a lot of European and U.S companies that were
unable to enter the Japanese markets due to its stringent safety and testing requirements
• Daiichi got access to Ranbaxy’s basket of 30 drugs for which the company had approvals in
the US, including 10 drugs for which Ranbaxy had exclusive sales right to sell for six months
after the expiry of their patents. The deal gave Daiichi an access to best FTF 180 day
exclusivity pipelines in the industry.
MARKET REACTIONS TO THE
ACQUISITION ANNOUNCEMENT
The purchase price represented a premium of 53.5 percent to Ranbaxy’s average daily
closing price on the National Stock Exchange for the three months ending on June 10,
2008 and 31.4 percent to such closing price on June 10, 2008.
This is an indicator that the Daiichi had seen potential in Ranbaxy’s business in India as
well as in other countries.
MARKET REACTIONS TO THE
ACQUISITION ANNOUNCEMENT
The share price of Ranbaxy rose 3.86 percent to Rs. 526.40 (BSE) and Rs.
525.85 (NSE) on June 9, two days before the company announced its
buyout by Daiichi Sankyo. India’s benchmark index, Sensex, plunged 506
points the same day.
MARKET REACTIONS TO THE
ACQUISITION ANNOUNCEMENT
Daiichi Sankyo agreed to pay as much as $4.6
billion for a 50.1 percent stake in Ranbaxy. As
reported earlier by Financial Express, on June 10,
a day before the deal was announced, the
Ranbaxy scrip surged 6.52 percent to Rs. 560.75
and the Sensex fell 177 points. The stock ended
almost flat at Rs. 560.80 on June 11. On Monday,
it settled at 567.75 points, up a mere 0.15
percent.
Daiichi Sankyo paid INR 737, that is about 100%
premium over intrinsic value of Ranbaxy’s share
RLL former chairman has rubbished Daiichi Sankyo's claim that crucial facts about the US authorities’ probe were
concealed at the time the company was sold by his family and attacked the Japanese firm for mismanaging the
Indian drug maker.
Singh also denied and rejected the charges put by the former company executive, Dinesh Thakur.
Ranbaxy agreed to pay a fine of $500 million for selling adulterated drugs in the US market and pleaded guilty to
seven criminal counts, including fudging of drug data, intention to defraud, and failing to report that its drugs did
not meet specifications.
The $500-million fine is the largest financial penalty paid by any generic drug maker in the US for violating
provisions of the federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).
Ranbaxy’s management described Daiichi Sankyo's allegation as 'baseless’ about 'certain Ranbaxy shareholders'
misrepresenting critical information concerning the investigations conducted by the US authorities.
WHAT MIGHT HAVE GONE
WRONG?
Improper Due-Diligence
• Losses were mainly rooted in poor performance owing to FDA
ban that already started in 2006
• In September,2008 FDA sent Ranbaxy warning letters -cGMP
violations at two plants : Paonta Sahib and Dewas
• Forced restrictions on the import of drugs manufactured at
these plants and banned the entry of almost 30 Ranbaxy
products in the USA.
• Ranbaxy’s QC scientists took shortcuts on the stability tests.
• Submitted manipulated data as a part of its application to
market new generic drugs in the US and kept hundreds of
improperly stored samples in its factories.
• Daiichi should have tried to estimate the full extent of the
legal risk arising out of the US FDA letters.
• They should have asked for information on plant inspections
done in 2006 and details of submissions made by Ranbaxy in
defence.
WHAT MIGHT HAVE GONE WRONG?
• Organizational structure of Ranbaxy- Integration of Analytical research and quality
assurance (QA) departments encouraging the problems to stay confined within the
walls of the company.
• Daiichi should have assessed the standard pharmaceutical organizational structure.
• Poor human resource practices of Ranbaxy, which led to high employee turnover.
• In R&D alone, 4 departmental heads had resigned in quick succession in the period
just before acquisition. This phenomenon of resource attrition at Ranbaxy continued
even after the acquisition.
• Mr Malvinder Singh the CEO and promoter of the company left the company in May
2009.
• In the original agreement he was to stay with Ranbaxy for 5 years after the
acquisition. By leaving 4 years before the contractual date not only did he have to
pay a hefty severance package but also raised doubt among foreign companies,
looking for Indian partners.
• For a foreign company like Daiichi it was natural to rely on promoters and their team
to continue running the company for a while.
WHAT MIGHT HAVE GONE WRONG?
• Daiichi paid INR 737 for a company with an intrinsic value of just INR 365. This
valuation glitch clearly demonstrates Daiichi’s lack of understanding of generic
business.
• Inadequate due diligence was done considering the size, scale and scope of the deal,
reflecting Daiichi’s inability in understanding of India and the generic world.
• One more thing that Daiichi probably missed on was the continuously increasing debt
levels of Ranbaxy.
• Synergies were not achieved in the patented drugs space, because even after the
acquisition R&D expenses for Daiichi had grown from 18.6% to 21.9% of sales. Should
the synergies have been achieved, with the directing of R&D and manufacturing to
India, COGS and R&D expenses for Daiichi should have decreased or at-least remained
stagnant.
AFTERMATH OF DEAL
The EPS showed a double fold increase The balance sheet of Daiichi Sankyo
without much of increase in gross profit indicated that the current liabilities had
which indicated that the reserves & surplus increased to 161% when compared to
should have been made available current assets which had decreased by
accordingly. (15.43%).
In the immediate year after the acquisition Ranbaxy reported a loss of INR 9,512.05 million
and Daiichi in spite of diversifying its geographic footprint booked a loss of ¥215,499
million and they also made a onetime goodwill write-down of ¥351.3 billion for
investment in Ranbaxy. These losses were mainly rooted in Ranbaxy’s poor performance
owing to the FDA ban.
AFTERMATH OF DEAL
• COGS significantly decreased in the year 2008 due to the increase in purchase of
Investments owing to the acquisition.
• Three weeks after the deal, Daiichi Sankyo reported currency – exchange losses of Rs. 9
billion in 2008 owing to the goodwill evaluation at the time acquisition
• On February 25, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration announced that a facility owned
by India-based Ranbaxy Laboratories falsified data and test results in approved and
pending drug applications.
• The agency halted review of drug applications from plant due to evidence of falsified
data; invokes application integrity policy.
AFTERMATH OF DEAL
• Daiichi, in its eagerness to tap the expertise of a generic drug maker, took the risk of buying
Ranbaxy for a top dollar. Daiichi Sankyo though learnt about the US FDA invocation ignored it
expecting it to get resolved.
• Ranbaxy shares have staged a huge rally since hitting a low 133 rupees in March 2009, trading at
465 rupees on March 14, 2011.
• Daiichi lack of understanding of generic business in the valuation paid for acquiring Ranbaxy.
28%
72% 60% US
• As an immediate effect, shares of Sun Pharma went up to 2.7% in the morning trade
after the acquisition announcement while that of Ranbaxy went down by 3.1%.
• The swap ratio of 8 shares of Sun Pharma for every 10 shares of Ranbaxy works to the
advantage of the new entrants into Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. as at the prevailing price
they now needs to pay 5% less for getting the shares of Sun Pharma as compared to
buying them directly from the market.
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES BEHIND THE DEAL
• 5th largest global specialty generic pharma company
• No. 1 pharma company in India, one of the fastest growing markets
• No. 1 Indian pharma company in US market
• Over US$ 2 billion in sales
• Pipeline of 184 ANDAs including high-value FTFs
• No. 1 in generic dermatology, No. 3 in branded
*ROW includes all Non-US and Non-India sales + API and others
SYNERGIES AIMED AT THROUGH THE DEAL
2. World’s 5th largest Specialty Generic Pharma Company
SYNERGIES AIMED AT THROUGH THE DEAL
3. India’s Largest Pharma Company
SYNERGIES AIMED AT THROUGH THE DEAL
4. Leadership In Prescription Share Number 1 Position with 13 Class of Specialist Doctors
Clear leadership:
Chronic Therapies
+
Acute, Hospitals and OTC Business
SYNERGIES AIMED AT THROUGH THE DEAL
7. US: Growing Leadership Position
• Pre-acquisition stage
1. Making Decision to Buy
2. Due diligence/ company evaluation
3. Process initiation/proposal phase
4. Structuring business deal
5. Financial settlement/exchange of stocks
• Post-acquisition stage
1. Merger closing phase and post merger integration plans to operate the
venture
THE
PRE-
ACQUISITION
STAGE
• Ranbaxy Laboratories Limited is an Indian
multinational pharmaceutical company with a
sizeable drug pipeline, a very promising future
and has announced some big product launches in
future in the US generics market.
• In terms of size, Sun Pharma will have a pro forma 2013 revenue of
Rs.25,911 crore and an operating profit of Rs.7,577 crore, with a net
profit of Rs.1,710 crore.
• In process initiation, acquiring company sends
a proposal for a merger or an acquisition to the
target company with complete details of the
deal including the commitments, amount and
the strategies.
• Streamlining of teams
• The company’s basic structure and functions could be managed in the first year. There is a
plan to streamline and rationalize functions. While it will take at least two to three years to
turn-around the merged entity and to ensure contributions from the buyout.
• The merger will create India’s biggest drug maker with an 8.5% share of the 16 pharmaceutical market,
worth an annual Rs.76,000 crore by sales. Under India’s merger and acquisition (M&A) rules,
companies need CCI’s approval if the combined assets of the two entities are worth more than
Rs.1,500 crore or their combined revenue amounts to more than Rs.4,500 crore in India. The CCI
approval is also mandatory if the companies have assets outside India, or their combined assets are
worth more than $750 million (Rs 4,566 crore), or if their turnover is more than $2,250 million (Rs
13,700 crore)
• The antitrust body’s main concerns are about the 46 drug formulations that will constitute the merged
entity’s portfolio and in which it will have a significant presence in the market. Out of these 46 drug
segments, the prices of five are regulated by the government. “In the rest of the segments, market
domination is a genuine worry,” said a government official familiar with the development
• CCI had directed Sun Pharma to divest all products containing 'Tamsulosin + Tolterodine' which are
marketed and supplied under the Tamlet brand name. Similarly, Ranbaxy was directed to divest all
products containing Leuprorelin which are marketed and supplied under the Eligard brand name. It
also had to divest products such as Terlibax, Rosuvas EZ, Olanex F, Raciper L and Triolvance.
Conclusion
• Mr. Dilip Sanghvi is known for turnaround of acquired company among his peers.
• He is most open to using mergers and acquisitions (M&A) to grow faster, but he has always been
conscious of Sun Pharma’s bite size and the price of the acquired asset.
• The financial conservatism is visible in the Ranbaxy acquisition as well. The all-stock deal will
double Sun Pharma’s revenues at a cost of eight per cent dilution in equity and earning per share.
• The deal has reaped the benefit in the market price also as Sun pharma market price after the
date of announcement of merger with Ranbaxy till the record the date of merger has touch a new
high to INR 1200 per share i.e. gains of almost 100%.
Conclusion
• But fall from the highest peak and also after announcement of hit on profit for F Y 2015-
16 has eroded the gains which was seen as being due to the merger for the shareholders
of Sun pharma.
• Now the market price is trading at the normal return of sun pharma which has given in
the last two previous years. So as on date the Ranbaxy shareholders have benefited due
to the merger transaction.
• But all the stakeholders will gain in the long term as it was proved in all earlier
acquisition, when the synergies benefit start reaping to the Sun Pharma due to its
turnaround strategy.
ACQUISITION OF
UNICHEM BY
TORRENT PHARMA
NOT JUST HEALTHCARE...LIFE CARE
• One of the leading Pharma companies in the Country.
• The flagship Company of Torrent Group with a turnover of Rs. 7673 Cr
• Pioneers in initiating the concept of niche marketing in India and ranked
amongst the leaders in therapeutic segment of cardiovascular (CV), central
nervous system (CNS), gastro-intestinal (GI) and women healthcare
(WHC) with significant presence in diabetology, pain management,
gynaecology, oncology and anti-infective segments.
• With presence in more than 40 countries like US, UK, Germany, Europe,
Brazil and rest of the world, Torrent is all poised to spread wings across
globe with strong technical capabilities and international accreditations.
HISTORY OF MERGERS AND
ACQUISITIONS IN TORRENT PHARMA
• 2005 started international acquisitions with 90-year-old Heumann
from Pfizer to enter the German market
• 2013 Acquisition of Elder Pharma's Indian branded business
• 2015 Dermaceutical business of Zyg Pharma
• 2015 purchased ANDA of Monocycline from Ranbaxy for the US
Market
• 2016 API plant of Glochem Industries
• 2017 women healthcare brands from Novartis and Unichem's
Indian branded business along with its Sikkim Plant
• 2018 acquired Bio-Pharm, Inc. (BPI) a generic pharmaceuticals
and OTC Company in USA which also included a US FDA registered
manufacturing facility.
IMPROVING HEALTH THROUGH SUPERIOR PRODUCTS
• One of India’s most respected pharmaceutical companies committed to
delivering better health through superior products.
• Unichem has several pharma products in therapeutic areas like
gastroenterology, cardiology, diabetology, psychiatry, neurology, anti-
bacterials, anti-infectives and pain management.
• Backed by a team of over 2500 people, Unichem is headquartered in Mumbai,
India, and has six drug manufacturing locations across the country.
• With formulations constituting the core of the company’s business, Unichem
is backward integrated to API Manufacturing. By combining strategic
research and in-depth industry knowledge, Unichem aims to transform itself
into a global pharmaceutical drug Company with an increasing focus on
cutting-edge research and developed markets.
PRE-ACQUISITION SCENARIO
• Also, post-acquisition, Torrent will enter the list of top five pharma
firms in the country and will be ranked at number five.
• The acquisition will help Torrent increase its Indian pharma market
share in terms of sales to 3.4% from 2.4%.
BENEFITS OF THE ACQUISITION TO TORRENT
PHARMA
• As many as 3,000 employees will be added to Torrent’s existing
employee workforce after the Unichem acquisition along with 2000
stockists enhancing their distribution reach.
• The acquisition would add a brand of Rs 200 crore and three brands
of over Rs 50 crore to Torrent’s existing portfolio.
BENEFITS OF THE ACQUISITION TO
UNICHEM
• Remain an independent publicly listed company with no change in
its existing shareholding following the transaction.