Radiation Sources in Industrial and

Research irradiators

Overview and Accidents

IAEA Day 6 – Lecture 1

International Atomic Energy Agency
 Objective

To understand the uses of research and

industrial irradiators and the potential for
accidents to occur with their use.

IAEA 2
 Contents

• Beneficial uses of ionizing radiation.

• Categories of irradiation facilities.
• Need for an adequate radiation safety program
• Consequences of radiological accidents

IAEA 3
Beneficial uses of ionizing radiation in
irradiators

• Sterilization of medical products (e.g. insulin syringes);

• Sterilization of blood products;
• Sterilization of pharmaceutical products;
• Preservation of foodstuffs (spices etc);
• Eradication of insects;
• Synthesis of polymers;
• Irradiation of cell cultures for research purposes.

Used in more than 160 gamma irradiation facilities and over

1300 electron beam facilities (2003)
IAEA 4
 Types of Irradiators

Gamma Irradiation Facilities

The total source activity in an irradiator may range

from a few Terabecquerels (1012 Bq) to more than 100
Petabecquerels (> 1017 Bq).

IAEA 5
 Types of Irradiators (cont)

Category I (gamma)
An irradiator in which the sealed source is:-
• completely enclosed in a dry container
constructed of solid materials,
• is shielded at all times;
• and where human access to the
sealed source and the volume
undergoing irradiation is not physically
possible in the designed configuration.
[IAEA Safety Series 107]

IAEA 6
 Types of Irradiators (cont)

IAEA 7
 Types of Irradiators (cont)

Category II (gamma)
A controlled human access irradiator in which the sealed
source is:-
• enclosed in a dry container constructed of solid materials;
• is fully shielded when not in use;

• and is exposed within a radiation volume that is

maintained inaccessible during use by an entry control
system.
[IAEA Safety Series 107]

IAEA 8
 Types of Irradiators (cont)

Personnel
access door

Turntable

Source Control
holder panel
IAEA 9
 Types of Irradiators (cont)

Category III (gamma)

An irradiator in which the sealed source is:- Demineralized
water pool
• contained in a water filled storage

approx 7 m
Product hoist
pool, cable

• is shielded at all times, Sample or

Source product container
• and where human access to the rod
sealed source and the volume Source array
undergoing irradiation is physically
restricted in the designed
configuration and proper mode of use.
IAEA 10
[IAEA Safety Series 107]
 Types of Irradiators (cont)

Category IV (gamma)
A controlled human access irradiator in which the sealed
source is:-
• contained in a water filled storage pool;
• is fully shielded when not in use;
• and is exposed within a radiation volume that is
maintained inaccessible during use by an entry control
system.
[IAEA Safety Series 107]
IAEA 11
 Types of Irradiators (cont)

Source hoist cylinder

2 m concrete Access for source transport container
shielding
Product Conveyor
Hoist cable

Personnel
access door

Shielding pool

Guide cable

Control panel
Source array
(safe position) Source transport container

IAEA 12
 Types of Irradiators (cont)

IAEA 13
 Electron Beam Facilities

IAEA Safety Series107 divides electron irradiation facilities

into two categories.
Category I
An integrally shielded unit with interlocks where human access
during operation is not physically possible owing to the
configuration of the shielding

Category II
A unit housed in shielded rooms that are maintained
inaccessible during operation by an entry control system
IAEA 14
 Electron Beam Facilities (cont)

Product conveyor
Lead shield

High voltage
transformer

Single stage electron

beam source
Controls
IAEA 15
 Electron Beam Facilities (cont)

High voltage
system
Oscillator
cabinet
Scan horn

Concrete shield

Access Product
labyrinth conveyor

IAEA 16
 Accidents
Need for an adequate radiation safety program

Deaths from exposure to radiation from irradiators

5 fatal accidents were reported to the IAEA between 1975 and 1994.

Incident 1 Dose Prime causes

• Untrained, unsupervised and
1 to 4 unauthorized worker gained
12 Gy to the
minutes to access to the irradiation cell
bone marrow
500 TBq 60Co
• The source had been left exposed

[Lessons learned from accidents in industrial irradiation facilities. IAEA, 1996]

IAEA 17
Need for an adequate radiation safety program

Deaths from exposure to radiation from irradiators (cont)

Incident 2 Dose Prime causes

• Faulty GM monitor dismantled leaving only
one non-redundant interlock safety system
“Several 22 Gy. connected to the entrance door.
minutes” to Died 13
• Continued operation of the facility
2.43 PBq days
60Co nevertheless was permitted by management.
later.
• Operator failed to use a portable survey
meter

[Lessons learned from accidents in industrial irradiation facilities. IAEA, 1996]

IAEA 18
Need for an adequate radiation safety program

Death from exposure to radiation from irradiators (cont)

Incident 3 Dose Prime causes

• Lack of regulatory control

• No contact with persons
23 TBq 60Co
8.3, 3.7 and 2.9 Gy. having radiation safety
Three workers One death after 6.5 expertise
exposed; one months • Inadequate worker training
died
• Key safety features were not
repaired. Some removed

[Lessons learned from accidents in industrial irradiation facilities. IAEA, 1996]

IAEA 19
Need for an adequate radiation safety program

Death from exposure to radiation from irradiators (cont)

Incident 4 Dose Prime causes

• Faulty limit switch indicating “source
down”; safety interlocks were by-passed
1½-2 10-15 Gy. • Gamma monitor ignored (failed previously)
mins to
12.6 PBq Died 36 • Management had not installed the shroud
60Co days later recommended by the manufacturer to
prevent product jamming.
• Operating instructions not in local language

[Lessons learned from accidents in industrial irradiation facilities. IAEA, 1996]

IAEA 20
Need for an adequate radiation safety program (cont)

Electron irradiator accidents

Incident 1 Outcome Prime causes

420-2400 Gy to R • Right arm Worker knowingly

hand; amputated above entered the room by an
elbow 138 days later unauthorized method
3-290 Gy to R foot;
(under the door through
290 Gy to parts of • Right leg amputated which the conveyor
R leg from 10 MeV above knee 6 passed) thus effectively
electrons months later bypassing interlocks

[Lessons learned from accidents in industrial irradiation facilities. IAEA, 1996]

IAEA 21
Need for an adequate radiation safety program (cont)

Electron irradiator accidents (cont)

Incident 2 Outcome Prime causes

Exposed during • Worker not aware of “dark
maintenance • 4 digits of R and L current”
procedures to hands amputated
• Worker did not use any
0.4-13 Gy/s over after 3 months
radiation survey meter
1-3 mins from • Hair thinning after 2
“dark current” • Worker did not have
weeks. No regrowth
from 3 MeV personal dosimeter
after 6 months
electrons. • Untrained assistant

[Lessons learned from accidents in industrial irradiation facilities. IAEA, 1996]

IAEA 22
Need for an adequate radiation safety program (cont)

Electron irradiator accidents (cont)

Incident 3 Outcome Prime causes

• Facility had no interlocks or
Hands in 15 MeV warning signals (1991)
beam while R hand and 2
adjusting an • A physicist (who was responsible
fingers of L
experimental for radiological protection)
hand amputated
sample. entered the irradiation chamber
8-15 months
to adjust a sample.
Dose difficult to later
estimate • A co-worker activated the
irradiator without checking.

[Lessons learned from accidents in industrial irradiation facilities. IAEA, 1996]

IAEA 23
Need for an adequate radiation safety program (cont)

IAEA 24
Need for an adequate radiation safety program (cont)

IAEA 25
 Major causes of radiological accidents

• Flaws in the initial design. Redundant and diverse safety

systems could have prevented most accidents.
• Access barriers based on radiation activated interlocks had
either not been installed, had been removed, or were easily
defeated.
• When trying to resolve problems, personnel were tempted to
circumvent barriers if they could be easily bypassed with
ladders, by stooping or crawling, or by manipulating
switches, using tape, etc. In several facilities, personnel had
employed tricks to circumvent the safety systems.

IAEA 26
Major causes of radiological accidents (cont)

• Personnel involved in accidents generally failed to follow

instructions to alert radiation safety supervisors when
alarms indicated that the source was not in the safe
“shielded” position.
• Personnel had usually failed to use a demonstrably
operational portable radiation survey meter when entering
the irradiation chamber. The incidents suggest that not
following this obvious and simple safety precaution may be
common practice. (Most operators involved in incidents also
had not worn their personal monitoring device.)

IAEA 27
Major causes of radiological accidents (cont)

• In some incidents, management tolerated the removal or

the defeat of radiation activated interlocks.
In at least one accident, management apparently approved
the installation of a switch to bypass an interlock and the
removal of the only passive detection system that could not
be circumvented easily by stooping or crawling.

• Several accidents occurred after management had

received the manufacturer’s recommendation to install a
protective shroud that could have prevented the accident,
but had failed to do so.

IAEA 28
 Major causes of radiological accidents (cont)

• Many of the accidents occurred during shifts with only one

trained worker on duty or on call. Employee behavior
appeared to reflect a management policy of having one
person undertake as many tasks and responsibilities as
possible.

• Workers and operating personnel performed inappropriate

actions based on available information and instructions
given. In some cases, the personnel involved were not
adequately trained to understand the hazards, or those who
were trained made bad judgments

IAEA 29
Lessons learned from radiological accidents

• Diverse safety systems could have prevented most

accidents.

• Safety is compromised if the facility is not carefully audited

to identify conditions critical to safety.
 This requires consideration of redundancy, avoidance
of single mode failures and human factors.
 Where these considerations were not adequately
taken into account, unsafe conditions resulted.

IAEA 30
Lessons learned from radiological accidents (cont)

• The management of the operating organization can

quickly lose control of the employees’ level of knowledge
and performance unless systematic audits are conducted
and frequent training is provided.

• Management practices or attitudes resulted in degradation

of the safety systems and operating procedures. It appears
that sometimes product and production costs took
precedence over safety.
This was particularly evident when oversight from the
Regulatory Authority was absent or weak.

IAEA 31
 Lessons learned from radiological accidents (cont)

• Personnel involved in accidents sometimes lacked an

understanding of the fundamental principles of the devices
with which they were working. e.g. the cold discharge
current for electron sources or the connection between a
strong odor of ozone and the interaction of ionizing radiation
with air.

IAEA 32
 Prevention and remedial actions

If implemented, the following would greatly improve the safety

performance of industrial irradiators and reduce the
frequency and mitigate the severity of accidents when they do
occur.

IAEA 33
 Prevention and remedial actions (cont)

Funding Organizations
Organizations have provided funds for the installation of
irradiators in developing countries in which the radiation
protection infrastructure is not yet strong or in countries that are
not sufficiently experienced in the licensing and inspection of
irradiators

• Such organizations must recognize their safety

responsibilities and promote the development and
implementation of radiation protection programs for
irradiators

IAEA 34
 Prevention and remedial actions (cont)

Licensees:-
• are responsible for the operation of the irradiator and the
security of radiation source(s) in accordance with the
requirements of the legislation imposed by the Regulatory
Authority;

• have primary responsibility for radiation safety.

Senior management must recognize the potential hazards
associated with an irradiator’s operation and must exercise
leadership in developing and maintaining a strong safety
culture throughout the entire organization.

IAEA 35
 Prevention and remedial actions (cont)

Designers, Manufacturers, Suppliers and Installers

• bear a primary responsibility for carrying out research,

testing and examination to ensure the safe design and
performance of facilities, equipment and systems.
• should provide sufficiently detailed information for the
development of local operational and maintenance
procedures, to enable a hazard assessment to be carried
out and for emergency instructions to be prepared.
• must provide safety information in the local language

IAEA 36