Nationality is the tie that binds an

individual to his state, from which he can

claim protection and whose laws he is
obliged to obey. In other words, nationality
is membership in a political community
with all its concomitant rights and
obligations.

This term is often used interchangeably with citizenship, which, however,

has a more exclusive scope in that it applies only to certain members of the
state accorded more privileges than the rest of the people who also owe
allegiance. Thus, during the American regime in the country, Filipinos and
Americans were both considered nationals of the United States vis-a-vis
other states but Filipino were nevertheless not entitled to American
citizenship rights for purposes of the administration of the internal affairs of
the parent state. The term subject, on the other hand, has particular
reference to the nationals of monarchical regimes, e.g., a British subject,
who may be a citizen of the United Kingdom or of one of its colonies.
 Acquisition of Nationality
Nationality may be acquired by birth or by naturalization. An
individual acquires the nationality of the state where he is born
jure soli or the nationality of his parentsjure sanguinis.
Naturalization, on the other hand, is a process by which a
foreigner acquires, voluntarily or by operation of law, the
nationality of another state.

Naturalization may be direct or derivative. Direct naturalization is

effected;
(a)by individual proceedings, usually judicial, under general
naturalization laws;
(b) by special act of the legislature, often in favor of distinguished
foreigners who have rendered some notable service to the local state;
(c) by collective change of the nationality (naturalization en masse) as
a result of cession or subjugation; and
 (d) in some cases, by adoption of orphan minors as
nationals of the state where they are born.
Derivative naturalization in turn is conferred:
(a) on the wife of the naturalized husband;
(b) on the minor children on the naturalized parent;
and
(c) on the alien woman upon marriage to a national.
Derivative naturalization does not always follow as
a matter of course, for it is usually made subject to
stringent restrictions and conditions. Our own laws,
for instance, provide that an alien woman married to a
Filipino shall acquire his citizenship only if she herself
might be lawfully naturalized.
 Multiple Nationality
An individual may sometimes find himself possessed of
more than one nationality because of the concurrent
application to him of the municipal laws of the states claiming
him as their national. For example, a child born in the United
States of Filipino parentage would be a citizen of that country
under the jus soli as prescribed by American Law and at the
same time a citizen of the Philippines under the Jus sanguinis.
Again, under the doctrine of indelible allegiance, as observed
by some states, an individual may be compelled to retain his
original nationality notwithstanding that he has already
renounced or forfeited it under the laws of a second state
whose nationality has acquired.
 An illustration would be the case of a
woman who upon marriage to a
foreigner continuous to be a national of
her own state under its laws while also
acquiring her husband’s nationality in
accordance with the laws of his state,

By contrast, a state may allow any of its nationals to

remain as such even if he may have acquired another
nationality, as where he is conferred an honorary
citizenship by a foreign government.
Loss of Nationality
Nationality may be lost voluntarily or involuntarily. The
voluntary methods include methods include renunciation,
express or implied, and request for release, both of which
usually precede the acquisition of a new nationality. The
involuntary methods are forfeiture as a result of some
disqualification or prohibited act like enlistment in a
foreign army or log continued residence in a foreign state,
and substitution of one nationality for another following a
change of sovereignty or any act conferring derivative
naturalization.
THE CANEVARO CASE(Tribunal of the
Permanent Court of Arbitration,1912; Scott,
Hague Court Reports, 284.)
May Italy file a diplomatic claim against Peru
on behalf of Rafael Canevaro, who is a
national of both states under their respective
municipal laws?
 Held. “Whereas, according to Peruvian legislation (34 of the
Constitution), Rafael Canevaro is a Peruvian by birth because born
on Peruvian territory, and, whereas, on the other hand, according to
Italian legislation (Article 44 of the Civil Code) he is of Italian
nationality because born of Italian father; whereas, as a matter of
fact, Rafael Canevaro had on several occasions acted as Peruvian
citizen, both by running as a candidate for Senate, where none are
admitted except Peruvian citizens and where he succeeded in
defending his election, and, particularly by accepting the office of
Consul- General for the Netherlands, after having secured the
authorization of both the Peruvian Government and the Peruvian
Congress; under these circumstances, whatever Rafael Canevaro’s
status as a national may be in Italy, the Government of Peru has a
right to consider him a Peruvian citizen and to deny his status as an
Italian claimant...”
 Conflict of Nationality Laws
To provide against conflicts arising from
divergent municipal laws nationality, the
following rules were embodied in the Hague
Convention of 1930 on the Conflict of
Nationality Laws:

Art.1. It is for each state to determine under its law who are nationals. This
law shall be recognized by other States insofar as it consistent with
international conventions, international customs, and the principles of law
generally recognized with regard to nationality.
Art.2. Any question as to whether a person possesses the nationality of a
particular State shall be determined in accordance with the law of the state.
Art.3. Subject to the provisions of the present Convention, a person having
two or more nationalities may be regarded as its national by each of the states
whose nationality he possesses.
 Art.4. A State may not afford diplomatic protection to one of
its nationals against a State whose nationality such person also
possesses.
Art.5. Within a third State, a person having more than one
nationality shall be treated as if he had only one. Without
prejudice to the application of its law in matters of personal
status and of any convention in force, a third State shall, of the
nationalities which any such person possesses, recognize
exclusively in its territory either the nationality of the country
in which he is habitually and principally resident or the
nationality of the country with which in the circumstances he
appears to be in fact most closely connected. (Principle of
effective or Active Nationality)
 If, on the other hand, he claims American Nationality, the
matter shall be resolved on the basis alone of American Law, to
the exclusion of all other laws.But if the issue of his real
nationality is raised in a third state, say Spain, the laws of that
country will obviously be inapplicable as he does not claim
Spanish nationality. In this situation, Spain shall apply the
principle of effective or active nationality, under which the dual
national shall be considered the national exclusively of the
state with which he is the most closely connected.
 Art.6. Without prejudice to the liberty of a state to accord wider
rights to renounce its nationality, a person possessing two
nationalities acquired without any voluntary act on his part may
renounce one of them with the authorization of the State whose
nationality he desires to surrender. This authorization may not be
refused in the case of a person who has his habitual and principal
residence abroad, if the conditions laid down in the law of the state
whose nationality he desires to surrender are satisfied.Thus, where a
person possesses both Philippine and American nationality, his claim
to Philippine nationality shall be decided on the basis alone of
Philippine Law, to the exclusion of all other laws.
THE NOTTEBOHM CASE (I.C.J. Reports, 1955, p. 4
(Judg. April 6, 1995)
 
Facts: Nottebohm , a German by birth, had been a
resident of Guatemala for thirty-four years when he
applied for and acquired naturalization in
Liechtenstein one month before the outbreak of
World War II. Many members of his family and his
business connections were in Germany. In 1943,
Guatemala, which had declared war on Germany,
confiscated al his properties on the group that he
was an enemy national. Leichtenstein thereupon
filed suit against Guatemala on his behalf as a
naturalized citizen of Liechtenstein.
 Was Nottebohm’s naturalization in Liechtenstein binding on
Guatemala?

Held: “The court of third States, when they have before them
an individual whom two others States hold to be their national
seek to resolve the conflict by having recourse to international
criteria and their prevailing tendency is to prefer the real and
effective nationality...(Nottebohm’s) actual connections with
Leichtenstein were extremely tenuous . No settled abode, no
prolonged residence in that country at the time of his
application.....
No intention of settling there was shown at that time or realized in
the ensuing weeks, months or years-on the contrary, he returned to
Guatemala very shortly after his naturalization and showed every
intention of remaining there. Naturalization was asked not so much
for the purpose of obtaining a legal recognition of Nottebohm’s
membership in fact in the population of Liechtenstein, as it was to
enable him to substitute for his status as a national of a belligerent
State that of a national of a neutral State, with the sole aim of thus
coming within the protection of Liechtenstein but not of becoming
wedded to its traditions, its interests, its way of life or of assuming
the obligations – other than fiscal obligations – and exercising the
rights pertaining to the status acquired.
“Guatemala is under no obligation to recognize a nationality
granted in such circumstances. Liechtenstein consequently is not
entitled to extend its protection to Nottebohmvis-a-vis Guatemala
and its claim must , for this reason , be held to be inadmissible.”
 Statelessness
Statelessness is the condition or status of an
individual who is born without any nationality
or who loses his nationality without retaining
or acquiring another. An example of the first
case would be that of a child born in a state
where only the jus sanguinis is recognized to
parents whose state observes only jus soli. The
second case may be illustrated by an individual
who after renouncing his original nationality in
order to be neutralized and is thereafter
denied repatriation by his former country.
 In such case, the individual is, from the traditional
viewpoint, powerless to assert any right that otherwise would be
available to him under international law were he a national of a
particular state. Any wrong suffered by him through the act or
omission of a state would be damnum absque injuria for in
theory, no other state has been offended and to international
delinquency committed as a result of the damage caused upon
him. This is so because any injury to the individual by a foreign
jurisdiction is, legally speaking, not a violation of his own right
but of the right of his state to the protection of its nationals; the
right to complain belong not to him but to state of which he is a
national.(Cruz, International Law pp.183-191)
 8. TREATMENT OF ALIENS

It is well settled that every state has the right, as inherent in

sovereignty and essential to its own security and existence, to
determine in what cases and under what conditions foreigners may
be admitted to its territory. If it sees fit, it may even bar their entry
altogether. Once it decides to accept them, however, its competence
as territorial sovereign is limited by the requirement that they be
treated justly, in accordance with the law of nations. If this duty is not
observed, the alien and his state would have valid cause for
complaint.
This is not to suggest that the alien is entitled to special
treatment over and above that accorded the national of the
local state. On the contrary, the alien cannot as a rule claim a
preferred position vis-à-vis the national of the state where he is
at best only a guest. Thus the foreigner may not enjoy the right
to vote, to run for public office, to exploit natural resources, or
to engage in certain businesses regarded as vital to the interests
of the local state. Denial of such prerogatives is a sovereign act
of the local state to which the foreigner must be prepared to
submit.
It is, in fact, a cardinal rule of international law that the
foreigner must accept the institutions of the local state as
he finds them. This rule is better stated in the saying,
"When in Rome, do as Romans do". Considering his less
privileged position, he cannot demand that the ways of his
host country be altered to suit his own convenience of
adjusted to gratify his own interests. This would militate
against the independence of the state and subordinate its
own will to the welfare of the alien.
It is also an accepted principle that the state is not
an insurer of the life property of the alien when
he is within its territory. Like all individuals
exposed to the incidents of social intercourse, he
is expected to take the customary precautions for
the protection of his own rights and to avail
himself of the usual remedies when these rights
are violated. Accordingly, the state generally
cannot be held responsible if the aliem is
victimized by a pickpocket or a swindler or is hurt
in an accident through the fault of anothe
individual and is unable to redress the wrong
done to him. The relation between him and the
state in these cases is too tenuous to make the
latter liable for the injury he has sustained.
 The Doctrine of State Responsibility
Notwithstanding the above observations, there are instances
when the alien can claim a more favored position than the
national of the local state and, in proper cases, hold the state
liable for injuries committed against him while within its
territory. Such instances are governed by what is known as the
doctrine of state responsibility.
Under this doctrine, a state may be held responsible for :
(a) an international delinquency,
(b) directly or indirectly imputable to it,
(c) which causes injury to the national of another state.
 Liability will attach to the state where its treatment
of the alien falls below the international standard of
justice or where it is remiss in according him the
protection or redress that is warranted by the
circumstances.
The doctrine of state responsibility has been
frequently invoked in recent times because of the
expanding need and desire of nations for wider relations
in their commercial and cultural activities. Its function is
to assure the traveler that when his rights are violated in
a foreign state, he will not be denied any remedy simply
because he is not one of its nationals. The idea, in other
words, is to encourage more intercourse among peoples
of the world through inter-visitation of their respective
countries.
 The International Standard of Justice

The international standard of justice is a concept of

controversial content that has defied precise definition. Some
writers describe it as the standard of the reasonable state.
That is, as referring to the ordinary norms of official conduct
observed in civilized jurisdictions. As thus envisioned, the
international standard of justice is deemed not satisfied if the
laws of a state are intrinsically unjust, as when there is a
marked disproportion between the degree of an offense and
the penalty imposed for it, e.g., when a minor crime like petty
theft is punished with death. The laws will also be below this
standard if they authorize the summary deciding decision of
contentious cases without the observance of the usual rights
to notice and hearing and the other generally accepted
requirements of due process.
 Where the laws of the state fall below the international
standard of justice, it is no defense that they are applicable not
only to aliens but as well, and equally, to the nationals of that
state. The relations of that state with its own nationals are
purely municipal; international law is involved in its relations
with the nationals of other states. Hence, while the national
may not demand, say, the right of confrontation if this is not
granted by the local law, the foreigner can. This is the view
more generally favored as against the so-called doctrine of
equality of treatment.
 Failure of Protection or Redress

Even if its laws conform to the international standard of justice,

the state may still be held liable if it does Not make reasonable
efforts to prevent injury to the alien or, having done so
unsuccessfully, fails to repair such injury. Thus, the state will be
held liable if a foreigner is killed it is shown that its authorities
were informed in advance of the plot to kill him but did not act
to forestall it. Furthermore, even if it did take reasonable
precautions, the state would still be held liable if it thereafter
does not employ the necessary diligence to arrest and punish
the malefactors or otherwise redress the wrong committed.
 B. E. CHATTIN (U.S.A.) v. UNITED MEXICAN STATES.(July 23, 1927)
The test of the international standard of justice was applied in the
Chattin Case, where the United States filed a claim on behalf of a national
who was allegedly arrested, tried and sentenced illegally by the Mexican
government and subjected to inhuman treatment in jail. In upholding most
of the charges filed by the claimant, the arbitrators declared in part:
“The whole of the proceedings disclose a most astonishing lack of
seriousness on the part of the Court . . . Neither during the investigation
nor during the hearings in open court was any such thing as an oral
examination or cross-examination of any importance attempted. It
seems highly improbable that the accused have been given real
opportunity during the hearings in open court, freely to speak for
themselves. It is not for the Commission to endeavor to reach from the
record any conviction as to the innocence or guilt of Chattin and his
colleagues; but even in case they were guilty, the Commission would
render a bad service to the government of Mexico if it failed to place the
stamp of its disapproval and even indignation on a criminal procedure so
far below international standards of civilization as the present one . . .
“Bringing the proceedings of Mexican authorities to the test
of international standards . . . there can be no doubt of their
being highly insufficient. Inquiring whether there is
convincing evidence of theses unjust proceedings . . . the
answer must be in the affirmative. Since this is a case of
alleged responsibility of Mexico for injustice committed by
its judiciary, it is necessary to inquire whether the
treatment of Chattin amounts even to an outrage, to bad
faith, to willful neglect of duty, or to an insufficiency of
government action recognizable by every unbiased man . . .
 The degree of diligence required must, of course, vary with
the circumstances of every case. It is not as easy to control a riot
as it is to prevent an individual crime, nor are the problems
invariably the same in the apprehension of the criminals. In the
Noyes Case, for example, the Republic of Panama was not held
liable for injuries sustained by an American national from an
unruly and intoxicated crowd in a small village, it having been
shown that the local police force of three members was
reinforced when disorder was apprehended, that a policeman
and the police chief himself tried actively to protect Noyes when
he was attacked, and that it was not possible to pinpoint the
culprits in view of the tumultuous nature of the incident.
 By contrast, compensation was awarded to the United States in the Youman’s
Case, where it was shown that the very troops sent to disperse a Mexican mob
joined it in killing a number of Americans. In the Galvan case, the reason for
holding the United States liable for the killing of a Mexican in Texas was not the
failure to apprehend the criminal but the unreasonable delay in his prosecution,
which dragged inconclusively for six years. For its part, Mexico was ordered t
pay damages to the United States in the Janes Case, where it appeared that
eight years had already elapsed and the known murderer of an American
national had not yet been arrested and punished.

It is important to remember in this connection that responsibility does not immediately

attach to the state upon a showing of a failure to prevent or redress an injury to aliens.
Distinction must be made between direct and indirect state responsibility. The rule is that
where the international delinquency was committed by superior government officials or
organs like the chief of state or the national legislature, liability will attach immediately as
their acts may not be effectively prevented or reversed under the constitution and laws
of the state. However, where the offense is committed by inferior government officials or,
more so, by private individuals, the state will be held liable only if, by reason of its
indifference in preventing or punishing it, it can be considered to have connived in effect
in its commission.
 Exhaustion of Local Remedies
But even assuming the liability of the state for an international
delinquency, its enforcement cannot be claimed by the injured
foreigner unless he first exhausts all available local remedies for the
protection or vindication of his rights. This is a corollary of the
principle that the foreigner must accept the institutions of the state as
he finds them. The generally accepted view is that the state must be
given an opportunity to do justice in its own regular way and without
unwarranted interference with its sovereignty by other states. As has
been aptly observed, “It is a sound principle that where there is a
judicial remedy, it must be sought; and only if it is sought in vain does
diplomatic interposition become proper.”
 This requirement may be dispensed with, however, if there are no
remedies to exhaust, as where the laws are intrinsically defective or
there is laxity or arbitrariness in their enforcement or where the
courts are corrupt or where there is no adequate machinery for the
administration of justice. There would be no remedy available from
the so-called “acts of state” which are not subject to judicial review.
 Resort to Diplomatic Protection
If the injured foreigner has exhausted all local remedies but
without success, he may then avail himself of the assistance of his
state- but only if he has a state. Otherwise, he will have no party to
represent him, and he by himself, being a mere individual, cannot
institute his claim in his own name. In theory, as previously stated,
any injury to an alien is a violation not of his own personal right but
of the right of his state to have its nationals protected whenever
they are in a foreign country. It follows that where the injured alien
is stateless, his case will be one of damnum absque injuria and
cannot be the subject of diplomatic protection.
So important is the tie of nationality, in fact, that it is required to
exist from the time of the injury until the time the international
claim is final settled. Once this tie is broken, the claim itself is
deemed automatically abated. If, therefore, the injured national dies
while the claim is under consideration and it should happen that his
heirs are not nationals of the claimant state, the claim will lapse.
 This requirement may yet yield to the growing
view that the individual as such should be allowed to
institute an international claim against a foreign state
for violation of his own personal rights. As it is now, it
is already subject to the exception that the United
Nations may file a diplomatic claim on behalf of his
officials, as affirmed in the case of Count Folke
Bernadotte, who was assassinated while mediating
the Palestine crisis. It is noteworthy also that under
European Convention on Human Rights, the European
Commission on Human Rights and also contracting
states other than the state of the injured individual
may bring alleged infractions of the convention before
the European Court of Human Rights.
 Enforcement of Claim
An international claim for damages may be resolved through
Avoidance of State Responsibility
negotiation or, if this fails, any of the other methods of settling
The doctrine
disputes, of state
like good responsibility
offices, arbitration,is applied moresettlement.
and judicial frequently
to There
tortuous
have rather thatalso
been cases contractual
where hostile liability because
and forcible of the
measures
willingness
have beenofemployed
most states to actwar
and when as “collection
itself has beenagencies”
resortedfor their
to as a
nationals
means ofentering
compellingintocompliance
private agreements
with the demands with of orthe
in injured
foreign
state. Nevertheless, to avoid the intervention of the alien’s
countries.
state inIn the event that
contracts of the responsibility
this nature, the of the statestate
local is established
sometimes or
acknowledge,
incorporates the what
therein duty is toknown
make as reparation
the Calvowill arise.This
clause. Such
is a
reparationbymay
stipulation take the
which the form
alienofwaives
restitution or, wherehis
or restricts thisright
is notto
possible, satisfaction or compensation, or all three of theses
appeal to his own state in connection with any claim arising from
together. Thus, the settlement may consist of the restoration or
thereplacement
contract and agrees to limit himself to the remedies available
of the object of the offense, a formal apology by the
under the laws
delinquent of the
state and local
payment state.
of the damages as well.
 A typical Calvo clause follows:

“The contractor and all persons who, as employees or in any

other capacity, may be engaged in the execution of the work under
this contract either directly or indirectly, shall be considered as
Mexicans in all matters, within the Republic of Mexico, concerning
the execution of such work and the fulfilment of this contract. They
shall not claim, nor shall they have, with regard to the interests and
the business connected with this contract, any other right or means
to enforce the same than those granted by the laws of the Republic
of Mexico, nor shall they enjoy any other rights than those
established in favour of Mexicans. They are consequently deprived
of any rights as aliens, and under no conditions shall the
intervention of foreign diplomatic agents be permitted, in any
matter related to this contract.”
 In so far as it requires the alien to exhaust the remedies available in the
local state, the Calvo clause may be enforced as a lawful condition of the
contract. However, it may not be interpreted to deprive the alien’s state
of the right to protect or vindicate his interests in case they are made not
by him but by his own state. Thus, as held in United States (North
American Dredging Co.)

“Under the rules of international law, may an alien lawfully make such a
promise (as in embodied in the Calvo clause)? The commission holds that
he may, but at the same time holds that he cannot deprive the
government of his nation of its undoubted right of applying international
remedies to violations of international law committed to his damage.
Such government frequently has a larger interest in maintaining the
principles of international law than in recovering damage for one of its
citizens in a particular case, and manifestly such citizen cannot by
contract tie in this respect the hands of his government.”
 Exclusion of Aliens
The state may also avoid liability to aliens by refusing
their admission, but this is not regarded as sound policy
since it would provoke retaliation in kind and ultimately
isolate its nationals from the rest of the international
community. Conversely, it would not be advisable either if
the entry of aliens were allowed indiscriminately because
they might pose a danger to the welfare and especially the
security of the admitting country. Instead of banning them
altogether, therefore, or permitting their unlimited influx,
the practice of most states now is to regulate the
immigration and stay of aliens and to provide for their
deportation whenever warranted. Arrangements may also
be made, in proper cases, for the extradition of alien
fugitives.(Cruz, International Law, pp. 193-207)
 a. EXTRADITION
It is a surrender of an individual accused or convicted of a crime
by a State within whose territory he is found and his delivery to the
state where he allegedly committed crime or was convicted of a
crime.
Under Section 2 (a) of Presidential Decree No. 1069, extradition
is defined as the "removal of an accused from the Philippines with
the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to
enable the requesting state or government to hold him in connection
with any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution
of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the
requesting state or government.“
In international law, there is no duty to extradite except on the
basis of a treaty and thus subject to specific conditions
provided there. Without a treaty, extradition is left to
diplomatic negotiation between the states involved. In such
case, extradition relies on the consent of the requested state
that may be given out of comity and good relations. Generally,
State makes exception of their nationals in extradition treaties,
as the Philippines do, for example, in its extradition treaties
with Indonesia and Thailand.
Under Philippine Extradition law, it is provided that "Extradition law
may be granted only pursuant to a treaty or convention, and with a
view to:
(a) "a criminal investigation instituted by authorities of the
requesting state or government charging the accused with an
offense punishable under the laws of both requesting state or
government and the Republic of the Philippines by imprisonment
or other form of deprivation of liberty for a period stipulated in the
relevant extradition treaty or convention; or
(b) "The execution of a prison sentence imposed by a court of the
requesting state or government, with such duration as that
stipulated in the relevant extradition treaty or convection, to be
served in the jurisdiction of and as a punishment for an offense
committed by the accused within the territorial jurisdiction of the
requesting state or government" (P.D. No. 1069, Sec. 3).
Attentat clause -This is a provision in an extradition treaty which
stipulates that an attempt against, or the taking of, the life of a
head of state of the members of his/her family does not
constitute a political offense and therefore extraditable.
For example, the Extradition Treaty between the Republic of
the Philippines and the Republic of Indonesia (1976), provides in
Article V(c), as follows: "The taking or attempted taking of the
life of the Head of State or Head of Government of either of the
Contracting Parties or a member of his family shall not be
deemed to be a political crime for the purpose of this
Treaty."This is an exception to Article V(a) of the Treaty which
lays down the general rule, thus: "Extradition shall not be
granted if the crime in respect of which it is requested is
regarded by the requested Party as a political crime"(emphasis
added).
 Principle of speciality
It is a principle by which the State requesting extradition
from another State is required to specify the crime as provided
in the extradition treaty for which the fugitive or the accused is
to be extradite and to be tried only for the offense specified in
the extradition treaty.

Example of the principle of speciality from

Philippine treaty practice
In the Treaty between the Republic of the Philippines and
the Kingdom of Thailand relating to Extradition (1981) it is
provided in Article IX as a general rule that "[a] person
extradited shall not be prosecuted, sentenced or detained for
any crime committed prior to his surrender other than that for
which he was extradited."
 Double Criminality Rule
This principle requires that the crime for which extradition is sought
must be recognized as a crime by both the requesting state and the state
to which the fugitive or the accused has fled.
For example, Article 2 of the Treaty of Extradition between the
Philippines and Australia (1988) defines the extraditable offences as
including all offences which are "punishable under the Laws of both
Contracting States by imprisonment for a period of at least (1) year, or by a
more severe penalty.“
“If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification
why it should not also be allowed in extradition cases. After all, both are
administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person
detained is not in issue.” (Gov’t of Hongkong v. Olalia, GR 153675, April
19, 2007).
The decision departs from the earlier case of Mark Jimenez (US v.
Judge Puruganan, September 24, 2002) which said that bail is not available
in extradition cases.(Bernas, Introduction to PIL, p. 190)
 Procedure in Extradition Cases
This is provided in Presidential Decree No. 1069, which
prescribes "the procedure for the extradition of persons who
have committed crimes in a foreign country.
"Briefly, the procedure is as follows:
(1) The foreign state or government with which the
Philippines has extradition through the Department of Foreign
Affairs, together with a statement of facts and copies of
appropriate documents on which extradition is requested.
(2) The Secretary of Foreign Affairs transmits the request
to the Secretary of Justice, after verification as to compliance
with P.D. No. 1069 and the extradition treaty.
(3) The Secretary of Justice designates an attorney from
his office to take charge of the case, who files a petition with
the Regional Trial Court of appropriate jurisdiction.
(4) The Court summons the accused to appear and
answer the petition, and may issue a warrant of arrest.
 (5) The Court conducts a public hearing unless the accused requests a
hearing in chamber. The Department of Justice Lawyer may represent the
requesting state, unless it decides to be represented by a private counsel.
Upon conclusion of the hearing, the Court either renders a decision
granting extradition or dismisses the petition, as the evidence warrants.
(6) The decision is served on the accused, two copies of which shall be
forwarded to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs through the Secretary of
Justice.
(7) The accused may appeal to the Court of Appeals whose decision
shall be final and immediately executory.
(8) When the decision becomes final and executory the accused is
delivered at the disposal of the requesting state, at the time and place to
be determined by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs.
 Distinguished from Deportation

It differs from deportation in that it is

affected at the request of the state of origin
whereas deportation is the unilateral act of the
local state; it is based on offences generally
committed in the state of origin whereas
deportation is based on causes arising in the
local state; and it calls for the return of the
fugitive to the state of the origin whereas an
undesirable alien may be deported to a state
other than his own or the state of origin.