Linguistic Canons of

Interpretation
Ejusdem Generis – comes from the Latin
words “eiusdem,” which means “of the same” or
“belonging to the same kind” and “genus or
generis” which means “class.” The same can
likewise be spelled as “eiusdem generis p.105,
Latin for Lawyers, Lazar Emmanuel (1999)
The canon provides that “when a general word or
phrase follows a list of specifics, the general word or
phrase will be interpreted to include only items of the
same type as those listed.
For example, in the phrase horses, cattle, sheep, pigs,
goats, or any other farm animal, the general language
or any other farm animal — despite its seeming
breadth — would probably be held to include only
four-legged, hoofed mammals typically found on
farms, and thus would exclude chickens.
Otherwise stated, it is “[a] rule of construction which
states that words of general application following a
listing or enumeration of specific components of a
class of things shall be interpreted as including only
other components of the same class as those
specifically listed; e.g., in a statute prohibiting the
possession of “handguns, rifles, shotguns, pistols and
other weapons,” the words “other weapons” might
not be construed as including knives and swords.”
p.105-106 Latin for Lawyers, Lazar Emmanuel
(1999)
In simpler language, “[t]he ejusdem generis canon
applies when a drafter has tacked on a catchall
phrase at the end of an enumeration of specifics, as
in dogs, cats, horses, cattle, and other animals.”
P. 114, Reading Law, Scalia, Garner
In simpler language, “[t]he ejusdem generis canon
applies when a drafter has tacked on a catchall
phrase at the end of an enumeration of specifics, as
in dogs, cats, horses, cattle, and other animals.”
P. 114, Reading Law, Scalia, Garner
The rationale for the ejusdem generis canon is twofold: (1) when the
initial terms all belong to an obvious and readily identifiable genus,
one presumes that the speaker or writer has that category in mind
for the entire passage; and (2) when the tag along general term is
given its broadest application, it renders the prior enumeration
superfluous, e.g. If the testator really wished the devisee to receive
all his property, he could simply have said “all my property”; why
set forth a detailed enumeration and then render it all irrelevant by
the concluding phrase all other property? One avoids this
contradiction by giving the enumeration the effect of limiting the
general phrase (while still not giving the general phrase a meaning
that it will not bear).
Noscitur a sociis – comes from the latin words
“noscere,” which means “to know or be acquainted
with,” and “socius,” which means “joint, common,
associated with; a partner or companion.

It was defined in the Black’s Law Dictionary as “[a]

canon of construction holding that the meaning of
an unclear word or phrase should be determined by
the words immediately surrounding it.”
In Reading Law: Interpretation of Legal Texts, Justice
Scalia and Bryan A. Garner referred to the subject canon as the
“associated words canon” and went on to state that “[w]hen
several nouns or verbs or adjectives or adverbs—any words—are
associated in a context suggesting that the words have something in
common, they should be assigned a permissible meaning that
makes them similar. The canon especially holds that “words
grouped in a list should be given related meanings.” They likewise
added that [f]or the associated-words canon to apply, the terms
must be conjoined in such a way as to indicate that they have some
quality in common [and that] [t]he common quality suggested by a
listing should be its most general quality—the least common
denominator, so to speak—relevant to the context.
Thus, “if a statute is said to apply to “tacks, staples, nails,
brads, screws, and fasteners,” it is clear from the words
with which they are associated that the word nails does not
denote fingernails and that staples does not mean reliable
and customary food items.”
EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS
The statement of one thing or fact suggests the exclusion of
all others. The expression of one thing in a statute or
document will be interpreted to mean that another thing
which is not specifically mentioned will be excluded; e.g.,
a statute which is applicable to “doctors, nurses, nurses
aids, and other hospital employees” will be construed as
excluding the employees of nursing homes. p.124 Latin for
Lawyers, Lazar Emmanuel (1999)
CASUS OMISSUS [L. casus + omittere / to omit,
leave out].
Under the said rule, a person, object or thing omitted
from an enumeration must be held to have been
omitted intentionally.
Last Antecedent Rule - Qualifying words restrict
or modify only the words or phrases to which they
are immediately associated not those which are
distantly or remotely located.
The doctrine states that when a qualifying word or phrase is used
with a group of obligations or conditions, the qualifying words are
presumed to modify only the condition or obligation that
immediately precedes it (the “last antecedent”).

For example, Article Two of the Federal Constitution provides, “No

person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United
States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be
eligible to the Office of President.…” The phrase “at the time of the
Adoption of this Constitution” is the modifying phrase.
The doctrine further states that if a comma separates a modifying
phrase from a list of prior antecedents, then the modifying phrase
modifies each of the prior antecedents.
Conversely, if there is no comma, then the modifying phrase
modifies only the final antecedent. Thus, if a statute applied to
“dentists, nurses, and doctors in a hospital,” pursuant to the
doctrine of last antecedent, the limiting phrase “in a hospital” would
modify only “doctors” and not “dentists [and] nurses,” unless a
contrary legislative intent were found.
 
 In contrast, if the statute applied to “dentists, nurses, and doctors,
in a hospital,” the limiting phrase “in a hospital” would modify all of
the professionals because a comma separates “in a hospital” from all
three antecedents. Notice how one, simple comma can significantly
affect meaning under this doctrine.
 Importantly, this doctrine is not absolute. It is meant to be an aid to
interpretation, especially as it conflicts with general comma rules.
Lessee v. Irvine, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 425, 444 (1799). The choice to put a
comma between the qualifying phrase and the preceding list of
antecedents is grammatically optional. United States v. Bass, 404
U.S. 336, 340 n.6. (1971). For this reason, judges will ignore the
doctrine when applying it would result in an absurd result or would
make no sense.
Exception:
 
Where the intention of the law is to apply the phrase
to all antecedents embraced in the provision, the
same should be made extensive to the whole.
 
 Cadayona v. CA
G.R. No. 128772, 03 February 2000

Petitioner maintains that Administrative Circular 1-95 requires that

only copies of the award, judgment, final order or resolution
appealed from and material points of record referred in the petition
shall be certified; said circular does not require that the annexes be
certified true copies. Under the so-called doctrine of last antecedent,
the phrase "certified true copies" does not qualify the remote phrase
"other supporting papers"; the qualifier phrase "certified true
copies" only refers to the immediately succeeding phrase "such
material portions of the record as referred to therein".
We find merit in the petition. The outright dismissal of the petition
for review is a reversible error.
A decision of the Civil Service Commission may be appealed to t e
Court of Appeals under Section 6 of Rule 43,5 which provides:
"Sec. 6. Contents of the Petition. The petition or review shall
xxx
(c) be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or a
certified true copy of the award, judgment, final order or resolution
appealed from, together with certified true copies of such material
portions of the record referred to therein and other supporting
papers; and (d) contain a sworn certification against forum
shopping as provided in the last paragraph of section 2, Rule 42.
The petition shall state the specific material dates showing that it
was filed within the period fixed herein."
 The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the requirements
under Rule 43 including the contents of the petition and the
documents which should accompany the petition, is a sufficient
ground for the dismissal thereof.
Section 6 of Rule 1 states that the Rules "shall be liberally construed in
order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding." In line with
this guideline, we do not construe the above-quoted section
as imposing the requirement that all supporting papers
accompanying the petition should be certified true copies. A
comparison of this provision with the counterpart provision in Rule
42 (governing petitions for review from the RTC to the CA) would
show that under the latter, only the judgments or final orders of the
lower courts need be certified true copies or duplicate originals.
 
Also under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (governing Appeals
by Certiorari to the Supreme Court), only the judgment or final
order or resolution accompanying the petition must be a clearly
legible duplicate original or a certified true copy thereof certified by
the clerk of court of the court a quo.8 Even under Rule 65 governing
certiorari and prohibition, petitions need be accompanied by
certified true copies of the questioned judgment,9 it being sufficient
that copies of all other relevant documents should accompany the
petition. Numerous resolutions issued by this Court emphasize that
in appeals by certiorari under Rules 45 and original civil actions for
certiorari under Rule 65 in relation to Rules 46 and 56, what is
required to be a certified true copy is the copy of the questioned
judgment, final order or resolution.
No plausible reason suggests itself why a different treatment, i.e. a
stricter requirement, should be given to petitions under Rule 43,
which governs appeals from the Court of Tax Appeals and quasi-
judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals. None could have been
intended by the framers of the Rules. A contrary ruling would be too
harsh and would not promote the underlying objective of securing a
just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and
proceeding. It must be conceded that obtaining certified true copies
necessary entails additional expenses that will make litigation more
onerous to the litigants. Moreover, certified true copies are not
easily procurable and party litigants must wait for a period of time
before the certified true copies are released. At any rate, the entire
records of the case will eventually be elevated to the appellate court.
In giving due course to the petition, we note that the petitioner
substantially complied with the requirement of Section 6 since only
three (Annexes D, E and F ) out of seven annexes were not certified
true copies. 
 Mapa v. Arroyo
G.R. No. 78585, 05 July 1989

We further reject petitioner's strained and tenuous application of

the so-called doctrine of last antecedent in the interpretation of
Section 20 and, correlatively, of Section 21. He would thereby have
the enumeration of "facilities, improvements, infrastructures and
other forms of development" interpreted to mean that the
demonstrative phrase "which are offered and indicated in the
approved subdivision plans, etc." refer only to "other forms of
development" and not to "facilities, improvements and
infrastructures."
While this subserves his purpose, such bifurcation whereby the
supposed adjectival phrase is set apart from the antecedent words,
is illogical and erroneous. The complete and applicable rule is ad
proximum antecedens fiat relatio nisi impediatur sentencia. 
Relative words refer to the nearest antecedent, unless it be
prevented by the context. In the present case, the
employment of the word "and" between "facilities,
improvements, infrastructures" and "other forms of
development," far from supporting petitioner's theory,
enervates it instead since it is basic in legal hermeneutics
that "and" is not meant to separate words but is a
conjunction used to denote a joinder or union.
PD 957, SEC. 20. Time of Completion. — Every owner or developer
shall construct and provide the facilities, improvements,
infrastructures and other forms of development, including water
supply and lighting facilities, which are offered and indicated in the
approved subdivision or condominium plans, brochures,
prospectus, printed matters letters or in any form of
advertisements, within one year from the date of the issuance of the
license for the subdivision or condominium project or such other
period of time as may be fixed by the Authority.
Reddendo Singula Singulis - “rendering each to
his own.”
This canon is appropriate when a complex sentence
has multiple subjects and either multiple verbs or
objects that are incorrectly placed. “Under the canon
reddendo singula singulis, where a sentence contains
several antecedents and several consequents they are
to be read distributively. In other words, the words are
to be applied to the subjects that seem most properly
related by context and applicability.”
By “rendering,” or associating, each object or
verb to its appropriate subject, the sentence is
correctly understood.

Ex. a will provides, “I devise and bequeath my

real property and personal property to UST.”
Ex. a contract might say “for money or other
good consideration paid or given.”
City of Manila v. Laguio
It is important to distinguish the punishable activities from the
establishments themselves. That these establishments are
recognized legitimate enterprises can be gleaned from another
Section of the Code. Section 131 under the Title on Local
Government Taxation expressly mentioned proprietors or
operators of massage clinics, sauna, Turkish and Swedish baths,
hotels, motels and lodging houses as among the contractors defined
in paragraph (h) thereof. The same Section also defined amusement
as a pleasurable diversion and entertainment, synonymous to
relaxation, avocation, pastime or fun; and amusement places to
include theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses and other places
of amusement where one seeks admission to entertain oneself by
seeing or viewing the show or performances. 
Thus, it can be inferred that the Code considers these
establishments as legitimate enterprises and activities. It is well to
recall the maxim reddendo singula singulis which means that
words in different parts of a statute must be referred to their
appropriate connection, giving to each in its place, its proper force
and effect, and, if possible, rendering none of them useless or
superfluous, even if strict grammatical construction demands
otherwise. Likewise, where words under consideration appear in
different sections or are widely dispersed throughout an act the
same principle applies.
Forthrich v. Corona

In their respective motions for reconsideration, both

respondents and intervenors pray that this case be
referred to this Court en banc. They contend that
inasmuch as their earlier motions for reconsideration (of
the Decision dated April 24, 1998) were resolved by a vote
of two-two, the required number to carry a decision, i.e.,
three, was not met. Consequently, the case should be
referred to and be decided by this Court en banc, relying
on the following constitutional provision:
Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or
resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the Members
who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the
case and voted thereon, and in no case without the
concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the
required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en
banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down
by the Court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may
be modified or reversed except by the Court sitting en banc.[4]
A careful reading of the above constitutional provision, however,
reveals the intention of the framers to draw a distinction between
cases, on the one hand, and matters, on the other hand, such
that cases are decided while matters, which include motions, are
resolved. Otherwise put, the word decided must refer to cases;
while the word resolved must refer to matters, applying the rule
of reddendo singula singulis. This is true not only in the
interpretation of the above-quoted Article VIII, Section 4(3), but
also of the other provisions of the Constitution where these
words appear.[5]
With the aforesaid rule of construction in mind, it is clear
that only cases are referred to the Court en banc for
decision whenever the required number of votes is not
obtained. Conversely, the rule does not apply where, as in
this case, the required three votes is not obtained in the
resolution of a motion for reconsideration. Hence, the
second sentence of the aforequoted provision speaks only
of case and not matter. The reason is simple. The above-
quoted Article VIII, Section 4(3) pertains to the disposition
of cases by a division. 
If there is a tie in the voting, there is no decision. The only way to
dispose of the case then is to refer it to the Court en banc. On the other
hand, if a case has already been decided by the division and the losing
party files a motion for reconsideration, the failure of the division to
resolve the motion because of a tie in the voting does not leave the
case undecided. There is still the decision which must stand in view of
the failure of the members of the division to muster the necessary vote
for its reconsideration. Quite plainly, if the voting results in a tie, the
motion for reconsideration is lost. The assailed decision is not
reconsidered and must therefore be deemed affirmed. Such was the
ruling of this Court in the Resolution of November 17, 1998.
Use of the word “Shall,” “Must,” or “Ought”
Mirasol v. CA
It is basic legal construction that where words of
command such as shall, must, or ought are
employed, they are generally and ordinarily
regarded as mandatory. Thus, where, as in Rule
64, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, the word
shall is used, a mandatory duty is imposed,
which the courts ought to enforce.
lidity of a statute, or executive order or regulation, the Solicitor General shall be notified by the party attacking the statute, executive o

RULE 64, SEC. 3. Notice to Solicitor General. In any action which

involves the validity of a statute, or executive order or regulation,
the Solicitor General shall be notified by the party attacking the
statute, executive order, or regulation, and shall be entitled to be
heard upon such question.
lidity of a statute, or executive order or regulation, the Solicitor General shall be notified by the party attacking the statute, executive o

BERCES v. GUINGONA

We find that the provisions of Section 68 of R.A. No. 7160 and

Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18 are not irreconcillably
inconsistent and repugnant and the two laws must in fact be read
together.
The first sentence of Section 68 merely provides that an "appeal
shall not prevent a decision from becoming final or executory." As
worded, there is room to construe said provision as giving
discretion to the reviewing officials to stay the execution of the
appealed decision.
lidity of a statute, or executive order or regulation, the Solicitor General shall be notified by the party attacking the statute, executive o

There is nothing to infer therefrom that the reviewing

officials are deprived of the authority to order a stay of the
appealed order. If the intention of Congress was to repeal
Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18, it could have used
more direct language expressive of such intention.
lidity of a statute, or executive order or regulation, the Solicitor General shall be notified by the party attacking the statute, executive o

The execution of decisions pending appeal is procedural

and in the absence of a clear legislative intent to remove
from the reviewing officials the authority to order a stay
of execution, such authority can provided in the rules
and regulations governing the appeals of elective
officials in administrative cases.
lidity of a statute, or executive order or regulation, the Solicitor General shall be notified by the party attacking the statute, executive o

The term "shall" may be read either as mandatory or directory

depending upon a consideration of the entire provisions in which it is
found, its object and the consequences that would follow from
construing it one way or the other (cf. De Mesa v. Mencias, 18
SCRA 533 [1966]). In the case at bench, there is no basis to justify
the construction of the word as mandatory.
The Office of the President made a finding that the execution of the
decision of the Sagguniang Panlalawigan suspending respondent
Mayor from office might be prejudicial to the public interest. Thus, in
order not to disrupt the rendition of service by the mayor to the
public, a stay of the execution of the decision is in order.
lidity of a statute, or executive order or regulation, the Solicitor General shall be notified by the party attacking the statute, executive o

Adasa v. Abalos

Petitioner’s posture on a supposed exception to the mandatory

import of the word "shall" is misplaced. It is petitioner’s view that the
language of Section 12 is permissive and therefore the mandate in
Section 7 has been transformed into a matter within the discretion
of the DOJ. To support this stance, petitioner cites a portion of
Agpalo’s Statutory Construction which reads:
lidity of a statute, or executive order or regulation, the Solicitor General shall be notified by the party attacking the statute, executive o

For instance, the word "shall" in Section 2 of Republic Act 304 which
states that "banks or other financial institutions owned or controlled by
the Government shall, subject to availability of funds xxx, accept at a
discount at not more than two per centum for ten years such (backpay)
certificate" implies not a mandatory, but a discretionary, meaning
because of the phrase "subject to availability of funds." Similarly, the
word "shall" in the provision to the effect that a corporation violating the
corporation law "shall, upon such violation being proved, be dissolved by
quo warranto proceedings" has been construed as "may."1
lidity of a statute, or executive order or regulation, the Solicitor General shall be notified by the party attacking the statute, executive o

After a judicious scrutiny of the cited passage, it becomes

apparent that the same is not applicable to the provision in
1

question. In the cited passage, the word "shall" departed

from its mandatory import connotation because it was
connected to certain provisos/conditions: "subject to the
availability of funds" and "upon such violation being proved."
No such proviso/condition, however, can be found in Section
7 of the subject circular. Hence, the word "shall" retains its
mandatory import.
 Use of the word “May”

Federation of Free Workers v. Inciong

G.R. No. 48848, 11 May 1988
Although the private respondent admits that the first application was
filed beyond the 30 day reglementary period mentioned in Section 6
of the implementing rules, We believe that compliance with the said
period is merely directory. The cited provision itself employs the
word to wit. —
... Employers falling under Section 1, paragraph (1)
thereof, may apply for exemption with the Secretary of Labor within
(30) days from the effectivity of these Rules. ... (emphasis supplied.)
In In re Guarina, this Court had this to say on the proper
interpretation of the use of this word in a statute, viz-
Whether the word "may", a statute is to be construed as
mandatory and imposing a duty, or merely as permissive
and conferring discretion, is to be determined in each case
from the apparent intention of the statute as gathered
from the context, as well as from the language of the
particular provision. The question in each case is whether,
taken as a whole and viewed in the light of surrounding
circumstances, it can be said that a purpose existed on the
part of the legislator to enact a law mandatory in his
character. If it can, then it should be given a mandatory
effect; if not, then it should be given its ordinary
permissive effect. ....
It must be stressed that Presidential Decree No. 1123 did not set a deadline
within which employers may seek exemption therefrom.
While the ostensible purpose behind Presidential Decree No. 1123 is to
protect wages, incomes and employment,  the law also takes into
consideration the possibility that some private employers may not be in a
financial position to pay an increase in the monetary benefits of their
employees. Thus, the Decree allows distressed employers to seek
exemptions while in such condition and the Secretary of Labor has been
mandated to issue the pertinent rules governing the procedure by which
distressed employers can seek such exemption. The standard set by the law
to guide the Secretary in determining which employer should be so entitled
is "the interest of development and employment. The Decree, therefore,
seeks a balancing of the interests of" both employer and employee as
regards the matter of exemption, i.e., the business ought to remain viable
for the benefit of the private employer without prejudice to the pecuniary
rights of the employee.
Taking into account this purpose of the Decree, We believe that a
liberal construction of the 30-day period is in accord with that
purpose. An employer who is distressed immediately before the
lapse of the 30-day period is no different from one who
becomes distressed immediately after the said period, as in the
case of the private respondent. Both distressed employers
would certainly need the benefit of the Decree. On the basis of
the observations mentioned earlier, the Decree could not have
intended to preclude from its coverage the latter employer. The
implementing rules should echo, and not subvert, the purpose
underlying the enabling law.
Inasmuch as compliance with the 30-day period recited in Section 6
is merely permissive, the approval of applications filed beyond
the said period is addressed to the discretion of the Secretary of
Labor. On this score, the petitioner has not satisfactorily demonstrated
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent Acting Secretary in
approving the first application filed by the private respondent beyond the
30-day deadline.
 SSC v. CA
G.R. No. 152958, 27 September 2004

Rago argued that the word "may" as used in the provision

concerning the filing of a motion for reconsideration in the SSC’s
1997 Revised Rules of Procedure is not mandatory but merely
permissive. He also agreed with the conclusion of the Court of
Appeals that a very strict interpretation of procedural rules would
defeat the constitutional mandate on social justice.
We gave due course to the petition and required the parties to
submit their Memoranda, which they did.
We shall first dispose of the procedural issue of prematurity raised
by petitioners which is Rago’s failure to file a motion for
reconsideration.
Section 5, Rule VI of the SSC’s 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure provides:
The party aggrieved by the order, resolution, award or decision of the
Commission may file a motion for reconsideration thereof within fifteen
(15) days from receipt of the same. Only one motion for reconsideration
shall be allowed any party.
The filing of the motion for reconsideration shall interrupt the running of
the period to appeal, unless said motion is pro forma.
The ordinary acceptations of the terms "may" and "shall" may be resorted
to as guides in ascertaining the mandatory or directory character of
statutory provisions. As regards adjective rules in general, the term "may"
is construed as permissive and operating to confer discretion, while the
word "shall" is imperative and operating to impose a duty which may be
enforced.19 However, these are not absolute and inflexible criteria in the
vast areas of law and equity. Depending upon a consideration of the entire
provision, its nature, its object and the consequences that would follow
from construing it one way or the other, the convertibility of said terms
either as mandatory or permissive is a standard recourse in statutory
construction.20
Conformably therewith, we have consistently held that the term "may" is
indicative of a mere possibility, an opportunity or an option. The grantee
of that opportunity is vested with a right or faculty which he has the
option to exercise.21 If he chooses to exercise the right, he must comply
with the conditions attached thereto.22
Applying these guidelines, we can construe Section 5, Rule VI as granting
Rago, or any member of the System aggrieved by the SSC’s resolution, the
option of filing a motion for reconsideration which he may or may not
exercise. Should he choose to do so, he is allowed to file only one motion
for reconsideration within fifteen days from the promulgation of the
questioned resolution.
Section 1 of Rule VII of the SSC rules provides:
[A]ny order, resolution, award or decision of the Commission, in the
absence of an appeal therefrom as herein provides, shall become final and
executory fifteen (15) days after the date of notification to the parties, and
judicial review thereof shall be permitted only after any party claiming to
be aggrieved thereby has exhausted his remedies before the
Commission….
It now becomes apparent that the permissive nature of a motion for
reconsideration with the SSC must be read in conjunction with the
requirements for judicial review, or the conditions sine qua non before a
party can institute certain civil actions. A combined reading of Section 5 of
Rule VI, quoted earlier, and Section 1 of Rule VII of the SSC’s 1997
Revised Rules of Procedure reveals that the petitioners are correct in
asserting that a motion for reconsideration is mandatory in the sense that
it is a precondition to the institution of an appeal or a petition for review
before the Court of Appeals. Stated differently, while Rago certainly had
the option to file a motion for reconsideration before the SSC, it was
nevertheless mandatory that he do so if he wanted to subsequently avail of
judicial remedies.
However, we are not unmindful of the doctrine that the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies is not an ironclad rule. It may be
disregarded (1) when there is a violation of due process, (2) when the issue
involved is purely a legal question, (3) when the administrative action is
patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, (4) when there
is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned, (5) when
there is irreparable injury, (6) when the respondent is a department secretary
whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed
approval of the latter, (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative
remedies would be unreasonable, (8) when it would amount to a nullification
of a claim, (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case
proceedings, (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy, (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency
of judicial intervention,27 (12) when no administrative review is provided by
law, (13) where the rule of qualified political agency applies, and (14) when
the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered
moot.28
Fortunately for Rago, his case falls within some of these exceptions as
discussed below.
 Use of the word “Or”

People v. Martin
G.R. No. 33487, 39 SCRA 340, 31 May 1971

To be stressed at the outset is the significant repetition, in the second

paragraph above-quoted, of basic words and concepts set forth in the
first paragraph. Thus, the first paragraph begins with: "Any individual
who shall bring into or land in the Philippines or conceal or harbor any
alien ...;" the second paragraph starts with "If the individual who
brings into or lands in the Philippines or conceals or harbors any
alien ..." (emphasis supplied) Scanning section 46 in its entire context,
it is at once apparent, there being no indication to the contrary, that the
act of bringing into, the act of landing, the act of concealing, the act
of harboring, are four separate acts, each act possessing its own
distinctive, different and disparate meaning.
"Bring into" has reference to the act of placing an alien within the
territorial waters of the Philippines. "Land" refers to the act of putting
ashore an alien. "Conceal" refers to the act of hiding an alien. "Harbor"
refers to the act of giving shelter and aid to an alien. It is of course
understood that the alien brought into or landed in the Philippines, or
concealed or harbored, is an "alien not duly admitted by any immigration
officer or not lawfully entitled to enter or reside within the Philippines
under the terms of the immigration laws."
The rule is too well-settled to require any citation of authorities
that the word "or" is a disjunctive term signifying dissociation
and independence of one thing from each of the other things
enumerated unless the context requires a different
interpretation. While in the interpretation of statutes, 'or' may
read 'and' and vice versa, it is so only when the context so
requires.
A reading of section 46 above-quoted does not justify giving the word "or"
a non-disjunctive meaning.
 Guzman v. Comelec
G.R. No. 1823380, 28 August 2009

Section 261(w) of the Omnibus Election Code reads thus:

xxx
(w) Prohibition against construction of public works, delivery of
materials for public works and issuance of treasury warrants and
similar devices.- During the period of forty five days preceding a
regular election and thirty days before a special election, any person
who: (a) undertakes the construction of any public works, except for
projects or works exempted in the preceding paragraph; or (b)
issues, uses or avails of treasury warrants or any device undertaking
future delivery of money, goods or other things of value chargeable
against public funds.
 The OSG posits that the foregoing provision is violated in either of two
ways: (a) by any person who, within 45 days preceding a regular election
and 30 days before a special election, undertakes the construction of any
public works except those enumerated in the preceding paragraph; or (b)
by any person who issues, uses or avails of treasury warrants or any device
undertaking future delivery of money, goods or other things of value
chargeable against public funds within 45 days preceding a regular
election and 30 days before a special election.
• We concur with the OSG’s position.
Section 261 (w) covers not only one act but two, i.e., the act under
subparagraph (a) above and that under subparagraph (b) above. For
purposes of the prohibition, the acts are separate and distinct, considering
that Section 261(w) uses the disjunctive or to separate subparagraphs (a)
and (b). In legal hermeneutics, or is a disjunctive that expresses
an alternative or gives a choice of one among two or more
things.13 The word signifies disassociation and independence of
one thing from another thing in an enumeration. It should be
construed, as a rule, in the sense that it ordinarily implies as a
disjunctive word. According to Black, too, the word “and” can
never be read as or, or vice versa, in criminal and penal
statutes, where the rule of strict construction prevails.
Consequently, whether or not the treasury warrant in question was
intended for public works was even of no moment in determining if the
legal provision was violated.
There was a probable cause to believe that Section 261(w), subparagraph
(b), of the Omnibus Election Code was violated when City Mayor Ting and
City Treasurer Garcia issued Treasury Warrant No. 0001534514 during
the election ban period. For this reason, our conclusion that the
COMELEC en banc gravely abused its discretion in dismissing E.O. Case
No. 06-14 for lack of merit is inevitable and irrefragable.
 San Miguel Corp. V. Municipal Council
G.R. No. L-30761 July 11, 1973
Considering that the phrase "gross value in money" is followed by
the words "or actual market value", it is evident that the latter was
intended to explain and clarify the preceding phrase. For the word
"or" may be used as the equivalent of "that is to say" and
gives that which precedes it the same significance as that
which follows it. It is not always disjunctive and is sometimes
interpretative or expository of the preceding word. Certainly We
cannot assume that the phrase "or actual market value"
was a mere surplusage, for it serves to clarify and explain
the meaning and import of the preceding phrase. In any
event, it is the duty of the courts, so far reasonably practicable, to
read and interpret a statute as to give life and effect to its provisions,
so as to render it a harmonious whole.
 Use of the word “And”

CIR v. Ariete
G.R. No. 164152, 21 January 2010

It is evident from these RMOs that the CIR was consistent in using
the word "and" and has even underscored the word in RMO No. 63-
97. This denotes that in addition to the filing of the verified
information, the same should also be duly recorded in the Official
Registry Book of the BIR. The conjunctive word "and" is not
without legal significance. It means "in addition to." The
word "and," whether it is used to connect words, phrases
or full sentences, must be accepted as binding together
and as relating to one another."And" in statutory
construction implies conjunction or union.
It is sufficiently clear that for a person to be excluded from the
coverage of the VAP, the verified information must not only be filed
under Section 281 of the Tax Code, it must also be duly recorded in
the Official Registry Book of the BIR before the date of availment
under the VAP.
 Use of the Word “And/Or”

China Bank v. Members of the Board of Trustees

G.R. No. 131787, 19 May 1999

The controversy lies in the legal signification of the words "and/or".

In the instant case, the legal meaning of the words "and/or" should
be taken in its ordinary signification, i.e., "either and or"; e.g. butter
and/or eggs means butter and eggs or butter or eggs.
The term "and/or" means that effect shall be given to both the
conjunctive "and" and the disjunctive "or;" or that one word or the
other may be taken accordingly as one or the other will best
effectuate the purpose intended by the legislature as gathered from
the whole statute. The term is used to avoid a construction which by
the use of the disjunctive "or" alone will exclude the combination of
several of the alternatives or by the use of the conjunctive "and" will
exclude the efficacy of any one of the alternatives standing alone.
It is according ordinarily held that the intention of the legislature in using
the term "and/or" is that word "and" and the word "or" are to be used
interchangeably.
It is seems to us clear from the language of the enabling law that Section
19 of P.D. No. 1752, intended that an employer with a provident plan or an
employee housing plan superior to that of the fund may obtain exemption
from coverage. If the law had intended that the employee should have
both a superior provident plan and a housing plan in order to qualify for
exemption, it would have used the words "and instead of "and/or".
Notably, paragraph (a) of Section 19 requires for annual certification of
waiver or suspension, that the features of the plan or plans are superior to
the fund or continue to be so. The law obviously comtemplates that the
existence of either plan is considered as sufficient basis for the grant of an
exemption; needless to state, the concurrence of both plans is more than
sufficient. To require the existence of both plans would radically impose a
more stringent condition for waiver which was not clearly envisioned by
the basic law. By removing the disjunctive word "or" in the implementing
rules the respondent Board has exceeded its authority.