Professional Documents
Culture Documents
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Shadow Banking
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Shadow Banking
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Shadow Banking
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Shadow Banking
Debtors
Govt Clearing Hedge Funds
Banks
Loans
Tri-party
Special Purpose
Repo
Creditors Vehicles (SPFs)
ABCP
ABS
Securities
Conduits
Lenders (SLs) ABCP
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Shadow Banking
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Mehrling
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Endogenous money and
shadow banking
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Hierarchy of money
► Mehrling: distinguish money (the means of
final settlement) from credit (a promise to
pay money, or means of delaying final
settlement)
► Merhling: “What looks like money at one level
of the system looks like credit from the
standpoint of the level above.”
. . . there is no other case in which a claim
to a thing can, within limits to be sure,
serve the same purpose as the thing itself:
you cannot ride on a claim to a horse, but
you can pay with a claim to money. But
this is a strong reason for calling money
what purports to be a claim to legal
money, provided it does serve as means of
10 /
Endogenous money in Minsky
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Liability management
Asset Liabilitie
s
Reserve s
Demand
s Deposits Time
Treasuri Deposits
es Commercial
Loans Paper
13 /
Liability management
Asset Liabilitie
s
Reserve s
Deposi
s ts ABS
Treasuri Repo
es
Loans
14 /
Hierarchy of money
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The repo market
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Repo
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Three dollar money markets
► Repo market
► Fed Funds
► LIBOR
LIBOR > FedFunds > Repo (1
)
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The federal funds system
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Liquidity management
► The Fed doesn’t intervene directly in the
Federal Funds market.
► Fed regulates liquidity through repo
transactions
with primary dealers
► This leads to a distinction between market
liqidity
and funding liquidity
► Primary dealers essentially convert funding
liquidity from the Fed into market liqidity
for the banking system.
► Treasury repo rate to primary dealers has
replaced discount rate on bills of exchange
► Transmitted through arbitrage operations
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Three phases of LOLR
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private LOLR
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private LOLR
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public LOLR
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public DOLR
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Crisis
management
► So far, described the workings of the
system in “normal” times; what about in
crisis conditions?
► Repo lending involves sale and
repurchase of securities
► This price is usually lower than the
market price
and is called the haircut.
► The haircut means that the loan is
overcollateralised as insurance against
market moves and non-payment.
► We can think of this as similar to banks only
offering up to 90% loan-to-value mortgages
(although not the case pre-crisis).
31 /
Crisis
management
► Securities as collateral are marked to
market – recorded on balance sheets at
current prices
► If securities prices fall, banks may find
themselves
unable to obtain reserves
► Bagehot’s in normal times rule doesn’t
apply to profit-seeking commercial
banks.
► Banks would no longer lend to each
other in non-Treasury repo markets
► Response of Federal Reserve:
► Widened range of institutions it
would transact with
► Widened range of eligible 32 /
Mehrling’s Conclusion
33 /
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Endogenous shadow bank
expansion?
The net payments of dealers and money
funds, and those of all other actors in the
broader financial ecosystem, are settled
using demand deposits, and net deposit
flows between banks are settled via trans-
fers of reserves between banks’ reserve
accounts maintained at the central bank.
The vast majority of credit and money
claims in the ecosystem begin life as a
loan and the creation of a demand
deposit in equal amounts.
Poszar, (2014), ‘Shadow Banking: The Money
View’, pp. 9, 33.
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