Airport Security

Airport Security Outline

 Major consideration in Terminal

planning and design
 Who? What?
 History – Why?
 How?
 Airport Security Program
 “Failure of Imagination”
Terminal Design Objectives

 Walking distances
 Aesthetic design
 Services
 Security
 Cost effectiveness
Flight Interface

 Arriving passenger areas

 Security
 Departure lounges
 Corridors
 Departure Gates

All are important for different reasons,

mostly to be more efficient, make more
money…
But Security is only to protect
life/property!
Introduction

 Safety vs. Security

 Safety-freedom from unintentional
danger, etc.
 Security-freedom from intentional acts
of violence, danger, risk of injury, loss,
etc.
 Who is/are the problem?
 Terrorists
 Hijackers
 Suicide bombers
 Criminals – Inside/Outside job
Introduction
 What is the problem?
 Individual attacks to…
 Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs)
 Nuclear
 Full nuclear detonation to “dirty” bomb
 Biological
 Chemical
 Conventional weapons – large explosives
 Vehicle Born Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIED)
 Mass attacks with military weapons
 Unconventional weapons – large A/C flown into
targets…
Introduction
 Why airports?
 Vital to a stable economy
 Important to community operation
 High density of people – targets
 Very visible, high profile facilities
History of Airport Security

 FAA/TSA regs are written in

blood
 Crash/incidentNew regulations
 First hijacking - 1930 Lima, Peru
 Revolutionaries dropping leaflets
 1930s to ‘55 - Several hijackings
 Eastern Europeans seeking asylum
 1st Fatal ‘47 – Romanians killed a crew
 1955 First Major Criminal Act
 Jack Graham blew up A/C, 33 dead
Airport Security Hist. (Cont’d)
 1960 First Suicide Bomber
 Again, for a heavy life insurance
payout
 Political/public demand for baggage
inspection
 Flying down to Cuba- 1959 to
‘80s
 First hijackings to escape Cuba, then…
 Hijacking to Cuba for money or politics
 Political/public demand for Pax
screening and hijacker profiling*
 1972 – Southern Airways Flight
Airport Security Hist. (Cont’d)

 1972-Part 107 Fed Aviation

Regulations
 Screen all pax, carry-on and baggage
 All airports must:
 Identify their Air Operations Area (AOA)
 ID those areas with little/no protection against
unauthorized access due to poor infrastructure
 Create their Airport Security Plan to upgrade
their facilities to comply with current and future
regulations with a timetable and budget
estimate
 Successfully reduced security incidents
Airport Security Hist. (Cont’d)

 1980s International Incidents

USA
 1985 TWA in Lebanon – Pax murdered
 1988 Pan Am Lockerbie Scotland-all
dead
 Threats to US personnel - gaining
access through foreign security
 New US Regulations applied to foreign facilities
 Screen all pax, carry-on and baggage
 Reconcile pax/bags or “no go”
 1990s - FAA sponsored more
History of Airport Security
 September 11, 2001
 Airport Security world changed
 “Failure of Imagination” –routine
security
 ALL A/C ordered to “Land
immediately”
 @0945 over 4500 A/C IFR + 1000s VFR
 LEX tasked to create plan for 30-50 A/C
 1215 nothing but Mil A/C - unprecedented
 All regs RE:airport sec’ty/air opsTSA responsibility
 Airports begin improvised security
checklist
History of Airport Security

 9/11/20
History of Airport Security

 Aviation & Transportation

Security Act
 Transportation Security Admin (TSA)
created
 Develop/enforce new guidelines
 Title 49 CFR – Transportation
 All regs RE:airport sec’ty/air opsTSA responsibility
 2003 US Dept. of Homeland Security
(DHS)
 TSA/USCG/Customs/INS combined
Airport Security Program

 TSA is responsible for Airport

Security
 Main source for planning/design
guidelines
 Air Operations Area (AOA)
 Secure Area
 Sterile area
 Security Identification Display
Area (SIDA)
 Exclusive Area
Airport Security Program

 Security Identification Display

Pier/Finger Terminal
Security @Commercial Airports

 Passenger Screening
 Baggage Screening
 Employee Identification
 Perimeter Security
Passenger Screening

 Major changes/overhaul since

9/11
 Since 2003 managed/operated by
TSA
 Prior by Airlines under FAA regulation
 Significant impacts on planning/design
 Continuously reviewed and evolving
 Facilities/Equipment include:
 Automatic process: magnetometer,
explosive trace detection, body
scanning, biometrics, etc
Passenger Screening

 Typical Passenger Screening

Layout
Baggage Screening

 Since 2003, every bag screened

 “100% EDS rule”, Explosive Detection
System
 Like a CT scan
 Magnetometer
 Greatly complicates baggage handling
 Usual solution – Automation (LEX)
 1st in Lobbies, then moved behind counters
 Search areas “blast resistant”
 Baggage Screening

 Initial
Standalone
Screening in
lobbies-  Inline
exposed Screening
Employee Identification

 All personnel in the Security

Identification Display Area
(SIDA):
 Must have criminal background
check/OK
 Trained in facilities and security issues
 Prominently display SIDA badge at all
times
 SIDA Facilities/Equipment needs:
 Secure defined perimeter
 Automatic electronic controls
Perimeter Security

 Airport Security Plan must have

a defined perimeter
 Perimeter fencing
 AC 107 Aviation Security--Airports
 Controlled access gates
 Kept to a minimum
 Security lighting
 PSO patrols
 NOT routine
Vulnerability Assessment

 Important for planning and

design
 ID where security enhancements are
needed
 Intro security issues early in design
 Wide range of
threats/vulnerabilities
 Threat-anything that may cause harm
 Vulnerability-anything the bad guys
can take advantage of to carry out a
threat
Vulnerability Assessment

 Flow
diagra
m
Special Design Issues
 TSA controls most Security
Design…
 TSA used to post links on website for
design
 Mark Day – Must have need to know &
get OK
 Blast Resistant Design/Mitigation
 Glazing and screens
 Structure – harden columns, blast
walls, etc.
 Mimimize “progressive collapse”
 Blast Analysis Plan (BAP)
Special Design Issues
 Security Facilities
 Fencing, gates, controls, CCTV, TSA
areas, road barriers, vehicle inspection
areas, etc
 Joint Military Facilities
 Coordinating force protection with TSA
 Avoid “Security Theater”
 Countermeasures to provide the
“feeling” of security…but do little or
nothing to achieve it
 Sometimes perception is beneficial but…
 Actual benefits very debatable
Special Construction Issues

 All personnel get criminal

background checks before access
approval
 Security during construction
 Workers can’t go sightseeing! Areas
off-limits!
 Security of classified equipment
 Fencing, gates, controls, CCTV, etc.
 TSA screening areas
 Only cleared workers handle the
installation
Special Security Issues

 Presidential/US VIP visit

 Secure Ramp/buildings/
 Detailed access to your info
 Shut down
airspace/terminal/roads/comm
 Foreign VIP visit
 Queen of England
 Emir of UAE and family
 Con Air
 Federal/International prisoner
exchange
Security at GA Airports

 TSA has not required the same

level of security effort at GA
airports…but…
 Encourage GA airports to
develop their own security
initiatives
 Like Commercial Airports
 Awareness programs
 Reporting methods
 Develop security plans similar to
commercial
Future Security
 Changing/Increasing
securityNorm
 Keep up with TSA/FAA regulation
changes
 Airport/perimeter security technology
changes
 Cannot completely eliminate
threats
 Continuous vulnerability assessment
 Watch the news
 Criminals/terrorists are copycats AND
innovators
Airport Security

 Questions?
Airport Security

 References, Links
• http://www.bluegrassairport.com/
• http://www.faa.gov/
• http://www.boeing.com/boeing/
• http://www.aaae.org/
• R. Horonjeff, F. McKelvey. Planning & Design of Airports. McGraw-Hill, New York, 2010
• TSA. Recommended Security Guidelines for Airport Planning, Design and Construction. 2006
• R. Souleyrette. CE 633 Lectures
• John Cassel, majordadjohn@msn.com
• Mark Day, MDay@bluegrassairport.com
• *-
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