Cognizable Habeas

Corpus Claims
 Cognizable Habeas Corpus Claims
• By statute, federal courts may “entertain an application for a
writ of habeas corpus [o]n behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground
that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States” 28 U.S.C. 2254(a)
• That means, in general, a prisoner can obtain habeas relief
only by showing a prejudicial constitutional defect in his state
criminal conviction/trial/sentence
• Stone gives us a limited (yet broad) exception: erroneous
admission of evidence in violation of the Fourth Amendment is
not cognizable in post-conviction review
 Cognizable Habeas Corpus Claims
• It seems like the Stone Court is applying a kind of
cost/benefit analysis (without being so explicit), to refashion
the judge-made exclusionary rule
• The exception is limited, because the Court has not returned
to this guilt-based v. process-based distinction in scope of
habeas; so, know that there’s basically a Fourth Amendment
exception to the ability to obtain habeas corpus relief
• We can probably understand Stone as a result of discomfort
with (1) the exclusionary rule itself; (2) fears over a flood of
habeas petitions; and (3) need to protect federalism/finality
 Cognizable Habeas Corpus Claims
• If Stone suggests that guilt/innocence claims are the most
important, then Herrera may seem confounding and concerning;
why wouldn’t a claim of “actual innocence” be cognizable?
• Herrera holds that for non-capital offenses, no freestanding
“actual innocence” claim; Court reserves question whether the 8A
and 14A prohibit execution of someone who is actually innocent
• Justice Scalia’s view (and potentially the Court’s view now):
nothing in text, history, or contemporary practice that permits
reopening of conviction/judicial consideration of innocence after
trial/appeal
• ”Innocence” is relevant to excuse a procedural default/defect
where relief is sought on other grounds