BURMA CAMPAIGN 1941-45

(WWII)

Lt COL SUBASH KHADKA

CO
SHREE BISHNU DAL BN
 SEQUENCE

• Background of the conflict

• Turning the tide in Burma

• The Battle of Irrawaddy Shore

• The Rangoon Race and the last Battle
• Analysis of the Campaign

• Brief Introduction to FM SLIM

 INTRODUCTION
• One of the longest Campaign in WWII

• Provided a common rallying point ag Imperial

Japanese Army

• Acid Test of operational art and leadership in

large theater, Intermittent weather,
inhospitable terrain, meager resources
BURMA
• Area: 676552 Sq Km

• IB: India, China, Laos,

Thailand, (Bangladesh)

• Geography: Central
Lowland covered by hills
sea level to 5870m

• Climate: Semi Tropical

with long monsoon
HILL RANGES
•NAGA
HILLS(Gamlang Razi)
•CHIN HILLS
•ARAKAN YOMAS
•SHAN HILLS
•KAREN HILLS
•DAWNA RANGE
MAJOR RIVERS

SALWEEN

SITTANG

IRRAWADDY

CHINDWIN
COMMUNICATION NETWORK
• Rangoon-Mandalay RLY
• NO Roads to India
• Comns with SIAM Restd
• River Traffic on
Irrawaddy
• Airfds: Dimapur, Palel,
Imphal
• Calcutta Dimapur 600
miles
 WEATHER
• Tropical Climate
• North East Monsoon(Dec to April) and South West
Monsoon (June to September)
• Hot humid summer
• Average raifall 32-200 inches per year
• Flooding

-https://ww2db.com/country/Burma
DEMOGRAPHY
BURMESE

SHANS KARENS

CHINS KACHINS
 STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF BURMA

• Main inland route to China

• Link Between ASEAN and South Asia

• Raw materials, Oil and Mineral resources

• Gateway to India
 Why was Burma Important to Japan?
• The Japanese having blocked the China coast wanted to cutoff
Burma road which is a major land route connecting China.
• The capture of Burma would provide Japan a strategic shield
and defensive circle to fight away from homeland.
• The oil fields of Yenang Yavng and Chauk could be of
industrial importance.
• The capture of Burma would creat political instability to india.
They expected Indian National Army lead by Netaji subash
Chandra Boss to fight Britain backed by the Japanese Army.
• The rice production, tungsten, timber, Rubber, tin and other
raw materials was also cause of economic importance of
Burma.
 Why was Burma Important to Allies?

• Oil and mineral resources

• Sea and Air communication with Malaya and

Singapore.
• Protect the flk of their main attk against malaya.

• Protection of British India

 BRITISH COLONIZATION(1826-1942)

• First Anglo Burma War 1826: Arakan and

Tenassarim annexed by Brit India
• Second Anglo Burma war 1852: Remainder of
lower Burma taken by Brit
• Third Anglo Burma war 1885: Upper Burma
Annexed
• Entire country as a province of British rule in
India
 BURMA COMMAND

• Burma under Far Eastern Command based in

Singapore
• 1942: Burma under ABDACOM command
(American British Dutch Australian)
• Aug 1943: SEAC South East Asia Command
under Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten
 JAPANESE OCCUPATION (1942-1944)

• January 1942, Japanese 15th Army under Lt

Gen Shojiro Lida launched offensive from
Southern Burma
• 17th Indian Div lost 2 Bde and compelled to
fall back.
• On the Eastern front, Chinese 6th Army
shattered causing the collapse of allied defense
• Fall of Rangoon in March 1942
 JAPANESE OCCUPATION
• Operational defeat, Burmese insurgency, civil
administrative break down, cut off of all
supplies forced allies evacuation from Burma

• Heavy casualty, considerable no of sickness,

loss of tremendous weapons, equipment,
transport
FAILURE OF ALLIED OFFENSIVE (1942-1943)
• Failure of offensive in Arakan state intended to
occupy Mayu Peninsula and Akyab island.
• Failure of First Arakan Campaign Dec 1942-
May 1943
• Withdraw of First Chendit Expedition 8 Feb
1943- June 1943, Limited success by long range
penetration unit Chindits in 'ops Longcloth' to
disrupt railway in central Burma but suffered
hvy casualty, no significant effects
 SITUATION IN 1943
• Whole of burma under Japanese control

• Japanese had fairly high air superiority

TURNING OF THE TIDE
 ORBAT
• 14th Army,Comila under Gen Slim
• IV CORPS under Lt Gen Scoones
• 15th Army under Lt Gen
– 17th Div: MG Cowan,Chin Hills Mutaguchi
– 20th Div: MG Gracey,Palel Tamu Area
– 23rd Div:MG Ouvry Roberts Imphal (Striking – 15th Div
Force)
– 50 Para Bde: N of Imphal
– 31st Div: MG Sato
– 245 Tk Bde – 33rd Div: MG Yamamoto,S
• Brit: Lee Grants Tks
• Indian: Stuarts kabaw valley
• 33rd Corps under Lt Gen Stopford
– 5th Indian Div: Arakan
– I.N.A Div
– 7th Indian Div( to arrive later) – 1x Tk Regt
– 2nd British Div (Planned Relief for 7th Div)
– 3 Special Svc Bde • Aim: Capture Imphal and
– 23 LRP Bde
• Loc: Assam break thr Bramhaputra Valley
• Aim: Adv and recapture of Burma
 FOUR PHASES OF THE BATTLE
• Phase I: concentration in which each side maneuvered its forces to
gain positional advantage over their opponent.

• Phase II: Attrition fight as each side strived to wear his opponent
down.

• Phase III: Counter-offensive, in which the 14 Army succeeded in

wearing down its opponents and began their own offensive.

• Phase IV: Pursuit period where the Japanese began withdrawing

from the Imphal plain and the 14 Army pursued them into Burma.
TURNING THE TIDE
(KOHIMA, IMPHAL & THE RETREAT OF IJA)

Lt COL SUBASH KHADKA

CO
SHREE BISHNU DAL BN
TURNING THE TIDE
(KOHIMA, IMPHAL & THE RETREAT OF IJA)

Lt COL SUBASH KHADKA

CO
SHREE BISHNU DAL BN
TURNING THE TIDE
(KOHIMA, IMPHAL & THE RETREAT OF IJA)
JAPANESE CASUALTIES

Lt COL SUBASH KHADKA

CO
SHREE BISHNU DAL BN
 MAJOR EVENTS
• Japanese offensive began 6 March 1944
• Japanese 214 Regt, 33rd Div attks detachment in
Tonzang, rft by 63rd Bde
• 13 March, Japanese infiltration from South to Tiddim
• Hasty wdl of 17th Div starts covered by RAF. Div cut
off, Dilemma of using reserve. 2 Bde rft fm 23 Div.
• 16th March, Gurkha troops stormed and captured the
23
saddle near Milestone 109 camp.
• 17th Div reached Imphal on 5th April.
20
• 17 March, after a 3 days severe fight fwd tps of 20 th
Div fell back on Tamu, Div Wdl using successive 17
posn starts
• Ambush and first 3 prisoners by 20th Div
• 32 bde from 20th Div withdrawn as Corps Res
 MAJOR EVENTS
• Visit to Dimapur and Imphal amid
threats of cut off
• Replacement of Lt Gen Scoones by
Maj Gen Ranking in March
• Japanese 31st Div appch Kohima,
dilemma to wdl or rft, rft with 161 Bde 23

• Threat of attk to Dimapur, 161 Bde bck

20
to Nichugard Pass, 8 miles SE of
Dimapur 17

• Reports of Dimapur attk prove untrue

(Surprise)
• 161 Bde bck to Kohima,
• Rft by 33 Indian Corps
 PROGRESS
• Attrition
• Plan to Regain Burma by overland adv by
North( Japanese domination of Indian Ocean and
lack of naval resources for allies)
• Tasks
– To re estb comm between Dimapur and Imphal
– To Clear Japanese from Dimapur-Kohima-Imphal-Yuwa-
Tamanthi
– To be prepared to exploit across the Chindwin in Yuwa-
Tamanthi A
 PROGRESS
• Early July, 7th Div Attk Urkhrul fm W & N, 20th Div Closed in
fm S & SE, 23 L.R.P. Bde cut escape route to the E

• After suffering hvy loss, Japanese 15th and 31st Div on retreat
to Chindwin

• 23rd Div on Tamu rd(20 miles front) rft with 5 Bde of 2nd Div,
33rd Corps

• 24 July, 23rd div offensive on Japanese posn, Tamu reoccupied

 NEW ORBAT
• 14th Army • 15th Army under Lt Gen
• 33rd Corps ,Lt Gen Mutaguchi
Stopford – 15th Div
– 5th Indian Div – 18th Div
– 7th Indian Div – 31st Div: MG Sato
– 2nd British Div – 33rd Div
– 23rd Div: Replaced by – 55th Div
11th East African Div,
MG Fowkes
– 23 LRP Bde
Troops of 11th East African Division on the road to Kalewa, Burma, during the
Chindwin River crossing.
http://ww2today.com/featured/burma-britains-longest-campaign-of-world-war-ii
 ALLIED OFFENSIVE
• 4 August 1944, 33rd Corps took over the front, IV Corps
returned to India
• 11th East African Div under Maj Gen Fowkes joins the front to
replace 23rd Div
• 6 Aug, Lt Gen Stopford, in ctrl of all ops in central front tasked
as
– To persue the en with not less than a bde gp in
• Imphal-Tiddim-Kalemyo-Kalewa
• Tamu-Kalewa
• Tamu-Sittang
– To Occupy Sittang and deny Chindwin to en shipping
– To seize Kalewa and estb brhd, on oppurtunity
 ALLIED OFFENSIVE
• Monsoon had already statred and rate of adv was slow
• 27 Sept, first serious resistance in Kabaw valley was
cleared by 26 Bde of 11 East African Div with high
Japanese casualties
• 5th Div on adv on Tiddim road S of Imphal, encounter
Japanese beats with high casualty
• 300 dead,18 prisoners, 33 machine gun and over 200
lorries
• 5th Div dependent on air drop for supplies due to lack of
road
 ALLIED OFFENSIVE
• Battle on kennedy peak(8800ft), highest pt on
Tiddim Kalemo Rd
• several days fighting, two wide turning movt
by 2 bdes, 3rd Bde estb Rd block, RAF and
USAAF bombing, resistance crumbled and
peak achieved on 4 Nov.
• Japanese:1316 Killed, 53 POW
• Allies: 88 Killed, 293 wounded, 22 missing
 RESULT
• Japanese Army suffered the greatest defeat in
the history
• 5 Japanese Div rendered ineffective
• 50,000 killed (Loss of around 75,000), 600
POW
• loss of 14th Army: Approx 40,000
 BATTLE OF IRRAWADDY SHORE
 
"The qualities most required for river crossing
are stability and cheerfulness"

Sir William Slim

 BATTLE OF IRRAWADDY SHORE
• “We had learned how to kill Japanese........how to build roads
and airfields with little equipment and strange materials. Our
troops had shown themselves steadier, more offensive, and
better trained than ever before. They did not now accept any
country as impassable, either for the enemy or themselves …
Our troops had proved themselves in battle the superiors of the
Japanese; they had seen them run … They had smashed for ever
the legend of the invincibility of the Japanese Army. Neither our
men nor the Japanese soldier himself believed in it any longer.”

– FM Slim
 ORBAT
• 14th Army • 28th Corps under Gen
• IV CORPS
– 7th Div Kimura
– 17th Div – 54th Div
– 255 Tk Bde
– Lushai Bde
– 55th Div
• 33rd Corps – 72nd Mobile Bde
– 2nd Div
– 19th Div
• 15th Corps
– 20th Div – 15th Div
– 254 Tk Bde
– 31st Div
– 268 Indian Motor Bde
• 5th Div (reserve) – 33rd Div
 MAJOR INCIDENTS
• IV Corps to switch from rt to lt flank and cross Irrawaddy
near Pakokku and seize Japanese Comnn center at Meiktila
• 33rd Corps to continue advance to Mandalay
• Japanese concentrated on important crossing points and
held the res well back
• Japanese initiative to send number of suicide squads across
the river to disrupt Allies prep
• 14th Jan: 1X Bn crossed the river
• 16/17th : Main crossing
• 19th Jan: 64 Bde crossed to reach East bank
 MAJOR INCIDENTS
• 4 knots of water current and medium en
opposition

• Crossed at several points using

DUKWs(Modified 2.5 T Trucks) and
FBE(Folding Boat Equipment) with OBM

• Operation proved successful with great surprise

 ALLIED OFFENSIVE
• 24 Nov, estb bridgehead, crossed Chindwin R
in tarpaulin rafts in ni,
• 11 Dec, Engr completed a floating bailey br
(1154 ft) in Chindwin , then the longest in the
world
• Imphal Kohima battle, last and greatest of the
series
 MAJOR INCIDENTS
• Japanese Prepared to meet threat at Mandalay
• 7th Div launched decisive surprise thrust at
Meiktila
• Japanese deceived on the true intention and
main thrust planned by Slim
• Japanese rigidness and inability to react to
changing condition provided allies great
victory
• Battle of Meiktila – Mandalay, as part of Field Marshal Slim’s
Fourteenth Army offensive into Burma during World War II. Slim’s
strategy was to first cross the lrrawaddy River North of Mandalay
with 33 Corps and lock the Japanese in battle, thus convincing
them that this was his main thrust. Meanwhile, 4 Corps would
secretly march along the Gangaw valley southwards, cross the
lrrawaddy where least expected by the Japanese, and then strike
East towards Meiktila, a key communication centre located deep in
the enemy’s rear .The march of 4 corps involved moving along 480
km of difficult terrain which was a logistician’s nightmare.
However, total surprise was achieved and the Japanese were
thrown off balance.
 CAUSES OF ALLIED VICTORY
• As per overall plan of 4 corps, 17 Division was moved from the
north to south which misled the Japanese and thereby achieved
surprise.

• Japanese continued to believe that the main thrust will be on

Mandalay and accordingly concentrated bulk of the forces there.
There by there was not enough troops to deal with Nyaungu
crossing.
 
• General Kimura's failure to judge Allied intention due to poor
intelligence.
 
• Speed and rapidity of General Kowan's force i.e. maximum use of
mobility.
 CAUSES OF ALLIED VICTORY
• By planning a simultaneous attack from three directions with
63 Brigade from south-west, 48 Brigade from north and 255
Tank Brigade from north, north-east and east. Coordinated use
of armour 255 Tk bde crumbled the def of Meitkila

• Japanese continued to employ the reserve force in piecemeal

which could be easily defeated by the Allied. Kumira
committed reserves prematurely to stop 19 and 20 division
Bridgehead.
 
• Japanese left large inter formation gaps which were selected
by the Allied forces as their crossing points.
 
 CAUSES OF ALLIED VICTORY

• Due priority was not given by the Japanese for

the protection of the administrative and
logistic base in Meiktila.
 
• Air superiority of Allied force dominated the
Japanese movement.
THE RANGOON RACE
AND THE LAST BATTLE
CENTRAL BURMA TO RANGOON

• ALLIED PLANS.
– 4 CORPS WITH 5 AND 17 IND DIV, 255 TK BDETO ADV
ALONG RD MEIKTILA- TOUNGOO- PEGU– RANGOON.
– 33 CORPS WITH 7 & 17 IND DIV TO FORM THE
SUBSIDARY THRUST TO ADV ALONGRIVER IRRAWADDY
RD MEIKTILA-PROME -RANGOON.
– 15 CORPS TO CLEAR ARAKAN TO PREVENT JAPANESE
RFTS TO CENTRAL BURMA & CAPTURE AIR BASES TO SUP
THE MAIN THRUST.
– OP DRACULA. A SIMULTANEOUS AMPHIBIOUS ATTK
BY 26 IND DIV OPS TO CAPTURE RANGOON.
SUPPLEMENTED BY ASSUALT ON ELEPHANT PORT BY A
PARA BN
 RACE TO RANGOON
It was a race
against two
masters……
the en & the
monsoons
 RACE TO RANGOON
• VITAL TO CAPTURE RANGOON BEFORE ONSET OF MONSOON TO
AVOID A LGS CRISIS.

• D DAY FOR THE AMPHIBIOUS OPS WAS 02 MAY.

 FACTORS AFFECTING THE CAMPAIGN

• Environmental factors: Effects of weather,

disease and terrain (more casualty from
disease than battle casualty)
• Lack of communication network (Ltd ntwk N
to S)
• Politically complex
• Involvement of multiple diverse troops
• Prolonged campaign
 PRINCIPLES OF WAR
• SELECTION & MAINT OF AIM: Cont offensive to reconquest Burma
• MAINT OF MORALE: Relief of tps, leaders at front, strengthened lgs
• OFFN ACTION: Luring the en into ground of own choice
• CONC OF FORCE: Timely rft, dispersed frmn to conc divs, superior
• SURPRISE: Crossing or Irrawaddy R, Hiding own intention
• SECURITY: All measures for the sy of tps, epts and supplies
• FLEXIBILITY: Timely adaptation with battlefd progress
• COOP: Betn services, arms, formations and units
• ADM: Improvisation, air supply, medical units co locates
• ECONOMY OF EFFORT: Forgotten theater with meager resources
 PRINCIPLES OF WAR & LESSONS
LEARNT
• BRITISH RETREAT FROM BURMA IN 1942.
– THE NECESSITY OF UNIFIED COMD.

– THE IMP OF PROPER TRG & EQPT.

– IMP OF INT & PROPAGANDA.

– NEED OF AIR SUPERIORITY.

 PRINCIPLES OF WAR &
LESSONS LEARNT
• JAPANESE OFFN OF 1944.
– DISREGARD OF HIGHER CDR’S
AIM.
– INADEQUATE ADM BACKING.

– LACK OF FLEXIBILITY & COORD.

 JAPANESE TACTICS
• Infiltration and envelopment
• Surprise by Jap Troops, movt by ni sighting
lack of air superiority, surprise of divisional
infiltration
• Light armed and self sustained up to 15 days
 Allies strategy in reln to Principle of war
• UNity of Effort: Air and army HQ colacated to produce an effect,
effective air sp for the wdl of 17th Div
• judicious use of res from 23 Div: 2 Bde rft from to 17 Div in Tiddim
• initiative of cdr, mobilisation of force, understanding of the situation
• Meticulous operational as well as logistic plan eg thousands of
evacuation of non combatant from Assam
• Battle of attrition, luring en to the ground of own choive, exhausting
and destroying them
• Surprise factor during crossing of Irrawaddy R
• Simple plan, offensive spirit, element of surprise
 ALLIED TRAINING
• Behind the fwd camp, two trg div set up jungle warfare
school
• experienced men from the front provided essential
training and skills focused on defeating Japanese
tactics and techniques
• Continued training within earshots of the battlefd in
the front
• Rotation system of the divisions in the frontline and
reserve provided excellent result in training and morale
 WEAKNESSES
• Misunderstanding of en main thrust and early
movt of res:
– Compensated by the Move of 5 Div fm Arakan to
Imphal
• Underestimate of Japanese offensive at Kohima
• Hasty wdl of 17th Div from Tiddim
• Little training of troops
• New tps lacked experience
 STRENGTH
• Smooth co ordination and rapid redeployment
and employment of Divs
• Air for sp, supply and transport, 3rd Tactical air
Force co located with 14th Army HQ
 ANALYSIS OF THE ALLIED OPS
Outstanding was the fact that our troops were either exhausted,
browned off or both, and that both Indian and British troops did not
have their hearts in the campaign. The former were obviously scared of
the Jap and generally demoralised by the nature of the campaign...the
latter also fear the jungle, hate the country and see no object in fighting
for it, and also have the strong feeling that they are taking part in a
forgotten campaign in which no one is taking any real interest.

-Rpt from a British Liaison officer in Burma

(After failure of 1st Arakan ops, May 1943)
 ANALYSIS OF THE ALLIED OPS
• [Slim] realised that the success of any campaign he might have
to fight in this underdeveloped labyrinth of mountains, rivers
and jungle - without roads, railways or airfields - must depend
on four factors: training, supply, transport and, above all,
morale. And it was on these problems, ever present during that
important period the 'Approach to Battle', that he concentrated
all his energy immediately on his arrival to take command.

- Lt.-Gen. Sir Geoffrey Evans, Slim as MilitaryCommander

(London: Batsford 1969)p.106.
 ANALYSIS OF THE JAPANESE OPS
• Fighting capability of Japanese troops deteriorated considerably in 1943-1944
• Troops were tired and exhausted during long ops
• Higher in Command control, morale, fighting spirit and resilience.
• 'Most of the Japanese operations in 1944-45 appear rather unimaginative in
their planning and tactics. However, the Japanese soldier still showed an
extreme disregard for death in both attack and defense'- Rottman, Gordon L.
“Japanese Army in World War II – The South Pacific and New Guinea, 1942-
43”
• Lack of flexibility and adaptiveness on part of leadership of Japanese army.
Field Marshal Slim credits Major-General Sato of the Japanese 31st Division
as the most unenterprising commander in the field.

• Lack of timely and right decision and lack of innovativeness

 LESSON LEARNT
• Role of Air supply in harsh terrain
• Detailed logistics planning and resolute
leadership key in operational success
 Relevance For Modern Ops
• Close and overlapping relation between the tactical,
operational and strategic level
• Exploiting the enemy's critical vulnerability and attk on en's
center of gravity (Supply line, command and control nodes, air
support etc)
• Unity of Command ensures continuity of effort, Simple
command relation to mitigate tremendous challenges
• Interdependency of operational and logistic plan/ Joint plan
required
• Role of air mobility for exploiting decisive results
 LESSONS LEARNT
Strategic Level:
• Conflicting aim of the participating countries
– Japan: Securing the western flank, Isolation of China
– British: Burma's liberation low on priority, defense
of England paramount
– US: Tie down Japanese within Asia, def of HUMP
Route
• Evolution of Land Air Cooperation
 LESSONS LEARNT
Operational:

• Reorg of command, SEAC with 14th Army as land component

• Improvement of mixed tpt structure in Div, 56 mules added to 1st
echelon of 7th Div
• Training, estb of jungle warfare school at Comilla, 15-day short
courses in patrolling, field craft, minor tactics, estb of
roadblocks and living off the land
• Def in Box to counter en 'Hook' tactics
• Air force can be effectively used in jungles for transportation of
supply and troops either by dropping or by creating airstrips.
 LESSONS LEARNT
• Improvisation:
Jute parachutes instead of silk, modification of jeep to fit in
rail wheel, amphibious modification of truck (DUKW)
 LESSONS LEARNT
TACTICAL:

• Morale and motivation drive troops and will to fight.

• Leadership and faith of the men wins war.

• Superiority of force is essential for success.

• There are no non-combatants in jungle warfare. Every unit and

subunit, including medical ones is responsible for its own all-
around protection, including patrolling, at all times.
 LESSONS LEARNT
 
• Motivate soldiers by first focusing on their personal needs and
then, always ending by instilling in them that they had the
capacity to destroy their opponent.

• The presence of the Army commander had to inspire any

soldier to push forward, when he may have felt he could not
push any further.

• Improvisation and use of local resources is a most in every

nature of warfare and in all kinds of terrain.
CONCLUSION
 Battle of Admin Box
General.
• Field Marshal Slim facing logistic problems when he took the command
• He went all out to solve those.
• Out of limited resources he organised an admin area, known as ADMIN BOX.
Location and Description.
• sited at the eastern side of the Ngakyedauk pass, 4 miles SW of Sinzweya.
• an area approx 1200 yards square.
• surrounded and over looked by high, steep hills, densely covered with jungle,
• an attacker can not approach very close without warning.
• In the centre there was a small scrub covered hill around which a large dump of
ammo of all natures was kept hidden.
• In the other parts of the area were stocks of supplies, Ordnance and Engineers store.
It had Vehicle Park and a Main Dressing Centre.
• mainly defended by cooks, clerks and the admin troops.
The Battle.
• prepared to sp the future Allied offensive on the Arakan front.
• Japanese launched Op Ha-GO prior to that and intended to forestall any Allied
offensive in that sector.
• Sakurai launched a lighting attk and cut the Allied 7 Div from the rear by 5 Feb 44.
• Japanese carried only 10 days ration and primarily relied on the capture of the
Admin Box to force an Allied wdr and to meet up own admin needs to continue ops.
• But Admin Box was well prep and Japanese could never succeed in capturing this
 SEAC
SEAC or SE Asian Comd

• formed to integrate the war effort of all Allied forces in the SE Asian region.
• In the Quebec conference in Aug 1942 it was decided that a separate comd should
be created to control operations of allied forces in South East Asia.
• areas include Burma, Ceylon, Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, Siam and Indo-China.
• The Commander-in-Chief of India can concentrate on trg and org of the Indian Army.
• The suggested composition was that the commander was a British with an American
Deputy and an integrated Anglo-American Staff. The Supreme commander receiving
instructions direct from the British Chiefs of Staff at London.
• Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten was appointed supreme commander, and
• Lieutenant General Stilwell of the US Army later selected as his Deputy.
• On 16 November 1943 that Admiral Mountbatten assumed his comd
• Admiral Sir James Somerville as Naval Commander-in-Chief,
• General George Giffard as Commander-in-Chief 11 Army Group, and
• Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Peirse as Air Commander-in-Chief.
 Hump Route

• The route used by American Air Force over the Himalayas to sp the offensive of
Chinese forces against the Japanese during the 2nd World War came to be known as
‘Hump Route”.
• With the fall of SE Asia and the whole Burma, all sup to the Chinese were stopped
as the old Burma Rd which linked China with Burma fell to the Japanese.
• The air route over the Himalayan range was called Hump route because of the high
mountains which looked like Hump.
• This route was dangerous because of its high altitude of about 2,300 feet and
adverse climatic conditions almost throughout the yr.
• But the American Air Commando Gp and the allied forces kept on sup the forces of
Chiang-Kai-Shek and Stilwell in China.
• The offensive on China front was kept alive due to regular log sp through this route.
• All sup were shipped to Calcutta from where those used to be sent by train to
Dimapur through Assam valley.
• From Dimapur, they used to be air tpt through the hump Route to Chinese Yunan
province.
 Op CAPITAL
• After Imphal and Kohima Operation Capital was planned to destroy the Japanese
Force on the Shwebo Plain, north and north-west of Mandalay by Allied superior armr
supported by air. Once the Allied had crossed R Chindwin, the Japanese withdrew
rapidly and readjusted as strong position on the shore of the R Irrawaddy. General
Slim promptly redesigned and adopted his plan as “Operation Extended Capital”.
• The purpose of the plan was to approach Mandalay from two entirely different
directions while deceiving the Japanese as to the real intention.
a. Cross Irrawaddy in considerable strength through its length.
b. Fight major battle in the plains around Mandalay and in low hills of Meiktila.
c. Cross river at more than one place and deceive the enemy about the real one
making him to employ his reserve prematurely and off Balance him to attack
Meiktila.
3. Accordingly his tac plan was as fol:
a. 33 Corps was to begin the op before 4 Corps. First they would secure a brH
over the Irrawaddy to the north of Mandaly to commit Jap res there. Then the main
xing would take place at SW of Mandalay and at the same time 4 Corps would also
strike further south at Meiktila.
b. 4 Corps to move secretly under a well laid deception plan (Op CLOAK) down
the Gangaw valley and mount a sudden, overpowering aslt over the Irrawaddy at
Nyaungu, south of Pakokku and push an armd strike force through Meiktila and
Thazi. The capture of this focal comm area, with its dumps and airfds, would severe
the lifeline of Jap 15 and 33 Armies.
 HAMMER AND ANVIL PLAN
Intro.
• The Japanese fell back after Kohima. Slim's original plan was to crush Kimura's force
under op Capital at Shwebo plain, between the river Chindwin and Irrawaddy with
deployment of Allied superior armr in one hand Kimura would be trapped against the
river line (Irrawaddy) at the back on the other hand.
• Gen Kimura appreciated the grd, sit and intention of FM Slim, ordered his force to
withdraw and redeploy along the eastern bank of Irrawaddy line around Mandalay.
• This change forced FM Slim to alter his plan codenamed as "OP EXTENDED
CAPITAL''. This new plan had a strong flavour of Hammer and Anvil tac.

Concept/Intention of the Plan. T

• Intention to destroy main Japanese forces in central Burma between Mandalay and
Meiktila Thazi.
• Meiktila was the main administrative centre of Japans 15th and 33rd Armies.
• capture Meiktila while Kimura was deeply engaged along the Irrawaddy about
Mandaly, en would be compelled to detach large forces to clear his vital
communication centre, only at grave peril to his Irrawaddy line.

Conlc. Gen Kimura though could correctly appreciate the grd and sit initially, but failed
to study Slim's intention during the conduct of op. As a result Japanese were
measurably deceived and were crushed by Allied hammer.
 HAMMER AND ANVIL PLAN

Basis of the Plan.

• based on 33 corps, with 19 Div transferred to it, forcing Xing of the Irrawaddy in the
north and west of Mandalay, thus drawing towards itself the greatest possible
concentration of Japanese (General Kimura's) divisions and give every indication that
Manadaly was 14 Army's sole objective.
• Meanwhile 4 Corps, moving secretly south up the Gangway valley, would suddenly
appear at Pokokku, seize a crossing site and without pause, strike violently with
armour and air borne forces at Meiktila.
• This would set the stage for a major battle to crush the Japanese by the hammer of
33 Corps from north and the anvil established by 4 Corps at Meiktila in the south.
 HAMMER AND ANVIL PLAN

Deceptive Measures.
a. A dummy 4 Corps HQ were substituted at Tamu for the real one when it moved
out.
b. 19 Division was transferred from 4 Corps to 33 Corps.
c. Advance of 4 Corps was led by 28 East African Brigade to indicate the presence
of 11 East African Division.
d. The real 4 Corps was to keep wireless silence until control of operations in
Gangway Valley necessitated breaking it.
e. Sherman tk of 255 tk bde was camouflaged to depict Lee tk of 254 tk bde with
view to prove the presence of 33 Corps in the south.
f. 2x feint crossing was made.
g. Mov of Lushi bde through Gangway valley was to simulate diversionary attk.
h. Indiscriminate conversations in clear between staff officers and wireless
operators were arranged.
j. Inaccurate statements were made over radio and newspapers to mislead Jap.
k. Volume of traffic was made to conform to have both the Corps conc in the
Shwebo plain.
 LONG RANGE PENETRATION GROUP (LRPG)

Gen.
• 2nd Chindit was a force organized by Gen Wingate in an unconventional role by
establishing strongholds in the triangle Mogaung ‑ Rail Indaw ‑ Bhamo for striking
against 18th Japanese Division and its communication network.
• This special force was also popularly known as LRPG.
• 2nd Chindit consists of six Brigades (23,000 men), supported by Number-1 Air
Commando. The expedition started on 5 February 44 and ended on 27 August 44.
Theory of LRP.
a. Basic theory is that fmn can op in jungle covered terr behind en lines for an
indefinite pd if sup by air.
b. A single fighting man in en’s heart is more than 100 tps in the front.
c. Should op in small colm but large enough to inflict a hy blow to en’s L of C.
d. Should be small enough to evade when outnumbered by en.
e. Suitable if pop is not hostile.
f. Suitable for impassable terr.
g. Depth depends on air sup capability.
h. Own L of C will be unhindered because it will not have any land comm.
j. Wrls will be the only means of comm with outside world.
 LONG RANGE PENETRATION GROUP (LRPG)

Tac Concept of the Op. The overall aim or tac concept of Chindit op can be
summarised as fol:
a. To pen deep inside Japanese held terr and cut off en L of C. This would delay
en attks and allow more time for allied prep of def.
b. To solve the mystery of what was happening on the ‘other side of the hill’.
c. To destroy the myth of impen jungles of Burma and invincible Jap.
d. To raise morale of the Allied tps.
Tasks of LRPG. Fol tasks were given to chindits:
a. To sp stillwell’s adv.
b. To create a favourable sit for the adv of Chinese expeditionary force from
Yunan.
e. To inflict max confusion, damage and losses to the en.
Achivements and Failure.
• Differences of opinion about the success of this force in Burma.
• the result was significant, but not profitable in terms of investment.
• Wingate’s LRPG proved that given proper trg and motivation, physically tough and
mentally alert sldrs can fight under all adverse conditions.
• It also served as a great propaganda tools to raise the morale of the Allied forces in
the Burma theatre and break the Japanese myth in their minds.
 Merrill's Marauders
Gen.
• In the 2nd World War, many unorthodox units were raised for spl purposes.
• "Merrill's Marauders" was one such force, named after its Comd Brig F D Merrill.
• He was a fine courageous ldr and always seen inspiring confidence in his men.
Emp of Merrils Marauders.
• It was composed of 3 American Bns of LRP Gp, trained in India under Maj Gen
Wingate.
• Gen Stilwell used American Marauders in short hooks to strike in behind the
Japanese.
• Helped in driving Chinese Army southwards,
During Burma Campaign.
• As per Stilwell's plan to get Myitkyina before the monsoon, Merrill was given 3 mixed
bdes (having each bn of American Marauder joined by 2 Chinese bns).
• On 28 Apr 44, they set out and xing about 100 miles through wildest mountainous
jungles completing in 16 days and capturing Myitkyina airfield in great surprise to the
Japanese, who retreated to the town.
• The Japanese then quickly reinforced the town, to great disappointment of Stilwell .
Ultimate Fate of Merril’s Marauders.
• Unfortunately Merrill had collapsed soon after his arrival at Myitkyina
• His replacement could not do well for his inexperience and unaccustomed to strain of
actual comd in the fd.
 Reconquest of BURMA
133. On 30 Mar 45 : 4 Corps began its adv down the longest and narrowest sailent known in
warefare from Meiktila to Pyabwe, which was the key to the Jap def on the main foute to Rangoon.
134. The Plan envisaged 17 Ind Div exerting pressure on Pyawbe from west and north. While 255
Tank Bde launched the main attk from the west and souty.
135. 17 Ind Div was ordered by Gen Meiserky to by pass the strong held village of Yindaw which was
a covering posn for Pyabe.
136. On 10 April after a highly coordinated attk by air armour and inf Pyabe was captured scattering
33 Jap army and causing about 1000 casualties.
137. On 9 April, the TK Bde cut the rd Pyabe-Rangoon.
138. On 16 April, Shwemyo was captured by to mechanised Bde of 5 Ind Div and strong Jap Bde
defended sector was (Shwemyo Bluff) was outflanked by a Bde of 5 Ind Div.
139. By 21 April 45, the airfield at Lewe was captured as also Pyinmana where Gen Honda Goc 33 Jap
army just escaped capture.
140. By 24 April 45, Tungoo airfields was captured and being only 160 miles from Rangoon. On the
first day of the capture 100 Dokotas landed and took off from the airfield.
141. By 25 April 45, Inf Div was secured the far side of R. Pyu.
142. Within 21 day of capture of Meiktila 4 corps had advanced 170 miles and inflicted 5000
casualties on retreating Jap.
143. On 22 April 45, 7 Ind Div captured Yenagyau town. This was the escape route the Peguyomas.
144. On 2 May – Prome was captured. Thus the last escape route of the Japs in Arakan was close as
Prome an important river port or the R Irrawaddy. On 3 March, the monsoon broke.
 
Field Marshal
William Slim
1891-1970
 "Leadership is the projection of
personality. It is that combination of
persuasion, compulsion and example
that makes other people do what you
want them to do"

Field Marshal Slim

 BACKGROUND
• Born in middle class family in Bristol, United
Kingdom on 6th August 1891
• Started education at 16 from King Edward’s
School in Birmingham, England
• Started as enlisted from British reserve in 1912
• August 4, 1914 became a Second Lieutenant
• Fought and wounded in Gallipoli
• On return to England, commissioned in West
India Regiment
 INTRODUCTION
• British military commander and the 13th
Governor-General of Australia.
• Served several campaigns, notably Gallipoli and
Mesopotamia , in world War I.
• Joined the Indian Army, rising in rank to
Brigadier in 1940
• Commanded British forces in Sudan in 1940
• Led a division in Iran and Iraq in 1941
• Went to Burma as corps commander and led the
14th British Army from 1943-45
 BACKGROUND
• Awarded the Military Cross for gallantry as a
Company Commander fighting in Battle of
Mesopotamia during capturing Baghdad
• WIA and evacuated to India
• 1926, graduate of Indian staff College at
Quetta
• Commanded 2nd Battalion, 7th Gurkha Rifles
 BACKGROUND
• Churchill initially opposed his appointment to
comd 14th army considering him as 'Sepoy
General'

• Heroic Leadership: Amid the battle of Imphal,

slim flown to Dimapur and Imphal amid
threats of Japanese Cut off
 LEADERSHIP QUALITIES

Communication
Slim’s ability to communicate one overriding
theme to his Soldiers. This theme was that his
forces had one single task and that was the
complete destruction of the Japanese Army. Slim
communicated this to his soldiers during the initial
days of his command. During these early days, it
proved to have a significant positive impact on
morale and sparked enthusiasm for training.
 LEADERSHIP QUALITIES

Decision Making
• His decision to fight the Japanese in the favorable terrain of the Imphal
plain played to his strengths of mechanized maneuver and combat aircraft
firepower.
 
• Slim’s decision was to continue to fight the Japanese during the monsoon
season of 1944. By continuing to press the fight, Slim was able to
maintain contact with his enemy and keep the initiative.
 
• His decision to attack enemy forces in both Mandalay and Meiktila
proved to be decisive in the reconquest of Burma. The commitment of the
reserve (5 Div to 4 Corps) gave Slim the additional combat power needed
to stop the Japanese counterattack and begin the race to Rangoon.
 LEADERSHIP QUALITIES

Motivation
• During the reconquest of Burma, Slim was literally there
every step of the way. Slim motivated Soldiers by first
focusing on their personal needs and then, always ending
by instilling in them the capacity to destroy their opponent.
• "A man must believe that what his organization is working
for, is worthy of all the labors and sacrifice he may be
called upon to give that it has a great and vitally necessary
object a noble object if you like".
-Slim
 LEADERSHIP QUALITIES

Planning and Preparation

• Slim focused on the health, supply and morale of
his unit from the initial days of his command.
•  
• In particular, Slim believed that the areas of
supply and transport would decide his unit’s
success
• throughout the rest of the campaign.
 OTHER QUALITIES
• Meticulous planning, Foresight and
imagination
• Staffs and junior cdrs given enough flexibility
and authority to implement the provided tasks
• Slim's control of the battle and overall
leadership major factor for success in Burma
 OTHER QUALITIES
• Integrity, Responsibility

"Like so many generals when plans have gone wrong,

I could find plenty of excuses, but only one reason -
Myself".
When writing about the `Battle of Gallabat', where he was considered extremely
unlucky and the battle ended in a tac failure, Slim characteristically accepted the entire
blame for the failure.

Geoffrey Evans, Slim as a Military Commander, Dehra dun, India: Natraj Publishers,
1977), P. 42.
 LEADERSHIP PRINCIPLES 

(a)Know your job.

(b) Know yourself & strive for self-improvement.
(c)Know your men & attend to their welfare.
(d) Keep your men informed.
(e)Set the examples.
(f) Ensure the accomplishment of the tasks.
(g) Train the men as a team. (Fight as a team & win as a team).
(h) Accept responsibility for your actions.
(i) Make sound & timely decisions.
(j) Seek responsibility yourself & subordinates.
(k) Employ your command according to its capabilities.
 Leadership Traits
 
(a) Alertness. (k) Sympathy.
(b) Bearing. (l) Enthusiasm.
(c) Courage. (m) Unselfishness.
(d) Decisiveness. (n) Justice.
(e) Dependability.(o) Integrity.
(f) Endurance. (p) Knowledge
(g) Sense if humor. (q) Loyalty.
(h) Tact. (r) Force.
(i) Judgment.(s) Intelligence.
(j) Initiative.
 CONTRIBUTIONS
• Provided Practical bridge to the theory of “Indirect Approach”

• Enhanced the Unity of Command for all the forces involved in

the Battle.

• Shattered the myth of Japanese invincibility that had for so

long crippled the Allied cause.

• Success of Burma Campaign. Tied down tens of thousands of

Japanese troops in Burma that could have been otherwise
redeployed.

• Served as a Governor General of Australia

 CONCLUSION

One of the Generals in WWII who was knocked

out of the ring at the begining but got back in
and beat his opponent back.
 Tips for SC PREP
• Do not be a collectomaniac
• Be social
• Time mgmt (Prep and during exam)
• take no stress & Do not panic during the exam
• Use of all avail means (Audio,Video, Pics, Graphics,
Visualization)
• Be logical, avoid being howwler
• No Shortcut- Hard Work/Smart Work
• Group Learning, avoid Isolation
 THANK YOU

• subash.khadka123@gmail.com
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