Exxonmobil Refinery Explosion,

Torrance,California,USA 18 Feb 2015

By G.Naga Charan Sai

EXXONMOBIL CORPORATION 
The Exxon Mobil Corporation (ExxonMobil) was
formed on November 30, 1999 as a merger between
Mobil Oil Corporation and Exxon .ExxonMobil operates
five refineries within the United States with a total
combined capacity of approximately 1,857,500
barrels per day (bpd).ExxonMobil also explores for oil
and gas deposits.
Google Earth image of Torrance refinery and surrounding community
Schematic of ExxonMobil Torrance Refinery FCC unit
 What Happened ?
On Wednesday, February 18, 2015,
an explosion occurred in the
ExxonMobil Torrance, California
refinery’s Electrostatic Precipitator
(ESP), a pollution control device in
the fluid catalytic cracking (FCC) unit
that removes catalyst particles using
charged plates that produce sparks—
potential ignition sources—during
normal operation. The incident
occurred when ExxonMobil was
attempting to isolate equipment for
maintenance while the unit was in an
idled mode of operation;
preparations for the maintenance
activity caused a pressure deviation
that allowed hydrocarbons to
backflow through the process and
ignite in the ESP. 
Damage to the ESP from the explosion.
MAJOR TAKEAWAYS
*It is essential to identify and define safe operating limits for
all modes of operation.
*It is important to consider all modes of operation—including
non-routine operations such as unit standby— when performing
process hazard analyses.
*Robust management of change practices are needed when
making changes to procedures.
*Control valves typically should not be used as block valves
because fluid flow through a partially open control valve can
cause damage to the valve that can limit its ability to fully
seal.
*Uncombusted hydrocarbons that are not accompanied by
carbon monoxide have the potential to reach FCC unit
electrostatic precipitators (ESPs). 
*Refining companies should evaluate their FCC units to
determine whether there are sufficient safeguards to prevent
an ESP hydrocarbon explosion.
CONCLUSION 
This incident was preventable; weaknesses
in the ExxonMobil Torrance refinery’s
process safety management program led to
a hydrocarbon backflow in the FCC unit and
ignition in the ESP. ExxonMobil did not
develop a procedure specifically for
operating in Safe Park that established safe
operating limits and the process conditions
that required unit shutdown.
THANK YOU