FORMISM

Formism
Formist believes that every room has a story to tell.
Every space expresses the soul of the people who live
and work there. They tell us who we are, what we
love, our interests and aspirations. It’s these stories
that capture our imagination and inspire us to bring
them to life through colour, shape and beautiful
design.
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• question here is of generating such a work in a
given stylesimply by indicating—to the architecture
generation machine—that we prefer style X (for
example, over styles Y or Z). The machine would
then generate an architectural work in styleX—no
matter the region or historical timeframe in which
the work is located, or the purpose towhich that
• work will be put.Could we ever reach this stage of
automation, where context and utility are irrelevant
torealizing expressive character, architect’s intent is
not the source of such character, and
machinessuffice to autonomously produce stylistic
features? Might we ever generate, or even invent,
stylethrough automation? Assuming sufficient
computational capacities on the part of
machines,could we 2
• even identify the elements and parameters that
would make such generation or invention possible?
The greatest apparent obstacle to suggesting that
we could pick out machine-readable building blocks
and rules of style lies in the traditional aesthetics
theories of style. According tothe going theories,
style is in one way or another to be understood in
• terms of personal or groupexpression—perhaps, as
one variant theory has it, in such ways as
differentiate works of oneartist (or group thereof)
from those of others. One interpretation of this last
variant theory saysthat (1) style is the mark
of particular individuals’ or groups’ expressive
thinking, hence (2) theremust be an aspect of such
thinking special to the individual or group wedded to
the particular human spirit attached to said style—
and (3) so much so, that it cannot be reduced to
formal,easily replicable rudiments.
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Thus, only Le Corbusier could have designed the
Ronchamp Chapel because the underlying stylewas
his alone.The contrary view—that aesthetic style in
architecture and other artistic media can be
produced and reproduced by the successful
manipulation of rudimentary forms corresponding to
particular styles—may be taken to be a
• formalist
• Architectural forms.
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• Here I focus on theformalist prospect that we could
account for architectural style by reference to the
universe of forms that architects have (or could
have) deployed in their works, plus adequate rules
for usingthose forms.To defend this view, I first
consider what I take to be the leading argument to
thecontrary, developed by Igor Douven. He argues
that the hysical notion of a particular kind of causal
relationship,
• formalist has to be wrong because thereis, in his
view, no plausible way for (a) formal qualities (and
the rules to manipulate them) tomodel the causal
relationships with (b) stylistic characteristics of an
artwork that we wouldexpect to hold between (a)
and (b) qualities or characteristics if form were the
key to graspingstyle. Douven’s argument is built on
his interpretation of a central metap
 supervenience
• , and the application of that notion to the present issue, as
well as his claim that styles serve as unique identifiers of
individual aestheticsensibilities among artists (including, in
our discussion, architects). His reasoning, in short, isthat at a
minimum the formalist needs to assume that changes among
stylistic characteristics of an artwork require or depend on
changes among its formal features, and this is not so, as
other,environmental changes can produce changes in the
identifying function linked to the artwork’sstyle, with
concomitant changes for what we think of as that work’s
style. I argue that thisreasoning is flawed because Douven’s
identity (‘unique identifier’) theory of style isunsupportable,
as is particularly evident in architecture—and because we
can make do with aweaker sort of supervenience
relationship to
particularly evident in architecture—and because we
can make do with aweaker sort of supervenience
relationship to account for the way form underpins
style, inarchitecture (and, perhaps, in other
artforms).In addition to undermining Douven’s view of
the supervenience relationship, I also offer a positive,
style-related reason to embrace formalism. Some kind
of formalism must be correct, I propose, because real,
human architects are able to generate and invent
styles, often, if notalways, by drawing on banks of
existing stylistic elements and parameters. Putting
aside the possibility of machine-generated style, we
have no problem accepting that people have this
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account for the way form underpins style,
inarchitecture (and, perhaps, in other artforms).In
addition to undermining Douven’s view of the
supervenience relationship, I also offer a positive,
style-related reason to embrace formalism. Some
kind of formalism must be correct, I propose, because
real, human architects are able to generate and
invent styles, often, if notalways, by drawing on banks
of existing stylistic elements and parameters. Putting
aside the possibility of machine-generated style, we
have no problem accepting that people have this
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•END
• Milagros poul
• Mekdes abay
• Nuhamin sisay
• Rajen alemayew
• Netsanet tsegaye