Professional Documents
Culture Documents
C. Munguma
Africa University
2020
Introduction
The interests driving US policy to conclude FTAs are many but stronger
protection of Intellectual Property Rights forms the central theme.
The Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002, directs USTR to seek to
“ensure that the provisions of any multilateral or bilateral trade agreement
governing intellectual property rights that is entered into by the United
States reflect[s] a standard of protection similar to that found in
United States law.”
The US has preferred the route of FTAs compared as to BITs.
Expanding the domain of TRIPS through
bilateral FTAs:
During the TRIPS negotiation (1986 -1993) US suggested that if developing
countries agreed to TRIPS, it would consider easing off negotiating
intellectual Property standards bilaterally and avoid using Special 301.
However, this tool was increasingly used which resulted in signing of more
bilateral agreement related to Intellectual Property.
The predominant focus on IPR in the bilateral FTAs can also be explained
by the strong resistance met by US at the TRIPS council.
Filing of a law suit in 1999 by US backed South African pharmaceutical
industry association against the South African Medicine Act which allowed
access to generics. See the Treatment Campaign case in SA.
“The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health”
According to the Declaration “the Agreement can and should be interpreted and
implemented in a manner supportive of WTO Members rights to protect public
health, and in particular, to promote access to medicines for all.”
The Declaration reaffirmed the rights of member countries to use all the public
interest safeguards in TRIPS, including compulsory licensing and parallel
importation.
In August 2003, the WTO members agreed to lift TRIPS restriction on
compulsory licensing for export of generic medicines to countries which lacked
the manufacturing capacity.
The Trade Promotion Authority Ac(t TPA) Act passed by US Congress in
August 2002 directed the USTR to respect and adhere to the Doha Declaration
in US trade negotiation.
TRIPS PLUS Provisions pertaining to patents
and access to medicine
The provisions which are TRIPS Plus and a recurrent theme in the
bilateral FTAs are the ones which are relevant to the following: -
Provisions which require patent extension beyond the period provided for
in the TRIPS Agreement and linking it to the delay in granting of patent
and marketing approval;
Provisions which delay approval of generic drugs by putting limitations on
compulsory licensing or
there may be no specific provisions governing the use of compulsory
licensing but other provisions of the FTA may effectively restrict its use
by member countries;
TRIPS PLUS Provisions pertaining to patents
and access to medicine.....
Article 16.7 (8) states that: "Where a Party provides for the grant of a patent
on the basis of an examination of the invention conducted in another country,
that Party, at the request of the patent owner, may extend the term of a patent
for up to five years to compensate for the unreasonable delay that may occur
in the issuance of the patent granted by such other country where that
country has extended the patent term based on such delay.”
Similar provisions exist in US Morocco FTA, US Bahrain FTA, CAFTA and
in the proposed Andean agreement
Effect of Patent extension and
Comparison with US Law
Such provisions can delay access to low cost generic drugs and would result
in longer patent terms in the developing countries than in the US.
Adequate checks exist in the US law to limit the length of any patent
extension such as provided under 35 U.S.C Section156 such as the total life
of a patent from the time of marketing approval cannot exceed 14 years, that
only one five year extension is permitted; the extension applies to only one
patent per product.
No such system exists in the developing countries.
Compulsory Licensing under the TRIPS
Agreement:
US-Chile FTA
There are no specific provisions governing the use of compulsory license but
other provisions of the FTA effectively restrict its use by member countries.
Provisions relating to protection of test data and those preventing generic
companies to obtain marketing approval during the patent term
US Singapore FTA
Article 16.7(6) of the IP Chapter limits the use of compulsory licensing to
remedy anti-competitive behaviour, in cases of public non commercial use or
in case of a national emergency. -
Examples......
US CHILE FTA:
Provides for five year test data protection for pharmaceutical products using
“new chemical entity”.
A disclosure of test data by the government is permissible only for the public
interest but cannot be used for the purpose of granting regulatory approval.
During the mandatory five year period, the Parties would not be able to use
compulsory licensing as the generic companies cannot obtain marketing
approval unless they run the tests for the product themselves.
Example....
US Singapore FTA
Article 16.8(1),(2),(3) are TRIPS plus as it provides test data protection to
pharmaceutical products rather than new chemical entities.
During the test data protection period of five years it would not be possible
for parties to use CL.
Provides protection not only to test data submitted in the Singapore or US,
but also to similar data submitted in other countries.
Such a provision would prevent generic companies from using originator
test data submitted else where and circumvention of test data protection at
home.
CAFTA:
Provisions are toughest as they offer up to ten years of protection to
originator drugs from generic competition even in the absence of patent
protection.
The parties are required under Article 15.10 to protect test data for five years
submitted to regulatory authorities anywhere in the world. “The company
which owns the original test data then has five years in which to apply for
regulatory approval in CAFTA countries.”
The company upon receiving marketing approval in CAFTA countries
enjoys another five years of test data protection depending on its decision to
enter CAFTA .
Effect of Data Exclusivity Provisions
Developing countries would have to wait longer than the United States to
access cheaper medicines.
Since the pharmaceutical companies usually seek approval of their
products in developed countries, therefore, the period of market
exclusivity will expire in US before it expires in the developing countries.
Few countries like Chile have tried to rectify the situation in their FTAs
with US such as requiring pharmaceutical companies to seek approval of
new drug soon after receiving approval in the United States.
Learning the art of negotiations
In case of US-Jordan FTA, the later saw an increase in its export from
$31 million in 1999 to $673 million in 2003 and the and figure
crossed $800 million in 2004.
The Jump in Jordan’s exports attributed to the “qualifying industrial
zones”
This boom in Jordan’s export is expected to be further reduced by the
fact that Egypt, Israel and the United States signed a partial free-trade
agreement pact in December 2004.
Tough competition offered by China and India in textiles after the end
Multi-fibre Agreement (MFA) and textile quotas is another challenge.
Erosion of preferences
Preferential market access to US is time bound and will erode as a result
of reduction in tariffs and quotas by the US under the multilateral trade or
by more FTAs that US is in the process of negotiating.
Chile which despite having an FTA will see the elimination of benefits
obtained by Chilean exporters of grapes and wine to US because of the
US Australian FTA.
In the US Chile FTA, the duties on imports of Chilean wines to US will
be reduced to zero in 12 years time, where as the US Australia FTA will
eliminate tariffs in eleven years.
Similar concerns have been expressed by Middle Eastern countries as US
in its FTA rush may be shifting trade away from its allies in the war on
terror.
Erosion of preferences ......