Professional Documents
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© Pierre-Richard Agénor
The World Bank
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Growth, External Debt, and Adjustment
The Debt Overhang and the Debt Laffer Curve
Measuring the Debt Burden
Debt Rescheduling
The HIPC Debt Initiative
2
Debt crisis of early 1980s had severe impact in
developing countries.
Closure of world capital markets led to inflationary
financing of fiscal deficits, a slowdown in
investment, and low rates of economic growth.
Servicing external debt continues to be a key
concern for policymakers in low-income countries.
Has led to a variety of proposals aimed at ensuring
that debt burden does not hamper capital formation
and growth.
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Growth, External Debt,
and Adjustment
4
High foreign debt levels’ adverse impact on
savings, investment, and growth.
Illustrating the dynamics: An extension of Villanueva
(1994).
National income, Q, given by,
Q = Y - r*D*,
r*: cost of borrowing,
D*: stock of external debt.
5
National income per unit of effective labor, q, is then,
q = k - r*d*,
y = k: intensive form Cobb-Douglas production
function;
d* = D*/AL.
Foreign saving, S*, equals changes in net external
debt,
.
D * = S* (4)
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Domestic saving, S, equals Sp + Sg with,
Sp = s(1 - )Q
Sg = Y - G.
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Domestic investment, financed by foreign and domestic savings,
. .*
K + K - D = S (9)
Labor, grows exogenously,
.
L/L = (10)
8
Following Villanueva’s learning-by-doing, labor
efficiency,
.
A = (K/L) + A, > 0.
(10) implies growth rate in efficiency units is given by,
. .
A/A + L/L = k + + (11).
9
Change in foreign debt; dependent on difference
between, r (k-1 - ) and r*;
.
D*/D* = (k-1 - - r*), > 0
10
Using (9), the change in the capital-effective labor
ratio is given by,
.*
. (Sp + Sg) - K + D
k= - [k + ( + )]k
AL
Model composes a system of two differential
equations in d* and k. See Figure 16.1 for graphical
solution.
Figure 16.2.
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Figure 16.1
Foreign Debt and the Capital-Effective Labor Ratio:
Long-Run Equilibrium
D
k
A
K
B
E
~
k
~
d* d* 12
Figure 16.2
Growth, Foreign Debt, and Fiscal Adjustment
D
k
E'
E
~
k
~
d* d*
13
Implications:
Fiscal adjustment reduces foreign debt burden and
14
The Debt Overhang
and the Debt Laffer Curve
15
Medium-term uncertainty associated with heavy
external debt burden can have adverse effects on
domestic investment--a phenomenon that the
model did not capture.
Helpman (1989), Krugman (1988), and Sachs
(1989): beyond a certain point, external debt levels
act as a marginal tax on investment; fraction of
return on capital goes towards paying back
creditors.
Debt overhang: when expected repayment on
foreign debt falls short of its contractual value.
16
Illustrating debt overhang:
Consider an economy with current debt, D*, that must
R = min(D*, Y - Cmin).
Production function given by,
D* > YL - Cmin
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Debt Laffer curve
Relates a country’s nominal debt obligations to the
expectations).
Laffer curve drawn as a straight line up until a point
for V.
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Figure 16.3
The Debt Laffer Curve
Zero probability
of default
E
45º
0 D* D
reduction in the debt tax rate would increase debt
servicing.
Froot and Krugman (1989):
Tried to estimate debt Laffer curve for 35 countries.
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Found that in 5 of the 12 low-income countries, high
debt-to-export ratios placed them on the wrong side
of Laffer curves.
Two problems with results:
Cannot be used when there is no secondary market
for debt.
Classens (1990), observed debt Laffer curves, while
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Deshpande (1997):
Examined investment experience of 13 highly
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Eliminating debt overhang and capital formation renewal
Debt relief beneficial to creditors, if increase in market
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Measuring the Debt Burden
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Debt Ratios
Conventional measures:
Stock of debt to output; debt stock can be a
misleading proxy, as it neglects both the duration
and interest rates on debt.
Actual debt service to exports; a measure of a
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Debt ratios that capture fiscal impact
Two conventional measures that capture fiscal
government expenditure.
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Alternative measures:
Comparing present value of debt obligations against
sustainable.
30
Three weaknesses of indicators:
Data requirements complex; considerable uncertainty
risk profile.
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Observed ratios
In many countries, conditions have worsened:
In HIPC countries, external debt reaches $207 billion
1995.
Ratio of actual debt service payments to exports was
17% in 1995.
Ratio of actual debt service to government revenues
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Figure 16.4a
Total External Debt Service
(In percent of GDP)
1980 1995
Africa Asia
Benin Bangladesh
Burundi India
Cameroon
Indonesia
Côte d'Ivoire
Korea
Ethiopia
Gabon Malaysia
Ghana Nepal
Kenya
Pakistan
Malawi
Philippines
Nigeria
Sri Lanka
Tanzania
Zimbabwe Thailand
0 5 10 15 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1980 1995
Argentina Algeria
Bolivia Egypt
Brazil
Jordan
Chile
Mauritania
Colombia
Costa Rica Morocco
Ecuador Oman
Jamaica Syria
Mexico
Tunisia
Peru
Turkey
Uruguay
Venezuela Yemen
0 5 10 15 20 0 2 4 6 8 10 12
1980 1995
Africa Asia
Benin Bangladesh
Burundi India
Cameroon
Indonesia
Côte d'Ivoire
Korea
Ethiopia
Gabon Malaysia
Ghana Nepal
Kenya Pakistan
Malawi
Philippines
Nigeria
Sri Lanka
Tanzania
Zimbabwe Thailand
0 10 20 30 40 50 0 10 20 30 40 50
1980 1995
Argentina Algeria
Bolivia Egypt
Brazil
Jordan
Chile
Mauritania
Colombia
Costa Rica Morocco
Ecuador Oman
Jamaica
Syria
Mexico
Tunisia
Peru
Turkey
Uruguay
Venezuela Yemen
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 0 10 20 30 40 50
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Source: United Nations.
Figure 16.7a
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries:
Debt to Exports Ratio and Per Capita GDP Growth Rate 1/
(In percent)
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
0
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Per capita real GDP growth rate (1985-94)
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Figure 16.7b
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries:
Debt to Exports Ratio and Per Capita GDP Growth Rate 1/
(In percent)
1,200
1,000
800
600
400
200
0
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Per capita real GDP growth rate (1985-94)
40
Paid debt service/exports of goods and services
30
20
10
0
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Per capita real GDP growth rate
by,
A: domestic absorption;
NT: net transfer respeipts from abroad;
i*: interest rate on foreign liabilities.
This yields,
D* = (1 + i*)D-1* - Z
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Z: net external surplus, the trade balance plus net
Setting d* = D*/ Y, z = Z/Y and g: constant growth
rate of output, and applying the no ponzi game
condition,
1 + g
d0*
h=1
(
1 + i*
)
h
zh (23)
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Debt Rescheduling
43
Two approaches to debt repayment (see Kletzer, 1988)
Ability-to-pay approach:
required debt service exceeds debt servicing capacity;
in general a solvency rather than liquidity problem.
Willingness-to-pay approach.
stock-of-debt reschedulings.
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Toronto terms:
From October 1988-June 1991, terms of concessions
45
London terms:
December 1991-December 1994; 50% reduction in
NPV terms.
Naples terms:
Since January 1995, terms of concessions as outlined
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The HIPC Debt Initiative
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For HIPCs, multilateral debt a large fraction of total
external debt, about 31% at the end of 1996, 42%
for bilateral official creditors and 12% for private
creditors.
HIPC Debt Initiative: joint World Bank-IMF
proposal, September, 1996:
addresses debt owed to multilateral official
creditors;
requires countries to show a track record of good
policy performance as monitored by the IMF and
the Bank;
6-year performance period, two stages of
implementation.
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First Stage:
Initial 3-year period; debtor country must establish
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Eligibility:
Debt sustainability analysis determines
eligibility and amount of debt relief based on
following criteria:
ratio of NPV of debt-to-export ratio between 200-
completion point;
various measures of vulnerability;
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